

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

**V.I. LENIN**  
**SELECTED WORKS**  
**IN THREE VOLUMES**

**1**



ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА-ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КПСС

**В. И. ЛЕНИН**

**ИЗБРАННЫЕ ПРОИЗВЕДЕНИЯ**

**В ТРЕХ ТОМАХ**

ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ

МОСКВА



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# V. I. LENIN

## SELECTED WORKS

IN THREE VOLUMES

1



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## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

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В. И. ЛЕНИН  
ИЗБРАННЫЕ ПРОИЗВЕДЕНИЯ

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## CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i> . . . . .	11
KARL MARX. <i>A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism</i>	15
<i>Preface</i> . . . . .	15
The Marxist Doctrine . . . . .	19
Philosophical Materialism . . . . .	20
Dialectics . . . . .	22
The Materialist Conception of History . . . . .	23
The Class Struggle . . . . .	25
Marx's Economic Doctrine . . . . .	27
Value . . . . .	27
Surplus Value . . . . .	29
Socialism . . . . .	36
Tactics of the Class Struggle of the Proletariat . . . . .	39
THE THREE SOURCES AND THREE COMPONENT PARTS OF MARXISM . . . . .	44
I. . . . .	45
II. . . . .	46
III. . . . .	47
MARXISM AND REVISIONISM . . . . .	49
THE HERITAGE WE RENOUNCE . . . . .	57
I. One Representative of the "Heritage" . . . . .	58
II. Narodism's Addition to the "Heritage" . . . . .	68
III. Has the "Heritage" Gained from Association with Narodism? . . . . .	74
IV. The "Enlighteners", the Narodniks, and the "Disciples" . . . . .	83
V. Mr. Mikhailovsky on the "Disciples" Renunciation of the Heritage . . . . .	85
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? <i>Burning Questions of Our Movement</i> . . . . .	92
<i>Preface</i> . . . . .	92
I Dogmatism and "Freedom of Criticism" . . . . .	95
A. What Does "Freedom of Criticism" Mean? . . . . .	95

B. The New Advocates of "Freedom of Criticism" . . . . .	98
C. Criticism in Russia . . . . .	102
D. Engels on the Importance of the Theoretical Struggle . . . . .	108
II. The Spontaneity of the Masses and the Consciousness of the Social-Democrats . . . . .	112
A. The Beginning of the Spontaneous Upsurge . . . . .	113
B. Bowing to Spontaneity. <i>Rabochaya Mysl</i> . . . . .	117
C. The Self-Emancipation Group and <i>Rabocheye Dyelo</i> . . . . .	124
III. Trade-Unionist Politics and Social-Democratic Politics . . . . .	132
A. Political Agitation and Its Restriction by the Economists . . . . .	133
B. How Martynov Rendered Plekhanov More Profound . . . . .	141
C. Political Exposures and "Training in Revolutionary Activity" . . . . .	144
D. What Is There in Common Between Economism and Terrorism? . . . . .	149
E. The Working Class as Vanguard Fighter for Democracy . . . . .	152
F. Once More "Slanderers", Once More "Mystifiers" . . . . .	165
IV. The Primitiveness of the Economists and the Organisation of the Revolutionaries . . . . .	168
A. What Is Primitiveness? . . . . .	168
B. Primitiveness and Economism . . . . .	171
C. Organisation of Workers and Organisation of Revolutionaries . . . . .	177
D. The Scope of Organisational Work . . . . .	190
E. "Conspiratorial" Organisation and "Democratism" . . . . .	195
F. Local and All-Russia Work . . . . .	202
V. The "Plan" for an All-Russia Political Newspaper . . . . .	211
A. Who Was Offended by the Article "Where To Begin" . . . . .	212
B. Can a Newspaper Be a Collective Organiser? . . . . .	216
C. What Type of Organisation Do We Require? . . . . .	226
Conclusion . . . . .	232
Appendix. The Attempt to Unite <i>Iskra</i> with <i>Rabocheye Dyelo</i> . . . . .	235
Correciton to <i>What Is To Be Done?</i> . . . . .	241
ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK ( <i>The Crisis in Our Party</i> ) . . . . .	242
Preface . . . . .	242
A. The Preparations for the Congress . . . . .	245
B. Significance of the Various Groupings at the Congress . . . . .	246
C. Beginning of the Congress. The Organising Committee Incident . . . . .	249
D. Dissolution of the <i>Yuzhny Rabochy</i> Group . . . . .	257
E. The Equality of Languages Incident . . . . .	259
F. The Agrarian Programme . . . . .	265
G. The Party Rules Comrade Martov's Draft . . . . .	272
H. Discussion on Centralism Prior to the Split Among the <i>Iskra</i> -ists . . . . .	279
I. Paragraph One of the Rules . . . . .	282
J. Innocent Victims of a False Accusation of Opportunism . . . . .	301
K. Continuation of the Debate on the Rules. Composition of the Council . . . . .	310
L. Conclusion of the Debate on the Rules. Co-operation to the Central Bodies. Withdrawal of the <i>Rabocheye Dyelo</i> Delegates . . . . .	314
M. The Elections. End of the Congress . . . . .	326

N. General Picture of the Struggle at the Congress. The Revolutionary and Opportunist Wings of the Party . . . . .	348
O. After the Congress. Two Methods of Struggle . . . . .	359
P. Little Annoyances Should Not Stand in the Way of a Big Pleasure . . . . .	375
Q. The New <i>Iskra</i> . Opportunism in Questions of Organisation . . . . .	384
R. A Few Words on Dialectics. Two Revolutions . . . . .	409
<i>Appendix</i> . The Incident of Comrade Gusev and Comrade Deutsch . . . . .	414
THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA . . . . .	422
TWO TACTICS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION . . . . .	425
Preface . . . . .	425
1. An Urgent Political Question . . . . .	429
2. What Can We Learn from the Resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on a Provisional Revolutionary Government? . . . . .	432
3. What Is Meant by "the Revolution's Decisive Victory over Tsarism"? . . . . .	438
4. The Abolition of the Monarchy. The Republic . . . . .	443
5. How Should "the Revolution Be Advanced"? . . . . .	447
6. Whence Is the Proletariat Threatened with the Danger of Finding Itself with Its Hands Tied in the Struggle Against the Inconsistent Bourgeoisie? . . . . .	450
7. The Tactics of "Eliminating the Conservatives from the Government" . . . . .	461
8. The <i>Osvobozhdeniye</i> and New- <i>Iskra</i> Trends . . . . .	465
9. What Is Meant by Being a Party of Extreme Opposition in Time of Revolution? . . . . .	472
10. "Revolutionary Communes" and the Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry . . . . .	475
11. A Cursory Comparison Between Several of the Resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and Those of the "Conference" . . . . .	484
12. Will the Sweep of the Democrat. Revolution Be Diminished if the Bourgeoisie Recoils from It? . . . . .	488
13. Conclusion Dare We Win? . . . . .	496
Epilogue Once Again the <i>Osvobozhdeniye</i> Trend, Once Again the New- <i>Iskra</i> Trend . . . . .	506
I. Why Do Bourgeois Liberal Realists Praise Social-Democratic "Realists"? . . . . .	506
II. Comrade Martynov Again Gives "Profundity" to the Question . . . . .	512
III. The Vulgar Bourgeois and the Marxist Views on Dictatorship . . . . .	519
LESSONS OF THE MOSCOW UPRISING . . . . .	528
ON THE ROAD . . . . .	535
IN MEMORY OF HERZFELD . . . . .	543
DISRUPTION OF UNITY UNDER COVER OF OUTCRIES FOR UNITY . . . . .	549
I "Factionalism" . . . . .	549

II. The Split . . . . .	553
III. The Break-up of the August Bloc . . . . .	557
IV. A Conciliator's Advice to the "Seven" . . . . .	559
V. Trotsky's Liquidationist Views . . . . .	562
THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION . . . . .	567
1. What Is Meant by the Self-Determination of Nations? . . . .	567
2. The Historically Concrete Presentation of the Question . . . .	572
3. The Concrete Features of the National Question in Russia, and Russia's Bourgeois-Democratic Reformation . . . . .	575
4. "Practicality" in the National Question . . . . .	579
5. The Liberal Bourgeoisie and the Socialist Opportunists in the National Question . . . . .	583
6. Norway's Secession from Sweden . . . . .	592
7. The Resolution of the London International Congress, 1896 . .	597
8. The Utopian Karl Marx and the Practical Rosa Luxemburg . . .	600
9. The 1903 Programme and Its Liquidators . . . . .	606
10. Conclusion . . . . .	614
THE WAR AND RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY . . . . .	618
ON THE NATIONAL PRIDE OF THE GREAT RUSSIANS . . . . .	625
ON THE SLOGAN FOR A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE . . . . .	629
EDITORIAL COMMENT BY <i>SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAI</i> ON THE MANIFESTO ON WAR ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.S.D.L.P. <i>On the Slogan for a United States of Europe</i> . .	633
IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM. <i>A Popular Outline</i> . . . . .	634
Preface . . . . .	634
Preface to the French and German Editions . . . . .	636
I. . . . .	636
II. . . . .	636
III. . . . .	638
IV. . . . .	638
V. . . . .	639
I. Concentration of Production and Monopolies . . . . .	642
II. Banks and Their New Role . . . . .	652
III. Finance Capital and the Financial Oligarchy . . . . .	666
IV. Export of Capital . . . . .	678
V. Division of the World Among Capitalist Associations . . . .	683
VI. Division of the World Among the Great Powers . . . . .	690
VII. Imperialism, as a Special Stage of Capitalism . . . . .	699
VIII. Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism . . . . .	708
IX. Critique of Imperialism . . . . .	716
X. The Place of Imperialism in History . . . . .	726

THE NASCENT TREND OF IMPERIALIST ECONOMISM . . . .	732
THE MILITARY PROGRAMME OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLU- TION . . . . .	740
I. . . . .	740
II. . . . .	743
III . . . . .	745
<i>Notes</i> . . . . .	753
<i>Name Index</i> . . . . .	807
<i>Subject Index</i> . . . . .	832

## ILLUSTRATIONS

V. I. Lenin 1917.

Page 157 of Lenin's manuscript *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the  
Democratic Revolution*, 1905 . . . . . 495

Cover of V. I. Lenin's book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of  
Capitalism*, 1917 . . . . . 640-41





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## PREFACE

The first volume of this three-volume edition of selected writings by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin contains works that were written during the period from 1897 to September 1916. It opens with the articles "Karl Marx (A Brief Biographical Sketch with an Exposition of Marxism)", "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism" and "Marxism and Revisionism". These works reveal the essence of Marx's great revolutionary teaching and the impressive consistency of his views, which combined to fashion "modern materialism and modern scientific socialism, as the theory and programme of the working-class movement in all the civilised countries of the world" (see p. 19 of this volume). They also reflect Lenin's struggle to keep the Marxist theory pure in the face of numerous attempts by revisionists and opportunists to distort and pervert it, his constant concern for the need to develop Marxism and apply it creatively.

The article "Marxism and Revisionism" constituted, as Lenin put it, "a formal declaration of war" on revisionism. It shows how the enemies of Marxism altered their tactics once Marxism had emerged victorious in the working-class movement: instead of mounting open opposition they tried to undermine Marxist doctrine from within by suggesting "amendments" and "improvements" to its main propositions. Lenin foresaw that the battle against revisionism would become fiercer as scientific communism gained in strength, and predicted the inevitable victory of Marxism over revisionism.

Volume 1 also includes the article "The Heritage We Renounce", which was directed against Narodism, then the main obstacle to Marxism in Russia. In this article Lenin defines the relationship of the proletarian party to its country's revolutionary traditions. Lenin attacks the positions adopted by the Narodniks and proves that it is not they, but the Marxists, who are the successors to the Russian

revolutionary enlighteners of the past. Lenin points out, however, that revolutionaries must not remain within the bounds of this tradition: they must press on and decide for themselves how the revolutionary struggle is to be carried on.

Also incorporated in this volume are *What Is To Be Done?* *Burning Questions of Our Movement*, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (*The Crisis in Our Party*) and *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. These works reveal the immense importance of the theory of scientific communism in the liberation struggle of the proletariat and the working masses. They also expound Lenin's view of the Party as the vanguard and guiding force of the working-class movement and expose opportunism in ideological, organisational and tactical matters.

On the eve of the decisive battle against the autocracy Lenin carried the Marxist teaching a stage farther and determined the Party's tactics in the revolution and its prospects. He developed and made more precise the questions of the hegemony of the proletariat, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the armed uprising and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Lenin elaborated a consistent theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution.

The crushing of the revolution of 1905-07 unleashed a wave of unbridled counter-revolution. Reaction was manifest in all areas of social life—in science, philosophy and art. Throughout this extremely difficult and critical period in the life of the Party Lenin's brilliant insight showed the way forward.

During the years of reaction primary significance attached to the struggle on the ideological front against numerous attempts to revise the Marxist teaching and the theoretical foundations of the Party and to corrupt its revolutionary outlook.

Lenin embarked on a fierce struggle against the Party's enemies—the liquidators, otzovists, Trotskyists and other opportunists. He safeguarded the Party and helped it to survive those hard times and unite and strengthen its ranks. The situation during that period and the Bolsheviks' fight to preserve and reinforce the Party are reflected in the articles "On the Road" and "Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity", which are included in this volume.

An important aspect of the Party's theoretical and practical work was its treatment of the national question, the essence and significance of which are elucidated in *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*. In opposition to the policy of national oppression, nationalism and chauvinism, the policy of setting different nations against one another, Lenin advocated a policy of international unity and the joining together of the working people of various nations

in the struggle against the oppressors. Lenin wrote: "Complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the unity of the workers of all nations—such is the national programme that Marxism, the experience of the whole world, the experience of Russia, teaches the workers" (see p. 616).

Lenin's work *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* played an enormous role in educating the Party in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and acts today as a true guide to Communist and Workers' Parties in all countries. Armed with the Leninist programme on the national question, Communists warmly support the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and feudalism, since this struggle promotes national emancipation and victory over the forces of imperialist reaction.

Also included in this volume is Lenin's work "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism", which shows the inseparable link between the question of national self-determination and the general question of the struggle for democracy in the epoch of imperialism.

A number of items in this volume belong to the period of the imperialist world war of 1914-18. They are the manifesto of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", "On the National Pride of the Great Russians", "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" and "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution". In these works Lenin expounds the situation in which the international working-class movement was placed by the outbreak of war. He exposes the betrayal of the leaders of the Second International and the West European socialist parties, and proceeds to work out Party strategy and tactics for war, peace and revolution.

In the very first works he wrote during the imperialist war, Lenin gave a scientific characterisation of imperialism as the highest and final stage of capitalism. Lenin's deep study of the new period enabled him to discover the law of the uneven economic and political development of capitalism during the epoch of imperialism. This led him to conclude that the simultaneous victory of the socialist revolution in all countries was impossible, but that there was no reason why socialism should not triumph initially in one or several countries. Lenin first formulated this brilliant discovery in August 1915 in the article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe". It was a new theory of socialist revolution, giving the international working class a clear view of the struggle ahead, releasing the energy and initiative of the proletarians of each individual country so that they could come to grips with their own national bourgeoisie and arming them with a scientifically-based certainty of victory. Lenin's doctrine of the possibility of the victo-

ry of socialism in a single country has become the guiding principle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in its struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution and the construction of socialism in the USSR.

Lenin's brilliant *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* was the fruit of his untiring analysis of imperialism. In this work Lenin summed up the development of world capitalism during the fifty years that had passed since the publication of Marx's *Capital*. Proceeding from the laws of the origin, development and decline of capitalism discovered by Marx and Engels, Lenin was the first to provide a deep scientific analysis of the economic and political essence of imperialism. By summarising the latest developments in the economics of world capitalism, Lenin demonstrated that all the contradictions inherent in capitalist society would inevitably be exacerbated under imperialism. He describes imperialism as a parasitical, decaying and moribund form of capitalism and reveals the conditions that will bring about its death and the inevitability and necessity of replacing capitalism by a new, progressive social system—socialism. He points out that imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution. "This has been confirmed since 1917 on a world-wide scale", Lenin wrote in 1920 in the preface to the French and German editions of the book.

Lenin's work *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, directed against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologists, reformists and revisionists, is a powerful weapon against the modern "theories" produced by the defenders of imperialism.

\* \* \*

The writings of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin included in this edition have been arranged chronologically, apart from the three works on Marxism with which Volume 1 opens. The editors' notes and the name and subject indexes have been placed at the back.

*Institute of Marxism-Leninism  
of the C.C. C.P.S.U.  
Politizdat Publishing House*

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# KARL MARX

A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH  
WITH AN EXPOSITION OF MARXISM<sup>1</sup>

## PREFACE

This article on Karl Marx, which now appears in a separate printing, was written in 1913 (as far as I can remember) for the *Granat Encyclopaedia*. A fairly detailed bibliography of literature on Marx, mostly foreign, was appended to the article. This has been omitted in the present edition. The editors of the *Encyclopaedia*, for their part, have, for censorship reasons, deleted the end of the article on Marx, namely, the section dealing with his revolutionary tactics. Unfortunately, I am unable to reproduce that end, because the draft has remained among my papers somewhere in Cracow or in Switzerland. I only remember that in the concluding part of the article I quoted, among other things, the passage from Marx's letter to Engels of April 16, 1856, in which he wrote: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War. Then the affair will be splendid." That is what our Mensheviks,<sup>2</sup> who have now sunk to utter betrayal of socialism and to desertion to the bourgeoisie, have failed to understand since 1905.

N. Lenin

Moscow, May 14, 1918

---

*Marx, Karl*, was born on May 5, 1818 (New Style), in the city of Trier (Rhenish Prussia). His father was a lawyer, a Jew, who in 1824 adopted Protestantism. The family was well-to-do, cultured, but not revolutionary. After graduating from a *Gymnasium* in Trier, Marx entered the university, first at Bonn and later in Berlin, where he read law, majoring in history and philosophy. He concluded his university course in 1841, submitting a doctoral thesis on the philosophy of Epicurus. At the time Marx was a Hegelian idealist in his views. In Berlin, he belonged to the circle of "Left Hegelians"<sup>3</sup> (Bruno Bauer and others) who sought to draw atheistic and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.

After graduating, Marx moved to Bonn, hoping to become a professor. However, the reactionary policy of the government, which deprived Ludwig Feuerbach of his chair in 1832, refused to allow him to return to the university in 1836, and in 1841 forbade young Professor Bruno Bauer to lecture at Bonn, made Marx abandon the idea of an academic career. Left Hegelian views were making rapid headway in Germany at the time. Ludwig Feuerbach began to criticise theology, particularly after 1836, and turn to materialism, which in 1841 gained the ascendancy in his philosophy (*The Essence of Christianity*). The year 1843 saw the appearance of his *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*. "One must oneself have experienced the liberating effect" of these books, Engels subsequently wrote of these works of Feuerbach. "We [i.e., the Left Hegelians, including Marx] all became at once Feuerbachians."<sup>4</sup> At that time, some radical bourgeois in the Rhineland, who were in touch with the Left Hegelians, founded, in Cologne, an opposition paper called *Rheinische Zeitung*<sup>5</sup> (the first issue appeared on January 1, 1842). Marx and Bruno Bauer were invited to be the chief contributors, and

in October 1842 Marx became editor-in-chief and moved from Bonn to Cologne. The newspaper's revolutionary-democratic trend became more and more pronounced under Marx's editorship, and the government first imposed double and triple censorship on the paper, and then on January 1, 1843, decided to suppress it. Marx had to resign the editorship before that date, but his resignation did not save the paper, which suspended publication in March 1843. Of the major articles Marx contributed to *Rheinische Zeitung*, Engels notes, in addition to those indicated below (see *Bibliography*<sup>6</sup>), an article on the condition of peasant wine-growers in the Moselle Valley.<sup>7</sup> Marx's journalistic activities convinced him that he was insufficiently acquainted with political economy, and he zealously set out to study it.

In 1843, Marx married, at Kreuznach, Jenny von Westphalen, a childhood friend he had become engaged to while still a student. His wife came of a reactionary family of the Prussian nobility, her elder brother being Prussia's Minister of the Interior during a most reactionary period—1850-58. In the autumn of 1843, Marx went to Paris in order to publish a radical journal abroad, together with Arnold Ruge (1802-1880; Left Hegelian: in prison in 1825-30; a political exile following 1848, and a Bismarckian after 1866-70). Only one issue of this journal, *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, appeared<sup>8</sup>; publication was discontinued owing to the difficulty of secretly distributing it in Germany, and to disagreement with Ruge. Marx's articles in this journal showed that he was already a revolutionary, who advocated "merciless criticism of everything existing", and in particular the "criticism by weapon",<sup>9</sup> and appealed to the *masses* and to the *proletariat*.

In September 1844 Frederick Engels came to Paris for a few days, and from that time on became Marx's closest friend. They both took a most active part in the then seething life of the revolutionary groups in Paris (of particular importance at the time was Proudhon's<sup>10</sup> doctrine, which Marx pulled to pieces in his *Poverty of Philosophy*, 1847); waging a vigorous struggle against the various doctrines of petty-bourgeois socialism, they worked out the theory and tactics of revolutionary *proletarian socialism*, or communism (Marxism). See Marx's works of this period, 1844-48, in the *Bibliography*. At the insistent request of the Prussian government, Marx was banished from Paris in 1845, as a dangerous revolutionary. He went to Brussels. In the spring of 1847 Marx and Engels joined a secret propaganda society called the Communist League<sup>11</sup>; they took a prominent part in the League's Second Congress (London, November 1847), at whose request they drew up the celebrated *Communist Manifesto*, which appeared in February 1848. With the clarity and brilliance of genius, this work outlines a new world-conception, consistent

materialism, which also embraces the realm of social life; dialectics, as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development; the theory of the class struggle and of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat—the creator of a new, communist society.

On the outbreak of the Revolution of February 1848,<sup>12</sup> Marx was banished from Belgium. He returned to Paris, whence, after the March Revolution,<sup>13</sup> he went to Cologne, Germany, where *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*<sup>14</sup> was published from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849, with Marx as editor-in-chief. The new theory was splendidly confirmed by the course of the revolutionary events of 1848-49, just as it has been subsequently confirmed by all proletarian and democratic movements in all countries of the world. The victorious counter-revolutionaries first instigated court proceedings against Marx (he was acquitted on February 9, 1849), and then banished him from Germany (May 16, 1849). First Marx went to Paris, was again banished after the demonstration of June 13, 1849,<sup>15</sup> and then went to London, where he lived till his death.

His life as a political exile was a very hard one, as the correspondence between Marx and Engels (published in 1913) clearly reveals. Poverty weighed heavily on Marx and his family; had it not been for Engels' constant and selfless financial aid, Marx would not only have been unable to complete *Capital* but would have inevitably been crushed by want. Moreover, the prevailing doctrines and trends of petty-bourgeois socialism, and of non-proletarian socialism in general, forced Marx to wage a continuous and merciless struggle and sometimes to repel the most savage and monstrous personal attacks (*Herr Vogt*<sup>16</sup>). Marx, who stood aloof from circles of political exiles, developed his materialist theory in a number of historical works (see *Bibliography*), devoting himself mainly to a study of political economy. Marx revolutionised this science (see "The Marxist Doctrine", below) in his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and *Capital* (Vol. I, 1867).

The revival of the democratic movements in the late fifties and in the sixties recalled Marx to practical activity. In 1864 (September 28) the International Working Men's Association—the celebrated First International—was founded in London. Marx was the heart and soul of this organisation, and author of its first Address<sup>17</sup> and of a host of resolutions, declarations and manifestoes. In uniting the labour movement of various countries, striving to channel into joint activity the various forms of non-proletarian, pre-Marxist socialism (Mazzini, Proudhon, Bakunin, liberal trade-unionism in Britain, Lassalleian vacillations to the right in Germany, etc.), and in combating the theories of all



these sects and schools, Marx hammered out a uniform tactic for the proletarian struggle of the working class in the various countries. Following the downfall of the Paris Commune (1871)—of which Marx gave such a profound, clear-cut, brilliant, *effective* and revolutionary analysis (*The Civil War in France*, 1871)—and the Bakuninist-caused<sup>18</sup> cleavage in the International, the latter organisation could no longer exist in Europe. After the Hague Congress of the International (1872), Marx had the General Council of the International transferred to New York. The First International had played its historical part, and now made way for a period of a far greater development of the labour movement in all countries in the world, a period in which the movement grew in *scope*, and *mass* socialist working-class parties in individual national states were formed.

Marx's health was undermined by his strenuous work in the International and his still more strenuous theoretical occupations. He continued work on the refashioning of political economy and on the completion of *Capital*, for which he collected a mass of new material and studied a number of languages (Russian, for instance). However, ill-health prevented him from completing *Capital*.

His wife died on December 2, 1881. and on March 14, 1883, Marx passed away peacefully in his armchair. He lies buried next to his wife at Highgate Cemetery in London. Of Marx's children some died in childhood in London, when the family were living in destitute circumstances. Three daughters married English and French socialists: Eleanor Aveling, Laura Lafargue and Jenny Longuet. The latter's son is a member of the French Socialist Party.

## THE MARXIST DOCTRINE

*Marxism* is the system of Marx's views and teachings. Marx was the genius who continued and consummated the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, as represented by the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism combined with French revolutionary doctrines in general. Acknowledged even by his opponents, the remarkable consistency and integrity of Marx's views, whose totality constitutes modern materialism and modern scientific socialism, as the theory and programme of the working-class movement in all the civilised countries of the world, make it incumbent on us to present a brief outline of his world-conception in general, prior to giving an exposition of the principal content of Marxism, namely, Marx's economic doctrine.

## PHILOSOPHICAL MATERIALISM

Beginning with the years 1844-45, when his views took shape, Marx was a materialist and especially a follower of Ludwig Feuerbach, whose weak points he subsequently saw only in his materialism being insufficiently consistent and comprehensive. To Marx Feuerbach's historic and "epoch-making" significance lay in his having resolutely broken with Hegel's idealism and in his proclamation of materialism, which already "in the eighteenth century, particularly French materialism, was not only a struggle against the existing political institutions and against ... religion and theology, but also ... against all metaphysics" (in the sense of "drunken speculation" as distinct from "sober philosophy"). (*The Holy Family*, in *Literarischer Nachlass*.<sup>19</sup>) "To Hegel...", wrote Marx, "the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos (the creator, the maker) of the real world. ... With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" (*Capital*, Vol. I, Afterword to the Second Edition<sup>20</sup>). In full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it, Frederick Engels wrote in *Anti-Dühring* (read by Marx in the manuscript): "The unity of the world does not consist in its being. ... The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved ... by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science. ..." "Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be ... But if the ... question is raised: what thought and consciousness really are, and where they come from; it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of Nature, which has developed in and along with its environment; hence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of Nature, do not contradict the rest of Nature's interconnections but are in correspondence with them. ...

"Hegel was an idealist, that is to say, the thoughts within his mind were to him not the more or less abstract images (*Abbilder*, reflections; Engels sometimes speaks of "imprints") of real things and processes, but on the contrary, things and their development were to him only the images, made real, of the 'Idea' existing somewhere or other before the world existed."<sup>21</sup> In his *Lydia Feuerbach*—which expounded his own and Marx's views on Feuerbach's philosophy, and was sent to the printers after he had read an old manuscript Marx and himself had written in 1844-45 on Hegel, Feuerbach and the materialist conception of history—Engels wrote. "The great basic question of

24443

27/6/83

all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is the relation of thinking and being . . . spirit to Nature . . . which is primary, spirit or Nature. . . . The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to Nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other . . . comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded Nature as primary, belonged to the various schools of materialism." Any other use of the concepts of (philosophical) idealism and materialism leads only to confusion. Marx decidedly rejected, not only idealism, which is always linked in one way or another with religion, but also the views—especially widespread in our day—of Hume and Kant, agnosticism, criticism, and positivism<sup>22</sup> in their various forms; he considered that philosophy a "reactionary" concession to idealism, and at best a "shame-faced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world".<sup>23</sup> On this question, see, besides the works by Engels and Marx mentioned above, a letter Marx wrote to Engels on December 12, 1868, in which, referring to an utterance by the naturalist Thomas Huxley, which was "more materialistic" than usual, and to his recognition that "as long as we actually observe and think, we cannot possibly get away from materialism", Marx reproached Huxley for leaving a "loop-hole" for agnosticism, for Humism. It is particularly important to note Marx's view on the relation between freedom and necessity: "Freedom is the appreciation of necessity. 'Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood'" (Engels in *Anti-Dühring*). This means recognition of the rule of objective laws in Nature and of the dialectical transformation of necessity into freedom (in the same manner as the transformation of the uncognised but cognisable "thing-in-itself" into the "thing-for-us", of the "essence of things" into "phenomena"). Marx and Engels considered that the "old" materialism, including that of Feuerbach (and still more the "vulgar" materialism of Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott), contained the following major shortcomings: (1) this materialism was "predominantly mechanical", failing to take account of the latest developments in chemistry and biology (today it would be necessary to add: and in the electrical theory of matter); (2) the old materialism was non-historical and non-dialectical (metaphysical, in the meaning of anti-dialectical), and did not adhere consistently and comprehensively to the standpoint of development; (3) it regarded the "human essence" in the abstract, not as the "complex of all" (concretely and historically determined) "social relations", and therefore merely "interpreted" the world, whereas it was a question of "changing" it, i.e., it did not understand the importance of "revolutionary practical activity"

## DIALECTICS

As the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. They thought that any other formulation of the principle of development, of evolution, was one-sided and poor in content, and could only distort and mutilate the actual course of development (which often proceeds by leaps, and *via* catastrophes and revolutions) in Nature and in society. "Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics [from the destruction of idealism, including Hegelianism] and apply it in the materialist conception of Nature. . . . Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich [this was written before the discovery of radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements, etc.!] and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis Nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical."<sup>24</sup>

"The great basic thought," Engels writes, "that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away . . . this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation are two different things. . . . For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain." Thus, according to Marx, dialectics is "the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought".<sup>25</sup>

This revolutionary aspect of Hegel's philosophy was adopted and developed by Marx. Dialectical materialism "does not need any philosophy standing above the other sciences". From previous philosophy there remains "the science of thought and its laws—formal logic and dialectics".<sup>26</sup> Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology, which, too, must regard its subject matter historically, studying and

generalising the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from *non-knowledge* to knowledge.

In our times the idea of development, of evolution, has almost completely penetrated social consciousness, only in other ways, and not through Hegelian philosophy. Still, this idea, as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel's philosophy, is far more comprehensive and far richer in content than the current idea of evolution is. A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis ("the negation of negation"), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; "breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection between *all* aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws—these are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional one. (Cf. Marx's letter to Engels of January 8, 1868, in which he ridicules Stein's "wooden trichotomies", which it would be absurd to confuse with materialist dialectics.)

### THE MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

A realisation of the inconsistency, incompleteness, and one-sidedness of the old materialism convinced Marx of the necessity of "bringing the science of society . . . into harmony with the materialist foundation, and of reconstructing it thereupon".<sup>27</sup> Since materialism in general explains consciousness as the outcome of being, and not conversely, then materialism as applied to the social life of mankind has to explain *social* consciousness as the outcome of *social* being. "Technology," Marx writes (*Capital*, Vol. I), "discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature, the immediate process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them."<sup>28</sup> In the preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx gives an integral formulation of the fundamental principles of materialism as applied to human society and its history, in the following words:

"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will,

relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces.

"The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.

"Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so we cannot judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. . . . In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society"<sup>29</sup> (cf. Marx's brief formulation in a letter to Engels dated July 7, 1866: "Our theory that the organisation of labour is determined by the means of production").

The discovery of the materialist conception of history, or more correctly, the consistent continuation and extension of materialism into the domain of social phenomena, removed the two chief shortcomings in earlier historical theories. In the first place, the latter at best examined only the ideological motives in the historical activities of human beings, without investigating the origins of those motives, or ascertaining the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relations, or seeing the roots of these relations in the degree of development reached by material production; in the second place, the earlier theories did not embrace the activities of the *masses* of the population,

whereas historical materialism made it possible for the first time to study with scientific accuracy the social conditions of the life of the masses, and the changes in those conditions. *At best*, pre-Marxist "sociology" and historiography brought forth an accumulation of raw facts, collected at random, and a description of individual aspects of the historical process. By examining the *totality* of opposing tendencies, by reducing them to precisely definable conditions of life and production of the various *classes* of individual aspects of the historical process. By examining the choice of a particular "dominant" idea or in its interpretation, and by revealing that, without exception, all ideas and all the various tendencies *stem* from the condition of the material forces of production, Marxism indicated the way to an all-embracing and comprehensive study of the process of the rise, development, and decline of socio-economic systems. People make their own history but what determines the motives of people, of the mass of people, i.e., what gives rise to the clash of conflicting ideas and strivings? What is the sum total of all these clashes in the mass of human societies? What are the objective conditions of production of material life that form the basis of all of man's historical activity? What is the law of development of these conditions? To all these Marx drew attention and indicated the way to a scientific study of history as a single process which, with all its immense variety and contradictoriness, is governed by definite laws.

### THE CLASS STRUGGLE

It is common knowledge that, in any given society, the strivings of some of its members conflict with the strivings of others, that social life is full of contradictions, and that history reveals a struggle between nations and societies, as well as within nations and societies, and, besides, an alternation of periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline. Marxism has provided the guidance, i.e., the theory of the class struggle, for the discovery of the laws governing this seeming maze and chaos. It is only a study of the sum of the strivings of all the members of a given society or group of societies that can lead to a scientific definition of the result of those strivings. Now the conflicting strivings stem from the difference in the position and mode of life of the *classes* into which each society is divided. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," Marx wrote in the *Communist Manifesto* (with the exception of the history of the primitive community, Engels added subsequently). "Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in

constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. . . . The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones. Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat." Ever since the Great French Revolution, European history has, in a number of countries, tellingly revealed what actually lies at the bottom of events—the struggle of classes. The Restoration period in France<sup>30</sup> already produced a number of historians (Thierry, Guizot, Mignet, and Thiers) who, in summing up what was taking place, were obliged to admit that the class struggle was the key to all French history. The modern period—that of the complete victory of the bourgeoisie, representative institutions, extensive (if not universal) suffrage, a cheap daily press, that is widely circulated among the masses, etc., a period of powerful and ever-expanding unions of workers and unions of employers, etc—has shown even more strikingly (though sometimes in a very one-sided, "peaceful", and "constitutional" form) the class struggle as the mainspring of events. The following passage from Marx's *Communist Manifesto* will show us what Marx demanded of social science as regards an objective analysis of the position of each class in modern society, with reference to an analysis of each class's conditions of development: "Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product. The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat." In a number of historical works (see *Bibliography*), Marx gave brilliant and profound examples of materialist historiography, of an analysis of the position of *each* individual class, and some-



times of various groups or strata within a class, showing plainly why and how "every class struggle is a political struggle".<sup>31</sup> The above-quoted passage is an illustration of what a complex network of social relations and *transitional* stages from one class to another, from the past to the future, was analysed by Marx so as to determine the resultant of historical development.

Marx's economic doctrine is the most profound, comprehensive and detailed confirmation and application of his theory.

## MARX'S ECONOMIC DOCTRINE

"It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society",<sup>32</sup> i.e., capitalist, bourgeois society, says Marx in the preface to *Capital*. An investigation into the relations of production in a given, historically defined society, in their inception, development, and decline—such is the content of Marx's economic doctrine. In capitalist society the production of *commodities* is predominant, and Marx's analysis therefore begins with an analysis of commodity.

### VALUE

A commodity is, in the first place, a thing that satisfies a human want; in the second place, it is a thing that can be exchanged for another thing. The utility of a thing makes it a *use-value*. Exchange-value (or simply, value) is first of all the ratio, the proportion, in which a certain number of use-values of one kind can be exchanged for a certain number of use-values of another kind. Daily experience shows us that millions upon millions of such exchanges are constantly equating with one another every kind of use-value, even the most diverse and incomparable. Now, what is there in common between these various things, things constantly equated with one another in a definite system of social relations? Their common feature is that they are *products of labour*. In exchanging products, people equate the most diverse kinds of labour. The production of commodities is a system of social relations in which individual producers create diverse products (the social division of labour), and in which all these products are equated to one another in the process of exchange. Consequently, what is common to all commodities is not the concrete labour of a definite branch of production, not labour of one particular kind, but *abstract* human labour—human labour in general. All the labour power of a given society, as represented in the sum total of the values of all commodities, is one and the same human labour power. Thousands upon thousands of millions of acts of exchange prove this. Consequently, each particular

commodity represents only a certain share of the *socially necessary* labour time. The magnitude of value is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour, or by the labour time that is socially necessary for the production of a given commodity, of a given use-value. "Whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of this, nevertheless we do it."<sup>33</sup> As one of the earlier economists said, value is a relation between two persons: only he should have added: a relation concealed beneath a material wrapping. We can understand what value is only when we consider it from the standpoint of the system of social relations of production in a particular historical type of society, moreover, of relations that manifest themselves in the mass phenomenon of exchange, a phenomenon which repeats itself thousands upon thousands of times. "As values, all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour time"<sup>34</sup> After making a detailed analysis of the twofold character of the labour incorporated in commodities, Marx goes on to analyse the *form of value* and *money*. Here, Marx's main task is to study the *origin* of the money form of value, to study the *historical process* of the development of exchange, beginning with individual and incidental acts of exchange (the "elementary or accidental form of value", in which a given quantity of one commodity is exchanged for a given quantity of another), passing on to the universal form of value, in which a number of different commodities are exchanged for one and the same particular commodity, and ending with the money form of value, when gold becomes that particular commodity, the universal equivalent. As the highest product of the development of exchange and commodity production, money masks, conceals, the social character of all individual labour, the social link between individual producers united by the market. Marx analyses the various functions of money in very great detail; it is important to note here in particular (as in the opening chapters of *Capital* in general) that what seems to be an abstract and at times purely deductive mode of exposition deals in reality with a gigantic collection of factual material on the history of the development of exchange and commodity production. "If we consider money, its existence implies a definite stage in the exchange of commodities. The particular functions of money which it performs, either as the mere equivalent of commodities, or as means of circulation, or means of payment, as hoard or as universal money, point, according to the extent and relative preponderance of the one function or the other, to very different stages in the process of social production" (*Capital*, Vol. I).<sup>35</sup>

### SURPLUS VALUE

At a certain stage in the development of commodity production money becomes transformed into capital. The formula of commodity circulation was  $C-M-C$  (commodity—money—commodity), i.e., the sale of one commodity for the purpose of buying another. The general formula of capital, on the contrary, is  $M-C-M$ , i.e., purchase for the purpose of selling (at a profit). The increase over the original value of the money that is put into circulation is called by Marx surplus value. The fact of this "growth" of money in capitalist circulation is common knowledge. Indeed, it is this "growth" which transforms money into *capital*, as a special and historically determined social relation of production. Surplus value cannot arise out of commodity circulation, for the latter knows only the exchange of equivalents; neither can it arise out of price increases, for the mutual losses and gains of buyers and sellers would equalise one another, whereas what we have here is not an individual phenomenon but a mass, average and social phenomenon. To obtain surplus value, the owner of money "must . . . find . . . in the market a commodity, whose use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value"<sup>36</sup>—a commodity whose process of consumption is at the same time a process of the creation of value. Such a commodity exists—human labour power. Its consumption is labour, and labour creates value. The owner of money buys labour power at its value, which, like the value of every other commodity, is determined by the socially necessary labour time requisite for its production (i.e., the cost of maintaining the worker and his family). Having bought labour power, the owner of money is entitled to use it, that is, to set it to work for a whole day—twelve hours, let us say. Yet, in the course of six hours ("necessary" labour time) the worker creates product sufficient to cover the cost of his own maintenance; in the course of the next six hours ("surplus" labour time), he creates "surplus" product, or surplus value, for which the capitalist does not pay. Therefore, from the standpoint of the process of production, two parts must be distinguished in capital: constant capital, which is expended on means of production (machinery, tools, raw materials, etc.), whose value, without any change, is transferred (immediately or part by part) to the finished product; secondly, variable capital, which is expended on labour power. The value of this latter capital is not invariable, but grows in the labour process, creating surplus value. Therefore, to express the degree of capital's exploitation of labour power, surplus value must be compared, not with the entire capital but only with the variable capital. Thus, in the example just given, the rate of surplus value, as Marx calls this ratio, will be 6:6, i.e., 100 per cent.

There were two historical prerequisites for capital to arise: first, the accumulation of certain sums of money in the hands of individuals under conditions of a relatively high level of development of commodity production in general; secondly, the existence of a worker who is "free" in a double sense: free of all constraint or restriction on the sale of his labour power, and free from the land and all means of production in general, a free and unattached labourer, a "proletarian", who cannot subsist except by selling his labour power.

There are two main ways of increasing surplus value: lengthening the working day ("absolute surplus value"), and reducing the necessary working day ("relative surplus value"). In analysing the former, Marx gives a most impressive picture of the struggle of the working class for a shorter working day and of interference by the state authority to lengthen the working day (from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth) and to reduce it (factory legislation in the nineteenth century). Since the appearance of *Capital*, the history of the working-class movement in all civilised countries of the world has provided a wealth of new facts amplifying this picture.

Analysing the production of relative surplus value, Marx investigates the three fundamental historical stages in capitalism's increase of the productivity of labour: (1) simple co-operation; (2) the division of labour, and manufacture; (3) machinery and large-scale industry. How profoundly Marx has here revealed the basic and typical features of capitalist development is shown incidentally by the fact that investigations into the handicraft industries of Russia furnish abundant material illustrating the first two of the mentioned stages. The revolutionising effect of large-scale machine industry, as described by Marx in 1867, has revealed itself in a number of "new" countries (Russia, Japan, etc.), in the course of the half-century that has since elapsed.

To continue. New and important in the highest degree is Marx's analysis of the *accumulation of capital*, i.e., the transformation of a part of surplus value into capital, and its use, not for satisfying the personal needs or whims of the capitalist, but for new production. Marx revealed the error made by all earlier classical political economists (beginning with Adam Smith), who assumed that the entire surplus value which is transformed into capital goes to form variable capital. In actual fact, it is divided into *means of production* and variable capital. Of tremendous importance to the process of development of capitalism and its transformation into socialism is the more rapid growth of the constant capital share (of the total capital) as compared with the variable capital share.

By speeding up the supplanting of workers by machinery and by creating wealth at one extreme and poverty at the other, the accumulation of capital also gives rise to what is called the "reserve army of labour", to the "relative surplus" of workers, or "capitalist overpopulation", which assumes the most diverse forms and enables capital to expand production extremely rapidly. In conjunction with credit facilities and the accumulation of capital in the form of means of production, this incidentally is the key to an understanding of the *crises* of overproduction which occur periodically in capitalist countries—at first at an average of every ten years, and later at more lengthy and less definite intervals. From the accumulation of capital under capitalism we should distinguish what is known as primitive accumulation: the forcible divorcement of the worker from the means of production, the driving of the peasants off the land, the stealing of communal lands, the system of colonies and national debts, protective tariffs, and the like. "Primitive accumulation" creates the "free" proletariat at one extreme, and the owner of money, the capitalist, at the other.

The "*historical tendency of capitalist accumulation*" is described by Marx in the following celebrated words: "The expropriation of the immediate producers is accomplished with merciless vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private property [of the peasant and craftsman], that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others.... That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass

of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under, it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated" (*Capital*, Vol. I).<sup>37</sup>

Also new and important in the highest degree is the analysis Marx gives, in Volume Two of *Capital*, of the reproduction of aggregate social capital. Here, too, Marx deals, not with an individual phenomenon but with a mass phenomenon; not with a fractional part of the economy of society, but with that economy as a whole. Correcting the aforementioned error of the classical economists, Marx divides the whole of social production into two big sections: (I) production of the means of production, and (II) production of articles of consumption, and examines in detail, with numerical examples, the circulation of the aggregate social capital—both when reproduced in its former dimensions and in the case of accumulation. Volume Three of *Capital* solves the problem of how the *average rate of profit* is formed on the basis of the law of value. The immense stride forward made by economic science in the person of Marx consists in his having conducted an analysis, from the standpoint of mass economic phenomena, of the social economy as a whole, not from the standpoint of individual cases or of the external and superficial aspects of competition, to which vulgar political economy and the modern "theory of marginal utility"<sup>38</sup> frequently restrict themselves. Marx first analyses the origin of surplus value, and then goes on to consider its division into profit, interest, and ground rent. Profit is the ratio between surplus value and the total capital invested in an undertaking. Capital with a "high organic composition" (i.e., with a preponderance of constant capital over variable capital in excess of the social average) yields a rate of profit below the average; capital with a "low organic composition" yields a rate of profit above the average. Competition among capitalists, and their freedom to transfer their capital from one branch to another, will in both cases reduce the rate of profit to the average. The sum total of the values of all the commodities in a given society coincides with the sum total of the prices of the commodities, but, in individual undertakings and branches of production, as a result of competition, commodities are sold, not at their values but at the *prices of pro-*

duction (or production prices), which are equal to the capital expended plus the average profit.

In this way, the well-known and indisputable fact of the divergence between prices and values and of the equalisation of profits is fully explained by Marx on the basis of the law of value, since the sum total of values of all commodities coincides with the sum total of prices. However, the equating of (social) value to (individual) prices does not take place simply and directly, but in a very complex way. It is quite natural that in a society of separate producers of commodities, who are united only by the market, a conformity to law can be only an average, social, mass manifestation, with individual deviations in either direction mutually compensating one another.

A rise in the productivity of labour implies a more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital. Inasmuch as surplus value is a function of variable capital alone, it is obvious that the rate of profit (the ratio of surplus value to the whole capital, not to its variable part alone) tends to fall. Marx makes a detailed analysis of this tendency and of a number of circumstances that conceal or counteract it. Without pausing to deal with the extremely interesting sections of Volume Three of *Capital* devoted to usurer's capital, commercial capital and money capital, we must pass on to the most important section—the theory of *ground rent*. Since the area of land is limited and, in capitalist countries, the land is all held by individual private owners, the price of production of agricultural products is determined by the cost of production, not on soil of average quality but on the worst soil; not under average conditions but under the worst conditions of delivery of produce to the market. The difference between this price and the price of production on better soil (or in better conditions) constitutes *differential rent*. Analysing this in detail, and showing how it arises out of the difference in fertility of different plots of land, and out of the difference in the amount of capital invested in land, Marx fully reveals (see also *Theories of Surplus Value*, in which the criticism of Rodbertus is most noteworthy) the error of Ricardo, who considered that differential rent is derived only when there is a successive transition from better land to worse. On the contrary, there may be inverse transitions, land may pass from one category into others (owing to advances in agricultural techniques, the growth of towns, and so on), and the notorious “law of diminishing returns”, which charges Nature with the defects, limitations and contradictions of capitalism, is profoundly erroneous. Further, the equalisation of profit in all branches of industry and the national economy in general presupposes complete freedom of competition and the free flow of capital from one branch to an-

other. However, the private ownership of land creates monopoly, which hinders that free flow. Because of that monopoly, the products of agriculture, where a lower organic composition of capital obtains, and consequently an individually higher rate of profit, do not enter into the quite free process of the equalisation of the rate of profit. As a monopolist, the landowner can keep the price above the average, and this monopoly price gives rise to *absolute* rent. Differential rent cannot be done away with under capitalism, but absolute rent *can*—for instance, by the nationalisation of the land, by making it state property. That would undermine the monopoly of private landowners, and would mean the more consistent and full operation of freedom of competition in agriculture. That is why, as Marx points out, bourgeois radicals have again and again in the course of history advanced this progressive bourgeois demand for nationalisation of the land, a demand which, however, frightens most of the bourgeoisie, because it would too closely affect another monopoly, one that is particularly important and “sensitive” today—the monopoly of the means of production in general. (A remarkably popular, concise, and clear exposition of his theory of the average rate of profit on capital and of absolute ground rent is given by Marx himself in a letter to Engels, dated August 2, 1862. See *Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, pp. 77-81; also the letter of August 9, 1862, *ibid.*, pp. 86-87.)

With reference to the history of ground rent it is also important to note Marx's analysis showing how labour rent (the peasant creates surplus product by working on the lord's land) is transformed into rent paid in produce or in kind (the peasant creates surplus product on his own land and hands it over to the landlord because of “non-economic constraint”), then into money-rent (rent in kind, which is converted into money—the *obrok*\* of old Russia—as a result of the development of commodity production), and finally into capitalist rent, when the peasant is replaced by the agricultural *entrepreneur*, who cultivates the soil with the help of hired labour. In connection with this analysis of the “genesis of capitalistic ground rent”, note should be taken of a number of profound ideas (of particular importance to backward countries like Russia) expressed by Marx regarding the *evolution of capitalism in agriculture*. “The transformation of rent in kind into money-rent is furthermore not only inevitably accompanied, but even anticipated, by the formation of a class of propertyless day-labourers, who hire themselves out for money. During their genesis, when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom necessarily develops among the more pros-

\* Quit-rent.—*Ed.*



perous peasants, subject to rent payments, of exploiting agricultural wage-labourers for their own account, much as in feudal times, when the more well-to-do peasant serfs themselves also held serfs. In this way, they gradually acquire the possibility of accumulating a certain amount of wealth and themselves becoming transformed into future capitalists. The old self-employed possessors of land themselves thus give rise to a nursery school for capitalist tenants, whose development is conditioned by the general development of capitalist production beyond the bounds of the countryside" (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 332).<sup>39</sup> "The expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural population not only set free for industrial capital, the labourers, their means of subsistence, and material for labour; it also created the home market" (*Capital*, Vol. I, p. 778).<sup>40</sup> In their turn, the impoverishment and ruin of the rural population play a part in the creation, for capital, of a reserve army of labour. In every capitalist country "part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing [i.e., non-agricultural] proletariat.... This source of relative surplus population is thus constantly flowing.... The agricultural labourer is therefore reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot already in the swarp of pauperism" (*Capital*, Vol. I, p. 668).<sup>41</sup> The peasant's private ownership of the land he tills is the foundation of small-scale production and the condition for its prospering and achieving the classical form. But such small-scale production is compatible only with a narrow and primitive framework of production and society. Under capitalism the "exploitation of the peasants differs only in form from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat. The exploiter is the same: capital. The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through mortgages and usury: the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through the state taxes" (*The Class Struggles in France*).<sup>42</sup> "The small holding of the peasant is now only the pretext that allows the capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages" (*The Eighteenth Brumaire*).<sup>43</sup> As a rule the peasant cedes to capitalist society, i.e., to the capitalist class, even a part of the wages, sinking "to the level of the Irish tenant farmer—all under the pretence of being a private proprietor" (*The Class Struggles in France*).<sup>44</sup> What is "one of the reasons why grain prices are lower in countries with predominant small-peasant land proprietorship than in countries with a capitalist mode of production"? (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 340.) It is that the peasant hands over gratis to society (i.e., the capitalist class) a part of his surplus product. "This lower price [of grain and other agricultural

produce] is consequently a result of the producers' poverty and by no means of their labour productivity" (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 340). Under capitalism the small-holding system, which is the normal form of small-scale production, degenerates, collapses, and perishes. "Proprietorship of land parcels, by its very nature, excludes the development of social productive forces of labour, social forms of labour, social concentration of capital, large-scale cattle raising, and the progressive application of science. Usury and a taxation system must impoverish it everywhere. The expenditure of capital in the price of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation. An infinite fragmentation of means of production, and isolation of the producers themselves." (Co-operative societies, i.e., associations of small peasants, while playing an extremely progressive bourgeois role, only weaken this tendency, without eliminating it: nor must it be forgotten that these co-operative societies do much for the well-to-do peasants, and very little—next to nothing—for the mass of poor peasants: then the associations themselves become exploiters of hired labour.) "Monstrous waste of human energy. Progressive deterioration of conditions of production and increased prices of means of production—an inevitable law of proprietorship of parcels."<sup>45</sup> In agriculture, as in industry, capitalism transforms the process of production only at the price of the "martyrdom of the producer". "The dispersion of the rural labourers over larger areas breaks their power of resistance, while concentration increases that of the town operatives. In modern agriculture, as in the urban industries, the increased productiveness and quantity of the labour set in motion are bought at the cost of laying waste and consuming by disease labour power itself. Moreover, all progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil. . . . Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology, and the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the labourer" (*Capital*, Vol. I, end of Chapter 13).<sup>46</sup>

## SOCIALISM

From the foregoing it is evident that Marx deduces the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into socialist society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of the development of contemporary society. The socialisation of labour, which is advancing ever more rapidly in thousands of forms and has manifested itself very strikingly, during the half-century since the death of Marx, in the growth of large-scale production,

capitalist cartels, syndicates and trusts, as well as in the gigantic increase in the dimensions and power of finance capital, provides the principal material foundation for the inevitable advent of socialism. The intellectual and moral motive force and the physical executor of this transformation is the proletariat, which has been trained by capitalism itself. The proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie, which finds expression in a variety of forms ever richer in content, inevitably becomes a political struggle directed towards the conquest of political power by the proletariat ("the dictatorship of the proletariat"). The socialisation of production cannot but lead to the means of production becoming the property of society, to the "expropriation of the expropriators". A tremendous rise in labour productivity, a shorter working day, and the replacement of the remnants, the ruins, of small-scale, primitive and disunited production by collective and improved labour—such are the direct consequences of this transformation. Capitalism breaks for all time the ties between agriculture and industry, but at the same time, through its highest development, it prepares new elements of those ties, a union between industry and agriculture based on the conscious application of science and the concentration of collective labour, and on a redistribution of the human population (thus putting an end both to rural backwardness, isolation and barbarism, and to the unnatural concentration of vast masses of people in big cities). A new form of family, new conditions in the status of women and in the upbringing of the younger generation are prepared by the highest forms of present-day capitalism: the labour of women and children and the break-up of the patriarchal family by capitalism inevitably assume the most terrible, disastrous, and repulsive forms in modern society. Nevertheless, "modern industry, by assigning as it does, an important part in the socially organised process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economic foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes. It is, of course, just as absurd to hold the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be absolute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient Greek, or the Eastern forms which, moreover, taken together form a series in historic development. Moreover, it is obvious that the fact of the collective working group being composed of individuals of both sexes and all ages, must necessarily, under suitable conditions, become a source of humane development; although in its spontaneously developed, brutal, capitalistic form, where the labourer exists for the process of production, and not the process of production for the labourer, that fact is a pestiferous source of corruption and slavery" (*Cap-*

ital, Vol. I, end of Chap. 13) The factory system contains "the germ of the education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the efficiency of social production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings" (*ibid*)<sup>47</sup> Marx's socialism places the problems of nationality and of the state on the same historical footing, not only in the sense of explaining the past but also in the sense of a bold forecast of the future and of bold practical action for its achievement. Nations are an inevitable product, an inevitable form, in the bourgeois epoch of social development. The working class could not grow strong, become mature and take shape without constituting itself within the nation', without being 'national' (though not in the bourgeois sense of the word). The development of capitalism, however, breaks down national barriers more and more, does away with national seclusion, and substitutes class antagonisms for national antagonisms. It is therefore perfectly true of the developed capitalist countries that the workmen have no country and that united action by the workers, of the civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat (*Communist Manifesto*)<sup>48</sup> The state which is organised coercion inevitably came into being at a definite stage in the development of society when the latter had split into irreconcilable classes and could not exist without an authority ostensibly standing above society, and to a certain degree separate from society. Arising out of class contradictions the state becomes the state of the most powerful economically dominant class which through the medium of the state becomes also the politically dominant class and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital (*Engels The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* a work in which the writer expounds his own views and Marx's). "Even the democratic republic the freest and most progressive form of the bourgeois state does not eliminate this fact in any way but merely modifies its form (the links between the government and the stock exchange, the corruption—direct and indirect—of officialdom and the press etc.) By leading to the abolition of classes socialism will thereby lead to the abolition of the state as well. 'The first act,' Engels writes in *Anti-Duhring*, 'by virtue of which the state really

constitutes itself the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. The state interference in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and by the direction of the processes of production. The state is not ‘abolished’, it withers away.”<sup>50</sup> “The society that will organise production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe” (Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*).<sup>51</sup>

Finally, as regards the attitude of Marx’s socialism towards the small peasantry, which will continue to exist in the period of the expropriation of the expropriators, we must refer to a declaration made by Engels, which expresses Marx’s views: “... when we are in possession of state power we shall not even think of forcibly expropriating the small peasants (regardless of whether with or without compensation), as we shall have to do in the case of the big landowners. Our task relative to the small peasant consists, in the first place, in effecting a transition of his private enterprise and private possession to co-operative ones, not forcibly but by dint of example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose. And then of course we shall have ample means of showing to the small peasant prospective advantages that must be obvious to him even today” (Engels, *The Peasant Question in France and Germany*,<sup>52</sup> p. 17, published by Alexeeva; there are errors in the Russian translation. Original in *Die Neue Zeit*<sup>53</sup>).

## TACTICS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT

After examining, as early as 1844-45, one of the main shortcomings in the earlier materialism, namely, its inability to understand the conditions or appreciate the importance of practical revolutionary activity, Marx, along with his theoretical work, devoted unremitting attention, throughout his lifetime, to the tactical problems of the proletariat’s class struggle. An immense amount of material bearing on this is contained in *all* the works of Marx, particularly in the four volumes of his correspondence with Engels, published in 1913. This material is still far from having been brought together, collected, examined and studied. We shall therefore have to confine ourselves here to the most

general and brief remarks, emphasising that Marx justly considered that, without *this* aspect, materialism is incomplete, one-sided, and lifeless. The fundamental task of proletarian tactics was defined by Marx in strict conformity with all the postulates of his materialist-dialectical *Weltanschauung*. Only an objective consideration of the sum total of the relations between absolutely all the classes in a given society, and consequently a consideration of the objective stage of development reached by that society and of the relations between it and other societies, can serve as a basis for the correct tactics of an advanced class. At the same time, all classes and all countries are regarded, not statically, but dynamically, i.e., not in a state of immobility, but in motion (whose laws are determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class). Motion, in its turn, is regarded from the standpoint, not only of the past, but also of the future, and that not in the vulgar sense it is understood in by the "evolutionists", who see only slow changes, but dialectically: "... in developments of such magnitude twenty years are no more than a day," Marx wrote to Engels, "though later on there may come days in which twenty years are embodied" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, p. 127).<sup>54</sup> At each stage of development, at each moment, proletarian tactics must take account of this objectively inevitable dialectics of human history, on the one hand, utilising the periods of political stagnation or of sluggish, so-called "peaceful" development in order to develop the class-consciousness, strength and militancy of the advanced class, and, on the other hand, directing all the work of this utilisation towards the "ultimate aim" of that class's advance, towards creating in it the ability to find practical solutions for great tasks in the great days, in which "twenty years are embodied". Two of Marx's arguments are of special importance in this connection: one of these is contained in *The Poverty of Philosophy* and concerns the economic struggle and economic organisations of the proletariat; the other is contained in the *Communist Manifesto* and concerns the political tasks of the proletariat. The former runs as follows: "Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance—combination. . . . Combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups . . . and in face of always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them [i.e., the workers] than that of wages. . . . In this struggle—a veritable civil war—all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and develop. Once it has reached this point, association takes on a political character."<sup>55</sup> Here we have the programme

and tactics of the economic struggle and of the trade union movement for several decades to come, for all the lengthy period in which the proletariat will prepare its forces for the "coming battle". All this should be compared with numerous references by Marx and Engels to the example of the British labour movement, showing how industrial "prosperity" leads to attempts "to buy the proletariat" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 1, p. 136),<sup>56</sup> to divert them from the struggle; how this prosperity in general "demoralises the workers" (Vol. 2, p. 218); how the British proletariat becomes "bourgeoisified"—"this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie" (Vol. 2, p. 290)<sup>57</sup>; how its "revolutionary energy" oozes away (Vol. 3, p. 124); how it will be necessary to wait a more or less lengthy space of time before "the British workers will free themselves from their apparent bourgeois infection" (Vol. 3, p. 127); how the British labour movement "lacks the mettle of the Chartists"<sup>58</sup> (1866: Vol. 3, p. 305)<sup>59</sup>; how the British workers' leaders are becoming a type midway between "a radical bourgeois and a worker" (in reference to Holyoak, Vol. 4, p. 209); how, owing to Britain's monopoly, and as long as that monopoly lasts, "the British workingman will not budge" (Vol. 4, p. 433).<sup>60</sup> The tactics of the economic struggle, in connection with the general course (*and outcome*) of the working-class movement, are considered here from a remarkably broad, comprehensive, dialectical, and genuinely revolutionary standpoint.

The *Communist Manifesto* advanced a fundamental Marxist principle on the tactics of the political struggle: "The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement."<sup>61</sup> That was why, in 1848, Marx supported the party of the "agrarian revolution" in Poland, "that party which brought about the Cracow insurrection in 1846".<sup>62</sup> In Germany, Marx, in 1848 and 1849, supported the extreme revolutionary democrats, and subsequently never retracted what he had then said about tactics. He regarded the German bourgeoisie as an element which was "inclined from the very beginning to betray the people" (only an alliance with the peasantry could have enabled the bourgeoisie to completely achieve its aims) "and compromise with the crowned representatives of the old society". Here is Marx's summing-up of the German bourgeoisie's class position in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution—an analysis which, incidentally, is a sample of a materialism that examines society in motion, and, moreover, not only from the aspect of a motion that is *backward*: "With-

out faith in itself, without faith in the people, grumbling at those above, trembling before those below ... intimidated by the world storm ... no energy in any respect, plagiarism in every respect ... without initiative ... an execrable old man who saw himself doomed to guide and deflect the first youthful impulses of a robust people in his own senile interests. ..." (*Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 1848; see *Literarischer Nachlass*, Vol. 3, p. 212).<sup>63</sup> About twenty years later, Marx declared, in a letter to Engels (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, p. 224), that the Revolution of 1848 had failed because the bourgeoisie had preferred peace with slavery to the mere prospect of a fight for freedom. When the revolutionary period of 1848-49 ended, Marx opposed any attempt to play at revolution (his struggle against Schapper and Willich), and insisted on the ability to work in the new phase, which in a quasi-"peaceful" way was preparing new revolutions. The spirit in which Marx wanted this work to be conducted is to be seen in his appraisal of the situation in Germany in 1856, the darkest period of reaction: "The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War" (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 2, p. 108).<sup>64</sup> While the democratic (bourgeois) revolution in Germany was uncompleted, Marx focussed every attention, in the tactics of the socialist proletariat, on developing the democratic energy of the peasantry. He held that Lassalle's attitude was "objectively ... a betrayal of the whole workers' movement to Prussia" (Vol. 3, p. 210), incidentally because Lassalle was tolerant of the Junkers and Prussian nationalism. "In a predominantly agricultural country," Engels wrote in 1865, in exchanging views with Marx on their forthcoming joint declaration in the press, "... it is dastardly to make an exclusive attack on the bourgeoisie in the name of the industrial proletariat but never to devote a word to the patriarchal exploitation of the rural proletariat under the lash of the great feudal aristocracy" (Vol. 3, p. 217).<sup>65</sup> From 1864 to 1870, when the period of the consummation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany was coming to an end, a period in which the Prussian and Austrian exploiting classes were struggling to complete that revolution in one way or another *from above*, Marx not only rebuked Lassalle, who was coquetting with Bismarck, but also corrected Liebknecht, who had lapsed into "Austrophilism" and a defence of particularism; Marx demanded revolutionary tactics which would combat with equal ruthlessness both Bismarck and the Austrophiles, tactics which would not be adapted to the "victor"—the Prussian Junker—but would immediately renew the revolutionary struggle against him *despite the conditions* created by the Prussian military victories (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 3, pp. 134, 136, 147, 179, 204, 210,



215, 418, 437, 440-41).<sup>66</sup> In the celebrated Address of the International of September 9, 1870, Marx warned the French proletariat against an untimely uprising, but when an uprising nevertheless took place (1871), Marx enthusiastically hailed the revolutionary initiative of the masses, who were "storming heaven" (Marx's letter to Kugelmann).<sup>67</sup> From the standpoint of Marx's dialectical materialism, the defeat of revolutionary action in that situation, as in many others, was a lesser evil, in the general course *and outcome* of the proletarian struggle, than the abandonment of a position already occupied, than surrender without battle. Such a surrender would have demoralised the proletariat and weakened its militancy. While fully appreciating the use of legal means of struggle during periods of political stagnation and the domination of bourgeois legality, Marx, in 1877 and 1878, following the passage of the Anti-Socialist Law,<sup>68</sup> sharply condemned Most's "revolutionary phrases"; no less sharply, if not more so, did he attack the opportunism that had for a time come over the official Social-Democratic Party, which did not at once display resoluteness, firmness, revolutionary spirit and a readiness to resort to an illegal struggle in response to the Anti-Socialist Law (*Briefwechsel*, Vol. 4, pp. 397, 401, 418, 422-424<sup>69</sup>; cf. also letters to Sorge)

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## THE THREE SOURCES AND THREE COMPONENT PARTS OF MARXISM<sup>70</sup>

Throughout the civilised world the teachings of Marx evoke the utmost hostility and hatred of all bourgeois science (both official and liberal), which regards Marxism as a kind of "pernicious sect". And no other attitude is to be expected, for there can be no "impartial" social science in a society based on class struggle. In one way or another, *all* official and liberal science *defends* wage slavery, whereas Marxism has declared relentless war on that slavery. To expect science to be impartial in a wage-slave society is as foolishly naïve as to expect impartiality from manufacturers on the question of whether workers' wages ought not to be increased by decreasing the profits of capital.

But this is not all. The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling "sectarianism" in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose *away from* the highroad of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already presented by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate *continuation* of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.

The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism.

It is these three sources of Marxism, which are also its component parts, that we shall outline in brief.

## I

The philosophy of Marxism is *materialism*. Throughout the modern history of Europe, and especially at the end of the eighteenth century in France, where a resolute struggle was conducted against every kind of medieval rubbish, against serfdom in institutions and ideas, materialism has proved to be the only philosophy that is consistent, true to all the teachings of natural science and hostile to superstition, cant and so forth. The enemies of democracy have, therefore, always exerted all their efforts to "refute", undermine and defame materialism, and have advocated various forms of philosophical idealism, which always, in one way or another, amounts to the defence or support of religion.

Marx and Engels defended philosophical materialism in the most determined manner and repeatedly explained how profoundly erroneous is every deviation from this basis. Their views are most clearly and fully expounded in the works of Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* and *Anti-Dühring*,<sup>71</sup> which, like the *Communist Manifesto*, are handbooks for every class-conscious worker.

But Marx did not stop at eighteenth-century materialism: he developed philosophy to a higher level. He enriched it with the achievements of German classical philosophy, especially of Hegel's system, which in its turn had led to the materialism of Feuerbach. The main achievement was *dialectics*, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of the human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter. The latest discoveries of natural science—radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements—have been a remarkable confirmation of Marx's dialectical materialism, despite the teachings of the bourgeois philosophers with their "new" reversions to old and decadent idealism.

Marx deepened and developed philosophical materialism to the full, and extended the cognition of nature to include the cognition of *human society*. His *historical materialism* was a great achievement in scientific thinking. The chaos and arbitrariness that had previously reigned in views on history and politics were replaced by a strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory, which shows how, in consequence of the growth of productive forces, out of one system of social life another and higher system develops—how capitalism, for instance, grows out of feudalism.

Just as man's knowledge reflects nature (i.e., developing matter), which exists independently of him, so man's *social knowledge* (i.e., his various views and doctrines—philosophical, religious, political and so forth) reflects the *economic system* of

society. Political institutions are a superstructure on the economic foundation. We see, for example, that the various political forms of the modern European states serve to strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat.

Marx's philosophy is a consummate philosophical materialism which has provided mankind, and especially the working class, with powerful instruments of knowledge.

## II

Having recognised that the economic system is the foundation on which the political superstructure is erected, Marx devoted his greatest attention to the study of this economic system. Marx's principal work, *Capital*, is devoted to a study of the economic system of modern, i.e., capitalist, society.

Classical political economy, before Marx, evolved in England, the most developed of the capitalist countries. Adam Smith and David Ricardo, by their investigations of the economic system, laid the foundations of the *labour theory of value*. Marx continued their work; he provided a proof of the theory and developed it consistently. He showed that the value of every commodity is determined by the quantity of socially necessary labour time spent on its production.

Where the bourgeois economists saw a relation between things (the exchange of one commodity for another) Marx revealed a *relation between people*. The exchange of commodities expresses the connection between individual producers through the market. *Money* signifies that the connection is becoming closer and closer, inseparably uniting the entire economic life of the individual producers into one whole. *Capital* signifies a further development of this connection: man's labour power becomes a commodity. The wage worker sells his labour power to the owner of land, factories and instruments of labour. The worker spends one part of the day covering the cost of maintaining himself and his family (wages), while the other part of the day he works without remuneration, creating for the capitalist *surplus-value*, the source of profit, the source of the wealth of the capitalist class.

The doctrine of surplus-value is the corner-stone of Marx's economic theory.

Capital, created by the labour of the worker, crushes the worker, ruining small proprietors and creating an army of unemployed. In industry, the victory of large-scale production is immediately apparent, but the same phenomenon is also to be observed in agriculture, where the superiority of large-scale capitalist agriculture is enhanced, the use of machinery increases and the peasant

economy, trapped by money-capital, declines and falls into ruin under the burden of its backward technique. The decline of small-scale production assumes different forms in agriculture, but the decline itself is an indisputable fact.

By destroying small-scale production, capital leads to an increase in productivity of labour and to the creation of a monopoly position for the associations of big capitalists. Production itself becomes more and more social—hundreds of thousands and millions of workers become bound together in a regular economic organism—but the product of this collective labour is appropriated by a handful of capitalists. Anarchy of production, crises, the furious chase after markets and the insecurity of existence of the mass of the population are intensified.

By increasing the dependence of the workers on capital, the capitalist system creates the great power of united labour.

Marx traced the development of capitalism from embryonic commodity economy, from simple exchange, to its highest forms, to large-scale production.

And the experience of all capitalist countries, old and new, year by year demonstrates clearly the truth of this Marxian doctrine to increasing numbers of workers.

Capitalism has triumphed all over the world, but this triumph is only the prelude to the triumph of labour over capital.

### III

When feudalism was overthrown, and "free" capitalist society appeared in the world, it at once became apparent that this freedom meant a new system of oppression and exploitation of the working people. Various socialist doctrines immediately emerged as a reflection of and protest against this oppression. Early socialism, however, was *utopian* socialism. It criticised capitalist society, it condemned and damned it, it dreamed of its destruction, it had visions of a better order and endeavoured to convince the rich of the immorality of exploitation.

But utopian socialism could not indicate the real solution. It could not explain the real nature of wage slavery under capitalism, it could not reveal the laws of capitalist development, or show what *social force* is capable of becoming the creator of a new society.

Meanwhile, the stormy revolutions which everywhere in Europe, and especially in France, accompanied the fall of feudalism, of serfdom, more and more clearly revealed the *struggle of classes* as the basis and the driving force of all development.

Not a single victory of political freedom over the feudal class

was won except against desperate resistance. Not a single capitalist country evolved on a more or less free and democratic basis except by a life-and-death struggle between the various classes of capitalist society.

The genius of Marx lies in his having been the first to deduce from this the lesson world history teaches and to apply that lesson consistently. The deduction he made is the doctrine of the *class struggle*.

People always have been the foolish victims of deception and self-deception in politics, and they always will be until they have learnt to seek out the *interests* of some class or other behind all moral, religious, political and social phrases, declarations and promises. Champions of reforms and improvements will always be fooled by the defenders of the old order until they realise that every old institution, however barbarous and rotten it may appear to be, is kept going by the forces of certain ruling classes. And there is *only one* way of smashing the resistance of those classes, and that is to find, in the very society which surrounds us, the forces which can—and, owing to their social position, *must*—constitute the power capable of sweeping away the old and creating the new, and to enlighten and organise those forces for the struggle.

Marx's philosophical materialism alone has shown the proletariat the way out of the spiritual slavery in which all oppressed classes have hitherto languished. Marx's economic theory alone has explained the true position of the proletariat in the general system of capitalism.

Independent organisations of the proletariat are multiplying all over the world, from America to Japan and from Sweden to South Africa. The proletariat is becoming enlightened and educated by waging its class struggle; it is ridding itself of the prejudices of bourgeois society; it is rallying its ranks ever more closely and is learning to gauge the measure of its successes; it is steeling its forces and is growing irresistibly.

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## MARXISM AND REVISIONISM

There is a well-known saying that if geometrical axioms affected human interests attempts would certainly be made to refute them. Theories of natural history which conflicted with the old prejudices of theology provoked, and still provoke, the most rabid opposition. No wonder, therefore, that the Marxian doctrine, which directly serves to enlighten and organise the advanced class in modern society, indicates the tasks facing this class and demonstrates the inevitable replacement (by virtue of economic development) of the present system by a new order—no wonder that this doctrine has had to fight for every step forward in the course of its life.

Needless to say, this applies to bourgeois science and philosophy, officially taught by official professors in order to befuddle the rising generation of the propertied classes and to “coach” it against internal and foreign enemies. This science will not even hear of Marxism, declaring that it has been refuted and annihilated. Marx is attacked with equal zest by young scholars who are making a career by refuting socialism, and by decrepit elders who are preserving the tradition of all kinds of outworn “systems”. The progress of Marxism, the fact that its ideas are spreading and taking firm hold among the working class, inevitably increase the frequency and intensity of these bourgeois attacks on Marxism, which becomes stronger, more hardened and more vigorous every time it is “annihilated” by official science.

But even among doctrines connected with the struggle of the working class, and current mainly among the proletariat, Marxism by no means consolidated its position all at once. In the first half-century of its existence (from the 1840s on) Marxism was engaged in combating theories fundamentally hostile to it. In

the early forties Marx and Engels settled accounts with the radical Young Hegelians whose viewpoint was that of philosophical idealism. At the end of the forties the struggle began in the field of economic doctrine, against Proudhonism.<sup>72</sup> The fifties saw the completion of this struggle, in criticism of the parties and doctrines which manifested themselves in the stormy year of 1848. In the sixties the struggle shifted from the field of general theory to one closer to the direct labour movement: the ejection of Bakuninism from the International. In the early seventies the stage in Germany was occupied for a short while by the Proudhonist Mühlberger, and in the late seventies by the positivist Dühring. But the influence of both on the proletariat was already absolutely insignificant. Marxism was already gaining an unquestionable victory over all other ideologies in the labour movement.

By the nineties this victory was in the main completed. Even in the Latin countries, where the traditions of Proudhonism held their ground longest of all, the workers' parties in effect built their programmes and their tactics on Marxist foundations. The revived international organisation of the labour movement—in the shape of periodical international congresses—from the outset, and almost without a struggle, adopted the Marxist standpoint in all essentials. But after Marxism had ousted all the more or less integral doctrines hostile to it, the tendencies expressed in those doctrines began to seek other channels. The forms and causes of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half-century of the existence of Marxism began (in the nineties) with the struggle of a trend hostile to Marxism within Marxism itself.

Bernstein, a one-time orthodox Marxist, gave his name to this trend,<sup>73</sup> by coming forward with the most noise and with the most purposeful expression of amendments to Marx, revision of Marx, revisionism. Even in Russia where—owing to the economic backwardness of the country and the preponderance of a peasant population weighed down by the relics of serfdom—non-Marxist socialism has naturally held its ground longest of all, it is plainly passing into revisionism before our very eyes. Both in the agrarian question (the programme of the municipalisation of all land) and in general questions of programme and tactics, our Social Narodniks are more and more substituting “amendments” to Marx for the moribund and obsolescent remnants of their old system, which in its own way was integral and fundamentally hostile to Marxism.

Pre-Marxist socialism has been defeated. It is continuing the struggle, no longer on its own independent ground, but on the general ground of Marxism, as revisionism. Let us, then, examine the ideological content of revisionism.



In the sphere of philosophy revisionism followed in the wake of bourgeois professorial "science". The professors went "back to Kant"—and revisionism dragged along after the neo-Kantians.<sup>74</sup> The professors repeated the platitudes that priests have uttered a thousand times against philosophical materialism—and the revisionists, smiling indulgently, mumbled (word for word after the latest *Handbuch*) that materialism had been "refuted" long ago. The professors treated Hegel as a "dead dog",<sup>75</sup> and while themselves preaching idealism, only an idealism a thousand times more petty and banal than Hegel's, contemptuously shrugged their shoulders at dialectics—and the revisionists floundered after them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarisation of science, replacing "artful" (and revolutionary) dialectics by "simple" (and tranquil) "evolution". The professors earned their official salaries by adjusting both their idealist and their "critical" systems to the dominant medieval "philosophy" (i. e., to theology)—and the revisionists drew close to them, trying to make religion a "private affair", not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class.

What such "amendments" to Marx really meant in class terms need not be stated: it is self-evident. We shall simply note that the only Marxist in the international Social-Democratic movement to criticise the incredible platitudes of the revisionists from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism was Plekhanov. This must be stressed all the more emphatically since profoundly mistaken attempts are being made at the present time to smuggle in old and reactionary philosophical rubbish disguised as a criticism of Plekhanov's tactical opportunism.\*

Passing to political economy, it must be noted first of all that in this sphere the "amendments" of the revisionists were much more comprehensive and circumstantial; attempts were made to influence the public by "new data on economic development". It was said that concentration and the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production do not occur in agriculture at all, while they proceed very slowly in commerce and industry. It was said that crises had now become rarer and weaker, and that cartels and trusts would probably enable capital to eliminate them altogether. It was said that the "theory of collapse" to which capitalism is heading was unsound, owing to the tendency of class antagonisms to become milder and less acute. It was said,

\* See *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism* by Bogdanov, Bazarov and others. This is not the place to discuss the book, and I must at present confine myself to stating that in the very near future I shall prove in a series of articles, or in a separate pamphlet, that *everything* I have said in the text about neo-Kantian revisionists essentially applies also to these "new" neo-Hunist and neo-Berkeleyan revisionists.<sup>76</sup> (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 14.—Ed.)

finally, that it would not be amiss to correct Marx's theory of value, too, in accordance with Böhm-Bawerk.

The fight against the revisionists on these questions resulted in as fruitful a revival of the theoretical thought in international socialism as did Engels's controversy with Dühring twenty years earlier. The arguments of the revisionists were analysed with the help of facts and figures. It was proved that the revisionists were systematically painting a rose-coloured picture of modern small-scale production. The technical and commercial superiority of large-scale *production* over small-scale production not only in industry, but also in agriculture, is proved by irrefutable facts. But commodity production is far less developed in agriculture, and modern statisticians and economists are, as a rule, not very skilful in picking out the special branches (sometimes even the operations) in agriculture which indicate that agriculture is being progressively drawn into the process of *exchange* in world economy. Small-scale production maintains itself on the ruins of natural economy by constant worsening of diet, by chronic starvation, by lengthening of the working day, by deterioration in the quality and the care of cattle, in a word, by the very methods whereby handicraft production maintained itself against capitalist manufacture. Every advance in science and technology inevitably and relentlessly undermines the foundations of small-scale production in capitalist society; and it is the task of socialist political economy to investigate this process in all its forms, often complicated and intricate, and to demonstrate to the small producer the impossibility of his holding his own under capitalism, the hopelessness of peasant farming under capitalism, and the necessity for the peasant to adopt the standpoint of the proletarian. On this question the revisionists sinned, in the scientific sense, by superficial generalisations based on facts selected one-sidedly and without reference to the system of capitalism as a whole. From the political point of view, they sinned by the fact that they inevitably, whether they wanted to or not, invited or urged the peasant to adopt the attitude of a small proprietor (i.e. the attitude of the bourgeoisie) instead of urging him to adopt the point of view of the revolutionary proletarian.

The position of revisionism was even worse as regards the theory of crises and the theory of collapse. Only for a very short time could people, and then only the most short-sighted, think of refashioning the foundations of Marx's theory under the influence of a few years of industrial boom and prosperity. Realities very soon made it clear to the revisionists that crises were not a thing of the past: prosperity was followed by a crisis. The forms, the sequence, the picture of particular crises changed, but crises

remained an inevitable component of the capitalist system. While uniting production, the cartels and trusts at the same time, and in a way that was obvious to all, aggravated the anarchy of production, the insecurity of existence of the proletariat and the oppression of capital, thereby intensifying class antagonisms to an unprecedented degree. That capitalism is heading for a breakdown—in the sense both of individual political and economic crises and of the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system—has been made particularly clear, and on a particularly large scale, precisely by the new giant trusts. The recent financial crisis in America and the appalling increase of unemployment all over Europe, to say nothing of the impending industrial crisis to which many symptoms are pointing—all this has resulted in the recent “theories” of the revisionists having been forgotten by everybody, including, apparently, many of the revisionists themselves. But the lessons which this instability of the intellectuals had given the working class must not be forgotten.

As to the theory of value, it need only be said that apart from the vaguest of hints and sighs, *à la* Böhm-Bawerk, the revisionists have contributed absolutely nothing, and have therefore left no traces whatever on the development of scientific thought.

In the sphere of politics, revisionism did really try to revise the foundation of Marxism, namely, the doctrine of the class struggle. Political freedom, democracy and universal suffrage remove the ground for the class struggle—we were told—and render untrue the old proposition of the *Communist Manifesto* that the working men have no country. For, they said, since the “will of the majority” prevails in a democracy, one must neither regard the state as an organ of class rule, nor reject alliances with the progressive, social-reform bourgeoisie against the reactionaries.

It cannot be disputed that these arguments of the revisionists amounted to a fairly well-balanced system of views, namely, the old and well-known liberal-bourgeois views. The liberals have always said that bourgeois parliamentarism destroys classes and class divisions, since the right to vote and the right to participate in the government of the country are shared by all citizens without distinction. The whole history of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the whole history of the Russian revolution in the early twentieth, clearly show how absurd such views are. Economic distinctions are not mitigated but aggravated and intensified under the freedom of “democratic” capitalism. Parliamentarism does not eliminate, but lays bare the innate character even of the most democratic bourgeois republics as organs of class oppression. By helping to enlighten

and to organise immeasurably wider masses of the population than those which previously took an active part in political events, parliamentarism does not make for the elimination of crises and political revolutions, but for the maximum intensification of civil war during such revolutions. The events in Paris in the spring of 1871 and the events in Russia in the winter of 1905 showed as clearly as could be how inevitably this intensification comes about. The French bourgeoisie without a moment's hesitation made a deal with the enemy of the whole nation, with the foreign army which had ruined its country, in order to crush the proletarian movement. Whoever does not understand the inevitable inner dialectics of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy—which leads to an even sharper decision of the argument by mass violence than formerly—will never be able on the basis of this parliamentarism to conduct propaganda and agitation consistent in principle, really preparing the working-class masses for victorious participation in such “arguments”. The experience of alliances, agreements and blocs with the social-reform liberals in the West and with the liberal reformists (Cadets<sup>77</sup>) in the Russian revolution, has convincingly shown that these agreements only blunt the consciousness of the masses, that they do not enhance but weaken the actual significance of their struggle, by linking fighters with elements who are least capable of fighting and most vacillating and treacherous. Millerandism<sup>78</sup> in France—the biggest experiment in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, a really national scale—has provided a practical appraisal of revisionism that will never be forgotten by the proletariat all over the world.

A natural complement to the economic and political tendencies of revisionism was its attitude to the ultimate aim of the socialist movement. “The movement is everything, the ultimate aim is nothing”—this catch-phrase of Bernstein's expresses the substance of revisionism better than many long disquisitions. To determine its conduct from case to case, to adapt itself to the events of the day and to the chopping and changing of petty politics, to forget the primary interests of the proletariat and the basic features of the whole capitalist system, of all capitalist evolution, to sacrifice these primary interests for the real or assumed advantages of the moment—such is the policy of revisionism. And it patently follows from the very nature of this policy that it may assume an infinite variety of forms, and that every more or less “new” question, every more or less unexpected and unforeseen turn of events, even though it changes the basic line of development only to an insignificant degree and only for the briefest period, will always inevitably give rise to one variety of revisionism or another.

The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon. No thinking socialist who is in the least informed can have the slightest doubt that the relation between the orthodox and the Bernsteinians in Germany, the Guesdists and the Jaurèsists (and now particularly the Broussists) in France,<sup>79</sup> the Social-Democratic Federation<sup>80</sup> and the Independent Labour Party in Great Britain,<sup>81</sup> Brouckère and Vandervelde in Belgium,<sup>82</sup> the Integralists and the Reformists in Italy,<sup>83</sup> the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia, is everywhere essentially similar, notwithstanding the immense variety of national conditions and historical factors in the present state of all these countries. In reality, the "division" within the present international socialist movement is now proceeding along the *same* lines in all the various countries of the world, which testifies to a tremendous advance compared with thirty or forty years ago, when heterogeneous trends in the various countries were struggling within the one international socialist movement. And that "revisionism from the left" which has taken shape in the Latin countries as "revolutionary syndicalism",<sup>84</sup> is also adapting itself to Marxism, "amending" it: Labriola in Italy and Lagardelle in France frequently appeal from Marx who is understood wrongly to Marx who is understood rightly.

We cannot stop here to analyse the ideological content of *this* revisionism, which as yet is far from having developed to the same extent as opportunist revisionism: it has not yet become international, has not yet stood the test of a single big practical battle with a socialist party in any single country. We confine ourselves therefore to that "revisionism from the right" which was described above.

Wherein lies its inevitability in capitalist society? Why is it more profound than the differences of national peculiarities and of degrees of capitalist development? Because in every capitalist country, side by side with the proletariat, there are always broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors. Capitalism arose and is constantly arising out of small production. A number of new "middle strata" are inevitably brought into existence again and again by capitalism (appendages to the factory, work at home, small workshops scattered all over the country to meet the requirements of big industries, such as the bicycle and automobile industries, etc.). These new small producers are just as inevitably being cast again into the ranks of the proletariat. It is quite natural that the petty-bourgeois world outlook should again and again crop up in the ranks of the broad workers' parties. It is quite natural that this should be so and always will be so, right up to the changes of fortune that will take

place in the proletarian revolution. For it would be a profound mistake to think that the "complete" proletarianisation of the majority of the population is essential for bringing about such a revolution. What we now frequently experience only in the domain of ideology, namely, disputes over theoretical amendments to Marx; what now crops up in practice only over individual partial issues of the labour movement, as tactical differences with the revisionists and splits on this basis—is bound to be experienced by the working class on an incomparably larger scale when the proletarian revolution will sharpen all disputed issues, will focus all differences on points which are of the most immediate importance in determining the conduct of the masses, and will make it necessary in the heat of the fight to distinguish enemies from friends, and to cast out bad allies in order to deal decisive blows at the enemy.

The ideological struggle waged by revolutionary Marxism against revisionism at the end of the nineteenth century is but the prelude to the great revolutionary battles of the proletariat, which is marching forward to the complete victory of its cause despite all the waverings and weaknesses of the petty bourgeoisie.

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## THE HERITAGE WE RENOUNCE

Referring, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*,<sup>85</sup> No. 10, 1897, to a comment by Mr. Minsky on the "dialectical materialists", Mr. Mikhailovsky says: "He" (Mr. Minsky) "must know that these people do not acknowledge any continuity with the past and emphatically renounce the heritage" (p. 179)—that is, the "heritage of the 1860-70s", which Mr. V. Rozanov solemnly renounced in 1891 in *Moskovskiy Uedomosti*<sup>86</sup> (p. 178).

Mr. Mikhailovsky's statement about the "Russian disciples" is a falsehood. True, he is not the only, and not the independent, author of the falsehood that "the Russian disciples renounce the heritage"—it has been reiterated for quite a long time now by practically all the representatives of the liberal-Narodnik press<sup>87</sup> when fighting the "disciples".<sup>88</sup> As far as we remember, when Mr. Mikhailovsky began his fierce war on the "disciples" he had not yet invented this falsehood but others had done so before him. Later he, too, chose to seize upon it. The further the "disciples" developed their views in Russian literature, the more minutely and thoroughly they set forth their opinions on a number of issues, both theoretical and practical, the more rarely did one find the hostile press objecting in substance to the fundamental tenets of the new trend, to the view that Russian capitalism is progressive, that the Narodnik idealisation of the small producer is absurd, that the explanation of trends of social thought and of legal and political institutions must be sought in the material interests of the various classes of Russian society. These fundamental tenets were hushed up, it was—and still is—thought best to say nothing about them, but fabrications to discredit the new trend were concocted with all the greater fertility. One of these fabrications—"shabby fabrications"—is the modish phrase that "the Russian disciples renounce the heritage", that they have broken

with the best traditions of the best, the most progressive section of Russian society, that they have severed the democratic thread, etc., etc., and all the many other ways in which this is expressed. The fact that such phrases are so widely used prompts us to undertake a detailed examination and refutation of them. In order that our exposition may not appear unsupported, we shall begin by drawing an historico-literary parallel between two "essayists of the countryside", chosen in order to describe the "heritage". Let us say in advance that we shall confine ourselves exclusively to economic and social questions, that of the "heritage", we shall examine only these, leaving aside philosophical, literary, aesthetic and other problems.

## I ONE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE "HERITAGE"

Thirty years ago, in 1867, *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*<sup>89</sup> began publishing a series of essays by Skaldin, under the title *In the Backwoods and in the Capital*. The essays appeared over a period of three years, 1867-69. In 1870 the author gathered them together in a single volume bearing the same title.\* A perusal of this book, now almost forgotten, is extremely instructive from the angle of the subject under discussion, i.e., the relation in which the representatives of the "heritage" stand to the Narodniks and the "Russian disciples". The title of the book is inaccurate. The author himself was conscious of this, and he explains in a foreword that his theme is the attitude of the "capital" to the "countryside", in other words, that his book is a series of social essays on rural conditions, and that he does not propose to speak of the capital specifically. Or rather, he might have proposed to do so, but does not find it expedient: *ως ὀφείλωμι — οὐ βούλομαι, ως δε βούλομαι — οὐ δύναμαι* (for I will not write as I may, and may not write as I will), Skaldin says, borrowing the words of a Greek writer to explain the inexpediency

Let us give a brief exposition of Skaldin's views

We shall begin with the peasant Reform<sup>90</sup>—that initial point from which all who wish to expound their general views on economic and social problems must, even to this day, inevitably begin. Very much space is devoted to the peasant Reform in Skaldin's book. He was perhaps the first writer who—on a broad basis of facts and a detailed examination of all aspects of life in the countryside—systematically showed the poverty-stricken

\* Skaldin, *In the Backwoods and in the Capital*, St Petersburg, 1870 (p. 451). We have not been able to obtain copies of *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* for this period and have used only the book.



state of the peasants *after* the Reform, the deterioration of their conditions, the new forms of their subjection, economic, legal and in daily life—the first, in a word, to show all that has since been elucidated and demonstrated in such detail and thoroughness in numerous investigations and surveys. Today all these truths are no longer new. At that time they were not only new, but aroused distrust in liberal society, which feared that behind these references to the so-called “defects of the Reform” lurked a condemnation of it and concealed support for serfdom. Skaldin’s views are the more interesting because he was a contemporary of the Reform (and even perhaps had a hand in it. We have no historical or literary information or biographical data about him at our disposal). Consequently, his views are based on direct observation both of the “capital” and the “countryside” of the time, and not on an armchair study of printed material.

What first of all strikes the contemporary reader, who is accustomed to the Narodniks’ sickly gushing over the peasant Reform, is the extreme *sobriety* of Skaldin’s views on the subject. He looks at the Reform without any illusions or idealisation: he sees it as a transaction between two parties, the landlords and the peasants, who until then had used the land in common on definite terms and now had divided it, the division being accompanied by a change in the legal status of both parties. The factor which determined the mode of division and the size of the share of each party was their respective interests. These interests determined the ambitions of both parties, while the fact that one of them was able to have a direct hand in the Reform itself, and in the practical working-out of the various questions connected with its implementation, determined, among other things, that party’s dominant position. That is how Skaldin understands the Reform. He dwells in particular detail on the principal question of the Reform, the allotments and land redemption payments, reverting to it time and again in the course of his essays. (Skaldin’s book is divided into eleven essays, each of them self-contained, their form reminding one of letters from the countryside. The first essay is dated 1866, and the last, 1869.) It goes without saying that on the subject of the so-called “land-poor” peasants, there is nothing in Skaldin’s book that is new to the contemporary reader, but at the end of the sixties his testimony was both new and valuable. We shall not, of course, recapitulate it, but shall only remark on that feature of his description of the facts which distinguishes him—to his advantage—from the Narodniks. Skaldin does not talk about “land poverty”, but about the “excessive amount of land cut off from the peasants’ allotments” (p. 213, also p. 214 and many other places; cf. title of the third essay), and says that the largest allotments established by the Regula-

tions proved to be smaller than those they had before (p. 257), incidentally citing some extremely characteristic and typical opinions of peasants on this aspect of the Reform.<sup>3</sup> Skaldin's explanations and proofs of this fact are very circumstantial, forceful and even vehement for a writer who as a rule is extremely moderate and temperate, and whose general outlook is undoubtedly bourgeois. The fact, then, must have been too starkly evident, if such a writer as Skaldin speaks of it so emphatically. Skaldin also speaks very emphatically and circumstantially of the severe burden of the payments, and supports his statements with many facts. "Inordinate taxation," reads a sub-title to the third essay (1867), "is the chief cause of their" (the peasants') "poverty", and Skaldin shows that taxation is higher than the peasants' returns from the land, and he cites from the *Proceedings of the Commission on Taxation* data relative to the incidence of taxation of the upper and lower classes in Russia which show that 76% of the taxation falls on the lower classes and 17% on the upper, whereas in Western Europe the correlation is everywhere incomparably more favourable to the lower classes. A sub-title to the seventh essay (1868) reads, "Excessive money dues are one of the chief causes of poverty among the peasants", and the author shows that the new conditions of life at once demanded money, money and more money of the peasant, that the Regulation made it a principle to compensate the landlords for the abolition of serfdom as well (252), and that the amount of the quit-rent was based "on sworn information supplied by the landlords, their stewards and village elders, that is, on absolutely arbitrary data not deserving of the slightest credence" (255), in consequence of which the average quit-rents computed by the commissions were higher than the existing average quit-rents. "Added to the burden of taxes borne by the peasants was the loss of land which they had used for centuries" (258). "Had the redemption price of the land not been assessed on the basis of the capitalised amount of the quit-rents, but on the basis of its actual value at the time of the emancipation, the redemption could have been paid off very easily and would not even have required the assistance of the government, or the issue of credit certificates" (264). "Redemption, which was designed by the Regulation of February 19 to make things easier for the peasants and to con-

Our land has been so trimmed down by him" (author's italics) "that we can't live without this cut-off land, he has surrounded us on all sides with his fields and we have nowhere to pasture our cattle so you have to pay for your allotment and on top of that you have to pay for the cut-off land, just as much as he asks" "How does that better us" said one literate and experienced muzhik, a former quit-renter. We are paying the same quit-rent as before though our land has been trimmed down."

summate the work of improving their conditions, in reality often has the effect of putting them into more straitened circumstances" (269). We cite these excerpts—which, in themselves, are of little interest and are in part out-of-date—in order to show how energetically the peasants' interests were defended by a writer who was hostile to the village commune and whose opinions on a whole number of questions were those of a true member of the Manchester School.<sup>91</sup> It is very instructive to note that nearly all the useful and non-reactionary precepts of Narodism fully coincide with those of this Mancunian. It goes without saying that, such being Skaldin's opinion of the Reform, he could not possibly sentimentally idealise it in the way the Narodniks did, and still do, when they say that it sanctioned people's production, that it was superior to the West-European peasant reforms, that it made a *tabula rasa* of Russia, and so on. Skaldin did not and could not say anything of the kind; further, he said plainly that in our country peasant Reform was less advantageous, less beneficial to the peasants than in the West. "The question will be put plainly," he wrote, "if we ask ourselves why the beneficial consequences of the emancipation in our country were not growing with the steady speed with which they did, say, in Prussia or Saxony in the first quarter of the present century" (221). "In Prussia, and throughout Germany, the peasants paid not for the redemption of their allotments, which had long been recognised as their property by law, but for the redemption of their compulsory services to the landlords" (272).

Let us now pass from the economic to the legal aspect of the Reform, as Skaldin sees it. Skaldin is a bitter foe of collective responsibility,<sup>92</sup> of the passport system, and of the patriarchal power of the peasant "commune" (and of the urban commune) over its members. In the third essay (1867) he insists on the abolition of collective responsibility, the poll tax and the passport system, on the necessity for an equitable property tax, and on the replacement of passports by free and permanent certificates. "In no other civilised country is there a tax on internal passports" (109). We know that this tax was only abolished in 1897. In the title to the fourth essay, we read: "arbitrary actions of village communes and urban dumas in sending out passports and levying taxes on absentee payers".... "Collective responsibility is a heavy burden which efficient and industrious husbandmen have to bear on account of idlers and wastrels" (126). Skaldin is disposed to attribute the differentiation of the peasantry, which was already to be observed at that time, to the personal qualities of those who get on or go under. He describes in detail the difficulties peasants living in St. Petersburg experience in obtaining or prolonging passports, and repudiates those who would retort that "thank God,

all this multitude of landless peasants have not been registered in the towns, have not increased the numbers of propertyless town-dwellers" (130). . . . "This barbarous collective responsibility. . . ." (131). . . . "Can people placed in such a position be called free citizens? Are they not the same old *glebae adscripti*?\*" (132). The peasant Reform is blamed. "But is the peasant Reform to blame for the fact that the law, having released the peasant from his bond to the landlord, has devised nothing to deliver him from his bond to his commune and place of registration? . . . Where are the attributes of civil liberty, if the peasant is not free to decide either his place of domicile or manner of occupation?" (132). Skaldin very accurately and aptly calls our peasant a "settled proletarian" (231).\*\* In the heading to the eighth essay (1868) we read: "the fact that the peasants are tied to their communes and allotments prevents improvement of their conditions. . . . It is an obstacle to the development of outside industries." "Apart from the ignorance of the peasants and the burden of progressively mounting taxation, one of the causes retarding the development of peasant labour and, consequently, of peasant prosperity, is the fact that they are tied to their communes and allotments. The tying of the labourer to one place and the shackling of the rural commune in unbreakable fetters—this in itself is an extremely unfavourable condition for the development of labour, private enterprise and small landed property" (284). "Bound to their allotments and communities, and unable to apply their labour where it would be more productive and of greater advantage to themselves, the peasants are, as it were, frozen in that congested, herdlike, unproductive form of life in which they emerged from serfdom" (285). Skaldin, consequently, regards these aspects of peasant life from the purely bourgeois standpoint, but in spite of that (and, perhaps, because of it), his assessment of the harm caused to all social development and to the peasants themselves by the fact that the latter are tied down is very accurate. And it causes particular harm (let us add) to the lowest sections of the peasantry, the rural proletariat. Skaldin says very

\* Peasants in the Roman Empire were bound to definite plots of land which they could not abandon however unprofitable their cultivation might be — *Ed*. . . . Skaldin very circumstantially demonstrates the correctness not only of the first, but also of the second part of this definition (proletarian). He devotes much space in his essays to a description of the peasants' dependent status and their poverty, to a description of the hard lot of the agricultural labourer, to a "description of the 1868 famine" (heading of the fifth essay) and of the diverse forms of peasant bondage and humiliation. There were people in the sixties, as there are in the nineties, who sought to hush up or deny the existence of famine. Skaldin passionately opposes them. It would of course be superfluous to give detailed excerpts on this point.

aply: "the concern of the law that the peasants shall not remain without land is admirable; but it should not be forgotten that the concern of the peasants themselves on this score is incomparably greater than that of any legislator" (286). "Apart from the fact that the peasant is bound to his allotment and his commune, even his temporary departure to earn something elsewhere, involves considerable difficulty and expense, owing to collective responsibility and the passport system" (298). "For many peasants, in my opinion, a way out of their difficult situation would be opened if . . . measures were taken to make it easier for peasants to give up their land" (294). Here Skaldin is expressing a wish that runs sharply counter to the Narodnik projects, which all tend in the very opposite direction, namely, to perpetuate the village commune,<sup>93</sup> to make the allotments inalienable, etc. There has been ample evidence since then to show that Skaldin was perfectly right: the fact that the peasant remains tied to the land, and that the peasant commune is an exclusive social estate only worsens the position of the rural proletariat and retards the country's economic development, while being unable in any degree to protect the "settled proletarian" from the worst forms of bondage and subjection, or from the decline of his wages and living standards to the very lowest level.

The reader may have already seen from the above-quoted excerpts that Skaldin is a foe of the village commune. He objects to the commune and to land redistribution because he favours private property, enterprise and so on (p. 142, et seq.). To the defenders of the village commune Skaldin retorts that "the ancient common law" has outlived its day. "In all countries," he writes, "as the rural dwellers came into contact with a civilised environment, their common law lost its primeval purity and became subject to corruption and distortion. The same is to be observed in our country: the power of the commune is gradually being turned into the power of the village exploiters and rural clerks and, instead of protecting the person of the peasant, is a heavy burden upon him" (143)—a very true observation, corroborated by endless facts in these thirty years. In Skaldin's opinion, "the patriarchal family, communal ownership of the land and common law" have been irrevocably condemned by history. "Those who would preserve these venerable monuments of past centuries for us in perpetuity, show thereby that they are more capable of being carried away by an idea than of penetrating into realities and grasping the irresistible march of history" (162), and to this correct observation Skaldin adds hot Manchester School philippics. "Community land tenure," he says elsewhere, "places every peasant in slavish subjection to the whole community" (222). Therefore, Skaldin's unreserved hostility to the village commune

from the purely bourgeois standpoint is combined with his consistent defence of the peasants' interests. Hostile though he is to the village commune, Skaldin does not advance foolish projects for forcibly abolishing the commune and forcibly introducing some other, similar system of land ownership, such as are usually concocted by the present-day opponents of the village commune, who favour gross interferences in the peasants' life and attack the village commune from anything but the standpoint of the peasants' interests. Skaldin, on the contrary, strongly protests against being classed with the believers in "forcible abolition of communal land tenure" (144). "The Regulation of February 19," he says, "very wisely left it to the peasants themselves... to pass ... from communal to family tenure. Indeed, none but the peasants themselves can properly decide the best time for such passage." Consequently, Skaldin is opposed to the village commune only for the reason that it hampers economic development, prevents the peasant from withdrawing from the commune and giving up his land, that is, for the same reason that the "Russian disciples" are opposed to it today; this hostility has nothing in common with defence of the selfish interests of the landlords, with defence of the survivals and the spirit of serfdom, with advocacy of interference in the life of the peasants. It is very important to note this difference, because the present-day Narodniks, who are accustomed to seeing enemies of the village commune only in the camp of *Moskovskiy Uedomosti* and the like, very willingly pretend to be oblivious to *any other* kind of hostility to the village commune.

Skaldin's general opinion about the causes of the peasants' distressed condition is that they are all survivals of serfdom. Describing the famine of 1868, he remarks that the serf-owners pointed to it with malicious glee, ascribing it to the dissoluteness of the peasants, to the abolition of the landlords' tutelage, and so on. Skaldin heatedly refutes these views. "The causes of the impoverishment of the peasants," he says, "*were inherited from serfdom*" (212), and are not the result of its abolition; they are the general causes which keep the majority of our peasants at a level bordering on that of the proletariat"—and he repeats the above-quoted opinions of the Reform. It is absurd to attack the family division of the land: "Even if divisions do injure the peasants' material interests for a while, they save their personal freedom and the moral dignity of the peasant family, that is, those higher human blessings without which no civil progress is possible" (217), and Skaldin rightly points to the real reasons for the campaign against land divisions: "many landlords highly exaggerate the harm caused by divisions, blaming them, as well as drunkenness, for all the consequences of the var-

ious causes of the peasants' poverty, which the landlords are so unwilling to recognise" (218). To those who say that much is being written today about the peasants' poverty, but that formerly it was not so and that therefore the peasants' conditions must have deteriorated, Skaldin replies that: "In order to form a judgement of the results of the peasants' emancipation from the landlords' power, by comparing the peasants' present with their former condition, it would have been necessary, while serfdom still prevailed, to trim down the peasants' allotments as they have been now trimmed down, and to tax the peasants with all the duties which have appeared since the emancipation, and then see how the peasants would have borne such conditions" (219). It is a supremely characteristic and important feature of Skaldin's views that he reduces *all* the causes of the deterioration in the peasants' condition to survivals of serfdom, to its legacy of labour service, quit-rent, cut-off land, and the peasants' lack of rights, and immobility. Skaldin not only does not see that the causes of the peasants' impoverishment might be found in the very structure of the new socio-economic relations, in the very structure of the post-Reform economy; he absolutely refuses to entertain the thought, being profoundly convinced that the complete abolition of all these survivals of serfdom would usher in an era of universal well-being. His views, in fact, are negative: remove the obstacles to the free development of the peasantry, remove the shackles bequeathed by serfdom, and everything will be for the best in this best of possible worlds. Skaldin writes: "Here" (i.e., in relation to the peasantry) "there is only one course the government can follow: to *eliminate* steadily and unflaggingly *the causes* which have reduced our peasants to their present state of dullness and poverty and which do not allow them to rise to their feet" (224, my italics). Highly characteristic in this respect is the reply given by Skaldin to those who defend the "commune" (that is, binding the peasants to the village communes and allotments) on the ground that, without it, "a rural proletariat will emerge". "This objection," Skaldin says, "falls to the ground when we remember what boundless tracts of land lie idle in our country from lack of hands to cultivate them. If the law did not hamper the natural distribution of manpower, the only people who would be real proletarians in Russia would be the professional beggars or the incorrigibly vicious and dissipated" (144)—the typical view of the eighteenth-century economists and "enlighteners", who believed that abolition of serfdom and all its survivals would usher in a reign of universal well-being on earth. The Narodnik would no doubt look down on Skaldin with disdain and say that he was simply a bourgeois. Yes, of course, Skaldin was a bourgeois, but he was a representative of

the progressive bourgeois ideology which the Narodniks have replaced by one that is petty-bourgeois and, on a whole number of points, reactionary. And this "bourgeois" had a better idea than the Narodnik of how to defend those practical and real interests of the peasants which coincided, and coincide now, with the requirements of social development generally!\*

To complete our account of Skaldin's views, let us add that he is opposed to the system of social estates, advocates a single court of justice for all of them, sympathises "theoretically" with the idea that the volost authorities should not be constituted on the basis of social estates, is an ardent advocate of public education, especially general education, favours local self-government and Zemstvo<sup>94</sup> institutions, and believes that land credits, especially small, should be widely available, for there is a strong desire among the peasants to buy land. Here, too, Skaldin is a true "Mancunian": he says, for instance, that Zemstvo and municipal banks are "a patriarchal or primitive form of bank" and should give way to private banks, which are "vastly superior" (80). The land might be endowed with value "through the stimulation of industrial and commercial activity in our provinces" (71), and so on.

To sum up. In outlook, Skaldin may be called a bourgeois enlightener. His views are very reminiscent of those of the eighteenth-century economists (correspondingly refracted, of course, in the prism of Russian conditions), and he reflected the general "enlightenment" character of the "heritage" of the sixties quite vividly. Like the West-European enlighteners and the majority of the literary representatives of the sixties, Skaldin was imbued with a violent hostility to serfdom and *all its* economic, social and legal products. That was the first characteristic feature of the "enlightener". The second characteristic feature common to all the Russian enlighteners was ardent advocacy of education, self-government, liberty, European forms of life and all-round Europeanisation of Russia generally. And the third characteristic feature of the "enlightener" was his defence of the interests of the masses, chiefly of the peasants (who, in the days of the enlighteners, were not yet fully emancipated or only in process of being emancipated), the sincere belief that abolition of serfdom and its survivals would be followed by universal well-being, and a sincere

\* And vice versa, all the progressive practical measures that we find the Narodniks advocating are, in substance, *fully bourgeois*, that is, they conduce to the capitalist line of development, and no other. Only petty-bourgeois people could concoct the theory that extension of peasant land tenure, tax reduction, resettlement, credits, technical progress, marketing arrangements and suchlike measures would serve the interests of so-called "people's production".



desire to help bring this about. These three features constitute the essence of what in our country is called "the heritage of the sixties", and it is important to emphasise that *there is nothing whatsoever of Narodism in this heritage*. There are quite a number of Russian writers whose views are characterised by these features and who have never had anything in common with Narodism. Where the outlook of a writer bears these features, he is always recognised by everyone as having "preserved the traditions of the sixties", quite irrespective of what his attitude to Narodism may be. Nobody, of course, would think of saying that Mr. M. Stasyulevich, for instance, whose jubilee was recently celebrated, had "renounced the heritage"—merely because he was an opponent of Narodism or was indifferent to the questions advanced by Narodism. We have taken Skaldin\* as an example precisely because, while he was *undoubtedly* a representative of the "heritage", he was at the same time a confirmed enemy of those ancient institutions which the Narodniks have taken under their protection.

We have said that Skaldin was a bourgeois. Ample proof of this description has been given above, but it must be observed that this word is often understood very incorrectly, narrowly and unhistorically, it being associated (*without distinction of historical period*) with a selfish defence of the interests of a minority. It must not be forgotten that at the time when the eighteenth-century enlighteners (who are by general consent included among the leaders of the bourgeoisie) wrote, and at the time when our enlighteners of the forties and sixties wrote, *all* social problems amounted to the struggle against serfdom and its survivals. At that time the new socio-economic relations and their contradictions were still in embryo. No selfishness was therefore displayed at that time by the ideologists of the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, both in the West and in Russia, they quite sincerely believed in universal well-being and sincerely desired it, they

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\* It might perhaps be objected that Skaldin is not typical of the sixties because of his hostility to the village commune and because of his tone. But it is not a question of the village commune alone. It is a question of the views common to all the enlighteners, which Skaldin shared. As to his tone, it really is not typical in its calm reasonableness, moderation, emphasis on gradualness, etc. It was not without reason that Engels called Skaldin a *Liberalconservative*.<sup>95</sup> However, the selection of a representative of the heritage with a more typical tone would, firstly, be inconvenient for various reasons, and might, secondly, give rise to misunderstanding when comparing him with the present-day Narodniks.<sup>96</sup> Because of the very character of our task, the *tone* (contrary to the proverb) *does not make the music*, and Skaldin's untypical tone serves to bring out his "music", that is, the substance of his views, more distinctly. And it is only the substance that interests us. It is only on the basis of the substance of writers' views (and not of their tone) that we intend to draw the comparison between the representatives of the heritage and the present-day Narodniks

sincerely did not see (partly could not yet see) the contradictions in the system which was growing out of serfdom. It is not for nothing that Skaldin in one part of his book quotes Adam Smith: we have seen that both his views and the character of his arguments in many respects repeat the theses of that great ideologist of the progressive bourgeoisie.

And so, if we compare Skaldin's practical suggestions with the views of the present-day Narodniks, on the one hand, and with the attitude to them of the "Russian disciples", on the other, we shall find that the "disciples" will always support Skaldin's suggestions, since the latter reflect the interests of the progressive social classes, and the vital interests of social development generally along the present, i.e., capitalist, path. The things that the Narodniks have changed in Skaldin's practical wishes, or in his presentation of problems, are *a change for the worse*, and are rejected by the "disciples". It is not against the "heritage" that the disciples "hurl themselves" (that is an absurd fabrication), but against the romantic and petty-bourgeois additions to the heritage made by the Narodniks. To these additions we shall now pass.

## II NARODISM'S ADDITION TO THE "HERITAGE"

From Skaldin, let us pass to Engelhardt. His *Letters from the Countryside*<sup>97</sup> are likewise essays on the social aspects of rural life, so that in substance and even in form his book very much resembles that of Skaldin's. Engelhardt is much more talented than Skaldin, and his letters from the country are incomparably more lively and imaginative. The lengthy disquisitions of the serious author of *In the Backwoods and in the Capital* are not to be found in Engelhardt's book, which, for its part, is replete with deft delineation and imagery. It is not surprising that Engelhardt's book enjoys the steady sympathy of the reading public, and only recently appeared in a fresh edition, while Skaldin's book is almost completely forgotten, although it was only two years after its publication that *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* began printing Engelhardt's letters. There is therefore no need for us to acquaint the reader with the contents of Engelhardt's book, and we shall confine ourselves to a brief exposition of two aspects of his views: first, views that are characteristic of the "heritage" in general, and common to Engelhardt and Skaldin in particular; and, second, views that are specifically Narodnik. Engelhardt is *already a Narodnik*, but his views still contain so much that is common to all the enlighteners, so much that has been discarded

or altered by contemporary Narodism, that one is at a loss how to class him—with the representatives of the “heritage” in general, without the Narodnik tinge, or with the Narodniks.

What makes Engelhardt akin to the former is, primarily, the remarkable sobriety of his views, his plain and direct descriptions of realities, his relentless exposure of all the bad sides of the “foundations” in general, and of the peasantry in particular—of those very “foundations”, the false idealisation and embellishment of which is an essential component of Narodism. Engelhardt’s very feebly and timidly expressed Narodism is therefore in direct and crying contradiction to the picture of rural *realities* that he paints with such talent, and if some economist or sociologist were to base his opinions of the countryside on Engelhardt’s *facts and observations*,<sup>5</sup> he would find it impossible to draw Narodnik conclusions from such material. Idealisation of the peasant and his village commune is one of the essential components of Narodism, and Narodniks of all shades, from Mr. V. V. to Mr. Mikhailovsky, have given full rein to this effort to idealise and embellish the “commune”. There is not the slightest trace of such embellishment in Engelhardt. As against the fashionable talk about the communal spirit of our peasantry, the current contrasting of this “communal spirit” to the individualism of the town, the competition of capitalist economy, etc., Engelhardt is absolutely relentless in exposing the amazing *individualism* of the small farmer. He shows at length that our “peasants in matter of ownership have the keenest possible sense of property” (p. 62, 1885 ed.), that they cannot tolerate “gang work”, hate it from narrowly selfish and egoistic motives: in gang work each is “afraid of doing more than the others” (p. 206). This fear of doing more work than others goes to comical (or, rather tragicomical) extremes; the author, for instance, tells of women living under one roof and bound by ties of common residence and kinship, each of whom washes only her particular part of the table at which they eat, or who milk the cows in turn, each getting milk for her *own* child (for fear that others may hide some of the milk) and preparing porridge for her own child separately (p. 323). Engelhardt brings out these features in such detail, and corroborates them with such a mass of

<sup>5</sup> Incidentally, this would be not only extremely interesting and instructive, but also perfectly legitimate on the part of an economic investigator. If scientists trust the data of questionnaires—the answers and opinions of numerous proprietors, who all too often are biassed and ill-informed, have not developed a consistent outlook or intelligently thought out their views—why not trust the observations gathered for a full eleven years by a man with splendid powers of observation, who is unquestionably sincere and has made a superb study of what he is talking about.

examples, that there can be no question of their being exceptional instances. One or the other: either Engelhardt is a worthless observer who deserves no credence, or the tales about the communal spirit and communal virtues of our muzhik are sheer imagination, which transfers to *economic practice* features abstracted from the form of *land tenure* (and from this form of landholding there are additionally abstracted all the fiscal and administrative aspects). Engelhardt shows that in his economic activity the muzhik aims at becoming a kulak. "There is a definite dose of the kulak in every peasant," he says (p. 491), "kulak ideals prevail among the peasants."... "I have said time and again that individualism, egoism, the urge to exploit are strongly developed among the peasants."... "Each prides himself on being a pike and strives to swallow the tiddler." Engelhardt demonstrates superbly that the trend among the peasantry is not towards the "communal" system, not towards "people's production", but towards the most ordinary petty-bourgeois system inherent in all capitalist societies. He describes and proves incontrovertibly the tendency of the well-to-do peasant to launch into trade (363), to loan grain in return for work, to buy the labour of the poor muzhik (pp. 457, 492, etc.)—or, in economic language, the conversion of enterprising muzhiks into a rural bourgeoisie. "If," says Engelhardt, "the peasants do not adopt the artel form of economy and each continues to conduct his own farm in isolation, then, even if there is an abundance of land, there will be both landless peasants and farm labourers among the peasant tillers. Further, I believe that the difference in status among the peasants will be even wider than it now is. Despite communal ownership of the land, side by side with the 'rich', there will be many virtually landless farm labourers. What benefit is it to me or my children if I have the right to land, but neither the capital nor the implements with which to cultivate it? It is like giving a blind man land and saying—eat it!" (p. 370). With a sort of melancholy irony, the "artel form of economy" figures forlornly in this passage as a pious and innocent wish which, far from following from the facts about the peasantry, is directly repudiated and ruled out by them.

Another feature which makes Engelhardt akin to the representatives of the heritage without any Narodnik tinge is his belief that the chief and fundamental cause of the distressed condition of the peasantry is the survivals of serfdom and the relementation characteristic of it. Do away with these survivals and this relementation, and all will be well. Engelhardt's absolute hostility to relementation and his caustic scoffing at all attempts to confer happiness on the muzhik through relementation from above, are in the sharpest contrast to the Na-

rodniks' faith in "the reason and conscience, the knowledge and patriotism of the ruling classes" (the words of Mr. Yuzhakov, in *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1896, No. 12, p. 106), to their fantastic projects for "organising production", etc. Let us recall Engelhardt's sarcastic denunciation of the rule that vodka should not be sold at flour-mills, a rule intended for the muzhik's "good"; or the disgust with which he speaks of the obligatory order issued by several Zemstvos in 1880 forbidding the sowing of rye before August 15, of that gross interference by armchair "scientists"—also actuated by consideration for the muzhik's good—in the farming of "millions of peasant proprietors" (424). Referring to such rules and orders as those forbidding smoking in pine forests, pike fishing in spring, cutting birch for the May festival, bird-nest pillaging and so on, Engelhardt sarcastically remarks: "... solicitude for the muzhik is and always has been the principal concern of intellectual minds. Who lives for himself? Everybody lives for the muzhik!... The muzhik is stupid, he cannot manage his own affairs. If nobody looks after him, he will burn down all the forests, kill off all the birds, denude the rivers of fish, ruin the land, and himself die out" (398). Do you think, reader, that this writer could have had any sympathy for laws so dear to the hearts of the Narodniks, as, say, those forbidding alienation of allotments? Could his pen have written anything like the phrase of one of the pillars of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* quoted above? Could he have shared the view of Mr. N. Karyshev, another pillar of the same journal, who flung the reproach at our gubernia Zemstvos (in the nineties!) that they "find no room" "for regular large and substantial expenditure on the organisation of agricultural labour"?\*

Let us mention another feature which makes Engelhardt akin to Skaldin: his unconscious attitude to many purely bourgeois aspirations and measures. Not that Engelhardt tries to gild the petty bourgeois or to concoct excuses (*à la* Mr. V. V.) for not applying this designation to any particular entrepreneur—far from it. As a practical farmer, Engelhardt is simply infatuated with every progressive innovation, every improvement in farming methods, and completely fails to realise that the social form of these improvements is the most effective refutation of his own theory that capitalism is impossible in our country. Let us recall, for instance, how delighted he was with the success he achieved on his farm thanks to the introduction of the *picce-rate system of paying* his workers (for flax scutching, threshing, etc.). Engelhardt does not even suspect that the substitution of piece rates for

\* *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1896, No. 5, May. Mr. Karyshev's article about gubernia Zemstvo expenditure on economic measures. P. 20

time rates is one of the most widespread methods by which a developing capitalist economy heightens the intensification of labour and increases the rate of surplus value. Another example. Engelhardt scoffs at the programme of *Zemledelcheskaya Gazeta*<sup>98</sup>. "discontinuation of leasing fields for cycle cultivation; farming based on employment of labourers; introduction of improved machines, implements and cattle breeds and of multi-field system; improvement of meadows and pastures, etc., etc." "All this, however, is nothing but general talk!" Engelhardt exclaims (128). Yet it was this programme that Engelhardt adopted in his own practical farming; he achieved technical progress on his own farm precisely by basing it on the employment of farm labourers. Or again: we know how frankly and faithfully Engelhardt exposed the real tendencies of the enterprising muzhik; but that did not prevent him from asserting that "it is not factories that are needed, but *small*" (Engelhardt's italics) "rural distilleries, oil mills", etc. (p. 336), that is, what is "needed" is that the rural bourgeoisie should go in for agricultural industries—which has always and everywhere been one of the major indications of agricultural capitalism. Here we have the influence of the fact that Engelhardt was not a theoretician but a practical farmer. It is one thing to argue that progress is possible without capitalism, and another thing to farm yourself. Having set himself the aim of conducting his farm on rational lines, Engelhardt *was compelled*, by virtue of surrounding circumstances, to strive for this by purely capitalistic methods and to leave aside all his theoretical and abstract misgivings concerning the "employment of farm labourers". In the field of theory Skaldin argued like a typical member of the Manchester School, completely failing to realise both that his arguments were of just this character, and that they corresponded to the needs of Russia's capitalist evolution. In the field of practice Engelhardt was compelled to act as a typical Mancunian, despite his theoretical protest against capitalism and his desire to believe that his fatherland was following a path of its own.

Engelhardt did believe this, and it is this that induces us to call him a Narodnik. He had already clearly perceived the *real* trend of economic development in Russia, and sought to *explain away* the contradictions of this development. He endeavoured to prove that agricultural capitalism was impossible in Russia, that "there is no Knecht in our country" (p. 556)—though he himself refuted in the greatest detail the story that our workers are expensive, and himself showed how miserably he paid his cattleman, Pyotr, who with his family, after their keep, had only 6 rubles a year left "with which to buy salt, vegetable oil, clothing" (p. 10). "Yet even he is envied, and if I turned him off,

fifty others would immediately be found eager to take his place" (p. 11). Speaking of the success of his farm, and of the skilful way his workers handle the plough, Engelhardt triumphantly exclaims: "And who are these ploughmen? Ignorant, unconscientious Russian peasants" (p. 225).

Though his own farming experience and his exposure of the peasant's individualism refuted all illusions concerning the "community spirit", Engelhardt not only "believed" that the peasants could adopt an artel form of economy, but expressed the "conviction" that such would indeed be the case, and that we, the Russians, would accomplish this great feat and introduce a new mode of farming. "It is this that constitutes the exceptional character, the specific nature of our economy" (p. 349). Engelhardt the realist turns into Engelhardt the romanticist, who replaces the complete lack of "exceptional character" in his own methods of farming, and in the peasants' farming methods as he observed them by "*faith*" in a future "exceptional character"! From this faith it is only a stone's throw to the ultra-Narodnik features which—though very few—one finds in Engelhardt, to a narrow nationalism bordering on chauvinism ("We'll give Europe a drubbing," and "in Europe, too, the muzhik will be on our side" (p. 387)—said Engelhardt to a landlord with whom he was discussing the prospect of war), and even to idealisation of labour service! Yes, this selfsame Engelhardt who devoted so many superb pages of his book to describing the downtrodden and degraded condition of the peasant who has taken a loan of money or grain to be paid off in work and is compelled to toil almost for nothing in the very worst conditions of personal dependence\*—this selfsame Engelhardt goes to the length of saying that "it would be a good thing if the doctor" (he was talking of the benefit of and need for doctors in the countryside. *U. I.*) "had a farm of his own, so that the muzhik could pay for the treatment with his labour" (p. 41). Comment is superfluous.

—All in all, comparing the above-enumerated good features of Engelhardt's outlook (i.e., those he has in common with the representatives of the "heritage" without any Narodnik tinge) with the bad (i.e., the Narodnik features), we have to admit that the former unquestionably predominate in the author of *Letters from the Countryside*, while the latter are an extraneous and accidental admixture, as it were, which has drifted in from without and is at odds with the general tone of his book.

\* Remember the picture of the village elder (i.e., the landlord's steward) summoning a peasant to work when the latter's own grain is already overripe and spoiling, and he is compelled to go merely because, if he does not, the volost authorities will "take his pants down".

### III HAS THE "HERITAGE" GAINED FROM ASSOCIATION WITH NARODISM?

"But what do you understand by Narodism?" the reader will probably ask. "The meaning attached to the concept 'heritage' was defined above, but no definition of the concept 'Narodism' has been given."

By Narodism we mean a system of views, which comprises the following three features: 1) *Belief that capitalism in Russia represents a deterioration, a retrogression.* Hence the urge and desire to "retard", "halt", "stop the break-up" of the age-old foundations by capitalism, and similar reactionary cries. 2) *Belief in the exceptional character of the Russian economic system in general, and of the peasantry, with its village commune, artel, etc., in particular.* It is not considered necessary to apply to Russian economic relationships the concepts elaborated by modern science concerning the different social classes and their conflicts. The village-commune peasantry is regarded as something higher and better than capitalism; there is a disposition to idealise the "foundations". The existence among the peasantry of contradictions characteristic of every commodity and capitalist economy is denied or slurred over; it is denied that any connection exists between these contradictions and their more developed form in capitalist industry and capitalist agriculture. 3) *Disregard of the connection between the "intelligentsia" and the country's legal and political institutions, on the one hand, and the material interests of definite social classes, on the other.* Denial of this connection, lack of a materialist explanation of these social factors, induces the belief that they represent a force capable of "dragging history along another line" (Mr. V. V.), of "diversion from the path" (Mr. N.—on, Mr. Yuzhakov, etc.), and so on.

That is what we mean by "Narodism". The reader will consequently see that we use this term in its broad sense, just as all the "Russian disciples" use it when opposing a whole system of views, and not individual representatives of this system. Among these individual representatives there are differences, of course, and sometimes important ones. Nobody ignores these differences. But the afore-mentioned views are common to all the most diverse representatives of Narodism, from—well, Mr. Yuzov, let us say, to Mr. Mikhailovsky. To these objectionable features of their views, the Yuzovs, Sazonovs, V. V., etc., add others, which are not shared, for instance, either by Mr. Mikhailovsky or by other contributors to the present-day *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. To deny these differences between the Narodniks



in the narrow sense and the Narodniks in general would, of course, be wrong; but it would be wronger still to ignore the fact that the *fundamental* socio-economic views of all Narodniks coincide on the afore-mentioned major points. And since it is these fundamental views that the "Russian disciples" reject, and not only "deplorable deviation" from them in a worse direction, they are obviously fully entitled to employ the term "Narodism" in its wider meaning. Not only are they entitled to do so; they cannot do otherwise.

Turning to the fundamental views of Narodism outlined above, the first thing we must note is that the "heritage" *has absolutely no part in them*. There are a whole number of undeniable representatives and guardians of the "heritage" who have nothing in common with Narodism, who do not pose the question of capitalism at all, who do not believe in the exceptional character of Russia, the peasant commune, etc., and who do not regard the intelligentsia and our legal and political institutions as a factor capable of "diversion from the path". Above we named in illustration the editor and publisher of *Čestnik Yevropy*,<sup>91</sup> who might be accused of anything save violation of the traditions of the heritage. On the other hand, there are people whose views resemble the afore-mentioned fundamental principles of Narodism, yet who plainly and frankly "renounce the heritage"—we might mention, for example, the same Mr. Y. Abramov to whom Mr. Mikhailovsky refers, or Mr. Yuzov. The Narodism which the "Russian disciples" battle against did not even exist when the heritage was (to use a legal term) "bequeathed", that is, in the sixties. Gerns. rudiments of Narodism existed, of course, not only in the sixties, but in the forties and even earlier—but it is not the history of Narodism that concerns us here. We repeat, what is important for us is to establish that the "heritage" of the sixties, in the sense outlined above, has nothing in common with Narodism, i.e., that there is nothing in common in the substance of their views, that they pose different problems. There are guardians of the "heritage" who are not Narodniks, and there are Narodniks who "have renounced the heritage". Of course, there are also Narodniks who guard the "heritage", or who pretend to do so. That is why we speak of a connection between the heritage and Narodism. Let us see what has been the effect of this connection.

First, Narodism made a big *step forward* compared with the heritage *by posing* for the attention of society problems which the guardians of the heritage were partly (in their time) not yet able to pose, or partly did not, and do not, pose because of their

Cf. Tugan-Baranovsky's *The Russian Factory* (St Petersburg 1898)

inherent narrowness of outlook. In *posing* these problems the Narodniks performed a great *historical* service, and it is quite natural and understandable that, having offered a solution (whatever it may be worth) for these problems, Narodism *thereby* occupied a foremost place among the progressive trends of Russian social thought.

But the solution of these problems proposed by Narodism proved to be worthless, to be based on backward theories, long ago discarded in Western Europe, on a romantic and petty-bourgeois criticism of capitalism, on a disregard for the cardinal facts of Russian history and reality. So long as the development of capitalism in Russia and of its inherent contradictions was still very weak, this primitive criticism of capitalism could hold its ground. But Narodism is absolutely incapable of measuring up to the contemporary development of capitalism in Russia, the contemporary state of our knowledge of Russian economic history and reality, the contemporary demands made on sociological theory. Once progressive, as the first to pose the problem of capitalism, nowadays Narodism is a *reactionary* and *harmful* theory which misleads social thought and plays into the hands of stagnation and Asiatic backwardness. Today the reactionary character of its criticism of capitalism has even lent Narodism features that make it *inferior* to the outlook which confines itself to faithful guardianship of the heritage.\* That this is so we shall now endeavour to prove by analysing each of the three basic features of the Narodnik outlook mentioned above.

The first feature—the belief that in Russia capitalism represents a deterioration, a retrogression. Very soon after the problem of capitalism in Russia had been posed, it became clear that our economic development was capitalistic, and the Narodniks proclaimed this development a retrogression, a mistake, a deviation from the path supposedly prescribed by the whole history of the nation's life, from the path supposedly hallowed by age-old foundations, and so on and so forth. The enlighteners' ardent faith in this course of social development was replaced by distrust of it; historical optimism and cheerfulness were replaced by pessimism and dejection founded on the fact that the farther matters proceeded as they were proceeding, the harder and more difficult would it be to solve the problems raised by the new development; appeals were made to "retard"

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\* I have already had occasion to remark above in the article on economic romanticism that our opponents display remarkable short-sightedness in regarding the terms *reactionary* and *petty-bourgeois* as polemical abuse, when they have a perfectly definite historico-philosophical meaning. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 217—Ed.)

and "halt" this development; the theory was advanced that Russia's backwardness was her good fortune, and so forth. All these features of the Narodnik outlook, far from having anything in common with the "heritage", flatly contradict it. The belief that Russian capitalism represents a "deviation from the path", a deterioration, etc., leads to a misrepresentation of Russia's whole economic evolution, to a misrepresentation of that "change-over" which is taking place before our eyes. Carried away by their desire to retard and stop the break-up of the age-old foundations by capitalism, the Narodniks display an amazing lack of historical tact, they forget that *antecedent* to this capitalism there was nothing but the same exploitation combined with countless forms of bondage and personal dependence, which burdened the position of the labourer, nothing but routine and stagnation in social production and, hence, in all spheres of social life. Contending against capitalism from their romantic, petty-bourgeois angle, the Narodniks throw all historical realism overboard and always compare the *reality* of capitalism with a *fiction* of the pre-capitalist order. The "heritage" of the sixties with their ardent faith in the progressive character of the existing course of social development, their relentless enmity directed wholly and exclusively against the relics of the past, their conviction that these relics had only to be swept clean away and everything would go splendidly—this "heritage", far from having any part in the afore-mentioned views of Narodism, runs directly counter to them.

The second feature of Narodism is belief in Russia's exceptionalism, ideolisation of the peasantry, the village commune, etc. The doctrine of Russia's exceptionalism induced the Narodniks to seize upon out-dated West-European theories, prompted them to regard many of the achievements of West-European culture with amazing levity: the Narodniks reassured themselves with the thought that, if we lacked some of the features of civilised humanity, "we are destined", on the other hand, to show the world new modes of economy, etc. Not only was the analysis of capitalism and all its manifestations given by progressive West-European thought not accepted in relation to Holy Russia; every effort was made to invent excuses for not drawing the same conclusions about Russian capitalism as were made regarding European capitalism. The Narodniks bowed and scraped to the authors of this analysis and—calmly continued to remain romanticists of the same sort as these authors had all their lives contended against. Again, this doctrine of Russia's exceptionalism, which is shared by all the Narodniks, far from having anything in common with the "heritage", runs directly counter to it. The "sixties", on the contrary, desired to Euro-

peanise Russia, believed that she should adopt the general European culture, were concerned to have the institutions of this culture transferred to our anything but exceptional soil. Any doctrine that teaches that Russia is exceptional is completely at variance with the spirit and the tradition of the sixities. Even more at variance with this tradition is Narodism's idealisation and over-embellishment of the countryside. This false idealisation, which desired at all costs to see something specific in our rural system, something quite unlike the rural system in every other country in the period of pre-capitalist relations, is in naked contradiction to the traditions of the sober and realistic heritage. The wider and more deeply capitalism developed, the more distinctly did the countryside display the contradictions common to every commodity-capitalist society, the more and more glaringly did the antithesis stand out between the Narodniks' honeyed talk about the peasant's "commune spirit", "artel spirit", etc., on the one hand, and the actual division of the peasantry into a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat, on the other; and the more rapidly did the Narodniks, who continued to look upon things with the eyes of the peasant, change from sentimental romanticists into ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, because in modern society the small producer changes into a commodity producer. Their false idealisation of the countryside and romantic dreams about the "commune spirit" led the Narodniks to adopt an extremely frivolous attitude towards the peasants' real needs arising from the existing course of economic development. In theory one might talk to one's heart's content about the strength of the foundations, but in practice every Narodnik sensed very well that the elimination of the relics of the past, the survivals of the pre-Reform system, which to this day bind our peasantry from head to foot, would open the way to precisely the capitalist course of development, and no other. Better stagnation than capitalist progress—this, essentially, is every Narodnik's attitude to the countryside, although of course not every Narodnik would venture to say so frankly and bluntly, with the naïve forthrightness of a Mr. V. V. "Tied to their allotments and communes, and unable to apply their labour where it would be more productive and of greater advantage to themselves, the peasants are, as it were, frozen in that congested, herd-like, unproductive form of life in which they emerged from serfdom." That is how one of the representatives of the "heritage" saw it from his characteristic "enlightener's" standpoint.<sup>100</sup> "Better that the peasants remain frozen in their routine, patriarchal form of life, than clear the way for capitalism in the countryside"—that, essentially, is how every Narodnik sees it. Indeed, probably not a single Narodnik would

venture to deny that social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant commune, with its collective responsibility and its ban on the sale of land and on the right to refuse an allotment, stands in the sharpest contradiction to contemporary economic realities, to contemporary commodity-capitalist relations and their development. To deny this contradiction is impossible, but the whole point is that the Narodniks are mortally afraid of this presentation of the question, of this contrasting of the legal status of the peasantry with economic realities and the present course of economic development. The Narodnik is stubbornly determined to believe in a non-existent non-capitalist development which is a figment of his romantic imagination, and therefore . . . and therefore he is prepared to retard the present development, which is proceeding along capitalist lines. The Narodnik's attitude to such problems as the social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant commune, collective responsibility, and the peasant's right to sell and give up his allotment, is not only one of extreme caution and fear for the fate of the "foundations" (the foundations of routine and stagnation); more than this, the Narodnik falls so low that he even welcomes the police rule forbidding the peasants to sell land. To such a Narodnik, one might retort in the words of Engelhardt: "The muzhik is stupid, he cannot manage his own affairs. If nobody looks after him, he will burn down all the forests, kill off all the birds, denude the rivers of fish, ruin the land and himself die out." Here the Narodnik quite definitely "renounces the heritage", becomes a reactionary. And note that with the progress of economic development, this destruction of the social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant commune increasingly becomes an imperative necessity for the rural proletariat, while the inconveniences arising therefrom for the peasant bourgeoisie are not at all considerable. The "enterprising muzhik" may easily rent land on the side, open an establishment in some other village, and travel on business wherever he likes and whenever he likes. But for the "peasant" who lives chiefly from the sale of his labour-power, being tied to his allotment and commune is an enormous restriction on his economic activity, makes it impossible for him to find a better employer, and compels him to sell his labour-power only to local purchasers, who invariably pay less and seek all sorts of ways and means of reducing him to bondage. Having surrendered to the sway of romantic dreaming and set himself the aim of maintaining and preserving the foundations despite the course of economic development, the Narodnik, without himself observing it, had slipped down this inclined plane until he found himself side by side with the agrarian, who yearns with all his heart and soul for the preser-

vation and consolidation of the "peasant's tie with the land". It is worth recalling, for example, that this social-estate exclusiveness of the peasant commune has bred specific methods of hiring workers: factory and farm owners send out agents to the villages, especially those heavily in arrears, to hire labourers on the most advantageous terms. Fortunately, the development of agricultural capitalism, by breaking down the "settled state" of the proletariat (such is the effect of the so-called agricultural outside employments), is gradually substituting free hire for this form of bondage.

Another, and perhaps no less striking corroboration of our contention that the present-day Narodnik theories are pernicious, is to be found in the common tendency among the Narodniks to idealise labour services. We have already given an example of how Engelhardt, consummating his Narodnik fall from grace, went so far as to say that "it would be a good thing" to develop labour services in the countryside! We find the same thing in Mr. Yuzhakov's famous project for agricultural gymnasia (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, 1895, No. 5).<sup>\*</sup> In serious economic articles in the same journal, a fellow contributor of Engelhardt's, Mr. V. V., indulged in similar idealisation when he declared that the peasant had scored a victory over the landlord, who had supposedly wanted to introduce capitalism; but the whole trouble was that the peasant undertook to cultivate the landlord's land in return for land received from him "on lease"—in other words, was restoring the very same mode of economy as existed under serfdom. These are some of the most glaring illustrations of the Narodniks' reactionary attitude to problems concerning our agriculture. In less glaring form, you will find this idea advocated by every Narodnik. Every Narodnik says that capitalism in our agriculture is pernicious and dangerous, because capitalism, you see, substitutes the farm labourer for the independent peasant. The *reality* of capitalism (the "farm labourer") is contrasted to the *fiction* of the "independent" peasant: and this fiction is based on the peasant ownership of means of production in the pre-capitalist era, the fact being modestly ignored that the peasant has to pay double their value for these means of production; that these means of production serve for the performance of labour service; that the living standard of this "independent" peasant is so low that in any capitalist country he would be classed as a pauper; and that added to the hopeless poverty and intellectual inertness of this "independent" peasant is the personal dependence that inevitably accompanies pre-capitalist forms of economy.

The third characteristic feature of Narodism—disregard of the connection between the “intelligentsia” and the country’s legal and political institutions, on the one hand, and the material interests of definite social classes, on the other—is bound up indissolubly with the previous ones: only this unrealistic attitude to sociological problems could have bred the doctrine that Russian capitalism is a “mistake”, and that “diversion from the path” is possible. This Narodnik view, too, bears no relation to the “heritage” and traditions of the sixties; on the contrary, it *runs directly counter to these traditions*. A natural corollary to this view is the Narodniks’ attitude to the numerous survivals of the pre-Reform reglementation of Russian life, an attitude which the representatives of the “heritage” could not possibly have shared. To illustrate this attitude, we shall take the liberty of borrowing the excellent remarks of Mr. V. Ivanov in his article “A Shabby Fabrication” (*Novoye Slovo*,<sup>101</sup> September 1897). The author refers to Mr. Boborykin’s novel *A Different Way*, and exposes his misconception of the dispute between the Narodniks and the “disciples”. Mr. Boborykin makes his hero, a Narodnik, reproach the “disciples” for supposedly dreaming of “a barrack regime with the intolerable despotism of reglementation”. Mr. V. Ivanov observes in this connection that:

“Far from saying that the ‘dream’ of their opponents was the intolerable despotism of ‘reglementation’, they” (the Narodniks) “*cannot and will not say so as long as they remain Narodniks*”. The substance of their dispute with the ‘economic materialists’ *in this respect* is that, in the opinion of the Narodniks, the remaining survivals of the old reglementation may serve as the basis for its further development. The intolerableness of the old reglementation is veiled from their eyes, on the one hand, by their conviction that the very ‘peasant soul (single and indivisible) is evolving’ towards reglementation, and, on the other, by their belief in the existing or coming moral beauty of the ‘intelligentsia’, ‘society’, or the ‘leading classes’ generally. They accuse the economic materialists of being infatuated not with ‘reglementation’, but, on the contrary, with the West-European system, which is based on freedom from reglementation. And the economic materialists really do assert that the survivals of the old reglementation, which sprang from a natural form of economy, are daily becoming more ‘intolerable’ in a country that has passed over to a money economy, entailing countless changes both in the actual status and in the mental and moral complexion of the various sections of its population. They are therefore convinced that the conditions necessary for the rise of a new and beneficial ‘reglementation’ of the country’s economic life cannot develop out of the survivals of a

reglementation which was adapted to a natural economy and serfdom, and can only evolve in such an atmosphere of wide and comprehensive freedom from the old reglementation as exists in the advanced countries of Western Europe and America. That is how matters stand with the question of 'reglementation' in the dispute between the Narodniks and their opponents" (pp. 11-12, loc. cit.). This attitude of the Narodniks to "the survivals of the old reglementation" is, perhaps, their most flagrant departure from the traditions of the "heritage". The representatives of this heritage were, as we have seen, distinguished by their ineradicable and fierce aversion for every survival of the old reglementation. Consequently, in this respect the "disciples" are incomparably closer to the "traditions" and "heritage" of the sixties than the Narodniks are.

In addition to the highly important error of the Narodniks mentioned above, their lack of sociological realism impels them to a specific manner of thinking and reasoning about social affairs and problems which might be called narrow intellectual self-conceit or, perhaps, the bureaucratic mentality. The Narodnik is always dilating on the path "we" should choose for our country, the misfortunes that would arise if "we" directed the country along such-and-such a path, the prospects "we" could ensure ourselves if we avoided the dangers of the path old Europe has taken, if we "take what is good" both from Europe and from our ancient village-commune system, and so on and so forth. Hence the Narodnik's complete distrust and contempt for the independent trends of the various social classes which are shaping history in accordance with their own interests. Hence the amazing levity with which the Narodnik (forgetting the conditions surrounding him) advances all sorts of social projects, from the "organisation of agricultural labour" to the "communalisation of production" through the good offices of our "society". "Mit der Gründlichkeit der geschichtlichen Action wird also der Umfang der Masse zunehmen, deren Action sie ist"\*—these words express one of the profoundest and most important precepts of that historico-philosophical theory which our Narodniks will not and cannot understand. As man's history-making activity grows broader and deeper, the size of that mass of the population which is the conscious maker of history is bound to increase. The Narodnik, however, always regarded the population in general, and the working population in particular, as the object of this or that more or less sensible measure, as something to be directed along this or that path, and never re-

\* Marx, *Die heilige Familie*, p. 120<sup>102</sup> Quoted from Beltov,<sup>103</sup> p. 235. ("With the thoroughness of the historical action, the size of the mass whose action it is will therefore increase" Marx, *The Holy Family*—Ed.)



garded the various classes of the population as independent history-makers on the existing path, never asked which conditions of the present path might stimulate (or, on the contrary, paralyse) the independent and conscious activity of these history-makers.

And so, although Narodism, by *posing* the question of capitalism in Russia, made a big step forward compared with the "heritage" of the enlighteners, the *solution* of the question it offered has proved so unsatisfactory, because of its petty-bourgeois outlook and sentimental criticism of capitalism, that on a number of cardinal questions of social life it *lags behind* the "enlighteners". Narodism's association with the heritage and traditions of our enlighteners has proved in the end to be a *drawback*: the new questions with which Russian social thought has been confronted by Russia's post-Reform economic development, Narodism has not solved, confining itself to sentimental and reactionary lamentations over them; while Narodnik romanticism has obscured the old questions already posed by the enlighteners, thus retarding their full solution.

#### IV THE "ENLIGHTENERS", THE NARODNIKS, AND THE "DISCIPLES"

We may now sum up the results of our comparisons. Let us endeavour to give a brief description of the relationship in which each of the trends of social thought enumerated in the sub-title stands to the others.

The enlightener believes in the present course of social development, because he fails to observe its inherent contradictions. The Narodnik fears the present course of social development, because he is already aware of these contradictions. The "disciple" believes in the present course of social development, because he sees the only earnest of a better future in the full development of these contradictions. The first and last trends therefore strive to support, accelerate, facilitate development along the present path, to remove all obstacles which hamper this development and retard it. Narodism, on the contrary, strives to retard and halt this development, is afraid of abolishing certain obstacles to the development of capitalism. The first and last trends are distinguished by what may be called historical optimism: the farther and the quicker things go as they are, the better it will be. Narodism, on the contrary, naturally tends to historical pessimism: the farther things go as they are, the worse it will be. The "enlighteners" never posed

questions concerning the character of post-Reform development and confined themselves exclusively to warring against the survivals of the pre-Reform system, to the negative task of clearing the way for a European type of development in Russia. Narodism posed the question of capitalism in Russia, but answered it in the sense that capitalism is reactionary, and therefore could not wholly accept the heritage of the enlighteners: the Narodniks always warred against people who in general strove to Europeanise Russia from the standpoint of a "single civilisation"; warred against them not only because they, the Narodniks, could not confine themselves to these people's ideals (such a war would have been just), but because they did not want to go so far in the development of this, i.e., capitalist, civilisation. The "disciples" answer the question of capitalism in Russia in the sense that it is progressive, and they therefore not only can, but must, accept the heritage of the enlighteners in its entirety, supplementing it with an analysis of the contradictions of capitalism from the standpoint of the propertyless producers. The enlighteners did not single out any one class of the population for special attention; they not only spoke of the people in general, but even of the nation in general. The Narodniks were desirous of representing the interests of labour, but they did not point to any definite groups in the contemporary economic system; actually, they always took the standpoint of the small producer, whom capitalism converts into a commodity producer. The "disciples" not only take the interests of labour as their criterion, but in doing so point to quite definite economic groups in the capitalist economy, namely, the propertyless producers. By the nature of their aims, the first and last trends correspond to the interests of the classes which are created and developed by capitalism; Narodism, by its nature, corresponds to the interests of the class of small producers, the petty bourgeoisie, which occupies an intermediate position among the classes of contemporary society. Consequently, Narodism's contradictory attitude to the "heritage" is not accidental, but is a necessary result of the very nature of the Narodnik views: we have seen that one of the basic features of the enlighteners' views was the ardent desire to Europeanise Russia, but the Narodniks cannot possibly share this desire fully without ceasing to be Narodniks.

We have in the end arrived at the conclusion which we have repeatedly indicated above in particular instances, namely, that *the disciples are much more consistent and faithful guardians of the heritage than the Narodniks*. Far from renouncing the heritage, they consider it one of their principal duties to refute the romantic and petty-bourgeois fears which induce the Na-

rodniks on very many and very important points to reject the European ideals of the enlighteners. But it goes without saying that the "disciples" do not guard the heritage in the way an archivist guards an old document. Guarding the heritage does not mean confining oneself to the heritage, and the "disciples" add to their defence of the general ideals of Europeanism an analysis of the contradictions implicit in our capitalist development, and an assessment of this development from the specific standpoint indicated above.

## V

### MR. MIKHAILOVSKY ON THE "DISCIPLES" RENUNCIATION OF THE HERITAGE

Let us, in conclusion, return to Mr. Mikhailovsky and examine his statements on the subject under consideration. Not only does Mr. Mikhailovsky declare that these people (the disciples) "do not acknowledge any continuity with the past and emphatically renounce the heritage" (loc. cit., 179); he also affirms that "they" (together with other persons of the most diverse trends, up to and including Mr. Abramov, Mr. Volynsky and Mr. Rozanov) "hurl themselves against the heritage with the greatest fury" (180). To which heritage is Mr. Mikhailovsky referring? To the heritage of the sixties and seventies, the heritage which *Moskovskiy Uedomosti* solemnly renounced and renounces (178).

We have already said that if it is a question of the "heritage" that has fallen to the people of today, then one must distinguish between *two heritages*: one is the heritage of the enlighteners in general, of the people who were absolutely hostile to the whole pre-Reform order, who stood for European ideals and for the interests of the broad mass of the population. The other heritage is Narodism. We have already shown that to confuse these two different things would be a gross error, for everyone knows that there have been, and still are, people who guard the "traditions of the sixties" but have nothing in common with Narodism. All Mr. Mikhailovsky's observations are founded wholly and exclusively upon a confusion of these totally different heritages. And since Mr. Mikhailovsky must be aware of this difference, his sally is not only absurd, but definitely slanderous. Did *Moskovskiy Uedomosti* hurl itself against Narodism specifically? Not at all: it hurled itself no less, if not more, against the enlighteners in general, and *Vestnik Yevropy*, which absolutely abhors Narodism, is in its eyes no less an enemy than the Narodnik *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. *Moskovskiy Uedomosti* would, of course, disagree on many points with the Narodniks who most

emphatically renounce the heritage—Yuzov, for example—but it would hardly hurl itself against him with fury, and in any case, it would praise him for that which distinguishes him from the Narodniks who desire to guard the heritage. Did Mr. Abramov or Mr. Volynsky hurl himself against Narodism? Not at all. The former is himself a Narodnik; and both hurled themselves against the enlighteners in general. Did the “Russian disciples” hurl themselves against the Russian enlighteners? Did they ever renounce the heritage which enjoins unreserved hostility to the pre-Reform way of life and its survivals? Far from hurling themselves against it, they denounced the Narodniks for desiring to maintain some of these survivals out of a petty-bourgeois fear of capitalism. Did they ever hurl themselves against the heritage which enjoins European ideals generally? Far from hurling themselves against it, they denounced the Narodniks because on many very important issues, instead of espousing general European ideals, they concoct the most arrant nonsense about Russia’s exceptional character. Did they ever hurl themselves against the heritage which enjoins concern for the interests of the labouring masses of the population? Far from hurling themselves against it, they denounced the Narodniks because their concern for these interests is inconsistent (owing to their confirmed tendency to lump together the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat); because the value of their concern is diminished by their habit of dreaming of what might be, instead of turning their attention to what is; because their concern is extremely circumscribed, since they have never been able properly to appraise the conditions (economic and other) which make it easier or harder for these people to care for their own interests themselves.

Mr. Mikhailovsky may not agree with these denunciations—being a Narodnik, he certainly will not agree with them—but to assert that certain people “furiously” attack the “heritage of the sixties and the seventies”, when, actually, they “furiously” attack *only Narodism*, and attack it for having failed to solve the new problems posed by post-Reform history *in the spirit of this heritage and without contradicting it*—such an assertion is a direct misrepresentation of the truth.

Mr. Mikhailovsky most amusingly complains that the “disciples” readily confuse “us” (i.e., the *Russkoye Bogatstvo* writers) with the “Narodniks” and other persons who have no connection with *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (p. 180). This curious attempt at dissociation from the “Narodniks”, while at the same time preserving all the basic views of Narodism, can evoke nothing but laughter. Everyone knows that all the “Russian disciples” employ the words “Narodnik” and “Narodism” in the broad

sense. That there are quite a number of different shades among the Narodniks has not been forgotten or denied by anybody: in their books neither P. Struve nor N. Beltoy, for instance, "confused" Mr. N. Mikhailovsky with Mr. V. V., or even for that matter with Mr. Yuzhakov; that is, they did not gloss over the differences between them, or ascribe the views of one to the other. P. B. Struve even expressly drew attention to the difference between Mr. Yuzhakov's views and those of Mr. Mikhailovsky. It is one thing to confuse different views; it is another to generalise and class in one category writers who, despite their differences on many questions, are at one on the fundamental and principal points, points which the "disciples" oppose. What is important for the "disciple" is not to show the worthlessness of the views which distinguish, for instance, a Mr. Yuzov from the other Narodniks, but to refute the views *common to Mr. Yuzov and Mr. Mikhailovsky and all the Narodniks in general*—that is, their attitude to Russia's capitalist evolution, their discussion of economic and social problems from the standpoint of the small producer, their failure to understand social (or historical) materialism. *These features* are the common property of a whole trend of social thought which has played a big historical role. This broad trend contains the most varied shades: right and left flanks, people who have sunk to nationalism and anti-semitism, etc., and people who are not guilty of these things; people who have been contemptuous of many of the behests of the "heritage", and people who have striven their utmost (that is, the utmost possible to a Narodnik) to guard these behests. Not one of the "Russian disciples" has denied these differences of shade; not one of them has Mr. Mikhailovsky been able to convict of ascribing the views of a Narodnik of one shade to a Narodnik of another shade. But since we oppose the fundamental views *common* to all these different shades, why should we be expected to speak of partial differences within the general trend? That, surely, is an absolutely senseless demand! Long before the appearance of the "disciples", our literature had noted many times that writers who were far from unanimous on everything held common views on Russian capitalism, the peasant "commune", the almighty power of so-called "society", and not only noted it, but praised it as a happy peculiarity of Russia. Again, in its broad sense, the term "Narodism" was employed in our literature long before the appearance of the "disciples". Not only did Mr. Mikhailovsky contribute for many years to a journal along with the "Narodnik" (in the narrow sense) Mr. V. V., but the outlook of both bore the same fundamental features mentioned above. Though, both in the eighties and the nineties, he objected to some of Mr. V. V.'s conclusions, and denied the correctness

of his excursions into the field of abstract sociology, Mr. Mikhailovsky, both in the eighties and the nineties, made the reservation that his criticism was not directed against Mr. V. V.'s economic works, that he was at one with his basic views on Russian capitalism. Consequently, if the pillars of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, who have done so much to develop, reinforce and disseminate the views of Narodism (in the broad sense), now think that they can escape the criticism of the "Russian disciples" simply by declaring that they are not "Narodniks" (in the narrow sense), that they constitute a quite specific "ethico-social school"—such subterfuges, of course, can only expose to justified ridicule people who are so brave and at the same time so diplomatic.

On p. 182 of his article, Mr. Mikhailovsky also levels the following phenomenal argument against the "disciples". Mr. Kamensky venomously attacks the Narodniks<sup>104</sup>; that, you see, "indicates that he is angry, which he is not entitled (sic!) to be. We, the 'subjective oldsters', as well as the 'subjective youngsters', can permit ourselves this weakness without being guilty of self-contradiction. But the representatives of a doctrine which 'prides itself on its inexorable objectivity'" (the expression of one of the "disciples") "are in a different position".

What is this?! If people insist that views on social phenomena must be based upon an inexorably objective analysis of *realities* and the real course of development, then it follows that they are not entitled to be angry?! Why, this is utter twaddle, the sheer gibberish! Have you not heard, Mr. Mikhailovsky, that the famous work on *Capital* is considered to be one of the finest specimens of inexorable objectivity in the investigation of social phenomena? It is precisely the inexorable objectivity of the work that is regarded by many scientists and economists as its principal and basic defect. Yet rarely will you find in a scientific work so much "feeling", so much heated and passionate polemical attacks on representatives of backward views, on representatives of the social classes which, in the author's convinced opinion, are hampering social development. A writer who shows with inexorable objectivity that the opinions of Proudhon, say, are a natural, understandable and inevitable reflexion of the views and sentiments of the French petit bourgeois, nevertheless "hurls himself" against that ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie with tremendous passion and fiery wrath. Does Mr. Mikhailovsky believe that Marx is here guilty of "self-contradiction"? If a certain doctrine demands of everyone taking part in public life an inexorably objective analysis of realities and of the relationship between the various classes arising from these realities, by what miracle can the conclusion be drawn from this that they must not sympathise, are "not entitled" to

sympathise with one or another class? It is ridiculous in this connection even to talk of duty, for no living person *can help taking the side* of one class or another (once he has understood their interrelationships), can help rejoicing at the successes of that class and being disappointed by its failures, can help being angered by those who are hostile to that class, who hamper its development by disseminating backward views, and so on and so forth. Mr. Mikhailovsky's nonsensical sally only shows that he still fails to grasp the very elementary distinction between determinism and fatalism.

"'Capital is coming'! that is certain," writes Mr. Mikhailovsky, "but (sic!) the question is, how shall we greet it" (p. 189).

Mr. Mikhailovsky makes a great discovery, points to a "question" to which the "Russian disciples" have evidently given no thought whatever! As though it were not on this question that the "Russian disciples" have parted ways with the Narodniks! One can "greet" the capitalism developing in Russia only in two ways: one can regard it either as progressive, or as retrogressive; either as a step forward on the right road, or as a deviation from the true path; one can assess it either from the standpoint of the class of small producers which capitalism destroys, or from the standpoint of the class of propertyless producers which capitalism creates. There is no middle way.\* Consequently, if Mr. Mikhailovsky denies the correctness of the attitude to capitalism which the "disciples" insist on, it means that he accepts the Narodnik attitude which he has many a time expressed quite definitely in his earlier articles. He has not made any additions or amendments to his old views on this subject, and continues to remain a Narodnik. But nothing of the kind! He is not a Narodnik, heaven forbid! He is a representative of an "ethico-sociological school". . . .

"Let no one talk," Mr. Mikhailovsky continues, "of those future (??) benefits which the further development of capitalism will (?) bring."

Mr. Mikhailovsky is no Narodnik. He only reiterates all the Narodniks' errors and fallacious methods of argument. How many times have the Narodniks been told that this talk of the "future" is wrong, that it is not a question of "future", but of actual progressive changes already taking place in the pre-capitalist relationships—changes which the development of

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We say nothing, of course, of the greeting given it by those who do not consider it necessary to be guided by the interests of labour, or to whom the very generalisation denoted by the term "capitalism" is incomprehensible and unintelligible. However important such trends of thought may be in Russian life, they have nothing whatever to do with the dispute between the Narodniks and their opponents, and there is no point in bringing them into it.

capitalism in Russia is bringing (not, will bring). By transplanting the question to the "future", Mr. Mikhailovsky in point of fact takes for granted the very assertions which the "disciples" contest. He takes it for granted that in reality, in what is taking place under our eyes, the development of capitalism is *not bringing* any progressive changes into the old socio-economic relations. This is what constitutes the Narodnik view, and it is against this that the "Russian disciples" argue and demonstrate that the contrary is true. There is not a book put out by the "Russian disciples" which does not affirm and demonstrate that the replacement of labour service by wage-labour in agriculture, and the replacement of what is called "handicraft" industry by factory industry, is a real phenomenon which is taking place (and, moreover, at a tremendous speed) now, under our eyes, and not merely "in the future"; that this change is in all respects progressive, that it is breaking down routine, disunited, small-scale hand production which has been immobile and stagnant for ages; that it is increasing the productivity of social labour, and thereby creating the possibility of higher living standards for the working man; that it is also creating the conditions which convert this possibility into a necessity—namely, by converting the "settled proletarian" lost in the "backwoods", settled physically and morally, into a mobile proletarian, and by converting Asiatic forms of labour, with their infinitely developed bondage and diverse forms of personal dependence, into European forms of labour; that "the European manner of thought and feeling is no less necessary (note, necessary *V. I.*) for the effective utilisation of machines than steam, coal, techniques",\* etc. All this, we repeat, is affirmed and demonstrated by every "disciple", but, presumably, does not apply to Mr. Mikhailovsky "and company"; all this is only written against "Narodniks" who are "not connected" with *Russkoye Bogatstvo*. *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, you see, is an "ethico-sociological school", whose essence is that it serves up the old rubbish under a new guise.

As we observed above, the purpose of this article is to refute the allegation so widespread in the liberal-Narodnik press that the "Russian disciples" abjure the "heritage", break with the best traditions of the best section of Russian society, and so forth. It is not without interest to observe that, in reiterating these hackneyed phrases, Mr. Mikhailovsky in point of fact says exactly the same thing as was said much earlier and much more emphatically by a "Narodnik" "not connected" with *Russkoye*

\* The words of Schulze-Gävernitz in an article on the Moscow-Vladimir cotton industry in *Schmollers Jahrbuch*.<sup>105</sup> 1896



*Bogatstvo*—Mr. V. V. Are you familiar, dear reader, with the articles which this writer contributed to *Nedelya*<sup>106</sup> three years ago, at the close of 1894, in reply to P. B. Struve's book? If you are not, I must confess that, in my opinion, you have lost absolutely nothing. The basic idea of these articles is that the "Russian disciples" are breaking the democratic thread which runs through all the progressive trends of Russian social thought. Is this not exactly what Mr. Mikhailovsky says, only in somewhat different terms, when he accuses the "disciples" of renouncing the "heritage", against which *Moskovskiy Uedomosti* hurls itself with fury? Actually, as we have seen, the inventors of this allegation blame others for their own sins when they assert that the "disciples'" irrevocable break with *Narodism* signifies a break with the best traditions of the best section of Russian society. Is it not the other way round, sirs? Does not such a break signify that these best traditions are being *purged of Narodism*?

Written in exile at the end of 1897

*Collected Works* Vol. 2  
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Vladimir Ilyin, *Economic Studies and  
Essays*, St. Petersburg

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## WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

### BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT<sup>107</sup>

"... Party struggles lend a party strength and vitality; the greatest proof of a party's weakness is its diffuseness and the blurring of clear demarcations; a party becomes stronger by purging itself . . ."

(From a letter of Lassalle to Marx,  
of June 24, 1852)

### PREFACE

According to the author's original plan, the present pamphlet was to have been devoted to a detailed development of the ideas expressed in the article "Where To Begin"<sup>108</sup> (*Iskra*,<sup>109</sup> No 4, May 1901)<sup>1</sup>. We must first apologise to the reader for the delay in fulfilling the promise made in that article (and repeated in response to many private inquiries and letters). One of the reasons for this delay was the attempt, undertaken in June of the past year (1901), to unite all the Social-Democratic organisations abroad.<sup>110</sup> It was natural to wait for the results of this attempt, for, had the effort proved successful, it would perhaps have been necessary to expound *Iskra's* conceptions of organisation from a somewhat different approach; in any case, such a success promised to put an end very quickly to the existence of the two trends in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. As the reader knows, the attempt failed, and, as we propose to show, was bound to fail after the new swing of *Rabocheye Dyelo*.<sup>111</sup> in its issue No. 10, towards Economism.<sup>112</sup> It was found to be absolutely essential to begin a determined struggle against this trend, diffuse and ill-defined, but for that reason the more persistent, the more capable of reasserting itself in diverse forms. Accordingly, the original plan of the pamphlet was altered and considerably enlarged.

Its main theme was to have been the three questions raised in the article "Where To Begin"—the character and main content of our political agitation; our organisational tasks; and the plan for building, simultaneously and from various sides, a militant, all-Russia organisation. These questions have long engaged the mind of the author, who tried to raise them in *Rabochaya Gazeta*<sup>113</sup> during one of the unsuccessful attempts to

<sup>1</sup> See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp 13-24 — *Ed*

revive that paper (see Chapter V). But the original plan to confine the pamphlet to an analysis of only these three questions and to set forth our views as far as possible in a positive form, without, or almost without, entering into polemics, proved wholly impracticable, for two reasons. On the one hand, Economism proved to be much more tenacious than we had supposed [we employ the term Economism in the broad sense, as explained in *Iskra*, No. 12 (December 1901), in the article entitled "A Talk With Defenders of Economism", which was a synopsis, so to speak, of the present pamphlet\*]. It became clear beyond doubt that the differences regarding the solution of the three questions mentioned were explainable to a far greater degree by the basic antithesis between the two trends in the Russian Social-Democratic movement than by differences over details. On the other hand, the perplexity of the Economists over the practical application of our views in *Iskra* clearly revealed that we often speak literally in different tongues and therefore *cannot* arrive at an understanding without beginning *ab ovo*, and that an attempt must be made, in the simplest possible style, illustrated by numerous and concrete examples, *systematically* to "clarify" all our basic points of difference with all the Economists. I resolved to make such an attempt at "clarification", fully realising that it would greatly increase the size of the pamphlet and delay its publication: I saw *no other way* of meeting my pledge I had made in the article "Where To Begin". Thus, to the apologies for the delay, I must add others for the serious literary shortcomings of the pamphlet. I had to work *in great haste*, with frequent interruptions by a variety of other tasks.

The examination of the above three questions still constitutes the main theme of this pamphlet, but I found it necessary to begin with two questions of a more general nature—why such an "innocent" and "natural" slogan as "freedom of criticism" should be for us a veritable war-cry, and why we cannot come to an understanding even on the fundamental question of the role of Social-Democrats in relation to the spontaneous mass movement. Further, the exposition of our views on the character and substance of political agitation developed into an explanation of the difference between trade-unionist politics and Social-Democratic politics, while the exposition of our views on organisational tasks developed into an explanation of the difference between the amateurish methods which satisfy the Economists, and the organisation of revolutionaries which we hold to be indispensable. Further, I advance the "plan" for an all-Russia political newspaper with all the more insistence

because the objections raised against it are untenable, and because no real answer has been given to the question I raised in the article "Where To Begin" as to how we can set to work from all sides simultaneously to create the organisation we need. Finally, in the concluding part, I hope to show that we did all we could to prevent a decisive break with the Economists, a break which nevertheless proved inevitable; that *Rabocheye Dyelo* acquired a special significance, a "historical" significance, if you will, because it expressed fully and strikingly, not consistent Economism, but the confusion and vacillation which constitute the distinguishing feature of *an entire period* in the history of Russian Social-Democracy; and that therefore the polemic with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which may upon first view seem excessively detailed, also acquires significance, for we can make no progress until we have completely put an end to this period.

*N. Lenin*

February 1902

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## I DOGMATISM AND "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM"

### A. WHAT DOES "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM" MEAN?

"Freedom of criticism" is undoubtedly the most fashionable slogan at the present time, and the one most frequently employed in the controversies between socialists and democrats in all countries. At first sight, nothing would appear to be more strange than the solemn appeals to freedom of criticism made by one of the parties to the dispute. Have voices been raised in the advanced parties against the constitutional law of the majority of European countries which guarantees freedom to science and scientific investigation? "Something must be wrong here," will be the comment of the onlooker who has heard this fashionable slogan repeated at every turn but has not yet penetrated the essence of the disagreement among the disputants; "evidently this slogan is one of the conventional phrases which, like nicknames, become legitimised by use, and become almost generic terms."

In fact, it is no secret for anyone that two trends have taken form in present-day international\* Social-Democracy. The conflict between these trends now flares up in a bright flame and

Incidentally, in the history of modern socialism this is a phenomenon, perhaps unique and in its way very consoling, namely, that the strife of the various trends within the socialist movement has from national become international. Formerly, the disputes between Lassaleans and Eisenachers,<sup>114</sup> between Guesdists and Possibilists, between Fabians<sup>115</sup> and Social-Democrats,<sup>116</sup> and between Narodnaya Volya<sup>117</sup> adherents and Social-Democrats, remained confined within purely national frameworks, reflecting purely national features, and proceeding, as it were, on different planes. At the present time (as is now evident), the English Fabians, the French Ministerialists,<sup>118</sup> the German Bernsteinians, and the Russian Critics<sup>119</sup>—all belong to the same family, all extol each other, learn from each other, and together take up arms against "dogmatic" Marxism. In this first really international battle with socialist opportunism, international revolutionary Social-Democracy will perhaps become sufficiently strengthened to put an end to the political reaction that has long reigned in Europe?

now dies down and smoulders under the ashes of imposing "truce resolutions". The essence of the "new" trend, which adopts a "critical" attitude towards "obsolete dogmatic" Marxism, has been clearly enough *presented* by Bernstein and *demonstrated* by Millerand.

Social-Democracy must change from a party of social revolution into a democratic party of social reforms. Bernstein has surrounded this political demand with a whole battery of well-attuned "new" arguments and reasonings. Denied was the possibility of putting socialism on a scientific basis and of demonstrating its necessity and inevitability from the point of view of the materialist conception of history. Denied was the fact of growing impoverishment, the process of proletarianisation, and the intensification of capitalist contradictions; the very concept, "*ultimate aim*", was declared to be unsound, and the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was completely rejected. Denied was the antithesis in principle between liberalism and socialism. Denied was *the theory of the class struggle*, on the alleged grounds that it could not be applied to a strictly democratic society governed according to the will of the majority, etc.

Thus, the demand for a decisive turn from revolutionary Social-Democracy to bourgeois social-reformism was accompanied by a no less decisive turn towards bourgeois criticism of all the fundamental ideas of Marxism. In view of the fact that this criticism of Marxism has long been directed from the political platform, from university chairs, in numerous pamphlets and in a series of learned treatises, in view of the fact that the entire younger generation of the educated classes has been systematically reared for decades on this criticism, it is not surprising that the "new critical" trend in Social-Democracy should spring up, all complete, like Minerva from the head of Jove. The content of this new trend did not have to grow and take shape, it was transferred bodily from bourgeois to socialist literature.

To proceed. If Bernstein's theoretical criticism and political yearnings were still unclear to anyone, the French took the trouble strikingly to demonstrate the "new method". In this instance, too, France has justified its old reputation of being "the land where, more than anywhere else, the historical class struggles were each time fought out to a decision..." (Engels, Introduction to Marx's *Der 18. Brumaire*). The French socialists have begun, not to theorise, but to act. The democratically more highly developed political conditions in France have permitted them to put "Bernsteinism into practice" immediately, with all its consequences. Millerand has furnished an excellent example of practical Bernsteinism; not without reason did Bernstein and Vollmar rush so zealously to defend and laud him.

Indeed, if Social-Democracy, in essence, is merely a party of reform and must be bold enough to admit this openly, then not only has a socialist the right to join a bourgeois cabinet, but he must always strive to do so. If democracy, in essence, means the abolition of class domination, then why should not a socialist minister charm the whole bourgeois world by orations on class collaboration? Why should he not remain in the cabinet even after the shooting-down of workers by gendarmes has exposed, for the hundredth and thousandth time, the real nature of the democratic collaboration of classes? Why should he not personally take part in greeting the tsar, for whom the French socialists now have no other name than hero of the gallows, knout and exile (*knouteur, pendeur et déportateur*)? And the reward for this utter humiliation and self-degradation of socialism in the face of the whole world, for the corruption of the socialist consciousness of the working masses—the only basis that can guarantee our victory—the reward for this is pompous *projects* for miserable reforms, so miserable in fact that much more has been obtained from bourgeois governments!

He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new "critical" trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of *opportunism*. And if we judge people, not by the glittering uniforms they don or by the high-sounding appellations they give themselves, but by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that "freedom of criticism" means freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.

"Freedom" is a grand word, but under the banner of freedom for industry the most predatory wars were waged, under the banner of freedom of labour, the working people were robbed. The modern use of the term "freedom of criticism" contains the same inherent falsehood. Those who are really convinced that they have made progress in science would not demand freedom for the new views to continue side by side with the old, but the substitution of the new views for the old. The cry heard today, "Long live freedom of criticism", is too strongly reminiscent of the fable of the empty barrel.

We are marching in a compact group along a precipitous and difficult path, firmly holding each other by the hand. We are surrounded on all sides by enemies, and we have to advance almost constantly under their fire. We have combined, by a freely adopted decision, for the purpose of fighting the enemy, and not of retreating into the neighbouring marsh, the inhabitants of which, from the very outset, have reproached us with

having separated ourselves into an exclusive group and with having chosen the path of struggle instead of the path of conciliation. And now some among us begin to cry out: Let us go into the marsh! And when we begin to shame them, they retort: What backward people you are! Are you not ashamed to deny us the liberty to invite you to take a better road! Oh, yes, gentlemen! You are free not only to invite us, but to go yourselves wherever you will, even into the marsh. In fact, we think that the marsh is your proper place, and we are prepared to render *you* every assistance to get there. Only let go of our hands, don't clutch at us and don't besmirch the grand word freedom, for we too are "free" to go where we please, free to fight not only against the marsh, but also against those who are turning towards the marsh!

## B. THE NEW ADVOCATES OF "FREEDOM OF CRITICISM"

Now, this slogan ("freedom of criticism") has in recent times been solemnly advanced by *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10), organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad,<sup>120</sup> not as a theoretical postulate, but as a political demand, as a reply to the question, "Is it possible to unite the Social-Democratic organisations operating abroad?": "For a durable unity, there must be freedom of criticism" (p. 36).

From this statement two definite conclusions follow: (1) that *Rabocheye Dyelo* has taken under its wing the opportunist trend in international Social-Democracy in general, and (2) that *Rabocheye Dyelo* demands freedom for opportunism in Russian Social-Democracy. Let us examine these conclusions.

*Rabocheye Dyelo* is "particularly" displeased with the "inclination of *Iskra* and *Zarya*<sup>121</sup> to predict a rupture between the *Mountain* and the *Gironde*<sup>122</sup> in international Social-Democracy".\*

"Generally speaking," writes B. Krichevsky, editor of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, "this talk of the *Mountain* and the *Gironde* heard in the ranks of Social-Democracy represents a shallow historical analogy, a strange thing to come from the pen of a Marxist. The *Mountain* and the *Gironde* did not represent different temperaments, or intellectual trends, as the historians of social thought may think, but different classes or strata—the middle bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, on the other. In the modern socialist movement, however, there is no conflict of class interests; the socialist movement in its entirety, in *all* of its diverse forms [Krichevsky's italics], including the most pronounced Bernsteinians, stands on the basis of the class interests of the proletariat and its class struggle for political and economic emancipation" (pp. 32-33).

\* A comparison of the two trends within the revolutionary proletariat (the revolutionary and the opportunist), and the two trends within the revolutionary bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century (the Jacobin, known as the *Mountain*, and the Girondist) was made in the leading article in No. 2 of *Iskra* (February



A bold assertion! Has not Krichovsky heard of the fact, long ago noted, that it is precisely the extensive participation of an "academic" *stratum* in the socialist movement in recent years that has promoted such a rapid spread of Bernsteinism? And what is most important—on what does our author found his opinion that even "the most pronounced Bernsteinians" stand on the basis of the class struggle for the political and economic emancipation of the proletariat? No one knows. This determined defence of the most pronounced Bernsteinians is not supported by any argument or reasoning whatever. Apparently, the author believes that if he repeats what the most pronounced Bernsteinians say about themselves his assertion requires no proof. But can anything more "shallow" be imagined than this judgement of an entire trend based on nothing more than what the representatives of that trend say about themselves? Can anything more shallow be imagined than the subsequent "homily" on the two different and even diametrically opposite types, or paths, of party development? (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, pp. 34-35.) The German Social-Democrats, in other words, recognise complete freedom of criticism, but the French do not, and it is precisely their example that demonstrates the "bane of intolerance".

To this we can only say that the very example B. Krichovsky affords us attests to the fact that the name Marxists is at times assumed by people who conceive history literally in the "Ilovaisky manner". To explain the unity of the German Socialist Party and the disunity of the French Socialist Party, there is no need whatever to go into the special features in the history of these countries, to contrast the conditions of military semi-absolutism in the one with republican parliamentarism in the other, to analyse the effects of the Paris Commune and the effects of the Exceptional Law Against the Socialists, to compare the economic life and economic development of the two countries, or to recall that "the unexampled growth of German Social-Democracy" was accompanied by a strenuous struggle, unique in the history of socialism, not only against erroneous theories (Mühlberger, Dühring,\* the Katheder-Socialists<sup>126</sup>), but also against

1901). The article was written by Plekhanov. The Cadets, the Bezzaglavtsi,<sup>123</sup> and the Mensheviks to this day love to refer to Jacobinism in Russian Social-Democracy. But how Plekhanov came to apply this concept for the first time against the Right wing of Social-Democracy—about this they prefer to keep silent or to forget. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

\* At the time Engels dealt his blows at Dühring, many representatives of German Social-Democracy inclined towards the latter's views, and accusations of acerbity, intolerance, uncomradely polemics, etc., were hurled at Engels even publicly at a Party Congress. At the Congress of 1877,<sup>124</sup> Most, and his supporters, introduced a resolution to prohibit the publication of Engels's articles in *Vorwärts*<sup>125</sup> because "they do not interest the overwhelming major-

erroneous tactics (Lassalle), etc., etc. All that is superfluous! The French quarrel among themselves because they are intolerant; the Germans are united because they are good boys.

And observe, this piece of matchless profundity is designed to "refute" the fact that puts to rout the defence of the Bernsteinians. The question whether or not the Bernsteinians *stand* on the basis of the class struggle of the proletariat is one that can be completely and irrevocably answered only by historical experience. Consequently, the example of France holds greatest significance in this respect, because France is the only country in which the Bernsteinians attempted to *stand* independently, on their own feet, with the warm approval of their German colleagues (and partly also of the Russian opportunists; cf. *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 2-3, pp. 83-84). The reference to the "intolerance" of the French, apart from its "historical" significance (in the Nozdryov<sup>127</sup> sense), turns out to be merely an attempt to hush up very unpleasant facts with angry invectives.

Nor are we inclined to make a present of the Germans to Krichevsky and the numerous other champions of "freedom of criticism". If the "most pronounced Bernsteinians" are still tolerated in the ranks of the German party, it is only to the extent that they *submit* to the Hanover resolution, which emphatically rejected Bernstein's "amendments",<sup>128</sup> and to the Lübeck resolution, which (notwithstanding the diplomatic terms in which it is couched) contains a direct warning to Bernstein.<sup>129</sup> It is debatable, from the standpoint of the interests of the German party, whether diplomacy was appropriate and whether, in this case, a bad peace is better than a good quarrel; in short, opinions may differ as to the expediency of any one of the *methods* employed to reject Bernsteinism, but that the German party *did reject* Bernsteinism on two occasions is a fact no one can fail to see. Therefore, to think that the German example confirms the thesis that "the most pronounced Bernsteinians stand on the basis of the class struggle of the proletariat, for political and economic emancipation", means to fail completely to understand what is going on under our very eyes.\*

ity of the readers", and Vahlteich declared that their publication had caused great damage to the Party, that Dühring too had rendered services to Social-Democracy. "We must utilise everyone in the interests of the Party; let the professors engage in polemics if they care to do so, but *Vorwärts* is not the place in which to conduct them" (*Vorwärts*, No. 65, June 6, 1877). Here we have another example of the defence of "freedom of criticism", and our legal critics and illegal opportunists, who love so much to cite the example of the Germans, would do well to ponder it!

\* It should be observed that *Rabocheye Dyelo* has always confined itself to a bare statement of facts concerning Bernsteinism in the German party and completely "refrained" from expressing its own opinion. See, for instance, the

Nor is that all. As we have seen, *Rabocheye Dyelo* demands "freedom of criticism" and defends Bernsteinism before *Russian* Social-Democracy. Apparently it convinced itself that we were unfair to our "Critics" and Bernsteinians. But to which ones? who? where? when? What did the unfairness represent? About this, not a word. *Rabocheye Dyelo* does not name a single Russian Critic or Bernsteinian! We are left with but one of two possible suppositions. *Either* the unfairly treated party is none other than *Rabocheye Dyelo* itself (this is confirmed by the fact that in the two articles in No. 10 reference is made only to the wrongs suffered by *Rabocheye Dyelo* at the hands of *Zarya* and *Iskra*). If that is the case, how is the strange fact to be explained that *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which always vehemently dissociated itself from all solidarity with Bernsteinism, could not defend itself without putting in a word in defence of the "most pronounced Bernsteinians" and of freedom of criticism? Or some third persons have been treated unfairly. If this is the case, then what reasons may there be for not naming them?

We see, therefore, that *Rabocheye Dyelo* is continuing to play the game of hide-and-seek it has played (as we shall show below) ever since its founding. And let us note further this *first* practical application of the vaunted "freedom of criticism". In actual fact, not only was it forthwith reduced to abstention from all criticism, but also to abstention from expressing independent views altogether. The very *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which avoids mentioning Russian Bernsteinism as if it were a shameful disease (to use Starover's<sup>131</sup> apt expression), proposes, for the treatment of this disease, *to copy word for word* the latest German prescription for the German variety of the malady! Instead of freedom of criticism—slavish (worse: apish) imitation! The very same social and political content of modern international opportunism reveals itself in a variety of ways according to national peculiarities. In one country the opportunists have long ago come out under a separate flag; in another, they have ignored theory and in fact pursued the

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reports of the Stuttgart Congress<sup>130</sup> in No. 2-3 (p. 66), in which all the disagreements are reduced to "tactics" and the statement is merely made that the overwhelming majority remain true to the previous revolutionary tactics. Or, No. 4-5 (p. 25, et seq.), in which we have nothing but a paraphrasing of the speeches delivered at the Hanover Congress, with a reprint of Bebel's resolution. An exposition and a criticism of Bernstein's views are again put off (as was the case in No. 2-3) to be dealt with in a "special article". Curiously enough, in No. 4-5 (p. 33), we read the following: "...the views expounded by Bebel have the support of the vast majority of the Congress," and a few lines thereafter: "...David defended Bernstein's views ... First of all, he tried to show that ... Bernstein and his friends, after all is said and done [sic!], stand on the basis of the class struggle. ..." This was written in December 1899, and in September 1901 *Rabocheye Dyelo*, apparently no longer believing that Bebel was right, repeats David's views as its own!

policy of the Radicals-Socialists; in a third, some members of the revolutionary party have deserted to the camp of opportunism and strive to achieve their aims, not in open struggle for principles and for new tactics, but by gradual, imperceptible, and, if one may so put it, unpunishable corruption of their party; in a fourth country, similar deserters employ the same methods in the gloom of political slavery, and with a completely original combination of "legal" and "illegal" activity, etc. To talk of freedom of criticism and of Bernsteinism as a condition for uniting the *Russian* Social-Democrats and not to explain how *Russian* Bernsteinism has manifested itself and what particular fruits it has borne, amounts to talking with the aim of saying nothing.

Let us ourselves try, if only in a few words, to say what *Rabocheye Dyelo* did not want to say (or which was, perhaps, beyond its comprehension).

### C. CRITICISM IN RUSSIA

The chief distinguishing feature of Russia in regard to the point we are examining is that *the very beginning* of the spontaneous working-class movement, on the one hand, and of the turn of progressive public opinion towards Marxism, on the other, was marked by the combination of manifestly heterogeneous elements under a common flag to fight the common enemy (the obsolete social and political world outlook). We refer to the heyday of "legal Marxism". Speaking generally, this was an altogether curious phenomenon that no one in the eighties or the beginning of the nineties would have believed possible. In a country ruled by an autocracy, with a completely enslaved press, in a period of desperate political reaction in which even the tiniest outgrowth of political discontent and protest is persecuted, the theory of revolutionary Marxism suddenly forces its way into the *censored* literature and, though expounded in Aesopian language, is understood by all the "interested". The government had accustomed itself to regarding only the theory of the (revolutionary) *Narodnaya Volya* as dangerous, without, as is usual, observing its internal evolution, and rejoicing at *any* criticism levelled against it. Quite a considerable time elapsed (by our Russian standards) before the government realised what had happened and the unwieldy army of censors and gendarmes discovered the new enemy and flung itself upon him. Meanwhile, Marxist books were published one after another, Marxist journals and newspapers were founded, nearly everyone became a Marxist, Marxists were flattered, Marxists were courted, and the book publishers rejoiced at the extraordinary, ready sale of Marxist literature. It was quite natural, therefore, that among the Marxian neophytes

who were caught up in this atmosphere, there should be more than one "author who got a swelled head. . .".<sup>132</sup>

We can now speak calmly of this period as of an event of the past. It is no secret that the brief period in which Marxism blossomed on the surface of our literature was called forth by an alliance between people of extreme and of very moderate views. In point of fact, the latter were bourgeois democrats; this conclusion (so markedly confirmed by their subsequent "critical" development) suggested itself to some even when the "alliance" was still intact.\*

That being the case, are not the revolutionary Social-Democrats who entered into the alliance with the future "Critics" mainly responsible for the subsequent "confusion"? This question, together with a reply in the affirmative, is sometimes heard from people with too rigid a view. But such people are entirely in the wrong. Only those who are not sure of themselves can fear to enter into temporary alliances even with unreliable people; not a single political party could exist without such alliances. The combination with the legal Marxists was in its way the first really political alliance entered into by Russian Social-Democrats. Thanks to this alliance, an astonishingly rapid victory was obtained over Narodism, and Marxist ideas (even though in a vulgarised form) became very widespread. Moreover, the alliance was not concluded altogether without "conditions". Evidence of this is the burning by the censor, in 1895, of the Marxist collection *Material on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia*. If the literary agreement with the legal Marxists can be compared with a political alliance, then that book can be compared with a political treaty.

The rupture, of course, did not occur because the "allies" proved to be bourgeois democrats. On the contrary, the representatives of the latter trend are natural and desirable allies of Social-Democracy insofar as its democratic tasks, brought to the fore by the prevailing situation in Russia, are concerned. But an essential condition for such an alliance must be the full opportunity for the socialists to reveal to the working class that its interests are diametrically opposed to the interests of the bourgeoisie. However, the Bernsteinian and "critical" trend, to which the majority of the legal Marxists turned, deprived the socialists of this opportunity and demoralised the socialist consciousness by vulgarising Marxism, by advocating the theory of the blunting of social contradictions, by declaring the idea

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\* The reference is to an article by K. Tulin directed against Struve. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 333-507.—*Ed.*) The article was based on an essay entitled "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature". See Preface.<sup>133</sup> (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

of the social revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat to be absurd, by reducing the working-class movement and the class struggle to narrow trade-unionism and to a "realistic" struggle for petty, gradual reforms. This was synonymous with bourgeois democracy's denial of socialism's right to independence and, consequently, of its right to existence; in practice it meant a striving to convert the nascent working-class movement into an appendage of the liberals.

Naturally, under such circumstances the rupture was necessary. But the "peculiar" feature of Russia manifested itself in the fact that this rupture simply meant the elimination of the Social-Democrats from the most accessible and widespread "legal" literature. The "ex-Marxists", who took up the flag of "criticism" and who obtained almost a monopoly to "demolish" Marxism, entrenched themselves in this literature. Catchwords like "Against orthodoxy" and "Long live freedom of criticism" (now repeated by *Rabocheye Dyelo*) forthwith became the vogue, and the fact that neither the censor nor the gendarmes could resist this vogue is apparent from the publication of *three* Russian editions of the work of the celebrated Bernstein<sup>134</sup> (celebrated in the Herostratean sense) and from the fact that the works of Bernstein, Mr. Prokopovich, and others were recommended by Zubatov (*Iskra*, No. 10). A task now devolved upon the Social-Democrats that was difficult in itself and was made incredibly more difficult by purely external obstacles—the task of combating the new trend. This trend did not confine itself to the sphere of literature. The turn towards "criticism" was accompanied by an infatuation for "Economism" among Social-Democratic practical workers.

The manner in which the connection between, and interdependence of, legal criticism and illegal Economism arose and grew is in itself an interesting subject, one that could serve as the theme of a special article. We need only note here that this connection undoubtedly existed. The notoriety deservedly acquired by the *Credo* was due precisely to the frankness with which it formulated this connection and blurted out the fundamental political tendency of "Economism"—let the workers carry on the economic struggle (it would be more correct to say the trade-unionist struggle, because the latter also embraces specifically working-class politics) and let the Marxist intelligentsia merge with the liberals for the political "struggle". Thus, trade-unionist work "among the people" meant fulfilling the first part of this task, while legal criticism meant fulfilling the second. This statement was such an excellent weapon against Economism that, had there been no *Credo*, it would have been worth inventing one.

The *Credo* was not invented, but it was published without

the consent and perhaps even against the will of its authors. At all events, the present writer, who took part in dragging this new "programme" into the light of day,\* has heard complaints and reproaches to the effect that copies of the résumé of the speakers' views were distributed, dubbed the *Credo*, and even published in the press together with the protest! We refer to this episode because it reveals a very peculiar feature of our Economism—fear of publicity. This is a feature of Economism generally, and not of the authors of the *Credo* alone. It was revealed by that most outspoken and honest advocate of Economism, *Rabochaya Mysl*,<sup>137</sup> and by *Rabocheye Dyelo* (which was indignant over the publication of "Economist" documents in the *Uademecum*<sup>138</sup>), as well as by the Kiev Committee, which two years ago refused to permit the publication of its *profession de foi*,<sup>139</sup> together with a repudiation of it,\*\* and by many other individual representatives of Economism.

This fear of criticism displayed by the advocates of freedom of criticism cannot be attributed solely to craftiness (although, on occasion, no doubt craftiness is brought into play: it would be imprudent to expose the young and as yet frail shoots of the new trend to attacks by opponents). No, the majority of the Economists look with sincere resentment (as by the very nature of Economism they must) upon all theoretical controversies, factional disagreements, broad political questions, plans for organising revolutionaries, etc. "Leave all that to the people abroad!" said a fairly consistent Economist to me one day, thereby expressing a very widespread (and again purely trade-unionist) view; our concern is the working-class movement, the workers' organisations here, in our localities; all the rest is merely the invention of doctrinaires, "the overrating of ideology", as the authors of the letter, published in *Iskra*, No. 12, expressed it, in unison with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10.

The question now arises: such being the peculiar features of Russian "criticism" and Russian Bernsteinism, what should have been the task of those who sought to oppose opportunism in deeds and not merely in words? First, they should have made efforts to resume the theoretical work that had barely begun in the period of legal Marxism and that fell anew on the shoul-

\* The reference is to the *Protest of the Seventeen* against the *Credo*. The present writer took part in drawing up this protest (the end of 1899). The protest and the *Credo* were published abroad in the spring of 1900.<sup>135</sup> (See "A Protest of Russian Social-Democrats", *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 167-82.—Ed.) It is now known from the article written by Madame Kuskova (I think in *Byloye*<sup>136</sup>) that she was the author of the *Credo* and that Mr. Prokopovich was very prominent among the Economists abroad at the time. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—Ed.)

\*\* As far as our information goes, the composition of the Kiev Committee has changed since then.

ders of the comrades working underground. Without such work the successful growth of the movement was impossible. Secondly, they should have actively combated the legal "criticism" that was perverting people's minds on a considerable scale. Thirdly, they should have actively opposed confusion and vacillation in the practical movement, exposing and repudiating every conscious or unconscious attempt to degrade our programme and our tactics.

That *Rabocheye Dyelo* did none of these things is well known; we shall have occasion below to deal with this well-known fact in detail and from various aspects. At the moment, however, we desire merely to show the glaring contradiction that exists between the demand for "freedom of criticism" and the specific features of our native criticism and Russian Economism. It suffices but to glance at the text of the resolution in which the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad endorsed the point of view of *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

"In the interests of the further ideological development of Social-Democracy, we recognise the freedom of criticism of Social-Democratic theory in Party literature to be absolutely necessary insofar as the criticism does not run counter to the class and revolutionary character of this theory" (*Two Conferences*, p. 10).

And the motivation? The resolution "in its first part coincides with the resolution of the Lübeck Party Congress on Bernstein". . . . In the simplicity of their souls the "Unionists" failed to observe what a *testimonium paupertatis* (attestation of poverty) they betray with this copying. . . . "But . . . in its second part, it restricts freedom of criticism much more than did the Lübeck Party Congress."

The resolution of the Union Abroad, then, is directed against the Russian Bernsteinians? If it is not, then the reference to Lübeck would be utterly absurd. But it is not true to say that it "restricts freedom of criticism". In adopting their Hanover resolution, the Germans, point by point, rejected *precisely* the amendments proposed by Bernstein, while in their Lübeck resolution they cautioned *Bernstein personally*, by naming him. Our "free" imitators, however, make *not a single allusion to a single manifestation of specifically Russian "criticism" and Russian Economism*. In view of this omission, the bare reference to the class and revolutionary character of the theory leaves far wider scope for misinterpretation, particularly when the Union Abroad refuses to identify "so-called Economism" with opportunism (*Two Conferences*, p. 8 Paragraph 1). But all this, in passing. The main thing to note is that the positions of the opportunists in relation to the revolutionary Social-Democrats in Russia are diametrically opposed to those in Germany. In that country, as we know, the revolutionary Social-Democrats are in favour



of preserving that which exists—the old programme and the tactics, which are universally known and have been elucidated in all their details by many decades of experience. But the “Critics” desire to introduce changes, and since these Critics represent an insignificant minority, and since they are very timid in their revisionist efforts, one can understand the motives of the majority in confining themselves to the dry rejection of “innovations”. In Russia, however, it is the Critics and the Economists who are in favour of preserving that which exists: the “Critics” want us to go on regarding them as Marxists and to guarantee them the “freedom of criticism” they enjoyed to the full (for, in fact, they never recognised any kind of party ties\* and, moreover, we never had a generally recognised party body that could “restrict” freedom of criticism, if only by counsel); the Economists want the revolutionaries to recognise the “sovereign character of the present movement” (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 25), i.e., to recognise the “legitimacy” of that which exists; they want the “ideologists” not to try to “divert” the movement from the path that “is determined by the interaction of material elements and material environment” (“Letter” in *Iskra*, No. 12); they want to have that struggle recognised as desirable “which it is possible for the workers to wage under the present conditions”, and as the only possible struggle, that “which they are actually waging at the present time” (“*Separate Supplement*” to *Rabochaya Mysl*, p. 14). We revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, are dissatisfied with this worship of spontaneity, i.e., of that which exists “at the present moment”. We demand that the tactics that have prevailed in recent years be changed; we declare that “before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all draw firm and definite lines of demarcation” (see announcement of the publication of *Iskra*).\*\* In a word, the Germans stand for that which

\* The fact alone of the absence of public party ties and party traditions, representing as it does a cardinal difference between Russia and Germany, should have warned all sensible socialists against blind imitation. But here is an instance of the lengths to which “freedom of criticism” goes in Russia. Mr Bulgakov, the Russian Critic, utters the following reprimand to the Austrian Critic, Hertz: “Notwithstanding the independence of his conclusions, Hertz on this point [on the question of co-operative societies] apparently remains excessively bound by the opinions of his party, and although he disagrees with it in details, he dare not reject the common principle” (*Capitalism and Agriculture*, Vol. II, p. 287). The subject of a politically ensalved state, in which nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand of the population are corrupted to the marrow by political subservience and completely lack the conception of party honour and party ties, superciliously reproves a citizen of a constitutional state for being excessively “bound by the opinions of his party”! Our illegal organisations have nothing else to do, of course, but draw up resolutions on freedom of criticism....

\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 354.—Ed.

exists and reject changes; we demand a change of that which exists, and reject subservience thereto and reconciliation to it.

This "slight" difference our "free" copyists of German resolutions failed to notice.

#### D. ENGELS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THEORETICAL STRUGGLE

"Dogmatism, doctrinairism", "ossification of the party—the inevitable retribution that follows the violent strait-lacing of thought"—these are the enemies against which the knightly champions of "freedom of criticism" in *Rabocheye Dyelo* rise up in arms. We are very glad that this question has been placed on the order of the day and we would only propose to add to it one other:

And who are the judges?

We have before us two publishers' announcements. One, "The Programme of the Periodical Organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad—*Rabocheye Dyelo*" (reprint from No. 1 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*). and the other, the "Announcement of the Resumption of the Publications of the Emancipation of Labour Group".<sup>140</sup> Both are dated 1899, when the "crisis of Marxism" had long been under discussion. And what do we find? We would seek in vain in the first announcement for any reference to this phenomenon, or a definite statement of the position the new organ intends to adopt on this question. Not a word is said about theoretical work and the urgent tasks that now confront it, either in this programme or in the supplements to it that were adopted by the Third Congress of the Union Abroad in 1901<sup>141</sup> (*Two Conferences*, pp. 15-18). During this entire time the Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* ignored theoretical questions, in spite of the fact that these were questions that disturbed the minds of all Social-Democrats the world over.

The other announcement, on the contrary, points first of all to the declining interest in theory in recent years, imperatively demands "vigilant attention to the theoretical aspect of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat", and calls for "ruthless criticism of the Bernsteinian and other anti-revolutionary tendencies" in our movement. The issues of *Zarya* to date show how this programme has been carried out.

Thus, we see that high-sounding phrases against the ossification of thought, etc., conceal unconcern and helplessness with regard to the development of theoretical thought. The case of the Russian Social-Democrats manifestly illustrates the general European phenomenon (long ago noted also by the German Marxists) that the much vaunted freedom of criticism does not imply sub-

stitution of one theory for another, but freedom from all integral and pondered theory; it implies eclecticism and lack of principle. Those who have the slightest acquaintance with the actual state of our movement cannot but see that the wide spread of Marxism was accompanied by a certain lowering of the theoretical level. Quite a number of people with very little, and even a total lack of theoretical training joined the movement because of its practical significance and its practical successes. We can judge from that how tactless *Rabocheye Dyelo* is when, with an air of triumph, it quotes Marx's statement: "Every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes."<sup>142</sup> To repeat these words in a period of theoretical disorder is like wishing mourners at a funeral many happy returns of the day. Moreover, these words of Marx are taken from his letter on the Gotha Programme,<sup>143</sup> in which he *sharply condemns* eclecticism in the formulation of principles. If you must unite, Marx wrote to the party leaders, then enter into agreements to satisfy the practical aims of the movement, but do not allow any bargaining over principles, do not make theoretical "concessions". This was Marx's idea, and yet there are people among us who seek—in his name—to belittle the significance of theory!

Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. This idea cannot be insisted upon too strongly at a time when the fashionable preaching of opportunism goes hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of practical activity. Yet, for Russian Social-Democrats the importance of theory is enhanced by three other circumstances, which are often forgotten: first, by the fact that our Party is only in process of formation, its features are only just becoming defined, and it has as yet far from settled accounts with the other trends of revolutionary thought that threaten to divert the movement from the correct path. On the contrary, precisely the very recent past was marked by a revival of non-Social-Democratic revolutionary trends (an eventuation regarding which Axelrod long ago warned the Economists).<sup>144</sup> Under these circumstances, what at first sight appears to be an "unimportant" error may lead to most deplorable consequences, and only short-sighted people can consider factional disputes and a strict differentiation between shades of opinion inopportune or superfluous. The fate of Russian Social-Democracy for very many years to come may depend on the strengthening of one or the other "shade".

Secondly, the Social-Democratic movement is in its very essence an international movement. This means, not only that we must combat national chauvinism, but that an incipient movement in a young country can be successful only if it makes use of the experiences of other countries. In order to make use of

these experiences it is not enough merely to be acquainted with them, or simply to copy out the latest resolutions. What is required is the ability to treat these experiences critically and to test them independently. He who realises how enormously the modern working-class movement has grown and branched out will understand what a reserve of theoretical forces and political (as well as revolutionary) experience is required to carry out this task.

Thirdly, the national tasks of Russian Social-Democracy are such as have never confronted any other socialist party in the world. We shall have occasion further on to deal with the political and organisational duties which the task of emancipating the whole people from the yoke of autocracy imposes upon us. At this point, we wish to state only that *the role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory*. To have a concrete understanding of what this means, let the reader recall such predecessors of Russian Social-Democracy as Herzen, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and the brilliant galaxy of revolutionaries of the seventies; let him ponder over the world significance which Russian literature is now acquiring; let him... but be that enough!

Let us quote what Engels said in 1874 concerning the significance of theory in the Social-Democratic movement. Engels recognises, *not two* forms of the great struggle of Social-Democracy (political and economic), as is the fashion among us, *but three, placing the theoretical struggle on a par with the first two*. His recommendations to the German working-class movement, which had become strong, practically and politically, are so instructive from the standpoint of present-day problems and controversies, that we hope the reader will not be vexed with us for quoting a long passage from his prefatory note to *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg*,\* which has long become a great bibliographical rarity:

"The German workers have two important advantages over those of the rest of Europe. First, they belong to the most theoretical people of Europe; and they have retained that sense of theory which the so-called 'educated' classes of Germany have almost completely lost. Without German philosophy, which preceded it, particularly that of Hegel, German scientific socialism—the only scientific socialism that has ever existed—would never have come into being. Without a sense of theory among the workers, this scientific socialism would never have entered their

\* Dritter Abdruck. Leipzig, 1875. Verlag der Genossenschaftsbuchdruckerei. (*The Peasant War in Germany*. Third impression. Co-operative Publishers, Leipzig, 1875.—Ed.)

flesh and blood as much as is the case. What an immeasurable advantage this is may be seen, on the one hand, from the indifference towards all theory, which is one of the main reasons why the English working-class movement crawls along so slowly in spite of the splendid organisation of the individual unions; on the other hand, from the mischief and confusion wrought by Proudhonism, in its original form, among the French and Belgians, and, in the form further caricatured by Bakunin, among the Spaniards and Italians.

"The second advantage is that, chronologically speaking, the Germans were about the last to come into the workers' movement. Just as German theoretical socialism will never forget that it rests on the shoulders of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen—three men who, in spite of all their fantastic notions and all their utopianism, have their place among the most eminent thinkers of all times, and whose genius anticipated innumerable things, the correctness of which is now being scientifically proved by us—so the practical workers' movement in Germany ought never to forget that it has developed on the shoulders of the English and French movements, that it was able simply to utilise their dearly bought experience, and could now avoid their mistakes, which in their time were mostly unavoidable. Without the precedent of the English trade unions and French workers' political struggles, without the gigantic impulse given especially by the Paris Commune, where would we be now?

"It must be said to the credit of the German workers that they have exploited the advantages of their situation with rare understanding. For the first time since a workers' movement has existed, the struggle is being conducted pursuant to its three sides—the theoretical, the political, and the practical-economic (resistance to the capitalists)—in harmony and in its interconnections, and in a systematic way. It is precisely in this, as it were, concentric attack, that the strength and invincibility of the German movement lies.

"Due to this advantageous situation, on the one hand, and to the insular peculiarities of the English and the forcible suppression of the French movement, on the other, the German workers have for the moment been placed in the vanguard of the proletarian struggle. How long events will allow them to occupy this post of honour cannot be foretold. But let us hope that as long as they occupy it, they will fill it fittingly. This demands redoubled efforts in every field of struggle and agitation. In particular, it will be the duty of the leaders to gain an ever clearer insight into all theoretical questions, to free themselves more and more from the influence of traditional phrases inherited from the old world outlook, and constantly to keep in mind that so-

cialism, since it has become a science, demands that it be pursued as a science, i.e., that it be studied. The task will be to spread with increased zeal among the masses of the workers the ever more clarified understanding thus acquired, to knit together ever more firmly the organisation both of the party and of the trade unions. . . .

"If the German workers progress in this way, they will not be marching exactly at the head of the movement—it is not at all in the interest of this movement that the workers of any particular country should march at its head—but they will occupy an honourable place in the battle line; and they will stand armed for battle when either unexpectedly grave trials or momentous events demand of them increased courage, increased determination and energy."

Engels's words proved prophetic. Within a few years the German workers were subjected to unexpectedly grave trials in the form of the Exceptional Law Against the Socialists. And they met those trials armed for battle and succeeded in emerging from them victorious.

The Russian proletariat will have to undergo trials immeasurably graver; it will have to fight a monster compared with which an anti-socialist law in a constitutional country seems but a dwarf. History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *immediate* tasks confronting the proletariat of any country. The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. And we have the right to count upon acquiring this honourable title, already earned by our predecessors, the revolutionaries of the seventies, if we succeed in inspiring our movement, which is a thousand times broader and deeper, with the same devoted determination and vigour.

## II THE SPONTANEITY OF THE MASSES AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

We have said that our movement, much more extensive and deep than the movement of the seventies, must be inspired with the same devoted determination and energy that inspired the movement at that time. Indeed, no one, we think, has until now doubted that the strength of the present-day movement lies in the awakening of the masses (principally, the industrial prole-

tariat) and that its weakness lies in the lack of consciousness and initiative among the revolutionary leaders.

However, of late a staggering discovery has been made, which threatens to disestablish all hitherto prevailing views on this question. This discovery was made by *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which in its polemic with *Iskra* and *Zarya* did not confine itself to making objections on separate points, but tried to ascribe "general disagreements" to a more profound cause—to the "different appraisals of the *relative* importance of the spontaneous and consciously 'methodical' element". *Rabocheye Dyelo* formulated its indictment as a "*belittling of the significance of the objective or the spontaneous element of development*".\* To this we say: Had the polemics with *Iskra* and *Zarya* resulted in nothing more than causing *Rabocheye Dyelo* to hit upon these "general disagreements", that alone would give us considerable satisfaction, so significant is this thesis and so clear is the light it sheds on the quintessence of the present-day theoretical and political differences that exist among Russian Social-Democrats.

For this reason the question of the relation between consciousness and spontaneity is of such enormous general interest, and for this reason the question must be dealt with in great detail.

#### A. THE BEGINNING OF THE SPONTANEOUS UPSURGE

In the previous chapter we pointed out how *universally* absorbed the educated youth of Russia was in the theories of Marxism in the middle of the nineties. In the same period the strikes that followed the famous St. Petersburg industrial war of 1896<sup>145</sup> assumed a similar general character. Their spread over the whole of Russia clearly showed the depth of the newly awakening popular movement, and if we are to speak of the "spontaneous element" then, of course, it is this strike movement which, first and foremost, must be regarded as spontaneous. But there is spontaneity and spontaneity. Strikes occurred in Russia in the seventies and sixties (and even in the first half of the nineteenth century), and they were accompanied by the "spontaneous" destruction of machinery, etc. Compared with these "revolts", the strikes of the nineties might even be described as "conscious", to such an extent do they mark the progress which the working-class movement made in that period. This shows that the "spontaneous element", in essence, represents nothing more nor less than consciousness in an *embryonic form*. Even the primitive revolts expressed the awakening of con-

\* *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, September 1901, pp. 17-18. *Rabocheye Dyelo's* italics.

sciousness to a certain extent. The workers were losing their age-long faith in the permanence of the system which oppressed them and began . . . I shall not say to understand, but to sense the necessity for collective resistance, definitely abandoning their slavish submission to the authorities. But this was, nevertheless, more in the nature of outbursts of desperation and vengeance than of *struggle*. The strikes of the nineties revealed far greater flashes of consciousness; definite demands were advanced, the strike was carefully timed, known cases and instances in other places were discussed, etc. The revolts were simply the resistance of the oppressed, whereas the systematic strikes represented the class struggle in embryo, but only in embryo. Taken by themselves, these strikes were simply trade union struggles, not yet Social-Democratic struggles. They marked the awakening antagonisms between workers and employers; but the workers were not, and could not be, conscious of the irreconcilable antagonism of their interests to the whole of the modern political and social system, i.e., theirs was not yet Social-Democratic consciousness. In this sense, the strikes of the nineties, despite the enormous progress they represented as compared with the "revolts", remained a purely spontaneous movement.

We have said that *there could not have been* Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc.\* The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. In the period under discussion, the middle nineties, this doctrine not only represented the completely formulated programme of the Emancipation of Labour group, but had already won over to its side the majority of the revolutionary youth in Russia.

\* Trade-unionism does not exclude "politics" altogether, as some imagine. Trade unions have always conducted some political (but not Social-Democratic) agitation and struggle. We shall deal with the difference between trade union politics and Social-Democratic politics in the next chapter.



Hence, we had both the spontaneous awakening of the working masses, their awakening to conscious life and conscious struggle, and a revolutionary youth, armed with Social-Democratic theory and straining towards the workers. In this connection it is particularly important to state the oft-forgotten (and comparatively little-known) fact that, although the *early* Social-Democrats of that period *zealously carried on economic agitation* (being guided in this activity by the truly useful indications contained in the pamphlet *On Agitation*, then still in manuscript<sup>146</sup>, they did not regard this as their sole task. On the contrary, *from the very beginning* they set for Russian Social-Democracy the most far-reaching historical tasks, in general, and the task of overthrowing the autocracy, in particular. Thus, towards the end of 1895, the St. Petersburg group of Social-Democrats, which founded the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class,<sup>147</sup> prepared the first issue of a newspaper called *Rabocheye Dyelo*. This issue was ready to go to press when it was seized by the gendarmes, on the night of December 8, 1895, in a raid on the house of one of the members of the group, Anatoly Alexeyevich Vaneyev,\* so that the first edition of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was not destined to see the light of day. The leading article in this issue (which perhaps thirty years hence some *Russkaya Starina* will unearth in the archives of the Department of Police) outlined the historical tasks of the working class in Russia and placed the achievement of political liberty at their head.<sup>148</sup> The issue also contained an article entitled "What Are Our Ministers Thinking About?"\*\* which dealt with the crushing of the elementary education committees by the police. In addition, there was some correspondence from St. Petersburg, and from other parts of Russia (e.g., a letter on the massacre of the workers in Yaroslavl Gubernia<sup>149</sup>). This, "first effort", if we are not mistaken, of the Russian Social-Democrats of the nineties was not a purely local, or less still, "Economic", newspaper, but one that aimed to unite the strike movement with the revolutionary movement against the autocracy, and to win over to the side of Social-Democracy all who were oppressed by the policy of reactionary obscurantism. No one in the slightest degree acquainted with the state of the movement at that period could doubt that such a paper would have met with warm response among the workers of the capital and the revolutionary intelligentsia and would have had a wide circulation. The failure of

\* A. A. Vaneyev died in Eastern Siberia in 1899 from consumption, which he contracted during solitary confinement in prison prior to his banishment. That is why we considered it possible to publish the above information, the authenticity of which we guarantee, for it comes from persons who were closely and directly acquainted with A. A. Vaneyev.

\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 87-92.—Ed.

the enterprise merely showed that the Social-Democrats of that period were unable to meet the immediate requirements of the time owing to their lack of revolutionary experience and practical training. This must be said, too, with regard to the *S. Petersburgsky Rabochy Listok*<sup>150</sup> and particularly with regard to *Rabochaya Gazeta* and the *Manifesto* of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, founded in the spring of 1898. Of course, we would not dream of blaming the Social-Democrats of that time for this unpreparedness. But in order to profit from the experience of that movement, and to draw practical lessons from it, we must thoroughly understand the causes and significance of this or that shortcoming. It is therefore highly important to establish the fact that a part (perhaps even a majority) of the Social-Democrats, active in the period of 1895-98, justly considered it possible even then, at the very beginning of the "spontaneous" movement, to come forward with a most extensive programme and a militant tactical line.\* Lack of training of the majority of the revolutionaries, an entirely natural phenomenon, could not have roused any particular fears. Once the tasks were correctly defined, once the energy existed for repeated attempts to fulfil them, temporary failures represented only part misfortune. Revolutionary experience and organisational skill are things that can be acquired, provided the desire is there to acquire them, provided the shortcomings are recognised, which in revolutionary activity is more than half-way towards their removal.

But what was only part misfortune became full misfortune when this consciousness began to grow dim (it was very much alive among the members of the groups mentioned), when there appeared people—and even Social-Democratic organs—that were prepared to regard shortcomings as virtues, that even tried to invent a *theoretical* basis for their *slavish cringing before spontaneity*. It is time to draw conclusions from this trend, the content of which is incorrectly and too narrowly characterised as Economism.

\* "In adopting a hostile attitude towards the activities of the Social-Democrats of the late nineties, *Iskra* ignores the absence at that time of conditions for any work other than the struggle for petty demands," declare the Economists in their "Letter to Russian Social-Democratic Organs" (*Iskra*, No 12). The facts given above show that the assertion about "absence of conditions" is *diametrically opposed to the truth*. Not only at the end, but even in the mid-nineties, all the conditions existed for *other* work, besides the struggle for petty demands—all the conditions except adequate training of leaders. Instead of frankly admitting that we, the ideologists, the leaders, lacked sufficient training—the Economists seek to shift the blame entirely upon the "absence of conditions", upon the effect of material environment that determines the road from which no ideologist will be able to divert the movement. What is this but slavish cringing before spontaneity, what but the infatuation of the "ideologists" with their own shortcomings?

**B. BOWING TO SPONTANEITY. *RABOCHAYA MYSL***

Before dealing with the literary manifestation of this subservience to spontaneity, we should like to note the following characteristic fact (communicated to us from the above-mentioned source), which throws light on the conditions in which the two future conflicting trends in Russian Social-Democracy arose and grew among the comrades working in St. Petersburg. In the beginning of 1897, just prior to their banishment, A. A. Vaneyev and several of his comrades attended a private meeting at which "old" and "young" members of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class gathered.<sup>151</sup> The conversation centred chiefly about the question of organisation, particularly about the "rules for the workers' mutual benefit fund", which, in their final form, were published in "*Listok Rabotnika*,"<sup>152</sup> No. 9-10, p. 46. Sharp differences immediately showed themselves between the "old" members ("Decembrists", as the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats jestingly called them) and several of the "young" members (who subsequently took an active part in the work of *Rabochaya Mysl*), with a heated discussion ensuing. The "young" members defended the main principles of the rules in the form in which they were published. The "old" members contended that the prime necessity was not this, but the consolidation of the League of Struggle into an organisation of revolutionaries to which all the various workers' mutual benefit funds, students' propaganda circles, etc., should be subordinated. It goes without saying that the disputing sides far from realised at the time that these disagreements were the beginning of a cleavage; on the contrary, they regarded them as something isolated and casual. But this fact shows that in Russia, too, Economism did not arise and spread without a struggle against the "old" Social-Democrats (which the Economists of today are apt to forget). And if, in the main, this struggle has not left "documentary" traces behind it, it is *solely* because the membership of the circles then functioning underwent such constant change that no continuity was established and, consequently, differences in point of view were not recorded in any documents.

The founding of *Rabochaya Mysl* brought Economism to the light of day, but not at one stroke. We must picture to ourselves concretely the conditions for activity and the short-lived character of the majority of the Russian study circles (a thing that is possible only for those who have themselves experienced it) in order to understand how much there was of the fortuitous in the successes and failures of the new trend in various towns, and the length of time during which neither the advocates nor

the opponents of the "new" could make up their minds—and literally had no opportunity of so doing—as to whether this really expressed a distinct trend or merely the lack of training of certain individuals. For example, the first mimeographed copies of *Rabochaya Mysl* never reached the great majority of Social-Democrats, and if we are able to refer to the leading article in the first number, it is only because it was reproduced in an article by V. I. ("*Listok*" *Rabotnika*, No. 9-10, p. 47, et seq.), who, of course, did not fail to extol with more zeal than reason the new paper, which was so different from the papers and projects for papers mentioned above.\* It is well worth dwelling on this leading article because it brings out in bold relief *the entire spirit of Rabochaya Mysl* and Economism generally.

After stating that the arm of the "blue-coats"<sup>153</sup> could never halt the progress of the working-class movement, the leading article goes on to say: "... The virility of the working-class movement is due to the fact that the workers themselves are at last taking their fate into their own hands, and out of the hands of the leaders"; this fundamental thesis is then developed in greater detail. Actually, the leaders (i.e., the Social-Democrats, the organisers of the League of Struggle) were, one might say, torn out of the hands of the workers\*\* by the police; yet it is made to appear that the workers were fighting against the leaders and liberated themselves from their yoke! Instead of sounding the call to go forward towards the consolidation of the revolutionary organisation and the expansion of political activity, the call was issued for a *retreat* to the purely trade union struggle. It was announced that "the economic basis of the movement is eclipsed by the effort never to forget the political ideal", and that the watchword for the working-class movement was "Struggle for economic conditions" (!) or, better still, "The workers for the workers". It was declared that strike funds "are more valuable to the movement than a hundred other organisations" (compare this statement made in October 1897, with the polemic between the "Decembrists" and the young members in the beginning of

<sup>1</sup> It should be stated in passing that the praise of *Rabochaya Mysl* in November 1898, when Economism had become fully defined, especially abroad, emanated from the selfsame V.I., who very soon after became one of the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. And yet *Rabocheye Dyelo* denied that there were two trends in Russian Social-Democracy, and continues to deny it to this day!

\*\* That this simile is a correct one is shown by the following characteristic fact. When, after the arrest of the "Decembrists", the news spread among the workers of the Schlüsselburg Highway that the discovery and arrest were facilitated by an *agent provocateur*, N. N. Mikhailov, a dentist, who had been in contact with a group associated with the "Decembrists", the workers were so enraged that they decided to kill him.

1897), etc. Catchwords like "We must concentrate, not on the 'cream' of the workers, but on the 'average', mass worker"; "Politics always obediently follows economics",\* etc., etc., became the fashion, exercising an irresistible influence upon the masses of the youth who were attracted to the movement but who, in the majority of cases, were acquainted only with such fragments of Marxism as were expounded in legally appearing publications.

Political consciousness was completely overwhelmed by spontaneity—the spontaneity of the "Social-Democrats" who repeated Mr. V. V.'s "ideas", the spontaneity of those workers who were carried away by the arguments that a kopek added to a ruble was worth more than any socialism or politics, and that they must "fight, knowing that they are fighting, not for the sake of some future generation, but for themselves and their children" (leader in *Rabochaya Mysl*, No. 1). Phrases like these have always been a favourite weapon of the West-European bourgeois, who, in their hatred for socialism, strove (like the German "*Sozial-Politiker*" Hirsch) to transplant English trade-unionism to their native soil and to preach to the workers that by engaging in the purely trade union struggle\*\* they would be fighting for themselves and for their children, and not for some future generations with some future socialism. And now the "V. V.s of Russian Social-Democracy"<sup>154</sup> have set about repeating these bourgeois phrases. It is important at this point to note three circumstances that will be useful to our further analysis of *contemporary* differences.\*\*\*

In the first place, the overwhelming of political consciousness by spontaneity, to which we referred above, also took place *spontaneously*. This may sound like a pun, but, alas, it is the bitter truth. It did not take place as a result of an open struggle between two diametrically opposed points of view, in which one triumphed over the other; it occurred because of the fact that an increasing number of "old" revolutionaries were "torn away"

\* These quotations are taken from the same leading article in the first number of *Rabochaya Mysl*. One can judge from this the degree of theoretical training possessed by these "V. V.s of Russian Social-Democracy", who kept repeating the crude vulgarisation of "economic materialism" at a time when the Marxists were carrying on a literary war against the real Mr. V. V., who had long ago been dubbed "a past master of reactionary deeds", for holding similar views on the relations between politics and economics!

\*\* The Germans even have a special expression, *Nur-Gewerkschaftler*, which means an advocate of the "pure trade union" struggle.

\*\*\* We emphasise the word *contemporary* for the benefit of those who may pharisaically shrug their shoulders and say: It is easy enough to attack *Rabochaya Mysl* now, but is not all this ancient history? *Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur* (change the name and the tale is about you.—Ed.) is our answer to such contemporary Pharisees, whose complete subjection to the ideas of *Rabochaya Mysl* will be proved further on.

by the gendarmes and increasing numbers of "young" "V. V.s of Russian Social-Democracy" appeared on the scene. Everyone, who has, I shall not say participated in, but at least breathed the atmosphere of, the *present-day* Russian movement, knows perfectly well that this is precisely the case. And if, nevertheless, we insist strongly that the reader be fully clear on this generally known fact, if we cite, for explicitness, as it were, the facts of the first edition of *Rabocheye Dyelo* and of the polemic between the "old" and the "young" at the beginning of 1897, we do this because the people who vaunt their "democracy" speculate on the ignorance of these facts on the part of the broad public (or of the very young generation). We shall return to this point further on.

Secondly, in the very first literary expression of Economism we observe the exceedingly curious phenomenon—highly characteristic for an understanding of all the differences prevailing among present-day Social-Democrats—that the adherents of the "labour movement pure and simple", worshippers of the closest "organic" contacts (*Rabocheye Dyelo's* term) with the proletarian struggle, opponents of any non-worker intelligentsia (even a socialist intelligentsia), are compelled, in order to defend their positions, to resort to the arguments of the *bourgeois* "pure trade-unionists". This shows that from the very outset *Rabochaya Mysl* began—unconsciously—to implement the programme of the *Credo*. This shows (something *Rabocheye Dyelo* cannot grasp) that *all* worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, all belittling of the role of "the conscious element", of the role of Social-Democracy, *means, quite independently of whether he who belittles that role desires it or not, a strengthening of the influence of bourgeois ideology upon the workers*. All those who talk about "overrating the importance of ideology",\* about exaggerating the role of the conscious element,\*\* etc., imagine that the labour movement pure and simple can elaborate, and will elaborate, an independent ideology for itself, if only the workers "wrest their fate from the hands of the leaders". But this is a profound mistake. To supplement what has been said above, we shall quote the following profoundly true and important words of Karl Kautsky on the new draft programme of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party.\*\*\*

"Many of our revisionist critics believe that Marx asserted that economic development and the class struggle create, not only the conditions for socialist

\* Letter of the Economists, in *Iskra*, No. 12.

\*\* *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10.

\*\*\* *Neue Zeit*, 1901-02, XX, I, No. 3, p. 79. The committee's draft to which Kautsky refers was adopted by the Vienna Congress (at the end of last year) in a slightly amended form.<sup>155</sup>

production, but also, and directly, the *consciousness* [K. K.'s italics] of its necessity. And these critics assert that England, the country most highly developed capitalistically, is more remote than any other from this consciousness. Judging by the draft, one might assume that this allegedly orthodox-Marxist view, which is thus refuted, was shared by the committee that drafted the Austrian programme. In the draft programme it is stated: "The more capitalist development increases the numbers of the proletariat, the more the proletariat is compelled and becomes fit to fight against capitalism. The proletariat becomes conscious of the possibility and of the necessity for socialism. In this connection socialist consciousness appears to be a necessary and direct result of the proletarian class struggle. But this is absolutely untrue. Of course, socialism, as a doctrine, has its roots in modern economic relationships just as the class struggle of the proletariat has, and, like the latter, emerges from the struggle against the capitalist-created poverty and misery of the masses. But socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not one out of the other; each arises under different conditions. Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Indeed, modern economic science is as much a condition for socialist production as, say, modern technology, and the proletariat can create neither the one nor the other, no matter how much it may desire to do so; both arise out of the modern social process. The vehicle of science is not the proletariat, but the *bourgeois intelligentsia* [K. K.'s italics]: it was in the minds of individual members of this stratum that modern socialism originated, and it was they who communicated it to the more intellectually developed proletarians who, in their turn, introduce it into the proletarian class struggle where conditions allow that to be done. Thus, socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without [*von Aussen Hineingetragen*] and not something that arose within it spontaneously [*urwuchsig*]. Accordingly, the old Hainfeld programme quite rightly stated that the task of Social-Democracy is to imbue the proletariat [literally: saturate the proletariat] with the *consciousness* of its position and the consciousness of its task. There would be no need for this if consciousness arose of itself from the class struggle. The new draft copied this proposition from the old programme, and attached it to the proposition mentioned above. But this completely broke the line of thought. . . ."

Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement,\* the *only* choice is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created

\* This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no part in creating such an ideology. They take part, however, not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians, as Proudhons and Weitlings; in other words, they take part only when they are able, and to the extent that they are able, more or less, to acquire the knowledge of their age and develop that knowledge. But in order that working men *may succeed in this more often*, every effort must be made to raise the level of the consciousness of the workers in general; it is necessary that the workers do not confine themselves to the artificially restricted limits of "*literature for workers*" but that they learn to an increasing degree to master *general literature*. It would be even truer to say "are not confined", instead of "do not confine themselves", because the workers themselves wish to read and do read all that is written for the intelligentsia, and only a few (bad) intellectuals believe that it is enough "for workers" to be told a few things about factory conditions and to have repeated to them over and over again what has long been known.

a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology *in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree* means to strengthen bourgeois ideology. There is much talk of spontaneity. But the *spontaneous* development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology, *to its development along the lines of the Credo programme*; for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade-unionism, is *Nur-Gewerkschaftlerei*, and trade-unionism means the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie. Hence, our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is *to combat spontaneity, to divert* the working-class movement from this spontaneous, trade-unionist striving to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracy. The sentence employed by the authors of the Economist letter published in *Iskra*, No. 12, that the efforts of the most inspired ideologists fail to divert the working-class movement from the path that is determined by the interaction of the material elements and the material environment is therefore *tantamount to renouncing socialism*. If these authors were capable of fearlessly, consistently, and thoroughly considering what they say, as everyone who enters the arena of literary and public activity should be, there would be nothing left for them but to "fold their useless arms over their empty breasts" and—surrender the field of action to the Struves and Prokopoviches, who are dragging the working-class movement "along the line of least resistance", i.e., along the line of bourgeois trade-unionism, or to the Zubatovs, who are dragging it along the line of clerical and gendarme "ideology".

Let us recall the example of Germany. What was the historic service Lassalle rendered to the German working-class movement? It was that he *diverted* that movement from the path of progressionist trade-unionism and co-operativism towards which it had been spontaneously moving (*with the benign assistance of Schulze-Delitzsch and his like*). To fulfil such a task it was necessary to do something quite different from talking of under-rating the spontaneous element, of tactics-as-process, of the interaction between elements and environment, etc. *A fierce struggle against spontaneity* was necessary, and only after such a struggle, extending over many years, was it possible, for instance, to convert the working population of Berlin from a bulwark of the progressionist party into one of the finest strongholds of Social-Democracy. This struggle is by no means over even today (as might seem to those who learn the history of the German movement from Prokopovich, and its philosophy from Struve). Even now the German working class is, so to speak, split up among



a number of ideologies. A section of the workers is organised in Catholic and monarchist trade unions; another section is organised in the Hirsch-Duncker unions,<sup>156</sup> founded by the bourgeois worshippers of English trade-unionism; the third is organised in Social-Democratic trade unions. The last-named group is immeasurably more numerous than the rest, but the Social-Democratic ideology was able to achieve this superiority, and will be able to maintain it, only in an unswerving struggle against all other ideologies.

But why, the reader will ask, does the spontaneous movement, the movement along the line of least resistance, lead to the domination of bourgeois ideology? For the simple reason that bourgeois ideology is far older in origin than socialist ideology, that it is more fully developed, and that it has at its disposal *immeasurably* more means of dissemination.\* And the younger the socialist movement in any given country, the more vigorously it must struggle against all attempts to entrench non-socialist ideology, and the more resolutely the workers must be warned against the bad counsellors who shout against "overrating the conscious element", etc. The authors of the Economist letter, in unison with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, inveigh against the intolerance that is characteristic of the infancy of the movement. To this we reply: Yes, our movement is indeed in its infancy, and in order that it may grow up faster, it must become imbued with intolerance against those who retard its growth by their subservience to spontaneity. Nothing is so ridiculous and harmful as pretending that we are "old hands" who have long ago experienced all the decisive stages of the struggle.

Thirdly, the first issue of *Rabochaya Mysl* shows that the term "Economism" (which, of course, we do not propose to abandon, since, in one way or another, this designation has already established itself) does not adequately convey the real character of the new trend. *Rabochaya Mysl* does not altogether repudiate the political struggle; the rules for a workers' mutual benefit fund published in its first issue contain a reference to combating the government. *Rabochaya Mysl* believes however, that "politics always obediently follows economics" (*Rabocheye Dyelo* varies this thesis when it asserts in its programme that "in Rus-

\* It is often said that the working class *spontaneously* gravitates towards socialism. This is perfectly true in the sense that socialist theory reveals the causes of the misery of the working class more profoundly and more correctly than any other theory, and for that reason the workers are able to assimilate it so easily, *provided*, however, this theory does not itself yield to spontaneity, *provided* it subordinates spontaneity to itself. Usually this is taken for granted, but it is precisely this which *Rabocheye Dyelo* forgets or distorts. The working class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism; nevertheless, most widespread (and continuously and diversely revived) bourgeois ideology spontaneously imposes itself upon the working class to a still greater degree.

sia more than in any other country, the economic struggle is *inseparable* from the political struggle"). If by *politics* is meant *Social-Democratic politics*, then the theses of *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo* are utterly incorrect. The economic struggle of the workers is very often connected (although not inseparably) with bourgeois politics, clerical politics, etc., as we have seen. *Rabocheye Dyelo's* theses are correct, if by politics is meant trade union politics, viz., the common striving of all workers to secure from the government measures for alleviating the distress to which their condition gives rise, but which do not abolish that condition, i.e., which do not remove the subjection of labour to capital. That striving indeed is common to the English trade-unionists, who are hostile to socialism, to the Catholic workers, to the "Zubatov" workers, etc. There is politics and politics. Thus, we see that *Rabochaya Mysl* does not so much deny the political struggle, as it bows to its *spontaneity*, to its unconsciousness. While fully recognising the political struggle (better: the political desires and demands of the workers), which arises spontaneously from the working-class movement itself, it absolutely refuses *independently to work out* a specifically *Social-Democratic politics* corresponding to the general tasks of socialism and to present-day conditions in Russia. Further on we shall show that *Rabocheye Dyelo* commits the same error.

### C. THE SELF-EMANCIPATION GROUP<sup>157</sup> AND RABOCHEYE DYELO

We have dealt at such length with the little-known and now almost forgotten leading article in the first issue of *Rabochaya Mysl* because it was the first and most striking expression of that general stream of thought which afterwards emerged into the light of day in innumerable streamlets. V. I. was perfectly right when, in praising the first issue and the leading article of *Rabochaya Mysl*, he said that the article had been written in a "sharp and fervent" manner ("*Listok*" *Rabotnika*, No. 9-10, p. 49). Every man with convictions who thinks he has something new to say writes "fervently" and in such a way as to make his views stand out in bold relief. Only those who are accustomed to sitting between two stools lack "fervour"; only such people are able to praise the fervour of *Rabochaya Mysl* one day and attack the "fervent polemics" of its opponents the next.

We shall not dwell on the "*Separate Supplement*" to *Rabochaya Mysl* (below we shall have occasion, on various points, to refer to this work, which expresses the ideas of the Economists more consistently than any other) but shall briefly mention the "Appeal of the Self-Emancipation of the Workers Group"

(March 1899, reprinted in the London *Nakanune*,<sup>158</sup> No. 7, July 1899). The authors of the "Appeal" rightly say that "the workers of Russia are *only just awakening*, are just beginning to look about them, and are *instinctively clutching at the first available* means of struggle". Yet they draw from this the same false conclusion as that drawn by *Rabochaya Mysl*, forgetting that the instinctive is the unconscious (the spontaneous) to the aid of which socialists must come; that the "first available means of struggle" will always be, in modern society, the trade union means of struggle, and the "first available" ideology the bourgeois (trade union) ideology. Similarly, these authors do not "repudiate" politics, they merely (merely!) echo Mr. V. V. that politics is the superstructure, and therefore, "political agitation must be the superstructure to the agitation carried on in favour of the economic struggle; it must arise on the basis of this struggle and follow in its wake".

As for *Rabocheye Dyelo*, it began its activity with the "defence" of the Economists. It stated a *downtright untruth* in its opening issue (No. 1, pp. 141-42) in claiming that it "does not know to which young comrades Axelrod referred" when he warned the Economists in his well-known pamphlet.\* In the polemic that flared up with Axelrod and Plekhanov over this untruth, *Rabocheye Dyelo* had to admit that "in form of perplexity, it sought to defend all the younger Social-Democrats abroad from this unjust accusation" (the charge of narrowness levelled by Axelrod at the Economists).<sup>159</sup> In reality this accusation was completely justified, and *Rabocheye Dyelo* knew perfectly well that, among others, it applied also to V. I., a member of its Editorial Board. Let me note in passing that in this polemic Axelrod was entirely right and *Rabocheye Dyelo* entirely wrong in their respective interpretations of my pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*.\*\* The pamphlet was written in 1897, before the appearance of *Rabochaya Mysl*, when I thought, rightly, that the *original* tendency of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, which I characterised above, was dominant. And this tendency was dominant at least until the middle of 1898. Consequently, *Rabocheye Dyelo* had no right whatever, in its attempt to deny the existence and danger of Economism, to refer to a pamphlet that expressed views forced out by Economist views in St. Petersburg in 1897-98.\*\*\*

\* *Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social-Democracy*, Geneva, 1898.

Two letters to *Rabochaya Gazeta*, written in 1897.

\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51.—Ed.

\*\*\* In defending its first untruth ("we do not know to which young comrades Axelrod referred"), *Rabocheye Dyelo* added a second, when it wrote in its Reply: "Since the review of *The Tasks* was published, tendencies have arisen,

But *Rabocheye Dyelo* not only "defended" the Economists, it itself constantly fell into their fundamental errors. The source of this confusion is to be found in the ambiguity of the interpretation given to the following thesis of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* programme: "We consider that the most important phenomenon of Russian life, the one that will mainly *determine the tasks* [our italics] and the character of the publication activity of the Union, is the *mass working-class movement* [*Rabocheye Dyelo's* italics] which has arisen in recent years." That the mass movement is a most important phenomenon is a fact not to be disputed. But the crux of the matter is, how is one to understand the statement that the mass working-class movement will "determine the tasks"? It may be interpreted in one of two ways. *Either* it means bowing to the spontaneity of this movement, i.e., reducing the role of Social-Democracy to mere subservience to the working-class movement as such (the interpretation of *Rabochaya Mysl*, the Self-Emancipation Group, and other Economists), or it means that the mass movement places before us *new* theoretical, political, and organisational tasks, far more complicated than those that might have satisfied us in the period before the rise of the mass movement. *Rabocheye Dyelo* inclined and still inclines towards the first interpretation, for it has said nothing definite about any new tasks, but has argued constantly as though the "mass movement" *relieves* us of the necessity of clearly understanding and fulfilling the tasks it sets before us. We need only point out that *Rabocheye Dyelo* considered that it was impossible to set the overthrow of the autocracy as the *first* task of the mass working-class movement, and that it degraded this task (in the name of the mass movement) to that of a struggle for immediate political demands (*Reply*, p. 25).

We shall pass over the article by B. Krichevsky, editor of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, entitled "The Economic and the Political Struggle in the Russian Movement", published in No. 7 of that paper, in which these very mistakes\* are repeated, and proceed

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or become more or less clearly defined, among certain Russian Social-Democrats, towards economic one-sidedness, which represent a step backwards from the state of our movement as described in *The Tasks*" (p. 9). This, in the *Reply*, published in 1900. But the first issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo* (containing the review) appeared in April 1899. Did Economism really arise only in 1899? No. The year 1899 saw the first protest of the Russian Social-Democrats against Economism (the protest against the *Credo*). Economism arose in 1897, as *Rabocheye Dyelo* very well knows, for already in November 1898, V. I. was praising *Rabochaya Mysl* (see "*Listok*" *Rabotnika*, No. 9-10).

\* The "stages theory", or the theory of "timid zigzags", in the political struggle is expressed, for example, in this article, in the following way: "Political demands, which in their character are common to the whole of Russia, should, however, at first [this was written in August 1900!] correspond to the experience gained by the given stratum [*sic*!] of workers in the economic

directly to *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10. We shall not, of course, enter in detail into the various objections raised by Krichевsky and Martynov against *Zarya* and *Iskra*. We are here interested solely in the basis of principles on which *Rabocheye Dyelo*, in its tenth issue, took its stand. Thus, we shall not examine the strange fact that *Rabocheye Dyelo* saw a "diametrical contradiction" between the proposition:

"Social-Democracy does not tie its hands, it does not restrict its activities to some one preconceived plan or method of political struggle; it recognises all means of struggle, as long as they correspond to the forces at the disposal of the Party," etc. (*Iskra*, No. 1.)\*

and the proposition:

"Without a strong organisation skilled in waging political struggle under all circumstances and at all times, there can be no question of that systematic plan of action, illumined by firm principles and steadfastly carried out, which alone is worthy of the name of tactics" (*Iskra*, No. 4).:\*\*

To confound recognition, *in principle*, of all means of struggle, of all plans and methods, provided they are expedient, with the demand *at a given political moment* to be guided by a strictly observed plan is tantamount, if we are to talk of tactics, to confounding the recognition by medical science of various methods of treating diseases with the necessity for adopting a certain definite method of treatment for a given disease. The point is, however, that *Rabocheye Dyelo*, itself the victim of a disease which we have called bowing to spontaneity, refuses to recognise any "method of treatment" for *that* disease. Hence, it has made

struggle. Only [!] on the basis of this experience can and should political agitation be taken up," etc. (p. 11). On page 4, the author, protesting against what he regards as the absolutely unfounded charge of Economist heresy, pathetically exclaims: "What Social-Democrat does not know that according to the theories of Marx and Engels the economic interests of certain classes play a decisive role in history, and, *consequently*, that particularly the proletariat's struggle for its economic interests must be of paramount importance in its class development and struggle for emancipation?" (Our italics.) The word "consequently" is completely irrelevant. The fact that economic interests play a decisive role *does not in the least imply* that the economic (i.e., trade union) struggle is of prime importance; for the most essential, the "decisive" interests of classes can be satisfied *only* by radical *political* changes in general. In particular the fundamental economic interests of the proletariat can be satisfied only by a political revolution that will replace the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Krichевsky repeats the arguments of the "V. V.s of Russian Social-Democracy" (viz., that politics follows economics, etc.) and of the Bernsteinians of German Social-Democracy (e.g., by similar arguments Woltmann sought to prove that the workers must first of all acquire "economic power" before they can think about political revolution).

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 370-71.—Ed.

\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 18.—Ed.

the remarkable discovery that "tactics-as-plan contradicts the fundamental spirit of Marxism" (No. 10, p. 18), that tactics are "*a process of growth of Party tasks, which grow together with the Party*" (p. 11, *Rabocheye Dyelo's* italics). This remark has every chance of becoming a celebrated maxim, a permanent monument to the *Rabocheye Dyelo* "trend". To the question, *whither?* the leading organ replies: Movement is a process of changing the distance between the starting-point and subsequent points of the movement. This matchless example of profundity is not merely a curiosity (were it that, it would not be worth dealing with at length), but *the programme of a whole trend*, the very programme which R. M. (in the "*Separate Supplement*" to *Rabochaya Mysl*) expressed in the words: That struggle is desirable which is possible, and the struggle which is possible is that which is going on at the given moment. This is precisely the trend of unbounded opportunism, which passively adapts itself to spontaneity.

"Tactics-as-plan contradicts the essence of Marxism!" But this is a slander of Marxism; it means turning Marxism into the caricature held up by the Narodniks in their struggle against us. It means belittling the initiative and energy of class-conscious fighters, whereas Marxism, on the contrary, gives a gigantic impetus to the initiative and energy of the Social-Democrat, opens up for him the widest perspectives, and (if one may so express it) places at his disposal the mighty force of many millions of workers "spontaneously" rising for the struggle. The entire history of international Social-Democracy teems with plans advanced now by one, now by another, political leader, some confirming the far-sightedness and the correct political and organisational views of their authors and others revealing their short-sightedness and their political errors. At the time when Germany was at one of the crucial turning points in its history—the formation of the Empire, the opening of the Reichstag, and the granting of universal suffrage—Liebknecht had one plan for Social-Democratic politics and work in general, and Schweitzer had another. When the anti-socialist law came down on the heads of the German socialists, Most and Hasselmann had one plan—they were prepared then and there to call for violence and terror; Höchberg, Schramm, and (partly) Bernstein had another—they began to preach to the Social-Democrats that they themselves had provoked the enactment of the law by being unreasonably bitter and revolutionary, and must now earn forgiveness by their exemplary conduct. There was yet a third plan proposed by those who prepared and carried out the publication of an illegal organ.<sup>160</sup> It is easy, of course, with hindsight, many years after the struggle over the selection of the path to be followed, and

after history has pronounced its verdict as to the expediency of the path selected, to utter profound maxims about the growth of Party tasks, which grow together with the Party. But at a time of confusion,\* when the Russian "Critics" and Economists are degrading Social-Democracy to the level of trade-unionism, and when the terrorists are strongly advocating the adoption of "tactics-as-plan" that repeats the old mistakes, at such a time, to confine oneself to profundities of this kind, means simply to issue to oneself a "certificate of poverty". At a time when many Russian Social-Democrats suffer from a lack of initiative and energy, from an inadequate "scope of political propaganda, agitation, and organisation",\*\* from a lack of "plans" for a broader organisation of revolutionary work, at such a time, to declare that "tactics-as-plan contradicts the essence of Marxism" means not only to vulgarise Marxism in the realm of theory, but to drag the Party backward in practice.

*Rabocheye Dyelo* goes on to sermonise:

"The task of the revolutionary Social-Democrat is only to accelerate objective development by his conscious work, not to obviate it or substitute his own subjective plans for this development. *Iskra* knows all this in theory; but the enormous importance which Marxism justly attaches to conscious revolutionary work causes it in practice, owing to its doctrinaire view of tactics, to belittle the significance of the objective or the spontaneous element of development" (p. 18)

Another example of the extraordinary theoretical confusion worthy of Mr. V. V. and his fraternity. We would ask our philosopher: how may a designer of subjective plans "belittle" objective development? Obviously by losing sight of the fact that this objective development creates or strengthens, destroys or weakens certain classes, strata, or groups, certain nations or groups of nations, etc., and in this way serves to determine a given international political alignment of forces, or the position adopted by revolutionary parties, etc. If the designer of plans did that, his guilt would not be that he belittled the spontaneous element, but, on the contrary, that he belittled the *conscious* element, for he would then show that he lacked the "consciousness" properly to understand objective development. Hence, the very talk of "estimating the *relative* significance" (*Rabocheye Dyelo's* italics) of spontaneity and consciousness itself reveals a complete lack of "consciousness". If certain "spontaneous elements

\* "*Ein Jahr der Uerwirrung*" ("A Year of Confusion") is the title Mehring gave to the chapter of his *History of German Social-Democracy* in which he describes the hesitancy and lack of determination displayed at first by the socialists in selecting the "tactics-as-plan" for the new situation.

\*\* Leading article in *Iskra*, No. 1. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 369.—Ed.)

of development" can be grasped at all by human understanding, then an incorrect estimation of them will be tantamount to "belittling the conscious element". But if they cannot be grasped, then we do not know them, and therefore cannot speak of them. What then is Krichevsky discussing? If he thinks that *Iskra's* "subjective plans" are erroneous (as he in fact declares them to be), he should have shown what objective facts they ignore, and only then charged *Iskra* with *lacking political consciousness* for ignoring them, with "belittling the conscious element", to use his own words. If, however, displeased with subjective plans, he can bring forward no argument other than that of "belittling the spontaneous element" (!), he merely shows: (1) that, theoretically, he understands Marxism *à la* Kareyev and Mikhailovsky, who have been sufficiently ridiculed by Beltov; and (2) that, practically, he is quite satisfied with the "spontaneous elements of development" that have drawn our legal Marxists towards Bernsteinism and our Social-Democrats towards Economism, and that he is "full of wrath" against those who have determined at all costs *to divert* Russian Social-Democracy from the path of "spontaneous" development.

Further, there follow things that are positively droll. "Just as human beings will reproduce in the old-fashioned way despite all the discoveries of natural science, so the birth of a new social order will come about, in the future too, *mainly* as a result of elemental outbursts, despite all the discoveries of social science and the increase in the number of conscious fighters" (p. 19). Just as our grandfathers in their old-fashioned wisdom used to say, Anyone can bring children into the world, so today the "modern socialists" (*à la* Nartsis Tuporylov)<sup>161</sup> say in their wisdom, Anyone can participate in the spontaneous birth of a new social order. We too hold that anyone can. All that is required for participation of that kind is *to yield* to Economism when Economism reigns and to terrorism when terrorism arises. Thus, in the spring of this year, when it was so important to utter a note of warning against infatuation with terrorism, *Rabocheye Dyelo* stood in amazement, confronted by a problem that was "new" to it. And now, six months after, when the problem has become less topical, it presents us at one and the same time with the declaration: "We think that it is not and should not be the task of Social-Democracy to counteract the rise of terroristic sentiments" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 23), and with the Conference resolution: "The Conference regards systematic and aggressive terror as being inopportune" (*Two Conferences*, p. 18). How beautifully clear and coherent this is! Not to counteract, but to declare inopportune, and to declare it in such a way that unsystematic and defensive terror does not come within the



scope of the "resolution". It must be admitted that such a resolution is extremely safe and is fully insured against error, just as a man who talks, but says nothing, insures himself against error. All that is needed to frame such a resolution is an ability to keep *at the tail-end* of the movement. When *Iskra* ridiculed *Rabocheye Dyelo* for declaring the question of terror to be new,\* the latter angrily accused *Iskra* of "having the incredible effrontery to impose upon the Party organisation solutions of tactical questions proposed by a group of emigrant writers more than fifteen years ago" (p. 24). Effrontery indeed, and what an overestimation of the conscious element—first to resolve questions theoretically beforehand, and then to try to convince the organisation, the Party, and the masses of the correctness of this solution!\*\* How much better it would be to repeat the elements and, without "imposing" anything upon anybody, swing with every "turn"—whether in the direction of Economism or in the direction of terrorism. *Rabocheye Dyelo* even generalises this great precept of worldly wisdom and accuses *Iskra* and *Zarya* of "setting up their programme against the movement, like a spirit hovering over the formless chaos" (p. 29). But what else is the function of Social-Democracy if not to be a "spirit" that not only hovers over the spontaneous movement, but also *raises* this movement *to the level of "its programme"*? Surely, it is not its function to drag at the *tail* of the movement. At best, this would be of no service to the movement; at worst, it would be exceedingly harmful. *Rabocheye Dyelo*, however, not only follows this "tactics-as-process", but elevates it to a principle, so that it would be more correct to describe its tendency not as opportunism, but as *tail-ism* (from the word *tail*). And it must be admitted that those who are determined always to follow behind the movement and be its tail are absolutely and forever guaranteed against "belittling the spontaneous element of development".

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And so, we have become convinced that the fundamental error committed by the "new trend" in Russian Social-Democracy is its bowing to spontaneity and its failure to understand that the spontaneity of the masses demands a high degree of consciousness from us Social-Democrats. The greater the spontaneous upsurge of the masses and the more widespread the movement, the more rapid, incomparably so, the demand for greater

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 18-20.—*Ed.*

\*\* Nor must it be forgotten that in solving "theoretically" the problem of terror, the Emancipation of Labour group *generalised* the experience of the antecedent revolutionary movement.

consciousness in the theoretical, political and organisational work of Social-Democracy.

The spontaneous upsurge of the masses in Russia proceeded (and continues) with such rapidity that the young Social-Democrats proved unprepared to meet these gigantic tasks. This unpreparedness is our common misfortune, the misfortune of *all* Russian Social-Democrats. The upsurge of the masses proceeded and spread with uninterrupted continuity; it not only continued in the places where it began, but spread to new localities and to new strata of the population (under the influence of the working-class movement, there was a renewed ferment among the student youth, among the intellectuals generally, and even among the peasantry). Revolutionaries, however, *lagged behind* this upsurge, both in their "theories" and in their activity; they failed to establish a constant and continuous organisation capable of *leading* the whole movement.

In Chapter I, we established that *Rabocheye Dyelo* belittled our theoretical tasks and that it "spontaneously" repeated the fashionable catchword "freedom of criticism"; those who repeated this catchword lacked the "consciousness" to understand that the positions of the opportunist "Critics" and those of the revolutionaries in Germany and in Russia are diametrically opposed.

In the following chapters, we shall show how this bowing to spontaneity found expression in the sphere of the political tasks and in the organisational work of Social-Democracy.

### III TRADE-UNIONIST POLITICS AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

We shall again begin by praising *Rabocheye Dyelo*. "Literature of Exposure and the Proletarian Struggle" is the title Martynov gave the article on his differences with *Iskra* published in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10. He formulated the substance of the differences as follows: "We cannot confine ourselves solely to exposing the system that stands in its (the working-class party's) path of development. We must also react to the immediate and current interests of the proletariat.... *Iskra* ... is in fact an organ of revolutionary opposition that exposes the state of affairs in our country, particularly the political state of affairs.... We, however, work and shall continue to work for the cause of the working class in close organic contact with the proletarian struggle" (p. 63). One cannot help being grateful to Martynov for this formula. It is of outstanding general interest, because

substantially it embraces not only our disagreements with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, but the general disagreement between ourselves and the Economists on the political struggle. We have shown that the Economists do not altogether repudiate "politics", but that they are constantly straying from the Social-Democratic to the trade-unionist conception of politics. Martynov strays in precisely this way, and we shall therefore take his views as a *model* of Economist error on this question. As we shall endeavour to prove, neither the authors of the "*Separate Supplement*" to *Rabochaya Mysl* nor the authors of the manifesto issued by the Self-Emancipation Group, nor the authors of the Economist letter published in *Iskra*, No. 12, will have any right to complain against this choice.

#### A. POLITICAL AGITATION AND ITS RESTRICTION BY THE ECONOMISTS

Everyone knows that the economic\* struggle of the Russian workers underwent widespread development and consolidation simultaneously with the production of "literature" exposing economic (factory and occupational) conditions. The "leaflets" were devoted mainly to the exposure of the factory system, and very soon a veritable passion for exposures was roused among the workers. As soon as the workers realised that the Social-Democratic study circles desired to, and could, supply them with a new kind of leaflet that told the whole truth about their miserable existence, about their unbearably hard toil, and their lack of rights, they began to send in, actually flood us with, correspondence from the factories and workshops. This "exposure literature" created a tremendous sensation, not only in the particular factory exposed in the given leaflet, but in all the factories to which news of the revealed facts spread. And since the poverty and want among the workers in the various enterprises and in the various trades are much the same, the "truth about the life of the workers" stirred *everyone*. Even among the most backward workers, a veritable passion arose to "get into print"—a noble passion for this rudimentary form of war against the whole of the present social system which is based upon robbery and oppression. And in the overwhelming majority of cases these "leaflets" were in truth a declaration of war, because the exposures served greatly to agitate the workers; they

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\*To avoid misunderstanding, we must point out that here, and throughout this pamphlet, by economic struggle, we imply (in keeping with the accepted usage among us) the "practical economic struggle", which Engels, in the passage quoted above, described as "resistance to the capitalists", and which in free countries is known as the organised-labour, syndical, or trade union struggle.

evoked among them common demands for the removal of the most glaring outrages and roused in them a readiness to support the demands with strikes. Finally, the employers themselves were compelled to recognise the significance of these leaflets as a declaration of war, so much so that in a large number of cases they did not even wait for the outbreak of hostilities. As is always the case, the mere publication of these exposures made them effective, and they acquired the significance of a strong moral influence. On more than one occasion, the mere appearance of a leaflet proved sufficient to secure the satisfaction of all or part of the demands put forward. In a word, economic (factory) exposures were and remain an important lever in the economic struggle. And they will continue to retain this significance as long as there is capitalism, which makes it necessary for the workers to defend themselves. Even in the most advanced countries of Europe it can still be seen that the exposure of abuses in some backward trade, or in some forgotten branch of domestic industry, serves as a starting-point for the awakening of class-consciousness, for the beginning of a trade union struggle, and for the spread of socialism.\*

The overwhelming majority of Russian Social-Democrats have of late been almost entirely absorbed by this work of organising the exposure of factory conditions. Suffice it to recall *Rabochaya Mysl* to see the extent to which they have been absorbed by it—so much so, indeed, that they have lost sight of the fact that this, *taken by itself*, is in essence still not Social-Democratic work, but merely trade union work. As a matter of fact, the exposures merely dealt with the relations between the workers *in a given trade* and their employers, and all they achieved was that the sellers of labour-power learned to sell their “commodity” on better terms and to fight the purchasers over a purely commercial deal. These exposures could have served (if properly utilised by an organisation of revolutionaries) as a beginning and a component part of Social-Democratic activity; but they

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\* In the present chapter we deal only with the *political* struggle, in its broader or narrower meaning. Therefore, we note only in passing, merely as a curiosity, *Rabocheye Dyelo's* charge that *Iskra* is “too restrained” in regard to the economic struggle (*Two Conferences*, p. 27, rehashed by Martynov in his pamphlet, *Social-Democracy and the Working Class*). If the accusers computed by the hundredweights or reams (as they are so fond of doing) any given year's discussion of the economic struggle in the industrial section of *Iskra*, in comparison with the corresponding sections of *Rabocheye Dyelo* and *Rabochaya Mysl* combined, they would easily see that the latter lag behind even in this respect. Apparently, the realisation of this simple truth compels them to resort to arguments that clearly reveal their confusion. “*Iskra*”, they write, “willy-nilly [!] is compelled [!] to reckon with the imperative demands of life and to publish at least [!] correspondence about the working-class movement” (*Two Conferences*, p. 27). Now this is really a crushing argument!

could also have led (and, given a worshipful attitude towards spontaneity, were bound to lead) to a "purely trade union" struggle and to a non-Social-Democratic working-class movement. Social-Democracy leads the struggle of the working class, not only for better terms for the sale of labour-power, but for the abolition of the social system that compels the propertyless to sell themselves to the rich. Social-Democracy represents the working class, not in its relation to a given group of employers alone, but in its relation to all classes of modern society and to the state as an organised political force. Hence, it follows that not only must Social-Democrats not confine themselves exclusively to the economic struggle, but that they must not allow the organisation of economic exposures to become the predominant part of their activities. We must take up actively the political education of the working class and the development of its political consciousness. *Now* that *Zarya* and *Iskra* have made the first attack upon Economism, "all are agreed" on this (although some agree only in words, as we shall soon see).

The question arises, what should political education consist in? Can it be confined to the propaganda of working-class hostility to the autocracy? Of course not. It is not enough *to explain* to the workers that they are politically oppressed (any more than it is *to explain* to them that their interests are antagonistic to the interests of the employers). Agitation must be conducted with regard to every concrete example of this oppression (as we have begun to carry on agitation round concrete examples of economic oppression). Inasmuch as *this* oppression affects the most diverse classes of society, inasmuch as it manifests itself in the most varied spheres of life and activity—vocational, civic, personal, family, religious, scientific, etc., etc.—is it not evident that *we shall not be fulfilling our task* of developing the political consciousness of the workers if we do not *undertake* the organisation of the *political exposure* of the autocracy *in all its aspects*? In order to carry on agitation round concrete instances of oppression, these instances must be exposed (as it is necessary to expose factory abuses in order to carry on economic agitation).

One might think this to be clear enough. It turns out, however, that it is only in words that "all" are agreed on the need to develop political consciousness, *in all its aspects*. It turns out that *Rabocheye Dyelo*, for example, far from tackling the task of organising (or making a start in organising) comprehensive political exposure, is even trying to *drag Iskra*, which has undertaken this task, *away from it*. Listen to the following: "The political struggle of the working class is merely [it is certainly not merely] the most developed, wide, and effective form of eco-

conomic struggle" (programme of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, published in issue No. 1, p. 3). "The Social-Democrats are now confronted with the task of lending the economic struggle itself, as far as possible, a political character" (Martynov, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 42). "The economic struggle is the most widely applicable means of drawing the masses into active political struggle" (resolution adopted by the Conference of the Union Abroad<sup>162</sup> and "amendments" thereto, *Two Conferences*, pp. 11 and 17). As the reader will observe, all these theses permeate *Rabocheye Dyelo* from its very first number to the latest "Instructions to the Editors", and all of them evidently express a single view regarding political agitation and struggle. Let us examine this view from the standpoint of the opinion prevailing among all Economists, that political agitation must *follow* economic agitation. Is it true that, in general,\* the economic struggle "is the most widely applicable means" of drawing the masses into the political struggle? It is entirely untrue. *Any and every* manifestation of police tyranny and autocratic outrage, not only in connection with the economic struggle, is not one whit less "widely applicable" as a means of "drawing in" the masses. The rural superintendents<sup>163</sup> and the flogging of peasants, the corruption of the officials and the police treatment of the "common people" in the cities, the fight against the famine-stricken and the suppression of the popular striving towards enlightenment and knowledge, the extortion of taxes and the persecution of the religious sects, the humiliating treatment of soldiers and the barrack methods in the treatment of the students and liberal intellectuals—do all these and a thousand other similar manifestations of tyranny, though not directly connected with the "economic" struggle, represent, in general, *less* "widely applicable" means and occasions for political agitation and for drawing the masses into the political struggle? The very opposite is true. Of the sum-total of cases in which the workers suffer (either on their own account or on account of those closely connected with them) from tyranny, violence, and the lack of rights, undoubtedly only a small minority represent cases of police tyranny in the

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\* We say "in general", because *Rabocheye Dyelo* speaks of general principles and of the general tasks of the Party as a whole. Undoubtedly, cases occur in practice when politics really *must* follow economics, but only Economists can speak of this in a resolution intended to apply to the whole of Russia. Cases do occur when it is *possible* "right from the beginning" to carry on political agitation "exclusively on an economic basis"; yet *Rabocheye Dyelo* came in the end to the conclusion that "there is no need for this whatever" (*Two Conferences*, p. 11). In the following chapter, we shall show that the tactics of the "politicians" and revolutionaries not only do not ignore the trade union tasks of Social-Democracy, but that, on the contrary, they alone *can* secure their consistent fulfilment.

trade union struggle as such. Why then should we, beforehand, *restrict* the scope of political agitation by declaring only *one* of the means to be "the most widely applicable", when Social-Democrats must have, in addition, other, generally speaking, no less "widely applicable" means?

In the dim and distant past (a full year ago!...) *Rabocheye Dyelo* wrote: "The masses begin to understand immediate political demands after one strike, or at all events, after several", "as soon as the government sets the police and gendarmerie against them" [*August* (No. 7) 1900, p. 15]. This opportunist theory of stages has now been rejected by the Union Abroad, which makes a concession to us by declaring: "There is no need whatever to conduct political agitation right from the beginning, exclusively on an economic basis" (*Two Conferences*, p. 11). The Union's repudiation of part of its former errors will show the future historian of Russian Social-Democracy better than any number of lengthy arguments the depths to which our Economists have degraded socialism! But the Union Abroad must be very naïve indeed to imagine that the abandonment of one form of restricting politics will induce us to agree to another form. Would it not be more logical to say, in this case too, that the economic struggle should be conducted on the widest possible basis, that it should always be utilised for political agitation, but that "there is no need whatever" to regard the economic struggle as the *most* widely applicable means of drawing the masses into active political struggle?

The Union Abroad attaches significance to the fact that it has substituted the phrase "most widely applicable means" for the phrase "the best means" contained in one of the resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the Jewish Workers' Union (Bund) <sup>164</sup>. We confess that we find it difficult to say which of these resolutions is the better one. In our opinion they are *both worse*. Both the Union Abroad and the Bund fall into the error (partly, perhaps, unconsciously, under the influence of tradition) of giving an Economist, trade-unionist interpretation to politics. Whether this is done by employing the word "best" or the words "most widely applicable" makes no essential difference whatever. Had the Union Abroad said that "political agitation on an economic basis" is the most widely applied (not "applicable") means, it would have been right in regard to a certain period in the development of our Social-Democratic movement. It would have been right in regard to the *Economists* and to many (if not the majority) of the practical workers of 1898-1901; for these practical Economists *applied* political agitation (to the extent that they applied it at all) *almost exclusively on an economic basis*. Political agitation on *such* lines was recognised and, as we have

seen, even recommended by *Rabochaya Mysl* and the Self-Emanicipation Group. *Rabocheye Dyelo* should have *strongly condemned* the fact that the useful work of economic agitation was accompanied by the harmful restriction of the political struggle; instead, it declares the means most widely *applied* (by the *Economists*) to be the most widely *applicable*! It is not surprising that when we call these people Economists, they can do nothing but pour every manner of abuse upon us; call us "mystifiers", "disrupters", "papal nuncios", and "slanderers"\*; go complaining to the whole world that we have mortally offended them; and declare almost on oath that "not a single Social-Democratic organisation is now tinged with Economism".\*\* Oh, those evil, slanderous politicians! They must have deliberately invented this Economism, out of sheer hatred of mankind, in order mortally to offend other people.

What concrete, real meaning attaches to Martynov's words when he sets before Social-Democracy the task of "lending the economic struggle itself a political character"? The economic struggle is the collective struggle of the workers against their employers for better terms *in the sale of their labour-power*, for better living and working conditions. This struggle is necessarily a trade union struggle, because working conditions differ greatly in different trades, and, consequently, the struggle *to improve* them can only be conducted on the basis of trade organisations (in the Western countries, through trade unions; in Russia, through temporary trade associations and through leaflets, etc.). Lending "the economic struggle itself a political character" means, therefore, striving to secure satisfaction of these trade demands, the improvement of working conditions in each separate trade by means of "legislative and administrative measures" (as Martynov puts it on the ensuing page of his article, p. 43). This is precisely what all workers' trade unions do and always have done. Read the works of the soundly scientific (and "soundly" opportunist) Mr. and Mrs. Webb and you will see that the British trade unions long ago recognised, and have long been carrying out, the task of "lending the economic struggle itself a political character"; they have long been fighting for the right to strike, for the removal of all legal hindrances to the co-operative and trade union movements, for laws to protect women and children, for the improvement of labour conditions by means of health and factory legislation, etc.

Thus, the pompous phrase about "lending the economic struggle *itself* a political character", which sounds so "terrifically"

\* These are the precise expressions used in *Two Conferences*, pp. 31, 32, 28 and 30.

\*\* *Two Conferences*, p. 32.



profound and revolutionary, serves as a screen to conceal what is in fact the traditional striving to *degrade* Social-Democratic politics to the level of trade union politics. Under the guise of rectifying the one-sidedness of *Iskra*, which, it is alleged, places "the revolutionising of dogma higher than the revolutionising of life",\* we are presented with the *struggle for economic reforms* as if it were something entirely new. In point of fact, the phrase "lending the economic struggle itself a political character" means nothing more than the struggle for economic reforms. Martynov himself might have come to this simple conclusion, had he pondered over the significance of his own words. "Our Party," he says, training his heaviest guns on *Iskra*, "could and should have presented concrete demands to the government for legislative and administrative measures against economic exploitation, unemployment, famine, etc." (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, pp. 42-43). Concrete demands for measures—does not this mean demands for social reforms? Again we ask the impartial reader: Are we slandering the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ites (may I be forgiven for this awkward, currently used designation!) by calling them concealed Bernsteinians when, as their point of *disagreement* with *Iskra*, they advance their thesis on the necessity of struggling for economic reforms?

Revolutionary Social-Democracy has always included the struggle for reforms as part of its activities. But it utilises "economic" agitation for the purpose of presenting to the government, not only demands for all sorts of measures, but also (and primarily) the demand that it cease to be an autocratic government. Moreover, it considers it its duty to present this demand to the government on the basis, not of the economic struggle *alone*, but of all manifestations in general of public and political life. In a word, it subordinates the struggle for reforms, as the part to the whole, to the revolutionary struggle for freedom and for socialism. Martynov, however, resuscitates the theory of stages in a new form and strives to prescribe, as it were, an exclusively economic path of development for the political struggle. By advancing at this moment, when the revolutionary movement is on the upgrade, an alleged special "task" of struggling for reforms, he is dragging the Party backwards and is playing into the hands of both "Economist" and liberal opportunism.

To proceed. Shamefacedly hiding the struggle for reforms behind the pompous thesis of "lending the economic struggle

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\**Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 60. This is the Martynov variation of the application, which we have characterised above, of the thesis "every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes" to the present chaotic state of our movement. In fact, this is merely a translation into Russian of the notorious Bernsteinian sentence: "The movement is everything, the final aim is nothing."

itself a political character", Martynov advanced, as if it were a special point, *exclusively economic* (indeed, exclusively factory) reforms. As to the reason for his doing that, we do not know it. Carelessness, perhaps? Yet if he had in mind something else besides "factory" reforms, then the whole of his thesis, which we have cited, loses all sense. Perhaps he did it because he considers it possible and probable that the government will make "concessions" only in the economic sphere?\* If so, then it is a strange delusion. Concessions are also possible and are made in the sphere of legislation concerning flogging, passports, land redemption payments,<sup>165</sup> religious sects, the censorship, etc., etc. "Economic" concessions (or pseudo-concessions) are, of course, the cheapest and most advantageous from the government's point of view, because by these means it hopes to win the confidence of the working masses. For this very reason, we Social-Democrats *must not* under any circumstances or in any way whatever create grounds for the belief (or the misunderstanding) that we attach greater value to economic reforms, or that we regard them as being particularly important, etc. "Such demands," writes Martynov, speaking of the concrete demands for legislative and administrative measures referred to above, "would not be merely a hollow sound, because, promising certain palpable results, they might be actively supported by the working masses..." We are not Economists, oh no! We only cringe as slavishly before the "palpableness" of concrete results as do the Bernsteins, the Prokopoviches, the Struves, the R.M.s, and *tutti quanti*! We only wish to make it understood (together with Narstis Tuporylov) that all which "does not promise palpable results" is merely a "hollow sound"! We are only trying to argue as if the working masses were incapable (and had not already proved their capabilities, notwithstanding those who ascribe their own philistinism to them) of actively supporting *every* protest against the autocracy, even if it *promises absolutely no palpable results whatever!*

Let us take, for example, the very "measures" for the relief of unemployment and the famine that Martynov himself advances. *Rabocheye Dyelo* is engaged, judging by what it has promised, in drawing up and elaborating a programme of "concrete [in the form of bills?] demands for legislative and administrative measures", "promising palpable results", while *Iskra*, which "constantly places the revolutionising of dogma higher than the revolutionising of life", has tried to explain the inseparable connection

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\* P. 43. "Of course, when we advise the workers to present certain economic demands to the government, we do so because in the *economic* sphere the autocratic government is, of necessity, prepared to make certain concessions."

between unemployment and the whole capitalist system, has given warning that "famine is coming", has exposed the police "fight against the famine-stricken", and the outrageous "provisional penal servitude regulations"; and *Zarya* has published a special reprint, in the form of an agitational pamphlet, of a section of its "Review of Home Affairs", dealing with the famine.\* But good God! How "one-sided" were these incorrigibly narrow and orthodox doctrinaires, how deaf to the calls of "life itself"! Their articles contained—oh horror!—*not a single*, can you imagine it?—not a single "concrete demand" "promising palpable results"! Poor doctrinaires! They ought to be sent to Krichevsky and Martynov to be taught that tactics are a process of growth, of that which grows, etc., and that the economic struggle *itself* should be given a political character!

"In addition to its immediate revolutionary significance, the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government ['*economic* struggle against the government"! has also this significance: it constantly brings home to the workers the fact that they have no political rights" (Martynov, p. 44). We quote this passage, not in order to repeat for the hundredth and thousandth time what has been said above, but in order to express particular thanks to Martynov for this excellent new formula: "the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government". What a gem! With what inimitable skill and mastery in eliminating all partial disagreements and shades of differences among Economists this clear and concise proposition expresses the *quintessence* of Economism, from summoning the workers "to the political struggle, which they carry on in the general interest, for the improvement of the conditions of all the workers",\*\* continuing through the theory of stages, and ending in the resolution of the Conference on the "most widely applicable", etc. "Economic struggle against the government" is precisely trade-unionist politics, which is still very far from being Social-Democratic politics.

## B. HOW MARTYNOV RENDERED PLEKHANOV MORE PROFOUND

"What a large number of Social-Democratic Lomonosovs have appeared among us lately!" observed a comrade one day, having in mind the astonishing propensity of many who are inclined toward Economism to arrive, "necessarily, by their own understanding", at great truths (e.g., that the economic struggle stimulates the workers to ponder over their lack of rights) and in

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol 5, pp. 253-74.—Ed

\*\* *Rabochaya Mysl*, "Separate Supplement" p 14

doing so to ignore, with the supreme contempt of born geniuses, all that has been produced by the antecedent development of revolutionary thought and of the revolutionary movement. Lomonosov-Martynov is precisely such a born genius. We need but glance at his article "Urgent Questions" to see how by "his own understanding" he *arrives at* what was long ago said by Axelrod (of whom our Lomonosov, naturally, says not a word); how, for instance, he *is beginning* to understand that we cannot ignore the opposition of such or such strata of the bourgeoisie (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 9, pp. 61, 62, 71; compare this with *Rabocheye Dyelo's Reply* to Axelrod, pp. 22, 23-24), etc. But alas, he is only "arriving" and is only "beginning", not more than that, for so little has he understood Axelrod's ideas, that he talks about "the economic struggle against the employers and the government". For three years (1898-1901) *Rabocheye Dyelo* has tried hard to understand Axelrod, but has so far not understood him! Can one of the reasons be that Social-Democracy, "like mankind", always sets itself only tasks that can be achieved?

But the Lomonosovs are distinguished not only by their ignorance of many things (that would be but half misfortune!), but also by their unawareness of their own ignorance. Now this is a real misfortune; and it is this misfortune that prompts them without further ado to attempt to render Plekhanov "more profound".

"Much water," Lomonosov-Martynov says, "has flowed under the bridge since Plekhanov wrote his book [*Tasks of the Socialists in the Fight Against the Famine in Russia*]. The Social-Democrats who for a decade led the economic struggle of the working class... have failed as yet to lay down a broad theoretical basis for Party tactics. This question has now come to a head, and if we should wish to lay down such a theoretical basis, we should certainly have to deepen considerably the principles of tactics developed at one time by Plekhanov.... Our present definition of the distinction between propaganda and agitation would have to be different from Plekhanov's [Martynov has just quoted Plekhanov's words: "A propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few persons, an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but he presents them to a mass of people."] By propaganda we would understand the revolutionary explanation of the present social system, entire or in its partial manifestations, whether that be done in a form intelligible to individuals or to broad masses. By agitation, in the strict sense of the word [*sic!*], we would understand the call upon the masses to undertake definite, concrete actions and the promotion of the direct revolutionary intervention of the proletariat in social life."

We congratulate Russian—and international—Social-Democracy on having found, thanks to Martynov, a new terminology, more strict and more profound. Hitherto we thought (with Plekhanov, and with all the leaders of the international working-class movement) that the propagandist, dealing with, say, the question of unemployment, must explain the capitalistic nature of crises, the cause of their inevitability in modern society, the

necessity for the transformation of this society into a socialist society, etc. In a word, he must present "many ideas", so many, indeed, that they will be understood as an integral whole only by a (comparatively) few persons. The agitator, however, speaking on the same subject, will take as an illustration a fact that is most glaring and most widely known to his audience, say, the death of an unemployed worker's family from starvation, the growing impoverishment, etc., and, utilising this fact known to all, will direct his efforts to presenting *a single idea* to the "masses", e.g., the senselessness of the contradiction between the increase of wealth and the increase of poverty; he will strive *to rouse* discontent and indignation among the masses against this crying injustice, leaving a more complete explanation of this contradiction to the propagandist. Consequently, the propagandist operates chiefly by means of the *printed* word; the agitator by means of the *spoken* word. The propagandist requires qualities different from those of the agitator. Kautsky and Lafargue, for example, we term propagandists; Bebel and Guesde we term agitators. To single out a third sphere, or third function, of practical activity, and to include in this function "the call upon the masses to undertake definite concrete actions", is sheer nonsense, because the "call", as a single act, either naturally and inevitably supplements the theoretical treatise, propagandist pamphlet, and agitational speech, or represents a purely executive function. Let us take, for example, the struggle the German Social-Democrats are now waging against the corn duties. The theoreticians write research works on tariff policy, with the "call", say, to struggle for commercial treaties and for Free Trade. The propagandist does the same thing in the periodical press, and the agitator in public speeches. At the present time, the "concrete action" of the masses takes the form of signing petitions to the Reichstag against raising the corn duties. The call for this action comes indirectly from the theoreticians, the propagandists, and the agitators, and, directly, from the workers who take the petition lists to the factories and to private homes for the gathering of signatures. According to the "Marty-nov terminology", Kautsky and Bebel are both propagandists, while those who solicit the signatures are agitators. Isn't it clear?

The German example recalled to my mind the German word "Verballhornung", which, literally translated, means "Ballhorning". Johann Ballhorn, a Leipzig publisher of the sixteenth century, published a child's reader in which, as was the custom, he introduced a drawing of a cock, but a cock without spurs and with a couple of eggs lying near it. On the cover he printed the legend, "*Revised* edition by Johann Ballhorn". Ever since then, the Germans describe any "revision" that is really a worsening as "ballhorning". And one cannot help recalling Ballhorn upon

seeing how the Martynovs try to render Plekhanov "more profound".

Why did our Lomonosov "invent" this confusion? In order to illustrate how *Iskra* "devotes attention only to one side of the case, just as Plekhanov did a decade and a half ago" (39). "With *Iskra*, propagandist tasks force agitational tasks into the background, at least for the present" (52). If we translate this last proposition from the language of Martynov into ordinary human language (because mankind has not yet managed to learn the newly-invented terminology), we shall get the following: with *Iskra*, the tasks of political propaganda and political agitation force into the background the task of "presenting to the government concrete demands for legislative and administrative measures" that "promise certain palpable results" (or demands for social reforms, that is, if we are permitted once again to employ the old terminology of the old mankind not yet grown to Martynov's level). We suggest that the reader compare this thesis with the following tirade:

"What also astonishes us in these programmes (the programmes advanced by revolutionary Social-Democrats) is their constant stress upon the benefits of workers' activity in parliament [non-existent in Russia], though they completely ignore [thanks to their revolutionary nihilism] the importance of workers' participation in the legislative manufacturers' assemblies on factory affairs [which do exist in Russia] ... or at least the importance of workers' participation in municipal bodies...."

The author of this tirade expresses in a somewhat more forthright and clearer manner the very idea which Lomonosov-Martynov discovered by his own understanding. The author is R.M., in the "*Separate Supplement*" to *Rabochaya Mysl* (p. 15).

### C. POLITICAL EXPOSURES AND "TRAINING IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY"

In advancing against *Iskra* his theory of "raising the activity of the working masses", Martynov actually betrayed an urge to belittle that activity, for he declared the very economic struggle before which all economists grovel to be the preferable, particularly important, and "most widely applicable" means of rousing this activity and its broadest field. This error is characteristic, precisely in that it is by no means peculiar to Martynov. In reality, it is possible to "raise the activity of the working masses" *only* when this activity is *not restricted* to "political agitation on an economic basis". A basic condition for the necessary expansion of political agitation is the organisation of *comprehensive* political exposure. *In no way* except by means of such exposures *can* the masses be trained in political consciousness

and revolutionary activity. Hence, activity of this kind is one of the most important functions of international Social-Democracy as a whole, for even political freedom does not in any way eliminate exposures; it merely shifts somewhat their sphere of direction. Thus, the German party is especially strengthening its positions and spreading its influence, thanks particularly to the untiring energy with which it is conducting its campaign of political exposure. Working-class consciousness cannot be genuine political consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond to *all* cases of tyranny, oppression, violence, and abuse, no matter *what class* is affected—unless they are trained, moreover, to respond from a Social-Democratic point of view and no other. The consciousness of the working masses cannot be genuine class-consciousness, unless the workers learn, from concrete, and above all from topical, political facts and events to observe *every* other social class in *all* the manifestations of its intellectual, ethical, and political life; unless they learn to apply in practice the materialist analysis and the materialist estimate of *all* aspects of the life and activity of *all* classes, strata, and groups of the population. Those who concentrate the attention, observation, and consciousness of the working class exclusively, or even mainly, upon itself alone are not Social-Democrats: for the self-knowledge of the working class is indissolubly bound up, not solely with a fully clear theoretical understanding—or rather, not so much with the theoretical, as with the practical, understanding—of the relationships between *all* the various classes of modern society, acquired through the experience of political life. For this reason the conception of the economic struggle as the most widely applicable means of drawing the masses into the political movement, which our Economists preach, is so extremely harmful and reactionary in its practical significance. In order to become a Social-Democrat, the worker must have a clear picture in his mind of the economic nature and the social and political features of the landlord and the priest, the high state official and the peasant, the student and the vagabond; he must know their strong and weak points; he must grasp the meaning of all the catch-words and sophisms by which each class and each stratum *camouflages* its selfish strivings and its real “inner workings”; he must understand what interests are reflected by certain institutions and certain laws and how they are reflected. But this “clear picture” cannot be obtained from any book. It can be obtained only from living examples and from exposures that follow close upon what is going on about us at a given moment; upon what is being discussed, in whispers perhaps, by each one in his own way; upon what finds expression in such and such events, in such and such statistics, in such and such court sentences, etc..

etc. These comprehensive political exposures are an essential and *fundamental* condition for training the masses in revolutionary activity.

Why do the Russian workers still manifest little revolutionary activity in response to the brutal treatment of the people by the police, the persecution of religious sects, the flogging of peasants, the outrageous censorship, the torture of soldiers, the persecution of the most innocent cultural undertakings, etc.? Is it because the "economic struggle" does not "stimulate" them to this, because such activity does not "promise palpable results", because it produces little that is "positive"? To adopt such an opinion, we repeat, is merely to direct the charge where it does not belong, to blame the working masses for one's own philistinism (or Bernsteinism). We must blame ourselves, our lagging behind the mass movement, for still being unable to organise sufficiently wide, striking, and rapid exposures of all the shameful outrages. When we do that (and we must and can do it), the most backward worker will understand, *or will feel*, that the students and religious sects, the peasants and the authors are being abused and outraged by those same dark forces that are oppressing and crushing him at every step of his life. Feeling that, he himself will be filled with an irresistible desire to react, and he will know how to hoot the censors one day, on another day to demonstrate outside the house of a governor who has brutally suppressed a peasant uprising, on still another day to teach a lesson to the gendarmes in surplices who are doing the work of the Holy Inquisition, etc. As yet we have done very little, almost nothing, *to bring* before the working masses prompt exposures on all possible issues. Many of us as yet do not recognise this as our *bounden duty* but trail spontaneously in the wake of the "drab everyday struggle", in the narrow confines of factory life. Under such circumstances to say that "*Iskra* displays a tendency to minimise the significance of the forward march of the drab everyday struggle in comparison with the propaganda of brilliant and complete ideas" (Martynov, op. cit., p. 61), means to drag the Party back, to defend and glorify our unpreparedness and backwardness.

As for calling the masses to action, that will come of itself as soon as energetic political agitation, live and striking exposures come into play. To catch some criminal red-handed and immediately to brand him publicly in all places is of itself far more effective than any number of "calls"; the effect very often is such as will make it impossible to tell exactly who it was that "called" upon the masses and who suggested this or that plan of demonstration, etc. Calls for action, not in the general, but in the concrete, sense of the term can be made only at the place



of action; only those who themselves go into action, and do so immediately, can sound such calls. Our business as Social-Democratic publicists is to deepen, expand, and intensify political exposures and political agitation.

A word in passing about "calls to action". *The only newspaper* which prior to the spring events called upon the workers to intervene actively in a matter that certainly did not promise any palpable results whatever for the workers, i.e., the drafting of the students into the army, was *Iskra*. Immediately after the publication of the order of January 11, on "drafting the 183 students into the army", *Iskra* published an article on the matter (in its February issue, No. 2),\* and, before any demonstration was begun, forthwith called upon "the workers to go to the aid of the students", called upon the "people" openly to take up the government's arrogant challenge. We ask: how is the remarkable fact to be explained that although Martynov talks so much about "calls to action", and even suggests "calls to action" as a special form of activity, he said not a word about *this* call? After this, was it not sheer philistinism on Martynov's part to allege that *Iskra* was one-sided because it did not issue sufficient "calls" to struggle for demands "promising palpable results"?

Our Economists, including *Rabocheye Dyelo*, were successful because they adapted themselves to the backward workers. But the Social-Democratic worker, the revolutionary worker (and the number of such workers is growing) will indignantly reject all this talk about struggle for demands "promising palpable results", etc., because he will understand that this is only a variation of the old song about adding a kopek to the ruble. Such a worker will say to his counsellors from *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*: you are busying yourselves in vain, gentlemen, and shirking your proper duties, by meddling with such excessive zeal in a job that we can very well manage ourselves. There is nothing clever in your assertion that the Social-Democrats' task is to lend the economic struggle itself a political character; that is only the beginning, it is not the main task of the Social-Democrats. For all over the world, including Russia, the police themselves often take the initiative in lending the economic struggle a political character, and the workers themselves learn to understand whom the government supports.\*\* The "eco-

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19.—Ed.

\*\* The demand "to lend the economic struggle itself a political character" most strikingly expresses *subservience to spontaneity* in the sphere of political activity. Very often the economic struggle spontaneously assumes a political character, that is to say, without the intervention of the "revolutionary bacilli—the intelligentsia", without the intervention of the class-conscious Social-Democrats. The economic struggle of the English workers, for instance, also assumed a political character without any intervention on the part of the socialists. The

conomic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government", about which you make as much fuss as if you had discovered a new America, is being waged in all parts of Russia, even the most remote, by the workers themselves who have heard about strikes, but who have heard almost nothing about socialism. The "activity" you want to stimulate among us workers, by advancing concrete demands that promise palpable results, we are already displaying and in our everyday, limited trade union work we put forward these concrete demands, very often without any assistance whatever from the intellectuals. But *such* activity is not enough for us; we are not children to be fed on the thin gruel of "economic" politics alone; we want to know everything that others know, we want to learn the details of *all* aspects of political life and to take part *actively* in every single political event. In order that we may do this, the intellectuals must talk to us less of what we already know\* and tell us more about what we do not

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task of the Social-Democrats, however, is not exhausted by political agitation on an economic basis; their task is *to convert* trade-unionist politics into Social-Democratic political struggle, *to utilise* the sparks of political consciousness which the economic struggle generates among the workers, for the purpose of *raising* the workers to the level of *Social-Democratic* political consciousness. The Martynovs, however, instead of raising and stimulating the spontaneously awakening political consciousness of the workers, *bow to spontaneity* and repeat over and over ad nauseam, that the economic struggle "impels" the workers to realise their own lack of political rights. It is unfortunate, gentlemen, that the spontaneously awakening trade-unionist political consciousness does not "*impel*" you to an understanding of your Social-Democratic tasks.

\* To prove that this imaginary speech of a worker to an Economist is based on fact, we shall refer to two witnesses who undoubtedly have direct knowledge of the working-class movement and who are least of all inclined to be partial towards us "doctrinaires"; for one witness is an Economist (who regards even *Rabocheye Dyelo* as a political organ!), and the other is a terrorist. The first witness is the author of a remarkably truthful and vivid article entitled "The St. Petersburg Working-Class Movement and the Practical Tasks of Social-Democracy", published in *Rabocheye Dyelo* No. 6. He divides the workers into the following categories: (1) class-conscious revolutionaries; (2) intermediate stratum; 3) the remaining masses. The intermediate stratum, he says, "is often more interested in questions of political life than in its own immediate economic interests, the connection between which and the general social conditions it has long understood". . . . *Rabochaya Mysl* "is sharply criticised": "It keeps on repeating the same thing over and over again, things we have long known, read long ago." "Again nothing in the political review!" (pp. 30-31). But even the third stratum, "the younger and more sensitive section of the workers, less corrupted by the tavern and the church, who hardly ever have the opportunity of getting hold of political literature, discuss political events in a rambling way and ponder over the fragmentary news they get about student riots", etc. The terrorist writes as follows: "... They read over once or twice the petty details of factory life in other towns, not their own, and then they read no more ... dull, they find it. . . . To say nothing in a workers' paper about the government ... is to regard the workers as being little children. . . . The workers are not little children" (*Svoboda*,<sup>166</sup> published by the Revolutionary-Socialist Group, pp. 69-70).

yet know and what we can never learn from our factory and "economic" experience, namely, political knowledge. You intellectuals can acquire this knowledge, and it is your *duty* to bring it to us in a hundred- and a thousand-fold greater measure than you have done up to now; and you must bring it to us, not only in the form of discussions, pamphlets, and articles (which very often—pardon our frankness—are rather dull), but precisely in the form of vivid *exposures* of what our government and our governing classes are doing at this very moment in all spheres of life. Devote more zeal to carrying out this duty and *talk less about "raising the activity of the working masses"*. We are far more active than you think, and we are quite able to support, by open street fighting even demands that do not promise any "palpable results" whatever. It is not for you to "raise" our activity, because *activity is precisely the thing you yourselves lack*. Bow less in subservience to spontaneity, and think more about raising *your own* activity, gentlemen!

#### D. WHAT IS THERE IN COMMON BETWEEN ECONOMISM AND TERRORISM?

In the last footnote we cited the opinion of an Economist and of a non-Social-Democratic terrorist, who showed themselves to be accidentally in agreement. Speaking generally, however, there is not an accidental, but a necessary, inherent connection between the two, of which we shall have need to speak later, and which must be mentioned here in connection with the question of education for revolutionary activity. The Economists and the present-day terrorists have one common root, namely, *subservience to spontaneity*, with which we dealt in the preceding chapter as a general phenomenon and which we shall now examine in relation to its effect upon political activity and the political struggle. At first sight, our assertion may appear paradoxical, so great is the difference between those who stress the "drab everyday struggle" and those who call for the most self-sacrificing struggle of individuals. But this is no paradox. The Economists and the terrorists merely bow to different poles of spontaneity; the Economists bow to the spontaneity of "the labour movement pure and simple", while the terrorists bow to the spontaneity of the passionate indignation of intellectuals, who lack the ability or opportunity to connect the revolutionary struggle and the working-class movement into an integral whole. It is difficult indeed for those who have lost their belief, or who have never believed, that this is possible, to find some outlet for their indignation and revolutionary energy other than terror. Thus, both forms of subservience to spontaneity we have mentioned are nothing but *the*

*beginning of the implementation of the notorious Credo programme: Let the workers wage their "economic struggle against the employers and the government" (we apologise to the author of the Credo for expressing her views in Martynov's words. We think we have a right to do so since the Credo, too, says that in the economic struggle the workers "come up against the political régime"), and let the intellectuals conduct the political struggle by their own efforts—with the aid of terror, of course! This is an absolutely logical and inevitable conclusion which must be insisted on—even though those who are beginning to carry out this programme do not themselves realise that it is inevitable. Political activity has its logic quite apart from the consciousness of those who, with the best intentions, call either for terror or for lending the economic struggle itself a political character. The road to hell is paved with good intentions, and, in this case, good intentions cannot save one from being spontaneously drawn "along the line of least resistance", along the line of the purely bourgeois Credo programme. Surely it is no accident either that many Russian liberals—avowed liberals and liberals that wear the mask of Marxism—whole-heartedly sympathise with terror and try to foster the terrorist moods that have surged up in the present time.*

The formation of the Revolutionary-Socialist *Svoboda* Group—which set itself the aim of helping the working-class movement in every possible way, but which included in its programme terror, and emancipation, so to speak, from Social-Democracy—once again confirmed the remarkable perspicacity of P. B. Axelrod, who *literally foretold* these results of Social-Democratic waverings *as far back as the end of 1897* (*Present Tasks and Tactics*), when he outlined his famous "two perspectives". All the subsequent disputes and disagreements among Russian Social-Democrats are contained, like a plant in the seed, in these two perspectives.\*

From this point of view it also becomes clear why *Rabocheye*

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\* Martynov "conceives of another, more realistic [?] dilemma" (*Social-Democracy and the Working Class*, p. 19): "Either Social-Democracy takes over the direct leadership of the economic struggle of the proletariat and by that [!] transforms it into a revolutionary class struggle. . . ." "By that", i.e., apparently by the direct leadership of the economic struggle. Can Martynov cite an instance in which leading the trade union struggle *alone* has succeeded in transforming a trade-unionist movement into a revolutionary class movement? Can he not understand that in order to bring about this "transformation" we must actively take up the "direct leadership" of *all-sided* political agitation? . . . "Or the other perspective: Social-Democracy refrains from assuming the leadership of the economic struggle of the workers and so . . . clips its own wings. . . ." In *Rabocheye Dyelo's* opinion, quoted above, it is *Iskra* that "refrains". We have seen, however, that the latter *does far more than Rabocheye Dyelo* to lead the economic struggle, but that, moreover, it does not confine itself thereto and *does not narrow down* its political tasks for its sake.

*Dyelo*, unable to withstand the spontaneity of Economism, has likewise been unable to withstand the spontaneity of terrorism. It is highly interesting to note here the specific arguments that *Svoboda* has advanced in defence of terrorism. It "completely denies" the deterrent role of terrorism (*The Regeneration of Revolutionism*, p. 64), but instead stresses its "excitative significance". This is characteristic, first, as representing one of the stages of the break-up and decline of the traditional (pre-Social-Democratic) cycle of ideas which insisted upon terrorism. The admission that the government cannot now be "terrified", and hence disrupted, by terror, is tantamount to a complete condemnation of terror as a system of struggle, as a sphere of activity sanctioned by the programme. Secondly, it is still more characteristic as an example of the failure to understand our immediate tasks in regard to "education for revolutionary activity". *Svoboda* advocates terror as a means of "exciting" the working-class movement and of giving it a "strong impetus". It is difficult to imagine an argument that more thoroughly disproves itself. Are there not enough outrages committed in Russian life without special "excitants" having to be invented? On the other hand, is it not obvious that those who are not, and cannot be, roused to excitement even by Russian tyranny will stand by "twiddling their thumbs" and watch a handful of terrorists engaged in single combat with the government? The fact is that the working masses are roused to a high pitch of excitement by the social evils in Russian life, but we are unable to gather, if one may so put it, and concentrate all these drops and streamlets of popular resentment that are brought forth to a far larger extent than we imagine by the conditions of Russian life, and that must be combined into a *single* gigantic torrent. That this can be accomplished is irrefutably proved by the enormous growth of the working-class movement and the eagerness, noted above, with which the workers clamour for political literature. On the other hand, calls for terror and calls to lend the economic struggle itself a political character are merely two different forms of *evading* the most pressing duty now resting upon Russian revolutionaries, namely, the organisation of comprehensive political agitation. *Svoboda* desires to *substitute* terror for agitation, openly admitting that "as soon as intensified and strenuous agitation is begun among the masses the excitative function of terror will be ended" (*The Regeneration of Revolutionism*, p. 68). This proves precisely that both the terrorists and the Economists *underestimate* the revolutionary activity of the masses, despite the striking evidence of the events that took place in the spring,\* and whereas the one group goes out in search of

\* The big street demonstrations which began in the spring of 1901 <sup>167</sup> (Author's note to the 1907 edition —Ed)

artificial "excitants", the other talks about "concrete demands". But both fail to devote sufficient attention to the development of *their own activity* in political agitation and in the organisation of political exposures. And no other work can serve as a *substitute* for this task either at the present time or at any other.

### E. THE WORKING CLASS AS VANGUARD FIGHTER FOR DEMOCRACY

We have seen that the conduct of the broadest political agitation and, consequently, of all-sided political exposures is an absolutely necessary and a *paramount* task of our activity, if this activity is to be truly Social-Democratic. However, we arrived at this conclusion *solely* on the grounds of the pressing needs of the working class for political knowledge and political training. But such a presentation of the question is too narrow, for it ignores the general democratic tasks of Social-Democracy, in particular of present-day Russian Social-Democracy. In order to explain the point more concretely we shall approach the subject from an aspect that is "nearest" to the Economist, namely, from the practical aspect. "Everyone agrees" that it is necessary to develop the political consciousness of the working class. The question is, *how* that is to be done and what is required to do it. The economic struggle merely "impels" the workers to realise the government's attitude towards the working class. Consequently, *however much we may try* to "lend the economic struggle itself a political character", we *shall never be able* to develop the political consciousness of the workers (to the level of Social-Democratic political consciousness) by keeping within the framework of the economic struggle, for *that framework is too narrow*. The Martynov formula has some value for us, not because it illustrates Martynov's aptitude for confusing things, but because it pointedly expresses the basic error that all the Economists commit, namely, their conviction that it is possible to develop the class political consciousness of the workers *from within*, so to speak, from their economic struggle, i.e., by making this struggle the exclusive (or, at least, the main) starting-point, by making it the exclusive (or, at least, the main) basis. Such a view is radically wrong. Piqued by our polemics against them, the Economists refuse to ponder deeply over the origins of these disagreements, with the result that we simply cannot understand one another. It is as if we spoke in different tongues.

Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers *only from without*, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain this

knowledge is the sphere of relationships of *all* classes and strata to the state and the government, the sphere of the interrelations between *all* classes. For that reason, the reply to the question as to what must be done to bring political knowledge to the workers cannot be merely the answer with which, in the majority of cases, the practical workers, especially those inclined towards Economism, mostly content themselves, namely: "To go among the workers." To bring political knowledge to the *workers* the Social-Democrats must *go among all classes of the population*; they must dispatch units of their army *in all directions*.

We deliberately select this blunt formula, we deliberately express ourselves in this sharply simplified manner, not because we desire to indulge in paradoxes, but in order to "impel" the Economists to a realisation of their tasks which they unparadoxably ignore, to suggest to them strongly the difference between trade-unionist and Social-Democratic politics, which they refuse to understand. We therefore beg the reader not to get wrought up, but to hear us patiently to the end.

Let us take the type of Social-Democratic study circle that has become most widespread in the past few years and examine its work. It has "contacts with the workers" and rests content with this, issuing leaflets in which abuses in the factories, the government's partiality towards the capitalists, and the tyranny of the police are strongly condemned. At workers' meetings the discussions never, or rarely ever, go beyond the limits of these subjects. Extremely rare are the lectures and discussions held on the history of the revolutionary movement, on questions of the government's home and foreign policy, on questions of the economic evolution of Russia and of Europe, on the position of the various classes in modern society, etc. As to systematically acquiring and extending contact with other classes of society, no one even dreams of that. In fact, the ideal leader, as the majority of the members of such circles picture him, is something far more in the nature of a trade union secretary than a socialist political leader. For the secretary of any, say English, trade union always helps the workers to carry on the economic struggle, he helps them to expose factory abuses, explains the injustice of the laws and of measures that hamper the freedom to strike and to picket (i.e., to warn all and sundry that a strike is proceeding at a certain factory), explains the partiality of arbitration court judges who belong to the bourgeois classes, etc., etc. In a word, every trade-union secretary conducts and helps to conduct "the economic struggle against the employers and the government". It cannot be too strongly maintained that *this is still not* Social-Democracy, that the Social-Democrat's ideal should not be the trade union secretary, but *the tribune of the*

*people*, who is able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects; who is able to generalise all these manifestations and produce a single picture of police violence and capitalist exploitation; who is able to take advantage of every event, however small, in order to set forth *before all* his socialist convictions and his democratic demands, in order to clarify for *all* and everyone the world-historic significance of the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat. Compare, for example, a leader like Robert Knight (the well-known secretary and leader of the Boiler-Makers' Society, one of the most powerful trade unions in England), with Wilhelm Liebknecht, and try to apply to them the contrasts that Martynov draws in his controversy with *Iskra*. You will see—I am running through Martynov's article—that Robert Knight engaged more in "calling the masses to certain concrete actions" (Martynov, op. cit., p. 39), while Wilhelm Liebknecht engaged more in "the revolutionary elucidation of the whole of the present system or partial manifestations of it" (38-39); that Robert Knight "formulated the immediate demands of the proletariat and indicated the means by which they can be achieved" (41), whereas Wilhelm Liebknecht, while doing this, did not hold back from "simultaneously guiding the activities of various opposition strata", "dictating a positive programme of action for them"\* (41); that Robert Knight strove "as far as possible to lend the economic struggle itself a political character" (42) and was excellently able "to submit to the government concrete demands promising certain palpable results" (43), whereas Liebknecht engaged to a much greater degree in "one-sided" "exposures" (40); that Robert Knight attached more significance to the "forward march of the drab everyday struggle" (61), whereas Liebknecht attached more significance to the "propaganda of brilliant and completed ideas" (61); that Liebknecht converted the paper he was directing into "an organ of revolutionary opposition that exposed the state of affairs in our country, particularly the political state of affairs, insofar as it affected the interests of the most varied strata of the population" (63), whereas Robert Knight "worked for the cause of the working class in close organic connection with the proletarian struggle" (63)—if by "close and organic connection" is meant the subservience to spontaneity which we examined above, by taking the examples of Krichевsky and Martynov—and "restricted the sphere of his influence", convinced, of course, as is Martynov,

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\* For example, during the Franco-Prussian War, Liebknecht dictated a programme of action *for the whole of democracy*; to an even greater extent Marx and Engels did this in 1848.



that "by doing so he deepened that influence" (63). In a word, you will see that *de facto* Martynov reduces Social-Democracy to the level of trade-unionism, though he does so, of course, not because he does not desire the good of Social-Democracy, but simply because he is a little too much in a hurry to render Plekhanov more profound, instead of taking the trouble to understand him.

Let us return, however, to our theses. We said that a Social-Democrat, if he really believes it necessary to develop comprehensively the political consciousness of the proletariat, must "go among all classes of the population". This gives rise to the questions: how is this to be done? have we enough forces to do this? is there a basis for such work among all the other classes? will this not mean a retreat, or lead to a retreat, from the class point of view? Let us deal with these questions.

We must "go among all classes of the population" as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, and as organisers. No one doubts that the theoretical work of Social-Democrats should aim at studying all the specific features of the social and political condition of the various classes. But extremely little is done in this direction, as compared with the work that is done in studying the specific features of factory life. In the committees and study circles, one can meet people who are immersed in the study even of some special branch of the metal industry; but one can hardly ever find members of organisations (obliged, as often happens, for some reason or other to give up practical work) who are especially engaged in gathering material on some pressing question of social and political life in our country which could serve as a means for conducting Social-Democratic work among other strata of the population. In dwelling upon the fact that the majority of the present-day leaders of the working-class movement lack training, we cannot refrain from mentioning training in this respect also, for it too is bound up with the Economist conception of "close organic connection with the proletarian struggle". The principal thing, of course, is *propaganda* and *agitation* among all strata of the people. The work of the West-European Social-Democrat is in this respect facilitated by the public meetings and rallies which *all* are free to attend, and by the fact that in parliament he addresses the representatives of *all* classes. We have neither a parliament nor freedom of assembly; nevertheless, we are able to arrange meetings of workers who desire to listen to *a Social-Democrat*. We must also find ways and means of calling meetings of representatives of all social classes that desire to listen to *a democrat*; for he is no Social-Democrat who forgets in practice that "the Communists support every revolutionary movement",<sup>168</sup> that we are obliged for that reason to expound and emphasise *general democratic tasks before the whole*

people, without for a moment concealing our socialist convictions. He is no Social-Democrat who forgets in practice his obligation to be *ahead of all* in raising, accentuating, and solving *every* general democratic question.

"But everyone agrees with this!" the impatient reader will exclaim, and the new instructions adopted by the last conference of the Union Abroad for the Editorial Board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* definitely say: "All events of social and political life that affect the proletariat either directly as a special class or as *the vanguard of all the revolutionary forces in the struggle for freedom* should serve as subjects for political propaganda and agitation" (*Two Conferences*, p. 17, our italics). Yes, these are very true and very good words, and we would be fully satisfied if *Rabocheye Dyelo* understood them and if it refrained from saying in the next breath things that contradict them. For it is not enough to call ourselves the "vanguard", the advanced contingent; we must act in such a way that *all* the other contingents recognise and are obliged to admit that we are marching in the vanguard. And we ask the reader: Are the representatives of the other "contingents" such fools as to take our word for it when we say that we are the "vanguard"? Just picture to yourselves the following: a Social-Democrat comes to the "contingent" of Russian educated radicals, or liberal constitutionalists, and says, We are the vanguard; "the task confronting us now is, as far as possible, to lend the economic struggle itself a political character". The radical, or constitutionalist, if he is at all intelligent (and there are many intelligent men among Russian radicals and constitutionalists), would only smile at such a speech and would say (to himself, of course, for in the majority of cases he is an experienced diplomat): "Your 'vanguard' must be made up of simpletons. They do not even understand that it is our task, the task of the progressive representatives of bourgeois democracy to lend the workers' economic struggle *itself* a political character. Why, we too, like the West-European bourgeois, want to draw the workers into politics, *but only into trade-unionist, not into Social-Democratic politics*. Trade-unionist politics of the working class is precisely *bourgeois politics* of the working class, and this 'vanguard's' formulation of its task is the formulation of trade-unionist politics! Let them call themselves Social-Democrats to their heart's content, I am not a child to get excited over a label. But they must not fall under the influence of those pernicious orthodox doctrinaires, let them allow 'freedom of criticism' to those who unconsciously are driving Social-Democracy into trade-unionist channels."

And the faint smile of our constitutionalist will turn into Homeric laughter when he learns that the Social-Democrats who talk of Social-Democracy as the vanguard, today, when sponta-

neity almost completely dominates our movement, fear nothing so much as "belittling the spontaneous element", as "underestimating the significance of the forward movement of the drab everyday struggle, as compared with the propaganda of brilliant and completed ideas", etc., etc.! A "vanguard" which fears that consciousness will outstrip spontaneity, which fears to put forward a bold "plan" that would compel general recognition even among those who differ with us. Are they not confusing "vanguard" with "rearguard"?

Indeed, let us examine the following piece of reasoning by Martynov. On page 40 he says that *Iskra* is one-sided in its tactics of exposing abuses, that "however much we may spread distrust and hatred of the government, we shall not achieve our aim until we have succeeded in developing sufficient active social energy for its overthrow". This, it may be said parenthetically, is the familiar solicitude for the activation of the masses, with a simultaneous striving to restrict one's own activity. But that is not the main point at the moment. Martynov speaks here, accordingly, of *revolutionary* energy ("for overthrowing"). And what conclusion does he arrive at? Since in ordinary times various social strata inevitably march separately, "it is, therefore, clear that we Social-Democrats cannot simultaneously guide the activities of various opposition strata, we cannot dictate to them a positive programme of action, we cannot point out to them in what manner they should wage a day-to-day struggle for their interests. . . . The liberal strata will themselves take care of the active struggle for their immediate interests, the struggle that will bring them face to face with our political régime" (p. 41). Thus, having begun with talk about revolutionary energy, about the active struggle for the overthrow of the autocracy, Martynov immediately turns towards trade union energy and active struggle for immediate interests! It goes without saying that we cannot guide the struggle of the students, liberals, etc., for their "immediate interests"; but this was not the point at issue, most worthy Economist! The point we were discussing was the possible and necessary participation of various social strata in the overthrow of the autocracy; and not only are we *able*, but it is our bounden duty, to guide *these* "activities of the various opposition strata", if we desire to be the "vanguard". Not only will our students and liberals, etc., themselves take care of "the struggle that brings them face to face with our political régime"; the police and the officials of the autocratic government will see to this first and foremost. But if "we" desire to be front-rank democrats, we must make it our concern to *direct* the thoughts of those who are dissatisfied only with conditions at the university, or in the Zemstvo, etc., to the idea that the entire political system is worthless. *We* must take upon

ourselves the task of organising an all-round political struggle under the leadership of *our* Party in such a manner as to make it possible for all oppositional strata to render their fullest support to the struggle and to our Party. *We* must train our Social-Democratic practical workers to become political leaders, able to guide all the manifestations of this all-round struggle, able at the right time to "dictate a positive programme of action" for the aroused students, the discontented Zemstvo people, the incensed religious sects, the offended elementary schoolteachers, etc., etc. For that reason, Martynov's assertion that "with regard to these, we can function *merely in the negative* role of exposers of abuses . . . we can *only* dissipate their hopes in various government commissions" is *completely false* (our italics). By saying this, Martynov shows that he *absolutely fails to understand* the role that the revolutionary "vanguard" must really play. If the reader bears this in mind, he will be clear as to *the real meaning* of Martynov's concluding remarks: "*Iskra* is the organ of the revolutionary opposition which exposes the state of affairs in our country, particularly the political state of affairs, insofar as it affects the interests of the most varied strata of the population. We, however, work and will continue to work for the cause of the working class in close organic contact with the proletarian struggle. By restricting the sphere of our active influence we deepen that influence" (63). The true sense of this conclusion is as follows: *Iskra* desires to *elevate* the trade-unionist politics of the working class (to which, through misconception, through lack of training, or through conviction, our practical workers frequently confine themselves) to the level of Social-Democratic politics. *Rabocheye Dyelo*, however, desires to *degrade* Social-Democratic politics to trade-unionist politics. Moreover, it assures the world that the two positions are "entirely compatible within the common cause" (63). *O, sancta simplicitas!*

To proceed. Have we sufficient forces to direct our propaganda and agitation among *all* social classes? Most certainly. Our Economists, who are frequently inclined to deny this, lose sight of the gigantic progress our movement has made from (approximately) 1894 to 1901. Like real "tail-enders", they often go on living in the bygone stages of the movement's inception. In the earlier period, indeed, we had astonishingly few forces, and it was perfectly natural and legitimate then to devote ourselves exclusively to activities among the workers and to condemn severely any deviation from this course. The entire task then was to consolidate our position in the working class. At the present time, however, gigantic forces have been attracted to the movement. The best representatives of the younger generation of the educated classes are coming over to us. Everywhere in the provinces there are peo-

ple, resident there by dint of circumstance, who have taken part in the movement in the past or who desire to do so now and who are gravitating towards Social-Democracy (whereas in 1894 one could count the Social-Democrats on the fingers of one's hand). A basic political and organisational shortcoming of our movement is our *inability* to utilise all these forces and give them appropriate work (we shall deal with this more fully in the next chapter). The overwhelming majority of these forces entirely lack the opportunity of "going among the workers", so that there are no grounds for fearing that we shall divert forces from our main work. In order to be able to provide the workers with real, comprehensive, and live political knowledge, we must have "our own people", Social-Democrats, everywhere, among all social strata, and in all positions from which we can learn the inner springs of our state mechanism. Such people are required, not only for propaganda and agitation, but in a still larger measure for organisation.

Is there a basis for activity among all classes of the population? Whoever doubts this lags in his consciousness behind the spontaneous awakening of the masses. The working-class movement has aroused and is continuing to arouse discontent in some, hopes of support for the opposition in others, and in still others the realisation that the autocracy is unbearable and must inevitably fall. We would be "politicians" and Social-Democrats in name only (as all too often happens in reality), if we failed to realise that our task is to utilise every manifestation of discontent, and to gather and turn to the best account every protest, however small. This is quite apart from the fact that the millions of the labouring peasantry, handicraftsmen, petty artisans, etc., would always listen eagerly to the speech of any Social-Democrat who is at all qualified. Indeed, is there a single social class in which there are no individuals, groups, or circles that are discontented with the lack of rights and with tyranny and, therefore, accessible to the propaganda of Social-Democrats as the spokesmen of the most pressing general democratic needs? To those who desire to have a clear idea of what the political agitation of a Social-Democrat among *all* classes and strata of the population should be like, we would point to *political exposures* in the broad sense of the word as the principal (but, of course, not the sole) form of this agitation.

"We must arouse in every section of the population that is at all politically conscious a passion for *political exposure*," I wrote in my article "Where To Begin" (*Iskra*, May (No. 4), 1901], with which I shall deal in greater detail later. "We must not be discouraged by the fact that the voice of political exposure is today so feeble, timid, and infrequent. This is not because of a wholesale

submission to police despotism, but because those who are able and ready to make exposures have no tribune from which to speak, no eager and encouraging audience, they do not see anywhere among the people that force to which it would be worth while directing their complaint against the 'omnipotent' Russian Government. . . . We are now in a position to provide a tribune for the nation-wide exposure of the tsarist government, and it is our duty to do this. That tribune must be a Social-Democratic newspaper.”\*

The ideal audience for political exposure is the working class, which is first and foremost in need of all-round and live political knowledge, and is most capable of converting this knowledge into active struggle, even when that struggle does not promise “palpable results”. A tribune for *nation-wide* exposures can be only an all-Russia newspaper. “Without a political organ, a political movement deserving that name is inconceivable in the Europe of today”; in this respect Russia must undoubtedly be included in present-day Europe. The press long ago became a power in our country, otherwise the government would not spend tens of thousands of rubles to bribe it and to subsidise the Katkovs and Meshcherskys. And it is no novelty in autocratic Russia for the underground press to break through the wall of censorship and *compel* the legal and conservative press to speak openly of it. This was the case in the seventies and even in the fifties. How much broader and deeper are now the sections of the people willing to read the illegal underground press, and to learn from it “how to live and how to die”, to use the expression of a worker who sent a letter to *Iskra* (No. 7).<sup>169</sup> Political exposures are as much a declaration of war against the *government* as economic exposures are a declaration of war against the factory owners. The moral significance of this declaration of war will be all the greater, the wider and more powerful the campaign of exposure will be and the more numerous and determined the social *class* that has *declared war in order to begin the war*. Hence, political exposures in themselves serve as a powerful instrument for *disintegrating* the system we oppose, as a means for diverting from the enemy his casual or temporary allies, as a means for spreading hostility and distrust among the permanent partners of the autocracy.

In our time only a party that will *organise* really *nation-wide* exposures can become the vanguard of the revolutionary forces. The word “nation-wide” has a very profound meaning. The overwhelming majority of the non-working-class expositors (be it remembered that in order to become the vanguard, we must attract other classes) are sober politicians and level-headed men of affairs.

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 21-22.—Ed.

They know perfectly well how dangerous it is to "complain" even against a minor official, let alone against the "omnipotent" Russian Government. And they will come *to us* with their complaints only when they see that these complaints can really have effect, and that we represent *a political force*. In order to become such a force in the eyes of outsiders, much persistent and stubborn work is required *to raise* our own consciousness, initiative, and energy. To accomplish this it is not enough to attach a "vanguard" label to rearguard theory and practice.

But if we have to undertake the organisation of a really nation-wide exposure of the government, in what way will then the class character of our movement be expressed?—the overzealous advocate of "close organic contact with the proletarian struggle" will ask us, as indeed he does. The reply is manifold: we Social-Democrats will organise these nation-wide exposures; all questions raised by the agitation will be explained in a consistently Social-Democratic spirit, without any concessions to deliberate or undeliberate distortions of Marxism; the all-round political agitation will be conducted by a party which unites into one inseparable whole the assault on the government in the name of the entire people, the revolutionary training of the proletariat, and the safeguarding of its political independence, the guidance of the economic struggle of the working class, and the utilisation of all its spontaneous conflicts with its exploiters which rouse and bring into our camp increasing numbers of the proletariat.

But a most characteristic feature of Economism is its failure to understand this connection, more, this identity of the most pressing need of the proletariat (a comprehensive political education through the medium of political agitation and political exposures) with the need of the general democratic movement. This lack of understanding is expressed, not only in "Martynovite" phrases, but in the references to a supposedly class point of view identical in meaning with these phrases. Thus, the authors of the "Economist" letter in *Iskra*, No. 12, state\*: "This basic drawback of *Iskra* [overestimation of ideology] is also the cause of its inconsistency on the question of the attitude of Social-Democracy to the various social classes and tendencies. By theoretical reasoning [not by "the growth of Party tasks, which grow together with the Party"], *Iskra* solved the problem

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\* Lack of space has prevented us from replying in detail, in *Iskra*, to this letter, which is highly characteristic of the Economists. We were very glad at its appearance, for the allegations that *Iskra* did not maintain a consistent class point of view had reached us long before that from various sources, and we were waiting for an appropriate occasion, or for a formulated expression of this fashionable charge, to give our reply. Moreover, it is our habit to reply to attacks, not by defence, but by counter-attack.

of the immediate transition to the struggle against absolutism. In all probability it senses the difficulty of such a task for the workers under the present state of affairs [not only senses, but knows full well that this task appears less difficult to the workers than to the Economist intellectuals with their nursemaid concern, for the workers are prepared to fight even for demands which, to use the language of the never-to-be-forgotten Martynov, do not "promise palpable results"] but lacking the patience to wait until the workers will have gathered sufficient forces for this struggle, *Iskra* begins to seek allies in the ranks of the liberals and intellectuals". . . .

Yes, we have indeed lost all "patience" "waiting" for the blessed time, long promised us by diverse "conciliators", when the Economists will have stopped charging the workers with *their own* backwardness and justifying their own lack of energy with allegations that the workers lack strength. We ask our Economists: What do they mean by "the gathering of working-class strength for the struggle"? Is it not evident that this means the political training of the workers, so that *all* the aspects of our vile autocracy are revealed to them? And is it not clear that *precisely for this work* we need "allies in the ranks of the liberals and intellectuals", who are prepared to join us in the exposure of the political attack on the Zemstvos, on the teachers, on the statisticians, on the students, etc.? Is this surprisingly "intricate mechanism" really so difficult to understand? Has not P. B. Axelrod constantly repeated since 1897 that "the task before the Russian Social-Democrats of acquiring adherents and direct and indirect allies, among the non-proletarian classes will be solved principally and primarily by the character of the propagandist activities conducted among the proletariat itself"? But the Martynovs and the other Economists continue to imagine that "by economic struggle against the employers and the government" the workers must *first* gather strength (for trade-unionist politics) and *then* "go over"—we presume from trade-unionist "training for activity" to Social-Democratic activity!

"... In this quest," continue the Economists, "*Iskra* not infrequently departs from the class point of view, obscures class antagonisms, and puts into the forefront the common nature of the discontent with the government, although the causes and the degree of the discontent vary considerably among the 'allies'. Such, for example, is *Iskra's* attitude towards the Zemstvo. . . ." *Iskra*, it is alleged, "promises the nobles that are dissatisfied with the government's sops the assistance of the working class, but it does not say a word about the class antagonism that exists between these social strata". If the reader will turn to the article "The Autocracy and the Zemstvo" (*Iskra*, Nos. 2 and 4), to



which, *in all probability*, the authors of the letter refer, he will find that they\* deal with the attitude of the *government* towards the "mild agitation of the bureaucratic Zemstvo, which is based on the social-estates", and towards the "independent activity of even the propertied classes". The article states that the workers cannot look on indifferently while the government is waging a struggle against the Zemstvo, and the Zemstvos are called upon to stop making mild speeches and to speak firmly and resolutely when revolutionary Social-Democracy confronts the government in all its strength. What the authors of the letter do not agree with here is not clear. Do they think that the workers will "not understand" the phrases "propertied classes" and "bureaucratic Zemstvo based on the social-estates"? Do they think that *urging* the Zemstvo to abandon mild speeches and to speak firmly is "overestimating ideology"? Do they imagine the workers can "gather strength" for the struggle against the autocracy if they know nothing about the attitude of the autocracy towards the Zemstvo *as well*? All this too remains unknown. One thing alone is clear and that is that the authors of the letter have a very vague idea of what the political tasks of Social-Democracy are. This is revealed still more clearly by their remark: "Such, too, is *Iskra's* attitude towards the student movement" (i.e., it also "obscures the class antagonisms"). Instead of calling on the workers to declare by means of public demonstrations that the real breeding-place of unbridled violence, disorder, and outrage is not the university youth but the Russian Government (*Iskra*, No. 2\*), we ought probably to have inserted arguments in the spirit of *Rabochaya Mysl*! Such ideas were expressed by Social-Democrats in the autumn of 1901, after the events of February and March, on the eve of a fresh upsurge of the student movement, which reveals that even in this sphere the "spontaneous" protest against the autocracy is *outstripping* the conscious Social-Democratic leadership of the movement. The spontaneous striving of the workers to defend the students who are being assaulted by the police and the Cossacks surpasses the conscious activity of the Social-Democratic organisation!

"And yet in other articles," continue the authors of the letter, "*Iskra* sharply condemns all compromise and defends, for instance, the intolerant conduct of the Guesdists." We would advise those who are wont so conceitedly and frivolously to declare that the present disagreements among the Social-Demo-

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\* In the interval *between* these articles there was one (*Iskra*, No. 3), which dealt especially with class antagonisms in the countryside. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*)

\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19.—*Ed.*

crats are unessential and do not justify a split, to ponder these words. Is it possible for people to work together in the same organisation, when some among them contend that we have done extremely little to explain the hostility of the autocracy to the various classes and to inform the workers of the opposition displayed by the various social strata to the autocracy, while others among them see in this clarification a "compromise"—evidently a compromise with the theory of "economic struggle against the employers and the government"?

We urged the necessity of carrying the class struggle into the rural districts in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the emancipation of the peasantry (issue No. 3\*), and spoke of the irreconcilability of the local government bodies and the autocracy in relation to Witte's secret Memorandum (No. 4). In connection with the new law we attacked the feudal landlords and the government which serves them (No. 8\*\*) and we welcomed the illegal Zemstvo congress. We urged the Zemstvo to pass over from abject petitions (No. 8\*\*\*) to struggle. We encouraged the students, who had begun to understand the need for the political struggle, and to undertake this struggle (No. 3), while, at the same time, we lashed out at the "outrageous incomprehension" revealed by the adherents of the "purely student" movement, who called upon the students to abstain from participating in the street demonstrations (No. 3, in connection with the manifesto issued by the Executive Committee of the Moscow students on February 25). We exposed the "senseless dreams" and the "lying hypocrisy" of the cunning liberals of *Rossiia*<sup>170</sup> (No. 5), while pointing to the violent fury with which the government-gaoler persecuted "peaceful writers, aged professors, scientists, and well-known liberal Zemstvo members" (No. 5, "Police Raid on Literature"). We exposed the real significance of the programme of "state protection for the welfare of the workers" and welcomed the "valuable admission" that "it is better, by granting reforms from above, to forestall the demand for such reforms from below than to wait for those demands to be put forward" (No. 6\*\*\*\*). We encouraged the protesting statisticians (No. 7) and censured the strike-breaking statisticians (No. 9). He who sees in these tactics an obscuring of the class-consciousness of the proletariat and a *compromise with liberalism* reveals his utter failure to understand the true significance of the programme of the *Credo* and carries out that

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—Ed.

\*\* *Ibid.*, Vol. 5, pp. 95-100.—Ed.

\*\*\* *Ibid.*, pp. 101-02.—Ed.

\*\*\*\* *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.—Ed.

*programme de facto*, however much he may repudiate it. For by *such an approach* he drags Social-Democracy towards the "economic struggle against the employers and the government" and *yields to liberalism*, abandons the task of actively intervening in every "liberal" issue and of determining *his own*, Social-Democratic, attitude towards this question.

#### F. ONCE MORE "SLANDERERS", ONCE MORE "MYSTIFIERS"

These polite expressions, as the reader will recall, belong to *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which in this way answers our charge that it "is indirectly preparing the ground for converting the working-class movement into an instrument of bourgeois democracy". In its simplicity of heart *Rabocheye Dyelo* decided that this accusation was nothing more than a poleinical sally: these malicious doctrinaires are bent on saying all sorts of unpleasant things about us, and, what can be more unpleasant than being an instrument of bourgeois democracy? And so they print in bold type a "refutation": "Nothing but downright slander", "mystification", "mummery" (*Two Conferences*, pp. 30, 31, 33). Like Jove *Rabocheye Dyelo* (although bearing little resemblance to that deity) is wrathful because it is wrong, and proves by its hasty abuse that it is incapable of understanding its opponents' mode of reasoning. And yet, with only a little reflection it would have understood why *any* subservience to the spontaneity of the mass movement and *any* degrading of Social-Democratic politics to the level of trade-unionist politics mean preparing the ground for converting the working-class movement into an instrument of bourgeois democracy. The spontaneous working-class movement is by itself able to create (and inevitably does create) only trade-unionism, and working-class trade-unionist politics is precisely working-class bourgeois politics. The fact that the working class participates in the political struggle, and even in the political revolution, does not in itself make its politics Social-Democratic politics. Will *Rabocheye Dyelo* make bold to deny this? Will it, at long last, publicly, plainly, and without equivocation explain how it understands the urgent questions of international and of Russian Social-Democracy? Hardly. It will never do anything of the kind, because it holds fast to the trick, which might be described as the "not here" method—"It's not me, it's not my horse. I'm not the driver. We are not Economists; *Rabochaya Mysl* does not stand for Economism; there is no Economism at all in Russia." This is a remarkably adroit and "political" trick, which suffers from the slight defect, however, that the publications practising it are usually nicknamed, "At your service, sir".

*Rabocheye Dyelo* imagines that bourgeois democracy in Rus-

sia is, in general, merely a "phantom" (*Two Conferences*, p. 32).<sup>\*</sup> Happy people! Ostrich-like, they bury their heads in the sand and imagine that everything around has disappeared. Liberal publicists who month after month proclaim to the world their triumph over the collapse and even the disappearance of Marxism; liberal newspapers (*S. Peterburgskkiye Uedomosti*, *Ruskiye Uedomosti*, and many others) which encourage the liberals who bring to the workers the Brentano conception of the class struggle<sup>171</sup> and the trade-unionist conception of politics; the galaxy of critics of Marxism, whose real tendencies were so very well disclosed by the *Credo* and whose literary products alone circulate in Russia without let or hindrance; the revival of revolutionary non-Social-Democratic tendencies, particularly after the February and March events—all these, apparently, are just phantoms! All these have nothing at all to do with bourgeois democracy!

*Rabocheye Dyelo* and the authors of the Economist letter published in *Iskra*, No. 12, should "ponder over the reason why the events of the spring brought about such a revival of revolutionary non-Social-Democratic tendencies instead of increasing the authority and the prestige of Social-Democracy".

The reason lies in the fact that we failed to cope with our tasks. The masses of the workers proved to be more active than we. We lacked adequately trained revolutionary leaders and organisers possessed of a thorough knowledge of the mood prevailing among all the opposition strata and able to head the movement, to turn a spontaneous demonstration into a political one, broaden its political character, etc. Under such circumstances, our backwardness will inevitably be utilised by the more mobile and more energetic non-Social-Democratic revolutionaries, and the workers, however energetically and self-sacrificingly they may fight the police and the troops, however revolutionary their actions may be, will prove to be merely a force supporting those revolutionaries, the rearguard of bourgeois democracy, and not the Social-Democratic vanguard. Let us take, for example, the German Social-Democrats, whose weak aspects alone our Economists desire to emulate. Why is there *not a single* political event in Germany that does not add to the authority

<sup>\*</sup> There follows a reference to the "concrete Russian conditions which fatalistically impel the working-class movement on to the revolutionary path" But these people refuse to understand that the revolutionary path of the working-class movement might not be a Social-Democratic path. When absolutism reigned, the entire West-European bourgeoisie "impelled", deliberately impelled, the workers on to the path of revolution. We Social-Democrats, however, cannot be satisfied with that. And if we, by any means whatever, degrade Social-Democratic politics to the level of spontaneous trade-unionist politics, we thereby play into the hands of bourgeois democracy.

and prestige of Social-Democracy? Because Social-Democracy is always found to be in advance of all others in furnishing the most revolutionary appraisal of every given event and in championing every protest against tyranny. It does not lull itself with arguments that the economic struggle brings the workers to realise that they have no political rights and that the concrete conditions unavoidably impel the working-class movement on to the path of revolution. It intervenes in every sphere and in every question of social and political life; in the matter of Wilhelm's refusal to endorse a bourgeois progressist as city mayor (our Economists have not yet managed to educate the Germans to the understanding that such an act is, in fact, a compromise with liberalism!); in the matter of the law against "obscene" publications and pictures; in the matter of governmental influence on the election of professors, etc., etc. Everywhere the Social-Democrats are found in the forefront, rousing political discontent among all classes, rousing the sluggards, stimulating the laggards, and providing a wealth of material for the development of the political consciousness and the political activity of the proletariat. As a result, even the avowed enemies of socialism are filled with respect for this advanced political fighter, and not infrequently an important document from bourgeois, and even from bureaucratic and Court circles, makes its way by some miraculous means into the editorial office of *Vorwärts*.

This, then, is the resolution of the seeming "contradiction" that surpasses *Rabocheye Dyelo's* powers of understanding to such an extent that it can only throw up its hands and cry, "Mummery!" Indeed, just think of it: We, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, regard the *mass* working-class movement as the *corner-stone* (and say so in bold type!); we warn all and sundry against belittling the significance of the element of spontaneity; we desire to lend the economic struggle itself—*itself*—a political character; we desire to maintain close and organic contact with the proletarian struggle. And yet we are told that we are preparing the ground for the conversion of the working-class movement into an instrument of bourgeois democracy! And who are they that presume to say this? People who "compromise" with liberalism by intervening in every "liberal" issue (what a gross misunderstanding of "organic contact with the proletarian struggle"!); by devoting so much attention to the students and even (oh horror!) to the *Zemstvos*! People who in general wish to devote a greater percentage (compared with the Economists) of their efforts to activity among non-proletarian classes of the population! What is this but "mummery"?

Poor *Rabocheye Dyelo*! Will it ever find the solution to this perplexing puzzle?

#### IV THE PRIMITIVENESS OF THE ECONOMISTS AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES

*Rabocheye Dyelo's* assertions, which we have analysed, that the economic struggle is the most widely applicable means of political agitation and that our task now is to lend the economic struggle itself a political character, etc., express a narrow view, not only of our political, but also of our *organisational* tasks. The "economic struggle against the employers and the government" does not at all require an all-Russia centralised organisation, and hence this struggle can never give rise to such an organisation as will combine, in one general assault, all the manifestations of political opposition, protest, and indignation, an organisation that will consist of professional revolutionaries and be led by the real political leaders of the entire people. This stands to reason. The character of any organisation is naturally and inevitably determined by the content of its activity. Consequently, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, by the assertions analysed above, sanctifies and legitimises not only narrowness of political activity, but also of organisational work. In this case, too, *Rabocheye Dyelo*, as always, proves itself an organ whose consciousness yields to spontaneity. Yet subservience to spontaneously developing forms of organisation, failure to realise the narrowness and primitiveness of our organisational work, of our "handicraft" methods in this most important sphere, failure to realise this, I say, is a veritable ailment from which our movement suffers. It is not an ailment that comes with decline, but one, of course, that comes with growth. It is however at the present time, when the wave of spontaneous indignation, as it were, is sweeping over us, leaders and organisers of the movement, that an irreconcilable struggle must be waged against all defence of backwardness, against any legitimisation of narrowness in this matter. It is particularly necessary to arouse in all who participate in practical work, or are preparing to take up that work, discontent with the *amateurism* prevailing among us and an unshakable determination to rid ourselves of it.

#### A. WHAT IS PRIMITIVENESS?

We shall try to answer this question by giving a brief description of the activity of a typical Social-Democratic study circle of the period 1894-1901. We have noted that the entire student youth of the period was absorbed in Marxism. Of course, these students were not only, or even not so much, interested in Marx-

ism as a theory; they were interested in it as an answer to the question, "What is to be done?", as a call to take the field against the enemy. These new warriors marched to battle with astonishingly primitive equipment and training. In a vast number of cases they had almost no equipment and absolutely no training. They marched to war like peasants from the plough, armed only with clubs. A students' circle establishes contacts with workers and sets to work, without any connection with the old members of the movement, without any connection with study circles in other districts, or even in other parts of the same city (or in other educational institutions), without any organisation of the various divisions of revolutionary work, without any systematic plan of activity covering any length of time. The circle gradually expands its propaganda and agitation; by its activities it wins the sympathies of fairly large sections of workers and of a certain section of the educated strata, which provide it with money and from among whom the "committee" recruits new groups of young people. The attractive power of the committee (or League of Struggle) grows, its sphere of activity becomes wider, and the committee expands this activity quite spontaneously; the very people who a year or a few months previously spoke at the students' circle gatherings and discussed the question, "Whither?", who established and maintained contacts with the workers and wrote and published leaflets, now establish contacts with other groups of revolutionaries, procure literature, set to work to publish a local newspaper, begin to talk of organising a demonstration, and finally turn to open warfare (which may, according to circumstances, take the form of issuing the first agitational leaflet or the first issue of a newspaper or of organising the first demonstration). Usually the initiation of such actions ends in an immediate and complete fiasco. Immediate and complete, because this open warfare was not the result of a systematic and carefully thought-out and gradually prepared plan for a prolonged and stubborn struggle, but simply the result of the spontaneous growth of traditional study circle work; because, naturally, the police, in almost every case, knew the principal leaders of the local movement, since they had already "gained a reputation" for themselves in their student days, and the police waited only for the right moment to make their raid. They deliberately allowed the study circle sufficient time to develop its work so that they might obtain a palpable *corpus delicti*, and they always permitted several of the persons known to them to remain at liberty "for breeding" (which, as far as I know, is the technical term used both by our people and by the gendarmes). One cannot help comparing this kind of warfare with that conducted by a mass of peasants, armed with clubs, against modern

troops. And one can only wonder at the vitality of the movement which expanded, grew, and scored victories despite the total lack of training on the part of the fighters. True, from the historical point of view, the primitiveness of equipment was not only inevitable at first, but *even legitimate* as one of the conditions for the wide recruiting of fighters, but as soon as serious war operations began (and they began in fact with the strikes in the summer of 1896), the defects in our fighting organisations made themselves felt to an ever-increasing degree. The government, at first thrown into confusion and committing a number of blunders (e.g., its appeal to the public describing the misdeeds of the socialists, or the banishment of workers from the capitals to provincial industrial centres), very soon adapted itself to the new conditions of the struggle and managed to deploy well its perfectly equipped detachments of *agents provocateurs*, spies, and gendarmes. Raids became so frequent, affected such a vast number of people, and cleared out the local study circles so thoroughly that the masses of the workers lost literally all their leaders, the movement assumed an amazingly sporadic character, and it became utterly impossible to establish continuity and coherence in the work. The terrible dispersion of the local leaders; the fortuitous character of the study circle memberships; the lack of training in, and the narrow outlook on, theoretical, political, and organisational questions were all the inevitable result of the conditions described above. Things have reached such a pass that in several places the workers, because of our lack of self-restraint and the ability to maintain secrecy, begin to lose faith in the intellectuals and to avoid them; the intellectuals, they say, are much too careless and cause police raids!

Anyone who has the slightest knowledge of the movement is aware that all thinking Social-Democrats have at last begun to regard these amateurish methods as a disease. In order that the reader who is not acquainted with the movement may have no grounds for thinking that we are "inventing" a special stage or special disease of the movement, we shall refer once again to the witness we have quoted. We trust we shall be forgiven for the length of the passage:

"While the gradual transition to more extensive practical activity," writes B—v in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 6, "a transition that is directly dependent on the general transitional period through which the Russian working-class movement is now passing, is a characteristic feature. . . . there is, however, another, no less interesting, feature in the general mechanism of the Russian workers' revolution. We refer to the *general lack of revolutionary forces fit for action*," which is felt not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout Russia. With the general revival of the working-class movement, with the general development

\* All italics ours.



of the working masses, with the growing frequency of strikes, with the increasingly open mass struggle of the workers, and with the intensified government persecution, arrests, deportation, and exile, this *lack of highly skilled revolutionary forces is becoming more and more marked* and, without a doubt, *cannot but affect the depth and the general character of the movement*. Many strikes take place without any strong and direct influence upon them by the revolutionary organisations. . . . A shortage of agitational leaflets and illegal literature is felt. . . . The workers' study circles are left without agitators. . . . In addition, there is a constant dearth of funds. In a word, *the growth of the working-class movement is outstripping the growth and development of the revolutionary organisations*. The numerical strength of the active revolutionaries is too small to enable them to concentrate in their own hands the influence exercised upon the whole mass of discontented workers, or to give this discontent even a shadow of coherence and organisation. . . . The separate study circles, the separate revolutionaries, scattered, uncombined, do not represent a single, strong, and disciplined organisation with proportionately developed parts. . . ." Admitting that the immediate organisation of fresh study circles to replace those that have been broken up "merely proves the vitality of the movement . . . but does not prove the existence of an adequate number of adequately prepared revolutionary workers", the author concludes: "The lack of practical training among the St. Petersburg revolutionaries is seen in the results of their work. The recent trials, especially that of the Self-Emancipation Group and the Labour-against-Capital group,<sup>172</sup> clearly showed that the young agitator, lacking a detailed knowledge of working-class conditions and, consequently, of the conditions under which agitation can be carried on in a given factory, ignorant of the principles of secrecy, and understanding only the general principles of Social-Democracy [if he does], is able to carry on his work for perhaps four, five, or six months. Then come arrests, which frequently lead to the break-up of the entire organisation, or at all events, of part of it. The question arises, therefore, can the group conduct successful activity if its existence is measured by months? . . . Obviously, the defects of the existing organisations cannot be wholly ascribed to the transitional period. . . . Obviously, the numerical, and above all the qualitative, make up of the functioning organisations is no small factor, and the first task our Social-Democrats must undertake . . . is that of *effectively combining the organisations and making a strict selection of their membership*."

## B. PRIMITIVENESS AND ECONOMISM

We must now deal with a question that has undoubtedly come to the mind of every reader. Can a connection be established between primitiveness as growing pains that affect the *whole* movement, and Economism, which is *one* of the currents in Russian Social-Democracy? We think that it can. Lack of practical training, of ability to carry on organisational work is certainly common *to us all*, including those who have from the very outset unswervingly stood for revolutionary Marxism. Of course, were it only lack of practical training, no one could blame the practical workers. But the term "primitiveness" embraces something more than lack of training; it denotes a narrow scope of revolutionary work generally, failure to understand that a good organisation of revolutionaries cannot be built on the basis of such narrow activity, and lastly—and this is the main thing—attempts to

justify this narrowness and to elevate it to a special "theory", i.e., subservience to spontaneity on this question too. Once such attempts were revealed, it became clear that primitiveness is connected with Economism and that we shall never rid ourselves of this narrowness of our organisational activity until we rid ourselves of Economism generally (i.e., the narrow conception of Marxist theory, as well as of the role of Social-Democracy and of its political tasks). These attempts manifested themselves in a twofold direction. Some began to say that the working masses themselves have not yet advanced the broad and militant political tasks which the revolutionaries are attempting to "impose" on them; that they must continue to struggle for *immediate* political demands, to conduct "the economic struggle against the employers and the government"\* (and, naturally, corresponding to this struggle which is "accessible" to the mass movement there must be an organisation that will be "accessible" to the most untrained youth). Others, far removed from any theory of "gradualness", said that it is possible and necessary to "bring about a political revolution", but that this does not require building a strong organisation of revolutionaries to train the proletariat in steadfast and stubborn struggle. All we need do is to snatch up our old friend, the "accessible" cudgel. To drop metaphor, it means that we must organise a general strike,\*\* or that we must stimulate the "spiritless" progress of the working-class movement by means of "excitative terror".\*\*\* Both these trends, the opportunists and the "revolutionists", bow to the prevailing amateurism; neither believes that it can be eliminated, neither understands our primary and imperative practical task to establish *an organisation of revolutionaries* capable of lending energy, stability, and continuity to the political struggle.

We have quoted the words of B—v: "The growth of the working-class movement is outstripping the growth and development of the revolutionary organisations." This "valuable remark of a close observer" (*Rabocheye Dyelo's* comment on B—v's article) has a twofold value for us. It shows that we were right in our opinion that the principal cause of the present crisis in Russian Social-Democracy is *the lag of the leaders* ("ideologists", revolutionaries, Social-Democrats) behind the *spontaneous upsurge of the masses*. It shows that all the arguments advanced by the authors of the Economist letter (in *Iskra*, No. 12), by Krichevsky and by Martynov, as to the danger of belittling the

\* *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, especially the *Reply* to Plekhanov.

\*\* See "Who Will Bring About the Political Revolution?" in the collection published in Russia, entitled *The Proletarian Struggle*. Re issued by the Kiev Committee.

\*\*\* *Regeneration of Revolutionism* and the journal *Swoboda*.

significance of the spontaneous element, of the drab everyday struggle, as to tactics-as-process, etc., are nothing more than a glorification and a defence of primitiveness. These people who cannot pronounce the word "theoretician" without a sneer, who describe their genuflections to common lack of training and backwardness as a "sense for the realities of life", reveal in practice a failure to understand our most imperative *practical* tasks. To laggards they shout: Keep in step! Don't run ahead! To people suffering from a lack of energy and initiative in organisational work, from a lack of "plans" for wide and bold activity, they prate about "tactics-as-process"! The worst sin we commit is that we *degrade* our political and organisational tasks to the level of the immediate, "palpable", "concrete" interests of the everyday economic struggle; yet they keep singing to us the same refrain: Lend the economic struggle itself a political character! We repeat: this kind of thing displays as much "sense for the realities of life" as was displayed by the hero in the popular fable who cried out to a passing funeral procession, "Many happy returns of the day!"

Recall the matchless, truly "Narcissus-like" superciliousness with which these wiseacres lectured Plekhanov on the "workers' circles generally" (*sic!*) being "unable to cope with political tasks in the real and *practical* sense of the word, i.e., in the sense of the expedient and successful *practical* struggle for political demands" (*Rabocheye Dyelo's Reply*, p. 24.) There are circles and circles, gentlemen! Circles of "amateurs" are not, of course, capable of coping with political tasks so long as they have not become aware of their amateurism and do not abandon it. If besides this, these amateurs are enamoured of their primitive methods, and insist on writing the word "practical" in italics, and imagine that being practical demands that one's tasks be reduced to the level of understanding of the most backward strata of the masses, then they are hopeless amateurs and, of course, certainly cannot *in general cope with any political tasks*. But a circle of leaders, of the type of Alexeyev and Myshkin, of Khalturin and Zhelvabov, is capable of coping with political tasks in the genuine and most practical sense of the term, for the reason and to the extent that their impassioned propaganda meets with response among the spontaneously awakening masses, and their sparkling energy is answered and supported by the energy of the revolutionary class. Plekhanov was profoundly right, not only in pointing to this revolutionary class and proving that its spontaneous awakening was inevitable, but in setting even the "workers' circles" a great and lofty political task. But you refer to the mass movement that has sprung up since that time in order to *degrade* this task, to *curtail* the energy and scope

of activity of the "workers' circles". If you are not amateurs enamoured of your primitive methods, what are you then? You boast that you are practical, but you fail to see what every Russian practical worker knows, namely, the miracles that the energy, not only of a circle, but even of an individual person is able to perform in the revolutionary cause. Or do you think that our movement cannot produce leaders like those of the seventies? If so, why do you think so? Because we lack training? But we are training ourselves, we will go on training ourselves, and we will be trained! Unfortunately it is true that the surface of the stagnant waters of the "economic struggle against the employers and the government" is overgrown with fungus; people have appeared among us who kneel in prayer to spontaneity, gazing with awe (to take an expression from Plekhanov) upon the "posterior" of the Russian proletariat. But we will get rid of this fungus. The time has come when Russian revolutionaries, guided by a genuinely revolutionary theory, relying upon the genuinely revolutionary and spontaneously awakening class, can at last—at long last!—rise to full stature in all their giant strength. All that is required is for the masses of our practical workers, and the still larger masses of those who dreamed of practical work when they were still at school, to pour scorn and ridicule upon any suggestion that may be made to degrade our political tasks and to restrict scope of our organisational work. And we will achieve that, rest assured, gentlemen!

In the article "Where To Begin", I wrote in opposition to *Rabocheye Dyelo*: "The tactics of agitation in relation to some special question, or the tactics with regard to some detail of party organisation may be changed in twenty-four hours; but only people devoid of all principle are capable of changing, in twenty-four hours, or, for that matter, in twenty-four months, their view on the necessity—in general, constantly, and absolutely—of an organisation of struggle and of political agitation among the masses."\* To this *Rabocheye Dyelo* replied: "This, the only one of *Iskra*'s charges that makes a pretence of being based on facts, is totally without foundation. Readers of *Rabocheye Dyelo* know very well that from the outset we not only called for political agitation, without waiting for the appearance of *Iskra* ... [saying at the same time that not only the workers' study circles, "but also the mass working-class movement could not regard as its first political task the overthrow of absolutism", but only the struggle for immediate political demands, and that "the masses begin to understand immediate political demands after one, or at all events, after several strikes"]... but that

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 18.—Ed.

with our publications which we furnished from abroad for the comrades working in Russia, we provided the *only* Social-Democratic political and agitational material ... [and in this sole material you not only based the widest political agitation exclusively on the economic struggle, but you even went to the extent of claiming that this restricted agitation was the "most widely applicable". And do you not observe, gentlemen, that your own argument—that this was the *only* material provided—proves the necessity for *Iskra's* appearance, and its struggle against *Rabocheye Dyelo*?]. . . . "On the other hand, our publishing activity actually prepared the ground for the tactical unity of the Party. . . [unity in the conviction that tactics is a process of growth of Party tasks that grow together with the Party?—A precious unity indeed!]. . . and by that rendered possible the creation of a 'militant organisation' for which the Union Abroad did all that an organisation abroad could do" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 15). A vain attempt at evasion! I would never dream of denying that you did all you possibly could. I have asserted and assert now that the *limits* of what is "possible" for you to do are restricted by the narrowness of your outlook. It is ridiculous to talk of a "militant organisation" to fight for "immediate political demands". or to conduct "the economic struggle against the employers and the government".

But if the reader wishes to see the pearls of "Economist" infatuation with amateurism, he must, of course, turn from the eclectic and vacillating *Rabocheye Dyelo* to the consistent and determined *Rabochaya Mysl*. In its *Separate Supplement*, p. 13, R. M. wrote: "Now two words about the so-called revolutionary intelligentsia proper. True, on more than one occasion it has proved itself prepared 'to enter into determined battle with tsarism'. The unfortunate thing, however, is that our revolutionary intelligentsia, ruthlessly persecuted by the political police, imagined the struggle against the political police to be the political struggle against the autocracy. That is why, to this day, it cannot understand 'where the forces for the struggle against the autocracy are to be obtained'."

Truly matchless is the lofty contempt for the struggle against the police displayed by this worshipper (in the worst sense of the word) of the *spontaneous* movement! He is prepared to *justify* our inability to organise secret activity by the argument that with the spontaneous mass movement it is not at all important for us to struggle against the political police! Very few people indeed would subscribe to this appalling conclusion; to such an extent have our deficiencies in revolutionary organisations become a matter of acute importance. But if Martynov, for example, refuses to subscribe to this, it will only be because

he is unable, or lacks the courage, to think out his ideas to their logical conclusion. Indeed, does the "task" of advancing concrete demands by the masses, demands that promise palpable results, call for special efforts to create a stable, centralised, militant organisation of revolutionaries? Cannot such a "task" be carried out even by masses that do not "struggle against the political police" at all? Could this task, moreover, be fulfilled if, in addition to the few leaders, it were not undertaken by such workers (the overwhelming majority) as are quite *incapable* of "struggling against the political police"? Such workers, average people of the masses, are capable of displaying enormous energy and self-sacrifice in strikes and in street battles with the police and the troops, and are capable (in fact, are alone capable) of *determining* the outcome of our entire movement—but the struggle against the *political* police requires special qualities: it requires *professional* revolutionaries. And we must see to it, not only that the masses "advance" concrete demands, but that the masses of the workers "advance" an increasing number of such professional revolutionaries. Thus, we have reached the question of the relation between an organisation of professional revolutionaries and the labour movement pure and simple. Although this question has found little reflection in literature, it has greatly engaged us "politicians" in conversations and polemics with comrades who gravitate more or less towards Economism. It is a question meriting special treatment. But before taking it up, let us offer one further quotation by way of illustrating our thesis on the connection between primitiveness and Economism.

In his *Reply*, Mr. N. N. wrote: "The Emancipation of Labour group demands direct struggle against the government without first considering where the material forces for this struggle are to be obtained, and without indicating *the path of the struggle*." Emphasising the last words, the author adds the following footnote to the word "path": "This cannot be explained by purposes of secrecy, because the programme does not refer to a plot but to a *mass movement*. And the masses cannot proceed by secret paths. Can we conceive of a secret strike? Can we conceive of secret demonstrations and petitions?" (*Vademecum*, p. 59.) Thus, the author comes quite close to the question of the "material forces" (organisers of strikes and demonstrations) and to the "paths" of the struggle, but, nevertheless, is still in a state of consternation, because he "worships" the mass movement, i.e., he regards it as something that *relieves* us of the necessity of conducting revolutionary activity and not as something that should encourage us and *stimulate* our revolutionary activity. It is impossible for a strike to remain a secret to those participating in it and to those immediately associated with it, but it may

(and in the majority of cases does) remain a "secret" to the masses of the Russian workers, because the government takes care to cut all communication with the strikers, to prevent all news of strikes from spreading. Here indeed is where a special "struggle against the political police" is required, a struggle that can never be conducted actively by such large masses as take part in strikes. This struggle must be organised, according to "all the rules of the art", by people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity. The fact that the masses are spontaneously being drawn into the movement does not make the organisation of this struggle *less necessary*. On the contrary, it makes it *more necessary*; for we socialists would be failing in our direct duty to the masses if we did not prevent the police from making a secret of every strike and every demonstration (and if we did not ourselves from time to time secretly prepare strikes and demonstrations). And we *will succeed in doing this*, because the spontaneously awakening masses will *also produce* increasing numbers of "professional revolutionaries" *from their own ranks* (that is, if we do not take it into our heads to advise the workers to keep on marking time).

### C. ORGANISATION OF WORKERS AND ORGANISATION OF REVOLUTIONARIES

It is only natural to expect that for a Social-Democrat whose conception of the political struggle coincides with the conception of the "economic struggle against the employers and the government", the "organisation of revolutionaries" will more or less coincide with the "organisation of workers". This, in fact, is what actually happens; so that when we speak of organisation, we literally speak in different tongues. I vividly recall, for example, a conversation I once had with a fairly consistent Economist, with whom I had not been previously acquainted.<sup>173</sup> We were discussing the pamphlet, *Who Will Bring About the Political Revolution?* and were soon of a mind that its principal defect was its ignoring of the question of organisation. We had begun to assume full agreement between us; but, as the conversation proceeded, it became evident that we were talking of different things. My interlocutor accused the author of ignoring strike funds, mutual benefit societies, etc., whereas I had in mind an organisation of revolutionaries as an essential factor in "bringing about" the political revolution. As soon as the disagreement became clear, there was hardly, as I remember, a single question of principle upon which I was in agreement with the Economist!

What was the source of our disagreement? It was the fact that

on questions both of organisation and of politics the Economists are forever lapsing from Social-Democracy into trade-unionism. The political struggle of Social-Democracy is far more extensive and complex than the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government. Similarly (indeed for that reason), the organisation of the revolutionary Social-Democratic Party must inevitably be of *a kind different* from the organisation of the workers designed for this struggle. The workers' organisation must in the first place be a trade-union organisation; secondly, it must be as broad as possible; and thirdly, it must be as public as conditions will allow (here, and further on, of course, I refer only to absolutist Russia). On the other hand, the organisation of the revolutionaries must consist first and foremost of people who make revolutionary activity their profession (for which reason I speak of the organisation of *revolutionaries*, meaning revolutionary Social-Democrats). In view of this common characteristic of the members of such an organisation, *all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals*, not to speak of distinctions of trade and profession, in both categories, *must be effaced*. Such an organisation must perforce not be very extensive and must be as secret as possible. Let us examine this threefold distinction.

In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade-union and a political organisation is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relations between the latter and the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal, and other conditions; they may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion they should be as close and as little complicated as possible); but there can be no question in free countries of the organisation of trade unions coinciding with the organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between the Social-Democratic organisation and the workers' associations, since *all* workers' associations and *all* study circles are prohibited, and since the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers' economic struggle—the strike—is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence. Conditions in our country, therefore, on the one hand, strongly “impel” the workers engaged in economic struggle to concern themselves with political questions, and, on the other, they “impel” Social-Democrats to confound trade-unionism with Social-Democracy (and our Krichevskys, Martynovs, and Co., while diligently discussing the first kind of “impulsion”, fail to notice the second). Indeed, picture to yourselves people who are immersed ninety-nine per cent in “the economic struggle against the em-



ployers and the government". Some of them will never, during the *entire* course of their activity (from four to six months), be impelled to think of the need for a more complex organisation of revolutionaries. Others, perhaps, will come across the fairly widely distributed Bernsteinian literature, from which they will become convinced of the profound importance of the forward movement of "the drab everyday struggle". Still others will be carried away, perhaps, by the seductive idea of showing the world a new example of "close and organic contact with the proletarian struggle"—contact between the trade-union and the Social-Democratic movements. Such people may argue that the later a country enters the arena of capitalism and, consequently, of the working-class movement, the more the socialists in that country may take part in, and support, the trade-union movement, and the less the reason for the existence of non Social-Democratic trade unions. So far the argument is fully correct; unfortunately, however, some go beyond that and dream of a complete fusion of Social-Democracy with trade-unionism. We shall soon see, from the example of the Rules of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle, what a harmful effect such dreams have upon our plans of organisation.

The workers' organisations for the economic struggle should be trade-union organisations. Every Social-Democratic worker should as far as possible assist and actively work in these organisations. But, while this is true, it is certainly not in our interest to demand that only Social-Democrats should be eligible for membership in the "trade" unions, since that would only narrow the scope of our influence upon the masses. Let every worker who understands the need to unite for the struggle against the employers and the government join the trade unions. The very aim of the trade unions would be impossible of achievement, if they did not unite all who have attained at least this elementary degree of understanding, if they were not very *broad* organisations. The broader these organisations, the broader will be our influence over them—an influence due, not only to the "spontaneous" development of the economic struggle, but to the direct and conscious effort of the socialist trade-union members to influence their comrades. But a broad organisation cannot apply methods of strict secrecy (since this demands far greater training than is required for the economic struggle). How is the contradiction between the need for a large membership and the need for strictly secret methods to be reconciled? How are we to make the trade unions as public as possible? Generally speaking, there can be only two ways to this end: either the trade unions become legalised (in some countries' this preceded the legalisation of the socialist and political unions), or the organisa-

tion is kept secret, but so "free" and amorphous, *lose*\* as the Germans say, that the need for secret methods becomes almost negligible as far as the bulk of the members is concerned.

The legalisation of non-socialist and non-political labour unions in Russia has begun, and there is no doubt that every advance made by our rapidly growing Social-Democratic working-class movement will multiply and encourage attempts at legalisation—attempts proceeding for the most part from supporters of the existing order, but partly also from the workers themselves and from liberal intellectuals. The banner of legality has already been hoisted by the Vasilyevs and the Zubatovs. Support has been promised and rendered by the Ozerovs and the Wormses, and followers of the new tendency are now to be found among the workers. Henceforth, we cannot but reckon with this tendency. How we are to reckon with it, on this there can be no two opinions among Social-Democrats. We must steadfastly expose any part played in this movement by the Zubatovs and the Vasilyevs, the gendarmes and the priests, and explain their real intentions to the workers. We must also expose all the conciliatory, "harmonious" notes that will be heard in the speeches of liberal politicians at legal meetings of the workers, irrespective of whether the speeches are motivated by an earnest conviction of the desirability of peaceful class collaboration, by a desire to curry favour with the powers that be, or whether they are simply the result of clamsiness. Lastly, we must warn the workers against the traps often set by the police, who at such open meetings and permitted societies spy out the "fiery ones" and try to make use of legal organisations to plant their *agents provocateurs* in the illegal organisations.

Doing all this does not at all mean forgetting that *in the long run* the legalisation of the working-class movement will be to our advantage, and not to that of the Zubatovs. On the contrary, it is precisely our campaign of exposure that will help us to separate the tares from the wheat. What the tares are, we have already indicated. By the wheat we mean attracting the attention of ever larger numbers, including the most backward sections, of the workers to social and political questions, and freeing ourselves, the revolutionaries, from functions that are essentially legal (the distribution of legal books, mutual aid, etc.), the development of which will inevitably provide us with an increasing quantity of material for agitation. In this sense, we may, and should, say to the Zubatovs and the Ozerovs: Keep at it, gentlemen, do your best! Whenever you place a trap in the path of the workers (either by way of direct provocation, or by

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\* *Lose* (German)—loose.—Ed.

the "honest" demoralisation of the workers with the aid of "Struve-ism"<sup>174</sup>), we will see to it that you are exposed. But whenever you take a real step forward, though it be the most "timid zigzag", we will say: Please continue! And the only step that can be a real step forward is a real, if small, extension of the workers' field of action. Every such extension will be to our advantage and will help to hasten the advent of legal societies of the kind in which it will not be *agents provocateurs* who are detecting socialists, but socialists who are gaining adherents. In a word, our task is to fight the tares. It is not our business to grow wheat in flower-pots. By pulling up the tares, we clear the soil for the wheat. And while the Afanasy Ivanoviches and Pulkheria Ivanovnas<sup>175</sup> are tending their flower-pot corps, we must prepare the reapers, not only to cut down the tares of today, but to reap the wheat of tomorrow.\*

Thus, we cannot by means of legalisation *solve* the problem of creating a trade-union organisation that will be as little secret and as extensive as possible (but we should be extremely glad if the Zubatovs and the Ozerovs disclosed to us even a partial opportunity for such a solution—to this end, however, we must strenuously combat them). There remain secret trade-union organisations, and we must give all possible assistance to the workers who (as we definitely know) are adopting this course. Trade-union organisations, not only can be of tremendous value in developing and consolidating the economic struggle, but can also become a very important auxiliary to political agitation and revolutionary organisation. In order to achieve this purpose, and in order to guide the nascent trade-union movement in the channels desired by Social-Democracy, we must first understand clearly the absurdity of the plan of organisation the St. Petersburg Economists have been nursing for nearly five years. That plan is set forth in the "Rules for a Workers' Mutual Benefit Fund" of July 1897 ("*Listok*" *Rabotnika*, No. 9-10, p. 46, taken from *Rabochaya Mysl*, No. 1), as well as in the "Rules for a Trade-Union Workers' Organisation" of October 1900 (special leaflet printed in St. Petersburg and referred to in *Iskra*, No. 1).

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*Iskra's* campaign against the tares evoked the following angry outburst from *Rabocheye Dyelo*: "For *Iskra*, the signs of the times lie not so much in the great events [of the spring], as in the miserable attempts of the agents of Zubatov to 'legalise' the working-class movement. It fails to see that these facts tell against it; for they testify that the working-class movement has assumed menacing proportions in the eyes of the government" (*Two Conferences*, p. 27). For all this we have to blame the "dogmatism" of the orthodox who "turn a deaf ear to the imperative demands of life". They obstinately refuse to see the yard-high wheat and are combating inch-high tares! Does this not reveal a "distorted sense of perspective in regard to the Russian working-class movement" (*ibid.*, p. 27)?

Both these sets of rules have one main shortcoming: they set up the broad workers' organisation in a rigidly specified structure and confound it with the organisation of revolutionaries. Let us take the last-mentioned set of rules, since it is drawn up in greater detail. The body consists of *fifty-two* paragraphs. Twenty-three deal with the structure, the method of functioning, and the competence of the "workers' circles", which are to be organised in every factory ("a maximum of ten persons") and which elect "central (factory) groups" "The central group," says paragraph 2, "observes all that goes on in its factory or workshop and keeps a record of events." "The central group presents to subscribers a monthly financial account" (par. 17), etc. Ten paragraphs are devoted to the "district organisation", and nineteen to the highly complex interconnection between the Committee of the Workers' Organisation and the Committee of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle (elected representatives of each district and of the "executive groups"—"groups of propagandists, groups for maintaining contact with the provinces and with the organisation abroad, groups for managing stores, publications, and funds").

Social-Democracy="executive groups" in relation to the economic struggle of the workers! It would be difficult to show more glaringly how the Economists' ideas deviate from Social-Democracy to trade-unionism, and how alien to them is any idea that a Social-Democrat must concern himself first and foremost with an organisation of revolutionaries capable of guiding the *entire* proletarian struggle for emancipation. To talk of "the political emancipation of the working class" and of the struggle against "tsarist despotism", and at the same time to draft rules like these, means to have no idea whatsoever of the real political tasks of Social-Democracy. Not one of the fifty or so paragraphs reveals even a glimmer of understanding that it is necessary to conduct the widest possible political agitation among the masses, an agitation highlighting every aspect of Russian absolutism and the specific features of the various social classes in Russia. Rules like these are of no use even for the achievement of trade union, let alone political, aims, since trade unions are organised by *trades*, of which no mention is made.

But most characteristic, perhaps, is the amazing top-heaviness of the whole "system", which attempts to bind each single factory and its "committee" by a permanent string of uniform and ludicrously petty rules and a three-stage system of election. Hemmed in by the narrow outlook of Economism, the mind is lost in details that positively reek of red tape and bureaucracy. In practice, of course, three-fourths of the clauses are never applied; on the other hand, a "secret" organisation of this kind,

with its central group in each factory, makes it very easy for the gendarmes to carry out raids on a vast scale. The Polish comrades have passed through a similar phase in their movement, with everybody enthusiastic about the extensive organisation of workers' benefit funds; but they very quickly abandoned this idea when they saw that such organisations only provided rich harvests for the gendarmes. If we have in mind broad workers' organisations, and not widespread arrests, if we do not want to provide satisfaction to the gendarmes, we must see to it that these organisations remain without any rigid formal structure. But will they be able to function in that case?

Let us see what the functions are: "...To observe all that goes on in the factory and keep a record of events" (par. 2 of the Rules). Do we really require a formally established group for this purpose? Could not the purpose be better served by correspondence conducted in the illegal papers without the setting up of special groups? "...To lead the struggles of the workers for the improvement of their workshop conditions" (par. 3). This, too, requires no set organisational form. Any sensible agitator can in the course of ordinary conversation gather what the demands of the workers are and transmit them to a narrow—not a broad—organisation of revolutionaries for expression in a leaflet. "...To organise a fund ... to which subscriptions of two kopeks per ruble\* should be made" (par. 9)—and then to present to subscribers a monthly financial account (par. 17), to expel members who fail to pay their contributions (par. 10), and so forth. Why, this is a very paradise for the police; for nothing would be easier for them than to penetrate into such a secrecy of a "central factory fund", confiscate the money, and arrest the best people. Would it not be simpler to issue one-kopek or two-kopek coupons bearing the official stamp of a well known (very narrow and very secret) organisation, or to make collections without coupons of any kind and to print reports in a certain agreed code in an illegal paper? The object would thereby be attained, but it would be a hundred times more difficult for the gendarmes to pick up clues.

I could go on analysing the Rules, but I think that what has been said will suffice. A small, compact core of the most reliable, experienced, and hardened workers, with responsible representatives in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organisation of revolutionaries, can, with the widest support of the masses and without any formal organisation, perform *all* the functions a trade-union organisation, in a manner, moreover, desirable to Social-Democracy.

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\* Of wages earned.—*Tr.*

Only in this way can we secure the *consolidation* and development of a *Social-Democratic* trade-union movement, despite all the gendarmes.

It may be objected that an organisation which is so *lose* that it is not even definitely formed, and which has not even an enrolled and registered membership, cannot be called an organisation at all. Perhaps so. Not the name is important. What is important is that this "organisation without members" shall do everything that is required, and from the very outset ensure a solid connection between our future trade unions and socialism. Only an incorrigible utopian would have a *broad* organisation of workers, with elections, reports, universal suffrage, etc., under the autocracy.

The moral to be drawn from this is simple. If we begin with the solid foundation of a strong organisation of revolutionaries, we can ensure the stability of the movement as a whole and carry out the aims both of Social-Democracy and of trade unions proper. If, however, we begin with a broad workers' organisation, which is supposedly most "accessible" to the masses (but which is actually most accessible to the gendarmes and makes revolutionaries most accessible to the police), we shall achieve neither the one aim nor the other; we shall not eliminate our rule-of-thumb methods, and, because we remain scattered and our forces are constantly broken up by the police, we shall only make trade unions of the Zubatov and Ozerov type the more accessible to the masses.

What, properly speaking, should be the functions of the organisation of revolutionaries? We shall deal with this question in detail. First, however, let us examine a very typical argument advanced by our terrorist, who (sad fate!) in this matter also is a next-door neighbour to the Economist. *Svoboda*, a journal published for workers, contains in its first issue an article entitled "Organisation", the author of which tries to defend his friends, the Economist workers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk. He writes:

"It is bad when the masses are mute and unenlightened, when the movement does not come from the rank and file. For instance, the students of a university town leave for their homes during the summer and other holidays, and immediately the workers' movement comes to a standstill. Can a workers' movement which has to be pushed on from outside be a real force? No, indeed. . . . It has not yet learned to walk, it is still in leading-strings. So it is in all matters. The students go off, and everything comes to a standstill. The most capable are seized; the cream is skimmed—and the milk turns sour. If the 'committee' is arrested, everything comes to a standstill until a new one can be formed. And one never knows what sort of committee will be set up next—it may be nothing like the former. The first said one thing, the second may say the very opposite. Continuity between yesterday and tomorrow is broken, the experience of the past does not serve as a guide for the future. And all because no roots have been struck in depth, in the masses; the work is

carried on not by a hundred fools, but by a dozen wise men. A dozen wise men can be wiped out at a snap, but when the organisation embraces masses, everything proceeds from them, and nobody, however he tries, can wreck the cause" (p. 63).

The facts are described correctly. The picture of our amateurism is well drawn. But the conclusions are worthy of *Rabochaya Mysl*, both as regards their stupidity and their lack of political tact. They represent the height of stupidity, because the author confuses the philosophical and social-historical question of the "depth" of the "roots" of the movement with the technical and organisational question of the best method in combating the gendarmes. They represent the height of political tactlessness, because, instead of appealing from bad leaders to good leaders, the author appeals from the leaders in general to the "masses". This is as much an attempt to drag us back organisationally as the idea of substituting excitative terrorism for political agitation drags us back politically. Indeed, I am experiencing a veritable *embarras de richesses*, and hardly know where to begin to disentangle the jumble offered up by *Svoboda*. For clarity, let me begin by citing an example. Take the Germans. It will not be denied, I hope, that theirs is a mass organisation, that in Germany everything proceeds from the masses, that the working-class movement there has learned to walk. Yet observe how these millions value their "dozen" tried political leaders, how firmly they cling to them. Members of the hostile parties in parliament have often taunted the socialists by exclaiming: "Fine democrats you are indeed! Yours is a working-class movement only in name; in actual fact the same clique of leaders is always in evidence, the same Bebel and the same Liebknecht, year in and year out, and that goes on for decades. Your supposedly elected workers' deputies are more permanent than the officials appointed by the Emperor!" But the Germans only smile with contempt at these demagogic attempts to set the "masses" against the "leaders", to arouse bad and ambitious instincts in the former, and to rob movement of its solidity and stability by undermining the confidence of the masses in their "dozen wise men". Political thinking is sufficiently developed among the Germans, and they have accumulated sufficient political experience to understand that without the "dozen" tried and talented leaders (and talented men are not born by the hundreds), professionally trained, schooled by long experience, and working in perfect harmony, no class in modern society can wage a determined struggle. The Germans too have had demagogues in their ranks who have flattered the "hundred fools", exalted them above the "dozen wise men", extolled the "horny hand" of the masses, and (like Most and Hasselmann) have spurred them on to reck-

less "revolutionary" action and sown distrust towards the firm and steadfast leaders. It was only by stubbornly and relentlessly combating all demagogic elements within the socialist movement that German socialism has managed to grow and become as strong as it is. Our wiseacres, however, at a time when Russian Social-Democracy is passing through a crisis entirely due to the lack of sufficiently trained, developed, and experienced leaders to guide the spontaneously awakening masses, cry out with the profundity of fools: "It is a bad business when the movement does not proceed from the rank and file."

"A committee of students is of no use; it is not stable." Quite true. But the conclusion to be drawn from this is that we must have a committee of professional *revolutionaries*, and it is immaterial whether a student or a worker is capable of becoming a professional revolutionary. The conclusion you draw, however, is that the working-class movement must not be pushed on from outside! In your political innocence you fail to notice that you are playing into the hands of our Economists and fostering our amateurism. Wherein, may I ask, did our students "push on" our workers? *In the sense* that the student brought to the worker the fragments of political knowledge he himself possesses, the crumbs of socialist ideas he has managed to acquire (for the principal intellectual diet of the present-day student, legal Marxism, could furnish only the rudiments, only scraps of knowledge). There has never been too much of *such* "pushing on from outside"; on the contrary, there has so far been all too little of it in our movement, for we have been stewing too assiduously in our own juice; we have bowed far too slavishly to the elementary "economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government". We professional revolutionaries must and will make it our business to engage in *this kind* of "pushing on" a hundred times more forcibly than we have done hitherto. But the very fact that you select so hideous a phrase as "pushing on from outside"—a phrase which cannot but rouse in the workers (at least in the workers who are as unenlightened as you yourselves) a sense of distrust towards *all* who bring them political knowledge and revolutionary experience from outside, which cannot but rouse in them an instinctive desire to resist *all* such people—proves you to be *demagogues*, and demagogues are the worst enemies of the working class.

And, please—don't hasten howling about my "uncomradely methods" of debating. I have not the least desire to doubt the purity of your intentions. As I have said, one may become a demagogue out of sheer political innocence. But I have shown that you have descended to demagogy, and I will never tire of repeating that demagogues are the worst enemies of the working



class. The worst enemies, because they arouse base instincts in the masses, because the unenlightened worker is unable to recognise his enemies in men who represent themselves, and sometimes sincerely so, as his friends. The worst enemies, because in the period of disunity and vacillation, when our movement is just beginning to take shape, nothing is easier than to employ demagogic methods to mislead the masses, who can realise their error only later by bitter experience. That is why the slogan of the day for the Russian Social-Democrat must be—resolute struggle against *Svoboda* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, both of which have sunk to the level of demagoguery. We shall deal with this further in greater detail.\*

"A dozen wise men can be more easily wiped out than a hundred fools." This wonderful truth (for which the hundred fools will always applaud you) appears obvious only because in the very midst of the argument you have skipped from one question to another. You began by talking and continued to talk of the unearthing of a "committee", of the unearthing of an "organisation", and now you skip to the question of unearthing the movement's "roots" in their "depths". The fact is, of course, that our movement cannot be unearthed, for the very reason that it has countless thousands of roots deep down among the masses; but that is not the point at issue. As far as "deep roots" are concerned, we cannot be "unearthed" even now, despite all our amateurism, and yet we all complain, and cannot but complain, that the "*organisations*" are being unearthed and as a result it is impossible to maintain continuity in the movement. But since you raise the question of *organisations* being unearthed and persist in your opinion, I assert that it is far more difficult to unearth a dozen wise men than a hundred fools. This position I will defend, no matter how much you instigate the masses against me for my "anti-democratic" views, etc. As I have stated repeatedly, by "wise men", in connection with organisation. I mean *professional revolutionaries*, irrespective of whether they have developed from among students or working men. I assert: (1) that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organisation of leaders maintaining continuity; (2) that the broader the popular mass drawn spontaneously into the struggle, which forms the basis of the movement and participates in it, the more urgent the need for such an organisation, and the more solid this organisation must be (for it is much easier for all sorts

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\* For the moment let us observe merely that our remarks on "pushing on from outside" and *Svoboda's* other disquisitions on organisation apply in their entirety to all the Economists, including the adherents of *Rabocheye Dyelo*; for some of them have actively preached and defended such views on organisation, while others among them have drifted into them

of demagogues to side-track the more backward sections of the masses); (3) that such an organisation must consist chiefly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity; (4) that in an autocratic state, the more we *confine* the membership of such an organisation to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to unearth the organisation; and (5) the *greater* will be the number of people from the working class and from the other social classes who will be able to join the movement and perform active work in it.

I invite our Economists, terrorists, and "Economists-terrorists"\* to confute these propositions. At the moment, I shall deal only with the last two points. The question as to whether it is easier to wipe out "a dozen wise men" or "a hundred fools" reduces itself to the question, above considered, whether it is possible to have a mass *organisation* when the maintenance of strict secrecy is essential. We can never give a mass organisation that degree of secrecy without which there can be no question of persistent and continuous struggle against the government. To concentrate all secret functions in the hands of as small a number of professional revolutionaries as possible does not mean that the latter will "do the thinking for all" and that the rank and file will not take an active part in the *movement*. On the contrary, the membership will promote increasing numbers of the professional revolutionaries from its ranks; for it will know that it is not enough for a few students and for a few working men waging the economic struggle to gather in order to form a "committee", but that it takes years to train oneself to be a professional revolutionary; and the rank and file will "think", not only of amateurish methods, but of such training. Centralisation of the secret functions of the *organisation* by no means implies centralisation of all the functions of the *movement*. Active participation of the widest masses in the illegal press will not diminish because a "dozen" professional revolutionaries

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\* This term is perhaps more applicable to *Svoboda* than the former, for in an article entitled "The Regeneration of Revolutionism" the publication defends terrorism, while in the article at present under review it defends Economism. One might say of *Svoboda* that "it would if it could, but it can't". Its wishes and intentions are of the very best—but the result is utter confusion; this is chiefly due to the fact that, while *Svoboda* advocates continuity of organisation, it refuses to recognise continuity of revolutionary thought and Social-Democratic theory. It wants to revive the professional revolutionary ("The Regeneration of Revolutionism"), and to that end proposes, first, excitative terrorism, and, secondly, "an organisation of average workers" (*Svoboda*, No. 1, p. 66, et seq.), as less likely to be "pushed on from outside". In other words, it proposes to pull the house down to use the timber for heating it.

centralise the secret functions connected with this work; on the contrary, it will *increase* tenfold. In this way, and in this way alone, shall we ensure that reading the illegal press, writing for it, and to some extent even distributing it, will *almost cease to be secret work*, for the police will soon come to realise the folly and impossibility of judicial and administrative red-tape procedure over every copy of a publication that is being distributed in the thousands. This holds not only for the press, but for every function of the movement, even for demonstrations. The active and widespread participation of the masses will not suffer; on the contrary, it will benefit by the fact that a "dozen" experienced revolutionaries, trained professionally no less than the police, will centralise all the secret aspects of the work—the drawing up of leaflets, the working out of approximate plans; and the appointing of bodies of leaders for each urban district, for each factory district, and for each educational institution, etc. (I know that exception will be taken to my "undemocratic" views, but I shall reply below fully to this anything but intelligent objection.) Centralisation of the most secret functions in an organisation of revolutionaries will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and enhance the quality of the activity of a large number of other organisations that are intended for a broad public and are therefore as loose and as non-secret as possible, such as workers' trade unions; workers' self-education circles and circles for reading illegal literature; and socialist, as well as democratic, circles among *all* other sections of the population; etc., etc. We must have such circles, trade unions, and organisations everywhere in *as large a number as possible* and with the widest variety of functions; but it would be absurd and harmful to *confound* them with the organisation of *revolutionaries*, to efface the border-line between them, to make still more hazy the all too faint recognition of the fact that in order to "serve" the mass movement we must have people who will devote themselves exclusively to Social-Democratic activities, and that such people must *train* themselves patiently and steadfastly to be professional revolutionaries.

Yes, this recognition is incredibly dim. Our worst sin with regard to organisation consists in the fact that *by our primitiveness we have lowered the prestige of revolutionaries in Russia*. A person who is flabby and shaky on questions of theory, who has a narrow outlook, who pleads the spontaneity of the masses as an excuse for his own sluggishness, who resembles a trade union secretary more than a spokesman of the people, who is unable to conceive of a broad and bold plan that would command the respect even of opponents, and who is inexperienced and clumsy in his own professional art—the art of combating the

political police—such a man is not a revolutionary, but a wretched amateur!

Let no active worker take offence at these frank remarks, for as far as insufficient training is concerned, I apply them first and foremost to myself. I used to work in a study circle<sup>176</sup> that set itself very broad, all-embracing tasks; and all of us, members of that circle, suffered painfully and acutely from the realisation that we were acting as amateurs at a moment in history when we might have been able to say, varying a well-known statement: "Give us an organisation of revolutionaries, and we will overturn Russia!" The more I recall the burning sense of shame I then experienced, the bitterer become my feelings towards those pseudo-Social-Democrats whose preachings "bring disgrace on the calling of a revolutionary", who fail to understand that our task is not to champion the degrading of the revolutionary to the level of an amateur, but *to raise* the amateurs to the level of revolutionaries.

#### D. THE SCOPE OF ORGANISATIONAL WORK

We have heard B—v tell us about "the lack of revolutionary forces fit for action which is felt not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout Russia". Hardly anyone will dispute this fact. But the question is, how is it to be explained? B—v writes:

"We shall not go into an explanation of the historical causes of this phenomenon; we shall merely state that a society, demoralised by prolonged political reaction and split by past and present economic changes, promotes from its own ranks *an extremely small number of persons fit for revolutionary work*; that the working class does produce revolutionary workers who to some extent reinforce the ranks of the illegal organisations, but that the number of such revolutionaries is inadequate to meet the requirements of the times. This is all the more so because the worker who spends eleven and a half hours a day in the factory is in such a position that he can, in the main, perform only the functions of an agitator; but propaganda and organisation, the delivery and reproduction of illegal literature, the issuance of leaflets, etc., are duties which must necessarily fall mainly upon the shoulders of an extremely small force of intellectuals" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 6, pp. 38-39).

On many points we disagree with B—v, particularly with those we have emphasised, which most saliently reveal that, although weary of our amateurism (as is every thinking practical worker), B—v cannot find the way out of this intolerable situation, because he is weighted down by Economism. The fact is that society produces very *many* persons fit for "the cause", but we are unable to make use of them all. The critical, transitional state of our movement in this respect may be formulated as follows: *There are no people—yet there is a mass of people*. There is a mass of people, because the working class and increasingly

varied social strata, year after year, produce from their ranks an increasing number of discontented people who desire to protest, who are ready to render all the assistance they can in the struggle against absolutism, the intolerableness of which, though not yet recognised by all, is more and more acutely sensed by increasing masses of the people. At the same time, we have no people, because we have no leaders, no political leaders, no talented organisers capable of arranging extensive and at the same time uniform and harmonious work that would employ all forces, even the most inconsiderable. "The growth and development of the revolutionary organisations" lag, not only behind the growth of the working-class movement, which even B—v admits, but behind that of the general democratic movement among all strata of the people. (In passing, probably B—v would now regard this as supplementing his conclusion.) The scope of revolutionary work is too narrow, as compared with the breadth of the spontaneous basis of the movement. It is too hemmed in by the wretched theory of "economic struggle against the employers and the government". Yet, at the present time, not only Social-Democratic political agitators, but Social-Democratic organisers must "go among all classes of the population". There is hardly a single practical worker who will doubt that the Social-Democrats could distribute the thousand and one minute functions of their organisational work among individual representatives of the most varied classes. Lack of specialisation is one of the most serious defects of our technique, about which B—v justly and bitterly complains. The smaller each separate "operation" in our common cause the more people we can find capable of carrying out such operations (people who, in the majority of cases, are completely incapable of becoming professional revolutionaries); the more difficult will it be for the police to "net" all these "detail workers", and the more difficult will it be for them to frame up, out of an arrest for some petty affair, a "case" that would justify the government's expenditure on "security". As for the number of people ready to help us, we referred in the preceding chapter to the gigantic change that has taken place in this respect in the last five years or so. On the other hand, in order to unite all these tiny fractions into one whole, in order not to break up the movement while breaking up its functions, and in order to imbue the people who carry out the minute func-

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\* Thus, an undoubted revival of the democratic spirit has recently been observed among persons in military service, partly as a consequence of the more frequent street battles with "enemies" like workers and students. As soon as our available forces permit, we must without fail devote the most serious attention to propaganda and agitation among soldiers and officers, and to the creation of "military organisations" affiliated to our Party.

tions with the conviction that their work is necessary and important, without which conviction they will never do the work,\* it is necessary to have a strong organisation of tried revolutionaries. The more secret such an organisation is, the stronger and more widespread will be the confidence in the Party. As we know, in time of war, it is not only of the utmost importance to imbue one's own army with confidence in its strength, but it is important also to convince the enemy and all *neutral* elements of this strength; friendly neutrality may sometimes decide the issue. If such an organisation existed, one built up on a firm theoretical foundation and possessing a Social-Democratic organ, we should have no reason to fear that the movement might be diverted from its path by the numerous "outside" elements that are attracted to it. (On the contrary, it is precisely at the present time, with amateurism prevalent, that we see many Social-Democrats leaning towards the *Credo* and only imagining that they are Social-Democrats.) In a word, specialisation necessarily presupposes centralisation, and in turn imperatively calls for it.

But B—v himself, who has so excellently described the necessity for specialisation, underestimates its importance, in our opinion, in the second part of the argument we have quoted. The number of working-class revolutionaries is inadequate, he says. This is perfectly true, and once again we stress that the "valuable communication of a close observer" fully confirms our view of the causes of the present crisis in Social-Democracy, and, consequently, of the means required to overcome it. Not only are revolutionaries in general lagging behind the spontaneous awakening of the masses, but even worker-revolutionaries are

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\* I recall that once a comrade told me of a factory inspector who wanted to help the Social-Democrats, and actually did, but complained bitterly that he did not know whether his "information" reached the proper revolutionary centre, how much his help was really required, and what possibilities there were for utilising his small and petty services. Every practical worker can, of course, cite many similar instances in which our primitiveness deprived us of allies. These services, each "small" in itself, but invaluable when taken in the mass, could and would be rendered to us by office employees and officials, not only in factories, but in the postal service, on the railways, in the Customs, among the nobility, among the clergy, and in *every* other walk of life, including even the police and the Court! Had we a real party, a real militant organisation of revolutionaries, we would not make undue demands on every one of these "aides", we would not hasten always and invariably to bring them right into the very heart of our "illegality", but, on the contrary, we would husband them most carefully and would even train people especially for such functions, bearing in mind that many students could be of much greater service to the Party as "aides" holding some official post than as "short-term" revolutionaries. But, I repeat, only an organisation that is firmly established and has no lack of active forces would have the right to apply such tactics.

lagging behind the spontaneous awakening of the working-class masses. This *fact* confirms with clear evidence, from the "practical" point of view, too, not only the absurdity but even the *politically reactionary nature* of the "pedagogics" to which we are so often treated in the discussion of our duties to the workers. This fact proves that our very first and most pressing duty is to help to train working-class revolutionaries who will be on the same level *in regard to Party activity* as the revolutionaries from amongst the intellectuals (we emphasise the words "in regard to Party activity", for, although necessary, it is neither so easy nor so pressingly necessary to bring the workers up to the level of intellectuals in other respects). Attention, therefore must be devoted *principally* to *raising* the workers to the level of revolutionaries; it is not at all our task *to descend* to the level of the "working masses" as the Economists wish to do, or to the level of the "average worker", as *Svoboda* desires to do (and by this ascends to the second grade of Economist "pedagogics"). I am far from denying the necessity for popular literature for the workers, and especially popular (of course, not vulgar) literature for the especially backward workers. But what annoys me is this constant confusion of pedagogics with questions of politics and organisation. You, gentlemen, who are so much concerned about the "average worker", as a matter of fact, rather insult the workers by your desire *to talk down* to them when discussing working-class politics and working-class organisation. Talk about serious things in a serious manner; leave pedagogics to the pedagogues, and not to politicians and organisers! Are there not advanced people, "average people", and "masses" among the intelligentsia too? Does not everyone recognise that popular literature is also required for the intelligentsia, and is not such literature written? Imagine someone, in an article on organising college or high-school students, repeating over and over again, as if he had made a new discovery, that first of all we must have an organisation of "average students". The author of such an article would be ridiculed, and rightly so. Give us your ideas on organisation, if you have any, he would be told, and we ourselves will decide who is "average", who above average, and who below. But if you have no organisational ideas *of your own*, then all your exertions in behalf of the "masses" and "average people" will be simply boring. You must realise that these questions of "politics" and "organisation" are so serious in themselves that they cannot be dealt with in any other but a serious way. We can and must *educate* workers (and university and Gymnasium students) so that *we may be able to discuss* these questions with them. But once you do bring up these questions, you must give real replies to them; do not fall back on the "aver-

age", or on the "masses"; do not try to dispose of the matter with facetious remarks and mere phrases.\*

To be fully prepared for his task, the worker-revolutionary must likewise become a professional revolutionary. Hence B—v is wrong in saying that since the worker spends eleven and a half hours in the factory, the brunt of all other revolutionary functions (apart from agitation) "*must necessarily* fall mainly upon the shoulders of an extremely small force of intellectuals". But this condition does not obtain out of sheer "necessity". It obtains because we are backward, because we do not recognise our duty to assist every capable worker to become a *professional* agitator, organiser, propagandist, literature distributor, etc., etc. In this respect, we waste our strength in a positively shameful manner; we lack the ability to husband that which should be tended and reared with special care. Look at the Germans: their forces are a hundredfold greater than ours. But they understand perfectly well that really capable agitators, etc., are not often promoted from the ranks of the "average". For this reason they immediately try to place every capable working man in conditions that will enable him to develop and apply his abilities to the fullest: he is made a professional agitator; he is encouraged to widen the field of his activity, to spread it from one factory to the whole of the industry, from a single locality to the whole country. He acquires experience and dexterity in his profession; he broadens his outlook and increases his knowledge; he observes at close quarters the prominent political leaders from other localities and of other parties; he strives to rise to their level and combine in himself the knowledge of the working-class environment and the freshness of socialist convictions with professional skill, without which the proletariat *cannot* wage a stubborn struggle against its excellently trained enemies. In this way alone do the working masses produce men of the stamp of Bebel and Auer. But what is to a great extent automatic in a politically free country must in Russia be done deliberately and systematically by our organisations. A worker-agitator who is at all gifted and "promising" *must not be left* to work eleven hours a day in a factory. We must

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\* *Svoboda*, No. 1, p. 66, in the article "Organisation": "The heavy tread of the army of workers will reinforce all the demands that will be advanced in behalf of Russian Labour"—Labour with a capital L, of course. And the author exclaims: "I am not in the least hostile towards the intelligentsia, but [*but*—the word that Shchedrin translated as meaning: The ears never grow higher than the forehead!]*—but* I always get frightfully annoyed when a man comes to me uttering beautiful and charming words and demands that they be accepted for their [his?] beauty and other virtues" (p. 62). Yes, I "always get frightfully annoyed", too.



arrange that he be maintained by the Party; that he may go underground in good time; that he change the place of his activity, if he is to enlarge his experience, widen his outlook, and be able to hold out for at least a few years in the struggle against the gendarmes. As the spontaneous rise of their movement becomes broader and deeper, the working-class masses promote from their ranks not only an increasing number of talented agitators, but also talented organisers, propagandists, and "practical workers" in the best sense of the term (of whom there are so few among our intellectuals who, for the most part, in the Russian manner, are somewhat careless and sluggish in their habits). When we have forces of specially trained worker-revolutionaries who have gone through extensive preparation (and, of course, revolutionaries "of all arms of the service"), no political police in the world will then be able to contend with them, for these forces, boundlessly devoted to the revolution, will enjoy the boundless confidence of the widest masses of the workers. We are directly *to blame* for doing too little to "stimulate" the workers to take this path, common to them and to the "intellectuals", of professional revolutionary training, and for all too often dragging them back by our silly speeches about what is "accessible" to the masses of the workers, to the "average workers", etc.

In this, as in other respects, the narrow scope of our organisational work is without a doubt due directly to the fact (although the overwhelming majority of the "Economists" and the novices in practical work do not perceive it) that we restrict our theories and our political tasks to a narrow field. Subservience to spontaneity seems to inspire a fear of taking even one step away from what is "accessible" to the masses, a fear of rising too high above mere attendance on the immediate and direct requirements of the masses. Have no fear, gentlemen! Remember that we stand so low on the plane of organisation that the very idea that we *could* rise *too* high is absurd!

#### E. "CONSPIRATORIAL" ORGANISATION AND "DEMOCRATISM"

Yet there are many people among us who are so sensitive to the "voice of life" that they fear it more than anything in the world and charge the adherents of the views here expounded with following a Narodnaya Volya line, with failing to understand "democratism", etc. These accusations, which, of course, have been echoed by *Rabocheye Dyelo*, need to be dealt with.

The writer of these lines knows very well that the St. Petersburg Economists levelled the charge of Narodnaya Volya tendencies also against *Rabochaya Gazeta* (which is quite under-

standable when one compares it with *Rabochaya Mysl*). We were not in the least surprised, therefore, when, soon after the appearance of *Iskra*, a comrade informed us that the Social-Democrats in the town of X describe *Iskra* as a Narodnaya Volya organ. We, of course, were flattered by this accusation; for what decent Social-Democrat has not been accused by the Economists of being a Narodnaya Volya sympathiser?

These accusations are the result of a twofold misunderstanding. First, the history of the revolutionary movement is so little known among us that the name "Narodnaya Volya" is used to denote any idea of a militant centralised organisation which declares determined war upon tsarism. But the magnificent organisation that the revolutionaries had in the seventies, and that should serve us as a model, was not established by the Narodnaya Volya, but by the *Zemlya i Volya*, which split up into the Chorny Peredel and the Narodnaya Volya.<sup>177</sup> Consequently, to regard a militant revolutionary organisation as something specifically Narodnaya Volya in character is absurd both historically and logically; for *no* revolutionary trend, if it seriously thinks of struggle, can dispense with such an organisation. The mistake the Narodnaya Volya committed was not in striving to enlist *all* the discontented in the organisation and to direct this organisation to resolute struggle against the autocracy; on the contrary, that was its great historical merit. The mistake was in relying on a theory which in substance was not a revolutionary theory at all, and the Narodnaya Volya members either did not know how, or were unable, to link their movement inseparably with the class struggle in the developing capitalist society. Only a gross failure to understand Marxism (or an "understanding" of it in the spirit of "Struve-ism") could prompt the opinion that the rise of a mass, spontaneous working-class movement *relieves* us of the duty of creating as good an organisation of revolutionaries as the Zemlya i Volya had, or, indeed, an incomparably better one. On the contrary, this movement *imposes* the duty upon us; for the spontaneous struggle of the proletariat will not become its genuine "class struggle" until this struggle is led by a strong organisation of revolutionaries.

Secondly, many people, including apparently B. Krichevsky (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 18), misunderstand the polemics that Social-Democrats have always waged against the "conspiratorial" view of the political struggle. We have always protested, and will, of course, continue to protest against *confining* the political struggle to conspiracy.\* But this does not, of course,

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\* Cf. *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, p. 21, polemics against P. L. Lavrov. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 340-41.—Ed.)

mean that we deny the need for a strong revolutionary organisation. Thus, in the pamphlet mentioned in the preceding footnote, after the polemics against reducing the political struggle to a conspiracy, a description is given (as a Social-Democratic ideal) of an organisation so strong as to be able to "resort to... rebellion" and to every "other form of attack", in order to "deliver a smashing blow against absolutism".\* In *form* such a strong revolutionary organisation in an autocratic country may also be described as a "conspiratorial" organisation, because the French word "conspiracy" is the equivalent of the Russian word "zagovor" ("conspiracy"), and such an organisation must have the utmost secrecy. Secrecy is such a necessary condition for this kind of organisation that all the other conditions (number and selection of members, functions, etc.) must be made to conform to it. It would be extremely naive indeed, therefore, to fear the charge that we Social-Democrats desire to create a conspiratorial organisation. Such a charge should be as flattering to every opponent of Economism as the charge of following a Narodnaya Volya line.

The objection may be raised that such a powerful and strictly secret organisation, which concentrates in its hands all the threads of secret activities, an organisation which of necessity is centralised, may too easily rush into a premature attack, may thoughtlessly intensify the movement before the growth of political discontent, the intensity of the ferment and anger of the working class, etc., have made such an attack possible and necessary. Our reply to this is: Speaking abstractly, it cannot be denied, of course, that a militant organisation *may* thoughtlessly engage in battle, which *may* end in a defeat entirely avoidable under other conditions. But we cannot confine ourselves to abstract reasoning on such a question, because every battle bears within itself the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no way of *reducing* this possibility except by organised preparation for battle. If, however, we proceed from the concrete conditions at present obtaining in Russia, we must

\* *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*, p. 23. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 342.—Ed.) Apropos, we shall give another illustration of the fact that *Rabocheye Dyelo* either does not understand what it is talking about or changes its views "with the wind". In No. 1 of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, we find the following passage in italics: "*The substance set forth in the pamphlet accords entirely with the editorial programme of 'Rabocheye Dyelo'*" (p. 142). Really? Does the view that the overthrow of the autocracy must not be set as the first task of the mass movement accord with the views expressed in *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats*? Do the theory of "the economic struggle against the employers and the government" and the stages theory accord with the views expressed in that pamphlet? We leave it to the reader to judge whether a periodical that understands the meaning of "accordance in opinion" in this peculiar manner can have firm principles.

come to the positive conclusion that a strong revolutionary organisation is absolutely necessary precisely for the purpose of giving stability to the movement and of *safeguarding* it against the possibility of making thoughtless attacks. Precisely at the present time, when no such organisation yet exists, and when the revolutionary movement is rapidly and spontaneously growing, we *already observe* two opposite extremes (which, as is to be expected, "meet"). These are: the utterly unsound Economism and the preaching of moderation, and the equally unsound "excitative terror", which strives "artificially to call forth symptoms of the end of the movement, which is developing and strengthening itself, when this movement is as yet nearer to the start than to the end" (V. Zasulich, in *Zarya*, No. 2-3, p. 353). And the instance of *Rabocheye Dyelo* shows that *there exist* Social-Democrats who give way to both these extremes. This is not surprising, for, apart from other reasons, the "economic struggle against the employers and the government" can *never* satisfy revolutionaries, and opposite extremes will therefore always appear here and there. Only a centralised, militant organisation that consistently carries out a Social-Democratic policy, that satisfies, so to speak, all revolutionary instincts and strivings, can safeguard the movement against making thoughtless attacks and prepare attacks that hold out the promise of success.

A further objection may be raised, that the views on organisation here expounded contradict the "democratic principle". Now, while the earlier accusation was specifically Russian in origin, this one is *specifically foreign* in character. And only an organisation abroad (the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad) was capable of giving its Editorial Board instructions like the following:

*"Organisational Principle.* In order to secure the successful development and unification of Social-Democracy, the broad democratic principle of Party organisation must be emphasised, developed, and fought for; this is particularly necessary in view of the anti-democratic tendencies that have revealed themselves in the ranks of our Party" (*Two Conferences*, p. 18).

We shall see in the next chapter how *Rabocheye Dyelo* combats *Iskra's* "anti-democratic tendencies". For the present, we shall examine more closely the "principle" that the Economists advance. Everyone will probably agree that "the broad democratic principle" presupposes the two following conditions: first, full publicity, and secondly, election to all offices. It would be absurd to speak of democracy without publicity, moreover, without a publicity that is not limited to the membership of the organisation. We call the German Socialist Party a democratic organisation because all its activities are carried out publicly; even its party congresses are held in public. But no one would

call an organisation democratic that is hidden from every one but its members by a veil of secrecy. What is the use, then, of advancing "the *broad* democratic principle" when the fundamental condition for this principle *cannot be fulfilled* by a secret organisation? "The broad principle" proves itself simply to be a resounding but hollow phrase. Moreover, it reveals a total lack of understanding of the urgent tasks of the moment in regard to organisation. Everyone knows how great the lack of secrecy is among the "broad" masses of our revolutionaries. We have heard the bitter complaints of B—v on this score and his absolutely just demand for a "strict selection of members" (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 6, p. 42). Yet, persons who boast a keen "sense of realities" *urge*, in a situation like this, not the strictest secrecy and the strictest (consequently, more restricted) selection of members, but "the *broad* democratic principle"! This is what you call being wide of the mark.

Nor is the situation any better with regard to the second attribute of democracy, the principle of election: In politically free countries, this condition is taken for granted. "They are members of the Party who accept the principles of the Party programme and render the Party all possible support," reads Clause 1 of the Rules of the German Social-Democratic Party. Since the entire political arena is as open to the public view as is a theatre stage to the audience, this acceptance or non-acceptance, support or opposition, is known to all from the press and from public meetings. Everyone knows that a certain political figure began in such and such a way, passed through such and such an evolution, behaved in a trying moment in such and such a manner, and possesses such and such qualities; consequently, *all* party members, knowing all the facts, can elect or refuse to elect this person to a particular party office. The general control (in the literal sense of the term) exercised over every act of a party man in the political field brings into existence an automatically operating mechanism which produces what in biology is called the "survival of the fittest". "Natural selection" by full publicity, election, and general control provides the assurance that, in the last analysis, every political figure will be "in his proper place", do the work for which he is best fitted by his powers and abilities, feel the effects of his mistakes on himself, and prove before all the world his ability to recognise mistakes and to avoid them.

Try to fit this picture into the frame of our autocracy! Is it conceivable in Russia for all "who accept the principles of the Party programme and render the Party all possible support" to control every action of the revolutionary working in secret? Is it possible for all to elect one of these revolutionaries

to any particular office, when, in the very interests of the work, the revolutionary *must* conceal his identity from nine out of ten of these "all"? Reflect somewhat over the real meaning of the high-sounding phrases to which *Rabocheye Dyelo* gives utterance, and you will realise that "broad democracy" in Party organisation, amidst the gloom of the autocracy and the domination of gendarmerie, is nothing more than a *useless and harmful toy*. It is a useless toy because, in point of fact, no revolutionary organisation has ever practised, or could practise, *broad* democracy, however much it may have desired to do so. It is a harmful toy because any attempt to practise "the broad democratic principle" will simply facilitate the work of the police in carrying out large-scale raids, will perpetuate the prevailing primitiveness, and will divert the thoughts of the practical workers from the serious and pressing task of training themselves to become professional revolutionaries to that of drawing up detailed "paper" rules for election systems. Only abroad, where very often people with no opportunity for conducting really active work gather, could this "playing at democracy" develop here and there, especially in small groups.

To show the unseemliness of *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s favourite trick of advancing the plausible "principle" of democracy in revolutionary affairs, we shall again summon a witness. This witness, Y. Serebryakov, editor of the London magazine, *Nakanune*, has a soft spot for *Rabocheye Dyelo* and is filled with a great hatred for Plekhanov and the "Plekhanovites". In its articles on the split in the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, *Nakanune* definitely sided with *Rabocheye Dyelo* and poured a stream of petty abuse upon Plekhanov. All the more valuable, therefore, is this witness in the question at issue. In *Nakanune* for July (No. 7) 1899, in an article entitled "Concerning the Manifesto of the Self-Emancipation of the Workers Group", Serebryakov argued that it was "indecent" to talk about such things as "self-deception, leadership, and the so-called Areopagus in a serious revolutionary movement" and, *inter alia*, wrote:

"Myshkin, Rogachov, Zhelyabov, Mikhailov, Perovskaya, Figner, and others never regarded themselves as leaders, and no one ever elected or appointed them as such, although in actuality, they were leaders, because, in the propaganda period, as well as in the period of the struggle against the government, they took the brunt of the work upon themselves, they went into the most dangerous places, and their activities were the most fruitful. They became leaders, not because they wished it, but because the comrades surrounding them had confidence in their wisdom, in their energy, in their loyalty. To be afraid of some kind of Areopagus (if it is not feared, why write about it?) that would arbitrarily govern the movement is far too naive. Who would pay heed to it?"

We ask the reader, in what way does the "Areopagus" differ from "anti-democratic tendencies"? And is it not evident that

*Rabocheye Dyelo's* "plausible" organisational principle is equally naïve and indecent; naïve, because no one would pay heed to the "Areopagus", or people with "anti-democratic tendencies", if "the comrades surrounding them had" no "confidence in their wisdom, energy, and loyalty"; indecent, because it is a demagogic sally calculated to play on the conceit of some, on the ignorance of others regarding the actual state of our movement, and on the lack of training and the ignorance of the history of the revolutionary movement on the part of still others. The only serious organisational principle for the active workers of our movement should be the strictest secrecy, the strictest selection of members, and the training of professional revolutionaries. Given these qualities, something even more than "democratism" would be guaranteed to us, namely, complete, comradely, mutual confidence among revolutionaries. This is absolutely essential for us, because there can be no question of replacing it by general democratic control in Russia. It would be a great mistake to believe that the impossibility of establishing real "democratic" control renders the members of the revolutionary organisation beyond control altogether. They have not the time to think about toy forms of democratism (democratism within a close and compact body of comrades in which complete, mutual confidence prevails), but they have a lively sense of their *responsibility*, knowing as they do from experience that an organisation of real revolutionaries will stop at nothing to rid itself of an unworthy member. Moreover, there is a fairly well-developed public opinion in Russian (and international) revolutionary circles which has a long history behind it, and which sternly and ruthlessly punishes every departure from the duties of comradeship (and "democratism", real and not toy democratism, certainly forms a component part of the conception of comradeship). Take all this into consideration and you will realise that this talk and these resolutions about "anti-democratic tendencies" have the musty odour of the playing at generals which is indulged in abroad.

It must be observed also that the other source of this talk, viz., naïveté, is likewise fostered by the confusion of ideas concerning the meaning of democracy. In Mr. and Mrs. Webb's book on the English trade unions there is an interesting chapter entitled "Primitive Democracy". In it the authors relate how the English workers, in the first period of existence of their unions, considered it an indispensable sign of democracy for all the members to do all the work of managing the unions; not only were all questions decided by the vote of all the members, but all official duties were fulfilled by all the members in turn. A long period of historical experience was required for workers

to realise the absurdity of such a conception of democracy and to make them understand the necessity for representative institutions, on the one hand, and for full-time officials, on the other. Only after a number of cases of financial bankruptcy of trade union treasuries had occurred did the workers realise that the rates of contributions and benefits cannot be decided merely by a democratic vote, but that this requires also the advice of insurance experts. Let us take also Kautsky's book on parliamentarism and legislation by the people. There we find that the conclusions drawn by the Marxist theoretician coincide with the lessons learned from many years of practical experience by the workers who organised "spontaneously". Kautsky strongly protests against Rittinghausen's primitive conception of democracy; he ridicules those who in the name of democracy demand that "popular newspapers shall be edited directly by the people"; he shows the need for *professional* journalists, parliamentarians, etc., for the Social-Democratic leadership of the proletarian class struggle; he attacks the "socialism of anarchists and *littérateurs*", who in their "striving for effect" extol direct legislation by the whole people, completely failing to understand that this idea can be applied only relatively in modern society.

Those who have performed practical work in our movement know how widespread the "primitive" conception of democracy is among the masses of the students and workers. It is not surprising that this conception penetrates also into rules of organisations and into literature. The Economists of the Bernsteinian persuasion included in their rules the following: "§ 10. All affairs affecting the interests of the whole of the union organisation shall be decided by a majority vote of all its members." The Economists of the terrorist persuasion repeat after them: "The decisions of the committee shall become effective only after they have been referred to all the circles" (*Svoboda*, No. 1, p. 67). Observe that this proposal for a widely applied referendum is advanced *in addition* to the demand that *the whole* of the organisation be built on an elective basis! We would not, of course, on this account condemn practical workers who have had too few opportunities for studying the theory and practice of real democratic organisations. But when *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which lays claim to leadership, confines itself, under such conditions, to a resolution on broad democratic principles, can this be described as anything but a mere "striving for effect"?

#### F. LOCAL AND ALL-RUSSIA WORK

The objections raised against the plan of organisation here outlined on the grounds that it is undemocratic and conspiratorial are totally unsound. Nevertheless, there remains a ques-



tion which is frequently put and which deserves detailed examination. This is the question of the relations between local work and all-Russia work. Fears are expressed that the formation of a centralised organisation may shift the centre of gravity from the former to the latter, damage the movement through weakening our contacts with the working masses and the continuity of local agitation generally. To these fears we reply that our movement in the past few years has suffered precisely from the fact that local workers have been too absorbed in local work; that therefore it is absolutely necessary to shift the centre of gravity somewhat to national work; and that, far from weakening, this would strengthen our ties and the continuity of our local agitation. Let us take the question of central and local newspapers. I would ask the reader not to forget that we cite the publication of newspapers only as *an example* illustrating an immeasurably broader and more varied revolutionary activity in general.

In the first period of the mass movement (1896-98), an attempt was made by local revolutionary workers to publish an all-Russia paper—*Rabochaya Gazeta*. In the next period (1898-1900), the movement made an enormous stride forward, but the attention of the leaders was wholly absorbed by local publications. If we compute the total number of the local papers that were published, we shall find that on the average one issue per month was published.\* Does this not clearly illustrate our amateurism? Does this not clearly show that our revolutionary organisation lags behind the spontaneous growth of the movement? If *the same number* of issues had been published not by scattered local groups, but by a single organisation, we would not only have saved an enormous amount of effort, but we would have secured immeasurably greater stability and continuity in our work. This simple point is frequently lost sight of by those practical workers who work *actively* and almost exclusively on local publications (unfortunately this is true even now in the overwhelming majority of cases), as well as by the publicists who display an astonishing quixotism on this question. The practical workers usually rest content with the argument that "it is difficult"† for local workers to engage in the organisation of an all-Russia newspaper, and that local newspapers are better

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\* See *Report to the Paris Congress*,<sup>178</sup> p. 14. "From that time (1897) to the spring of 1900, thirty issues of various papers were published in various places. . . . On an average, over one issue per month was published."

† This difficulty is more apparent than real. In fact, *there is not* a single local study circle that lacks the opportunity of taking up some function or other in connection with all-Russia work. "Don't say, I can't, say, I won't."

than no newspapers at all. This argument is, of course, perfectly just, and we, no less than any practical worker, appreciate the enormous importance and usefulness of local newspapers *in general*. But not this is the point. The point is, can we not overcome the fragmentation and primitiveness that are so glaringly expressed in the thirty issues of local newspapers that have been published throughout Russia in the course of two and a half years? Do not restrict yourselves to the indisputable, but too general, statement about the usefulness of local newspapers generally; have the courage frankly to admit their negative aspects revealed by the experience of two and a half years. This experience has shown that under the conditions in which we work, these local newspapers prove, in the majority of cases, to be unstable in their principles, devoid of political significance, extremely costly in regard to expenditure of revolutionary forces, and totally unsatisfactory from a technical point of view (I have in mind, of course, not the technique of printing, but the frequency and regularity of publication). These defects are not accidental; they are the inevitable outcome of the fragmentation which, on the one hand, explains the predominance of local newspapers in the period under review, and, on the other, is *fostered by this predominance*. It is positively *beyond the strength* of a separate local organisation to raise its newspaper to the level of a political organ maintaining stability of principles: it is *beyond its strength* to collect and utilise sufficient material to shed light on the whole of our political life. The argument usually advanced to support the need for numerous local newspapers in free countries that the cost of printing by local workers is low and that the people can be kept more fully and quickly informed—this *argument*, as experience has shown, speaks *against* local newspapers in Russia. They turn out to be excessively costly in regard to the expenditure of revolutionary forces, and appear *very* rarely, for the simple reason that the publication of an *illegal* newspaper, however small its size, requires an extensive secret apparatus, such as is possible with large-scale factory production; for this apparatus cannot be created in a small, handicraft workshop. Very frequently, the primitiveness of the secret apparatus (every practical worker can cite numerous cases) enables the police to take advantage of the publication and distribution of one or two issues to make *mass* arrests, which result in such a clean sweep that it becomes necessary to start all over again. A well-organised secret apparatus requires professionally well-trained revolutionaries and a division of labour applied with the greatest consistency, but both these requirements are beyond the strength of a separate local organisation, however strong it may be at any given moment. Not only the general interests of our movement

as a whole (training of the workers in consistent socialist and political principles) but also specifically local interests are *better served by non-local newspapers*. This may seem paradoxical at first sight, but it has been proved to the hilt by the two and a half years of experience referred to. Everyone will agree that had all the local forces that were engaged in the publication of the thirty issues of newspapers worked on a single newspaper, sixty, if not a hundred, issues could easily have been published, with a fuller expression, in consequence, of all the specifically local features of the movement. True, it is no easy matter to attain such a degree of organisation, but we must realise the need for it. Every local study circle must think about it and *work actively* to achieve it, without waiting for an impetus from outside, without being tempted by the popularity and closer proximity of a local newspaper which, as our revolutionary experience has shown, proves to a large extent to be illusory.

And it is a bad service indeed those publicists render to the practical work who, thinking themselves particularly close to the practical workers, fail to see this illusoriness, and make shift with the astoundingly hollow and cheap argument that we must have local newspapers, we must have district newspapers, and we must have all-Russia newspapers. Generally speaking, of course, all these are necessary, but once the solution of a concrete organisational problem is undertaken, surely time and circumstances must be taken into consideration. Is it not quixotic for *Svoboda* (No. 1, p. 68) to write in a special article "dealing with *the question of a newspaper*": "It seems to us that every locality, with any appreciable number of workers, should have its own workers' newspaper: not a newspaper imported from somewhere, but its very own." If the publicist who wrote these words refuses to think of their meaning, then at least the reader may do it for him. How many scores, if not hundreds, of "localities with any appreciable number of workers" there are in Russia, and what a perpetuation of our amateurish methods this would mean if indeed every local organisation set about publishing its own newspaper! How this diffusion would facilitate the gendarmerie's task of netting—and without "any appreciable" effort—the local revolutionary workers at the very outset of their activity and of preventing them from developing into real revolutionaries. A reader of an all-Russia newspaper, continues the author, would find little interest in the descriptions of the malpractices of the factory owners and the "details of factory life in various towns not his own". But "an inhabitant of Orel would not find Orel affairs dull reading. In every issue he would learn who had been 'picked for a lambasting' and who

had been 'flayed', and he would be in high spirits" (p. 69). Certainly, the Orel reader is in high spirits, but our publicist's flights of imagination are also high—too high. He should have asked himself whether such concern with trivialities is tactically in order. We are second to none in appreciating the importance and necessity of factory exposures, but it must be borne in mind that we have reached a stage when St. Petersburg folk find it dull reading the St. Petersburg correspondence of the St. Petersburg *Rabochaya Mysl*. Leaflets are the medium through which local factory exposures have always been *and must continue* to be made, but we must raise the level of the *newspaper*, not lower it to the level of a factory leaflet. What we ask of a newspaper is not so much "petty" exposures, as exposures of the major, typical evils of factory life, exposures based on especially striking facts and capable, therefore, of arousing the interest of *all* workers and all leaders of the movement, of really enriching their knowledge, broadening their outlook, and serving as a starting-point for awakening new districts and workers from ever-newer trade areas.

"Moreover, in a local newspaper, all the malpractices of the factory administration and other authorities may be denounced then and there. In the case of a general, distant newspaper, however, by the time the news reaches it the facts will have been forgotten in the source localities. The reader, on getting the paper, will exclaim: 'When was that—who remembers it?'" (ibid.). Precisely—who remembers it! From the same source we learn that the 30 issues of newspapers which appeared in the course of two and a half years were published in six cities. This averages *one issue per city per half-year*! And even if our frivolous publicist *trebled* his estimate of the productivity of local work (which would be wrong in the case of an average town, since it is impossible to increase productivity to any considerable extent by our rule-of-thumb methods), we would still get only one issue every two months, i.e., nothing at all like "denouncing then and there". It would suffice, however, for ten local organisations to combine and send their delegates to take an active part in organising a general newspaper, to enable us every fortnight to "denounce", *over the whole of Russia*, not petty, but really outstanding and typical evils. No one who knows the state of affairs in our organisations can have the slightest doubt on that score. As for catching the enemy red-handed—if we mean it seriously and not merely as a pretty phrase—that is quite beyond the ability of an illegal paper generally. It can be done only by a leaflet, because the time limit for exposures of that nature can be a day or two at the most (e.g., the usual brief strikes, violent factory clashes, demonstrations, etc.).

"The workers live not only at the factory, but also in the city," continues our author, rising from the particular to the general, with a strict consistency that would have done honour to Boris Krichevsky himself; and he refers to matters like municipal councils, municipal hospitals, municipal schools, and demands that workers' newspapers should not ignore municipal affairs in general.

This demand—excellent in itself—serves as a particularly vivid illustration of the empty abstraction to which discussions of local newspapers are all too frequently limited. In the first place, if indeed newspapers appeared "in every locality with any appreciable number of workers" with such detailed information on municipal affairs as *Svoboda* desires, this would, under our Russian conditions, inevitably degenerate into actual concern with trivialities, lead to a weakening of the consciousness of the importance of an all-Russia revolutionary assault upon the tsarist autocracy, and strengthen the extremely virile shoots—not uprooted but rather hidden, or temporarily suppressed—of the tendency that has become noted as a result of the famous remark about revolutionaries who talk a great deal about non-existent parliaments and too little about existent municipal councils.<sup>179</sup> We say "inevitably", in order to emphasise that *Svoboda* obviously does not desire this, but the contrary, to come about. But good intentions are not enough. For municipal affairs to be dealt with in their proper perspective, in relation to our entire work, this perspective must *first* be clearly conceived, firmly established, not only by argument, but by numerous examples, so that it may acquire the stability of a *tradition*. This is still far from being the case with us. Yet this must be done *first*, before we can allow ourselves to think and talk about an extensive local press.

Secondly, to write really well and interestingly about municipal affairs, one must have first-hand knowledge, not book knowledge, of the issues. But there are hardly any Social-Democrats *anywhere in Russia* who possess such knowledge. To be able to write in newspapers (not in popular pamphlets) about municipal and state affairs, one must have fresh and varied material gathered and written up by able people. And in order to be able to gather and write up such material, we must have something more than the "primitive democracy" of a primitive circle, in which everybody does everything and all entertain themselves by playing at referendums. It is necessary to have a staff of expert writers and correspondents, an army of Social-Democratic reporters who establish contacts far and wide, who are able to fathom all sorts of "state secrets" (the knowledge of which makes the Russian government official so puffed up,

but the blabbing of which is such an easy matter to him), who are able to penetrate "behind the scenes"—an army of people who must, as their "official duty", be ubiquitous and omniscient. And we, the Party that fights against *all* economic, political, social, and national oppression, can and must find, gather, train, mobilise, and set into motion such an army of omniscient people—all of which requires still to be done. Not only has not a single step in this direction been taken in the overwhelming majority of localities, but even the *recognition* of its necessity is very often lacking. One will search in vain in our Social-Democratic press for lively and interesting articles, correspondence, and exposures dealing with our big and little affairs—diplomatic, military, ecclesiastical, municipal, financial, etc., etc. There is *almost nothing*, or very little, about these matters.\* That is why "it always annoys me frightfully when a man comes to me, utters beautiful and charming words" about the need for newspapers in "every locality with any appreciable number of workers" that will expose factory, municipal, and government evils.

The predominance of the local papers over a central press may be a sign of either poverty or luxury. Of poverty, when the movement has not yet developed the forces for large-scale production, continues to flounder in amateurism, and is all but swamped with "the petty details of factory life". Of luxury, when the movement *has fully mastered* the task of comprehensive exposure and comprehensive agitation, and it becomes necessary to publish numerous local newspapers in addition to the central organ. Let each decide for himself what the predominance of local newspapers implies in present-day Russia. I shall limit myself to a precise formulation of my own conclusion, to leave no grounds for misunderstanding. Hitherto, the majority of our local organisations have thought almost exclusively in terms of local newspapers, and have devoted almost all their activities to this work. This is abnormal; the very opposite should have been the case. The majority of the local organisations should think principally of the publication of an all-Russia newspaper and de-

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\* That is why even examples of exceptionally good local newspapers fully confirm our point of view. For example, *Yuzhny Rabochy*<sup>180</sup> is an excellent newspaper, entirely free of instability of principle. But it has been unable to provide what it desired for the local movement, owing to the infrequency of its publication and to extensive police raids. Principled presentation of the fundamental questions of the movement and wide political agitation, which our Party most urgently requires at the present time, has proved too big a job for the local newspaper. The material of particular value it has published, like the articles on the mine owners' convention and on unemployment, was not strictly local material, *it was required for the whole of Russia*, not for the South alone. No such articles have appeared in any of our Social-Democratic newspapers.

vote their activities chiefly to it. Until this is done, we shall *not* be able to establish a *single* newspaper capable, to any degree, of serving the movement with *comprehensive* press agitation. When this is done, however, normal relations between the necessary central newspaper and the necessary local newspapers will be established automatically.

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It would seem at first glance that the conclusion on the necessity for shifting the centre of gravity from local to all-Russia work does not apply to the sphere of the specifically economic struggle. In this struggle, the immediate enemies of the workers are the individual employers or groups of employers, who are not bound by any organisation having even the remotest resemblance to the purely military, strictly centralised organisation of the Russian Government—our immediate enemy in the political struggle—which is led in all its minutest details by a single will.

But that is not the case. As we have repeatedly pointed out, the economic struggle is a trade struggle, and for that reason it requires that the workers be organised according to trades, not only according to place of employment. Organisation by trades becomes all the more urgently necessary, the more rapidly our employers organise in all sorts of companies and syndicates. Our fragmentation and our amateurism are an outright hindrance to this work of organisation which requires the existence of a single, all-Russia body of revolutionaries capable of giving leadership to the all-Russia trade unions. We have described above the type of organisation that is needed for this purpose; we shall now add but a few words on the question of our press in this connection.

Hardly anyone will doubt the necessity for every Social-Democratic newspaper to have a *special department* devoted to the trade union (economic) struggle. But the growth of the trade union movement compels us to think about the creation of a trade union press. It seems to us, however, that with rare exceptions, there can be no question of trade union newspapers in Russia at the present time; they would be a luxury, and many a time we lack even our daily bread. The form of trade union press that would suit the conditions of our illegal work and is already required at the present time is *trade union pamphlets*. In these pamphlets, *legal\** and illegal material should be gathered and

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\* Legal material is particularly important in this connection, and we are particularly behind in our ability to gather and utilise it systematically. It

grouped systematically, on the working conditions in a given trade, on the differences in this respect in the various parts of Russia; on the main demands advanced by the workers in the given trade; on the inadequacies of legislation affecting that trade; on outstanding instances of economic struggle by the workers in the trade; on the beginnings, the present state, and the requirements of their trade union organisation, etc. Such pamphlets would, in the first place, relieve our Social-Democratic press of a mass of trade details that are of interest only to workers in the given trade. Secondly, they would record the results of our experience in the trade union struggle, they would preserve the gathered material, which now literally gets lost in a mass of leaflets and fragmentary correspondence; and they would summarise this material. Thirdly, they could serve as guides for agitators, because working conditions change relatively slowly and the main demands of the workers in a given trade are extremely stable (cf., for example, the demands advanced by the weavers in the Moscow district in 1885<sup>182</sup> and in the St. Petersburg district in 1896<sup>183</sup>). A compilation of such demands and needs might serve for years as an excellent handbook for agitators on economic questions in backward localities or among the backward strata of the workers. Examples of successful strikes in a given region, information on higher living standards, on improved working conditions, in one locality, would encourage the workers in other localities to take up the fight again and again. Fourthly, having made a start in generalising the trade union struggle and in this way strengthening the link between

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would not be an exaggeration to say that one could somehow compile a trade union pamphlet on the basis solely of legal material, but it could not be done on the basis of illegal material alone. In gathering illegal material from workers on questions like those dealt with in the publications of *Rabochaya Mysl*,<sup>184</sup> we waste a great deal of the efforts of revolutionaries (whose place in this work could very easily be taken by legal workers), and yet we never obtain good material. The reason is that a worker who very often knows only a single department of a large factory and almost always the economic results, but not the general conditions and standards of his work, cannot acquire the knowledge which is possessed by the office staff of a factory, by inspectors, doctors, etc., and which is scattered in petty newspaper reports and in special industrial, medical, Zemstvo, and other publications.

I vividly recall my "first experiment", which I would never like to repeat. I spent many weeks "examining" a worker, who would often visit me, regarding every aspect of the conditions prevailing in the enormous factory at which he was employed. True, after great effort, I managed to obtain material for a description (of the one single factory!), but at the end of the interview the worker would wipe the sweat from his brow, and say to me smilingly: "I find it easier to work overtime than to answer your questions."

The more energetically we carry on our revolutionary struggle, the more the government will be compelled to legalise part of the "trade union" work, thereby relieving us of part of our burden.



the Russian trade union movement and socialism, the Social-Democrats would at the same time see to it that our trade union work occupied neither too small nor too large a place in our Social-Democratic work as a whole. A local organisation that is cut off from organisations in other towns finds it very difficult, sometimes almost impossible, to maintain a correct sense of proportion (the example of *Rabochaya Mysl* shows what a monstrous exaggeration can be made in the direction of trade-unionism). But an all-Russia organisation of revolutionaries that stands undeviatingly on the basis of Marxism, that leads the entire political struggle and possesses a staff of professional agitators, will never find it difficult to determine the proper proportion.

## V THE "PLAN" FOR AN ALL-RUSSIA POLITICAL NEWSPAPER

"The most serious blunder *Iskra* committed in this connection," writes B. Krichевsky (*Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10, p. 30), charging us with a tendency to "convert theory into a lifeless doctrine by isolating it from practice", "was its 'plan' for a general party organisation" (viz., the article entitled "Where To Begin"\*)). Martynov echoes this idea in declaring that "*Iskra*'s tendency to belittle the significance of the forward march of the drab everyday struggle in comparison with the propaganda of brilliant and completed ideas . . . was crowned with the plan for the organisation of a party which it sets forth in the article entitled 'Where To Begin' in issue No. 4" (ibid., p. 61). Finally, L. Nadezhdin has of late joined in the chorus of indignation against this "plan" (the quotation marks were meant to express sarcasm). In his pamphlet, which we have just received, entitled *The Eve of the Revolution* (published by the "Revolutionary-Socialist Group" *Svoboda*, whose acquaintance we have made), he declares (p. 126): "To speak now of an organisation held together by an all-Russia newspaper means propagating armchair ideas and armchair work" and represents a manifestation of "bookishness", etc.

That our terrorist turns out to be in agreement with the champions of the "forward march of the drab everyday struggle" is not surprising, since we have traced the roots of this intimacy between them in the chapters on politics and organisation. But we must draw attention here to the fact that Nadezhdin is the only one who has conscientiously tried to grasp the train of

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 18-24 —Ed

thought in an article he disliked and has made an attempt to reply to the point, whereas *Rabocheye Dyelo* has said nothing that is material to the subject, but has tried merely to confuse the question by a series of unseemly, demagogic sallies. Unpleasant though the task may be, we must first spend some time in cleansing this Augean stable.

#### A. WHO WAS OFFENDED BY THE ARTICLE "WHERE TO BEGIN"\*

Let us present a small selection of the expletives and exclamations that *Rabocheye Dyelo* hurled at us. "It is not a newspaper that can create a party organisation, but vice versa..." "A newspaper, standing *above* the party, *outside of its control*, and independent of it, thanks to its having its own staff of agents..." "By what miracle has *Iskra* forgotten about the actually existing Social-Democratic organisations of the party to which it belongs?..." "Those who possess firm principles and a corresponding plan are the supreme regulators of the real struggle of the party and dictate to it their plan..." "The plan drives our active and virile organisations into the kingdom of shadows and desires to call into being a fantastic network of agents..." "Were *Iskra's* plan carried into effect, every trace of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which is taking shape, would be obliterated..." "A propagandist organ becomes an uncontrolled autocratic law-maker for the entire practical revolutionary struggle..." "How should our Party react to the suggestion that it be *completely* subordinated to an autonomous editorial board?", etc., etc.

As the reader can see from the contents and the tone of these above quotations, *Rabocheye Dyelo* has taken offence. Offence, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the organisations and committees of our Party which it alleges *Iskra* desires to drive into the kingdom of shadows and whose very traces it would obliterate. How terrible! But a curious thing should be noted. The article "Where To Begin" appeared in May 1901. The articles in *Rabocheye Dyelo* appeared in September 1901. Now we are in mid-January 1902. During these five months (prior to and after September), *not a single* committee and *not a single* organisation

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\* In the collection *Twelve Years*, Lenin omitted section A of Chapter V and gave the following note. "Section A. 'Who Was Offended by the Article 'Where to Begin'' has been omitted from the present edition because it contains exclusively a polemic with *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the Bund on the question of attempts by *Iskra* to 'command', etc. Among other things, this section said that the Bund itself invited (in 1898-99) members of *Iskra* to revive the *Central Organ* of the Party and organise a 'literary laboratory'."—Ed.

of the Party protested formally against this monster that seeks to drive them into the kingdom of shadows; and yet scores and hundreds of communications from all parts of Russia have appeared during this period in *Iskra*, as well as in numerous local and non-local publications. How could it happen that those who would be driven into the realm of shadows are not aware of it and have not taken offence, though a third party has?

The explanation is that the committees and other organisations are engaged in real work and are not playing at "democracy". The committees read the article "Where To Begin", saw that it represented an attempt "to elaborate a definite plan for an organisation, so that its formation may be undertaken from all aspects"; and since they knew and saw very well that *not one* of these "sides" would dream of "setting about to build it" until it was convinced of its necessity, and of the correctness of the architectural plan, it has naturally never occurred to them to take offence at the boldness of the people who said in *Iskra*: "In view of the pressing importance of the question, we, on our part, take the liberty of submitting to the comrades a skeleton plan to be developed in greater detail in a pamphlet now in preparation for the print."\* With a conscientious approach to the work, was it possible to view things otherwise than that if the comrades *accepted* the plan submitted to them, they would carry it out, not because they are "subordinate", but because they would be convinced of its necessity for our common cause, and that if they *did not accept it*, then the "skeleton" (a pretentious word, is it not?) would remain merely a skeleton? Is it not demagoguery to fight against the skeleton of a plan, not only by "picking it to pieces" and advising comrades to reject it, but by *inciting* people inexperienced in revolutionary matters against its authors *merely on the grounds* that they *dare* to "legislate" and come out as the "supreme regulators", i.e., because they *dare to propose* an outline of a plan? Can our Party develop and make progress if an attempt *to raise* local functionaries to broader views, tasks, plans, etc., is objected to, not only with the claim that these views are erroneous, but on the grounds that the very "desire" *to "raise"* us gives "offence"? Nadezhdin, too, "picked" our plan "to pieces", but he did not sink to such demagoguery as cannot be explained solely by naïveté or by primitiveness of political views. From the outset, he emphatically rejected the charge that we intended to establish an "inspectorship over the Party". That is why Nadezhdin's criticism of the plan can and should be answered on its merits, while *Rabocheye Dyelo* deserves only to be treated with contempt.

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 20.—Ed

But contempt for a writer who sinks so low as to shout about "autocracy" and "subordination" does not relieve us of the duty of disentangling the confusion that such people create in the minds of their readers. Here we can clearly demonstrate to the world the nature of catchwords like "broad democracy". We are accused of forgetting the committees, of desiring or attempting to drive them into the kingdom of shadows, etc. How can we reply to these charges when, out of considerations of secrecy, we *can give* the reader *almost no facts* regarding our real relationships with the committees? Persons hurling vehement accusations calculated to provoke the crowd prove to be ahead of us because of their brazenness and their disregard of the duty of a revolutionary to conceal carefully from the eyes of the world the relationships and contacts which he maintains, which he is establishing or trying to establish. Naturally, we refuse once and for all to compete with such people in the field of "democratism". As to the reader who is not initiated in all Party affairs, the only way in which we can discharge our duty to him is to acquaint him, not with what is and what is *im Werden* but with *a particle* of what has taken place and what may be told as a thing of the past.

The Bund hints that we are "impostors"; the Union Abroad accuses us of attempting to obliterate all traces of the Party. Gentlemen, you will get complete satisfaction when we relate to the public *four facts* concerning the past.

First fact.\* The members of one of the Leagues of Struggle, who took a direct part in founding our Party and in sending a delegate to the Inaugural Party Congress, reached agreement with a member of the *Iskra* group regarding the publication of a series of books for workers that were to serve the entire movement. The attempt to publish the series failed, and the pamphlets written for it, *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* and *The New Factory Law*,\*\* by a circuitous course and through the medium of third parties, found their way abroad, where they were published.

Second fact. Members of the Central Committee of the Bund approached a member of the *Iskra* group with the proposal to organise what the Bund then described as a "literary laboratory". In making the proposal, they stated that unless this was done, the movement would greatly retrogress. The result of these

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\* *Iskra*, No. 8. The reply of the Central Committee of the General Jewish Union of Russia and Poland to our article on the national question.

\*\* We deliberately refrain from relating these facts in the sequence of their occurrence.<sup>184</sup>

\*\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51 and 267-315--*Ed.*

negotiations was the appearance of the pamphlet *The Working-Class Cause in Russia*.\*

Third fact. The Central Committee of the Bund, via a provincial town, approached a member of the *Iskra* group with the proposal that he undertake the editing of the revived *Rabochaya Gazeta* and, of course, obtained his consent. The offer was later modified: the comrade in question was invited to act as a contributor, in view of a new plan for the composition of the Editorial Board. Also this proposal, of course, obtained his consent. Articles were sent (which we managed to preserve): "Our Programme", which was a direct protest against Bernsteinism, against the change in the line of the legal literature and of *Rabochaya Mysl*; "Our Immediate Task" ("to publish a Party organ that shall appear regularly and have close contacts with all the local groups"; the drawbacks of the prevailing "amateurism"); "An Urgent Question" (an examination of the objection that it is necessary *first* to develop the activities of local groups before undertaking the publication of a common organ; an insistence on the paramount importance of a "revolutionary organisation" and on the necessity of "developing organisation, discipline, and the technique of secrecy to the highest degree of perfection").\*\* The proposal to resume publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta* was not carried out, and the articles were not published.

Fourth fact. A member of the committee that was organising the second regular congress of our Party communicated to a member of the *Iskra* group the programme of the congress and proposed that group as editorial board of the revived *Rabochaya Gazeta*. This preliminary step, as it were, was later sanctioned by the committee to which this member belonged, and by the Central Committee of the Bund. The *Iskra* group was notified of the place and time of the congress and (uncertain of being able, for certain reasons, to send a delegate) drew up a written report for the congress. In the report, the idea was suggested that the mere election of a Central Committee would not only fail to solve the question of unification at a time of such complete disorder as the present, but would even compromise the grand idea of establishing a party, in the event of an early, swift, and thorough police round-up, which was more than likely in view of the prevailing lack of secrecy; that therefore, a beginning should be made by inviting all committees

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\* The author requests me to state that, like his previous pamphlets, this one was sent to the Union Abroad on the assumption that its publications were edited by the Emancipation of Labour group (owing to certain circumstances, he could not then—February 1899—know of the change in editorship). The pamphlet will be republished by the League<sup>1895</sup> at an early date.

\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 210-14, 215-20, 221-26.—Ed.

and all other organisations to support the revived common organ, which would establish *real* contacts between all the committees and *really* train a group of leaders for the entire movement; and that the committees and the Party would very easily be able to transform such a group into a Central Committee as soon as the group had grown and become strong. In consequence of a number of police raids and arrests, however, the congress could not take place. For security reasons the report was destroyed, having been read only by a few comrades, including the representatives of one committee.

Let the reader now judge for himself the character of the methods employed by the Bund in hinting that we were impostors, or by *Rabocheye Dyclo*, which accuses us of trying to relegate the committees to the kingdom of shadows and to "substitute" for the organisation of a party an organisation disseminating the ideas advocated by a single newspaper. It was to the committees, *on their repeated invitation*, that we reported on the necessity for adopting a definite plan of concerted activities. It was precisely for the Party organisation that we elaborated this plan, in articles sent to *Rabochaya Gazeta*, and in the report to the Party congress, again on the invitation of those who held such an influential position in the Party that they took the initiative in its (actual) restoration. Only after the *twice* repeated attempts of the Party organisation, *in conjunction with ourselves*, officially to revive the central organ of the Party had failed, did we consider it our bounden duty to publish an *unofficial* organ, in order that with the *third* attempt the comrades might have before them the results of *experience* and not merely conjectural proposals. Now certain results of this experience are present for all to see, and all comrades may now judge whether we properly understood our duties and what should be thought of people that strive to mislead those unacquainted with the immediate past, simply because they are piqued at our having pointed out to some their inconsistency on the "national" question, and to others the inadmissibility of their vacillation in matters of principle.

## B. CAN A NEWSPAPER BE A COLLECTIVE ORGANISER?

The quintessence of the article "Where To Begin" consists in the fact that it discusses *precisely* this question and gives an affirmative reply to it. As far as we know, the only attempt to examine this question on its merits and to prove that it must be answered in the negative was made by L. Nadezhdin, whose argument we reproduce in full:

"It pleased us greatly to see *Iskra* (No 4) present the question of the need for an all-Russia newspaper; but we cannot agree that this presentation bears

relevance to the title 'Where To Begin'. Undoubtedly this is an extremely important matter, but neither a newspaper, nor a series of popular leaflets, nor a mountain of manifestos, can serve as the basis for a militant organisation in revolutionary times. We must set to work to build strong political organisations in the localities. We lack such organisations: we have been carrying on our work mainly among enlightened workers, while the masses have been engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle. *If strong political organisations are not trained locally, what significance will even an excellently organised all-Russia newspaper have?*" It will be a burning bush, burning without being consumed, but firing no one! *Iskra* thinks that around it and in the activities in its behalf people will gather and organise. *But they will find it far easier to gather and organise around activities that are more concrete.* This something more concrete must and should be the extensive organisation of local newspapers, the immediate preparation of the workers' forces for demonstrations, the constant activity of local organisations among the unemployed (indefatigable distribution of pamphlets and leaflets, convening of meetings, appeals to actions of protest against the government, etc.) We must begin live political work in the localities, and when the time comes to unite on this real basis, it will not be an artificial, paper unity, not by means of newspapers can such a unification of local work into an all-Russia cause be achieved!" (*The Eve of the Revolution*, p. 54.)

We have emphasised the passages in this eloquent tirade that most clearly show the author's incorrect judgement of our plan, as well as the incorrectness of his point of view in general, which is here contraposed to that of *Iskra*. Unless we train strong political organisations in the localities, even an excellently organised all-Russia newspaper will be of no avail. This is incontrovertible. But the whole point is that *there is no other way of training* strong political organisations except through the medium of an all-Russia newspaper. The author missed the most important statement *Iskra* made *before it proceeded* to set forth its "plan": that it was necessary "to call for the formation of a revolutionary organisation, capable of uniting all forces and guiding the movement in actual practice and *not in name alone*, that is, *an organisation ready at any time to support every protest and every outbreak* and use it to build up and consolidate the fighting forces suitable for the decisive struggle". But now after the February and March events, everyone will agree with this in principle, continues *Iskra*. Yet what we need is not a solution of the question in principle, but its *practical solution*; we must immediately advance a definite constructive plan through which all may immediately set to work to build *from every side*. Now we are again being dragged away from the practical solution towards something which in principle is correct, indisputable, and great, but which is entirely inadequate and incomprehensible to the broad masses of workers, namely, "to rear strong political organisations"! This is not the point at issue, most worthy author. The point is *how* to go about the rearing and how to accomplish it.

It is not true to say that "we have been carrying on our work mainly among enlightened workers, while the masses have been engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle". Presented in such a form, the thesis reduces itself of *Svoboda's* usual but fundamentally false contraposition of the enlightened workers to the "masses". In recent years, even the enlightened workers have been "engaged almost exclusively in the economic struggle". That is the first point. On the other hand, the masses will never learn to conduct the political struggle until we help *to train* leaders for this struggle, both from among the enlightened workers and from among the intellectuals. Such leaders *can* acquire training *solely* by systematically evaluating *all* the everyday aspects of our political life, *all attempts* at protest and struggle on the part of the various classes and on various grounds. Therefore, to talk of "rearing political organisations" and at the same time *to contrast* the "paper work" of a political newspaper to "live political work in the localities" is plainly ridiculous. *Iskra* has adapted its "plan" for a newspaper to the "plan" for creating a "militant preparedness" to support the unemployed movement, peasant revolts, discontent among the Zemstvo people, "popular indignation against some tsarist bashi-bazouk on the rampage", etc. Anyone who is at all acquainted with the movement knows full well that the vast majority of local organisations have *never even dreamed* of these things; that many of the prospects of "live political work" here indicated *have never* been realised by a single organisation; that the attempt, for example, to call attention to the growth of discontent and protest among the Zemstvo intelligentsia rouses feelings of consternation and perplexity in Nadezhdin ( 'Good Lord, is this newspaper intended for Zemstvo people?'—*The Eve*, p. 129), among the Economists (Letter to *Iskra*, No. 12), and among many practical workers. Under these circumstances, it is possible to "begin" *only* by inducing people *to think* about all these things, to summarise and generalise all the diverse signs of ferment and active struggle. In our time, when Social-Democratic tasks are being degraded, *the only way* "live political work" can be *begun* is with live political agitation, which is impossible unless we have an all-Russia newspaper, frequently issued and regularly distributed.

Those who regard the *Iskra* "plan" as a manifestation of "bookishness" have totally failed to understand its substance and take for the goal that which is suggested as the most suitable means for the present time. These people have not taken the trouble to study the two comparisons that were drawn to present a clear illustration of the plan. *Iskra* wrote: The publication of an all-Russia political newspaper must be *the main line* by which we may unswervingly develop, deepen, and expand the



organisation (viz., the revolutionary organisation that is ever ready to support every protest and every outbreak). Pray tell me, when bricklayers lay bricks in various parts of an enormous, unprecedentedly large structure, is it "paper" work to use a line to help them find the correct place for the bricklaying; to indicate to them the ultimate goal of the common work; to enable them to use, not only every brick, but even every piece of brick which, cemented to the bricks laid before and after it, forms a finished, continuous line? And are we not now passing through precisely such a period in our Party life when we have bricks and bricklayers, but lack the guide line for all to see and follow? Let them shout that in stretching out the line, we want to command. Had we desired to command, gentlemen, we would have written on the title page, not "*Iskra*, No. 1", but "*Rabochaya Gazeta*, No. 3", as we were invited to do by certain comrades, and *as we would have had a perfect right to do* after the events described above. But we did not do that. We wished to have our hands free to wage an irreconcilable struggle against all pseudo-Social-Democrats; we wanted our line, if properly laid, to be respected because it was correct, and not because it had been laid by an official organ.

"The question of uniting local activity in central bodies runs in a vicious circle," Nadezhdin lectures us: "unification requires homogeneity of the elements, and the homogeneity can be created only by something that unites; but the unifying element may be the product of strong local organisations which at the present time are by no means distinguished for their homogeneity." This truth is as revered and as irrefutable as that we must train strong political organisations. And it is equally barren. *Every* question "runs in a vicious circle" because political life as a whole is an endless chain consisting of an infinite number of links. The whole art of politics lies in finding and taking as firm a grip as we can of the link that is least likely to be struck from our hands, the one that is most important at the given moment, the one that most of all guarantees its possessor the possession of the whole chain.\* If we had a crew of experienced bricklayers who had learned to work so well together that they could lay their bricks exactly as required without a guide line (which, speaking abstractly, is by no means impossible), then perhaps we might take hold of some other link. But it is unfortunate that as yet we have no experienced bricklayers trained for teamwork,

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\* Comrade Krichevsky and Comrade Martynov! I call your attention to this outrageous manifestation of "autocracy", "uncontrolled authority", "supreme regulation", etc. Just think of it. a desire to possess the whole chain!! Send in a complaint at once. Here you have a ready-made topic for two leading articles for No. 12 of *Rabocheye Dvelo*!

that bricks are often laid where they are not needed at all, that they are not laid according to the general line, but are so scattered that the enemy can shatter the structure as if it were made of sand and not of bricks.

Another comparison: "A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organiser. In this respect *it may be compared to the scaffolding erected round a building under construction*; it marks the contours of the structure and facilitates communication between the builders, permitting them to distribute the work and to view the common results achieved by their organised labour."<sup>\*</sup> Does this sound anything like the attempt of an armchair author to exaggerate his role? The scaffolding is not required at all for the dwelling; it is made of cheaper material, is put up only temporarily, and is scrapped for firewood as soon as the shell of the structure is completed. As for the building of revolutionary organisations, experience shows that sometimes they may be built without scaffolding, as the seventies showed. But at the present time we cannot even imagine the possibility of erecting the building we require without scaffolding.

Nadezhdin disagrees with this, saying: "*Iskra* thinks that around it and in the activities in its behalf people will gather and organise. *But they will find it far easier to gather and organise around activities that are more concrete!*" Indeed, "far easier around activities that are more concrete". A Russian proverb holds: "Don't spit into a well, you may want to drink from it." But there are people who do not object to drinking from a well that has been spat into. What despicable things our magnificent, legal "Critics of Marxism" and illegal admirers of *Rabochaya Mysl* have said in the name of this something more concrete! How restricted our movement is by our own narrowness, lack of initiative, and hesitation, which are justified with the traditional argument about finding it "far easier to gather around something more concrete"! And Nadezhdin—who regards himself as possessing a particularly keen sense of the "realities of life", who so severely condemns "armchair" authors and (with pretensions to wit) accuses *Iskra* of a weakness for seeing Economics everywhere, and who sees himself standing far above the division between the orthodox and the Critics—fails to see that with his arguments he contributes to the narrowness that arouses his indignation and that he is drinking from the most spat-in

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\* Martynov, in quoting the first sentence of this passage in *Rabocheye Dyelo* (No. 10, p. 62), omitted the second, as if desiring to emphasise either his unwillingness to discuss the essentials of the question or his inability to understand them.

well! The sincerest indignation against narrowness, the most passionate desire to raise its worshippers from their knees, will not suffice if the indignant one is swept along without sail or rudder and, as "spontaneously" as the revolutionaries of the seventies, clutches at such things as "excitative terror", "agrarian terror", "sounding the tocsin", etc. Let us take a glance at these "more concrete" activities around which he thinks it will be "far easier" to gather and organise: (1) local newspapers; (2) preparations for demonstrations; (3) work among the unemployed. It is immediately apparent that all these things have been seized upon at random as a pretext for saying something; for, however we may regard them, it would be absurd to see in them anything especially suitable for "gathering and organising". The selfsame Nadezhdin says a few pages further: "It is time we simply stated the fact that activity of a very pitiable kind is being carried on in the localities, the committees are not doing a tenth of what they could do . . . the co-ordinating centres we have at present are the purest fiction, representing a sort of revolutionary bureaucracy, whose members mutually grant generalships to one another; and so it will continue until strong local organisations grow up." These remarks, though exaggerating the position somewhat, no doubt contain many a bitter truth; but can it be said that Nadezhdin does not perceive the connection between the pitiable activity in the localities and the narrow mental outlook of the functionaries, the narrow scope of their activities, inevitable in the circumstances of the lack of training of Party workers confined to local organisations? Has he, like the author of the article on organisation, published in *Svoboda*, forgotten how the transition to a broad local press (from 1898) was accompanied by a strong intensification of Economism and "primitiveness"? Even if a "broad local press" could be established at all satisfactorily (and we have shown this to be impossible, save in very exceptional cases)—even then the local organs could not "gather and organise" *all* the revolutionary forces for a *general* attack upon the autocracy and for leadership of the *united* struggle. Let us not forget that we are here discussing *only* the "rallying", organising significance of the newspaper, and we could put to Nadezhdin, who defends fragmentation, the question he himself has ironically put: "Have we been left a legacy of 200,000 revolutionary organisers?" Furthermore, "preparations for demonstrations" cannot be *contraposed* to *Iskra's* plan, for the very reason that this plan includes the organisation of the broadest possible demonstrations *as one of its aims*; the point under discussion is the selection of the practical *means*. On this point also Nadezhdin is confused, for he has lost sight of the fact that only forces that are "gathered

and organised" can "prepare for" demonstrations (which hitherto, in the overwhelming majority of cases, have taken place spontaneously) and that we *lack precisely the ability* to rally and organise. "Work among the unemployed." Again the same confusion; for this too represents one of the field operations of the mobilised forces and not a plan for mobilising the forces. The extent to which Nadezhdin here too underestimates the harm caused by our fragmentation, by our lack of "200,000 organisers", can be seen from the fact that: many people (including Nadezhdin) have reproached *Iskra* for the paucity of the news it gives on unemployment and for the casual nature of the correspondence it publishes about the most common affairs of rural life. The reproach is justified; but *Iskra* is "guilty without sin". We strive "to stretch a line" through the countryside too, where there are hardly any bricklayers anywhere, and we are *obliged* to encourage *everyone* who informs us even as regards the most common facts, in the hope that this will increase the number of our contributors in the given field and will ultimately *train us all* to select facts that are really the most outstanding. But the material on which we can train is so scanty that, unless we generalise it for the whole of Russia, we shall have very little to train on at all. No doubt, one with at least as much ability as an agitator and as much knowledge of the life of the vagrant as Nadezhdin manifests could render priceless service to the movement by carrying on agitation among the unemployed; but such a person would be simply hiding his light under a bushel if he failed to inform *all* comrades in Russia as regards every step he took in his work, so that others, who, in the mass, still lack the ability to undertake new kinds of work, might learn from his example.

All without exception now talk of the importance of unity, of the necessity for "gathering and organising"; but in the majority of cases what is lacking is a definite idea of where to begin and how to bring about this unity. Probably all will agree that if we "unite", say, the district circles in a given town, it will be necessary to have for this purpose *common institutions*, i.e., not merely the common title of "League", but genuinely *common* work, exchange of material, experience, and forces, distribution of functions, not only by districts, but through specialisation on a town-wide scale. All will agree that a big secret apparatus will not pay its way (to use a commercial expression) "with the resources" (in both money and manpower, of course) of a single district, and that this narrow field will not provide sufficient scope for a specialist to develop his talents. But the same thing applies to the co-ordination of activities of a number of towns, since even a specific locality *will be* and, in the history

of our Social-Democratic movement, has proved to be, far too narrow a field; we have demonstrated this above in detail with regard to political agitation and organisational work. What we require foremost and imperatively is to broaden the field, establish *real* contacts between the towns on the basis of *regular, common* work; for fragmentation weighs down on the people and they are "stuck in a hole" (to use the expression employed by a correspondent to *Iskra*), not knowing what is happening in the world, from whom to learn, or how to acquire experience and satisfy their desire to engage in broad activities. I continue to insist that we can *start* establishing *real* contacts only with the aid of a common newspaper, as the only regular, all-Russia enterprise, one which will summarise the results of the most diverse forms of activity and thereby *stimulate* people to march forward untiringly along *all* the innumerable paths leading to revolution, in the same way as all roads lead to Rome. If we do not want unity in name only, we must arrange for all local study circles *immediately to assign*, say, a fourth of their forces to *active* work for the *common* cause, and the newspaper will immediately convey to them\* the general design, scope, and character of the cause; it will give them a precise indication of the most keenly felt shortcomings in the all-Russia activity, where agitation is lacking and contacts are weak, and it will point out which little wheels in the vast general mechanism a given study circle might repair or replace with better ones. A study circle that has not yet begun to work, but which is only just seeking activity, could then start, not like a craftsman in an isolated little workshop unaware of the earlier development in "industry" or of the general level of production methods prevailing in industry, but as a participant in an extensive enterprise that *reflects* the whole general revolutionary attack on the autocracy. The more perfect the finish of each little wheel and the larger the number of detail workers engaged in the common cause, the closer will our network become and the less will be the disorder in the ranks consequent on inevitable police raids.

The mere function of distributing a newspaper would help to establish *actual* contacts (if it is a newspaper worthy of the name, i.e., if it is issued regularly, not once a month like a magazine, but at least four times a month). At the present time,

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\* *A reservation:* that is, if a given study circle sympathises with the policy of the newspaper and considers it useful to become a collaborator, meaning by that, not only for literary collaboration, but for revolutionary collaboration generally. *Note for Rabocheye Dyelo:* Among revolutionaries who attach value to the cause and not to playing at democracy, who do not separate "sympathy" from the most active and lively participation, this reservation is taken for granted.

communication between towns on revolutionary business is an extreme rarity, and, at all events, is the exception rather than the rule. If we had a newspaper, however, such communication would become the rule and would secure, not only the distribution of the newspaper, of course, but (what is more important) an exchange of experience, of material, of forces, and of resources. Organisational work would immediately acquire much greater scope, and the success of one locality would serve as a standing encouragement to further perfection; it would arouse the desire to utilise the experience gained by comrades working in other parts of the country. Local work would become far richer and more varied than it is at present. Political and economic exposures gathered from all over Russia would provide mental food for workers of all trades and *all stages of development*; they would provide material and occasion for talks and readings on the most diverse subjects, which would, in addition, be suggested by hints in the legal press, by talk among the people, and by "shamefaced" government statements. Every outbreak, every demonstration, would be weighed and discussed in its every aspect in all parts of Russia and would thus stimulate a desire to keep up with, and even surpass, the others (we socialists do not by any means flatly reject all emulation or all "competition"! ) and consciously prepare that which at first, as it were, sprang up spontaneously, a desire to take advantage of the favourable conditions in a given district or at a given moment for modifying the plan of attack, etc. At the same time, this revival of local work would obviate that desperate, "convulsive" exertion of *all* efforts and risking of *all* forces which every single demonstration or the publication of every single issue of a local newspaper now frequently entails. On the one hand, the police would find it much more difficult to get at the "roots", if they did not know in what district to dig down for them. On the other hand, regular common work would train our people to adjust the force of a *given* attack to the strength of the given contingent of the common army (at the present time hardly anyone ever thinks of doing that, because in nine cases out of ten these attacks occur spontaneously); such regular common work would facilitate the "transportation" from one place to another, not only of literature, but also of revolutionary forces.

In a great many cases these forces are now being bled white on restricted local work, but under the circumstances we are discussing it would be possible to transfer a capable agitator or organiser from one end of the country to the other, and the occasion for doing this would constantly arise. Beginning with short journeys on Party business at the Party's expense, the comrades would become accustomed to being maintained by the

Party, to becoming professional revolutionaries, and to training themselves as real political leaders.

And if indeed we succeeded in reaching the point when all, or at least a considerable majority, of the local committees, local groups, and study circles took up active work for the common cause, we could, in the not distant future, establish a weekly newspaper for regular distribution in tens of thousands of copies throughout Russia. This newspaper would become part of an enormous pair of smith's bellows that would fan every spark of the class struggle and of popular indignation into a general conflagration. Around what is in itself still a very innocuous and very small, but regular and *common*, effort, in the full sense of the word, a regular army of tried fighters would systematically gather and receive their training. On the ladders and scaffolding of this general organisational structure there would soon develop and come to the fore Social-Democratic Zhelyabovs from among our revolutionaries and Russian Bebel's from among our workers, who would take their place at the head of the mobilised army and rouse the whole people to settle accounts with the shame and the curse of Russia.

That is what we should dream of!

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"We should dream!" I wrote these words and became alarmed. I imagined myself sitting at a "unity conference" and opposite me were the *Rabocheye Dyelo* editors and contributors. Comrade Martynov rises and, turning to me, says sternly: "Permit me to ask you, has an autonomous editorial board the right to dream without first soliciting the opinion of the Party committees?" He is followed by Comrade Krichevsky, who (philosophically deepening Comrade Martynov, who long ago rendered Comrade Plekhanov more profound) continues even more sternly: "I go further. I ask, has a Marxist any right at all to dream, knowing that according to Marx mankind always sets itself the tasks it can solve and that tactics is a process of the growth of Party tasks which grow together with the Party?"

The very thought of these stern questions sends a cold shiver down my spine and makes me wish for nothing but a place to hide in. I shall try to hide behind the back of Pisarev.

"There are rifts and rifts," wrote Pisarev of the rift between dreams and reality. "My dream may run ahead of the natural march of events or may fly off at a tangent in a direction in which no natural march of events will ever proceed. In the first case my dream will not cause any harm; it may even support and augment the energy of the working men. . . . There is noth-

ing in such dreams that would distort or paralyse labour-power. On the contrary, if man were completely deprived of the ability to dream in this way, if he could not from time to time run ahead and mentally conceive, in an entire and completed picture, the product to which his hands are only just beginning to lend shape, then I cannot at all imagine what stimulus there would be to induce man to undertake and complete extensive and strenuous work in the sphere of art, science, and practical endeavour.... The rift between dreams and reality causes no harm if only the person dreaming believes seriously in his dream, if he attentively observes life, compares his observations with his castles in the air, and if, generally speaking, he works conscientiously for the achievement of his fantasies. If there is some connection between dreams and life then all is well."<sup>186</sup>

Of this kind of dreaming there is unfortunately too little in our movement. And the people most responsible for this are those who boast of their sober views, their "closeness" to the "concrete", the representatives of legal criticism and of illegal "tail-ism".

### C. WHAT TYPE OF ORGANISATION DO WE REQUIRE?

From what has been said the reader will see that our "tactics-as-plan" consists in rejecting an immediate *call* for assault; in demanding "to lay effective siege to the enemy fortress"; or, in other words, in demanding that all efforts be directed towards gathering, organising, and *mobilising* a permanent army. When we ridiculed *Rabocheye Dyelo* for its leap from Economism to shouting for an assault (for which it clamoured in *April* 1901, in "*Listok*" *Rabochego Dyela*,<sup>187</sup> No. 6) it of course came down on us with accusations of being "doctrinaire", of failing to understand our revolutionary duty, of calling for caution, etc. Of course, we were not in the least surprised to hear these accusations from those who totally lack principles and who evade all arguments by references to a profound "tactics-as-process", any more than we were surprised by the fact that these charges were repeated by Nadezhdin, who in general has a supreme contempt for durable programmes and the fundamentals of tactics.

It is said that history does not repeat itself. But Nadezhdin exerts every effort to cause it to repeat itself and he zealously imitates Tkachov in strongly condemning "revolutionary culturism", in shouting about "sounding the tocsin" and about a special "eve-of-the-revolution point of view", etc. Apparently, he has forgotten the well-known maxim that while an original historical event represents a tragedy, its replica is merely a farce.<sup>188</sup> The attempt to seize power, which was prepared by



the preaching of Tkachov and carried out by means of the "terrifying" terror that did really terrify, had grandeur, but the "excitative" terror of a Tkachov the Little is simply ludicrous, particularly so when it is supplemented with the idea of an organisation of average people.

"If *Iskra* would only emerge from its sphere of bookishness," wrote Nadezhdin, "it would realise that these [instances like the worker's letter to *Iskra*, No. 7, etc.] are symptoms of the fact that soon, very soon, the 'assault' will begin, and to speak now (*sic!*) of an organisation linked with an all-Russia newspaper means to propagate armchair ideas and armchair activity." What an unimaginable muddle—on the one hand, excitative terror and an "organisation of average people", along with the opinion that it is far "easier" to gather around something "more concrete", like a local newspaper, and, on the other, the view that to talk "now" about an all-Russia organisation means to propagate armchair thoughts, or, bluntly put, "now" it is already too late! But what of the "extensive organisation of local newspapers"—is it not too late for that, my dear L. Nadezhdin? And compare with this *Iskra's* point of view and tactical line: excitative terror is nonsense; to talk of an organisation of average people and of the *extensive* publication of local newspapers means to fling the door wide open to Economism. We must speak of a single all Russia organisation of revolutionaries, and it will never be too late to talk of that until the real, not a paper, assault begins.

"Yes, as far as organisation is concerned the situation is anything but brilliant," continues Nadezhdin. "Yes, *Iskra* is entirely right in saying that the mass of our fighting forces consists of volunteers and insurgents . . . You do well to give such a sober picture of the state of our forces. But why, at the same time, do you forget that *the masses are not ours at all* and consequently, *will not ask us* when to begin military operations; they will simply go and 'rebel'. . . When the crowd itself breaks out with its elemental destructive force it *may* overwhelm and sweep aside the 'regular troops' among whom we prepared all the time to introduce extremely systematic organisation but never *managed* to do so." (Our italics.)

Astounding logic! For the very reason that the "masses are not ours" it is stupid and unseemly to shout about an immediate "assault", for assault means attack by regular troops and not a spontaneous mass upsurge. For the very reason that the masses *may* overwhelm and sweep aside the regular troops we must without fail "manage to keep up" with the spontaneous upsurge by our work of "introducing extremely systematic organisation" in the regular troops, for the more we "manage" to introduce such organisation the more probably will the regular troops not be overwhelmed by the masses, but will take their place at their head. Nadezhdin is confused because he imagines that troops in the course of systematic organisation are engaged

in something that isolates them from the masses, when in actuality they are engaged exclusively in all-sided and all-embracing political agitation, i.e., precisely in work that *brings closer and merges into a single whole* the elemental destructive force of the masses and the conscious destructive force of the organisation of revolutionaries. You, gentlemen, wish to lay the blame where it does not belong. For it is precisely the *Svoboda* group that, by including terror in its *programme*, calls for an organisation of terrorists, and such an organisation would indeed prevent our troops from establishing closer contacts with the masses, which, unfortunately, are still not ours, and which, unfortunately, do not yet ask us, or rarely ask us, when and how to launch their military operations.

"We shall miss the revolution itself," continues Nadezhdin in his attempt to scare *Iskra*, "in the same way as we missed the recent events, which came upon us like a bolt from the blue." This sentence, taken in connection with what has been quoted above, clearly demonstrates the absurdity of the "eve-of-the-revolution point of view" invented by *Svoboda*.\* Plainly put, this special "point of view" boils down to this that it is too late "now" to discuss and prepare. If that is the case, most worthy opponent of "bookishness", what was the use of writing a pamphlet of 132 pages on "questions of theory\*\* and tactics"? Don't you think it would have been more becoming for the "eve-of-the-revolution point of view" to have issued 132,000 leaflets containing the summary call, "Bang them—knock'em down!"?

Those who make nation-wide political agitation the cornerstone of their programme, *their tactics, and their organisational work*, as *Iskra* does, stand the least risk of missing the revolution. The people who are now engaged throughout Russia in weaving the network of connections that spread from the

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\* *The Eve of the Revolution*, p. 62.

\*\* In his *Review of Questions of Theory*, Nadezhdin, by the way, made almost no contribution whatever to the discussion of questions of theory, apart, perhaps, from the following passage, a most peculiar one from the 'eve-of-the-revolution point of view': "Bernsteinism, on the whole, is losing its acuteness for us at the present moment, as is the question whether Mr. Adamovich will prove that Mr. Struve has already earned a lacing, or, on the contrary, whether Mr. Struve will refute Mr. Adamovich and will refuse to resign—it really makes no difference, because the hour of revolution has struck" (p. 110). One can hardly imagine a more glaring illustration of Nadezhdin's infinite disregard for theory. We have proclaimed "the eve of the revolution", therefore "it really makes no difference" whether or not the orthodox will succeed in finally driving the Critics from their positions! Our wisecrack fails to see that it is precisely during the revolution that we shall stand in need of the results of our theoretical battles with the Critics in order to be able resolutely to combat their *practical* positions!

all-Russia newspaper not only did not miss the spring events, but, on the contrary, gave us an opportunity to foretell them. Nor did they miss the demonstrations that were described in *Iskra*, Nos. 13 and 14<sup>189</sup>; on the contrary, they took part in them, clearly realising that it was their duty to come to the aid of the spontaneously rising masses and, at the same time, through the medium of the newspaper, help all the comrades in Russia to inform themselves of the demonstrations and to make use of their gathered experience. And if they live they will not miss the revolution, which, first and foremost, will demand of us experience in agitation, ability to support (in a Social-Democratic manner) every protest, as well as direct the spontaneous movement, while safeguarding it from the mistakes of friends and the traps of enemies.

We have thus come to the last reason that compels us so strongly to insist on the plan of an organisation centred round an all-Russia newspaper, through the common work for the common newspaper. Only such organisation will ensure the *flexibility* required of a militant Social-Democratic organisation, viz., the ability to adapt itself immediately to the most diverse and rapidly changing conditions of struggle, the ability, "on the one hand, to avoid an open battle against an overwhelming enemy, when the enemy has concentrated all his forces at one spot and yet, on the other, to take advantage of his unwieldiness and to attack him when and where he least expects it".\* It would be a grievous error indeed to build the Party organisation in anticipation only of outbreaks and street fighting, or only upon the "forward march of the drab everyday struggle". We must *always* conduct our everyday work and always be prepared for every situation, because very frequently it is almost impossible to foresee when a period of outbreak will give way to a period of calm. In the instances, however, when it is possible to do so, we could not turn this foresight to account for the purpose of reconstructing our organisation; for in an autocratic country

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\* *Iskra*, No. 4, "Where To Begin". "Revolutionary culturists, who do not accept the eve-of-the-revolution point of view, are not in the least perturbed by the prospect of working for a long period of time," writes Nadezhdin (p. 62). This brings us to observe: Unless we are able to devise political tactics and an organisational plan for *work over a very long period*, while ensuring, in *the very process of this work*, our Party's readiness to be at its post and fulfil its duty in every contingency whenever the march of events is accelerated—unless we succeed in doing this, we shall prove to be but miserable political adventurers. Only Nadezhdin, who began but yesterday to describe himself as a Social-Democrat, can forget that the aim of Social-Democracy is to transform radically the conditions of life of the whole of mankind and that for this reason it is not permissible for a Social-Democrat to be "perturbed" by the question of the duration of the work.

these changes take place with astonishing rapidity, being sometimes connected with a single night raid by the tsarist janizaries.<sup>190</sup> And the revolution itself must not by any means be regarded as a single act (as the Nadezhdins apparently imagine), but as a series of more or less powerful outbreaks rapidly alternating with periods of more or less complete calm. For that reason, the principal content of the activity of our Party organisation, the focus of this activity, should be work that is both possible and essential in the period of a most powerful outbreak as well as in the period of complete calm, namely, work of political agitation, connected throughout Russia, illuminating all aspects of life, and conducted among the broadest possible strata of the masses. But this work is *unthinkable* in present-day Russia without an all-Russia newspaper, issued very frequently. The organisation, which will form round this newspaper, the organisation of its *collaborators* (in the broad sense of the word, i.e., all those working for it), will be ready for *everything*, from upholding the honour, the prestige, and the continuity of the Party in periods of acute revolutionary "depression" to preparing for, appointing the time for, and carrying out the *nation-wide armed uprising*.

Indeed, picture to yourselves a very ordinary occurrence in Russia—the total round-up of our comrades in one or several localities. In the absence of a *single*, common, regular activity that combines *all* the local organisations, such round-ups frequently result in the interruption of the work for many months. If, however, all the local organisations had one common activity, then, even in the event of a very serious round-up, two or three energetic persons could in the course of a few weeks establish contact between the common centre and new youth circles, which, as we know, spring up very quickly even now. And when the common activity, hampered by the arrests, is apparent to all, new circles will be able to come into being and make connections with the centre even more rapidly.

On the other hand, picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now agree that we must think of this and prepare for it. But *how*? Surely the Central Committee cannot appoint agents to all localities for the purpose of preparing the uprising. Even if we had a Central Committee, it could achieve absolutely nothing by such appointments under present-day Russian conditions. But a network of agents\* that would

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\* Alas, alas! Again I have let slip that awful word "agents", which jars so much on the democratic ears of the Martynovs! I wonder why this word did not offend the heroes of the seventies and yet offends the amateurs of the nineties? I like the word, because it clearly and trenchantly indicates *the common cause* to which all the agents bend their thoughts and actions, and if I had to

form in the course of establishing and distributing the common newspaper would not have to "sit about and wait" for the call for an uprising, but could carry on the regular activity that would guarantee the highest probability of success in the event of an uprising. Such activity would strengthen our contacts with the broadest strata of the working masses and with all social strata that are discontented with the autocracy, which is of such importance for an uprising. Precisely such activity would serve to cultivate the ability to estimate correctly the general political situation and, consequently, the ability to select the proper moment for an uprising. Precisely such activity would train *all* local organisations to respond simultaneously to the same political questions, incidents, and events that agitate the whole of Russia and to react to such "incidents" in the most vigorous, uniform, and expedient manner possible; for an uprising is in essence the most vigorous, most uniform, and most expedient "answer" of the entire people to the government. Lastly, it is precisely such activity that would train all revolutionary organisations throughout Russia to maintain the most continuous, and at the same time the most secret, contacts with one another, thus creating *real* Party unity; for without such contacts it will be impossible collectively to discuss the plan for the uprising and to take the necessary preparatory measures on the eve, measures that must be kept in the strictest secrecy.

In a word, the "plan for an all-Russia political newspaper", far from representing the fruits of the labour of armchair workers, infected with dogmatism and bookishness (as it seemed to those who gave but little thought to it), is the most practical plan for immediate and all-round preparation of the uprising, with, at the same time, no loss of sight for a moment of the pressing day-to-day work.

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replace this word by another, the only word I might select would be the word "collaborator", if it did not suggest a certain bookishness and vagueness. The thing we need is a military organisation of agents. However, the numerous Martynovs (particularly abroad), whose favourite pastime is "mutual grants of generalships to one another", may instead of saying "passport agent" prefer to say, "Chief of the Special Department for Supplying Revolutionaries with Passports", etc.

## CONCLUSION

The history of Russian Social-Democracy can be distinctly divided into three periods:

The first period embraces about ten years, approximately from 1884 to 1894. This was the period of the rise and consolidation of the theory and programme of Social-Democracy. The adherents of the new trend in Russia were very few in number. Social-Democracy existed without a working-class movement, and as a political party it was at the embryonic stage of development.

The second period embraces three or four years—1894-98. In this period Social-Democracy appeared on the scene as a social movement, as the upsurge of the masses of the people, as a political party. This is the period of its childhood and adolescence. The intelligentsia was fired with a vast and general zeal for struggle against Narodism and for going among the workers; the workers displayed a general enthusiasm for strike action. The movement made enormous strides. The majority of the leaders were young people who had not reached "the age of thirty-five", which to Mr. N. Mikhailovsky appeared to be a sort of natural border-line. Owing to their youth, they proved to be untrained for practical work and they left the scene with astonishing rapidity. But in the majority of cases the scope of their activity was very wide. Many of them had begun their revolutionary thinking as adherents of Narodnaya Volya. Nearly all had in their early youth enthusiastically worshipped the terrorist heroes. It required a struggle to abandon the captivating impressions of those heroic traditions, and the struggle was accompanied by the breaking off of personal relations with people who were determined to remain loyal to the Narodnaya Volya and for whom the young Social-Democrats had profound respect. The struggle compelled the youthful leaders to educate themselves, to read illegal literature of every trend, and to study closely the questions of legal Narodism. Trained in this

struggle. Social-Democrats went into the working-class movement without "for a moment" forgetting either the theory of Marxism, which brightly illumined their path, or the task of overthrowing the autocracy. The formation of the Party in the spring of 1898 was the most striking and at the same time the *last* act of the Social-Democrats of this period.

The third period, as we have seen, was prepared in 1897 and it definitely cut off the second period in 1898 (1898-?). This was a period of disunity, dissolution, and vacillation. During adolescence a youth's voice breaks. And so, in this period, the voice of Russian Social-Democracy began to break, to strike a false note—on the one hand, in the writings of Messrs. Struve and Prekopovich, of Bulgakov and Berdyaev, and on the other, in those of V. I.—n and R. M., of B. Krichevsky and Martynov. But it was only the leaders who wandered about separately and drew back; the movement itself continued to grow and it advanced with enormous strides. The proletarian struggle spread to new strata of the workers and extended to the whole of Russia, at the same time indirectly stimulating the revival of the democratic spirit among the students and among other sections of the population. The political consciousness of the leaders, however, capitulated before the breadth and power of the spontaneous upsurge; among the Social-Democrats, another type had become dominant—the type of functionaries, trained almost exclusively on "legal Marxist" literature, which proved to be all the more inadequate the more the spontaneity of the masses demanded political consciousness on the part of the leaders. The leaders not only lagged behind in regard to theory ("freedom of criticism") and practice ("primitiveness"), but they sought to justify their backwardness by all manner of high-flown arguments. Social-Democracy was degraded to the level of trade-unionism by the Brentano adherents in legal literature, and by the tail-enders in illegal literature. The *Credo* programme began to be put into operation, especially when the "primitive methods" of the Social-Democrats caused a revival of revolutionary non-Social-Democratic tendencies.

If the reader should feel critical that I have dealt at too great length with a certain *Rabocheye Dyelo*, I can say only that *Rabocheye Dyelo* acquired "historical" significance because it most notably reflected the "spirit" of this third period.\* It was not

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I could also reply with the German proverb: *Den Sack schlägt man, den Esel meint man* (you beat the sack, but you mean the donkey). Not *Rabocheye Dyelo* alone, but also the broad mass of practical workers and theoreticians was carried away by the "criticism" *à la mode*, becoming confused in regard to the question of spontaneity and lapsing from the Social-Democratic to the trade-unionist conception of our political and organisational tasks

the consistent R. M., but the weathercock Krichevskys and Martynovs who were able properly to express the disunity and vacillation, the readiness to make concessions to "criticism", to "Economism", and to terrorism. Not the lofty contempt for practical work displayed by some worshipper of the "absolute" is characteristic of this period, but the combination of pettifogging practice and utter disregard for theory. It was not so much in the direct rejection of "grandiose phrases" that the heroes of this period engaged as in their vulgarisation. Scientific socialism ceased to be an integral revolutionary theory and became a hodgepodge "freely" diluted with the content of every new German textbook that appeared; the slogan "class struggle" did not impel to broader and more energetic activity but served as a balm, since "the economic struggle is inseparably linked with the political struggle"; the idea of a party did not serve as a call for the creation of a militant organisation of revolutionaries, but was used to justify some sort of "revolutionary bureaucracy" and infantile playing at "democratic" forms.

When the third period will come to an end and the fourth (now heralded by many portents) will begin we do not know. We are passing from the sphere of history to the sphere of the present and, partly, of the future. But we firmly believe that the fourth period will lead to the consolidation of militant Marxism, that Russian Social-Democracy will emerge from the crisis in the full flower of manhood, that the opportunist rearguard will be "replaced" by the genuine vanguard of the most revolutionary class.

In the sense of calling for such a "replacement" and by way of summing up what has been expounded above, we may meet the question, What is to be done? with the brief reply:

Put an End to the Third Period.

Written between the autumn of  
1901 and February 1902  
First published as a separate  
work in March 1902 in  
Stuttgart

*Collected Works*, Vol. 5,  
pp. 347-520



## Appendix

THE ATTEMPT TO UNITE *ISKRA*  
WITH *RABOCHEYE DYELO*

It remains for us to describe the tactics adopted and consistently pursued by *Iskra* in its organisational relations with *Rabocheye Dyelo*. These tactics were fully expressed in *Iskra*, No. 1, in the article entitled "The Split in the Union of Russian Social Democrats Abroad".\* From the outset we adopted the point of view that the *real* Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, which at the First Congress of our Party was recognised as its representative abroad, *had split* into two organisations; that the question of the Party's representation remained an open one, having been settled only temporarily and conditionally by the election, at the International Congress in Paris, of two members to represent Russia on the International Socialist Bureau,<sup>191</sup> one from each of the two sections of the divided Union Abroad. We declared that fundamentally *Rabocheye Dyelo was wrong*; in principle we emphatically took the side of the Emancipation of Labour group, at the same time refusing to enter into the details of the split and noting the services rendered by the Union Abroad in the sphere of purely practical work.\*

Consequently, ours was, to a certain extent, a waiting policy. We made a concession to the opinions prevailing among the majority of the Russian Social-Democrats that the most determined opponents of Economism could work hand in hand with the Union Abroad because it had repeatedly declared its agreement in principle with the Emancipation of Labour group, without, allegedly, taking an independent position on fundamental questions of theory and tactics. The correctness of our position was indirectly proved by the fact that almost simultaneously with the appearance of the first issue of *Iskra* (December 1900)

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 378-79 — *Ed.*

Our judgement of the split was based, not only upon a study of the literature on the subject, but also on information gathered abroad by several members of our organisation.

three members separated from the Union, formed the so-called "Initiators' Group", and offered their services: (1) to the foreign section of the *Iskra* organisation, (2) to the revolutionary *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation,<sup>192</sup> and (3) to the Union Abroad, as mediators in negotiations for reconciliation. The first two organisations at once announced their agreement; *the third turned down* the offer. True, when a speaker related these facts at the "Unity" Conference last year, a member of the Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad declared the rejection of the offer to have been due *entirely* to the fact that the Union Abroad was dissatisfied with the composition of the Initiators' Group. While I consider it my duty to cite this explanation, I cannot, however, refrain from observing that it is an unsatisfactory one; for, knowing that two organisations had agreed to enter into negotiations, the Union Abroad could have approached them through another intermediary or directly.

In the spring of 1901 both *Zarya* (No. 1, April) and *Iskra* (No. 4, May)\* entered into open polemics with *Rabocheye Dyelo*. *Iskra* particularly attacked the article "A Historic Turn" in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, which, in its April supplement, that is, after the spring events, revealed instability on the question of terror and the calls for "blood", with which many had been carried away at the time. Notwithstanding the polemics, the Union Abroad agreed to resume negotiations for reconciliation through the instrumentality of a new group of "conciliators".<sup>193</sup> A preliminary conference of representatives of the three cited organisations, held in June, framed a draft agreement on the basis of a very detailed "accord on principles", which the Union Abroad published in the pamphlet *Two Conferences*, and the League Abroad in the pamphlet *Documents of the "Unity" Conference*.

The contents of this accord on principles (more frequently named the Resolutions of the June Conference) make it perfectly clear that we put forward as an absolute condition for unity *the most emphatic* repudiation of any and every manifestation of opportunism generally, and of Russian opportunism in particular. Paragraph 1 reads: "We repudiate all attempts to introduce opportunism into the proletarian class struggle—attempts that have found expression in the so-called Economism, Bernsteinism, Millerandism, etc." "The sphere of Social-Democratic activities includes . . . ideological struggle against all opponents of revolutionary Marxism" (4, c); "In every sphere of organisational and agitational activity Social-Democracy must never for a moment forget that the immediate task of the Russian proletariat is the overthrow of the autocracy" (5, a);

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 13-24.—Ed.

"... agitation, not only on the basis of the everyday struggle between wage-labour and capital" (5, b); "... we do not recognise ... a stage of purely economic struggle and of struggle for partial political demands" (5, c); "... we consider it important for the movement to criticise tendencies that make a principle of the elementariness ... and narrowness of the lower forms of the movement" (5, d). Even a complete outsider, having read these resolutions at all attentively, will have realised from their very formulations that they are directed against people who were opportunists and Economists, who, even for a moment, forgot the task of overthrowing the autocracy, who recognised the theory of stages, who elevated narrowness to a principle, etc. Anyone who has the least acquaintance with the polemics conducted by the Emancipation of Labour group, *Zarya*, and *Iskra* against *Rabocheye Dyelo* cannot doubt for a single moment that these resolutions repudiate, point by point, the very errors into which *Rabocheye Dyelo* strayed. Hence, when a member of the Union Abroad declared at the "Unity" Conference that the articles in No. 10 of *Rabocheye Dyelo* had been prompted, not by a new "historic turn" on the part of the Union Abroad, but by the excessive "abstractness" of the resolutions,\* the assertion was justly ridiculed by one of the speakers. Far from being abstract, he said, the resolutions were incredibly concrete: one could see at a glance that they were "trying to catch somebody".

This remark occasioned a characteristic incident at the Conference. On the one hand, Krichevsky, seizing upon the word "catch" in the belief that this was a slip of the tongue which betrayed our evil intentions ("to set a trap"), pathetically exclaimed: "Whom are they out to catch?" "Whom indeed?" rejoined Plekhanov sarcastically. "Let me come to the aid of Comrade Plekhanov's lack of perspicacity," replied Krichevsky. "Let me explain to him that the trap was set *for the Editorial Board of Rabocheye Dyelo* [general laughter] but we have not allowed ourselves to be caught!" (A remark from the left: 'All the worse for you!') On the other hand, a member of the Borba group (a group of conciliators), opposing the amendments of the Union Abroad to the resolutions and desiring to defend our speaker, declared that obviously the word "catch" was dropped by chance in the heat of polemics.

For my part, I think the speaker responsible for uttering the word will hardly be pleased with this "defence". I think the words "trying to catch somebody" were "true words spoken in jest"; we have always accused *Rabocheye Dyelo* of instability

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\* This assertion is repeated in *Two Conferences*, p. 25.

and vacillation, and, naturally, we *had* to try to catch it in order to put a stop to the vacillation. There is not the slightest suggestion of evil intent in this, for we were discussing instability of principles. And we succeeded in "catching" the Union Abroad in such a comradely manner\* that Krichevsky himself and one other member of the Administrative Committee of the Union signed the June resolutions.

The articles in *Rubocheye Dyelo*, No. 10 (our comrades saw the issue for the first time when they arrived at the Conference, a few days before the meetings started) clearly showed that a new turn had taken place in the Union Abroad in the period between the summer and the autumn: the Economists had once more gained the upper hand, and the Editorial Board, which veered with every "wind", again set out to defend "the most pronounced Bernsteinians" and "freedom of criticism", to defend "spontaneity", and through the lips of Martynov to preach the "theory of restricting" the sphere of our political influence (for the alleged purpose of rendering this influence more complex). Once again Parvus' apt observation that it is difficult to catch an opportunist with a formula has been proved correct. An opportunist will readily put his name to *any* formula and as readily abandon it, because opportunism means precisely a lack of definite and firm principles. Today, the opportunists have repudiated *all* attempts to introduce opportunism, repudiated *all* narrowness, solemnly promised "never for a moment to forget about the task of overthrowing the autocracy" and to carry on "agitation not only on the basis of the everyday struggle between wage-labour and capital", etc., etc. But tomorrow they will change their form of expression and revert to their old tricks on the pretext of defending spontaneity and the forward march of the drab everyday struggle, of extolling demands promising palpable results, etc. By continuing to assert that in the articles in No. 10 "the Union Abroad did not and does not now see any heretical departure from the general principles of the draft adopted at the conference" (*Two Confer-*

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\* Precisely. In the introduction to the June resolutions we said that Russian Social-Democracy as a whole always stood by the principles of the Emancipation of Labour group and that the particular service of the Union Abroad was its publishing and organising activity. In other words, we expressed our complete readiness to forget the past and to recognise the usefulness (for the cause) of the work of our comrades of the Union Abroad *provided* it completely ceased the vacillation we tried to "catch". Any impartial person reading the June resolutions will only thus interpret them. If the Union Abroad, after having *caused* a split by its new turn towards Economism (in its articles in No. 10 and in the amendments), now solemnly charges us with *untruth* (*Two Conferences*, p. 30), because of what we said about its services, then, of course, such an accusation can only evoke a smile.

ences, p. 26), the Union Abroad merely reveals a complete lack of ability, or of desire, to understand the essential points of the disagreements.

After the tenth issue of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, we could make only one effort: open a general discussion in order to ascertain whether all the members of the Union Abroad agreed with the articles and with the Editorial Board. The Union Abroad is particularly displeased with us because of this and accuses us of trying to sow discord in its ranks, of interfering in other people's business, etc. These accusations are obviously unfounded, since with an elected editorial board that "veers" with every wind, however light, everything depends upon the direction of the wind, and we defined the direction at private meetings at which no one was present, except members of the organisations intending to unite. The amendments to the June resolutions submitted in the name of the Union Abroad have removed the last shadow of hope of arriving at agreement. The amendments are documentary evidence of the new turn towards Economism and of the fact that the majority of the Union members are in agreement with *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10. It was moved to delete the words "so-called Economism" from the reference to manifestations of opportunism (on the plea that "the meaning" of these words "was vague"; but if that were so, all that was required was a more precise definition of the nature of the widespread error), and to delete "Millerandism" (although Krichevsky had defended it in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 2-3, pp. 83-84, and still more openly in *Vorwärts*\*). Notwithstanding the fact that the June resolutions definitely indicated that the task of Social-Democracy is "to guide every manifestation of the proletarian struggle against all forms of political, economic, and social oppression", thereby calling for the introduction of system and unity in all these manifestations of the struggle, the Union Abroad added the wholly superfluous words that "the economic struggle is a powerful stimulus to the mass movement" (taken by itself, this assertion cannot be disputed, but with the existence of narrow Economism it could not but give occasion for false interpretations). Moreover, even the direct *constriction* of "politics" was suggested for the June resolutions, both by the deletion of the words "not for a moment" (to forget the aim of overthrowing the autocracy) and by the addition of the words "the economic struggle is the most widely applicable means of drawing the masses into active political

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\* A polemic on the subject started in *Vorwärts* between its present editor, Kautsky, and the Editorial Board of *Zarya*. We shall not fail to acquaint the Russian reader with this controversy.<sup>196</sup>

struggle". Naturally, upon the submission of such amendments, the speakers on our side refused, one after another, to take the floor, considering it hopeless to continue negotiations with people who were again turning towards Economism and were striving to secure for themselves freedom to vacillate.

"It was precisely the preservation of the independent features and the autonomy of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, considered by the Union to be the *sine qua non* of the durability of our future agreement, that *Iskra* regarded, as the stumbling-block to agreement" (*Two Conferences*, p. 25). This is most inexact. We never had any designs against *Rabocheye Dyelo's* autonomy.\* We did indeed *absolutely refuse to recognise* the independence of its features, if by "independent features" is meant independence on questions of principle in theory and tactics. The June resolutions contain an utter repudiation of *such* independence of features, because, in practice, such "independence of features" has always meant, as we have pointed out, all manner of vacillations fostering the disunity which prevails among us and which is intolerable from the Party point of view. *Rabocheye Dyelo's* articles in its tenth issue, together with its "amendments", clearly revealed its desire to preserve this kind of independence of features, and such a desire naturally and inevitably led to a rupture and a declaration of war. But all of us were ready to recognise *Rabocheye Dyelo's* "independence of features" in the sense that it should concentrate on definite literary functions. A proper distribution of these functions naturally called for: (1) a theoretical magazine, (2) a political newspaper, and (3) popular collections of articles and popular pamphlets. Only by agreeing to such a distribution of functions would *Rabocheye Dyelo* have proved that it *sincerely* desired to abandon once and for all its errors, against which the June resolutions were directed. Only such a distribution of functions would have removed all possibility of friction, effectively guaranteed a durable agreement, and, at the same time, served as a basis for a revival and for new successes of our movement.

At present not a single Russian Social-Democrat can have any doubts that the final rupture between the revolutionary and the opportunist tendencies was caused, not by any "organisational" circumstances, but by the desire of the opportunists to consolidate the independent features of opportunism and to continue to cause confusion of mind by the disquisitions of the Krichevskys and Martynovs.

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\* That is, if the editorial consultations in connection with the establishment of a joint supreme council of the combined organisations are not to be regarded as a restriction of autonomy. But in June *Rabocheye Dyelo* agreed to this.

CORRECTION TO *WHAT IS TO BE DONE?*

The Initiators' Group of whom I speak in the pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*, p. 141,<sup>2</sup> have asked me to make the following correction to my description of the part they played in the attempt to reconcile the Social-Democratic organisations abroad: "Of the three members of this group, only one left the Union Abroad at the end of 1900; the others left in 1901, only after becoming convinced that it was impossible to obtain the Union's consent to a conference with the *Iskra* organisation abroad and the revolutionary *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation, which the Initiators' Group had proposed. The Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad at first rejected this proposal, contending that the persons comprising the Initiators' Group were 'not competent' to act as mediators, and it expressed the desire to enter into direct contact with the *Iskra* organisation abroad. Soon thereafter, however, the Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad informed the Initiators' Group that following the appearance of the first number of *Iskra* containing the report of the split in the Union, it had altered its decision and no longer desired to maintain relations with *Iskra*. After this, how can one explain the statement made by a member of the Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad that the latter's rejection of a conference was called forth *entirely* by its dissatisfaction with the composition of the Initiators' Group? It is true that it is equally difficult to explain why the Administrative Committee of the Union Abroad agreed to a conference in June of last year; for the article in the first issue of *Iskra* still remained in force and *Iskra's* 'negative' attitude to the Union Abroad was still more strongly expressed in the first issue of *Zarya*, and in No. 4 of *Iskra*, both of which appeared prior to the June Conference."

N. Lenin

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# ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

(THE CRISIS IN OUR PARTY)<sup>195</sup>

## PREFACE

When a prolonged, stubborn and heated struggle is in progress, there usually begin to emerge after a time the central and fundamental points at issue, upon the decision of which the ultimate outcome of the campaign depends, and in comparison with which all the minor and petty episodes of the struggle recede more and more into the background.

That, too, is how matters stand in the struggle within our Party, which for six months now has been riveting the attention of all members of the Party. And precisely because in the present outline of the whole struggle I have had to refer to many details which are of infinitesimal interest, and to many squabbles which at bottom are of no interest whatever, I should like from the very outset to draw the reader's attention to two really central and fundamental points, points which are of tremendous interest, of undoubted historical significance, and which are the most urgent political questions confronting our Party today.

The first question is that of the political significance of the division of our Party into "majority" and "minority" which took shape at the Second Party Congress<sup>196</sup> and pushed all previous divisions among Russian Social-Democrats far into the background.

The second question is that of the significance in principle of the new *Iskra's* position on organisational questions, insofar as this position is really based on principle

The first question concerns the starting-point of the struggle in our Party, its source, its causes, and its fundamental political character. The second question concerns the ultimate outcome of the struggle, its finale, the sum-total of principles that results from adding up all that pertains to the realm of principle and subtracting all that pertains to the realm of squabbling. The answer to the first question is obtained by analysing the struggle at the Party Congress; the answer to the second, by analysing



what is new in the principles of the new *Iskra*. Both these analyses, which make up nine-tenths of my pamphlet, lead to the conclusion that the "majority" is the revolutionary, and the "minority" the opportunist wing of our Party; the disagreements that divide the two wings at the present time for the most part concern, not questions of programme or tactics, but only organisational questions; the new system of views that emerges the more clearly in the new *Iskra* the more it tries to lend profundity to its position, and the more that position becomes cleared of squabbles about co-optation, is opportunism in matters of organisation.

The principal shortcoming of the existing literature on the crisis in our Party is, as far as the study and elucidation of facts is concerned, the almost complete absence of an analysis of the minutes of the Party Congress; and as far as the elucidation of fundamental principles of organisation is concerned, the failure to analyse the connection which unquestionably exists between the basic error committed by Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod in their formulation of Paragraph 1 of the Rules and their defence of that formulation, on the one hand, and the whole "system" (insofar as one can speak here of a system) of *Iskra*'s present principles of organisation, on the other. The present editors of *Iskra* apparently do not even notice this connection, although the importance of the controversy over Paragraph 1 has been referred to again and again in the literature of the "majority". As a matter of fact, Comrade Axelrod and Comrade Martov are now only deepening, developing and extending their initial error with regard to Paragraph 1. As a matter of fact, the entire position of the opportunists in organisational questions already began to be revealed in the controversy over Paragraph 1: their advocacy of a diffuse, not strongly welded, Party organisation; their hostility to the idea (the "bureaucratic" idea) of building the Party from the top downwards, starting from the Party Congress and the bodies set up by it; their tendency to proceed from the bottom upwards, allowing every professor, every high-school student and "every striker" to declare himself a member of the Party; their hostility to the "formalism" which demands that a Party member should belong to one of the organisations recognised by the Party; their leaning towards the mentality of the bourgeois intellectual, who is only prepared to "accept organisational relations platonically"; their penchant for opportunist profundity and for anarchistic phrases; their tendency towards autonomism as against centralism—in a word, all that is now blossoming so luxuriantly in the new *Iskra*, and is helping more and more to reveal fully and graphically the initial error.

As for the minutes of the Party Congress, the truly undeserved neglect of them can only be explained by the fact that our

controversies have been cluttered by squabbles, and possibly by the fact that these minutes contain too large an amount of too unpalatable truth. The minutes of the Party Congress present a picture of the actual state of affairs in our Party that is unique of its kind and unparalleled for its accuracy, completeness, comprehensiveness, richness and authenticity; a picture of views, sentiments and plans drawn by the participants in the movement themselves; a picture of the political shades existing in the Party, showing their relative strength, their mutual relations and their struggles. It is the minutes of the Party Congress, and they alone, that show us how far we have really succeeded in making a clean sweep of the survivals of the old, purely circle ties and substituting for them a single great party tie. It is the duty of every Party member who wishes to take an intelligent share in the affairs of his Party to make a careful study of our Party Congress. I say study advisedly, for merely to read the mass of raw material contained in the minutes is not enough to obtain a picture of the Congress. Only by careful and independent study can one reach (as one should) a stage where the brief digests of the speeches, the dry extracts from the debates, the petty skirmishes over minor (seemingly minor) issues will combine to form one whole, enabling the Party member to conjure up the living figure of each prominent speaker and to obtain a full idea of the political complexion of each group of delegates to the Party Congress. If the writer of these lines only succeeds in stimulating the reader to make a broad and independent study of the minutes of the Party Congress, he will feel that his work was not done in vain.

One more word to the opponents of Social-Democracy. They gloat and grimace over our disputes; they will, of course, try to pick isolated passages from my pamphlet, which deals with the failings and shortcomings of our Party, and to use them for their own ends. The Russian Social-Democrats are already steeled enough in battle not to be perturbed by these pinpricks and to continue, in spite of them, their work of self-criticism and ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings, which will unquestionably and inevitably be overcome as the working-class movement grows. As for our opponents, let them try to give us a picture of the *true* state of affairs in their own "parties" even remotely approximating that given by the minutes of our Second Congress!

*N. Lenin*

May 1904

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## A. THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS

There is a saying that everyone is entitled to curse his judges for twenty-four hours. Our Party Congress, like any congress of any party, was also the judge of certain persons, who laid claim to the position of leaders but who met with discomfiture. Today these representatives of the "minority" are, with a naïveté verging on the pathetic, "cursing their judges" and doing their best to discredit the Congress, to belittle its importance and authority. This striving has been expressed most vividly, perhaps, in an article in *Iskra*, No. 57, by "Practical Worker", who feels outraged at the idea of the Congress being a sovereign "divinity". This is so characteristic a trait of the new *Iskra* that it cannot be passed over in silence. The editors, the majority of whom were *rejected* by the Congress, continue, on the one hand, to call themselves a "Party" editorial board, while, on the other, they accept with open arms people who declare that the Congress was not divine. Charming, is it not? To be sure, gentlemen, the Congress was not divine; but what must we think of people who begin to "blackguard" the Congress *after* they have met with defeat at it?

For indeed, let us recall the main facts in the history of the preparations for the Congress.

*Iskra* declared at the very outset, in its announcement of publication in 1900,\* that before we could unite, lines of demarcation must be drawn. *Iskra* endeavoured to make the Conference of 1902<sup>197</sup> a private meeting and not a Party Congress.\*\* *Iskra* acted with extreme caution in the summer and autumn of 1902 when it re-established the Organising Committee elected at that conference. At last the work of demarcation was finished—as we all acknowledged. The Organising Committee was constituted at the very end of 1902. *Iskra* welcomed its firm establishment, and in an editorial article in its 32nd issue declared that the convocation of a Party Congress was a *most urgent* and pressing neces-

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 351-56.—Ed.

\*\* See Minutes of the Second Congress, p. 20.

sity.\* Thus, the last thing we can be accused of is having been hasty in convening the Second Congress. We were, in fact, guided by the maxim: measure your cloth seven times before you cut it; and we had every moral right to expect that after the cloth had been cut our comrades would not start complaining and measuring it all over again.

The Organising Committee drew up very precise (formalistic and bureaucratic, those would say who are now using these words to cover up their political spinelessness) Regulations for the Second Congress, got them passed by all the committees, and finally endorsed them, stipulating among other things, in Point 18, that "all decisions of the Congress and all the elections it carries out are decisions of the Party and binding on all Party organisations. They cannot be challenged by anyone on any pretext whatever and can be rescinded or amended only by the next Party Congress."<sup>\*\*</sup> How innocent in themselves, are they not, are these words, accepted at the time without a murmur, as something axiomatic; yet how strange they sound today—like a verdict against the "minority"! Why was this point included? Merely as a formality? Of course not. This provision seemed necessary, and was indeed necessary, because the Party consisted of a number of isolated and independent groups, which might refuse to recognise the Congress. This provision in fact expressed the *free will* of all the revolutionaries (which is now being talked about so much, and so irrelevantly, the term "free" being euphemistically applied to what really deserves the epithet "capricious"). It was equivalent to a *word of honour* mutually pledged by all the Russian Social-Democrats. It was intended to guarantee that all the tremendous effort, danger and expense entailed by the Congress should not be in vain, that the Congress should not be turned into a farce. It in advance qualified any refusal to recognise the decisions and *elections* at the Congress as a *breach of faith*.

Who is it, then, that the new *Iskra* is scoffing at when it makes the new discovery that the Congress was not divine and its decisions are not sacrosanct? Does that discovery imply "new views on organisation", or only new attempts to cover up old tracks?

## B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIOUS GROUPINGS AT THE CONGRESS

Thus, the Congress was called after the most careful preparation and on the basis of the fullest representation. The general recognition that its composition was correct and its decisions

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 309. -Ed

\*\* See Minutes of the Second Congress, pp. 22-23 and 380

*absolutely* binding found expression also in the statement of the chairman (Minutes, p. 54) after the Congress had been constituted.

What was the principal task of the Congress? To create a *real* party on the basis of the principles and organisational ideas that had been advanced and elaborated by *Iskra*. That this was the direction in which the Congress had to work was predetermined by the three years' activities of *Iskra* and by the recognition of the latter by the majority of the committees. *Iskra's* programme and trend were to become the programme and trend of the Party; *Iskra's* organisational plans were to be embodied in the Rules of Organisation of the Party. But it goes without saying that this could not be achieved without a struggle: since the Congress was so highly representative, the participants included organisations which had vigorously fought *Iskra* (the Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo*) and organisations which, while verbally recognising *Iskra* as the leading organ, actually pursued plans of their own and were unstable in matters of principle (the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group and delegates from some of the committees who were closely associated with it). Under these circumstances, the Congress could not but become an *arena of struggle for the victory of the "Iskra" trend*. That it did become such an arena will at once be apparent to all who peruse its minutes with any degree of attention. Our task now is to trace in detail the principal groupings revealed at the Congress on various issues and to reconstruct, on the basis of the precise data of the minutes, the political complexion of each of the main groups. What precisely were these groups, trends and shades which, at the Congress, were to unite under the guidance of *Iskra* into a single party?—that is what we must show by analysing the debates and the voting. The elucidation of this is of cardinal importance both for a study of what our Social-Democrats really are and for an understanding of the causes of the divergence among them. That is why, in my speech at the League Congress and in my letter to the editors of the new *Iskra*, I gave prime place to an analysis of the various groupings. My opponents of the "minority" (headed by Martov) utterly failed to grasp the substance of the question. At the League Congress they confined themselves to corrections of detail, trying to "vindicate" themselves from the charge of having swung towards opportunism, but not even attempting to counter my picture of the groupings at the Congress by drawing *any different one*. Now Martov tries in *Iskra* (No. 56) to represent every attempt clearly to delimit the various political groups at the Congress as mere "circle politics". Strong language, Comrade Martov! But the strong language of the new *Iskra* has this peculiar quality: one has only to reproduce all the stages of our divergence, from the Congress onwards, for all this strong language to turn

*completely and primarily* against the present editorial board. Take a look at yourselves, you so-called Party editors who talk about circle politics!

Martov now finds the facts of our struggle at the Congress so unpleasant that he tries to slur over them altogether. "An *Iskra*-ist," he says, "is one who, at the Party Congress and prior to it, expressed his complete solidarity with *Iskra*, advocated its programme and its views on organisation and supported its organisational policy. There were over forty such *Iskra*-ists at the Congress—that was the number of votes cast for *Iskra*'s programme and for the resolution adopting *Iskra* as the Central Organ of the Party." Open the Congress Minutes, and you will find that the programme was adopted by the votes of *all* (p. 233) except Akimov, who abstained. Thus, Comrade Martov wants to assure us that the Bundists, and Brouckère, and Martynov *demonstrated* their "complete solidarity" with *Iskra* and *advocated* its views on organisation! This is ridiculous. The fact that *after* the Congress *all* who took part became equal members of the Party (and not even all, for the Bundists had withdrawn) is here jumbled with the question of the grouping that evoked the struggle *at* the Congress. Instead of a study of the *elements* that went to make up the "majority" and the "minority" after the Congress, we get the official phrase. "recognised the programme"!

Take the voting on the adoption of *Iskra* as the Central Organ. You will see that it was Martynov—whom Comrade Martov, with a courage worthy of a better cause, now credits with having advocated *Iskra*'s organisational views and organisational policy—who insisted on separating the two parts of the resolution: the bare adoption of *Iskra* as the Central Organ, and the recognition of its services. When the first part of the resolution (recognising the services of *Iskra*, expressing *solidarity* with it) was put to the vote, *only thirty-five votes* were cast in favour; there were two votes against (Akimov and Brouckère) and eleven abstentions (Martynov, the five Bundists and the five votes of the editorial board: the two votes each of Martov and myself and Plekhanov's one). Consequently, the anti-*Iskra* group (five Bundists and three *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists) is quite apparent in this instance also, one most advantageous to Martov's present views and chosen by himself. Take the voting on the second part of the resolution—adopting *Iskra* as the Central Organ without any statement of motives or expression of solidarity (Minutes, p. 147): forty-four votes *in favour*, which the Martov of today classes as *Iskra*-ist. The total number of votes to be cast was fifty-one; subtracting the five votes of the editors, who abstained, we get forty-six; two votes *against* (Aki-

mov and Brouckère); consequently, the remaining forty-four include *all five Bundists*. And so, the Bundists at the Congress "expressed complete solidarity with *Iskra*"—this is how official history is written by the official *Iskra*! Running ahead somewhat, we will explain to the reader the real reasons for this official truth: the present editorial board of *Iskra* could and would have been a real Party editorial board (and not a quasi-Party one, as it is today) *if the Bundists and the "Rabocheye Dyelo"-ists had not withdrawn from the Congress*; that is why these trusty guardians of the present, so-called Party editorial board had to be proclaimed *Iskra*-ists. But I shall speak of this in greater detail later.

The next question is: if the Congress was a struggle between the *Iskra*-ist and the anti-*Iskra*-ist elements, were there no intermediate, unstable elements who vacillated between the two? Anyone at all familiar with our Party and with the picture generally presented by congresses of every kind will be inclined *a priori* to answer the question in the affirmative. Comrade Martov is now very reluctant to recall these unstable elements, so he represents the *Yuzhny Rabochoy* group and the delegates who gravitated towards it as typical *Iskra*-ists, and our differences with them as paltry and unimportant. Fortunately, we now have before us the complete text of the minutes and are able to answer the question—a question of fact, of course—on the basis of documentary evidence. What we said above about the general grouping at the Congress does not, of course, claim to answer the question, but only to present it correctly.

Without an analysis of the political groupings, without having a picture of the Congress as a struggle between definite shades, the divergence between us cannot be understood at all. Martov's attempt to gloss over the different shades by ranking even the Bundists with the *Iskra*-ists is simply an evasion of the question. Even *a priori*, on the basis of the history of the Russian Social-Democratic movement before the Congress, three main groups are to be noted (for subsequent verification and detailed study): the *Iskra*-ists, the anti-*Iskra*-ists, and the unstable, vacillating, wavering elements.

### C. BEGINNING OF THE CONGRESS. THE ORGANISING COMMITTEE INCIDENT

The most convenient way to analyse the debates and the voting is to take them in the order of the Congress sittings, so as successively to note the political shades as they became more and more apparent. Only when absolutely necessary will departures from the chronological order be made for the purpose

of considering together closely allied questions or similar groupings. For the sake of impartiality, we shall endeavour to mention *all* the more important votes, omitting, of course, the innumerable votes on minor issues, which took up an inordinate amount of time at our Congress (owing partly to our inexperience and inefficiency in dividing the material between the commissions and the plenary sittings, and partly to quibbling which bordered on obstruction).

The first question to evoke a debate which began to reveal differences of shades was whether first place should be given (on the Congress "order of business") to the item: "Position of the Bund in the Party" (Minutes, pp. 29-33). From the standpoint of the *Iskra*-ists, which was advocated by Plekhanov, Martov, Trotsky, and myself, there could be no doubt on this score. The Bund's withdrawal from the Party strikingly bore out our view: if the Bund refused to go our way and accept the principles of organisation which the majority of the Party shared with *Iskra*, it was useless and senseless to "make believe" that we were going the same way and only drag out the Congress (as the Bundists did drag it out). The matter had already been fully clarified in our literature, and it was apparent to any at all thoughtful Party member that all that remained was to put the question frankly, and bluntly and honestly make the choice: autonomy (in which case we go the same way), or federation (in which case our ways part).

Evasive in their entire policy, the Bundists wanted to be evasive here too and postpone the matter. They were joined by Comrade Akimov, who, evidently on behalf of all the followers of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, at once brought up the differences with *Iskra* over questions of organisation (Minutes, p. 31). The Bund and *Rabocheye Dyelo* were supported by Comrade Makhov (representing the two votes of the Nikolayev Committee—which shortly before had expressed its solidarity with *Iskra*!). To Comrade Makhov the matter was altogether unclear, and another "sore spot", he considered, was "the question of a democratic system or, on the contrary [mark this!], centralism"—exactly like the majority of our present "Party" editorial board, who at the Congress had not yet noticed this "sore spot"!

Thus the *Iskra*-ists were opposed by the Bund, *Rabocheye Dyelo* and Comrade Makhov, who together controlled the ten votes which were cast against us (p. 33). *Thirty votes* were cast *in favour*—this is the figure, as we shall see later, around which the votes of the *Iskra*-ists often fluctuated. Eleven abstained, apparently not taking the side of either of the contending "parties". It is interesting to note that when we took the vote on Paragraph 2 of the Rules of the Bund (it was the rejection of



this Paragraph 2 that caused the Bund to withdraw from the Party), the votes in favour of it and the abstentions also amounted to ten (Minutes, p. 289), the abstainers being the three *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists (Brouckère, Martynov, and Akimov) and Comrade Makhov. Clearly, the grouping in the vote on the *place* of the Bund item on the agenda was *not fortuitous*. Clearly, all these comrades differed with *Iskra* not only on the technical question of the order of discussion, but *in essence as well*. In the case of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, this difference in essence is clear to everyone, while Comrade Makhov gave an inimitable description of his attitude in the speech he made on the withdrawal of the Bund (Minutes, pp. 289-90). It is worth while dwelling on his speech. Comrade Makhov said that after the resolution rejecting federation, "the position of the Bund in the R.S.D.L.P. ceased to be for me a question of principle and became a question of practical politics in relation to an historically-evolved national organisation". "Here," the speaker continued, "I could not but take into account all the consequences that might follow from our vote, and would therefore have voted for Paragraph 2 in its entirety." Comrade Makhov has admirably imbibed the spirit of "practical politics": in principle he had *already* rejected federation, and *therefore* in practice *he would have voted* for including in the Rules a point that signified federation! And this "practical" comrade explained his profound position of principle in the following words: "But [the famous Shchedrin "but"! ] since my voting one way or the other would only have significance in principle [!] and could not be of any practical importance, in view of the almost unanimous vote of all the other Congress delegates, I preferred to abstain in order to bring out in principle [God preserve us from such principles!] the difference between my position on this question and the position of the Bund delegates, who voted in favour. Conversely, I would have voted in favour if the Bund delegates had abstained, as they had at first insisted." Can you make head or tail of it? A man of principle abstains from loudly saying "Yes" because practically it is useless when everybody else says "No".

After the vote on the place of the Bund item on the agenda, the question of the Borba group cropped up at the Congress: it too led to an extremely interesting grouping and was closely bound up with the "sorest" point at the Congress, namely, the personal composition of the central bodies. The committee appointed to determine the composition of the Congress pronounced against inviting the Borba group, in accordance with a *twice-adopted* decision of the Organising Committee (see Minutes, pp. 383 and 375) and the report of *the latter's representatives on this committee* (p 35).

Thereupon Comrade Egorov, a member of the Organising Committee, declared that "the question of Borba" (mark, of Borba, not of some particular member of it) was "new to him", and demanded an adjournment. How a question on which the Organising Committee had twice taken a decision could be new to a member of the Organising Committee remains a mystery. During the adjournment the Organising Committee held a meeting (Minutes, p. 40), attended by such of its members as happened to be at the Congress (several members of the Organising Committee, old members of the *Iskra* organisation, were not at the Congress).<sup>\*</sup> Then began a debate about Borba. The *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists spoke in favour (Martynov, Akimov, and Brouckère—pp. 36-38), the *Iskra*-ists (Pavlovich, Sorokin, Lange, Trotsky, Martov, and others)—against. Again the Congress split up into the groupings with which we are already familiar. The struggle over Borba was a stubborn one, and Comrade Martov made a very circumstantial (p. 38) and "militant" speech, in which he rightly referred to "inequality of representation" of the groups in Russia and abroad, and said that it would hardly be "well" to allow a foreign group any "privilege" (golden words, particularly edifying today, in the light of the events since the Congress!), and that we should not encourage "the organisational chaos in the Party that was characterised by a disunity not justified by any considerations of principle" (one right in the eye for ... the "minority" at our Party Congress!). Except for the followers of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, nobody came out openly and with reasoned motives in favour of Borba until the list of speakers was closed (p. 40). It should be said in fairness to Comrade Akimov and his friends that they at least did not wriggle and hide, but frankly advocated their line, frankly said what they wanted.

After the list of speakers had been closed, when it was already out of order to speak *on the issue itself*, Comrade Egorov "insistently demanded that a decision just adopted by the Organising Committee be heard". It is not surprising that the delegates were outraged at this manoeuvre, and Comrade Plekhanov, the chairman, expressed his "astonishment that Comrade Egorov should insist upon his demand". One thing or the other, one would think: either take an open and definite stand before the whole Congress on the question at issue, or say nothing at all. But to allow the list of speakers to be closed and then, under the guise of a "reply to the debate", confront the Congress with a *new* decision of the Organising Committee on

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<sup>\*</sup> Concerning this meeting, see the "Letter" of Pavlovich, who was a member of the Organising Committee and who before the Congress was *unanimously* elected as the editorial board's trusted representative, its seventh member (League Minutes, p. 44).

the very subject that had been under discussion, was like a stab in the back!

When the sitting was resumed after dinner, the Bureau, still in perplexity, decided to waive "formalities" and resort to the last method, adopted at congresses only in extreme cases, viz., "comradely explanation". The spokesman of the Organising Committee, Popov, announced the Committee's decision, which had been adopted by all its members against one, Pavlovich (p. 43), and which recommended the Congress to invite Ryazanov.

Pavlovich declared that he had challenged and continued to challenge the lawfulness of the Organising Committee meeting, and that the Committee's new decision "*contradicts its earlier decision*". This statement caused an uproar. Comrade Egorov, also an Organising Committee member and a member of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, evaded answering on the actual point in question and tried to make the central issue one of discipline. He claimed that Comrade Pavlovich had violated Party discipline (!), for, having heard his protest, the Organising Committee had decided "not to lay Pavlovich's dissenting opinion before the Congress". The debate shifted to the question of Party discipline, and Plekhanov, amid the loud applause of the delegates, explained for the edification of Comrade Egorov that "*we have no such thing as binding instructions*" (p. 42; cf. p. 379, Regulations for the Congress, Point 7: "The powers of delegates must not be restricted by binding instructions. In the exercise of their powers, delegates are absolutely free and independent"). "The Congress is the supreme Party authority", and, consequently, he violates Party discipline and the Congress Regulations who in any way restricts any delegate in taking *directly* to the Congress *any* question of Party life whatsoever. The issue thus came down to this: circles or a party? Were the rights of delegates to be restricted at the Congress in the name of the imaginary rights or rules of the various bodies and circles, or were *all* lower bodies and old groups to be *completely*, and not nominally but actually, disbanded in face of the Congress, pending the creation of genuinely Party official institutions? The reader will already see from this how profoundly important from the standpoint of principle was this dispute at the very outset (the third sitting) of this Congress whose purpose was the actual restoration of the Party. Focused in this dispute, as it were, was the conflict between the old circles and small groups (such as *Yuzhny Rabochy*) and the nascent Party. And the anti-*Iskra* groups at once revealed themselves: the Bundist Abramson, Comrade Martynov, that ardent ally of the present *Iskra* editorial board, and our friend Comrade Makhov all sided with Egorov and the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group against Pavlovich. Comrade Martynov, who now vies with Martov

and Axelrod in sporting "democracy" in organisation, even cited the example of . . . the army, where an appeal to a superior authority can only be made through a lower one!! The true meaning of this "compact" anti-*Iskra* opposition was quite clear to everyone who was present at the Congress or who had carefully followed the internal history of our Party prior to the Congress. It was the purpose of the opposition (perhaps not always realised by all of its representatives, and sometimes pursued by force of inertia) to guard the independence, individualism and parochial interests of the small, petty groups from being swallowed up in the broad Party that was being built on the *Iskra* principles.

It was precisely from this angle that the question was approached by Comrade Martov, who had not yet joined forces with Martynov. Comrade Martov vigorously took the field, and rightly so, against those whose "notion of Party discipline does not go beyond a revolutionary's duty to the particular group of a *lower* order to which he belongs". "No *compulsory* [Martov's italics] grouping can be tolerated within a united Party," he explained to the champions of the circle mentality, not foreseeing what a flail these words would be for his own political conduct at the end of the Congress and after. . . . A compulsory grouping cannot be tolerated in the case of the Organising Committee, but can quite well be tolerated in the case of the editorial board. Martov condemns a compulsory grouping when he looks at it from the centre, but Martov defends it the moment he finds himself dissatisfied with the composition of the centre. . . .

It is interesting to note that in his speech Comrade Martov laid particular stress not only on Comrade Egorov's "profound error", but also on the political instability the Organising Committee had displayed. "A recommendation has been submitted on behalf of the Organising Committee," he exclaimed in just indignation, "which *runs counter* to the Committee report [based, we will add, on the report of members of the Organising Committee—p. 43, Koltsov's remarks] and *to the Organising Committee's own earlier recommendations*." (My italics.) As we see, *at that time*, before his "swing-over", Martov clearly realised that substituting Ryazanov for Borba in no way removed the utter contradictoriness and inconsistency of the Organising Committee's actions (Party members may learn from the League Congress Minutes, p. 57, how Martov conceived the matter after his swing-over). Martov did not confine himself then to analysing the issue of discipline; he bluntly asked the Organising Committee: "What new circumstance has arisen to necessitate the *change*?" (My italics.) And, indeed, when the Organising Committee made its recommendation, it did not even

have the courage to defend its opinion openly, as Akimov and the others did. Martov denies this (League Minutes, p. 56), but whoever reads the minutes of the Congress will see that he is mistaken. Popov, in submitting the Organising Committee recommendation, *did not say a word* about the motives (Party Congress Minutes, p. 41). Egorov shifted the issue to one of discipline, and all he said on the question itself was: "The Organising Committee may have had new reasons [but whether it did, and what those new reasons were, is unknown]; it could have forgotten to nominate somebody, and so on. [This "and so on" was the speaker's sole refuge, for the Organising Committee could not have *forgotten* about Borba, which it had discussed twice before the Congress and once in the committee.] The Organising Committee did not adopt this decision because it has changed its attitude towards the Borba group, but because it wants to remove unnecessary rocks in the path of the Party's future central organisation at the very outset of its activities." This is not a reason, but an evasion of a reason. Every sincere Social-Democrat (and we do not entertain the least doubt about the sincerity of any Congress delegate) is concerned to remove what *he considers* to be sunken rocks, and to remove them by *those methods which he considers* advisable. Giving reasons means explicitly stating and explaining one's view of things, and not making shift with truisms. And they *could not* give a reason without "changing their attitude towards Borba", because in its earlier and contrary decisions the Organising Committee had also been concerned to remove sunken rocks, but it had then regarded the very opposite as "rocks". And Comrade Martov very severely and very rightly attacked this argument, saying that it was "*petty*" and inspired by a wish to "*burke the issue*", and advising the Organising Committee "*not to be afraid of what people will say*". These words characterise perfectly the essential nature of the political shade which played so large a part at the Congress and which is distinguished precisely by its want of independence, its pettiness, its lack of a line of its own, its fear of what people will say, its constant vacillation between the two definite sides, its fear of plainly stating its  *credo*—in a word, by all the features of a "Marsh".\*

\* There are people in our Party today who are horrified when they hear this word, and raise an outcry about uncomradely methods of controversy. A strange perversion of sensibility due to . . . a misapplied sense of official form! There is scarcely a political party acquainted with internal struggles that has managed to do without this term, by which the unstable elements who vacillate between the contending sides have always been designated. Even the Germans, who know how to keep their internal struggles within very definite bounds indeed, are not offended by the word *versumpf* (sunk in the marsh.—Ed.), are not horrified, and do not display ridiculous official prudery.

A consequence of this political spinelessness of the unstable group was, incidentally, that *no one* except the Bundist Yudin (p. 53) did put before the Congress a resolution to invite one of the members of the Borba group. Yudin's resolution received five votes—all Bundists, apparently: the vacillating elements had changed sides again! How large was the vote of the middle group is shown approximately by the voting on the resolutions of Koltsov and Yudin on this question: the *Iskra*-ist received thirty-two votes (p. 47), the Bundist received sixteen, that is, in addition to the eight anti-*Iskra*-ist votes, the two votes of Comrade Makhov (cf. p. 46), the four votes of the members of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, and two others. We shall show in a moment that this alignment can by no means be regarded as accidental; but first let us briefly note Martov's *present* opinion of this Organising Committee incident. Martov maintained at the League that "Pavlovich and others fanned passions". One has only to consult the Congress Minutes to see that the longest, most heated and sharpest speeches against Borba and the Organising Committee were delivered by Martov himself. By trying to lay the "blame" on Pavlovich he only demonstrates his own instability: it was Pavlovich he helped to elect prior to the Congress as the seventh member of the editorial board; at the Congress he fully associated himself with Pavlovich (p. 44) against Egorov; but afterwards, having suffered defeat at the hands of Pavlovich, he began to accuse him of "fanning passions". This is ludicrous.

Martov waxes ironical in *Iskra* (No. 56) over the importance that was attached to whether X or Y should be invited. But again the irony turns against Martov, for it was this Organising Committee incident that started the dispute over such an "important" question as inviting X or Y on to the Central Committee or the Central Organ. It is unseemly to measure with two different yardsticks, depending on whether the matter concerns *your own* "group of a lower order" (relative to the Party) or *someone else's*. This is precisely a philistine and circle, not a Party attitude. A simple comparison of Martov's speech at the League (p. 57) with his speech at the Congress (p. 44) sufficiently demonstrates this. "I cannot understand," Martov said, *inter alia*, at the League, "how people can insist on calling themselves *Iskra*-ists and at the same time be ashamed of being *Iskra*-ists." A strange failure to understand the difference between "calling oneself" and "being"—between word and deed. Martov himself, at the Congress, *called himself* an opponent of compulsory groupings, yet, after the Congress, came to *be* a supporter of them. . . .

## D. DISSOLUTION OF THE YUZHNY RABOCHY GROUP

The alignment of the delegates over the Organising Committee question may perhaps seem accidental. But such an opinion would be wrong, and in order to dispel it we shall depart from the chronological order and at once examine an incident which occurred at the end of the Congress, but which was very closely connected with the one just discussed. This incident was the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group. The organisational trend of *Iskra*—complete amalgamation of the Party forces and removal of the chaos dividing them—came into conflict here with the interests of *one* of the groups, which had done useful work when there was no real party, but which had become superfluous now that the work was being centralised. From the standpoint of circle interests, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group was entitled no less than the old *Iskra* editorial board to lay claim to “continuity” and inviolability. But in the interests of the Party, it was its duty to submit to the transfer of its forces to “the appropriate Party organisations” (p. 313, end of resolution adopted by the Congress). From the standpoint of circle interests and “philistinism”, the dissolution of a useful group, which no more desired it than did the old *Iskra* editorial board, could not but seem a “ticklish matter” (the expression used by Comrade Rusov and Comrade Deutsch). But from the standpoint of the interests of the Party, its dissolution, its “assimilation” in the Party (Gusev’s expression), was essential. The *Yuzhny Rabochy* group bluntly declared that it “did not deem it necessary” to proclaim itself dissolved and demanded that “the Congress definitely pronounce its opinion”, and pronounce it “immediately: yes or no”. The *Yuzhny Rabochy* group openly invoked the same “continuity” as the old *Iskra* editorial board began to invoke... after it was dissolved! “Although we are all individually members of one Party,” Comrade Egorov said, “it nevertheless consists of a number of organisations, with which we have to reckon as *historical entities*.... If such an organisation is *not detrimental to the Party*, there is no need to dissolve it.”

Thus an important question of *principle* was quite definitely raised, and all the *Iskra*-ists—inasmuch as their own circle interests had not yet come to the forefront—took a decisive stand against the unstable elements (the Bundists and two of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists had already withdrawn from the Congress; they would undoubtedly have been heart and soul in favour of “reckoning with historical entities”). The result of the vote was *thirty-one for*, five against and five abstentions (the four votes of the members of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group and one other,

that of Byelov, most likely, judging by his earlier pronouncements, p. 308). A group of *ten votes* distinctly opposed to *Iskra's* consistent organisational plan and defending the circle spirit as against the party spirit can be quite definitely discerned here. During the debate the *Iskra*-ists presented the question precisely from the standpoint of principle (see Lange's speech, p. 315), opposing parochial amateurishness and disunity, refusing to pay heed to the "sympathies" of individual organisations, and plainly declaring that "if the comrades of *Yuzhny Rabochy* had adhered more strictly to principle earlier, a year or two ago, the unity of the Party and the triumph of the programme principles we have sanctioned here would have been achieved sooner". Orlov, Gusev, Lyadov, Muravyov, Rusov, Pavlovich, Glebov, and Gorin all spoke in this strain. And far from protesting against these definite and repeated references made at the Congress to the lack of principle in the policy and "line" of *Yuzhny Rabochy*, of Makhov and of others, far from making any reservation on this score, the *Iskra*-ists of the "minority", in the person of Deutsch, vigorously associated themselves with these views, condemned "chaos", and welcomed the "blunt way the question was put" (p. 315) by that very same Comrade Rusov who, *at this same sitting*, had the audacity—oh, horror!—to "bluntly put" the question of the old editorial board too on a purely Party basis (p. 325).

On the part of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group the proposal to dissolve it evoked violent indignation, traces of which are to be found in the minutes (it should not be forgotten that the minutes offer only a pale reflection of the debates, for they do not give the full speeches, but only very condensed summaries and extracts). Comrade Egorov even described as a "lie" the bare mention of the *Rabochaya Mysl* group alongside of *Yuzhny Rabochy*—a characteristic sample of the attitude that prevailed at the Congress towards consistent Economism. Even much later, at the 37th sitting, Egorov spoke of the dissolution of *Yuzhny Rabochy* with the utmost irritation (p. 356), requesting to have it recorded in the minutes that during the discussion on *Yuzhny Rabochy* the members of the group had not been asked either about publication funds or about control by the Central Organ and the Central Committee. Comrade Popov hinted, during the debate on *Yuzhny Rabochy*, at a compact majority having predetermined the fate of the group. "Now," he said (p. 316), "*after the speeches of Comrades Gusev and Orlov, everything is clear.*" The meaning of these words is unmistakable: now, after the *Iskra*-ists had stated their opinion and moved a resolution, everything was clear, i.e., it was clear that *Yuzhny Rabochy* would be dissolved, against its own wishes. Here the *Yuzhny*



*Rabochy* spokesman himself drew a distinction between the *Iskra*-ists (and, moreover, *Iskra*-ists like Gusev and Orlov) and his own supporters, as representing different "lines" of organisational policy. And when the present-day *Iskra* represents the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group (and Makhov too, most likely?) as "typical *Iskra*-ists", it only demonstrates that the new editorial board has forgotten the most important (from this group's standpoint) events of the Congress and is anxious to cover up the evidence showing what elements went to form what is known as the "minority".

Unfortunately, the question of a popular periodical was not discussed at the Congress. It was very actively discussed by all the *Iskra*-ists both before the Congress and during the Congress itself, outside the sittings, and they agreed that it would be highly irrational at this moment in the Party's life to launch such a publication or convert any of the existing ones for the purpose. The anti-*Iskra*-ists expressed the opposite opinion at the Congress; so did the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group in their report; and the fact that a motion to this effect, with ten signatures, was not tabled can only be attributed to chance, or to a disinclination to raise a "hopeless" issue.

## E. THE EQUALITY OF LANGUAGES INCIDENT

Let us return to the chronological order of the Congress sittings.

We have now convincingly seen that even before the Congress proceeded to discuss its actual business, there was clearly revealed not only a perfectly definite group of anti-*Iskra*-ists (eight votes), but also a group of intermediate and unstable elements prepared to support the eight anti-*Iskra*-ists and increase their votes to roughly sixteen or eighteen.

The question of the position of the Bund in the Party, which was discussed at the Congress in extreme, excessive detail, reduced itself to deciding about the principle, while its practical decision was postponed until the discussion on organisation. Since the points involved had been given quite a lot of space in the press prior to the Congress, the discussion at the Congress produced relatively little that was new. It must, however, be mentioned that the supporters of *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Marty-nov, Akimov, and Brouckère), while agreeing with Martov's resolution, made the reservation that they found it inadequate and disagreed with the conclusions drawn from it (pp. 69, 73, 83 and 86).

After discussing the position of the Bund, the Congress passed on to the programme. This discussion centred mainly

around amendments of detail which present but slight interest. The opposition of the anti-*Iskra*-ists on matters of principle found expression only in Comrade Martynov's onslaught on the famous presentation of the question of spontaneity and consciousness. Martynov was, of course, backed by the Bundists and *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists to a man. The unsoundness of his objections was pointed out, among others, by Martov and Plekhanov. It should be noted as a curiosity that the *Iskra* editorial board (on second thoughts, apparently) have now gone over to Martynov's side and are saying the opposite of what they said at the Congress.<sup>198</sup> Presumably, this is in accordance with the celebrated principle of "continuity"... It only remains for us to wait until the editorial board have thoroughly cleared up the question and explained to us just how far they agree with Martynov, on what points exactly, and since when. Meanwhile, we only ask: has anyone ever seen a *party* organ whose editorial board said after a congress the very opposite of what they had said at the congress?

Passing over the arguments about the adoption of *Iskra* as the Central Organ (we dealt with that above) and the beginning of the debate on the Rules (which it will be more convenient to examine in connection with the whole discussion of the Rules), let us consider the shades of principle revealed during the discussion of the programme. First of all let us note one detail of a highly characteristic nature, namely, the debate on proportional representation. Comrade Egorov of *Yuzhny Rabochy* advocated the inclusion of this point in the programme, and did so in a way that called forth the justified remark from Posadovsky (an *Iskra*-ist of the minority) that there was a "serious difference of opinion". "There can be no doubt," said Comrade Posadovsky, "that we do not agree on the following fundamental question: *should we subordinate our future policy to certain fundamental democratic principles and attribute absolute value to them*, or should all democratic principles be exclusively subordinated to the interests of our Party? I am decidedly in favour of the latter." Plekhanov "fully associated himself" with Posadovsky, objecting in even more definite and emphatic terms to "the absolute value of democratic principles" and to regarding them "abstractly". "Hypothetically," he said, "a case is conceivable where we Social-Democrats would oppose universal suffrage. There was a time when the bourgeoisie of the Italian republics deprived members of the nobility of political rights. The revolutionary proletariat may restrict the political rights of the upper classes in the same way as the upper classes used to restrict its political rights." Plekhanov's speech was greeted with applause and *hissing*, and when

Plekhanov protested against somebody's *Zwischenruf*,\* "You should not hiss," and told the comrades not to restrain their demonstrations, Comrade Egorov got up and said: "Since such speeches call forth applause, I am obliged to hiss." Together with Comrade Goldblatt (a Bund delegate), Comrade Egorov challenged the views of Posadovsky and Plekhanov. Unfortunately, the debate was closed, and this question that had cropped up in it immediately vanished from the scene. But it is useless for Comrade Martov to attempt now to belittle or even altogether deny its significance by saying at the League Congress: "These words [Plekhanov's] aroused the indignation of some of the delegates; this could easily have been avoided if Comrade Plekhanov had added that it was of course impossible to imagine so tragic a situation as that the proletariat, in order to consolidate its victory, should have to trample on such political rights as freedom of the press. . . . (Plekhanov: 'Merci'.)" (League Minutes, p. 58). This interpretation *directly* contradicts Comrade Posadovsky's categorical statement *at the Congress* about a "serious difference of opinion" and disagreement on a "fundamental question". On this fundamental question, all the *Iskra*-ists at the Congress *opposed* the spokesmen of the anti-*Iskra* "Right" (Goldblatt) and of the Congress "Centre" (Egorov). This is a fact, and one may safely assert that if the "Centre" (I hope this word will shock the "official" supporters of mildness less than any other. . .) had had occasion to speak "*without restraint*" (through the mouth of Comrade Egorov or Makhov) on this or on analogous questions, the serious difference of opinion would have been revealed at once.

It was revealed even more distinctly over the matter of "equality of languages" (Minutes, pp. 171 et seq.). On this point it was not so much the debate that was so eloquent, but the voting: counting up the times a vote was taken, we get the incredible number of *sixteen*! Over what? Over whether it was enough to stipulate in the programme the equality of all citizens irrespective of sex, etc., *and language*, or whether it was necessary to stipulate "freedom of language", or "equality of languages". Comrade Martov characterised this episode fairly accurately at the League Congress when he said that "a trifling dispute over the formulation of one point of the programme became a matter of principle because half the Congress was prepared to overthrow the Programme Committee". Precisely.\*\*

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\* Interjection from the floor.—Ed.

\*\* Martov added: "On this occasion much harm was done by Plekhanov's witticism about asses." (When the question of freedom of language was being discussed, a Bundist, I think it was, mentioned stud farms among other institu-

The immediate cause of the conflict was indeed trifling, yet it did become a matter of *principle* and consequently assumed terribly bitter forms, even to the point of attempts to "*overthrow*" the Programme Committee, of suspecting people of a desire to "*mislead the Congress*" (as Egorov suspected Martov!), and of personal remarks of the most . . . abusive kind (p. 178). Even Comrade Popov "expressed regret that mere trifles had given rise to *such an atmosphere*" (my italics, p. 182) as prevailed during the course of three sittings (the 16th, 17th and 18th).

All these expressions very definitely and categorically point to the extremely important fact that the atmosphere of "suspicion" and of the most bitter forms of conflict ("overthrowing")—for which later, at the League Congress, the *Iskra*-ist majority were held responsible!—actually arose *long before we split into a majority and a minority*. I repeat, this is a fact of enormous importance, a fundamental fact, and failure to understand it leads a great many people to very thoughtless conclusions about the majority at the end of the Congress having been artificial. From the present point of view of Comrade Martov, who asserts that nine-tenths of the Congress delegates were *Iskra*-ists, the fact that "mere trifles", a "trivial" cause, could give rise to a conflict which became a "matter of principle" and nearly led to the overthrow of a Congress commission is absolutely inexplicable and absurd. It would be ridiculous to evade this *fact* with lamentations and regrets about "harmful" witticisms. No cutting witticisms could have made the conflict a matter of *principle*; it could become that only because of the character of the political groupings at the Congress. It was not cutting remarks and witticisms that gave rise to the conflict—they were only a *symptom* of the fact that the Congress political grouping itself harboured a "contradiction", that it harboured all the makings of a conflict, that it harboured an internal heterogeneity which burst forth with immanent force at the least cause, *even the most trifling*.

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tions, whereupon Plekhanov said in a loud undertone: "Horses don't talk, but asses sometimes do.") I cannot, of course, see anything particularly mild accommodating, tactful or flexible about this witticism. But I find it strange that Martov, who admitted that the dispute became a *matter of principle*, made absolutely no attempt to analyse what this principle was and what shades of opinion found expression here, but confined himself to talking about the "harmfulness" of witticisms. This is indeed a bureaucratic and formalistic attitude! It is true that "much harm was done at the Congress" by cutting witticisms, levelled not only at the Bundists, but also at those whom the Bundists sometimes supported and even saved from defeat. However, once you admit that the incident involved principles, you cannot confine yourself to phrases about the "impermissibility" (League Minutes, p. 58) of certain witticisms

On the other hand, from the point of view from which I regard the Congress, and which I deem it my duty to uphold as a definite political interpretation of the events, even though this interpretation may seem offensive to some—from this point of view the desperately acute conflict of *principle* that arose from a “trifling” cause is quite explicable and inevitable. Since a struggle between the *Iskra*-ists and the anti-*Iskra*-ists went on *all the time* at our Congress, since between them stood unstable elements, and since the latter, together with the anti-*Iskra*-ists, controlled one-third of the votes ( $8+10=18$ , out of 51, according to my calculation, an approximate one, of course), it is perfectly clear and natural that *any falling away from the “Iskra”-ists of even a small minority* created the possibility of a victory for the anti-*Iskra* trend and therefore evoked a “frenzied” struggle. This was not the result of improper cutting remarks and attacks, but of the political combination. It was not cutting remarks that gave rise to the political conflict; it was the existence of a political conflict in the very grouping at the Congress that gave rise to cutting remarks and attacks—this contrast expresses the cardinal disagreement in principle between Martov and myself in appraising the political significance of the Congress and its results.

In all, there were during the Congress three major cases of a small number of *Iskra*-ists falling away from the majority—over the equality of languages question, over Paragraph 1 of the Rules, and over the elections—and in all three cases a fierce struggle ensued, finally leading to the severe crisis we have in the Party today. For a political understanding of this crisis and this struggle, we must not confine ourselves to phrases about the impermissibility of witticisms, but must examine the political grouping of the shades that clashed at the Congress. The “equality of languages” incident is therefore doubly interesting as far as ascertaining the causes of the divergence is concerned, for here Martov was (still was!) an *Iskra*-ist and fought the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the “Centre” harder perhaps than anybody else.

The war opened with an argument between Comrade Martov and Comrade Lieber, the leader of the Bundists (pp. 171-72). Martov argued that the demand for “equality of citizens” was enough. “Freedom of language” was rejected, but “equality of languages” was forthwith proposed, and Comrade Egorov joined Lieber in the fray. Martov declared that it was *fetishism* “when speakers insist that nationalities are equal and transfer inequality to the sphere of language, whereas the question should be examined from just the opposite angle: inequality of nationalities exists, and one of its expressions is that people belonging

to certain nations are deprived of the right to use their mother tongue" (p. 172). There Martov was absolutely right. The totally baseless attempt of Lieber and Egorov to insist on the correctness of their formulation and make out that we were unwilling or unable to uphold the principle of equality of nationalities was indeed a sort of fetishism. Actually, they were, like "fetish-worshippers", defending the word and not the principle, acting not from fear of committing an error of principle, but from fear of what people might say. This shaky mentality (what if "others" blame us for this?)—which we already noted in connection with the Organising Committee incident—was quite clearly displayed here by our entire "Centre". Another of its spokesmen, the Mining Area delegate Lvov, who stood close to *Yuzhny Rabochy*, declared that "the question of the suppression of languages which has been raised by the border districts is a very serious one. It is important to include a point on language in our programme and thus obviate any possibility of the Social-Democrats being suspected of Russifying tendencies." A remarkable explanation of the "seriousness" of the question. It is very serious *because* possible suspicions on the part of the border districts must be obviated! The speaker says absolutely nothing on the substance of the question, he does not rebut the charge of fetishism but entirely confirms it, for he shows a complete lack of arguments of his own and merely talks about what the border districts may say. Everything they *may* say will be *untrue*—he is told. But instead of examining whether it is true or not, he replies: "*They may suspect.*"

Such a presentation of the question, coupled with the claim that it is serious and important, does indeed raise an issue of principle, but by no means the one the Liebers, Egorovs, and Lvovs would discern in it. The principle involved is: should we leave it to the organisations and members of the Party to apply the general and fundamental theses of the programme to their specific conditions, and to develop them for the purpose of such application, or are we, merely out of fear of suspicion, to fill the programme with petty details, minutiae, repetitions, and casuistry? The principle involved is: how can Social-Democrats discern ("suspect") in a fight against casuistry an attempt to restrict elementary democratic rights and liberties? When are we going to wean ourselves at last from this fetishist worship of casuistry?—that was the thought that occurred to us when watching this struggle over "languages".

The grouping of the delegates in this struggle is made particularly clear by the abundant roll-call votes. There were as many as three. All the time the *Iskra* core was solidly opposed by the anti-*Iskra*-ists (eight votes) and, with very slight fluctua-

tions, by the whole Centre (Makhov, Lvov, Egorov, Popov, Medvedev, Ivanov, Tsaryov, and Byclov—only the last two vacillated at first, now abstaining, now voting with us, and it was only during the third vote that their position became fully defined). Of the *Iskra*-ists, several fell away—chiefly the Caucasians (three with six votes)—and thank to this the “fetishist” trend ultimately gained the upper hand. During the third vote, when the followers of both trends had clarified their position most fully, the three Caucasians, with six votes, broke away from the majority *Iskra*-ists and went over to the other side; two delegates—Posadovsky and Kostich—with two votes, fell away from the minority *Iskra*-ists. During the first two votes, the following had gone over to the other side or abstained: Lensky, Stepanov, and Gorsky of the *Iskra*-ist majority, and Deutsch of the minority. *The falling away of eight “Iskra”-ist votes (out of a total of thirty-three) gave the superiority to the coalition of the anti-“Iskra”-ists and the unstable elements.* It was just this fundamental fact of the Congress grouping that was repeated (only with other *Iskra*-ists falling away) during the vote on Paragraph 1 of the Rules and during the elections. It is not surprising that those who were defeated in the elections now carefully close their eyes to the *political reasons* for that defeat, to the *starting-points* of that conflict of shades which progressively revealed the unstable and politically spineless elements and exposed them ever more relentlessly in the eyes of the Party. The equality of languages incident shows us this conflict all the more clearly because at that time Comrade Martov had not yet earned the praises and approval of Akimov and Makhov.

## F. THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

The inconsistency of principle of the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the “Centre” was also clearly brought out by the debate on the agrarian programme, which took up so much time at the Congress (see Minutes, pp. 190-226) and raised quite a number of extremely interesting points. As was to be expected, the campaign against the programme was launched by Comrade Martynov (after some minor remarks by Comrades Lieber and Egorov). He brought out the old argument about redressing “this particular historical injustice”, whereby, he claimed, we were indirectly “sanctifying other historical injustices”, and so on. He was joined by Comrade Egorov, who even found that “the significance of this programme is unclear. Is it a programme for ourselves, that is, does it define our demands, or do we want to make it popular?” (!!?) Comrade Lieber said he “would like

to make the same points as Comrade Egorov". Comrade Makhov spoke up in his usual positive manner and declared that "the majority [?] of the speakers positively cannot understand what the programme submitted means and what its aims are". The proposed programme, you see, "can hardly be considered a Social-Democratic agrarian programme"; it... "smacks somewhat of a game at redressing historical injustices"; it bears "the trace of demagoguery and adventurism". As a theoretical justification of this profundity came the caricature and oversimplification so customary in vulgar Marxism: the *Iskra*-ists, we were told, "want to treat the peasants as something homogeneous in composition; but as the peasantry split up into classes long ago [?], advancing a single programme must inevitably render the whole programme demagogic and make it adventurist when put into practice" (p. 202). Comrade Makhov here "blurted out" the real reason why our agrarian programme meets with the disapproval of many Social-Democrats, who are prepared to "recognise" *Iskra* (as Makhov himself did) but who have absolutely failed to grasp its trend, its theoretical and tactical position. It was the vulgarisation of Marxism as applied to so complex and many-sided a phenomenon as the present-day system of Russian peasant economy, and not differences over particulars, that was and is responsible for the failure to understand this programme. And on this vulgar-Marxist standpoint the leaders of the anti-*Iskra* elements (Lieber and Martynov) and of the "Centre" (Egorov and Makhov) quickly found themselves in harmony. Comrade Egorov gave frank expression also to one of the characteristic features of *Yuzhny Rabochy* and the groups and circles gravitating towards it, namely, their failure to grasp the importance of the peasant movement, their failure to grasp that it was not overestimation, but, on the contrary, underestimation of its importance (and a lack of forces to utilise it) that was the weak side of our Social-Democrats at the time of the first famous peasant revolts. "I am far from sharing the infatuation of the editorial board for the peasant movement," said Comrade Egorov, "an infatuation to which many Social-Democrats have succumbed since the peasant disturbances." But, unfortunately, Comrade Egorov did not take the trouble to give the Congress any precise idea of what this infatuation of the *editorial board* consisted in: he did not take the trouble to make specific reference to any of the material published by *Iskra*. Moreover, he forgot that *all* the fundamental points of our agrarian programme had already been developed by *Iskra* in its third issue,\* that is, *long before* the peasant disturbances. Those

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See *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—Ed.



whose "recognition" of *Iskra* was not merely verbal might well have given a little more attention to its theoretical and tactical principles!

"No, we cannot do much among the peasants!" Comrade Egorov exclaimed, and he went on to indicate that this exclamation was not meant as a protest against any particular "infatuation", but as a denial of our entire position: "It means that our slogan cannot compete with the slogan of the adventurers." A most characteristic formulation of an unprincipled attitude, which reduces everything to "competition" between the slogans of different parties! And this was said after the speaker had pronounced himself "satisfied" with the theoretical explanations, which pointed out that we strove for lasting success in our agitation, undismayed by temporary failures, and that lasting success (as against the resounding clamour of our "competitors" ... for a short time) was impossible unless the programme had a firm theoretical basis (p. 196). What confusion is disclosed by this assurance of "satisfaction" followed by a repetition of the vulgar precepts inherited from the old Economism, for which the "competition of slogans" decided everything—not only the agrarian question, but the entire programme and tactics of the economic and political struggle! "You will not induce the agricultural labourer," Comrade Egorov said, "to fight side by side with the rich peasant for the cut-off lands,<sup>199</sup> which to no small extent are already in this rich peasant's hands."

There again you have the same over-simplification, undoubtedly akin to our opportunist Economism, which insisted that it was impossible to "induce" the proletariat to fight for what was to no small extent in the hands of the bourgeoisie and would fall into its hands to an even larger extent in the future. There again you have the vulgarisation that forgets the Russian peculiarities of the general capitalist relations between the agricultural labourer and the rich peasant. Actually, the cut-off lands today oppress the agricultural labourer *as well*, and he does not have to be "induced" to fight for emancipation from his state of servitude. It is certain intellectuals who have to be "induced"—induced to take a wider view of their tasks, induced to renounce stereotyped formulas when discussing specific questions, induced to take account of the historical situation, which complicates and modifies our aims. It is only the superstition that the muzhik is stupid—a superstition which, as Comrade Martov rightly remarked (p. 202), was to be detected in the speeches of Comrade Makhov and the other opponents of the agrarian programme—only this superstition explains why these opponents forget our agricultural labourer's actual conditions of life.

Having simplified the question into a naked contrast of worker

and capitalist, the spokesmen of our "Centre" tried, as often happens, to ascribe their own narrow-mindedness to the muzhik. "It is precisely because I consider the muzhik, within the limits of his narrow class outlook, a clever fellow," Comrade Makhov remarked, "that I believe he will stand for the petty-bourgeois ideal of seizure and division." Two things are obviously confused here: the definition of the class outlook of the muzhik as that of a petty bourgeois, *and the restriction*, the reduction of *this* outlook to "narrow limits". It is in this reduction that the mistake of the Egorovs and Makhovs lies (just as the mistake of the Martynovs and Akimovs lay in reducing the outlook of the proletariat to "narrow limits"). For both logic and history teach us the petty-bourgeois class outlook may be more or less narrow, and more or less progressive, precisely because of the dual status of the petty bourgeois. And far from dropping our hands in despair because of the narrowness ("stupidity") of the muzhik or because he is governed by "prejudice", we must work unremittingly to widen his outlook and help his reason to triumph over his prejudice.

The vulgar-"Marxist" view of the Russian agrarian question found its culmination in the concluding words of Comrade Makhov's speech, in which that faithful champion of the old *Iskra* editorial board set forth his principles. It was not for nothing that these words were greeted with applause . . . true, it was ironical applause. "I do not know, of course, what to call a misfortune," said Comrade Makhov, outraged by Plekhanov's statement that we were not at all alarmed by the movement for a General Redistribution,<sup>200</sup> and that we would not be the ones to hold back this progressive (bourgeois progressive) movement. "But this revolution, if it can be called such, would not be a revolutionary one. It would be truer to call it, not revolution, but reaction (*laughter*), a revolution that was more like a riot. . . . Such a revolution would throw us back, and it would require a certain amount of time to get back to the position we have today. Today we have far more than during the French Revolution (*ironical applause*), we have a Social-Democratic Party (*laughter*). . . ." Yes, a Social-Democratic Party which reasoned like Makhov, or which had central institutions of the Makhov persuasion, would indeed only deserve to be laughed at. . . .

Thus we see that even on the purely theoretical questions raised by the agrarian programme, the already familiar grouping at once appeared. The anti-*Iskra*-ists (eight votes) rushed into the fray on behalf of vulgar Marxism, and the leaders of the "Centre", the Egorovs and Makhovs, trailed after them, constantly erring and straying into the same narrow outlook. It

is quite natural, therefore, that the voting on certain points of the agrarian programme should have resulted in thirty and thirty-five votes in favour (pp. 225 and 226), that is, approximately the same figure as we observed in the dispute over the place of the Bund question on the agenda, in the Organising Committee incident, and in the question of shutting down *Yuzhny Rabochy*. An issue had only to arise which did not quite come within the already established and customary pattern, and which called for some independent application of Marx's theory to peculiar and new (new to the Germans) social and economic relations, and *Iskra*-ists who proved equal to the problems only made up three-fifths of the vote, while the whole "Centre" turned and followed the Liebcis and Martynovs. Yet Comrade Martov strives to gloss over this obvious fact, fearfully avoiding all mention of votes where the shades of opinion were clearly revealed!

It is clearly evident from the debate on the agrarian programme that the *Iskra*-ists had to fight against a good two-fifths of the Congress. On this question the Caucasian delegates took up an absolutely correct stand—due largely, in all probability, to the fact that first-hand knowledge of the forms taken by the numerous remnants of feudalism in their localities kept them from the schoolboyishly abstract and bare contrasts that satisfied the Makhovs. Martynov and Lieber, Makhov, and Egorov were combated by Plekhanov, by Gusev (who declared that he had "frequently encountered such a pessimistic view of our work in the countryside" as Comrade Egorov's "among the comrades active in Russia"), by Kostrov, by Karsky and by Trotsky. The latter rightly remarked that the "well-meant advice" of the critics of the agrarian programme "smacked too much of *philistinism*". It should only be said, since we are studying the political grouping at the Congress, that he was hardly correct when in this part of his speech (p. 208) he ranked Comrade Lange with Egorov and Makhov. Anyone who reads the minutes carefully will see that Lange and Gorin took quite a different stand from Egorov and Makhov. Lange and Gorin did not like the formulation of the point on the cut-off lands; they fully understood the idea of our agrarian programme, but tried to apply it *in a different way*, worked constructively to find what they considered a more irreproachable formulation, and in submitting their motions had in view either to convince the authors of the programme or else to side with them against all the non-*Iskra*-ists. For example, one has only to compare Makhov's motions to reject the whole agrarian programme (p. 212; *nine* for, thirty-eight against) or individual points in it (p. 216, etc.) with the position of Lange, who *moved* his own formulation of the point on the cut-off lands

(p. 225), to become convinced of the radical difference between them.\*

Referring to the arguments which smacked of "philistinism", Comrade Trotsky pointed out that "in the approaching revolutionary period we must link ourselves with the peasantry"... "In face of this task, the scepticism and political 'far-sightedness' of Makhov and Egorov are more harmful than any short-sightedness." Comrade Kostich, another minority *Iskra*-ist, very aptly pointed to Comrade Makhov's "unsureness of himself, of the stability of his principles"—a description that fits our "Centre" to a tittle. "In his pessimism Comrade Makhov is at one with Comrade Egorov, although they differ in shade," Comrade Kostich continued. "He forgets that the Social-Democrats are already working among the peasantry, are already directing their movement as far as possible. And this pessimism narrows the scope of our work" (p. 210).

To conclude our examination of the Congress discussion of the programme, it is worth while mentioning the brief debate on the subject of supporting oppositional trends. Our programme clearly states that the Social-Democratic Party supports "every *oppositional* and revolutionary movement *directed against the existing social and political order in Russia*". One would think that this last reservation made it quite clear *exactly which* oppositional trends we support. Nevertheless, the different shades that long ago developed in our Party at once revealed themselves *here too*, difficult as it was to suppose that any "perplexity or misunderstanding" was still possible on a question which had been chewed over so thoroughly! Evidently, it was not a matter of misunderstandings, but of *shades*. Makhov, Lieber, and Martynov at once sounded the alarm and again proved to be in so "compact" a minority that Comrade Martov would most likely have to attribute this too to intrigue, machination, diplomacy, and the other nice things (see his speech at the League Congress) to which people resort who are incapable of understanding the political reasons for the formation of "compact" groups of both minority and majority.

Makhov again began with a vulgar simplification of Marxism. "Our only revolutionary class is the proletariat," he declared, and from this correct premise he forthwith drew an incorrect conclusion: "The rest are of no account, they are mere hangers-on (*general laughter*)... Yes, they are mere hangers-on and only out to reap the benefits. I am against supporting them" (p. 226). Comrade Makhov's inimitable formulation of his position embarrassed many (of his supporters), but as a matter of

\* Cf. Gorin's speech, p. 213.

fact Lieber and Martynov agreed with him when they proposed deleting the word "oppositional" or restricting it by an addition: "democratic-oppositional". Plekhanov quite rightly took the field against this amendment of Martynov's. "We must criticise the liberals," he said, "expose their half-heartedness. That is true. . . . But, while exposing the narrowness and limitations of all movements other than the Social-Democratic, it is our duty to explain to the proletariat that even a constitution which does not confer universal suffrage would be a step forward compared with absolutism, and that therefore it should not prefer the existing order to such a constitution." Comrades Martynov, Lieber, and Makhov would not agree with this and persisted in their position, which was attacked by Axelrod, Starover, and Trotsky and once more by Plekhanov. Comrade Makhov managed on this occasion to surpass himself. First he had said that the other classes (other than the proletariat) were "of no account" and that he was "against supporting them". Then he condescended to admit that "while essentially it is reactionary, the bourgeoisie is often revolutionary—for example, in the struggle against feudalism and its survivals". "But there are some groups," he continued, going from bad to worse, "which are always [!] reactionary—such are the handicraftsmen." Such were the gems of theory arrived at by those very leaders of our "Centre" who later foamed at the mouth in defence of the old editorial board! Even in Western Europe, where the guild system was so strong, it was the handicraftsmen, like the other petty bourgeois of the towns, who displayed an exceptionally revolutionary spirit in the era of the fall of absolutism. And it is particularly absurd of a Russian Social-Democrat to repeat without reflection what our Western comrades say about the handicraftsmen of today, that is, of an era separated by a century or half a century from the fall of absolutism. To speak of the handicraftsmen in Russia being politically reactionary as compared with the bourgeoisie is merely to repeat a set phrase learnt by rote.

Unfortunately, there is no record in the minutes of the number of votes cast for the rejected amendments of Martynov, Makhov, and Lieber on this question. All we can say is that, here too, the leaders of the anti-*Iskra* elements and one of the leaders of the "Centre"\* joined forces in the already familiar grouping

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\* Another leader of this same group, the "Centre", Comrade Egorov, spoke on the question of supporting the oppositional trends on a different occasion, in connection with Axelrod's resolution on the Socialist-Revolutionaries<sup>201</sup> (p. 359). Comrade Egorov detected a "contradiction" between the demand in the programme for *support* of every oppositional and revolutionary movement and the *antagonistic* attitude towards both the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the

against the *Iskra*-ists. Summing up the *whole* discussion on the *programme*, one cannot help seeing that of the debates which were at all animated and evoked general interest there was *not one* that failed to reveal the difference of shades which Comrade Martov and the new *Iskra* editorial board now so carefully ignore.

## G. THE PARTY RULES. COMRADE MARTOV'S DRAFT

From the programme, the Congress passed to the Party Rules (we leave out the question of the Central Organ, already touched on above, and the delegates' reports, which the majority of the delegates were unfortunately unable to present in a satisfactory form). Needless to say, the question of the Rules was of tremendous importance to all of us. After all, *Iskra* had acted from the very outset not only as a press organ but also as an *organisational* nucleus. In an editorial in its fourth issue ("Where To Begin") *Iskra* had put forward a whole plan of organisation,\* which it pursued systematically and steadily over a period of *three years*. When the Second Party Congress adopted *Iskra* as the Central Organ, two of the three points of the preamble of the resolution on the subject (p. 147) were devoted *precisely to this organisational plan and to "Iskra's organisational ideas: its role in directing the practical work of the Party and the leading part it had played in the work of attaining unity*. It is quite natural, therefore, that the work of *Iskra* and the entire work of organising the Party, the entire work of *actually* restoring the Party, *could not* be regarded as finished until definite ideas of organisation had been adopted by the whole Party and formally enacted. This task was to be performed by the Party's Rules of Organisation.

The principal ideas which *Iskra* strove to make the basis of the Party's organisation amounted essentially to the following two: first, the idea of centralism, which defined in principle the method of deciding all particular and detailed questions of organ-

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liberals. In another form, and approaching the question from a somewhat different angle, Comrade Egorov here revealed the same narrow conception of Marxism, and the same unstable, semi-hostile attitude towards the position of *Iskra* (which he had "recognised"), as Comrades Makhov, Lieber, and Martynov had done

\* In his speech on the adoption of *Iskra* as the Central Organ, Comrade Popov said, *inter alia*: "I recall the article 'Where To Begin' in No. 3 or No. 4 of *Iskra*. Many of the comrades active in Russia found it a tactless article; others thought this plan was fantastic, and the majority [?—probably the majority around Comrade Popov] attributed it solely to ambition" (p. 140). As the reader sees, it is no new thing for me to hear my political views attributed to ambition—an explanation now being rehashed by Comrade Axelrod and Comrade Martov.

isation; second, the special function of an organ, a newspaper, for ideological leadership—an idea which took into account the temporary and special requirements of the Russian Social-Democratic working-class movement in the existing conditions of political slavery, with the *initial* base of operations for the revolutionary assault being set up abroad. The first idea, as the one matter of principle, had to pervade the entire Rules; the second, being a particular idea necessitated by temporary circumstances of place and mode of action, took the form of a *seeming* departure from centralism in the proposal to set up *two centres, a Central Organ and a Central Committee*. Both these principal *Iskra* ideas of Party organisation had been developed by me in the *Iskra* editorial (No. 4) “Where To Begin”<sup>\*\*</sup> and in *What Is To Be Done?*<sup>\*\*\*</sup> and, finally, had been explained in detail, in a form that was practically a finished set of Rules, in *A Letter to a Comrade*.<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Actually, all that remained was the work of formulating the paragraphs of the Rules, which were to embody just those ideas if the recognition of *Iskra* was not to be merely nominal, a mere conventional phrase. In the preface to the new edition of my *Letter to a Comrade* I have already pointed out that a simple comparison of the Party Rules with that pamphlet is enough to establish the complete identity of the ideas of organisation contained in the two.<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup>

*A propos* of the work of formulating *Iskra*’s ideas of organisation in the Rules, I must deal with a certain incident mentioned by Comrade Martov. “...A statement of fact,” said Martov at the League Congress (p. 58), “will show you how far my lapse into opportunism on this paragraph [i.e., Paragraph 1] was unexpected by Lenin. About a month and a half or two months before the Congress I showed Lenin my draft, in which Paragraph 1 was formulated just in the way I proposed it at the Congress. Lenin objected to my draft on the ground that it was too detailed, and told me that all he liked was the idea of Paragraph 1—the definition of Party membership—which he would incorporate in his Rules with certain modifications, because he did not think my formulation was a happy one. Thus, Lenin had long been acquainted with my formulation, he knew my views on this subject. You thus see that I came to the Congress with my visor up, that I did not conceal my views. I warned him that I would oppose mutual co-optation, the principle of unanimity in cases of co-optation to the Central Committee and the Central Organ, and so on.”

<sup>\*</sup> See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 13-24.—*Ed.*

<sup>\*\*</sup> See pp. 92-231 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> See *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 231-52.—*Ed.*

<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 7, pp. 132-33.—*Ed.*

As regards the warning about opposing mutual co-optation, we shall see in its proper place how matters really stood. At present let us deal with this "open visor" of Martov's Rules. At the League Congress, recounting from memory this episode of his unhappy draft (which he himself withdrew at the Congress because it was an unhappy one, but after the Congress, with his characteristic consistency, again brought out into the light of day), Martov, as so often happens, forgot a good deal and therefore again got things muddled. One would have thought there had already been cases enough to warn him against quoting private conversations and relying on his memory (people involuntarily recall only what is to their advantage!)—nevertheless, for want of any other, Comrade Martov used unsound material. Today even Comrade Plekhanov is beginning to imitate him—evidently, a bad example is contagious.

I could not have "liked" the "idea" of Paragraph 1 of Martov's draft, for that draft contained *no idea* that came up at the Congress. His memory played him false. I have been fortunate enough to find Martov's draft among my papers, and in it "*Paragraph 1 is formulated not in the way he proposed it at the Congress*"! So much for the "open visor"!

Paragraph 1 in Martov's draft: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who, accepting its programme, works actively to accomplish its aims under the control and direction of the organs [*sic!*] of the Party."

Paragraph 1 in my draft: "A member of the Party is one who accepts its programme and who supports the Party both financially and by personal participation in one of the Party organisations."

Paragraph 1 as formulated by Martov at the Congress and adopted by the Congress: "A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who accepts its programme, supports the Party financially, and renders it regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organisations."

It is clearly evident from this juxtaposition that there is no *idea* in Martov's draft, but only an *empty phrase*. That Party members must work under the control and direction of the *organs* of the Party goes without saying; *it cannot be otherwise*, and only those talk about it who love to talk without saying anything, who love to drown "Rules" in a flood of verbiage and bureaucratic formulas (that is, formulas useless for the work and supposed to be useful for display). The *idea* of Paragraph 1 appears only when the question is asked: can the *organs of the Party* exercise *actual* direction over Party members who *do not belong* to any of the *Party organisations*? There is not even a trace of this idea in Comrade Martov's draft. Consequently,



*I could not have been acquainted* with the "views" of Comrade Martov "on this subject", for in Comrade Martov's draft there are *no views on this subject*. Comrade Martov's statement of fact proves to be a *muddle*.

About Comrade Martov, on the other hand, it does have to be said that from my draft "he knew my views on this subject" and did not protest against them, did not reject them, either on the editorial board, although my draft was shown to everyone two or three weeks before the Congress, or in talking to the delegates, who were acquainted *only* with my draft. More, even *at the Congress*, when I moved my draft Rules\* and defended them *before the election of the Rules Committee*, Comrade Martov distinctly stated: "I associate myself with Comrade Lenin's conclusions *Only on two points do I disagree with him*" (my italics)—on the mode of constituting the Council and on unanimous co-optation (p. 157). *Not a word was yet said about any difference* over Paragraph 1.

In his pamphlet on the state of siege, Comrade Martov saw fit to recall his Rules once more, and in great detail. He assures us there that his Rules, to which, with the exception of certain minor particulars he would be prepared to subscribe even now (February 1904—we cannot say how it will be three months hence), "quite clearly expressed his disapproval of hypertrophy of centralism" (p. IV). The reason he did not submit this draft to the Congress, Comrade Martov *now* explains, was, firstly, that "his *Iskra* training had imbued him with disdain for Rules" (when it suits Comrade Martov, the word *Iskra* means for him, not a narrow circle spirit, but the most steadfast of trends! It is a pity, however, that Comrade Martov's *Iskra* training did not imbue him in three years with disdain for the anarchistic phrases by which the unstable mentality of the intellectual is capable of justifying the violation of Rules adopted by common consent). Secondly, that, don't you see, he, Comrade Martov, wanted to avoid "introducing any dissonance into the tactics of

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Incidentally, the Minutes Committee, in Appendix XI, has published the draft Rules "*moved at the Congress by Lenin*" (p. 393). Here the Minutes Committee has also muddled things a little. It has confused my *original* draft (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 476-78.—*Ed.*), which was shown to all the delegates (and to many before the Congress), with the draft *moved at the Congress*, and *published the former* under the guise of the latter. Of course, I have no objection to my drafts being published, *even in all their stages of preparation*, but there was no need to cause confusion. And confusion has been caused for Popov and Martov (pp. 154 and 157) criticised formulations in the draft I *actually moved at the Congress which are not in the draft* published by the Minutes Committee (cf. p. 394, Paragraphs 7 and 11). With a little more care, the mistake could easily have been detected simply by comparing the pages I mention.

that basic organisational nucleus which *Iskra* constituted." Wonderfully consistent, isn't it? On a question of *principle* regarding an opportunist formulation of Paragraph 1 or hypertrophy of centralism, Comrade Martov was so afraid of any dissonance (which is terrible only from the narrowest circle point of view) that he did not set forth his disagreement even to a nucleus like the editorial board! On the *practical* question of the composition of the central bodies, Comrade Martov appealed for the assistance of the Bund and the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists against the vote of the majority of the *Iskra* organisation (that real *basic organisational nucleus*). The "dissonance" in his phrases, which smuggle in the circle spirit in defence of the quasi-editorial board only to repudiate the "circle spirit" in the appraisal of the question by those best qualified to judge—this dissonance Comrade Martov does not notice. To punish him, we shall quote his draft Rules *in full*, noting for our part what *views* and what *hypertrophy* they reveal\*:

"Draft of Party Rules—I Party Membership—1) A member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is one who, accepting its programme, works actively to accomplish its aims under the control and direction of the organs of the Party.—2) Expulsion of a member from the Party for conduct incompatible with the interests of the Party shall be decided by the Central Committee. [The sentence of expulsion, giving the reasons shall be preserved in the Party files and shall be communicated, on request, to every Party committee. The Central Committee's decision to expel a member may be appealed against to the Congress on the demand of two or more committees.] "I shall indicate by square brackets the provisions in Martov's draft which are *obviously* meaningless, failing to contain not only "ideas", but even any definite conditions or requirements—like the inimitable specification in the "Rules" as to *where exactly* a sentence of expulsion is to be preserved, or the provision that the Central Committee's decision to expel a member (and not all its decisions in general?) may be appealed against to the Congress. This indeed, is hypertrophy of verbiage, or real bureaucratic formalism, which frames superfluous patently useless or red-tapist, points and paragraphs. "II. Local Committees—3) In its local work, the Party is represented by the Party committees" (how new and clever!). "4) [As Party committees are recognised all those existing at the time of the Second Congress and represented at the Congress]—5) New Party committees, in addition to those mentioned in Paragraph 4, shall be appointed by the Central Committee [which shall either endorse as a committee the existing membership of the given local organisation, or shall set up a local committee by reforming the latter].—6) The committees may add to their membership by means of co-optation.—7) The Central Committee has the right to augment the membership of a local committee with such numbers of comrades (known to it) as shall not exceed one-third of the total membership of the committee." A perfect sample of bureaucracy. Why not exceeding one-third? What is the purpose of this? What is the sense of this restriction which restricts nothing, seeing that the *augmenting* may be repeated over and

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\* I might mention that unfortunately I could not find the first variant of Comrade Martov's draft, which consisted of some forty-eight paragraphs and suffered even more from "hypertrophy" of worthless formalism.

over again? "8) [In the event of a local committee falling apart or being broken up by persecution" (does this mean that not all the members have been arrested?), "the Central Committee shall re-establish it." (Without regard to Paragraph 7? Does not Comrade Martov perceive a similarity between Paragraph 8 and those Russian laws on orderly conduct which command citizens to work on weekdays and rest on holidays?) "9) [A regular Party Congress may instruct the Central Committee to reform the composition of any local committee if the activities of the latter are found incompatible with the interests of the Party. In that event the existing committee shall be deemed dissolved and the comrades in its area of operation exempt from subordination to it]" The provision contained in this paragraph is as highly useful as the provision contained to this day in the Russian law which reads: "Drunkness is forbidden to all and sundry." "10) [The local Party committees shall direct all the propagandist, agitational, and organisational activities of the Party in their localities and shall do all in their power to assist the Central Committee and the Central Organs of the Party in carrying out the general Party tasks entrusted to them.] Phew! What in the name of all that's holy is the purpose of this? "11) [The internal arrangements of a local organisation, the mutual relations between a committee and the groups subordinate to it" (do you hear that, Comrade Axelrod?), "and the limits of the competence and autonomy" (are not the limits of competence the same as the limits of autonomy?) "of these groups shall be determined by the committee itself and communicated to the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organs.] (An omission: it is not stated where these communications are to be filed) "12) [All groups subordinate to committees, and individual Party members, have the right to demand that their opinions and recommendations on any subject be communicated to the Central Committee of the Party and its Central Organs]—13) The local Party committees shall contribute from their revenues to the funds of the Central Committee such sums as the Central Committee shall assign to their share.—III. Organisations for the Purpose of Agitation in Languages Other than Russian.—14) [For the purpose of carrying on agitation in any non-Russian language and of organising the workers among whom such agitation is carried on, separate organisations may be set up in places where such specialised agitation and the setting up of such organisations are deemed necessary]—15) The question as to whether such a necessity exists shall be decided by the Central Committee of the Party, and in disputed cases by the Party Congress." The first part of this paragraph is superfluous in view of subsequent provisions in the Rules, and the second part, concerning disputed cases, is simply ludicrous. "16) [The local organisations mentioned in Paragraph 14 shall be autonomous in their special affairs but shall act under the control of the local committee and be subordinate to it, the forms of this control and the character of the organisational relations between the committee and the special organisation being determined by the local committee" (Well, thank God! It is now quite clear that this whole spate of empty words was superfluous.) "In respect of the general affairs of the Party, such organisations shall act as part of the committee organisation.]—17) [The local organisations mentioned in Paragraph 14 may form autonomous leagues for the effective performance of their special tasks. These leagues may have their own special press and administrative bodies, both being under the direct control of the Central Committee of the Party. The Rules of these leagues shall be drawn up by themselves but shall be subject to endorsement by the Central Committee of the Party.]—18) [The autonomous leagues mentioned in Paragraph 17 may include local Party committees if, by reason of local conditions, these devote them-

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\* We would draw Comrade Axelrod's attention to this word. Why, this is terrible! Here are the roots of that "Jacobinism" which goes to the length even . . . even of altering the composition of an editorial board. . . .

selves mainly to agitation in the given language. *Note* While forming part of the autonomous league, such a committee does not cease to be a committee of the Party.]” (This entire paragraph is extremely useful and wonderfully clever, the note even more so.) “19) [The relations of local organisations belonging to an autonomous league with the central bodies of that league shall be controlled by the local committees.]—20) [The central press and administrative bodies of the autonomous leagues shall stand in the same relation to the Central Committee of the Party as the local Party committees.]—IV. Central Committee and Press Organs of the Party.—21) [The Party as a whole shall be represented by its Central Committee and its press organs, political and theoretical.]—22) The functions of the Central Committee shall be to exercise general direction of all the practical activities of the Party; to ensure the proper utilisation and allocation of all its forces, to exercise control over the activities of all sections of the Party; to supply the local organisations with literature; to organise the technical apparatus of the Party; to convene Party congresses.—23) The functions of the press organs of the Party shall be: to exercise ideological direction of Party life, to conduct propaganda for the Party programme, and to carry out theoretical and popular elaboration of the world outlook of Social-Democracy.—24) All local Party committees and autonomous leagues shall maintain direct communication both with the Central Committee of the Party and with the editorial board of the Party organs and shall keep them periodically informed of the progress of the movement and of organisational work in their localities.—25) The editorial board of the Party press organs shall be appointed at Party congresses and shall function until the next congress.—26) [The editorial board shall be autonomous in its internal affairs] and may in the interval between congresses augment or alter its membership, informing the Central Committee in each case.—27) All statements issued by the Central Committee or receiving its sanction shall, on the demand of the Central Committee, be published in the Party organ.—28) The Central Committee, by agreement with the editorial board of the Party organs, shall set up special writers’ groups for various forms of literary work.—29) The Central Committee shall be appointed at Party congresses and shall function until the next congress. The Central Committee may augment its membership by means of co-optation, without restriction as to numbers, in each case informing the editorial board of the Central Organs of the Party.—V. The Party Organisation Abroad.—30) The Party organisation abroad shall carry on propaganda among Russians living abroad and organise the socialist elements among them. It shall be headed by an elected administrative body.—31) The autonomous leagues belonging to the Party may maintain branches abroad to assist in carrying out their special tasks. These branches shall constitute autonomous groups within the general organisation abroad.—VI. Party Congresses.—32) The supreme Party authority is the Congress.—33) [The Party Congress shall lay down the Programme, Rules and guiding principles of the activities of the Party; it shall control the work of all Party bodies and settle disputes arising between them].—34) The right to be represented at congresses shall be enjoyed by: a) all local Party committees; b) the central administrative bodies of all the autonomous leagues belonging to the Party; c) the Central Committee of the Party and the editorial board of its Central Organs; d) the Party organisation abroad.—35) Mandates may be entrusted to proxies, but no delegate shall hold more than three valid mandates. A mandate may be divided between two representatives. Binding instructions are forbidden.—36) The Central Committee shall be empowered to invite to the congress in a deliberative capacity comrades whose presence may be useful.—37) Amendments to the Programme or Rules of the Party shall require a two-thirds majority; other questions shall be decided by a simple majority.—38) A congress shall be deemed properly constituted if more than half the Party committees existing at the time of it are represented.—39) Congresses shall, as far as possible, be convened

once every two years. [If for reasons beyond the control of the Central Committee a congress cannot be convened within this period, the Central Committee shall on its own responsibility postpone it.]”

Any reader who, by way of an exception, has had the patience to read these so-called Rules to the end assuredly will not expect me to give special reasons for the following conclusions. First conclusion: the Rules suffer from almost incurable dropsy. Second conclusion: it is impossible to discover in these Rules any special shade of organisational views evincing a disapproval of hypertrophy of centralism. Third conclusion: Comrade Martov acted very wisely indeed in concealing from the eyes of the world (and withholding from discussion at the Congress) more than 38 39 of his Rules. Only it is rather odd that *à propos* of this concealment he should talk about an open visor.

## H. DISCUSSION ON CENTRALISM PRIOR TO THE SPLIT AMONG THE ISKRA-ISTS

Before passing to the really interesting question of the formulation of Paragraph 1 of the Rules, a question which undoubtedly disclosed the existence of different shades of opinion, let us dwell a little on that brief general discussion of the Rules which occupied the 14th and part of the 15th Congress sittings. This discussion is of some significance inasmuch as it *preceded* the complete divergence within the *Iskra* organisation over the composition of the central bodies, whereas the subsequent debate on the Rules in general, and on co-optation in particular, took place *after* this divergence in the *Iskra* organisation. Naturally, *before* the divergence we were able to express our views more impartially, in the sense that they were more independent of views about the personal composition of the Central Committee, which became such a keen issue with us all Comrade Martov, as I have already remarked, *associated himself* (p. 157) with my views on organisation, only making the reservation that he differed on two points of *detail*. Both the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the “Centre”, on the contrary, at once took the field against both *fundamental* ideas of the whole *Iskra* organisational plan (and, consequently, against the Rules in their entirety): against centralism and against “two centres” Comrade Lieber referred to my Rules as “organised distrust” and discerned *decentralism* in the proposal for two centres (as did Comrades Popov and Egorov). Comrade Akimov wanted to broaden the jurisdiction of the local committees, and, in particular, to grant them themselves “the right to alter their composition”. “They should be allowed greater freedom of action. . . . The local committees should be elected by

the active workers in their localities, just as the Central Committee is elected by the representatives of all the active organisations in Russia. And if even this cannot be allowed, let the number of members that the Central Committee may appoint to local committees be limited. . . " (p. 158). Comrade Akimov, as you see, suggested an argument against "hypertrophy of centralism", but Comrade Martov remained deaf to these weighty arguments, not yet having been induced by his defeat over the composition of the central bodies to follow in Akimov's wake. He remained deaf even when Comrade Akimov suggested to him the "*idea*" of his own Rules (Paragraph 7—restriction of the Central Committee's right to appoint members to the committees)! At that time Comrade Martov still did not want any "dissonance" with us, and for that reason tolerated a dissonance both with Comrade Akimov and with himself. . . . At that time the only opponents of "monstrous centralism" were those to whom *Iskra's* centralism was clearly *disadvantageous*: it was opposed by Akimov, Lieber, and Goldblatt, *followed*, cautiously and circumspectly (so that they could always turn back), by Egorov (see pp. 156 and 276) and such like. At that time it was still clear to the vast majority of the Party that it was the parochial, circle interests of the Bund, *Yuzhny Rabochy*, etc., that evoked the protest against centralism. For that matter, now too it is clear to the majority of the Party that it is the circle interests of the old *Iskra* editorial board that cause it to protest against centralism. . . .

Take, for example, Comrade Goldblatt's speech (pp. 160-61). He inveighs against my "monstrous" centralism and claims that it would lead to the "destruction" of the lower organisations, that it is "permeated through and through with the desire to give the centre unrestricted powers and the unrestricted right to interfere in everything", that it allows the organisations "only one right—to submit without a murmur to orders from above", etc. "The centre proposed by the draft would find itself in a vacuum, it would have no peripheral organisations around it, but only an amorphous mass in which its executive agents would move." Why, this is exactly the kind of *false phrasemongering* to which the Martovs and Axelrods proceeded to treat us after their defeat at the Congress. The Bund was laughed at when it fought *our* centralism while granting *its own* central body *even more definite* unrestricted rights (e.g., to appoint and expel members, and even to refuse to admit delegates to congresses). And when people sort things out, the howls of the *minority* will also be laughed at, for they cried out against centralism and against the Rules when they were in the minority, but lost no time in taking advantage of the Rules once they had managed to make themselves the majority.

Over the question of two centres, the grouping was also clearly evident: *all* the *Iskra*-ists were opposed by Lieber, by Akimov (the first to strike up the now favourite Axelrod-Martov tune about the Central Organ predominating over the Central Committee on the Council), by Popov, and by Egorov. From the ideas of organisation which the *old Iskra* had always advocated (and which the Popovs and Egorovs had *verbally* approved!), the plan for two centres followed of itself. The policy of the *old Iskra* cut across the plans of *Yuzhny Rabochy*, the plans to create a parallel popular organ and to convert it virtually into the dominant organ. There lies the root of the paradox, so strange at first glance, that all the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the entire Marsh were in favour of one central body, that is, of *seemingly greater centralism*. Of course, there were some delegates (especially among the Marsh) who probably did not have a clear idea where the organisational plans of *Yuzhny Rabochy* would lead, and were bound to lead in the nature of things, but they were impelled to follow the anti-*Iskra*-ists by their very irresoluteness and unsureness of themselves.

Of the speeches by *Iskra*-ists during *this* debate on the Rules (the one preceding the split among the *Iskra*-ists), particularly noteworthy were those of Comrades Martov ("association" with my ideas of organisation) and Trotsky. Every word of the answer the latter gave Comrades Akimov and Lieber exposes the utter falsity of the "minority's" post-Congress conduct and theories. "The Rules, he [Comrade Akimov] said, do not define the jurisdiction of the Central Committee with enough precision. I cannot agree with him. On the contrary, this definition is precise and means that inasmuch as the Party is one whole, it must be ensured control over the local committees. Comrade Lieber said, borrowing my expression, that the Rules were 'organised distrust'. That is true. But I used this expression in reference to the Rules proposed by the Bund spokesmen, which represented organised distrust on the part of a section of the Party towards the whole Party. Our Rules, on the other hand" (at that time, before the defeat over the composition of the central bodies, the Rules were "ours"!), "represent the organised distrust of the Party towards all its sections, that is, control over all local, district, national, and other organisations" (p. 158). Yes, *our* Rules are *here* correctly described, and we would advise those to bear this more constantly in mind who are now assuring us with an easy conscience that it was the intriguing majority who conceived and introduced the system of "organised distrust" or, which is the same thing, the "state of siege". One has only to compare this speech with the speeches at the Congress of the League Abroad to get a specimen of political spinelessness, a spec-

imen of how the views of Martov and Co. changed depending on whether the matter concerned their own group of a lower order or someone else's.

## I. PARAGRAPH ONE OF THE RULES

We have already cited the different formulations around which an interesting debate flared up at the Congress. This debate took up nearly two sittings and ended with *two roll-call* votes (during the entire Congress there were, if I am not mistaken, only eight roll-call votes, which were resorted to only in very important cases because of the great loss of time they involved). The question at issue was undoubtedly one of principle. The interest of the Congress in the debate was tremendous. *All* the delegates voted—a rare occurrence at our Congress (as at any big congress) and one that likewise testifies to the interest displayed by the disputants.

What, then, was the substance of the matter in dispute? I already said at the Congress, and have since repeated it time and again, that "I by no means consider our difference (over Paragraph 1) so vital as to be a matter of life or death to the Party. We shall certainly not perish because of an unfortunate clause in the Rules!" (P. 250.)\* Taken by itself, this difference, although it did reveal shades of principle, could never have called forth that divergence (actually, to speak unreservedly, that split) which took place after the Congress. But every *little* difference may become a *big* one if it is insisted on, if it is put into the foreground, if people *set about* searching for all the roots and branches of the difference. Every *little* difference may assume *tremendous* importance if it serves as the starting-point for a *swing* towards definite mistaken views, and if these mistaken views are combined, by virtue of new and additional divergences, with *anarchistic* actions which bring the Party to the point of a split.

And that is just what happened in the present case. The comparatively slight difference over Paragraph 1 has now acquired tremendous importance, because it was this that started the swing towards the opportunist profundities and anarchistic phrase-mongering of the minority (especially at the League Congress, and subsequently in the columns of the new *Iskra* as well). It was this that *marked the beginning* of the coalition of the *Iskra*-ist minority with the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the Marsh,

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 501.—Ed.



which assumed final and definite shape by the time of the elections, and without understanding which *it is impossible to understand* the major and fundamental divergence over the composition of the central bodies. The slight mistake of Martov and Axelrod over Paragraph 1 was a slight crack in our pot (as I put it at the League Congress). The pot could be bound tight with a *hard* knot (and not a hangman's knot, as it was misunderstood by Martov, who during the League Congress was in a state bordering on hysteria); or *all* efforts could be directed towards widening the crack and breaking the pot in two. And that is what happened, thanks to the boycott and similar anarchistic moves of the zealous Martovites. The difference over Paragraph 1 played no small part in the elections to the central bodies, and Martov's defeat in the elections led him into a "struggle over principles" with the use of grossly mechanical and even brawling methods (such as his speeches at the Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad).

Now, after all these happenings, the question of Paragraph 1 has thus assumed *tremendous importance*, and we must clearly realise both the character of the Congress groupings in the voting on this paragraph and—far more important still—the real nature of those *shades of opinion* which revealed or began to reveal themselves over Paragraph 1. Now, after the events with which the reader is familiar, the question *stands* as follows: Did Martov's formulation, which was supported by Axelrod, reflect his (or their) instability, vacillation, and political vagueness, as I expressed it at the Party Congress (p. 333), his (or their) deviation towards Jaurèsism and anarchism, as Plekhanov suggested at the League Congress (League Minutes, p. 102 and elsewhere)? Or did my formulation, which was supported by Plekhanov, reflect a wrong, bureaucratic, formalistic, Jack-in-office, un-Social-Democratic conception of centralism? *Opportunism and anarchism, or bureaucracy and formalism?*—that is the way the question *stands now*, when the little difference has become a big one. And when discussing the pros and cons of my formulation *on their merits*, we must *bear in mind* just *this* presentation of the question, which has been forced upon us all by the events, or, I would say if it did not sound too pompous, has been evolved by history.

Let us begin the examination of these pros and cons with an analysis of the Congress debate. The first speech, that of Comrade Egorov, is interesting only for the fact that his attitude (*non liquet*, it is not yet clear to me, I do not yet know where the truth lies) was very characteristic of the attitude of many delegates, who found it difficult to grasp the rights and wrongs of this really new and fairly complex and detailed question. The next speech, that of Comrade Axelrod, at once made the

issue one of principle. This was the first speech Comrade Axelrod made at the Congress on questions of principle, one might even say the first speech he made at all, and it can scarcely be claimed that his *début* with the celebrated "professor" was particularly fortunate. "I think," Comrade Axelrod said, "that we must draw a distinction between the concepts party and organisation. These two concepts are being confused here. And the confusion is dangerous." That was the first argument against my formulation. Examine it more closely. When I say that the Party should be the *sum* (and not the mere arithmetical sum, but a complex) of *organisations*,\* does that mean that I "confuse" the concepts party and organisation? Of course not. I thereby express clearly and precisely my wish, my demand, that the Party, as the vanguard of the class, should be as *organised* as possible, that the Party should admit to its ranks only such elements *as allow of at least a minimum of organisation*. My opponent, on the contrary, *lumps together* in the Party organised and unorganised elements, those who lend themselves to direction and those who do not, the advanced and the incorrigibly backward—for the corrigibly backward can join an organisation. This *confusion* is indeed *dangerous*. Comrade Axelrod further cited the "strictly secret and centralised organisations of the past" (*Zemlya i Volya* and *Narodnaya Volya*): around them, he said, "were grouped a large number of people who did not belong to the organisation but who helped it in one way or another and who were regarded as Party members. . . . This principle should be even more strictly observed in the Social-Democratic organisation." Here we come to one of the *key* points of the matter: is "this principle" really a Social-Democratic one—this principle which allows people who do not belong to any of the organisations of the Party, but only "help it in one way or another", to call themselves Party members? And Plekhanov gave the only possible reply to this question when he said: "Axelrod was wrong in citing the seventies. At that time

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\* The word "organisation" is commonly employed in two senses, a broad and a narrow one. In the narrow sense it signifies an individual nucleus of a collective of people with at least a minimum degree of coherent form. In the broad sense it signifies the sum of such nuclei united into a whole. For example, the navy, the army, or the state is at one and the same time a sum of organisations (in the narrow sense of the word) and a variety of social organisation (in the broad sense of the word). The Department of Education is an organisation (in the broad sense of the word) and consists of a number of organisations (in the narrow sense of the word). Similarly, the Party is an organisation, *should be* an organisation (in the broad sense of the word); at the same time, the Party should consist of a whole number of diversified organisations (in the narrow sense of the word). Therefore, when he spoke of drawing a distinction between the concepts party and organisation, Comrade Axelrod,

there was a well-organised and splendidly disciplined centre, around it there were the organisations, of various categories, which it had created, and what remained outside these organisations was chaos, anarchy. The component elements of this chaos called themselves Party members but this harmed rather than benefited the cause. We should not imitate the anarchy of the seventies but avoid it. Thus this principle which Comrade Axelrod wanted to pass off as a Social Democratic one is in reality an *anarchistic principle*. To refute this one would have to show that control, direction and discipline *are possible* outside an organisation and that conferring the title of Party members on elements of chaos *is necessary*. The supporters of Comrade Martov's formulation did not show and could not show *either* of these things Comrade Axelrod took as an example a professor who regards himself as a Social Democrat and declares himself such. To complete the thought contained in this example Comrade Axelrod should have gone on to tell us whether the organised Social Democrats themselves regard the professor as a Social-Democrat. By failing to raise this further question Comrade Axelrod abandoned his argument half way. After all one thing or the other. Either the organised Social Democrats regard the professor in question as a Social Democrat in which case why should they not enrol him in one of the Social Democratic organisations? For only if the professor is thus enrolled will his declaration answer to his actions and not be empty talk (as professorial declarations all too frequently are). Or the organised Social Democrats *do not* regard the professor as a Social Democrat in which case it would be absurd senseless and *harmful* to allow him the right to bear the honourable and responsible title of Party member. The matter therefore reduces itself to the alternative consistent application of the principle of organisation or the sanctification of disunity and anarchy? Are we to build the Party on the basis of that already formed and welded core of *Social-Democrats* which brought about the Party Congress for instance and which should enlarge and multiply Party organisations of all kinds or are we to content ourselves with the soothing *phrase* that all who help are Party members? If we adopt Lenin's formula Comrade Axelrod continued we shall be throwing overboard a section of those who even if they cannot be directly admitted to an organisation are nevertheless Party members. The confusion of concepts of which Comrade Axelrod wanted to accuse me stands out here quite clearly in

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 firstly did not take account of the difference between the broad and the narrow sense of the word organisation and secondly did not observe that he was himself *confusing* organised and unorganised elements

his own case: he already takes it for granted that all who help *are* Party members, whereas that is what the whole argument is about and our opponents have still to *prove* the necessity and value of such an interpretation. What is the meaning of the phrase "throwing overboard", which at first glance seems so terrible? Even if only members of organisations recognised as Party organisations are regarded as Party members, people who cannot "directly" join any Party organisation can still work in an organisation which does not belong to the Party but is associated with it. Consequently, there can be no talk of throwing anyone overboard in the sense of preventing them from working, from taking part in the movement. On the contrary, the stronger our Party organisations, consisting of *real* Social-Democrats, the less wavering and instability there is *within* the Party, the broader, more varied, richer, and more fruitful will be the Party's influence on the elements of the working-class *masses* surrounding it and guided by it. The Party, as the vanguard of the working class, must not be confused, after all, with the entire class. And Comrade Axelrod is guilty of just this confusion (which is characteristic of our opportunist Economism in general) when he says: "First and foremost we are, of course, creating an organisation of the most active elements of the Party, an organisation of revolutionaries; but since we are the Party of a class, we must take care not to leave outside the Party ranks people who consciously, though perhaps not very actively, associate themselves with that Party." Firstly, the active elements of the Social-Democratic working-class party will include not only organisations of revolutionaries, but a *whole number* of workers' organisations recognised as Party organisations. Secondly, how, by what logic, does the fact that we are the party of a class warrant the conclusion that it is unnecessary to make a distinction between those who *belong* to the Party and those who *associate* themselves with it? Just the contrary: precisely because there are differences in degree of consciousness and degree of activity, a distinction must be made in degree of proximity to the Party. We are the party of a class, and therefore *almost the entire class* (and in times of war, in a period of civil war, the entire class) should act under the leadership of our Party, should adhere to our Party as closely as possible. But it would be Manilovism<sup>202</sup> and "tail-ism" to think that the entire class, or almost the entire class, can ever rise, under capitalism, to the level of consciousness and activity of its vanguard, of its Social-Democratic Party. No sensible Social-Democrat has ever doubted that under capitalism even the trade union organisations (which are more primitive and more comprehensible to the undeveloped sections) are incapable of embracing the entire, or almost the entire, working class. To

forget the distinction between the vanguard and the whole of the masses gravitating towards it, to forget the vanguard's constant duty of *raising* ever wider sections to its own advanced level, means simply to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our tasks, and to narrow down these tasks. And it is just such a shutting of one's eyes, it is just such forgetfulness, to obliterate the difference between those who associate themselves and those who belong, those who are conscious and active and those who only help.

To argue that we are the party of a class *in justification* of organisational looseness, *in justification* of confusing organisation with disorganisation, is to repeat the mistake of Nadezhdin, who confused "the philosophical and social-historical question of the 'depth' of the 'roots' of the movement with the technical and organisational question" (*What Is To Be Done?* p. 91).<sup>\*</sup> It is this confusion, wrought by the deft hand of Comrade Axelrod, that was then repeated dozens of times by the speakers who defended Comrade Martov's formulation. "The more widespread the title of Party member, the better," said Martov, without, however, explaining the benefit of a widespread *title* which did not correspond to fact. Can it be denied that control over Party members who do not belong to a Party organisation is a mere fiction? A widespread fiction is not beneficial, but harmful. "We could only rejoice if every striker, every demonstrator, answering for his actions, could proclaim himself a Party member" (p. 239). Is that so? *Every striker* should have the right to *proclaim himself a Party member*? In this statement Comrade Martov instantly carries his mistake to the point of absurdity, by *lowering* Social-Democracy to the level of mere strike-making, thereby repeating the misadventures of the Akimovs. We could only rejoice if the Social-Democrats succeeded in directing every strike, for it is their plain and unquestionable duty to direct every manifestation of the class struggle of the proletariat, and strikes are one of the most profound and most powerful manifestations of that struggle. But we should be tail-enders if we were to *identify* this primary form of struggle, which *ipso facto* is no more than a trade-unionist form, with the all-round and conscious Social-Democratic struggle. We should be opportunistically *legitimising a patent falsehood* if we were to allow every striker the right to "proclaim himself a Party member", for *in the majority of cases* such a "proclamation" would be *false*. We should be indulging in complacent daydreaming if we tried to assure ourselves and others that *every striker* can be a Social-Democrat and a member of the Social-Democratic Party, in face of that infinite disunity, oppression, and stultifica-

<sup>\*</sup> See p. 184 of the present volume.—Ed.

tion which under capitalism is bound to weigh down upon such very wide sections of the "untrained", unskilled workers. This example of the "*striker*" brings out with particular clarity the difference between the *revolutionary striving* to direct every strike in a Social-Democratic way and the *opportunist phrase-mongering* which proclaims *every* striker a Party member. We are the Party of a class inasmuch as we *in fact* direct almost the entire, or even the entire, proletarian class in a Social-Democratic way; but only Akimovs can conclude from this that we must *in word* identify the Party and the class.

"I am not afraid of a conspiratorial organisation," said Comrade Martov in this same speech; but, he added, "for me a conspiratorial organisation has meaning only when it is enveloped by a broad Social-Democratic working-class party" (p. 239). To be exact he should have said: when it is enveloped by a broad Social-Democratic working-class *movement*. And in that form Comrade Martov's proposition would have been not only indisputable, but a plain truism. I dwell on this point only because subsequent speakers turned Comrade Martov's truism into the very *prevalent and very vulgar* argument that Lenin wants "to confine the sum-total of Party members to the sum-total of conspirators". This conclusion, which can only provoke a smile, was drawn both by Comrade Posadovsky and by Comrade Popov; and when it was taken up by Martynov and Akimov, its true character of an opportunist phrase became altogether manifest. Today Comrade Axelrod is developing this same argument in the new *Iskra* by way of acquainting the reading public with the new editorial board's new views on organisation. Already at the Congress, at the very first sitting where Paragraph I was discussed, I noticed that our opponents wanted to avail themselves of this cheap weapon, and therefore warned in my speech (p. 240): "It should not be imagined that Party organisations must consist solely of professional revolutionaries. We need the most diverse organisations of all types, ranks, and shades, beginning with extremely limited and secret and ending with very broad, free, *lose Organisationen*."<sup>2</sup> This is such an obvious and self-evident truth that I did not think it necessary to dwell on it. But today, when we have been dragged back in so many respects, one has to "repeat old lessons" on this subject too. In order to do so, I shall quote certain passages from *What Is To Be Done?* and *A Letter to a Comrade*.

"...A circle of leaders, of the type of Alexeyev and Myshkin, of Khalturin and Zhelyabov, is capable of coping with political tasks in the genuine and most practical sense of the term, for the

<sup>2</sup> See *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 500.—Ed.

reason and to the extent that their impassioned propaganda meets with response among the spontaneously awakening masses, and their sparkling energy is answered and supported by the energy of the revolutionary class.”\* In order to be a Social-Democratic *party*, we must win the *support* precisely of the *class*. It is not that the Party should envelop the conspiratorial organisation, as Comrade Maitov thought, but that the revolutionary class, the proletariat, should envelop the Party, the latter to include both conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial organisations.

“...The workers’ organisations for the economic struggle should be trade union organisations. Every Social-Democratic worker should as far as possible assist and actively work in these organisations. But... it is certainly not in our interest to demand that only Social-Democrats should be eligible for membership in the trade unions since that would only narrow the scope of our influence upon the masses. Let every worker who understands the need to unite for the struggle against the employers and the government join the trade unions. The very aim of the trade unions would be impossible of achievement, if they did not unite all who have attained at least this elementary degree of understanding—if they were not very *broad* organisations. The broader these organisations, the broader will be our influence over them—an influence due, not only to the ‘spontaneous’ development of the economic struggle, but to the direct and conscious effort of the socialist trade union members to influence their comrades” (p. 86).\*\* Incidentally, the example of the trade unions is particularly significant for an assessment of the controversial question of Paragraph 1. That these unions *should* work “under the control and direction” of the Social-Democratic organisations, of that there can be no two opinions among Social-Democrats. But *on those grounds* to confer on all members of trade unions the right to “proclaim themselves” members of the Social-Democratic Party would be an obvious absurdity and would constitute a double danger: on the one hand, of *narrowing* the dimensions of the trade union movement and thus weakening the solidarity of the workers; and, on the other, of opening the door of the Social-Democratic Party to vagueness and vacillation. The German Social-Democrats had occasion to solve a similar problem in a practical instance, in the celebrated case of the Hamburg bricklayers working on piece rates.<sup>203</sup> The Social-Democrats did not hesitate for a moment to proclaim strike-breaking dishonourable in Social-Democratic eyes, that is, to acknowledge that to direct and support strikes was *their own* vital

\* See p. 173 of the present volume.—Ed.

\*\* See p. 180 of the present volume.—Ed.

concern; but at the same time they just as resolutely rejected the demand for identifying the interests of the Party with the interests of the trade unions, for *making the Party responsible* for individual acts of individual trade unions. The Party should and will strive to imbue the trade unions with its spirit and bring them under its influence; but precisely in order to do so it must distinguish the fully Social-Democratic elements in these unions (the elements belonging to the Social-Democratic Party) from those which are not fully class-conscious and politically active, and not confuse the two, as Comrade Axelrod would have us do.

"...Centralisation of the most secret functions in an organisation of revolutionaries will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and enhance the quality of the activity of a large number of other organisations that are intended for a broad public and are therefore as loose and as non-secret as possible, such as workers' trade unions; workers' self-education circles and circles for reading illegal literature; and socialist, as well as democratic, circles among *all* other sections of the population; etc., etc. We must have such circles, trade unions, and organisations everywhere in *as large a number as possible* and with the widest variety of functions; but it would be absurd and harmful to *confound* them with the organisation of *revolutionaries*, to efface the border-line between them. . ." (p. 96).<sup>\*</sup> This quotation shows how out of place it was for Comrade Martov to remind me that the organisation of revolutionaries should be *enveloped* by broad organisations of workers. I had already pointed this out in *What Is To Be Done?*—and in *A Letter to a Comrade* I developed this idea more concretely. Factory circles, I wrote there, "are particularly important to us: the main strength of the movement lies in the organisation of the workers at the *large* factories, for the large factories (and mills) contain not only the predominant part of the working class, as regards numbers, but even more as regards influence, development, and fighting capacity. Every factory must be our fortress. . . . The factory subcommittee should endeavour to embrace the whole factory, the largest possible number of the workers, with a network of all kinds of circles (or agents). . . . All groups, circles, subcommittees, etc., should enjoy the status of committee institutions or branches of a committee. Some of them will openly declare their wish to join the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and, *if endorsed* by the committee, will join the Party, and will assume definite functions (on the instructions of, or in agreement with, the committee), will undertake to obey the orders of the Party organs, *receive the same rights as all Party members*, and be regarded as immediate candidates for

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<sup>\*</sup> See p. 189 of the present volume — Ed



membership of the committee, etc. Others *will not join* the R.S.D.L.P., and will have the status of circles formed by Party members, or associated with one Party group or another, etc." (pp. 17-18).<sup>\*</sup> The words I have underlined make it particularly clear that the *idea* of my formulation of Paragraph 1 was already fully expressed in *A Letter to a Comrade*. The conditions for joining the Party are directly indicated there, namely: 1) a certain degree of organisation, and 2) endorsement by a Party committee. A page later I roughly indicate also what groups and organisations should (or should not) be admitted to the Party, and for what reasons: "The distributing groups should belong to the R.S.D.L.P. and know a certain number of its members and functionaries. The groups for studying labour conditions and drawing up trade union demands need not necessarily belong to the R.S.D.L.P. Groups of students, officers, or office employees engaged in self-education *in conjunction with one or two* Party members should in some cases not even be aware that these belong to the Party, etc." (pp. 18-19).<sup>\*\*</sup>

There you have additional material on the subject of the "open visor"! Whereas the formula of Comrade Martov's draft does not even touch on relations between the Party and the organisations, I pointed out nearly a year before the Congress that some organisations should belong to the Party, and others not. In *A Letter to a Comrade* the idea I advocated at the Congress was already clearly outlined. The matter might be put graphically in the following way. Depending on degree of organisation in general and of secrecy of organisation in particular, roughly the following categories may be distinguished: 1) organisations of revolutionaries; 2) organisations of workers, as broad and as varied as possible (I confine myself to the working class, taking it as self-evident that under certain conditions, certain elements of other classes will also be included here). These two categories constitute the Party. Further, 3) workers' organisations associated with the Party; 4) workers' organisations not associated with the Party but actually under its control and direction; 5) unorganised elements of the working class, who in part also come under the direction of the Social-Democratic Party, at any rate during big manifestations of the class struggle. That, approximately, is how the matter presents itself to me. As Comrade Martov sees it, on the contrary, the borderline of the Party remains absolutely vague, for "every striker" can "proclaim himself a Party member". What benefit is there

<sup>\*</sup> See *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 243, 245, 246.—Ed.

<sup>\*\*</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247.—Ed.

in this looseness? A widespread "title". Its harm is that it introduces a *disorganising* idea, the confusing of class and party.

In illustration of the general propositions we have adduced, let us take a cursory glance at the further discussion of Paragraph 1 at the Congress. Comrade Brouckère (to the great glee of Comrade Martov) pronounced in favour of my formulation, but *his* alliance with me, unlike Comrade Akimov's with Martov, turned out to be based on a misunderstanding. Comrade Brouckère did "not agree with the Rules as a whole, with their entire spirit" (p. 239), and defended my formulation *as the basis of the democracy* which the supporters of *Rabocheye Dyelo* desired. Comrade Brouckère had not yet risen to the view that in a political struggle it is sometimes necessary to choose the *lesser evil*; Comrade Brouckère did not realise that it was useless to advocate democracy at a Congress like ours. Comrade Akimov was more perspicacious. He put the question quite rightly when he stated that "Comrade Martov and Lenin are arguing as to which [formulation] will best achieve their common aim" (p. 252); "Brouckère and I," he continued, "want to choose the one *which will least achieve that aim*. From this angle I choose Martov's formulation." And Comrade Akimov frankly explained that he considered "their very aim" (that is, the aim of Plekhanov, Martov, and myself—the creation of a directing organisation of revolutionaries) to be "impracticable and harmful"; like Comrade Martynov,\* he advocated the Economist idea that "an organisation of revolutionaries" was unnecessary. He was "confident that in the end the realities of life will force their way into our Party organisation, whether you bar their path with Martov's formulation or with Lenin's". It would not be worth while dwelling on this "tail-ist" conception of the "realities of life" if we did not encounter it in the case of Comrade Martov too. In general, Comrade Martov's second speech (p. 245) is so interesting that it deserves to be examined in detail.

Comrade Martov's first argument: control by the Party organisations over Party members not belonging to them "is practicable, inasmuch as, having assigned a function to someone, the committee will be able to watch over it" (p. 245). This the-

\* Comrade Martynov, it is true, wanted to be different from Comrade Akimov, he wanted to show that conspiratorial did not mean secret, that behind the two different words were two different concepts. What the difference is, neither Comrade Martynov nor Comrade Axelrod, who is now following in his footsteps, ever did explain. Comrade Martynov "acted" as if I had not—for example in *What Is To Be Done?* (as well as in the *Tasks* [see *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 323-51—Ed.])—resolutely opposed "confining the political struggle to conspiracy" Comrade Martynov was anxious to have his hearers *forget* that the people I had been fighting *had not seen* any necessity for an *organisation of revolutionaries*, just as Comrade Akimov did not see it now.

sis is remarkably characteristic, for it "betrays", if one may so put it, *who* needs Martov's formulation and whom it will serve *in actual fact*—free-lance intellectuals or workers' groups and the worker masses. The fact is that there are two possible interpretations of Martov's formulation: 1) that anyone who renders the Party regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organisations is entitled to "*proclaim himself*" (Comrade Martov's own words) a Party member; 2) that a Party organisation is *entitled to regard* as a Party member anyone who renders it regular personal assistance under its direction. It is only the first interpretation that really gives "every striker" the opportunity to call himself a Party member, and accordingly *it alone* immediately won the hearts of the Liebers, Akimovs, and Martynovs. But this interpretation is manifestly no more than a phrase, because it would apply to the entire working class, and the distinction between Party and class would be obliterated; control over and direction of "every striker" can only be spoken of "symbolically". That is why, in his second speech, Comrade Martov at once slipped into the second interpretation (even though, be it said in parenthesis, *it was directly rejected by the Congress* when it turned down Kostich's resolution<sup>204</sup>—p. 255), namely, that a committee would assign functions and watch over their fulfilment. Such special assignments will never, of course, be made to the *mass* of the workers, to the *thousands* of proletarians (of whom Comrade Axelrod and Comrade Martynov spoke)—they will frequently be given precisely to those *professors* whom Comrade Axelrod mentioned, to those *high-school students* for whom Comrade Lieber and Comrade Popov were so concerned (p. 241), and to the *revolutionary youth* to whom Comrade Axelrod referred in his second speech (p. 242). In a word, Comrade Martov's formula will either remain a dead letter, an empty phrase, or it will be of benefit mainly and almost exclusively to "*intellectuals who are thoroughly imbued with bourgeois individualism*" and do not wish to join an organisation. *In words*, Martov's formulation defends the interests of the broad strata of the proletariat, but *in fact* it serves the interests of the *bourgeois intellectuals*, who fight shy of proletarian discipline and organisation. No one will venture to deny that *the intelligentsia*, as a *special stratum* of modern capitalist society, is characterised, by and large, *precisely by individualism* and incapacity for discipline and organisation (cf., for example, Kautsky's well-known articles on the intelligentsia). This, incidentally, is a feature which unfavourably distinguishes this social stratum from the proletariat; it is one of the reasons for the flabbiness and instability of the intellectual, which the proletariat so often

feels; and this trait of the intelligentsia is intimately bound up with its customary mode of life, its mode of earning a livelihood, which in a great many respects approximates to the *petty-bourgeois mode of existence* (working in isolation or in very small groups, etc.). Nor is it fortuitous, lastly, that the defenders of Comrade Martov's formulation were the ones who had to cite the example of professors and high-school students! It was not champions of a broad proletarian struggle who, in the controversy over Paragraph 1, took the field against champions of a radically conspiratorial organisation, as Comrades Martynov and Axelrod thought, but the supporters of *bourgeois-intellectual individualism* who clashed with the supporters of *proletarian organisation and discipline*.

Comrade Popov said: "Everywhere, in St. Petersburg as in Nikolayev or Odessa, as the representatives from these towns testify, there are dozens of workers who are distributing literature and carrying on word-of-mouth agitation but who cannot be members of an organisation. They can be attached to an organisation, but not regarded as members" (p. 241). Why they cannot be members of an organisation remained Comrade Popov's secret. I have already quoted the passage from *A Letter to a Comrade* showing that the admission of all such workers (by the hundred, not the dozen) to an organisation is both possible and necessary, and, moreover, that a great many of these organisations can and should belong to the Party.

Comrade Martov's second argument: "In Lenin's opinion there should be no organisations in the Party other than Party organisations..." Quite true! "In my opinion, on the contrary, such organisations should exist. Life creates and breeds organisations faster than we can include them in the hierarchy of our militant organisation of professional revolutionaries..." That is untrue in two respects: 1) the number of effective organisations of revolutionaries that "life" breeds is far less than we need, than the working-class movement requires; 2) our Party should be a hierarchy not only of organisations of revolutionaries, but of a mass of workers' organisations as well.... "Lenin thinks that the Central Committee will confer the title of Party organisations only on such as are fully reliable in the matter of principles. But Comrade Brouckère understands very well that life [*sic*!] will assert itself and that the Central Committee, in order not to leave a multitude of organisations outside the Party, will have to legitimise them despite their not quite reliable character; that is why Comrade Brouckère associates himself with Lenin..." What a truly tail-ist conception of "life"! Of course, if the Central Committee had *necessarily* to consist of people who were not guided by their own opinions,

but by what others might say (*vide* the Organising Committee incident), then "life" would "assert itself" in the sense that the most backward elements in the Party would gain the upper hand (*as has in fact happened now when the backward elements have taken shape as the Party "minority"*). But no intelligent reason can be given which would induce a sensible Central Committee to admit "unreliable" elements to the Party. By this reference to "life", which "breeds" unreliable elements, Comrade Martov patently revealed the opportunist character of his plan of organisation!... "I for my part think," he continued, "that if such an organisation [one that is not quite reliable] is prepared to accept the Party programme and Party control, we may admit it to the Party, without thereby making it a Party organisation. I would consider it a great triumph for our Party if, for example, some union of 'independents' were to declare that they accepted the views of Social-Democracy and its programme and were joining the Party; which does not, however, mean that we would include the union in the Party organisation..." Such is the muddle Martov's formulation leads to: non-Party organisations belonging to the Party! Just imagine *his* scheme: the Party=1) organisations of revolutionaries, +2) workers' organisations recognised as Party organisations, +3) workers' organisations not recognised as Party organisations (consisting principally of "independents"), +4) individuals performing various functions—professors, high-school students, etc., +5) "every striker". Alongside of this remarkable plan one can only put the words of Comrade Lieber: "Our task is not only to organise an organisation (!!): we can and should organise a party" (p. 211). Yes, of course, we can and should do that, but what it requires is not meaningless words about "organising organisations", but the *unequivocal demand* that Party members should work to create an *organisation* in fact. He who talks about "organising a party" and yet defends using the word party to cover disorganisation and disunity of every kind is just indulging in empty words.

"Our formulation," Comrade Martov said, "expresses the desire to have a series of organisations between the organisation of revolutionaries and the masses." It does not. This truly essential desire is just what Martov's formulation *does not express*, for it *does not offer an incentive to organise*, does not contain a demand for organisation, does not separate organised from unorganised. All it offers is a *title*,\* and in this connection

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\* At the League Congress, Comrade Martov adduced one more argument in support of his formulation, an argument that deserves to be laughed at. "We might point out," he said, "that, taken literally, Lenin's formulation excludes the *agents of the Central Committee* from the Party, for they do not

we cannot but recall Comrade Axelrod's words: "No decree can forbid them [circles of revolutionary youth and the like] or individuals to call themselves Social-Democrats [true enough!] and even to regard themselves as part of the Party"—now that is *not true at all!* It is impossible and *pointless* to forbid anyone to call himself a Social-Democrat, for in its *direct* sense this word only signifies a system of convictions, and not definite organisational relations. But as to forbidding various circles and persons to "regard themselves as part of the Party", that can and should be done if these circles and persons injure the Party, corrupt or disorganise it. It would be absurd to speak of the *Party* as of a whole, as of a political entity, if it could not "by decree forbid" a circle to "regard itself as part" of the whole! What in that case would be the point of defining the procedure and conditions of expulsion from the Party? Comrade Axelrod reduced Comrade Martov's fundamental mistake to an obvious absurdity; he even elevated this mistake to an *opportunist theory* when he added: "As formulated by Lenin, Paragraph 1 directly conflicts in principle with the very nature [!] and aims of the Social-Democratic Party of the proletariat" (p. 243). This means nothing less than that making higher demands of the Party than of the class conflicts in principle with the very nature of the aims of the proletariat. It is not surprising that Akimov was heart and soul in favour of such a *theory*.

It should be said in fairness that Comrade Axelrod—who *now* wants to convert this mistaken formulation, one obvious-

constitute an organisation." (p. 59). Even at the League Congress this argument was greeted with *laughter*, as the minutes record. Comrade Martov supposes that the "difficulty" he mentions can only be solved by including the Central Committee agents in "the organisation of the Central Committee". But that is not the point. The point is that Comrade Martov's example saliently demonstrates that *he completely fails to understand the idea of Paragraph 1*; it was a sheer specimen of pedantic criticism that did indeed deserve to be laughed at. *Formally speaking*, all that would be required would be to form an 'organisation of Central Committee agents', pass a *resolution* to include it in the Party, and the "difficulty" which caused Comrade Martov so much brain-racking would immediately vanish. The *idea* of Paragraph 1 as formulated by me consists in the *incentive* to organise: it consists in *guaranteeing actual* control and direction. *Essentially*, the very question whether the Central Committee agents will belong to the Party is ridiculous, for *actual* control over them is fully and absolutely guaranteed by the *very fact that they have been appointed agents* and that they are kept on as agents. Consequently, here there can be no question of any confusion of organised and unorganised (which is the root mistake in Comrade Martov's formulation). Why Comrade Martov's formulation is no good is that it allows anyone, any opportunist, any windbag, any "professor", and any "high-school student" to *proclaim himself* a Party member. It is in vain for Comrade Martov to try to *talk away this Achilles' heel* of his formulation by examples in which there can be no question of people arbitrarily styling or proclaiming themselves members.

ly tending towards opportunism, into the germ of *new* views—at the Congress, on the contrary, expressed a readiness to “bargain”, saying: “But I observe that I am knocking at an open door” (I observe this in the new *Iskra* too), “because Comrade Lenin, with his peripheral circles which are to be regarded as part of the Party organisation, goes out to meet my demand.” (And not only with the peripheral circles, but with every kind of workers’ union: cf. p. 242 of the Minutes, the speech of Comrade Strakhov, and the passages from *What Is To Be Done?* and *A Letter to a Comrade* quoted above.) “There still remain the individuals, but here, too, we could bargain.” I replied to Comrade Axelrod that, generally speaking, I was not averse to bargaining, and I must now explain in what sense this was meant. As regards the individuals—all those professors, high-school students, etc.—I would least of all have agreed to make concessions; but if doubts had been aroused as to the workers’ organisations, I would have agreed (despite the utter groundlessness of such doubts, as I have proved above), to add to my Paragraph I a note to the following effect: “Workers’ organisations which accept the Programme and Rules of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party should be included in the largest possible numbers among the Party organisations.” Strictly speaking, of course, the place for such a recommendation is not in the Rules, which should be confined to statutory definitions, but in explanatory commentaries and pamphlets (and I have already pointed out that I gave such explanations in my pamphlets long before the Rules were drawn up); but at least such a note would not contain even a shadow of *wrong* ideas capable of leading to disorganisation, not a shadow of the *opportunistic* arguments\* and “*anarchistic conceptions*” that are undoubtedly inherent in Comrade Martov’s formulation.

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\* To this category of arguments, which inevitably crop up when attempts are made to justify Martov’s formulation, belongs in particular, Comrade Trotsky’s statement (pp. 248 and 346) that “opportunism is produced by more complex [or is determined by deeper] causes than one or another clause in the Rules; it is brought about by the relative level of development of bourgeois democracy and the proletariat . . .” The point is not that clauses in the Rules may produce opportunism, but that with their help a more or less trenchant weapon against opportunism can be forged. The deeper its causes, the more trenchant should this weapon be. Therefore, to *justify* a formulation which opens the door to opportunism on the grounds that opportunism has “deep causes” is tail-ism of the first water. When Comrade Trotsky was opposed to Comrade Lieber, he understood that the Rules constitute the “organised distrust” of the whole towards the part, of the vanguard towards the backward contingent; but when Comrade Trotsky came to be on Comrade Lieber’s side, he forgot this and even began to justify the *weakness* and instability of *our* organisation of this distrust (distrust of opportunism) by talking about “complex causes”, the “level of development of the proletariat”, etc. Here

This last expression, given by me in quotation marks, is that of Comrade Pavlovich, who quite justly characterised as *anarchism* the recognition of "*irresponsible* and *self-enrolled* Party members". "Translated into simple terms," said Comrade Pavlovich, explaining my formulation to Comrade Lieber, "it means: 'if you want to be a Party member, your acceptance of organisational relations too must be not merely platonic'." Simple as this "translation" was, it seems it was not superfluous (as events since the Congress have shown) not only for various dubious professors and high-school students, but for honest-to-goodness Party members, for people at the top. . . . With no less justice, Comrade Pavlovich pointed to the contradiction between Comrade Martov's formulation and the indisputable precept of scientific socialism which Comrade Martov quoted so unhappily: "Our Party is the conscious spokesman of an unconscious process." Exactly. And for that very reason it is wrong to want "every striker" to have the right to call himself a Party member, for if "every strike" were not only a spontaneous expression of the powerful class instinct and of the class struggle which is leading inevitably to the social revolution, but a *conscious expression* of that process, then . . . then the general strike would not be an anarchist phrase, then our Party would forth-

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is another of Comrade Trotsky's arguments "It is much easier for the intellectual youth, organised in one way or another, to *enter themselves* [my italics] on the rolls of the Party' Just so. That is why it is the formulation by which even unorganised elements may *proclaim themselves* Party members that suffers from intellectualist vagueness, and not my formulation, which *obviates* the right to 'enter *oneself*' on the rolls. Comrade Trotsky said that if the Central Committee "refused to recognise" an organisation of opportunists, it would only be because of the character of certain individuals, and that since these individuals would be known as political personalities, they would not be dangerous and could be removed by a general Party boycott. This is only true of cases when people have to be *removed from the Party* (and only half true at that, because an organised party *removes* members by a vote and not by a boycott). It is absolutely untrue of the far more frequent cases when *removal* would be absurd, and when all that is required is *control*. For purposes of control, the Central Committee might, on certain conditions, *deliberately* admit to the Party an organisation which was not quite reliable but which was capable of working, it might do so with the object of testing it, of trying to *direct it on to the right path*, of correcting its partial aberrations by guidance, etc. This would not be dangerous *if in general* "*self-entering*" on the Party rolls were not allowed. It would often be useful for an open and *responsible*, controlled expression (and discussion) of mistaken views and mistaken tactics. "But if statutory definitions are to correspond to actual relations, Comrade Lenin's formulation must be rejected," said Comrade Trotsky, and again he spoke like an opportunist. Actual relations are not a dead thing, they live and develop. Statutory definitions may correspond to the progressive development of those relations, but they may also (if the definitions are bad ones) "correspond" to retrogression or stagnation. The latter case is the "case" of Comrade Martov



with and at once *embrace* the whole working class, and, consequently, would at once put an end to *bourgeois society as a whole*. If it is to be a conscious spokesman *in fact*, the Party must be able to work out organisational relations that will *ensure a definite level* of consciousness and systematically raise this level. "If we are to go the way of Martov," Comrade Pavlovich said, "we should first of all delete the clause on accepting the *programme*, for before a programme can be accepted it must be mastered and understood. . . . Acceptance of the programme presupposes a fairly high level of political consciousness." We shall never allow *support* of Social-Democracy, *participation* in the struggle it directs, to be artificially *restricted* by any requirements (mastery, understanding, etc.), for this *participation* itself, the very fact of it, *promotes* both consciousness and the instinct for organisation; but since we have *joined together in a party* to carry on systematic work, we must see to it that it is systematic.

That Comrade Pavlovich's warning regarding the programme was not superfluous became apparent *at once*, during *that very same* sitting. Comrades Akimov and Lieber, who secured the adoption of Comrade Martov's formulation,\* *at once* betrayed their true nature by demanding (pp. 254-55) that in the case of the programme too only platonic acceptance, acceptance only of its "basic principles", should be required (for "membership" in the Party). "Comrade Akimov's proposal is quite logical from Comrade Martov's standpoint," Comrade Pavlovich remarked. Unfortunately, we cannot see from the minutes *how many* votes this proposal of Akimov's secured—in all probability, not less than seven (five Bundists, Akimov, and Brouckère). And it was the withdrawal of *seven* delegates from the Congress that converted the "compact majority" (anti-*Iskra*-ists "Centre" and Martovites) which began to form over Paragraph 1 of the Rules into a compact minority! It was the withdrawal of *seven* delegates that resulted in the defeat of the motion to endorse the old editorial board—that supposed howling violation of "continuity" in the *Iskra* editorship! A curious *seven* it was that constituted the sole salvation and guarantee of *Iskra* "continuity": the Bundists, Akimov, and Brouckère, that is, the very delegates who voted against the *motives* for adopting *Iskra* as

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The vote was twenty-eight for and twenty two against. Of the eight anti-*Iskra*-ists, seven were for Martov and one for me. Without the aid of the opportunists, Comrade Martov would not have secured adoption of his opportunist formulation. (At the League Congress Comrade Martov tried very unsuccessfully to refute this undoubted fact, for some reason mentioning only the votes of the Bundists and forgetting about Comrade Akimov and his friends—or rather remembering them *only* when it could serve against me: Comrade Brouckère's agreement with me.)

the Central Organ, the very delegates whose opportunism was acknowledged dozens of times by the Congress, and acknowledged in particular by Martov and Plekhanov in the matter of *toning down* Paragraph 1 in reference to the programme. The "continuity" of *Iskra* guarded by the anti-*Iskra*-ists!—this brings us to the *starting-point* of the post-Congress tragicomedy.

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The grouping of votes over Paragraph 1 of the Rules revealed a phenomenon of exactly the same type as the equality of languages incident: the falling away of one-quarter (approximately) of the *Iskra* majority made possible the victory of the anti-*Iskra*-ists, who were backed by the "Centre". Of course, here too there were individual votes which disturbed the full symmetry of the picture—in so large an assembly as our Congress there are bound to be some "strays" who shift quite fortuitously from one side to the other, especially on a question like Paragraph 1, where the true character of the divergence was only beginning to emerge and many delegates had simply *not yet found their bearings* (considering that the question had not been discussed beforehand in the press). Five votes fell away from the majority *Iskra*-ists (Rusov and Karsky with two votes each, and Lensky with one): on the other hand, they were joined by one anti-*Iskra*-ist (Brouckère) and by three from the Centre (Medvedev, Egorov and Tsaryov); the result was a total of twenty-three votes (24—5+4), one vote less than in the final grouping in the elections. *It was the anti-"Iskra"-ists who gave Martov his majority*, seven of them voting for him and one for me (of the "Centre" too, seven voted for Martov, and three for me). That coalition of the minority *Iskra*-ists with the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre" which formed a compact minority at the end of the Congress and after the Congress *was beginning to take shape*. The political error of Martov and Axelrod, who *undoubtedly took a step towards opportunism and anarchistic individualism* in their formulation of Paragraph 1, and especially in their defence of that formulation, was revealed at once and very clearly thanks to the free and open arena offered by the Congress; it was revealed in the fact that the least stable elements, the least steadfast in principle, at once employed all their forces to widen the fissure, the breach, that appeared in the views of the revolutionary Social-Democrats. Working together at the Congress were people who in matters of organisation frankly pursued *different aims* (see Akimov's speech)—a circumstance which at once induced those who were *in principle* opposed to our organisational plan and our Rules to support the error of

Comrades Martov and Axelrod. The *Iskra*-ists who on this question too remained faithful to the views of revolutionary Social-Democracy found themselves *in the minority*. This is a point of *the utmost importance*, for unless it is grasped it is absolutely impossible to understand either the struggle over the details of the Rules or the struggle over the personal composition of the Central Organ and the Central Committee.

## J. INNOCENT VICTIMS OF A FALSE ACCUSATION OF OPPORTUNISM

Before passing on to the subsequent discussion of the Rules, it is necessary in order to elucidate our difference over the personal composition of the central institutions, to touch on the *private* meetings of the *Iskra* organisation during the Congress. The last and most important of these four meetings was held *just after* the vote on Paragraph 1 of the Rules—and thus the split in the *Iskra* organisation which took place at this meeting was in point of both time and logic a prelude to the subsequent struggle.

The *Iskra* organisation began to hold private meetings\* soon after the Organising Committee incident, which gave rise to a discussion of possible candidates for the Central Committee. It stands to reason that, since binding instructions had been abolished, these meetings were purely in the nature of consultations and their decisions were not binding on anyone; but their importance was nevertheless immense. The selection of candidates for the Central Committee was a matter of considerable difficulty to delegates who were acquainted neither with the secret names nor with the inner work of the *Iskra* organisation, the organisation that had brought about actual Party unity and whose leadership of the practical movement was one of the motives for the official adoption of *Iskra*. We have already seen that, united, the *Iskra*-ists were fully assured a big majority at the Congress, as much as three-fifths, and all the delegates realised this very well. All the *Iskra*-ists, in fact, expected the "*Iskra*" organisation to make definite recommendations as to the personal composition of the Central Committee, and not one member of that organisation raised any objection to a preliminary discussion of the Central Committee's composition within it; not one of them so much as hinted at endorsing the entire membership of the Organising

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I have already tried at the League Congress to give an account of what took place at the private meetings, keeping to the barest essentials in order to avoid hopeless arguments. The principal facts are also set out in my *Letter to the Editors of 'Iskra'* (p. 4). Comrade Martov did not challenge them in his *Reply*.

Committee, that is, converting that body into the Central Committee, or *even at conferring* with the Organising Committee as a whole regarding candidates for the Central Committee. This circumstance is also highly significant, and it is extremely important to bear it in mind, for *now, after the event*, the Martovites are zealously defending the Organising Committee, thereby only proving their political spinelessness for the hundredth and thousandth time.\* Until the split over the composition of the central bodies led Martov to join forces with the Akimovs, everyone at the Congress clearly realised what any impartial person may easily ascertain from the Congress minutes and from the entire history of *Iskra*, namely, that the Organising Committee was *mainly* a commission set up to convene the Congress, a commission deliberately composed of representatives of different shades, including even the Bundists; while the real work of *creating* the organised unit of the Party was done entirely by the *Iskra* organisation. (It should be remembered also that quite by chance *several Iskra*-ists on the Organising Committee were absent from the Congress, either because they had been arrested or for other reasons "beyond their control".) The members of the *Iskra* organisation present at the Congress<sup>205</sup> have already been enumerated in Comrade Pavlovich's pamphlet (see his *Letter on the Second Congress*, p. 13).

The ultimate result of the heated debates in the *Iskra* organisation was the two votes I have already mentioned in my *Letter to the Editors*. The first vote: "by nine votes to four, with three abstentions, one of the candidates supported by Martov was rejected". What could be simpler and more natural, one would think, than such a fact: by the common consent of all the sixteen *Iskra* organisation members at the Congress, the possible candidates are discussed, and one of Comrade Martov's candidates is rejected by the majority (it was Comrade Stein, as Comrade Martov himself has now blurted out—*State of Siege*, p. 69). After all, one of the reasons why we assembled at the Party Congress was to discuss and decide to whom to entrust the "conductor's baton"—and it was the common duty of us all as Party members to give this item on the agenda the most serious attention, to decide this question from the standpoint of the *interests*

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\* Just reflect on this "picture of morals", the *delegate* from the *Iskra* organisation confers at the Congress with it *alone* and *does not hint*, even, at conferring with the Organising Committee. But after he is defeated both in this organisation and at the Congress, he begins to *regret* that the Organising Committee was not endorsed, to extol it retrospectively, and loftily to ignore the organisation that gave him his mandate! It may safely be vouched that no analogous instance will be found in the history of any really Social-Democratic and really working-class party.

of the work, and not of "philistine sentimentality", as Comrade Rusov quite rightly expressed it later. Of course, in discussing candidates at the Congress, we were bound to touch upon certain personal qualities, were bound to express our approval or disapproval,\* especially at an unofficial and intimate meeting. And I have already pointed out at the League Congress that it is absurd to think that a candidate is "disgraced" when he is not approved (League Minutes, p. 49), absurd to make a "scene" and go into hysterics over what forms part of a Party member's direct duty to select officials conscientiously and judiciously. And yet this was what put the fat in the fire as far as our minority are concerned, and they began after the Congress to clamour about "destroying reputations" (League Minutes, p. 70) and to assure the broad public in print that Comrade Stein had been the "chief figure" on the former Organising Committee and that he had been groundlessly accused of "diabolical schemes" (*State of Siege*, p. 69). Is it not hysterics to shout about "destroying reputations" in connection with the approval or disapproval of candidates? Is it not squabbling when people who have been defeated both at a private meeting of the *Iskra* organisation and at the official supreme assembly of the Party, the Congress, begin to complain to all and sundry and recommend rejected candidates to the worthy public as "chief figures", and when they then try to force their candidates upon the Party by causing a split and demanding co-optation? In our musty émigré atmosphere political concepts have become so confused that Comrade Martov is no longer able to distinguish Party duty from personal and circle allegiance! It is bureaucracy and formalism, we are to believe, to think it proper to discuss and decide upon candidates only at congresses, where delegates assemble primarily for the discussion of important questions of principle, where representatives of the movement assemble who are able to treat the question of personalities impartially, and who are able (and in duty bound) to demand and gather all necessary information about the candidates before

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\* Comrade Martov bitterly complained at the League of the vehemence of my disapproval, failing to see that his complaint turned into an argument against himself. Lenin behaved—to use his own expression—frenziedly (League Minutes, p. 63). That is so. He banged the door. True. His conduct (at the second or third meeting of the *Iskra* organisation) aroused the indignation of the members who remained at the meeting. It did. But what follows? Only that my arguments on the substance of the questions in dispute were convincing and were borne out by the course of the Congress. For if, in fact, nine of the sixteen members of the *Iskra* organisation in the end sided with me, clearly this was so notwithstanding and in spite of my reprehensible vehemence. Hence, had it not been for this "vehemence", perhaps even more than nine would have sided with me. The more "indignation" my arguments and facts had to overcome, the more convincing they must have been.

casting their decisive votes, and where the assignment of a certain place to arguments over the conductor's baton is natural and essential. Instead of this bureaucratic and formal view, new usages and customs have now become the thing: we are, after congresses, to talk right and left about the political burial of Ivan Ivanovich or the destroyed reputation of Ivan Nikiforovich<sup>206</sup>; writers are to recommend candidates in pamphlets, the while beating their breasts and hypocritically asserting: "This is not a circle, it is a party...." Those of the reading public who have a taste for scandal will eagerly savour the sensational news that, on the assurance of Martov himself,\* so-and-so was the chief figure on the Organising Committee. This reading public is far more competent to discuss and decide the question than formalistic institutions like congresses, with their grossly mechanical decisions by majority vote.... Yes, there are still veritable Augean stables of émigré squabbling for our real Party workers to clean up!

Second vote of the *Iskra* organisation: "by ten votes to two, with four abstentions, a list of five [candidates for the Central Committee] was adopted which, on my proposal, included one leader of the non-*Iskra*-ist elements and one leader of the *Iskra*-ist minority."<sup>\*\*</sup> This vote is of the utmost importance, for it clearly and irrefutably proves the utter falsity of the fables which were built up later, in the atmosphere of squabbling, to the effect that we wanted to eject the non-*Iskra*-ists from the Party or set them aside, that what the majority did was to pick candidates from only one half of the Congress and have them elected by that half, etc. All this is sheer falsehood. The vote I have cited shows that we did not exclude the non-*Iskra*-ists even from the Central Committee, let alone the Party, and that we allowed our opponents a very substantial *minority*. The whole point is that they *wanted to have a majority*, and when this modest wish was not gratified, they started a *row* and refused to be represented on the central bodies at all. That such was the case, Comrade Martov's assertions at the League notwithstanding, is shown by the following *letter* which the minority of the *Iskra* organisation addressed to us, the majority of the *Iskra*-ists (and the majority at the Congress after the withdrawal of the seven), shortly after

\* I, too, like Martov, tried in the *Iskra* organisation to get a certain candidate nominated to the Central Committee and failed, a candidate of whose splendid reputation before and at the beginning of the Congress, as borne out by outstanding facts, I too could speak. But it has never entered by head. This comrade *has sufficient self-respect not to allow* anybody, after the Congress, to nominate him in print or to complain about political burials, destroyed reputations, etc.

\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 121.—Ed.

the Congress adopted Paragraph I of the Rules (it should be noted that the *Iskra* organisation meeting I have been speaking of was the *last*: after it, the organisation *actually* broke up and each side tried to convince the other Congress delegates that it was in the right).

Here is the text of the letter:

"Having heard the explanation of delegates Sorokin and Sablina regarding the wish of the majority of the editorial board and the Emancipation of Labour group to attend the meeting [on such and such a date]\* and having with the help of these delegates established that at the previous meeting a list of Central Committee candidates was read which was supposed to have come from us, and which was used to misrepresent our whole *political* position; and bearing in mind also that, firstly, this list was attributed to us without any attempt to ascertain its real origin; that, secondly, this circumstance is undoubtedly connected with the accusation of opportunism openly circulated against the majority of the *Iskra* editorial board and of the Emancipation of Labour group; and that, thirdly, this accusation is, as is perfectly clear to us, connected with a quite definite plan to *change the composition of the 'Iskra' editorial board*—we consider that the explanation given us of the reasons for excluding us from the meeting is unsatisfactory, and that the refusal to admit us to the meeting is proof of not wanting to give us the opportunity to refute the above-mentioned false accusations.

"As to the possibility of our reaching agreement on a joint list of candidates for the Central Committee, we declare that the only list we can accept as the basis for agreement is: Popov, Trotsky, and Glebov. Furthermore, we emphasise that this is a *compromise* list, since the inclusion of Comrade Glebov is to be viewed only as a concession to the wishes of the majority; for now that the role he has played at the Congress is clear to us, *we do not consider Comrade Glebov* a person satisfying the requirements that should be made of a candidate for the Central Committee.

"At the same time, we stress that our entering into negotiations regarding the candidates for the Central Committee has no bearing whatever on the question of the composition of the editorial board of the Central Organ, as on this question (the composition of the editorial board) we are not prepared to enter into any negotiations.

"On behalf of the comrades,  
"Martov and Starover"

This letter, which accurately reproduces the frame of mind of the disputing sides and the state of the dispute, takes us at once to the "heart" of the incipient split and reveals its real causes. The minority of the *Iskra* organisation, having refused to agree with the majority and preferred freedom of agitation at the Congress (to which they were, of course, fully entitled), nevertheless tried to induce the "delegates" of the majority to admit them to their private meeting! Naturally, this amusing demand only met with a smile and a shrug at our meeting (where the letter was of course read), and the outcry, bordering on hysterics,

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\* According to my reckoning, the date mentioned in the letter was a Tuesday. The meeting took place on Tuesday evening, that is, *after* the 28th sitting of the Congress. This chronological point is very important. It is a *documentary refutation* of Comrade Martov's opinion that we parted company over the

about "false accusations of opportunism" evoked outright laughter. But let us first examine Martov's and Starover's bitter complaints point by point.

The list had been wrongly attributed to them; their political position was being misrepresented.—But, as Martov himself has admitted (League Minutes, p. 64), it never occurred to me to doubt the truth of his statement that he was not the author of the list. In general, the authorship of the list has nothing to do with the case, and whether the list was drawn up by some *Iskra*-ist or by some representative of the "Centre", etc., is of absolutely no importance. The important thing is that this list, which consisted entirely of members of the present minority, circulated at the Congress, if only as a mere guess or conjecture. Lastly, *the most important thing of all* is that at the Congress Comrade Martov *was obliged* to dissociate himself with the utmost vehemence from *such* a list, a list which he now *would be bound* to greet with delight. Nothing could more saliently exemplify instability in the evaluation of people and shades than this right-about-face in the course of a couple of months from howling about "defamatory rumours" to forcing on the Party central body the very candidates who figure in this supposedly defamatory list!\*

This list, Comrade Martov said at the League Congress, "politically implied a coalition between us and *Yuzhny Rabochy*, on the one hand, and the Bund, on the other, a coalition in the sense of a *direct agreement*" (p. 64). That is not true, for, firstly, the Bund would never have entered into an "agreement" about a list which did not include a single Bundist; and, secondly, there was *and could have been no question* of a direct agreement (which was what Martov thought disgraceful) even with the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, let alone the Bund. It was not an agreement but a coalition that was in question; not that Comrade Martov had made a deal, but that he *was bound to have the support* of those very anti-*Iskra*-ists and unstable elements whom he had fought during the first half of the Congress and who had seized upon his error over Paragraph 1 of the Rules. The letter I have quoted proves incontrovertibly that the *root* of the "grievance" lay in

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organisation of the central bodies, and not over their personal composition. It is *documentary proof* of the correctness of my statement of the case at the League Congress and in the *Letter to the Editors*. After the 28th sitting of the Congress, Comrades Martov and Starover had a great deal to say about a false accusation of opportunism, but *did not say a word* about the differences over the composition of the Council or over co-optation to the central bodies (which we argued about at the 25th, 26th and 27th sittings).

These lines were already set up when we received news of the incident of Comrade Gusev and Comrade Deutsch. We shall examine this incident separately in an *appendix*. (See pp 414-21 of the present volume—*Ed*)



the *open, and moreover false, accusation of opportunism*. This "accusation" which put the fat in the fire, and which Comrade Martov *now* so carefully steers clear of, in spite of my reminder in the *Letter to the Editors*, was twofold. Firstly, during the discussion of Paragraph 1 of the Rules Plekhanov bluntly declared that Paragraph 1 was a question of "keeping away" from us "every kind of representative of opportunism", and that my draft, as a bulwark against their invading the Party, "should, if only for that reason, receive the votes of all enemies of opportunism" (Congress Minutes, p. 246). These vigorous words, even though I softened them down a little (p. 250),\* caused a sensation, which was clearly expressed in the speeches of Comrades Rusov (p. 247), Trot-ky (p. 248), and Akimov (p. 253). In the "lobby" of our "parliament", Plekhanov's thesis was keenly commented on and varied in a thousand ways in endless arguments over Paragraph 1. But instead of defending their case on its merits, our dear comrades assumed a ludicrous air of injury and even went to the length of complaining in writing about a "false accusation of opportunism"!

Their narrow circle mentality and astonishing immaturity as Party members, which cannot stand the fresh breeze of open controversy in the presence of all, is here clearly revealed. It is the mentality so familiar to the Russian, as expressed in the old saying: either coats off, or let's have your hand! These people are so accustomed to the bell-jar seclusion of an intimate and snug little circle that they almost fainted as soon as a person spoke up in a free and open arena on his own responsibility. Accusations of opportunism!—against whom? Against the Emancipation of Labour group, and its majority at that—can you imagine anything more terrible? Either split the Party on account of this ineffaceable insult, or hush up this "domestic unpleasantness" by restoring the "continuity" of the bell-jar—this alternative is already pretty clearly indicated in the letter we are examining. Intellectualist individualism and the circle mentality had come into conflict with the requirement of open speaking before the Party. Can you imagine such an absurdity, such a squabble, such a complaint about "*false accusations of opportunism*" in the German party? There, proletarian organisation and discipline weaned them from such intellectualist flabbiness long ago. Nobody has anything but the profoundest respect for Liebknecht, let us say; but how they would have laughed over there at *complaints* that he (together with Bebel) was "openly accused of opportunism" at the 1895 Congress,<sup>207</sup> when, on the agrarian question, he found himself in the bad company of the notorious

opportunist Vollmar and his friends. Liebknecht's name is inseparably bound up with the history of the German working-class movement not, of course, because he happened to stray into opportunism on such a comparatively minor and specific question, but in spite of it. And similarly, in spite of all the acrimony of the struggle, the name of Comrade Axelrod, say, inspires respect in every Russian Social-Democrat, and always will; but not because Comrade Axelrod happened to defend an opportunist idea at the Second Congress of our Party, happened to dig out old anarchistic rubbish at the Second Congress of the League, but in spite of it. Only the most hidebound circle mentality, with its logic of "either coats off, or let's have your hand", could give rise to hysterics, squabbles, and a Party split because of a "false accusation of opportunism against the majority of the Emancipation of Labour group".

The other element of this terrible accusation is intimately connected with the preceding (Comrade Martov tried in vain at the League Congress [p. 63] to evade and hush up *one* side of this incident). It relates in fact to that *coalition* of the anti-*Iskra*-ist and wavering elements with Comrade Martov which *began to emerge* in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Rules. Naturally, there was no agreement, direct or indirect, between Comrade Martov and the anti-*Iskra*-ists, nor could there have been, and nobody suspected him of it: it only seemed so to him in his fright. But *politically* his error was revealed in the fact that people who undoubtedly gravitated towards opportunism began to form around him an ever more solid and "compact" majority (which has now become a minority *only* because of the "accidental" withdrawal of seven delegates). We pointed to this "coalition", also *openly*, of course, immediately after the matter of Paragraph 1—both at the Congress (see Comrade Pavlovich's remark already quoted: Congress Minutes, p. 255) and in the *Iskra* organisation (Plekhanov, as I recall, pointed to it in particular). It is literally the same point and the same jibe as was addressed by Clara Zetkin to Bebel and Liebknecht in 1895, when she said: "*Es tut mir in der Seele weh, dass ich dich in der Gesellschaft seh'*" ("It cuts me to the quick to see you [i.e., Bebel] in such company [i.e., of Vollmar and Co.]").<sup>208</sup> It is strange, to be sure, that Bebel and Liebknecht did not send a hysterical message to Kautsky and Zetkin complaining of a false accusation of opportunism. . . .

As to the list of candidates for the Central Committee, this letter shows that Comrade Martov was mistaken in declaring at the League that the refusal to come to an agreement with us was not yet final—another example of how unwise it is in a political struggle to attempt to reproduce the *spoken word* from memory, instead of relying on documents. Actually, the "minority" were so

modest as to present the "majority" with an ultimatum: take two from the "minority" and one (by way of compromise and *only* as a concession, properly speaking!) from the "majority". This is monstrous, but it is a fact. And this fact clearly shows how absurd are the fables now being spread to the effect that the "majority" picked representatives of only one half of the Congress and got them elected by that one half. *Just the opposite*: the Martovites offered us one out of three only as a concession, consequently, in the event of our not agreeing to this unique "concession", they wanted to get *all* the seats filled by their own candidates! At our private meeting we had a good laugh at the Martovites' modesty and drew up a list of our own: Glebov—Travinsky (subsequently elected to the Central Committee)—*Popov*. For the latter we then substituted (also at a private meeting of the twenty-four) Comrade Vasilyev (subsequently elected to the Central Committee) *only because* Comrade Popov refused, first in private conversation and then openly at the Congress (p. 338), to be included in our list.

*That is how matters really stood.*

The modest "minority" modestly wished to be in the majority. When this modest wish was not met, the "minority" were pleased to decline altogether and to start a row. Yet there are people who now talk pontifically about the "intransigence" of the "majority"!

Entering the fray in the arena of free agitation at the Congress, the "minority" presented the "majority" with amusing ultimatums. Having suffered defeat, *our heroes burst into tears and began to cry out about a state of siege. Voilà tout.*

The terrible accusation that we intended to change the composition of the editorial board was also greeted with a smile (at our private meeting of the twenty-four); from the very beginning of the Congress, and even before the Congress, everybody had known perfectly well of the plan to *reconstitute* the editorial board by electing an initial trio (I shall speak of this in greater detail when I come to the election of the editorial board at the Congress). That the "minority" took fright at this plan *after* they saw its correctness splendidly confirmed by their coalition with the anti-*Iskra*-ists did not surprise us—it was quite natural. Of course, we could not take seriously the proposal that we should of our own free will, without a fight at the Congress, convert ourselves into a minority; nor could we take seriously this whole letter, the authors of which had reached such an incredible state of exasperation as to speak of "false accusations of opportunism". We confidently hoped that their sense of Party duty would very soon get the better of the natural desire to "vent their spleen".

## K. CONTINUATION OF THE DEBATE ON THE RULES. COMPOSITION OF THE COUNCIL

The succeeding clauses of the Rules aroused far more controversy over details than over principles of organisation. The 24th sitting of the Congress was entirely devoted to the question of representation at Party congresses, and again a decided and definite struggle against the common plans of all the *Iskra*-ists was waged only by the Bundists (Goldblatt and Lieber, pp. 258-59) and Comrade Akimov, who with praiseworthy frankness admitted his role at the Congress: "Every time I speak, I do so fully realising that my arguments will not influence the comrades, but will on the contrary damage the point I am trying to defend" (p. 261). Coming just after Paragraph 1 of the Rules, this apt remark was particularly appropriate; only the words "on the contrary" were not quite in order here, for Comrade Akimov was able not only to damage various points, but at the same time, and by so doing, to "influence the comrades" . . . those very inconsistent *Iskra*-ists who inclined toward opportunist phrase-mongering.

Well, in the upshot Paragraph 3 of the Rules, which defines the conditions of representation at congresses, was adopted by a majority with seven abstentions (p. 263)—anti-*Iskra*-ists, evidently.

The arguments over the composition of the Council, which took up the greater part of the 25th Congress sitting, revealed an extraordinary number of groupings around a multitude of proposals. Abramson and Tsarvov rejected the plan for a Council altogether. Panin insisted on making the Council a court of arbitration exclusively, and therefore quite consistently moved to delete the definition that the Council is the supreme institution and that it may be summoned by any two of its members.\* Hertz and Rusov advocated differing methods of constituting the Council, in addition to the *three* methods proposed by the *five* members of the Rules Committee.

The questions in dispute reduced themselves primarily to definition of the Council's functions, whether it was to be a court of arbitration or the supreme institution of the Party. Comrade Panin, as I have said, was consistently in favour of the former. But he stood alone. Comrade Martov vigorously opposed this:

Apparently, Comrade Starover also inclined to the view of Comrade Panin, only with the difference that the latter knew what he wanted and quite consistently moved resolutions aimed at converting the Council into a pure arbitration or conciliation body, whereas Comrade Starover did not know what he wanted when he said that according to the draft the Council could meet "only on the wish of the parties" (p. 266). That was quite incorrect

"I propose that the motion to delete the words, 'the Council is the supreme institution', be rejected. Our formulation [i.e., the formulation of the Council's functions that we had agreed on in the Rules Committee] deliberately leaves open the possibility of the Council developing into the supreme Party institution. For us, the Council is not merely a conciliation board." Yet the composition of the Council as proposed by Comrade Martov was solely and exclusively that of a "conciliation board" or court of arbitration: two members from each of the central bodies and a fifth to be invited by these four. Not only such a composition of the Council, but even that adopted by the Congress on the motion of Comrades Rusov and Hertz (the fifth member to be appointed by the Congress), answers the sole purpose of conciliation or mediation. Between such a composition of the Council and its mission of becoming the supreme Party institution there is an irreconcilable contradiction. The composition of the supreme Party institution should be constant, and not dependent on chance changes (sometimes owing to arrests) in the composition of the central bodies. The supreme institution should stand in direct relation to the Party Congress, receiving its powers from the latter, and not from two other Party institutions subordinate to the Congress. The supreme institution should consist of persons known to the Party Congress. Lastly, the *supreme* institution should not be *organised* in a way that makes *its very existence* dependent on chance—the two bodies fail to agree on the selection of the fifth member, and the Party is left without a supreme institution! To this it was objected: 1) that if one of the five were to abstain and the remaining four were to divide equally, the position might also prove a hopeless one (Egorov). This objection is unfounded, for the impossibility of *adopting a decision* is something that is inevitable at times in the case of *any* body, but that is quite different from the impossibility of *forming* the body. Second objection: "if an institution like the Council proves incapable of selecting the fifth member, it will mean that it is ineffectual in general" (Zasulich). But the point here is not that it will be ineffectual, but that there will be *no supreme institution* at all: without the fifth member, *there will be no Council*, there will be *no "institution"*, and the question of whether it is effectual or not will not even arise. Lastly, if the trouble were that it might not be possible to form some Party body over which stood another, higher, body, that would be remediable, for in urgent cases the higher body could fill the gap in one way or another. But there is *no* body above the Council except the Congress, and therefore to frame the Rules in such a way that it *might not even be possible to form* the Council would obviously be illogical.

Both my brief speeches at the Congress on this question were devoted to an examination (pp. 267 and 269)\* *only of these two* wrong objections which Martov and other comrades adduced in defence of his proposal. As to the question of the Central Organ or the Central Committee predominating on the Council, *I did not even touch on it*. This question was brought up, as early as the 14th sitting of the Congress (p. 157), by *Comrade Akimov*, he being the *first* to talk of the danger of the Central Organ predominating: and Comrades Martov, Axelrod, and others, *after the Congress*, were only following in *Akimov's* footsteps when they invented the absurd and demagogic story that the "majority" wanted to convert the Central Committee into a tool of the editorial board. When he dealt with this question in his *State of Siege*, Comrade Martov modestly avoided mentioning its real initiator!

Anybody who cares to acquaint himself with the *entire* treatment at the Party Congress of the question of the Central Organ predominating over the Central Committee, and is not content with isolated quotations torn from their context, will easily perceive how Comrade Martov has distorted the matter. *It was none other than Comrade Popov* who, as early as the 14th sitting, started a polemic *against the views of Comrade Akimov*, who wanted "the 'strictest centralisation' at the top of the Party *in order to weaken the influence of the Central Organ*" (p. 154; *my italics*), "which in fact is the whole meaning of this [Akimov's] system". "Far from defending such centralisation," Comrade Popov added, "I am prepared to combat it with every means in my power, because it is *the banner of opportunism*." There you have the *root* of the famous question of the Central Organ predominating over the Central Committee, and it is not surprising that Comrade Martov is now *obliged* to pass over the true origin of the question in silence. *Even Comrade Popov* could not fail to discern the *opportunist* character of Akimov's talk about the predominance of the Central Organ,\*\* and in order thoroughly to dissociate himself from Comrade Akimov, Comrade Popov *categorically* declared: "Let there be three members from the

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, p. 91 — *Ed.*

Neither Comrade Popov nor Comrade Martov hesitated to call Comrade Akimov an opportunist: they only began to take exception and grow indignant when this appellation was applied to *them* and applied justly, in connection with "equality of languages" or Paragraph 1. Comrade Akimov, in whose footsteps Comrade Martov has followed, was however able to conduct himself with greater dignity and manhood at the Party Congress than Comrade Martov and Co. at the League Congress: "I have been called an opportunist here," said Comrade Akimov at the Party Congress. "I personally consider this an abusive and offensive term and believe that I have done nothing to deserve it. However, I am not protesting" (p. 296). Can it be that Comrades Martov and Starover invited Comrade Akimov to subscribe to their protest against the false accusation of opportunism, but that Comrade Akimov declined?

editorial board on this central body [the Council] and two from the Central Committee. *That is a secondary question.* [My italics.] The important thing is that the leadership, the supreme leadership of the Party, should proceed from one source" (p. 155). Comrade Akimov objected: "Under the draft, the Central Organ is ensured predominance on the Council if only because the composition of the editorial board is constant whereas that of the Central Committee is changeable" (p. 157)—an argument which only relates to "constancy" of leadership in matters of *principle* (which is a normal and desirable thing), and certainly not to "predominance" in the sense of interference or encroachment on independence. And Comrade Popov, who at that time did not yet belong to a "minority" which masks its dissatisfaction with the composition of the central bodies by spreading tales of the Central Committee's lack of independence, told Comrade Akimov quite logically: "I propose that it [the Council] be regarded as the directing centre of the Party, in which case *it will be entirely unimportant whether there are more representatives on the Council from the Central Organ or from the Central Committee*" (pp. 157-58; my italics).

When the discussion of the composition of the Council was resumed at the 25th sitting, Comrade Pavlovich, continuing the old debate, pronounced in favour of the predominance of the Central Organ over the Central Committee "in view of the former's stability" (p. 264). It was stability in matters of *principle* that he had in mind, and that was how he was understood by Comrade Martov, who, speaking immediately after Comrade Pavlovich, considered it unnecessary to "fix the preponderance of one institution over the other" and pointed to the possibility of one of the Central Committee members residing abroad, "whereby the stability of the Central Committee in matters of principle would to some extent be preserved" (p. 264). Here there is not yet even a trace of the demagogic *confusion* of stability in matters of *principle*, and its preservation, with the preservation of the independence and initiative of the Central Committee. *At the Congress* this confusion, which *since the Congress* has practically become Comrade Martov's trump card, was furthered *only by Comrade Akimov, who already at that time* spoke of the "Arakcheev spirit of the Rules" (p. 268), and said that "*if three members of the Party Council were to be from the Central Organ, the Central Committee would be converted into a mere tool of the editorial board.*" [My italics.] Three persons residing abroad would obtain the unrestricted (!!) right to order the work of the entire (!!) Party. Their security would be guaranteed, and their power would therefore be lifelong" (p. 268). It was with this absolutely absurd and demagogic talk, in which *ideological lead-*

*ership is called interference in the work of the entire Party* (and which after the Congress provided a cheap slogan for Comrade Axelrod with his talk about "theocracy")—it was *with this* that Comrade Pavlovich again took issue when he stressed that he stood "for the stability and purity of the principles represented by *Iskra*. By giving preponderance to the editorial board of the Central Organ I want to fortify these principles" (268).

That is how the celebrated question of the predominance of the Central Organ over the Central Committee really stands. This famous "difference of principle" on the part of Comrades Axelrod and Martov is nothing but a *repetition of the opportunist and demagogic talk of Comrade Akimov*, the true character of which was clearly detected even by Comrade Popov, in the days when he had not yet suffered defeat over the composition of the central bodies!

\* \* \*

To sum up the question of the composition of the Council: despite Comrade Martov's attempts in his *State of Siege* to prove that my statement of the case in the *Letter to the Editors* is contradictory and incorrect, the minutes of the Congress clearly show that, *in comparison* with Paragraph 1, this question was indeed only a *detail*, and that the assertion in the article "Our Congress" (*Iskra*, No. 53) that we argued "almost exclusively" about the organisation of the Party's central institutions is a *complete distortion*. It is a distortion all the more outrageous since the author of the article *entirely ignores the controversy over Paragraph 1*. Further, that there was no definite grouping of the *Iskra*-ists over the composition of the Council is also borne out by the minutes: there were no roll-call votes; Martov differed with Panin; I found common ground with Popov; Egorov and Gusev took up a separate stand, and so on. Finally, my last statement (at the Congress of the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad), to the effect that the Martovites' coalition with the anti-*Iskra*-ists grew steadily stronger, is *also borne out* by Comrade Martov's and Comrade Axelrod's swing towards Comrade Akimov—now apparent to everyone—on this question as well.

## L. CONCLUSION OF THE DEBATE ON THE RULES. CO-OPTATION TO THE CENTRAL BODIES. WITHDRAWAL OF THE "RABOCHEYE DYELO" DELEGATES

Of the subsequent debate on the Rules (26th sitting of the Congress), only the question of restricting the powers of the Central Committee is worth mentioning, for it throws light on



the character of the attacks the Martovites are *now* making on hypercentralism. Comrades Egorov and Popov strove for the restriction of centralism with rather more conviction, irrespective of their own candidature or that of those they supported. When the question was still in the Rules Commission, they moved that the right of the Central Committee to dissolve local committees be made contingent on the consent of the Council and, in addition, be limited to cases specially enumerated (p. 272, note 1). This was opposed by three members of the Rules Commission (Glebov, Martov, and myself), and at the Congress Comrade Martov upheld our view (p. 273) and answered Egorov and Popov by saying that "the Central Committee would in any case deliberate before deciding on so serious a step as the dissolution of an organisation". As you see, *at that time* Comrade Martov still turned a deaf ear to *every* anti-centralist scheme, and the Congress rejected the proposal of Egorov and Popov—only unfortunately the minutes do not tell us by how many votes.

At the Party Congress, Comrade Martov was also "against substituting the word 'endorses' for the word 'organises' [the Central Committee organises committees, etc.—Paragraph 6 of the Party Rules]. It must be given the right to organise as well." That is what Comrade Martov said *then*, not having yet hit on the wonderful idea that the concept "organise" does not include endorsement, which he discovered only at the League Congress.

Apart from these two points, the debate over Paragraphs 5-11 of the Rules (Minutes, pp. 273-76) is hardly of any interest, being confined to quite minor arguments over details. Then came Paragraph 12—the question of co-optation to all Party bodies in general and to the central bodies in particular. The commission proposed raising the majority required for co-optation from two-thirds to four-fifths. Glebov, who presented its report, moved that decisions to co-opt to the Central Committee must be *unanimous*. Comrade Egorov, while acknowledging *dissonances* undesirable, stood for a simple majority in the absence of a reasoned veto. Comrade Popov agreed neither with the commission nor with Comrade Egorov and demanded either a simple majority (without the right of veto) or unanimity. Comrade Martov agreed neither with the commission, nor with Glebov, nor with Egorov, nor with Popov, declaring against unanimity, against four-fifths (in favour of two-thirds), and *against "mutual co-optation", that is, the right of the editorial board of the Central Organ to protest a co-optation to the Central Committee and vice versa ("the right of mutual control over co-optation")*.

As the reader sees, the groupings were highly variegated and the differences so numerous as almost to lend "uniqueness" to the views of each delegate!

Comrade Martov said: "I admit the psychological impossibility of working with unpleasant persons. But it is also important for our organisation to be virile and effectual.... The right of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ to mutual control in cases of co-optation is unnecessary. It is not because I think that one is not competent in the sphere of the other that I am against it. No! The editorial board of the Central Organ, for instance, might give the Central Committee sound advice as to whether Mr. Nadezhdin, say, should be admitted to the Central Committee. I object because I do not want to create mutually exasperating red tape."

I objected: "There are two questions here. The first is that of the required majority, and I am against lowering it from four-fifths to two-thirds. The stipulation for a reasoned protest is not expedient, and I am against it. Incomparably more important is the second question, the right of the Central Committee and the Central Organ to mutual control over co-optation. The mutual consent of the two central bodies is an essential condition for harmony. What is involved here is a possible rupture between the two central bodies. Whoever does not want a split should be concerned to safeguard harmony. We know from the history of the Party that there have been people who caused splits. It is a question of principle, a very important question, one on which the whole future of the Party may depend" (pp. 276-77).<sup>\*</sup> That is the full text of the summary of my speech as recorded at the Congress, a speech to which Comrade Martov attaches particularly serious importance. Unfortunately, although attaching serious importance to it, he did not take the trouble to consider it in connection with the whole debate and the whole political situation at the Congress at the moment it was made.

The first question that arises is why, in my original draft (see p. 394, Paragraph 11).<sup>\*\*</sup> I stipulated a majority of only two-thirds and did not demand mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies. Comrade Trotsky, who spoke after me (p. 277), did in fact at once raise this question.

The answer to it is given in my speech at the League Congress and in Comrade Pavlovich's letter on the Second Congress. Paragraph 1 of the Rules "broke the pot" and it had to be bound tight with a "double knot"—I said at the League Congress. That meant, firstly, that on a purely theoretical question Martov had proved to be an opportunist, and his mistake had been *upheld* by Lieber and Akimov. It meant, secondly, that the coalition of the Martovites (that is, an insignificant minority of the *Iskra*-ists)

<sup>\*</sup> See *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, pp. 91-92.—Ed.

<sup>\*\*</sup> See *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 477.—Ed.

with the anti-*Iskra*-ists ensured them a majority at the Congress in the voting on the personal composition of the central bodies. And it was about the *personal composition* of the central bodies that I was speaking here, emphasising the need for harmony and warning against "*people who cause splits*". This warning was indeed of important significance in principle, for the *Iskra* organisation (which was undoubtedly best qualified to judge about the personal composition of the central bodies, having as it did the closest practical acquaintance with all affairs and with all the candidates) had already made its recommendations on this subject and had taken the decision we know regarding the candidates who aroused its misgivings. Both morally and on its merits (that is, its competence to judge), the *Iskra* organisation should have had the decisive say in this delicate matter. But *formally speaking*, of course, Comrade Martov had every right to appeal to the Liebers and Akimovs *against* the majority of the *Iskra* organisation. And in his brilliant speech on Paragraph 1, Comrade Akimov had said with remarkable explicitness and sagacity that whenever he perceived a difference among the *Iskra*-ists over the methods of achieving their common *Iskra* aim, he consciously and deliberately *voted for the worse method*, because his. Akimov's, aims were diametrically opposed to those of the *Iskra*-ists. There could not be the *slightest doubt* therefore that, quite irrespective of the wishes and intentions of Comrade Martov, *it was the worse composition of the central bodies* that would obtain the support of the Liebers and Akimovs. They *could vote*, they were bound to vote (judging by their *deeds*, by their vote on Paragraph 1, and not by their words) precisely for that list which would promise the presence of "*people who cause splits*", and would do so *in order to* "*cause splits*". Is it surprising, in view of this situation, that I said that it was an important question of principle (harmony between the two central bodies), one on which the whole future of the Party might depend?

No Social-Democrat at all acquainted with the *Iskra* ideas and plans and with the history of the movement, and at all earnest in sharing those ideas, could doubt for a moment that while formally it was quite right and proper for the dispute within the *Iskra* organisation over the composition of the central bodies to be decided by the Liebers and Akimovs, this would ensure the *worst possible results*. It was imperative to *fight to avert* these worst possible results.

How were we to fight them? We did not fight by hysterics and rows, of course, but by methods which were *quite loyal and quite legitimate*: perceiving that we were in the minority (as on the question of Paragraph 1), *we appealed to the Congress to protect the rights of the minority*. Greater strictness as regards

the majority required for adoption of members (four-fifths instead of two-thirds), the requirement of unanimity for co-optation, mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies—all this we began to advocate *when we found ourselves in the minority on the question of the personal composition of the central bodies*. This fact is constantly ignored by the Ivans and Peters who are so ready to give opinions on the Congress lightly, after a couple of chats with friends, without seriously studying *all* the minutes and all the “testimony” of the persons concerned. Yet anybody who cares to make a conscientious study of these minutes and this testimony will inevitably encounter the fact I have mentioned, namely, that the *root* of the dispute *at that moment of the Congress* was the *personal composition of the central bodies*, and that we strove for stricter conditions of control just because we were in the minority and wanted “a double knot to bind tight the pot” broken by Martov amid the jubilation and with the jubilant assistance of the Liebers and the Akimovs.

“If it were not so,” Comrade Pavlovich says, speaking of this moment of the Congress, “one would have to assume that in moving the point about unanimity in cases of co-optation, we were concerned for the interests of our adversaries; for to the side which predominates in any institution unanimity is unnecessary and even disadvantageous.” (*Letter on the Second Congress*, p. 14.) But today the chronological aspect of the events is all too often forgotten; it is forgotten that there was a *whole period at the Congress* when the present minority was the majority (thanks to the participation of the Liebers and Akimovs), and that it was precisely at this period that the controversy over co-optation to the central bodies took place, the underlying reason for which was the difference within the *Iskra* organisation over the personal composition of the central bodies. Whoever grasps this fact will understand the passion that marked our debates and will not be surprised by the *seeming* paradox that petty differences over details gave rise to really important issues of principle.

Comrade Deutsch, speaking at this same sitting (p. 277), was in many respects right when he said: “This motion is undoubtedly designed for the given moment.” Yes, indeed, it is only when we have understood the *given moment*, in all its complexity, that we can understand the true meaning of the controversy. And it is highly important to bear in mind that when *we* were in the minority, we defended the rights of the minority by *such methods* as will be acknowledged legitimate and permissible by any European Social-Democrat, namely, by appealing to the Congress for stricter control over the personal composition of the central bodies. Similarly, Comrade Egorov was in

many respects right when he said at the Congress, but at a different sitting "I am exceedingly surprised to hear reference to principles again being made in the debate [This was said in reference to the elections to the Central Committee at the 31st sitting of the Congress, that is, if I am not mistaken, on Thursday morning, whereas the 26th sitting, of which we are now speaking, was held on Monday evening] I think it is clear to everyone that during the last few days the debate has not revolved around any question of principle, but exclusively around securing or preventing the inclusion of one or another person in the central institutions. Let us acknowledge that principles have been lost at this Congress long since, and call a spade a spade (*General laughter. Muravyov* 'I request to have it recorded in the minutes that Comrade Martov smiled') (p. 337) It is not surprising that Comrade Martov, like the rest of us, laughed at Comrade Egorov's complaints, which were indeed ludicrous. Yes 'during the last few days' a very great deal did revolve around the personal composition of the central bodies. That is true. That was indeed *clear to everyone* at the Congress (and it is only *now* that the minority is trying to *obscure* this clear fact). And it is true, lastly, that a spade should be called a spade. But, for God's sake, where is the 'loss of principles' *here*? After all, we assembled at the Congress *in order, in the first days* (see p. 10, the Congress agenda), to discuss the programme, tactics, and Rules and to decide the questions relating to them, and *in the last days* (Items 18 and 19 of the agenda) to discuss the personal composition of the central bodies and to decide *those* questions. When the *last days* of congresses are devoted to a struggle over the conductor's baton—that is natural and absolutely legitimate (But when a fight over the conductor's baton is waged *after congresses*, that is squabbling). If someone suffers defeat *at the congress* over the personal composition of the central bodies (as Comrade Egorov did) it is *simply ludicrous* of him, *after that*, to speak of 'loss of principles'. It is therefore understandable why everybody laughed at Comrade Egorov. And it is also understandable why Comrade Muravyov requested to have it recorded in the minutes that Comrade Martov shared in the laughter *in laughing at Comrade Egorov. Comrade Martov was laughing at himself*.

In addition to Comrade Muravyov's irony, it will not be superfluous, perhaps, to mention the following fact. As we know, *after the Congress* Comrade Martov asserted right and left that it was the question of co-optation to the central bodies that played the cardinal role in our divergence and that 'the majority of the old editorial board' was emphatically opposed to mutual control over co-optation to the central bodies. *Before*

*the Congress*, when accepting my plan to elect two trios, with mutual co-optation by a two-thirds majority, Comrade Martov wrote to me on the subject: "In adopting this form of mutual co-optation, it should be stressed that after the Congress additions to each body will be effected on somewhat different lines. (I would advise the following: each body co-opts new members, informing the other body of its intention; the latter may enter a protest, in which case the dispute shall be settled by the Council. To avoid delays, this procedure should be followed in relation to candidates nominated in advance—at least in the case of the Central Committee—from whose number the additions may then be made more expeditiously.) In order to stress that subsequent co-optation will be effected in the manner provided by the Party Rules, the following words should be added to Item 22\*: '...by which the decisions taken must be endorsed'." (My italics.) Comment is superfluous.

Having explained the significance of the moment when the controversy over co-optation to the central bodies took place, we must dwell a little on the *voteings* on the subject—it is unnecessary to dwell on the *discussion*, as the speeches of Comrade Martov and myself, already quoted, were followed only by brief interchanges in which very few of the delegates took part (see Minutes, pp. 277-80). In relation to the voting, Comrade Martov asserted at the League Congress that in my account of the matter I was guilty of "the greatest distortion" (League Minutes, p. 60) "in representing the struggle around the Rules [Comrade Martov unwittingly uttered a profound truth: after Paragraph 1, the heated disputes were indeed *around* the Rules] as a struggle of *Iskra* against the Martovites joined in coalition with the Bund".

Let us examine this interesting "greatest distortion". Comrade Martov added together the voteings on the composition of the Council and the voteings on co-optation and listed *eight* in all: 1) election to the Council of two members each from the Central Organ and the Central Committee—27 for (M), 16 against (L), 7 abstentions.\*\* (Let me say parenthetically that the number of

\* The reference is to my original draft of the *Tagesordnung* (agenda.—*Ed.*) of the Congress and my commentary to it, with which all the delegates were familiar. Item 22 of this draft provided for the election of two trios—to the Central Organ and to the Central Committee—"mutual co-optation" by these six by a two-thirds majority, the endorsement of this mutual co-optation by the Congress, and subsequent co-optation by the Central Organ and the Central Committee separately.

\*\* The letters M and L in parentheses indicate which side I (L) and which side Martov (M) was on.

abstentions is shown in the Minutes—p. 270—as 8, but that is a detail.) 2) election of the fifth Council member by the Congress—23 for (L), 18 against (M), 7 abstentions. 3) replacement of lapsed Council members by the Council itself—23 against (M), 16 for (L), 12 abstentions. 4) unanimity for co-optation to the Central Committee—25 for (L), 19 against (M), 7 abstentions. 5) the stipulation for *one* reasoned protest for non-co-optation—21 for (L), 19 against (M), 11 abstentions. 6) unanimity for co-optation to the Central Organ—23 for (L), 21 against (M), 7 abstentions. 7) votability of a motion giving the Council the right to annul a Central Organ or Central Committee decision not to co-opt a new member—25 for (M), 19 against (L), 7 abstentions. 8) this motion itself—24 for (M), 23 against (L), 4 abstentions. “*Here, evidently,*” Comrade Martov concluded (League Minutes, p. 61), “*one Bund delegate voted for the motion while the rest abstained.*” (My italics.)

Why, may one ask, did Comrade Martov consider it *evident* that the Bundist had voted *for him, Martov*, when there were no roll-call votes?

Because he counted the *number of votes cast*, and when it indicated that the Bund *had taken part* in the voting, he, Comrade Martov, did not doubt that it had been on *his, Martov's*, side.

Where, then, is the “greatest distortion” on my part?

The total votes were 51, without the Bundists 46, without the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists 43. In *seven* of the eight votings mentioned by Comrade Martov, 43, 41, 39, 44, 40, 44, and 44 delegates took part: in *one*, 47 delegates (or rather votes), and here Comrade Martov himself admitted that he was supported by a Bundist. We thus find that the picture sketched by Martov (and sketched incompletely, as we shall soon see) *only confirms and strengthens my account of the struggle!* We find that in a great many cases the number of abstentions was *very high*: this points to the slight—*relatively* slight—interest shown by the Congress as a whole in certain *minor points*, and to the absence of any definite grouping of the *Iskra*-ists on these questions. Martov's statement that the Bundists “manifestly helped Lenin by abstaining” (League Minutes, p. 62) *in fact speaks against Martov*: it means that it was *only* when the Bundists were absent or abstained that I could sometimes count upon victory. But whenever the Bundists *thought it worth while* to intervene in the struggle, they supported Comrade Martov; and the above-mentioned case when 47 delegates voted was *not the only time* they intervened. Whoever cares to refer to the Congress Minutes will notice a *very strange incompleteness* in Comrade Martov's picture. Comrade Martov *simply omitted three cases* when the Bund *did take part* in the voting, and it goes without saying that in all these cases

Comrade Martov was the victor. Here are the three cases: 1) adoption of Comrade Fomin's amendment to lower the required majority from four-fifths to two-thirds—27 for, 21 against (p. 278), that is, 48 votes. 2) adoption of Comrade Martov's motion to delete mutual co-optation—26 for, 24 against (p. 279), that is, 50 votes. Lastly, 3) rejection of my motion to permit co-optation to the Central Organ or the Central Committee only with the consent of all members of the Council (p. 280)—27 against, 22 for (there was even a roll-call vote, of which, unfortunately, there is no record in the minutes), that is, 49 votes.

To sum up: on the question of co-optation to the central bodies the Bundists took part *in only four votings* (the *three* I have just mentioned, with 48, 50, and 49 votes, and the *one* mentioned by Comrade Martov, with 47 votes). *In all these votings* Comrade Martov was the victor. *My statement of the case proves to be right in every particular*: in declaring that there was a coalition with the Bund, in noting the relatively minor character of the questions (a large number of abstentions in very many cases), and in pointing to the absence of any definite grouping of the *Iskra*-ists (no roll-call votes: very few speakers in the debates).

Comrade Martov's attempt to detect a contradiction in my statement of the case turns out to have been made with unsound means, for he tore isolated words from their context and did not trouble to reconstruct the complete picture

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The last paragraph of the Rules, dealing with the organisation abroad, again gave rise to debates and votings which were highly significant from the point of view of the groupings at the Congress. The question at issue was recognition of the League as the Party organisation abroad. Comrade Akimov, of course, at once rose up in arms, reminding the Congress of the Union Abroad, which had been endorsed by the First Congress, and pointing out that the question was one of principle. "Let me first make the reservation," he said, "that I do not attach any particular practical significance to which way the question is decided. The ideological struggle which has been going on in our Party is undoubtedly not over yet; but it will be continued on a different plane and with a different alignment of forces. . . . Paragraph 13 of the Rules once more reflects, and in a very marked way, the tendency to convert our Congress from a Party congress into a factional congress. Instead of causing all Social-Democrats in Russia to defer to the decisions of the Party Congress in the name of Party unity, by uniting all Party organisations, it is proposed that the Congress



should destroy the organisation of the minority and make the minority disappear from the scene" (p. 281). As the reader sees, the "continuity" which became so dear to Comrade Martov after his defeat over the composition of the central bodies was no less dear to Comrade Akimov. But at the Congress these people who apply different standards to themselves and to others rose up in heated protest against Comrade Akimov. Although the programme had been adopted, *Iskra* endorsed, and nearly the entire Rules passed, that "principle" which "in principle" distinguished the League from the Union was brought to the fore. "If Comrade Akimov is anxious to make the issue one of principle," exclaimed Comrade Martov, "we have nothing against it; especially since Comrade Akimov has spoken of possible combinations in a struggle with two trends. *The victory of one trend must be sanctioned* [this, mark, was said at the 27th sitting of the Congress!] not in the sense that we make another bow to *Iskra*, but in the sense that we *bow a last farewell to all the possible combinations Comrade Akimov spoke of*" (p. 282; my italics).

What a picture! When all the Congress arguments regarding the programme *were already over*, Comrade Martov continued to *bow a last farewell* to all possible combinations... until he suffered defeat over the composition of the central bodies! Comrade Martov "bowed a last farewell" at the Congress to that possible "combination" which he cheerfully brought to fruition *on the very morrow of the Congress*. But Comrade Akimov proved *even then* to be much more far-sighted than Comrade Martov; Comrade Akimov referred to the five years' work of "an old Party organisation which, by the will of the First Congress, bears the name of a committee", and concluded with a most venomous and *prescient* stab: "As to Comrade Martov's opinion that my hopes of a new trend appearing in our Party are in vain, let me say that *even he himself inspires me with such hopes*" (p. 283).

Yes, it must be confessed, Comrade Martov has fully justified Comrade Akimov's hopes!

Comrade Martov became convinced that Comrade Akimov was right, and joined him, after the "continuity" had been broken of an old Party body deemed to have been working for three years. Comrade Akimov's victory did not cost him much effort.

But at the Congress Comrade Akimov was backed—and backed consistently—only by Comrades Martynov and Brouckère and the Bundists (eight votes). Comrade Egorov, like the real leader of the "Centre" that he is, adhered to the golden mean: he agreed with the *Iskra*-ists, you see, he "sympathised" with them (p. 282), and *proved* his sympathy by the *proposal* (p. 283) to avoid the

question of principle altogether and *say nothing* about either the League or the Union. The proposal was rejected by twenty-seven votes to fifteen. Apparently, in addition to the anti-*Iskra*-ists (eight), nearly the entire "Centre" (ten) voted with Comrade Egorov (the total vote was forty-two, so that a large number abstained or *were absent*, as often happened during votes which were uninteresting or whose result was a *foregone conclusion*). *Whenever the question arose* of carrying out the "*Iskra*" *principles in practice*, it turned out that the "sympathy" of the "Centre" was purely *verbal*, and we secured only thirty votes or a little over. This was to be seen even more graphically in the debate and votes on Rusov's motion (to recognise the League as the *sole* organisation abroad). Here the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Marsh" took up an outright position of *principle*, and its champions, Comrades Lieber and Egorov, declared Comrade Rusov's motion unvotable, impermissible: "It slaughters all the other organisations abroad" (Egorov). And, not desiring to have any part in "slaughtering organisations", the speaker not only refused to vote, but even left the hall. But the leader of the "Centre" must be given his due: he displayed ten times more political manhood and strength of conviction (in his mistaken principles) than did Comrade Martov and Co., for he took up the cudgels for a "slaughtered" organisation *not only when that organisation was his own circle*, defeated in open combat.

Comrade Rusov's motion was deemed votable by twenty-seven votes to fifteen, and was then adopted by twenty-five votes to seventeen. If we add to these seventeen the absent Comrade Egorov, we get *the full complement (eighteen) of the anti-"Iskra"-ists and the "Centre"*.

As a whole Paragraph 13 of the Rules, dealing with the organisation abroad, was adopted by only *thirty-one votes* to twelve, with six abstentions. This figure, thirty-one—showing the approximate number of *Iskra*-ists at the Congress, that is, of people who consistently advocated *Iskra*'s views and applied them *in practice*—we are now encountering for no less than the *sixth time* in our analysis of the voting at the Congress (place of the Bund question on the agenda, the Organising Committee incident, the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group, and two votes on the agrarian programme). Yet Comrade Martov seriously wants to assure us that there are no grounds for picking out such a "narrow" group of *Iskra*-ists!

Nor can we omit to mention that the adoption of Paragraph 13 of the Rules evoked an extremely characteristic discussion in connection with a statement by Comrades Akimov and Martynov that they "refused to take part in the voting" (p. 288). The Bureau of the Congress discussed this statement and found—

with every reason—that not even the direct closing down of the Union would entitle its delegates to refuse to take part in the Congress proceedings. Refusal to vote is absolutely abnormal and impermissible—such was the view of the Bureau, which was shared by the whole Congress, including the *Iskra*-ists of the minority, who at the 28th sitting *hotly condemned what they themselves were guilty of at the 31st!* When Comrade Martynov proceeded to defend his statement (p. 291), he was opposed alike by Pavlovich, by Trotsky, by Karsky, and by Martov. Comrade Martov was particularly clear on the duties of a dissatisfied minority (until he found himself in the minority!) and held forth on the subject in a very didactic manner. “Either you are delegates to the Congress,” he told Comrades Akimov and Martynov, “in which case you *must* take part in *all* its proceedings [mv italics: Comrade Martov did not yet perceive any formalism and bureaucracy in subordination of the minority to the majority!]; or you are not delegates, in which case you cannot remain at the sitting. . . . The statement of the Union delegates compels me to ask two questions: are they members of the Party, and are they delegates to the Congress?” (p. 292).

*Comrade Martov instructing Comrade Akimov in the duties of a Party member!* But it was not without reason that Comrade Akimov had said that he had some hopes in Comrade Martov. . . . These hopes were to come true, however, only *after* Martov was defeated in the elections. When the matter did not concern himself, but others, Comrade Martov was deaf even to the terrible catchword “emergency law”, *first launched* (if I am not mistaken) by *Comrade Martynov*. “The explanation given us,” Comrade Martynov replied to those who urged him to withdraw his statement, “has not made it clear whether the decision was one of principle or an *emergency measure* against the Union. If the latter, we consider that the Union has been insulted. Comrade Egorov got the same impression as we did, namely, that it was an *emergency law* [mv italics] against the Union, and therefore even left the hall” (p. 295). Both Comrade Martov and Comrade Trotsky protested vigorously, along with Plekhanov, against the absurd, *truly absurd*, idea of regarding a vote of the Congress as an *insult*; and Comrade Trotsky, defending a resolution adopted by the Congress on his motion (that Comrades Akimov and Martynov could consider that full satisfaction had been given them), declared that “the resolution is one of principle, not a philistine one, and *it is no business of ours if anybody takes offence at it*” (p. 296). But it very soon became apparent that the circle mentality and the philistine outlook are still all too strong in our Party, and the proud words I have italicised proved to be merely a high-sounding phrase.

Comrades Akimov and Martynov refused to withdraw their statement, and walked out of the Congress, amidst the delegates' general cry: "Absolutely unwarranted!"

## M. THE ELECTIONS. END OF THE CONGRESS

After adopting the Rules, the Congress passed a resolution on district organisations and a number of resolutions on particular Party organisations, and, following the extremely instructive debate on the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group which I have analysed above, proceeded to discuss the election of the Party's central institutions.

We already know that the *Iskra* organisation, from which the entire Congress had expected an authoritative recommendation, had split over this question, for the *minority* of the organisation wanted to test in free and open combat whether it could not win a *majority* at the Congress. We also know that a plan was known long before the Congress—and to all the delegates at the Congress itself—for *reconstituting* the editorial board by the election of two trios, one to the Central Organ and one to the Central Committee. Let us dwell on this plan in greater detail in order to throw light on the Congress debate.

Here is the exact text of my commentary to the draft *Tagesordnung* of the Congress where this plan was set forth\*: "The Congress shall elect three persons to the editorial board of the Central Organ and three to the Central Committee. These six persons *in conjunction* shall, if necessary, co-opt by a two-thirds majority vote additional members to the editorial board of the Central Organ and to the Central Committee and report to this effect to the Congress. After the report has been endorsed by the Congress, subsequent co-optation shall be effected by the editorial board of the Central Organ and by the Central Committee separately."

The plan stands out in this text quite definitely and unambiguously: it implies a *reconstitution* of the editorial board, effected *with the participation* of the most influential leaders of the practical work. Both the features of this plan which I have emphasised are apparent at once to anyone who takes the trouble to read the text at all attentively. But nowadays one has to stop and explain the most elementary things. It was precisely a *reconstitution* of the editorial board that the plan implied—not necessarily an enlargement and not necessarily a reduction

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\* See my *Letter to the Editors of "Iskra"*, p. 5, and the League Minutes, p. 33.

of its membership, but its reconstitution; for the question of a possible enlargement or reduction was left *open*: co-optation was provided for only *if necessary*. Among the suggestions for such reconstitution made by various people, some provided for a possible reduction of the number of editors, and some for increasing it to seven (I personally had always regarded seven as far preferable to six), and even to eleven (I considered this possible in the event of peaceful union with all Social-Democratic organisations in general and with the Bund and the Polish Social-Democrats in particular). But what is most important, and this is usually overlooked by people talking about the "trio", is that *the matter of further co-optation to the Central Organ was to be decided with the participation of the members of the Central Committee*. Not one comrade of all the "minority" members of the organisation or Congress delegates, who knew of this plan and approved it (either explicitly or tacitly), has taken the trouble to explain the meaning of this point. Firstly, why was a trio, and only a trio, taken as the starting-point for reconstituting the editorial board? Obviously, this would have been *absolutely senseless* if the *sole*, or at least the main, purpose had been to *enlarge* the board, and if that board had really been considered a "harmonious" one. If the purpose is to enlarge a "harmonious" body, it would be strange to *start*, not with the whole body, but with only a *part*. Obviously, *not all* members of the board were considered quite suitable for discussing and *deciding* the matter of reconstituting it, of converting the old editorial circle into a *Party institution*. Obviously, even those who personally desired the reconstitution to be an enlargement recognised that the old composition of the board was not harmonious and did not answer to the ideal of a Party institution, for otherwise there would be no reason *first* to reduce the six to *three* in order to enlarge it. I repeat, this is self-evident, and only the temporary confusion of the issue by "personalities" could have caused it to be forgotten.

Secondly, it will be seen from the above-quoted text that even *the agreement of all three members of the Central Organ* would not by itself be enough for the enlargement of the trio. This, too, is always lost sight of. Two-thirds of *six*, that is, *four* votes, were to be required for co-optation; hence it would only be necessary for the three members elected to the Central Committee to exercise their veto, and *no enlargement of the trio would be possible*. Conversely, even if two of the three members of the editorial board of the Central Organ were opposed to further co-optation, it would nevertheless be possible if all three members of the Central Committee were in favour of it. It is thus obvious that the intention was, in converting the old circle into a Party in-

stitution, to grant the *deciding* voice to the Congress-elected leaders of the practical work. Which comrades we roughly had in mind may be seen from the fact that prior to the Congress the editorial board unanimously elected Comrade Pavlovich a seventh member of their body, in case it should be necessary to make a statement at the Congress on behalf of the board; in addition to Comrade Pavlovich, a certain old member of the *Iskra* organisation and member of the Organising Committee, *who was subsequently elected to the Central Committee*,<sup>209</sup> was proposed for the seventh place.

Thus the plan for the election of two trios was obviously designed: 1) to reconstitute the editorial board; 2) to rid it of certain elements of the old circle spirit, which is out of place in a Party institution (if there had been nothing to get rid of there would have been no point in the idea of an initial trio'); and, lastly, 3) to get rid of the "theocratic" features of a body of writers (getting rid of them by enlisting the services of prominent practical workers *in deciding* the question of enlarging the trio). This plan, with which all the editors were acquainted, was, clearly, based on *three years' experience* of work and *fully* accorded with the principles of revolutionary organisation that we were consistently introducing. In the period of *disunity* in which *Iskra* entered the arena, groups were often formed haphazardly and spontaneously, and inevitably suffered from certain pernicious manifestations of the circle spirit. The creation of a Party presupposed and demanded the elimination of these features: the participation of prominent practical workers in this elimination was *essential*, for certain members of the editorial board had *always* dealt with organisational affairs, and the body to enter the system of Party institutions was to be a body not merely of writers, but of political leaders. It was likewise natural, from the standpoint of the policy *Iskra* had always pursued, to leave the selection of the initial trio to the Congress: we had observed the greatest *caution* in preparing for the Congress, waiting until all controversial questions of principle relating to programme, tactics, and organisation had been *fully* clarified; we had *no doubt* that the Congress would be an "*Iskra*"-ist one in the sense that its overwhelming majority would be solid on these fundamental questions (this was also indicated in part by the resolutions recognising *Iskra* as the leading organ); we *were bound* therefore to leave it to the comrades who had borne the whole brunt of the work of disseminating *Iskra*'s ideas and preparing for its conversion into a party to decide *for themselves* who were the most suitable candidates for the new Party institution. It is *only* by the fact that this plan for "two trios" was a natural one, *only* by the fact that it *fully accorded* with *Iskra*'s whole policy and

with everything known about *Iskra* to people at all closely acquainted with the work, that the general approval of this plan and the absence of any rival plan *is to be explained*.

And so, at the Congress, Comrade Rusov first of all moved the election of *two trios*. *It never even occurred* to the followers of Martov, who *had informed us in writing that this plan was connected with the false accusation of opportunism*, to reduce the dispute over a board of six or three to the question whether this accusation was right or wrong. *Not one of them even hinted at it! None of them ventured to say a single word* about the differing shades of principle involved in the dispute over six or three. They preferred a commoner and cheaper method, namely, to evoke *pity*, to speak of *possible injured feelings*, to pretend that *the question of the editorial board had already been settled* by appointing *Iskra* the Central Organ. This last argument, adduced by Comrade Koltsov against Comrade Rusov, was a piece of *downright falsity*. Two separate items were included—not fortuitously, of course—in the Congress agenda (see Minutes, p. 10): Item 4—"Central Organ of the Party", and Item 18—"Election of the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ". That in the first place. In the second place, when the Central Organ was being appointed, *all* the delegates categorically declared that this did *not* mean the endorsement of the editorial board, but only of the trend,\* and *not a single protest* was raised against these declarations.

Thus the statement that by endorsing a definite organ the Congress had in effect endorsed the editorial board—a statement many times reiterated by the adherents of the minority (by Koltsov, p. 321, by Posadovsky, p. 321, by Popov, p. 322, and by many others)—was *simply untrue in fact*. It was a perfectly obvious *manoeuvre* to cover a *retreat* from the position held at the time when the question of the composition of the central bodies could still be regarded *in a really dispassionate light* by

\* See Minutes, p. 140, Akimov's speech: "I am told that we shall discuss the election of the Central Organ at the end"; Muraviov's speech against Akimov, "who takes the question of the future editorial board of the Central Organ very much to heart" (p. 141); Pavlovich's speech to the effect that, having appointed the organ, we had obtained "the concrete material on which to perform the operations Comrade Akimov is so much concerned about", and that there could not be a shadow of doubt about *Iskra's* "submitting" to "the decisions of the Party" (p. 142); Trotsky's speech "Since we are not endorsing the editorial board, what is it that we are endorsing in *Iskra*?... Not the name, but the trend... not the name, but the banner" (p. 142); Martynov's speech: "...Like many other comrades, I consider that while discussing the adoption of *Iskra*, as a newspaper of a definite trend, as our Central Organ, we should not at this juncture discuss the method of electing or endorsing its editorial board, we shall discuss that later in its proper order on the agenda..." (p. 143)

*all.* The retreat could not be justified either by motives of principle (for to raise the question of the "false accusation of opportunism" *at the Congress* was too much to the *disadvantage* of the minority, and they *did not even hint* at it), or by a reference to the *factual* data showing which was actually more effectual—six or three (for the mere mention of these facts would have produced a heap of arguments against the minority). They had to try to burke the issue by *talk* about a "symmetrical whole", about a "harmonious team", about a "symmetrical and crystal-integral entity", and so on. It is not surprising that these arguments were immediately called by their true name: "*wretched words*" (p. 328). The very plan for a trio clearly testified to a lack of "harmony", and the impressions obtained by the delegates during a month and more of working together obviously afforded a mass of material to enable them to judge *for themselves*. When Comrade Posadovsky hinted at this material (incautiously and injudiciously from his own standpoint: see pp. 321 and 325 regarding the "qualified sense" in which he had used the word "dissonances"), Comrade Muravyov bluntly declared: "In my opinion it is now quite clear to the majority of the Congress that such\* dissonances undoubtedly do exist" (p. 321). The minority chose to construe the word "dissonances" (which was given currency by Posadovsky, not Muravyov) in a purely personal sense, not daring to take up the gauntlet flung down by Comrade Muravyov, not daring to bring forward in defence of the board of six a *single* argument *on the actual merits of the case*. The result was a dispute which for its sterility was more than comic: the majority (through the mouth of Comrade Muravyov) declared that the true significance of the six-or-three issue was *quite clear* to them, but the minority persistently refused to listen and affirmed that "we are *not in a position* to examine it". The majority not only considered themselves in a position to examine it, but had "examined it" already and announced that the results of the examination were *quite clear* to them, but the minority apparently *feared an examination* and took cover behind mere "wretched words". The majority urged us to "bear in mind that our Central Organ is something more than a literary group"; the majority "wanted the Central Organ to be headed by *quite definite persons, persons known to the Congress, persons meeting the requirements* I have

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\* What "dissonances" exactly Comrade Posadovsky had in mind the Congress never did learn. Comrade Muravyov, for his part, stated at this same sitting (p. 322) that his meaning had been misrepresented, and when the minutes were being endorsed he plainly declared that he "was referring to the dissonances which had been revealed in the Congress debates on various points, dissonances over principle, whose existence is now unfortunately a fact that nobody will deny" (p. 353).



mentioned" (that is, not only literary requirements; Comrade Lange's speech, p. 327). Again the minority did not dare to take up the gauntlet and did not say a word as to who, in their opinion, was suitable for what was more than a literary body, as to who was a figure of a "quite definite" magnitude "known to the Congress". The minority continued to take shelter behind their celebrated "harmony". Nor was this all. The minority even introduced into the debate arguments which were absolutely false in principle and which therefore quite rightly evoked a sharp rebuff. "The Congress," don't you see, "has neither the moral nor the political right to refashion the editorial board" (Trotsky, p. 326); "it is too delicate [*sic!*] a question" (Trotsky again): "*how will the editors who are not re-elected feel about the fact that the Congress does not want to see them on the board any more?*" (Tsaryov, p. 324).\*

Such arguments simply put the whole question on the plane of *pity and injured feelings*, and were a direct admission of bankruptcy as regards real arguments of principle, real political arguments. And the majority immediately gave this attitude its true name: *philistinism* (Comrade Rusov). "We are hearing strange speeches from the lips of revolutionaries," Comrade Rusov justly remarked, "speeches that are in marked disharmony with the concepts of Party work, Party ethics. The principal argument on which the opponents of electing trios take their stand amounts to a *purely philistine view of Party affairs* (my italics throughout). . . . If we adopt this standpoint, which is a *philistine* and not a Party standpoint, we shall at every election have to consider: will not Petrov be offended if Ivanov is elected and not he, will not some member of the Organising Committee be offended if another member, and not he, is elected to the Central Committee? Where is this going to land us, comrades? If we have gathered here for the purpose of creating a Party, and *not of indulging in mutual compliments and philistine sentimentality*, then we can never agree to such a view. We are about to *elect officials*, and there can be no talk of lack of confidence in any person not elected; *our only consideration should be the interests of the work and a person's suitability for the post to which he is being elected*" (p. 325).

We would advise all who want to make an independent examination of the reasons for the Party split and to dig down to the roots of it at the Congress to read this speech of Comrade Rusov's

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\* Cf. Comrade Posadovsky's speech: ". . . By electing three of the six members of the old editorial board, you pronounce the other three to be unnecessary and superfluous. And you have neither any right nor any grounds to do that."

over and over again; his arguments were not even contested by the minority, let alone refuted. And indeed there is no contesting such elementary, rudimentary truths, which were forgotten only because of "*nervous excitement*", as Comrade Rusov himself rightly explained. And this is really the explanation least discreditable to the minority of how they could desert the Party standpoint for a philistine and circle standpoint.\*

But the minority were so totally unable to find sensible and business-like arguments against election that, in addition to introducing philistinism into Party affairs, they resorted to downright *scandalous practices*. Indeed, what other name can we give to the action of Comrade Popov when he advised Comrade

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\* In his *State of Siege*, Comrade Martov treats this question just as he does all the others he touches upon. He does not trouble to give a complete picture of the controversy. He very modestly evades the only real issue of *principle* that arose in this controversy: philistine sentimentality, or the election of officials; the Party standpoint, or the injured feelings of the Ivan Ivanoviches? Here, too, Comrade Martov confines himself to plucking out isolated bits and pieces of what happened and adding all sorts of abusive remarks at my expense. That's not quite enough, Comrade Martov!

Comrade Martov particularly pesters me with the question *why* Comrades Axelrod, Zasulich, and Starover were not elected at the Congress. The philistine attitude he has adopted prevents him from seeing how *unseemly* these questions are (why doesn't he ask his colleague on the editorial board, Comrade Plekhanov?). He detects a contradiction in the fact that I regard the behaviour of the minority at the Congress on the question of the six as "tactless", yet at the same time demand Party publicity. There is no contradiction here, as Martov himself could easily have seen if he had taken the trouble to give a connected account of the *whole* matter, and not merely fragments of it. It was tactless to treat the question from a philistine standpoint and appeal to pity and consideration for injured feelings; the interests of Party publicity demanded that an estimation be given *in point of fact* of the advantages of six as compared with three, an estimation of the candidates for the posts, an estimation of the different shades; *the minority gave not a hint of any of this at the Congress*.

By carefully studying the minutes, Comrade Martov would have found in the delegates' speeches a *whole series* of arguments against the board of six. Here is a selection from these speeches: firstly, that dissonances, in the sense of different shades of principle, were clearly apparent in the old six; secondly, that a technical simplification of the editorial work was desirable; thirdly, that the interests of the work came before philistine sentimentality, and only election could ensure that the persons chosen were suited for their posts; fourthly, that the right of the Congress to choose must not be restricted; fifthly, that the Party now needed something more than a literary group on the Central Organ, that the Central Organ needed not only writers, but administrators as well; sixthly, that the Central Organ must consist of quite definite persons, persons known to the Congress; seventhly, that a board of six was often ineffectual, and the board's work had been accomplished *not thanks to its abnormal constitution, but in spite of it*; eighthly, that the conduct of a newspaper was a party (not a circle) affair, etc. Let Comrade Martov, if he is so interested in the reasons for the non-election of these persons, *penetrate into* the meaning of each of these considerations and refute *a single one* of them.

Muravyov "not to undertake delicate *commissions*" (p. 322)? What is this but "getting personal", as Comrade Sorokin rightly put it (p. 328)? What is it but speculating on "*personalities*", in the absence of *political* arguments? Was Comrade Sorokin right or wrong when he said that "we have always protested against such practices"? "*Was it permissible for Comrade Deutsch to try demonstratively to pillory comrades who did not agree with him?*"\* (p. 328).

Let us sum up the debate on the editorial board. The minority did not refute (nor even try to refute) the majority's numerous statements that the plan for a trio was known to the *delegates* at the very beginning of the Congress *and prior to the Congress*, and that, consequently, this plan was based on *considerations and facts which had no relation to the events and disputes at the Congress*. In defending the board of six, the minority took up a position which was *wrong and impermissible in principle*, one based on *philistine* considerations. The minority displayed an utter forgetfulness of the *Party* attitude towards the election of *officials*, not even attempting to give an *estimation* of each candidate for a post and of his suitability or unsuitability for the functions it involved. The minority *evaded* a discussion of the question on its merits and talked instead of their celebrated harmony, "shedding tears" and "indulging in pathos" (Lange's speech, p. 327), as though "somebody was being murdered". In their state of "*nervous excitement*" (p. 325) the minority even went to the length of "*getting personal*", of howling that election was "*criminal*", and similar *impermissible* practices.

The battle over six or three at the 30th sitting of our Congress was a battle between *philistinism* and the *party spirit*, between "*personalities*" of the worst kind and *political considerations* between *wretched words* and the most elementary conception of *revolutionary duty*.

And at the 31st sitting, when the Congress, by a majority of

That is the way Comrade Sorokin, at this same sitting understood Comrade Deutsch's words (cf. p. 324—"sharp interchange with Orlov") Comrade Deutsch explained (p. 351) that he had 'said nothing like it', but in the same breath admitted that he had said something *very, very much* "like it" "I did not say 'who dares'," Comrade Deutsch explained, 'what I said was 'I would be interested to see the people who would dare [*sic*—Comrade Deutsch fell out of the frying pan into the fire'] to support such a criminal [*sic*] proposal as the election of a board of three'" (p. 351) Comrade Deutsch did not refute, but confirmed Comrade Sorokin's words. Comrade Deutsch only confirmed the truth of Comrade Sorokin's reproach that "all concepts are here muddled" (in the minority's arguments in favour of six) Comrade Deutsch only confirmed the pertinence of Comrade Sorokin's reminder of the elementary truth that "we are Party members and should be guided exclusively by political considerations" To cry that election was *criminal* was to sink not only to philistinism, but to practices that were downright *scandalous*!

nineteen to seventeen with three abstentions, had *rejected* the motion to endorse the old editorial board as a whole (see p. 330 and the *errata*), and when the *former editors* had returned to the hall, Comrade Martov in his "statement on behalf of the majority of the former editorial board" (pp. 330-31) displayed this same shakiness and instability of political position and *political concepts* to an even greater degree. Let us examine in detail each point of this collective *statement* and my reply (pp. 332-33).

"From now on," Comrade Martov said when the old editorial board was not endorsed, "the old *Iskra* does not exist, and it would be more consistent to change its name. At any rate, we see in the new resolution of the Congress a substantial limitation of the vote of confidence in *Iskra* which was passed at one of the first Congress sittings."

Comrade Martov and his colleagues raised a truly interesting and in many respects instructive question of *political consistency*. I have already replied to this by referring to what *everyone* said when *Iskra* was being endorsed (Minutes, p. 349, cf. above, p. 82).<sup>\*</sup> What we have here is unquestionably a crying instance of political inconsistency, but whether on the part of the majority of the Congress or of the majority of the old editorial board we shall leave the reader to judge. And there are two other questions very pertinently raised by Comrade Martov and his colleagues which we shall likewise leave the reader to decide: 1) Did the desire to detect a "limitation of the vote of confidence in *Iskra*" in the Congress decision to *elect officials to the editorial board of the Central Organ* betray a *philistine* or a *Party* attitude? 2) When *did the old "Iskra" really cease to exist*—starting from No. 46, when the two of us, Plekhanov and I, began to conduct it, or from No. 53, when the majority of the old editorial board took it over? If the first question is a most interesting *question of principle*, the second is a most interesting *question of fact*.

"Since it has now been decided," Comrade Martov continued, "to elect an editorial board of three, I must declare on my own behalf and that of the three other comrades that none of us will sit on this new editorial board. For myself, I must add that if it be true that certain comrades wanted to include my name in the list of candidates for this 'trio'. I must regard it as an insult which I have done nothing to deserve [*sic!*]. I say this in view of the circumstances under which it has been decided to change the editorial board. This decision was taken on the grounds of some kind of 'friction',<sup>\*\*</sup> of the former editorial board

<sup>\*</sup> See pp. 303-10 of the present volume.—*Ed.*

<sup>\*\*</sup> Comrade Martov was probably referring to Comrade Posadovsky's expression "dissonances". I repeat that Comrade Posadovsky never did explain to the Congress what *he* meant, while Comrade Muraviov, who had likewise

having been ineffectual, moreover, the Congress decided the matter along definite lines without questioning the editorial board about this friction or even appointing a commission to report whether it had been ineffectual. [Strange that it never occurred to any member of the minority to propose to the Congress to "question the editorial board" or appoint a commission! Was it not because it would have been useless after the split in the *Iskra* organisation and the failure of the negotiations Comrades Martov and Staroveri wrote about?] Under the circumstances I must regard the assumption of certain comrades that I would agree to sit on an editorial board reformed in this manner as a slur on my political reputation.

I have purposely quoted this argument in full to acquaint the reader with a specimen and with the beginning of what has blossomed out so profusely *since the Congress* and which cannot be called by any other name than *squabbling*. I have already employed this expression in my *Letter to the Editors of Iskra* and in spite of the editors' annoyance I am obliged to repeat it for its correctness is beyond dispute. It is a mistake to think that squabbling presupposes "sordid motives" (as the editors of the new *Iskra* conclude) any revolutionary at all acquainted with our colonies of exiles and political emigres will have witnessed dozens of cases of squabbling in which the most absurd

used the expression explained that he meant dissidences over *principles* as recalled in the Congress debates. The reader will recall that the *official* debate over *principles* in which four of the editors (Plekhanov, Martov, Axelrod and I) took part was in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Rules and that Comrades Martov and Staroveri complained in writing of a "false accusation of opportunism" as being one of the arguments for changing the editorial board. In this letter Comrade Martov had detected a *clear* connection between opportunism and the plan to change the editorial board but at the Congress he confined himself to hating hazily at *some kind of fiction*. The "false accusation of opportunism" had already been refuted.

Comrade Martov further added: Ryazanov might agree to such a role but not the Martov whom I think, you know by his work. Inasmuch as this was a *personal* attack on Ryazanov (Comrade Martov withdrew the remark. But it was not because of Ryazanov's personal qualities to refer to them would have been out of place) that his name figured at the Congress is a byword it was because of the *political complexion* of the Borba group's *political mistakes*. Comrade Martov does well to withdraw veils or assumed personal insults but this should not lead us to forget *political mistakes* which should serve as a *lesson to the Party*. The Borba group was censured at our Congress of causing organisational chaos and disunity not justified by any considerations of principle' (Comrade Martov's speech p. 75). Such political conduct does indeed deserve censure and not only when seen in a small group prior to the Party Congress during the period of *general* chaos but also when we see it *after* the Party Congress in the period when the chaos has been abolished even if indulged in by the majority of the *Iskra* editorial board and the majority of the *Imprisonment* of Labour group.

accusations, suspicions, self-accusations, "personalities", etc., were levelled and harped upon owing to "nervous excitement" and abnormal, stagnant conditions of life. No sensible person will necessarily seek for sordid *motives* in these squabbles, *however sordid their manifestations may be*. And it is only to "nervous excitement" that we can attribute that tangled skein of absurdities, personalities, fantastic horrors, and imaginary insults and slurs which is contained in the above-quoted passage from Comrade Martov's speech. Stagnant conditions of life breed such squabbles among us by the hundred, and a political party would be unworthy of respect if it did not have the courage to designate its malady by its true name, to make a ruthless diagnosis and search for a cure.

Insofar as anything relating to principles can be extracted at all from this tangled skein, one is led *inevitably* to the conclusion that "elections have nothing to do with any slurs on political reputations", that "to deny the right of the Congress to hold new elections, make new appointments of any kind, and change the composition of its authorised boards" is to *confuse* the issue, and that "Comrade Martov's views on the permissibility of electing part of the old board reflect an *extreme confusion of political ideas*" (as I expressed it at the Congress, p. 332).\*

I shall omit Comrade Martov's "personal" remark as to who initiated the plan for the trio, and shall pass to his "political" characterisation of the significance attaching to the non-endorsement of the old editorial board: "...What has now taken place is the last act of the struggle which has raged during the second half of the Congress. [Quite right! And this second half of the Congress began when Martov fell into the tight clutches of Comrade Akimov over Paragraph 1 of the Rules.] It is an open secret that in this reform it is not a question of being 'effectual', but of a struggle for influence on the Central Committee. [Firstly, it is an open secret that it *was* a question of being effectual, *as well as* of a divergence over the *composition* of the Central Committee, for the plan of the "reform" was proposed at a time when that divergence *was nowhere in sight* and when Comrade Martov joined us in electing Comrade Pavlovich a seventh member of the editorial board! Secondly, we have already shown by *documentary* proofs that it was a question of the *personal composition* of the Central Committee, that *à la fin des fins* the matter came down to a difference of lists: Glebov-Travinsky-Popov or Glebov-Trotsky-Popov.] The majority of the editorial board showed that they did not want the Central Committee to be converted into a tool of the editorial board. [That

is Akimov's refrain: the question of the influence for which every majority fights at any and every party congress so as then to *consolidate* it with the help of a *majority* on the central institutions is transferred to the plane of *opportunist slanders* about a "tool" of the *editorial board*, about a "mere *appendage*" of the editorial board, as Comrade Martov himself put it somewhat later, p. 334.] That is why it was found necessary to reduce the number of members of the editorial board (!!). And that is why I cannot join such an editorial board. [Just examine this "that is why" a little more carefully. How *might* the editorial board have converted the Central Committee into an appendage or tool? *Only* if it had had three votes on the Council and had *abused* its superiority. Is that not clear? And is it not likewise clear that, having been elected the third member, Comrade Martov could always have prevented such an abuse and *by his vote alone* have destroyed all superiority of the editorial board on the Council? Consequently, the whole matter boils down to the personal composition of the Central Committee, and it is at once clear that the talk about a tool and an appendage is *slander*.] Together with the majority of the old editorial board, I thought that the Congress would put an end to the 'state of siege' in the Party and would establish a normal state of affairs. But as a matter of fact the state of siege, with its emergency laws against particular groups, still continues, and has even become more acute. Only if the old editorial board remains in its entirety can we guarantee that the rights conferred on the editorial board by the Rules will not be used to the detriment of the Party. . . ."

There you have the whole passage from Comrade Martov's speech in which *he first advanced the notorious war-cry of a "state of siege"*. And now look at my reply to him:

"... However, in correcting Martov's statement about the private character of the plan for two trios, I have no intention of denying Martov's assertion of the 'political significance' of the step we took in not endorsing the old editorial board. On the contrary, I fully and unreservedly agree with Comrade Martov that this step is of great political significance—only not the significance which Martov ascribes to it. He said that it was an act in a struggle for influence on the Central Committee in Russia. I go farther than Martov. The whole activity of *Iskra* as a separate group has hitherto been a struggle for influence; but now it is a matter of something more, namely, the organisational consolidation of this influence, and not only a struggle for it. How profoundly Comrade Martov and I differ politically on this point is shown by the fact that he blames me for this wish to influence the Central Committee, whereas I count it to my credit that I strove and still strive to consolidate this influence by organisational means. It appears that we are even

talking in different languages! What would be the point of all our work, of all our efforts, if they ended in the same old struggle for influence, and not in its complete acquisition and consolidation? Yes, Comrade Martov is absolutely right: the step we have taken is undoubtedly a major political step showing that one of the trends now to be observed has been chosen for the future work of our Party. *And I am not at all frightened by the dreadful words 'a state of siege in the Party', 'emergency laws against particular individuals and groups', etc.* We not only can but we must create a 'state of siege' in relation to unstable and vacillating elements, and all our Party Rules, the whole system of centralism now endorsed by the Congress are nothing but a 'state of siege' in respect to the numerous sources of political vagueness. It is special laws, even if they are emergency laws, that are needed as measures against vagueness, and the step taken by the Congress has correctly indicated the political direction to be followed, by having created a firm basis for such laws and such measures".\*

I have italicised in this summary of my speech at the Congress *the sentence which Comrade Martov preferred to omit in his "State of Siege"* (p. 16). It is not surprising that he did not like this sentence and did not choose to understand its obvious meaning.

What does the expression "dreadful words" imply, Comrade Martov?

It implies *mockery*, mockery of those who give big names to little things, who confuse a simple question by pretentious phrasemongering.

The little and simple fact which *alone* could have given, and actually did give, Comrade Martov cause for "nervous excitement" was *nothing but his defeat at the Congress over the personal composition of the central bodies*. The political significance of this simple fact was that, having won, the majority of the Party Congress consolidated their influence by establishing their majority in the Party leadership as well, by creating an organisational basis for a struggle, with the help of the Rules, against what this majority considered to be vacillation, instability, and vagueness.\*\* To make this an occasion for talking of a "struggle

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 507-08.—*Ed.*

\*\* How was the instability, vacillation, and vagueness of the *Iskra*-ist minority manifested at the Congress? Firstly, by their opportunist phrasemongering over Paragraph 1 of the Rules; secondly, by their coalition with Comrades Akimov and Lieber, which during the second half of the Congress rapidly grew more pronounced; thirdly, by their readiness to degrade the question of electing officials to the Central Organ to the level of philistinism, of wretched words, and even of getting personal. After the Congress all these lovely attributes developed from mere buds into blossoms and fruit.



for influence" with horror in one's eyes and complaining of a "state of siege" was nothing but *pretentious phrase-mongering*, dreadful words.

Comrade Martov does not agree with this? Then perhaps he will try to prove to us that a party congress has ever existed, or is in general conceivable, where the majority would not proceed to consolidate the influence they had gained: 1) by securing a majority on the central bodies, and 2) by endowing it with powers to counteract vacillation, instability, and vagueness.

Before the elections, our Congress had to decide whether to give *one-third* of the votes on the Central Organ and on the Central Committee to the Party majority or the Party minority. The board of six and Comrade Martov's list meant giving one-third to us and two-thirds to his followers. A trio on the Central Organ and our list meant two-thirds for us and one-third for Comrade Martov's followers. Comrade Martov refused to make terms with us or yield, and challenged us *in writing* to a battle at the Congress. Having suffered defeat at the Congress, he began to weep and to complain of a "state of siege"! Well, isn't that squabbling? Isn't it a new manifestation of the wishy-washiness of the intellectual?

One cannot help recalling in this connection the brilliant social and psychological characterisation of this latter quality recently given by Karl Kautsky. The Social-Democratic parties of different countries suffer not infrequently nowadays from similar maladies, and it would be very, very useful for us to learn from more experienced comrades the correct diagnosis and the correct cure. Karl Kautsky's characterisation of certain intellectuals will therefore be only a seeming digression from our theme.

"The problem . . . that again interests us so keenly today is the *antagonism between the intelligentsia\* and the proletariat*. My colleagues [Kautsky is himself an intellectual, a writer and editor] will mostly be indignant that I admit this antagonism. But it actually exists, and, as in other cases, it would be the most inexpedient tactics to try to overcome the fact by denying it. This antagonism is a social one, it relates to classes, not to individuals. The individual intellectual, like the individual capitalist, may identify himself with the proletariat in its class struggle. When he does, he changes his character too. It is not *this type* of intellectual, who is still an exception among his class, that we shall mainly speak of in what follows. Unless otherwise stated, *I shall use the word intellectual to mean only the common run of intellectual who takes the stand of bourgeois society*, and who is characteristic of the intelligentsia as a *class*. This *class* stands in a certain *antagonism* to the proletariat.

"This antagonism differs, however, from the antagonism between labour

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\* I use the words intellectual and intelligentsia to translate the German *Literat* and *Literatentum*, which include not only writers but in general all educated people, the members of the liberal professions, the brain workers, as the English call them, as distinct from manual workers.

and capital. The intellectual is not a capitalist. True, his standard of life is bourgeois, and he must maintain it if he is not to become a pauper; but at the same time he is compelled to sell the product of his labour, and often his labour-power, and is himself often enough exploited and humiliated by the capitalist. Hence the intellectual does not stand in any economic antagonism to the proletariat. But his status of life and his conditions of labour are not proletarian, and this gives rise to a certain antagonism in sentiments and ideas.

"As an isolated individual, the proletarian is nothing. His whole strength, his whole progress, all his hopes and expectations are derived from *organisation*, from systematic action in conjunction with his fellows. He feels big and strong when he forms part of a big and strong organism. This organism is the main thing for him; the individual in comparison means very little. The proletarian fights with the utmost devotion as part of the anonymous mass, without prospect of personal advantage or personal glory, doing his duty in any post he is assigned to with a voluntary discipline which pervades all his feelings and thoughts.

"Quite different is the case of the intellectual. He does not fight by means of power, but by argument. His weapons are his personal knowledge, his personal ability, his personal convictions. He can attain to any position at all only through his personal qualities. Hence the freest play for his individuality seems to him the prime condition for successful activity. It is only with difficulty that he submits to being a part subordinate to a whole, and then only from necessity, not from inclination. He recognises the need of discipline only for the mass, not for the elect minds. And of course he counts himself among the latter. . . .

"Nietzsche's philosophy, with its cult of the superman, for whom the fulfilment of his own individuality is everything and any subordination of that individuality to a great social aim is vulgar and despicable, is the real philosophy of the intellectual; and it renders him totally unfit to take part in the class struggle of the proletariat.

"Next to Nietzsche, the most outstanding exponent of a philosophy answering to the sentiments of the intelligentsia is probably Ibsen. His Doctor Stockmann (in *An Enemy of the People*) is not a socialist, as many have thought, but the type of the intellectual, who is bound to come into conflict with the proletarian movement, and with any movement of the people generally, as soon as he attempts to work within it. For the basis of the proletarian movement, as of every democratic\* movement, is respect for the majority of one's fellows. The typical intellectual *à la* Stockmann regards a 'compact majority' as a monster that must be overthrown. . . .

"An ideal example of an intellectual who had become thoroughly imbued with the sentiments of the proletariat, and who, although he was a brilliant writer, had quite lost the specific mentality of the intellectual, marched cheerfully with the rank and file, worked in any post he was assigned to, subordinated himself whole-heartedly to our great cause, and despised the feeble whining [*weichliches Gewinsel*] about the suppression of his individuality which the intellectual trained on Ibsen and Nietzsche is prone to indulge in when he happens to be in the minority—an ideal example of the kind of intellectual the socialist movement needs was Liebknecht. We may also mention Marx, who never forced himself to the forefront and whose party discipline in the

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\* It is extremely characteristic of the confusion brought by our Martovites into all questions of organisation that, though they have swung towards Akimov and a *misplaced* democracy, they are at the same time *incensed* at the democratic election of the editorial board, its election at the Congress, as planned in advance by everybody! Perhaps that is your *principle*, gentlemen?

International, where he often found himself in the minority, was exemplary”

Just such feeble whining of intellectuals who happened to find themselves in the minority, and nothing more, was the refusal of Martov and his friends to be named for office merely because the old circle had not been endorsed, as were their complaints of a state of siege and emergency laws “against particular groups”, which Martov cared nothing about when *Yuzhny Rabochy* and *Rabocheye Dyelo* were dissolved, but only came to care about when *his* group was dissolved.

Just such feeble whining of intellectuals who happened to find themselves in the minority was that endless torrent of complaints, reproaches, hints, accusations, slanders, and insinuations regarding the “compact majority” which was started by Martov and which poured out in such a flood at our Party Congress\*\* (and even more so after).

The minority bitterly complained that the compact majority held private meetings. Well, the minority had to do something to conceal the unpleasant fact that the delegates it invited to its own private meetings refused to attend, while those who would willingly have attended (the Egorovs, Makhovs, and Brouckères) the minority could not invite after all the fighting it had done with them at the Congress.

The minority bitterly complained of the “false accusation of opportunism”. Well, it had to do something to conceal the unpleasant fact that it was *opportunists*, who in most cases had followed the anti-*Iskra*-ists—and partly these anti-*Iskra*-ists themselves—that made up the compact minority, seizing with both hands on the championship of the circle spirit in Party institutions, opportunism in arguments, philistinism in Party affairs, and the instability and wishy-washiness of the intellectual.

We shall show in the next section what is the explanation of the highly interesting *political fact* that a “compact majority” was formed towards the end of the Congress, and why, in spite of every challenge, the minority so very, very warily *evas*es the *reasons* for its formation and its *history*. But let us first finish our analysis of the Congress debates.

During the elections to the Central Committee, Comrade Martov moved a highly characteristic resolution (p. 336), the three main features of which I have on occasion referred to as “mate in three moves”. Here they are: 1) to ballot *lists* of candidates for the Central Committee, and not the candidates individually;

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\* Karl Kautsky, “Franz Mehring”, *Neue Zeit*, XXII, I, S. 99-101. 1903, No. 4.

See pp. 337, 338, 340, 352, etc., of the Congress Minutes.

2) after the lists had been announced, to allow two sittings to elapse (for discussion, evidently); 3) in the absence of an absolute majority, a second ballot to be regarded as final. This resolution was a most carefully conceived stratagem (we must give the adversary his due!), with which Comrade Egorov did not agree (p. 337), but which would *most certainly* have assured a complete victory for Martov *if the seven Bundists and "Rabocheye Dyelo"-ists had not quit the Congress*. The reason for this stratagem was that the *Iskra*-ist minority *did not have, and could not have had*, a "direct agreement" (such as there was among the *Iskra*-ist majority) *even with the Egorovs and Makhovs*, let alone the Bund and Brouckère.

Remember that at the League Congress Comrade Martov complained that the "false accusation of opportunism" presumed a direct agreement between him and the Bund. I repeat, this only seemed so to Comrade Martov in his fright, and *this very refusal of Comrade Egorov to agree to the balloting of lists* (Comrade Egorov "had not yet lost his principles"—presumably the principles that made him join forces with Goldblatt in appraising the absolute importance of democratic guarantees) *graphically demonstrates the highly important fact that there could be no question of a "direct agreement" even with Egorov*. But a *coalition* there could be, and was, both with Egorov and with Brouckère, a coalition in the sense that the Martovites *were sure* of their support every time they, the Martovites, came into serious conflict with us and Akimov and his friends had to choose the *lesser evil*. There was not and is not the slightest doubt that *Comrades Akimov and Lieber would certainly have voted both for the board of six on the Central Organ and for Martov's list for the Central Committee*, as being *the lesser evil*, as being *what would least achieve the "Iskra" aims* (see Akimov's speech on Paragraph 1 and the "hopes" he placed in Martov). Balloting of lists, allowing two sittings to elapse, and a re-ballot were designed to achieve this very result with almost mechanical certainty without a direct agreement.

But since our compact majority remained a compact majority, Comrade Martov's flank movement would only have meant delay, and we were bound to reject it. The minority poured forth their complaints on this score in a written statement (p. 341) and, *following the example of Martynov and Akimov, refused to vote* in the elections to the Central Committee, "in view of the conditions in which they were held". Since the Congress, such complaints of abnormal conditions at the elections (see *State of Siege*, p. 31) have been poured right and left into the ears of hundreds of Party gossips. But in what did this *abnormality* consist? In the secret ballot—which had been stipulated before-

hand in the Standing Orders of the Congress (Point 6, Minutes, p. 11), and in which it was absurd to detect any "hypocrisy" or "injustice"? In the formation of a compact majority—that "monster" in the eyes of wishy-washy intellectuals? Or in the *abnormal* desire of these worthy intellectuals to *violate the pledge* they had given before the Congress that they would recognise all its elections (p. 380, Point 18 of the Congress Regulations)?

Comrade Popov *subtly* hinted at this desire when he asked outright at the Congress on the day of the elections: "Is the Bureau certain that the decision of the Congress is valid and in order when half the delegates refused to vote?"\* The Bureau of course replied that it was certain, and recalled the incident of Comrades Akimov and Martynov. Comrade Martov agreed with the Bureau and explicitly declared that Comrade Popov was mistaken and that "*the decisions of the Congress are valid*" (p. 343). Now let the reader form his own opinion of the political consistency—highly normal, we must suppose—revealed by a comparison of *this declaration made by him in the hearing of the Party* with his behaviour after the Congress and with the phrase in his *State of Siege* about "*the revolt of half the Party which already began at the Congress*" (p. 20). The hopes which Comrade Akimov had placed in Comrade Martov outweighed the ephemeral good intentions of Martov himself.

"*You have conquered*", Comrade Akimov!

\* \* \*

Certain features, seemingly petty but actually very important, of the *end* of the Congress, the part of it *after* the elections, may serve to show how pure and simple a "dreadful word" was the famous phrase about a "state of siege", which has now for ever acquired a tragicomical meaning. Comrade Martov is now making great play with this tragicomical "state of siege", seriously assuring both himself and his readers that this bogey of his own invention implied some sort of abnormal persecution, hounding, bullying of the "minority" by the "majority". We shall presently show how matters stood *after* the Congress. But take even the end of the Congress, and you will find that *after the elections*, far from persecuting the unhappy Martovites, who are supposed to have been bullied, ill-treated, and led to the slaughter, the "compact majority" *itself offered* them (through Lyadov) *two seats out of three* on the Minutes Committee (p. 354). Take the resolutions on tactical and other questions (p. 355 et seq.), and

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\* P. 342. This refers to the election of the fifth member of the Council. Twenty-four ballots (out of a total of forty-four votes) were cast, two of which were blank.

you will find that they were discussed on their merits in a purely business-like way, and that the signatories to many of the resolutions included both representatives of the monstrous compact "majority" and followers of the "humiliated and insulted" "minority" (Minutes, pp. 355, 357, 363, 365 and 367). This looks like "shutting out from work" and "bullying" in general, does it not?

The only interesting—but, unfortunately, all too brief—controversy on the substance of a question arose in connection with Starover's resolution on the liberals. As one can see from the signatures to it (pp. 357 and 358), it was adopted by the Congress because three of the supporters of the "majority" (Braun, Orlov, and Osipov) voted both *for* it and for Plekhanov's resolution, not perceiving the irreconcilable contradiction between the two. No irreconcilable contradiction is apparent at first glance, because Plekhanov's resolution lays down a general principle, outlines a definite attitude, as regards principles and tactics, towards *bourgeois liberalism in Russia*, whereas Starover's attempts to define the *concrete conditions in which "temporary agreements" would be permissible* with "liberal or liberal-democratic trends". The subjects of the two resolutions are different. But Starover's suffers from *political vagueness*, and is consequently petty and shallow. It *does not define the class content of Russian liberalism*, does not indicate the *definite* political trends in which this is expressed, does not explain to the proletariat the *principal* tasks of propaganda and agitation in relation to these definite trends; it confuses (owing to its vagueness) such different things as the student movement and *Osvobozhdeniye*, it too pettily and casuistically prescribes *three* concrete conditions under which "temporary agreements" would be permissible. Here too, as in many other cases, political vagueness leads to casuistry. The absence of any general principle and the attempt to enumerate "conditions" result in a petty and, strictly speaking, *incorrect* specification of these conditions. Just examine Starover's three conditions: 1) the "liberal or liberal-democratic trends" shall "clearly and unambiguously declare that in their struggle against the autocratic government they will resolutely side with the Russian Social-Democrats". What is the difference between the liberal and liberal-democratic trends? The resolution furnishes no material for a reply to this question. Is it not that the liberal trends speak for the politically least progressive sections of the bourgeoisie, and the liberal-democratic—for the more progressive sections of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie? If that is so, can Comrade Starover possibly think that the sections of the bourgeoisie which are least progressive (but progressive

nevertheless, for otherwise there could be no talk of liberalism) can "resolutely side with the Social-Democrats"?? That is absurd, and even if the spokesmen of such a trend were to "*declare it clearly and unambiguously*" (an absolutely impossible assumption), we, the party of the proletariat, *would be obliged not to believe* their declarations. To be a liberal and resolutely side with the Social-Democrats—the one excludes the other.

Further, let us assume a case where "liberal or liberal-democratic trends" clearly and unambiguously declare that in their struggle against the autocracy they will resolutely side with the *Socialist-Revolutionaries*. Such an assumption is far less unlikely than Comrade Starover's (owing to the bourgeois-democratic nature of the Socialist-Revolutionary trend). From his resolution, because of its vagueness and casuistry, it would appear that *in a case like this temporary agreements* with such liberals would be *impermissible*. But this conclusion, which follows inevitably from Comrade Starover's resolution, is an *absolutely false* one. Temporary agreements are permissible with the Socialist-Revolutionaries (see the Congress resolution on the latter), and, *consequently*, with liberals who side with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Second condition: these trends "shall not include in their programmes any demands running counter to the interests of the working class or the democracy generally, or obscuring their political consciousness". Here we have the same mistake again: there never have been, nor can there be, liberal-democratic trends which did not include in their programmes demands running counter to the interests of the working class and obscuring its (the proletariat's) political consciousness. Even one of the most democratic sections of our liberal-democratic trend, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, put forward in their programme—a muddled one, like all liberal programmes—demands that run counter to the interests of the working class and obscure its political consciousness. The conclusion to be drawn from this fact is that it is *essential* to "expose the limitations and inadequacy of the bourgeois emancipation movement", but not that temporary agreements are impermissible.

Lastly, in the general form in which it is presented, Comrade Starover's third "condition" (that the liberal-democrats should make universal, equal, secret, and direct suffrage the slogan of their struggle) is likewise *incorrect*: it *would be unwise* to declare impermissible in all cases temporary and partial agreements with liberal-democratic trends whose slogan was a constitution with a qualified suffrage, or a "curtailed" constitution generally. As a matter of fact, the *Osvobozhdeniye* "trend" would fit into just this category, but it would be political short-sighted-

ness incompatible with the principles of Marxism to tie one's hands by forbidding in advance "temporary agreements" with even the most timorous liberals.

To sum up: Comrade Starover's resolution, which was signed also by Comrades Martov and Axelrod, is a *mistake*, and the Third Congress would be wise to rescind it. It suffers from *political vagueness* in its theoretical and tactical position, from casuistry in the practical "conditions" it stipulates. It *confuses two questions*: 1) the exposure of the "anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian" features of *all* liberal-democratic trends, and the need to *combat* these features, and 2) the *conditions* for temporary and partial *agreements* with any of these trends. It does not give what it should (an analysis of the class content of liberalism), and gives what it should not (prescription of "conditions"). It is absurd in general to draw up detailed "conditions" for temporary agreements at a party congress, when there is not even a definite partner to such possible agreements in view; and even if there were such a definite partner in view, it would be a hundred times more rational to leave the definition of the "conditions" for a temporary agreement to the Party's central institutions, as the Congress did in relation to the Socialist-Revolutionary "trend" (see Plekhanov's modification of the end of Comrade Axelrod's resolution—Minutes, pp. 362 and 15).

As to the objections of the "minority" to Plekhanov's resolution, Comrade Martov's only argument was: Plekhanov's resolution "ends with the paltry conclusion that a particular writer should be exposed. Would this not be 'using a sledge-hammer to kill a fly'?" (P. 358.) This argument, whose emptiness is concealed by a smart phrase—"paltry conclusion"—provides a new specimen of pompous phrase-mongering. Firstly, Plekhanov's resolution speaks of "exposing in the eyes of the proletariat the limitations and inadequacy of the bourgeois emancipation movement wherever these limitations and inadequacy manifest themselves". Hence Comrade Martov's assertion (at the League Congress; Minutes, p. 88) that "all attention is to be directed only to Struve, only to one liberal" is the sheerest nonsense. Secondly, to compare Mr. Struve to a "fly" when the possibility of temporary agreements with the Russian liberals is in question, is to sacrifice an elementary and manifest political fact for a smart phrase. No, Mr. Struve is not a fly, but a political magnitude, and not because he personally is such a big figure, but because of his position as the sole representative of Russian liberalism—of at all effectual and organised liberalism—in the illegal world. Therefore, to talk of the Russian liberals, and of what our Party's attitude towards them should be, without having precisely Mr. Struve and *Osvobozhdeniye*<sup>210</sup> in mind is to talk without saying anything. Or perhaps Comrade



Martov will show us *even one single* "liberal or liberal-democratic trend" in Russia which could compare even remotely today with the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend? It would be interesting to see him try!\*

"Struve's name means nothing to the workers," said Comrade Kostrov, supporting Comrade Martov. I hope Comrade Kostrov and Comrade Martov will not be offended—but that argument is fully in the Akimov style. It is like the argument about the proletariat in the genitive case.<sup>21</sup>

Who are the workers to whom Struve's name (and the name of *Osvobozhdeniye*, mentioned in Comrade Plekhanov's resolution alongside of Mr. Struve) "means nothing"? Those who know very little, or nothing at all, of the "liberal and liberal-democratic trends" in Russia. One asks, what should be the attitude of our Party Congress to such workers: should it instruct Party members to acquaint these workers with the only definite liberal trend in Russia; or should it *refrain from mentioning* a name with which the workers are little acquainted because of their little acquaintance with politics? If Comrade Kostrov, having taken one step in the wake of Comrade Akimov, does not want to take another, he will answer this question in the former sense. And having answered it in the former sense, he will see how groundless his argument was. *At any rate*, the words "Struve" and "*Osvobozhdeniye*" in Plekhanov's resolution *are likely to be of much more value* to the workers than the words "liberal and liberal-democratic trend" in Starover's resolution.

Except through *Osvobozhdeniye*, the Russian worker cannot at the present time acquaint himself in practice with anything like a frank expression of the political tendencies of our liberalism. The legal liberal literature is unsuitable for this purpose

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\* At the League Congress Comrade Martov also adduced the following argument against Comrade Plekhanov's resolution: "The chief objection to it, the chief defect of this resolution, is that it totally ignores the fact that it is our duty, in the struggle against the autocracy, not to shun alliance with liberal-democratic elements. Comrade Lenin would call this a Martynov tendency. This tendency is already being manifested in the new *Iskra*" (p. 88).

For the wealth of "gems" it contains, this passage is indeed rare. 1) The phrase about *alliance* with the liberals is a sheer muddle. Nobody mentioned alliance, Comrade Martov, but only temporary or partial agreements. That is an entirely different thing. 2) If Plekhanov's resolution ignores an incredible "alliance" and speaks only of "support" in general, that is one of its merits, not a defect. 3) Perhaps Comrade Martov will take the trouble to explain what in general characterises "Martynov tendencies"? Perhaps he will tell us what is the relation between these tendencies and opportunism? Perhaps he will trace the relation of these tendencies to Paragraph 1 of the Rules? 4) I am just burning with impatience to hear from Comrade Martov how "Martynov tendencies" were manifested in the "new" *Iskra*. Please, Comrade Martov, relieve me of the torments of suspense!

because it is so nebulous. And we must as assiduously as possible (and among the broadest possible masses of workers) direct the weapon of our criticism against the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, so that when the future revolution breaks out, the Russian proletariat may, with the real criticism of weapons, paralyse the inevitable attempts of the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry to curtail the democratic character of the revolution.

Apart from Comrade Egorov's "perplexity", mentioned above, over the question of our "supporting" the oppositional and revolutionary movement, the debate on the resolutions offered little of interest; in fact, there was hardly any debate at all.

The Congress ended with a brief reminder from the chairman that its decisions were binding on all Party members.


## N. GENERAL PICTURE OF THE STRUGGLE AT THE CONGRESS. THE REVOLUTIONARY AND OPPORTUNIST WINGS OF THE PARTY

Having finished our analysis of the Congress debates and voting, we must now sum up, so that we may, on the basis of the *entire* Congress material, answer the question: what elements, groups, and shades went to make up the final majority and minority which we saw in the elections and which were destined for a time to become the main division in our Party? A summary must be made of all the material relating to shades of principle, theoretical and tactical, which the minutes of the Congress provide in such abundance. Without a general "resumé", without a general picture of the Congress as a whole, and of all the principal groupings during the voting, this material is too disjointed, too disconnected, so that at first sight the individual groupings seem accidental, especially to one who does not take the trouble to make an independent and comprehensive *study* of the Congress minutes (and how many readers have taken that trouble?).





In English parliamentary reports we often meet the characteristic word "division". The House "divided" into such and such a majority and minority, it is said when an issue is voted. The "division" of our Social-Democratic House on the various issues discussed at the Congress presents a picture of the struggle within the Party, of its shades of opinion and groups, that is *unique of its kind and unparalleled for its completeness and accuracy*. To make the picture a graphic one, to obtain a real *picture* instead of a heap of disconnected, disjointed, and iso-

lated facts and incidents, to put a stop to the endless and senseless arguments over particular votings (who voted for whom and who supported whom?), I have decided to try to depict *all the basic types* of "divisions" at our Congress in the form of a *diagram*. This will probably seem strange to a great many people, but I doubt whether any other method can be found that would really generalise and summarise the results in the most complete and accurate manner possible. Which way a particular delegate voted can be ascertained with absolute accuracy in cases when a roll-call vote was taken; and in certain important cases when no roll-call vote was taken it can be determined from the minutes with a very high degree of proba-

#### GENERAL PICTURE OF THE STRUGGLE AT THE CONGRESS



The plus and minus signs indicate the total number of votes cast *for* and *against* on a particular issue. The figures below the strips indicate the number of votes cast by each of the four groups. The character of the votings covered by each of the types A to E is explained in the text.

NAME OF GROUP	
	Iskra-ists of the majority
	Iskra-ists of the minority
	Centre
	Anti-Iskra-ists

bility, with a sufficient degree of approximation to the truth. And if we take into account *all* the roll-call votes and all the other votes on issues of any importance (as judged, for example, by the thoroughness and warmth of the debates), we shall

obtain the most objective picture of our inner Party struggle that the material at our disposal permits. In doing so, instead of giving a photograph, i.e., an image of each voting separately, we shall try to give a picture, i.e., to present all the main *types* of voting, ignoring relatively unimportant exceptions and variations which would only confuse matters. In any case, anybody will be able with the aid of the minutes to check every detail of our picture, to amplify it with any particular voting he likes, in short, to criticise it not only by arguing, expressing doubts, and making references to isolated incidents, but by drawing a *different picture* on the basis of the same material.

In marking on the diagram each delegate who took part in the voting, we shall indicate by special shading the four main groups which we have traced in detail through the whole of the Congress debates, viz., 1) the *Iskra*-ists of the majority; 2) the *Iskra*-ists of the minority; 3) the "Centre", and 4) the anti-*Iskra*-ists. We have seen the difference in shades of principle between these groups in a *host of instances*, and if anyone does not like the *names* of the groups, which remind lovers of zigzags too much of the *Iskra* organisation and the *Iskra* trend, we can tell them that it is not the name that matters. Now that we have traced the shades through *all* the debates at the Congress, it is easy to substitute for the already established and familiar Party appellations (which jar on the ears of some) a characterisation of the *essence of the shades between the groups*. Were this substitution made, we would obtain the following names for these same four groups: 1) consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats; 2) minor opportunists; 3) middling opportunists; and 4) major opportunists (major by our Russian standards). Let us hope that these names will be less shocking to those who have latterly taken to assuring themselves and others that *Iskra*-ist is a name which only denotes a "circle", and not a *trend*.

Let us now explain in detail the types of voting "snapped" on this diagram (see diagram: General Picture of the Struggle at the Congress).

The first type of voting (A) covers the cases when the "Centre" joined with the *Iskra*-ists against the anti-*Iskra*-ists or a part of them. It includes the vote on the programme as a whole (Comrade Akimov alone abstained, all the others voted for); the vote on the resolution condemning federation in principle (all voted for except the five Bundists); the vote on Paragraph 2 of the Bund Rules (the five Bundists voted against us; five abstained, viz.: Martynov, Akimov, Brouckère, and Makhov with his two votes; the rest were with us); *it is this vote that is represented in diagram A*. Further, the *three* votes on the question

of endorsing *Iskra* as the Party's Central Organ were also of this type: the editors (five votes) abstained; in all three cases there were two votes against (Akimov and Brouckère), and, in addition, when the vote on the *motives* for endorsing *Iskra* was taken, the five Bundists and Comrade Martynov abstained.\*

This type of voting provides the answer to a very interesting and important question, namely, when did the Congress "Centre" vote with the *Iskra*-ists? It was either when the *anti-"Iskra"-ists, too, were with us*, with a few exceptions (adoption of the programme, or endorsement of *Iskra* without motives stated), or else when it was a question of the sort of *statement* which was not in itself a direct committal to a definite political position (recognition of *Iskra*'s organising work was not in itself a committal to carry out its organisational policy in relation to particular groups; rejection of the principle of federation did not preclude abstention from voting, on a specific scheme of federation, as we have seen in the case of Comrade Makhov). We have already seen, when speaking of the significance of the groupings at the Congress in general, how falsely this matter is put in the official account of the official *Iskra*, which (through the mouth of Comrade Martov) *slurs and glosses over* the difference between the *Iskra*-ists and the "Centre", between consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats and opportunists, by citing *cases when the anti-"Iskra"-ists, too, voted with us!* Even the most "Right-wing" of the opportunists in the German and French Social-Democratic parties never vote against such points as *the adoption of the programme as a whole*.

The second type of voting (B) covers the cases when the *Iskra*-ists, consistent and inconsistent, voted together against all the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the entire "Centre". These were mostly cases that involved giving effect to definite and specific plans of the *Iskra* policy, that is, endorsing "*Iskra*" *in fact and not only in word*. They include the *Organising Committee incident*†: the question of

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\* Why was the vote on Paragraph 2 of the Bund Rules taken for depiction in the diagram? Because the votes on endorsing *Iskra* were not as full, while the votes on the programme and on the question of federation referred to political decisions of a less definite and specific character. Speaking generally, the choice of one or another of a number of votes of the same type will not in the least affect the main features of the picture, as anyone may easily see by making the corresponding changes.

† It is this vote that is depicted in Diagram B, the *Iskra*-ists secured thirty-two votes, the Bundist resolution sixteen. It should be pointed out that of the votes of this type *not one was by roll-call*. The way the individual delegates voted can only be established—but with a very high degree of probability—by two sets of evidence: 1) in the debate the speakers of both groups of *Iskra*-ists spoke in favour, those of the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre" against; 2) the number of votes cast *in favour* was always very close to thirty-three. Nor should it be forgotten that when analysing the Congress debates we pointed out, quite apart from the voting, a number of cases when

making the position of the Bund in the Party the first item on the agenda; the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group; two votes on the agrarian programme, and, sixthly and lastly, the vote *against* the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad (*Rabocheye Dyelo*), that is, the recognition of the League as the only Party organisation abroad. The old, pre-Party, circle spirit, the interests of opportunist organisations or groups, the narrow conception of Marxism were fighting here against the strictly consistent and principled policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy; the *Iskra*-ists of the minority still sided with us in quite a number of cases, in a number of exceedingly important votes (important from the standpoint of the Organising Committee, *Yuzhny Rabochy*, and *Rabocheye Dyelo*) . . . until *their own* circle spirit and their own inconsistency came into question. The "divisions" of this type bring out with graphic clarity that on a number of issues involving the practical application of our principles, *the Centre joined forces with the anti-"Iskra"-ists*, displaying a much greater kinship with them than with us, a much greater leaning *in practice* towards the *opportunist* than towards the *revolutionary* wing of Social-Democracy. Those who were *Iskra*-ists *in name* but were ashamed *to be Iskra*-ists revealed their true nature, and the struggle that inevitably ensued caused no little acrimony, which obscured from the less thoughtful and more impressionable the significance of the shades of principle disclosed in that struggle. But now that the ardour of battle has somewhat abated and the minutes remain as a dispassionate extract of a series of heated encounters, only those who wilfully close their eyes can fail to perceive that the alliance of the Makhovs and Egorovs with the Akimovs and Liebers was not, and could not be, fortuitous. The only thing Martov and Axelrod can do is keep well away from a comprehensive and accurate analysis of the minutes, or try at this late date to *undo* their behaviour at the Congress by all sorts of expressions of *regret*. As if regrets can remove differences of views and differences of policy! As if the present alliance of Martov and Axelrod with Akimov, Brouckère, and Martynov can cause our Party, restored at the Second Congress, to forget the struggle which the *Iskra*-ists waged with the anti-*Iskra*-ists almost throughout the Congress!

The distinguishing feature of the third type of voting at the Congress, represented by the three remaining parts of the diagram (C, D, and E), is that *a small section of the "Iskra"-ists broke away and went over to the anti-"Iskra"-ists*, who accord-

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the "Centre" sided with the anti-*Iskra*-ists (the opportunists) against us. Some of these issues were: the absolute value of democratic demands, whether we should support the oppositional elements, restriction of centralism, etc.

ingly gained the victory (as long as they remained at the Congress). In order to trace with complete accuracy the development of this celebrated *coalition* of the *Iskra*-ist minority with the anti-*Iskra*-ists, the mere mention of which drove Martov to write hysterical epistles at the Congress, we have reproduced all the three main kinds of roll-call votes of this type. C is the vote on equality of languages (the last of the three roll-call votes on this question is given, it being the fullest). All the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the whole Centre stand solid against us; from the *Iskra*-ists a part of the majority and a part of the minority break away. *It is not yet clear which of the "Iskra-ists are capable of forming a definite and lasting coalition with the opportunist "Right wing" of the Congress.* Next comes type D—the vote on Paragraph 1 of the Rules (of the two votes, we have taken the one which was more clear-cut, that is, in which there were no abstentions). *The coalition stands out more saliently and assumes firmer shape*\*: all the *Iskra*-ists of the minority are now on the side of Akimov and Lieber, but only a very small number of *Iskra*-ists of the majority, these counterbalancing three of the "Centre" and one anti-*Iskra*-ist who have come over to our side. A mere glance at the diagram suffices to show which elements shifted from side to side casually and temporarily and which *were drawn with irresistible force towards a lasting coalition with the Akimovs.* The last vote (E—elections to the Central Organ, the Central Committee, and the Party Council), *which in fact represents the final division into majority and minority,* clearly reveals the complete fusion of the *Iskra*-ist minority with the *entire* "Centre" and the *remnants* of the anti-*Iskra*-ists. By this time, of the eight anti-*Iskra*-ists, only Comrade Brouckère remained at the Congress (Comrade Akimov had already explained his mistake to him and he had taken his proper place in the ranks of the *Marovites*). The withdrawal of the seven *most "Right-wing" of the opportunists* decided the issue of the elections against Martov.\*\*

\* Judging by all indications, four other votes on the Rules were of the same type: p. 278—27 for Fomin, as against 21 for us; p. 279—26 for Martov, as against 24 for us; p. 280—27 against me, 22 for; and, on the same page, 24 for Martov, as against 23 for us. These are the votes on the question of co-optation to the central bodies, which I have already dealt with. No roll-call votes are available (there was one, but the record of it has been lost). The Bundists (all or part) evidently *saved* Martov. Martov's erroneous statements (at the League) concerning these votes have been corrected above.

\*\* The seven opportunists who withdrew from the Second Congress were the five Bundists (the Bund withdrew from the Party after the Second Congress rejected the principle of federation) and two *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, Comrade Martynov and Comrade Akimov. These latter left the Congress after the *Iskra*-ist League was recognised as the *only* Party organisation abroad,

And now, with the aid of the objective evidence of votes of *every type*, let us sum up the results of the Congress.

There has been much talk to the effect that the majority at our Congress was "*accidental*". This, in fact, was Comrade Martov's sole consolation in his *Once More in the Minority*. The diagram clearly shows that in *one sense*, but in only one, the majority could be called accidental, viz., in the sense that the withdrawal of the seven most opportunist delegates of the "*Right*" was—supposedly—a matter of *accident*. *To the extent* that this withdrawal was an accident (and no more), our majority was accidental. A mere glance at the diagram will show better than any long arguments on whose side these seven would have been, *were bound to have been*.<sup>\*</sup> But the question is: how far was the withdrawal of the seven really an accident? That is a question which those who talk so freely about the "accidental" character of the majority do not like to ask themselves. It is an unpleasant question for them. Was it an accident that the most extreme representatives of the *Right* and not of the *Left* wing of our Party were the ones to withdraw? Was it an accident that it was *opportunists* who withdrew, and not consistent *revolutionary Social-Democrats*? Is there no connection between this "accidental" withdrawal and the struggle against the opportunist wing which was waged throughout the Congress and which stands out so graphically in our diagram?

One has only to ask these questions, which are so unpleasant to the minority, to realise what fact all this talk about the accidental character of the majority is intended to *conceal*. It is the unquestionable and incontrovertible fact that *the minority was formed of those in our Party who gravitate most towards opportunism*. The minority was formed of those elements in the Party *who are least stable in theory, least steadfast in matters of principle*. It was from the *Right wing* of the Party that the minority was formed. The division into majority and minority is a direct and inevitable continuation of that division of the Social-Democrats into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing, into a Mountain and a Gironde, which did not appear only yesterday, nor in the Russian workers' party alone, and which no doubt will not disappear tomorrow.

This fact is of cardinal importance for elucidating the causes and the various stages of our disagreements. Whoever tries to *evade* the fact by denying or glossing over the struggle at the

i.e., after the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ist Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad was dissolved. (Author's footnote to the 1907 edition.—Ed.)

\* We shall see later that *after* the Congress both Comrade Akimov and the Voronezh Committee, which has the closest *kinship* with Comrade Akimov, explicitly expressed their sympathy with the "*minority*".



Congress and the shades of principle that it revealed, simply testifies to his own intellectual and political poverty. And in order to *disprove* the fact, it would have to be shown, *in the first place*, that the general picture of the voting and "divisions" at our Party Congress was different from the one I have drawn; and, *in the second place*, that it was the most consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats, those who in Russia have adopted the name of *Iskra*-ists, who *were in the wrong on the substance* of all those issues over which the Congress "divided". Well, just try to show that, gentlemen!

Incidentally, the fact that the minority was formed of the most opportunist, the least stable and consistent elements of the Party provides an answer to those numerous objections and expressions of doubt which are addressed to the majority by people who are imperfectly acquainted with the matter, or have not given it sufficient thought. Is it not petty, we are told, to account for the *divergence* by a minor mistake of Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod? Yes, gentlemen, Comrade Martov's mistake was a minor one (and I said so even at the Congress, in the heat of the struggle), but this minor mistake *could (and did)* cause a lot of harm because Comrade Martov was pulled over to the side of delegates who had made a *whole series of mistakes*, had manifested an inclination towards opportunism and inconsistency of principle on a whole series of questions. That Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod should have displayed instability was an unimportant fact concerning individuals; it was not an individual fact, however, but a *Party* fact, and a *not altogether unimportant one*, that a very considerable minority should have been formed of *all* the least stable elements, of *all* who either rejected *Iskra*'s trend altogether and openly opposed it, or paid lip service to it but actually sided time and again with the anti-*Iskra*-ists.

Is it not absurd to *account for* the divergence by the prevalence of an inveterate circle spirit and revolutionary philistin-

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 Note for Comrade Martov's benefit. If Comrade Martov has now forgotten that the term "*Iskra*"-ist implies the *follower of a trend* and not a *member of a circle* we would advise him to read in the Congress Minutes the explanation Comrade Trotsky gave Comrade Akimov on this point. There were three *Iskra*-ist circles (in relation to the Party) at the Congress: the Emancipation of Labour group, the *Iskra* editorial board, and the *Iskra* organisation. Two of these three circles had the good sense to dissolve themselves, the third did not display enough Party spirit to do so, and was dissolved by the Congress. The broadest of the *Iskra*-ist circles, the *Iskra* organisation (which included the editorial board and the Emancipation of Labour group), had sixteen members present at the Congress in all, of whom *only eleven* were entitled to vote. *Iskra*-ists by trend, on the other hand, not by membership in any *Iskra*-ist "circle", numbered, by my calculation, *twenty-seven, with thirty-three votes*. Hence, *less than half* of the *Iskra*-ists at the Congress belonged to *Iskra*-ist circles.

ism in the small circle comprised by the old *Iskra* editorial board? No, it is not absurd, because *all those in our Party* who all through the Congress had fought for every kind of circle, all those who were generally incapable of rising above revolutionary philistinism, all those who talked about the "historical" character of the philistine and circle spirit in order to justify and preserve that evil, rose up in support of this particular circle. The fact that narrow circle interests prevailed over the Party interest in the one little circle of the *Iskra* editorial board might, perhaps, be regarded as an accident; but it was no accident that in staunch support of this circle rose up the Akinovs and Brouckères, who attached no less (if not more) value to the "historical continuity" of the celebrated Voronezh Committee and the notorious St. Petersburg "Workers' Organisation"<sup>212</sup>; the Egorovs, who lamented the "murder" of *Rabocheye Deyelo* as bitterly as the "murder" of the old editorial board (if not more so); the Makhovs, etc., etc. You can tell a man by his friends—the proverb says. And you can tell a man's political complexion by his political allies, by the people who vote for him.

The minor mistake committed by Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod was, and might have remained, a minor one until it became the starting-point for a durable alliance between them and the whole opportunist wing of our Party, until it led, as a result of that alliance, to a recrudescence of opportunism, to the exaction of revenge by all whom *Iskra* had fought and who were now overjoyed at a chance of venting their spleen on the consistent adherents of revolutionary Social-Democracy. And as a result of the post-Congress events, what we are witnessing in the new *Iskra* is precisely a recrudescence of opportunism, the revenge of the Akinovs and Brouckères (see the leaflet issued by the Voronezh Committee), and the glee of the Martynovs, who have at last (at last!) been allowed, in the detested *Iskra*, to have a kick at the detested "enemy" for each and every former grievance. This makes it particularly clear how essential it was to "restore *Iskra's* old editorial board" (we are quoting from Comrade Starover's ultimatum of November 3, 1903) in order to preserve *Iskra* "continuity". . . .

Taken by itself, there was nothing dreadful, nor critical, nor even anything abnormal in the fact that the Congress (and the Party) divided into a Left and a Right, a revolutionary and an opportunist wing. On the contrary, the whole past decade in the history of the Russian (and not only the Russian) Social-Democratic movement had been leading inevitably and inexorably to such a division. The fact that the division took place

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\* See pp. 407-08 of the present volume.—Ed.

over a number of very *minor* mistakes of the Right wing, of (relatively) very unimportant differences (a fact which seems shocking to the superficial observer and to the philistine mind), marked *a big step forward for our Party as a whole*. Formerly we used to differ over major issues, such as might in some cases even justify a split; now we have reached agreement on all major and important points, and are only divided by *shades* about which we may *and should* argue, but over which it would be absurd and childish to part company (as Comrade Plekhanov has quite rightly said in his interesting article "What Should Not Be Done", to which we shall revert). *Now*, when the *anarchistic behaviour* of the minority *since the Congress* has almost brought the Party to a split, one may often hear wiseacres saying: Was it worth while fighting at the Congress over such trifles as the Organising Committee incident, the dissolution of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group or *Rabocheye Dyelo*, or Paragraph 1, or the dissolution of the old editorial board, etc? Those who argue in this way are in fact introducing the circle standpoint into Party affairs: a struggle of *shades* in the Party is *inevitable and essential*, as long as it does not lead to anarchy and splits, as long as it is confined *within bounds* approved by the common consent of all comrades and Party members. And *our struggle* against the Right wing of the Party *at the Congress*, against Akimov and Axelrod, Martynov and Martov, *in no way exceeded those bounds*. One need only recall two facts which incontrovertibly prove this: 1) when Comrades Martynov and Akimov were about to quit the Congress, *we were all prepared* to do everything to obliterate the idea of an "insult": *we all adopted* (by thirty-two votes) Comrade Trotsky's motion inviting these comrades to regard the explanations as satisfactory and withdraw their statement; 2) when it came to the election of the central bodies, we were prepared to allow the minority (or the opportunist wing) of the Congress *a minority on both central bodies*: Martov on the Central Organ and Popov on the Central Committee. *We could not* act otherwise from the Party standpoint, since even before the Congress we had decided to

\* I cannot help recalling in this connection a conversation I happened to have at the Congress with one of the "Centre" delegates. "How oppressive the atmosphere is at our Congress!" he complained "This bitter fighting, this agitation of one against the other, this biting controversy, this uncomradely attitude!..." "What a splendid thing our Congress is!" I replied. "A free and open struggle. Opinions have been stated. The shades have been revealed. The groups have taken shape. Hands have been raised. A decision has been taken. A stage has been passed. Forward! That's the stuff for me! That's life! That's not like the endless, tedious word-chopping of your intellectuals, which stops not because the question has been settled, but because they are too tired to talk any more..."

The comrade of the "Centre" stared at me in perplexity and shrugged his shoulders. We were talking different languages

elect two trios. *If the difference of shades revealed at the Congress was not great*, neither was the *practical* conclusion we drew from the struggle between these shades: the conclusion amounted *solely* to this, that *two-thirds* of the seats on both bodies of three ought to be given to the *majority* at the Party Congress.

It was only the *refusal* of the minority at the Party Congress to be a *minority on the central bodies* that led first to the "feeble whining" of defeated intellectuals, and then to *anarchistic talk* and anarchistic actions.

In conclusion, let us take one more glance at the diagram from the standpoint of the composition of the central bodies. Quite naturally, *in addition* to the question of shades, the delegates were faced during the elections with the question of the *suitability*, efficiency, etc., of one or another *person*. The minority are now very prone to confuse these two questions. Yet that they are different questions is self-evident, and this can be seen from the simple fact, for instance, that the election of an *initial* trio for the Central Organ had been planned even *before the Congress*, at a time when no one could have foreseen the alliance of Martov and Axelrod with Martynov and Akimov. Different questions have to be answered in different ways: the answer to the question of shades must be sought for in the *minutes of the Congress*, in the *open* discussions and voting on each and every issue. As to the question of the suitability of *persons*, everybody at the Congress had decided that it should be settled by *secret ballot*. Why did the *whole Congress unanimously* take that decision? The question is so elementary that it would be odd to dwell on it. But (since their defeat at the ballot-box) the minority have begun to forget even elementary things. We have heard torrents of ardent, passionate speeches, heated almost to the point of irresponsibility, in defence of the old editorial board, but we have heard *absolutely nothing* about the shades *at the Congress* that were involved in the struggle over a board of six or three. We hear talk and gossip on all sides about the ineffectualness, the unsuitability, the evil designs, etc., of the persons elected to the Central Committee, but we hear *absolutely nothing* about the shades *at the Congress* that fought for predominance on the Central Committee. To me it seems indecent and discreditable to go about talking and gossiping *outside the Congress* about the qualities and actions of individuals (for in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred these actions are an organisational secret, which can only be divulged to the supreme authority of the Party). To fight *outside the Congress* by means of *such gossip* would, in my opinion, be *scandal-mongering*. And the only public reply I could make to all this talk would be to point to the struggle at the Congress: You say that the Central Committee was elected by a narrow majority. That is true.

But this narrow majority consisted of all who had most consistently fought, not in words but in actual fact, for the realisation of the *Iskra* plans. Consequently, the *moral* prestige of this majority should be even higher—incomparably so—than its *formal* prestige—higher in the eyes of all who value the continuity of the *Iskra* trend above the continuity of a particular *Iskra* circle. Who was *more competent to judge* the suitability of particular persons to carry out the *Iskra* policy—those who fought for that policy at the Congress, or those who in no few cases fought against that policy and defended everything retrograde, every kind of old rubbish, every kind of circle mentality?

### O. AFTER THE CONGRESS. TWO METHODS OF STRUGGLE

The analysis of the debates and voting at the Congress, which we have now concluded, actually explains *in nuce* (in embryo) everything that has happened since the Congress, and we can be brief in outlining the subsequent stages of our Party crisis.

The refusal of Martov and Popov to stand for election immediately introduced an atmosphere of *squabbling* into a Party struggle between Party shades. On the very next day after the Congress, Comrade Glebov, thinking it incredible that the unelected editors could seriously have decided to *swing towards* Akimov and Martynov, and attributing the whole thing primarily to irritation, suggested to Plekhanov and me that the matter should be ended peaceably and that all four should be “co-opted” on condition that proper representation of the editorial board on the Council was guaranteed (i.e., that of the two representatives, one was definitely drawn from the *Party* majority). This condition seemed sound to Plekhanov and me, for its acceptance would imply a *tacit admission of the mistake at the Congress*, a desire for peace instead of war, a desire to be closer to Plekhanov and me than to Akimov and Martynov, Egorov and Makhov. The concession as regards “co-optation” thus became a *personal* one, and it was not worth while refusing to make a personal concession which should clear away the irritation and restore peace. Plekhanov and I therefore consented. But the editorial majority rejected the condition. *Glebov left*. We began to wait and see what would happen next: whether Martov would adhere to the loyal stand he had taken up at the Congress (*against* Comrade Popov, the representative of the Centre), or whether the unstable elements who inclined towards a split and in whose wake he had followed, would gain the upper hand.

We were faced with the question, would Comrade Martov choose to regard his Congress “coalition” as an isolated political

fact (just as, *si licet parva componere magnis*,\* Bebel's coalition with Vollmar in 1895 was an isolated case), or would he want to *consolidate* this coalition, exert himself to prove that it was *Plekhanov and I* who were mistaken at the Congress, and become the actual leader of the opportunist wing of our Party? This question might be formulated otherwise as follows: a squabble or a political Party struggle? Of the three of us who on the day after the Congress were the sole available members of the central institutions, Glebov inclined most to the former answer and made the most efforts to reconcile the children who had fallen out. Comrade Plekhanov inclined most to the latter answer and was, as the saying goes, neither to hold nor to bind. I on this occasion acted the part of "Centre", or "Marsh", and endeavoured to employ persuasion. To try at this date to recall the spoken attempts at persuasion would be a hopelessly muddled business, and I shall not follow the bad example of Comrade Martov and Comrade Plekhanov. But I do consider it necessary to reproduce certain passages from one written attempt at persuasion which I addressed to one of the "minority" *Iskra*-ists:

"... The refusal of Martov to serve on the editorial board, his refusal and that of other Party writers to collaborate, the refusal of a number of persons to work on the Central Committee, and the propaganda of a boycott or passive resistance are bound to lead, even if against the wishes of Martov and his friends, to a split in the Party. Even if Martov adheres to a loyal stand (which he took up so resolutely at the Congress), others will not, and the outcome I have mentioned will be inevitable. . . .

"And so I ask myself: over what, in point of fact, would we be parting company? . . . I go over all the events and impressions of the Congress; I realise that I often behaved and acted in a state of frightful irritation, 'frenziedly': I am quite willing to admit this fault of mine to anyone, if that can be called a fault which was a natural product of the atmosphere, the reactions, the interjections, the struggle, etc. But examining now, quite unfrenziedly, the results attained, the outcome achieved by frenzied struggle, I can detect nothing, absolutely nothing in these results that is injurious to the Party, and absolutely nothing that is an affront or insult to the minority.

"Of course, the very fact of finding oneself in the minority could not but be vexatious, but I categorically protest against the idea that we 'cast slurs' on anybody, that we *wanted* to insult or humiliate anybody. Nothing of the kind. And one should not allow political differences to lead to an interpretation of events based on accusing the other side of unscrupulousness, chicanery, intrigue,

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\* If little things may be compared to big.—*Ed.*

and the other nice things we are hearing mentioned more and more often in this atmosphere of an impending split. This should not be allowed, for it is, to say the least, the *nec plus ultra* of irrationality.

"Martov and I have had a political (and organisational) difference, as we had dozens of times before. Defeated over Paragraph 1 of the Rules, I could not but strive with all my might for *revanche* in what remained to me (and to the Congress). I could not but strive, on the one hand, for a strictly *Iskra*-ist Central Committee, and, on the other, for a trio on the editorial board. . . . I consider this trio the *only* one capable of being an official institution, instead of a body based on indulgence and slackness, the only one to be a real centre, each member of which would always state and defend his Party viewpoint, not one grain more, and irrespective of all personal considerations and all fear of giving offence, of resignations, and so on.

"This trio, after what had occurred at the Congress, undoubtedly meant legitimising a political and organisational line in one respect directed against Martov. Undoubtedly. Cause a rupture on that account? Break up the Party because of it?? Did not Martov and Plekhanov oppose me over the question of demonstrations? And did not Martov and I oppose Plekhanov over the question of the programme? Is not one side of every trio always up against the other two? If the majority of the *Iskra*-ists, both in the *Iskra* organisation and at the Congress, found this particular shade of Martov's line organisationally and politically mistaken, is it not really senseless to attempt to attribute this to 'intrigue', 'incitement', and so forth? Would it not be senseless to try to talk away this fact by *abusing* the majority and calling them 'riffraff'?

"I repeat that, like the majority of the *Iskra*-ists at the Congress, I am profoundly convinced that the line Martov adopted was wrong, and that he had to be corrected. To take offence at this correction, to regard it as an insult, etc., is unreasonable. We have not cast, and are not casting, any 'slurs' on anyone, nor are we excluding anyone *from work*. And to cause a split because someone has been excluded *from a central body* seems to me a piece of inconceivable folly."<sup>\*</sup>

I have thought it necessary to recall these written statements of mine now, because they *conclusively* prove that the majority wanted to draw a definite line *at once* between possible (and in

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<sup>\*</sup> This letter (to A. N. Potresov, of August 31 [September 13], 1903—Ed.) was written in *September* (New Style). I have only omitted what seemed to me irrelevant to the matter in hand. If the addressee considers what I have omitted important, he can easily repair the omission. Incidentally, let me take this opportunity to say that any of my opponents may publish any of my private letters should they think a useful purpose will be served by it.

a heated struggle inevitable) personal grievances and personal irritations caused by biting and "frenzied" attacks, etc., on the one hand, and a definite political mistake, a definite political line (coalition with the Right wing), on the other.

These statements prove that the *passive resistance* of the minority began immediately after the Congress and at once evoked from us the warning that it was a *step towards splitting the Party*; the warning that it ran directly counter to their *declarations of loyalty at the Congress*; that the split would be solely over *the fact of exclusion from the central institutions* (that is, non-election to them), for nobody ever thought of excluding any Party member *from work*; and that our political difference (an inevitable difference, inasmuch as it had not yet been elucidated and settled which line at the Congress was mistaken, Martov's or ours) was being *perverted more and more into a squabble*, accompanied by abuse, suspicions, and so on and so forth.

But the warnings were in vain. The behaviour of the minority showed that the least stable elements among them, those who *least valued the Party*, were gaining the upper hand. This compelled Plekhanov and me to withdraw the consent we had given to Glebov's proposal. For if the minority were demonstrating by their *deeds* their political instability not only as regards principles, but even as regards *elementary Party loyalty*, what value could be attached to their *talk* about this celebrated "continuity"? Nobody scoffed more wittily than Plekhanov at the utter absurdity of demanding the "co-optation" to the Party editorial board of a majority consisting of people who frankly proclaimed their new and growing differences of opinion! Has there ever been a case in the world of a party majority on the central institutions converting itself into a minority of its own accord, *prior to the airing of new differences* in the press, in full view of the Party? Let the differences first be stated, let the Party judge how profound and important they were, let the Party itself correct the mistake it had made at the Second Congress, should it be shown that it had made a mistake! The very fact that such a demand was made *on the plea* of differences still unknown demonstrated the utter instability of those who made it, the complete submersion of political differences by squabbling, and their entire disrespect both for the Party as a whole and for their own convictions. Never have there been, nor will there be, persons of *convinced principle* who refuse to try to *convince* before they secure (*privately*) a majority in the institution they want to bring round to their standpoint.

Finally, on October 4, Comrade Plekhanov announced that he would make a *last* attempt to put an end to this absurd state of affairs. A meeting was called of all the six members of the old editorial board, attended by a new member of the Central Com-



mittee.\* Comrade Plekhanov spent three whole hours proving how unreasonable it was to demand "co-optation" of four of the "minority" to two of the "majority". He proposed *co-opting two of them*, so as, on the one hand, to remove all fears that we wanted to "bully", suppress, besiege, behead or bury anyone, and, on the other, to safeguard the rights and position of the Party "majority". *The co-optation of two was likewise rejected.*

On October 6, Plekhanov and I wrote the following official letter to all the old editors of *Iskra* and to Comrade Trotsky, one of its contributors:

"Dear Comrades,

"The editorial board of the Central Organ considers it its duty officially to express its regret at your withdrawal from participation in *Iskra* and *Zarya*. In spite of the repeated invitations to collaborate which we made to you immediately following the Second Party Congress and several times after, we have not received a single contribution from you. The editors of the Central Organ declare that your withdrawal from participation is not justified by anything they have done. No personal imitation should serve, of course, as an obstacle to your working on the Central Organ of the Party. If, on the other hand, your withdrawal is due to any differences of opinion with us, we would consider it of the greatest benefit to the Party if you were to set forth these differences at length. More, we would consider it highly desirable for the nature and depth of these differences to be explained to the whole Party as early as possible in the columns of the publications of which we are the editors."

As the reader sees, it was still quite unclear to us whether the actions of the "minority" were principally governed by personal imitation or by a desire to steer the organ (and the Party) along a *new course*, and if so, what course exactly. I think that if we were even now to set seventy wise men to elucidate this question with the help of any literature or any testimony you like, they too could make nothing of this tangle. I doubt whether a squabble can ever be disentangled: you have either to cut it, or set it aside."

This Central Committee member<sup>213</sup> arranged, in addition, a number of private and collective talks with the minority, in which he refuted the preposterous tales that were being spread and appealed to their sense of Party duty.

The letter to Comrade Martov contained in addition a reference to a certain pamphlet and the following sentence: "Lastly, we once more inform you, in the interests of the work, that we are still prepared to co-opt you to the editorial board of the Central Organ, in order to give you every opportunity officially to state and defend your views in the supreme institution of the Party."

Comrade Plekhanov would probably add: "or satisfy *each and every claim* of the initiators of the squabble" We shall see why this was impossible

Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, Trotsky, and Koltsov sent a couple of lines in reply to this letter of October 6, to the effect that the undersigned were taking no part in *Iskra* since its passage into the hands of the new editorial board. Comrade Martov was more communicative and honoured us with the following reply:

"To the Editorial Board of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.

"Dear Comrades,

"In reply to your letter of October 6 I wish to state the following: I consider all our discussions on the subject of working together on one organ at an end after the conference which took place in the presence of a Central Committee member on October 4, and at which you refused to state the reasons that induced you to withdraw your proposal to us that Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, and I should join the editorial board on condition that we undertook to elect Comrade Lenin our 'representative' on the Council. After you repeatedly evaded at this conference formulating the statements you had yourselves made in the presence of witnesses, I do not think it necessary to explain in a letter to you my motives for refusing to work on *Iskra* under present conditions. Should the need arise, I shall explain them in detail to the whole Party, which will already be able to learn from the minutes of the Second Congress why I rejected the proposal, which you now repeat, that I accept a seat on the editorial board and on the Council.

"L. Martov"

This letter, in conjunction with the previous documents, clarifies beyond any possible dispute that question of boycott, disorganisation, anarchy, and preparations for a split which Comrade Martov (with the help of exclamation marks and rows of dots) so assiduously evades in his *State of Siege*—the question of loyal and disloyal methods of struggle.

Comrade Martov and the others are *invited* to set forth their differences, they are *asked* to tell us plainly what the trouble is all about and what their intentions are, they are *exhorted* to stop sulking and to analyse calmly the mistake made over Paragraph 1 (which is intimately connected with their mistake in swinging to the Right)—but Comrade Martov and Co. *refuse to talk*, and cry: "We are being besieged! We are being bullied!" The jibe about "dreadful words" has not cooled the ardour of these comical outcries.

How is it possible to *besiege* someone who *refuses to work together with you*?—we asked Comrade Martov. How is it possible to ill-treat, "bully", and oppress a minority which *refuses to be a minority*? Being in the minority necessarily and inevitably involves certain disadvantages. These disadvantages are that you either have to join a body which will outvote you on certain questions, or you stay outside that body and attack it, and consequently come under the fire of well-mounted batteries.

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\* I omit what Martov replied in reference to his pamphlet, then being republished.

Did Comrade Martov's cries about a "state of siege" mean that those in the minority were being fought or governed unfairly and unloyally? *Only* such an assertion could have contained even a grain of sense (in Martov's eyes), for, I repeat, being in the minority necessarily and inevitably involves certain disadvantages. But the whole comedy of the matter is that Comrade Martov *could not be fought at all* as long as he refused to talk! The minority *could not be governed at all* as long as they refused to be a minority!

Comrade Martov could not cite *a single fact* to show that the editorial board of the Central Organ had exceeded or abused its powers while Plekhanov and I were on it. Nor could the practical workers of the minority cite *a single fact* of a like kind with regard to the Central Committee. However Comrade Martov may now twist and turn in his *State of Siege*, it remains absolutely incontrovertible that *the outcries about a state of siege were nothing but "feeble whining"*.

How utterly Comrade Martov and Co. lacked *sensible* arguments against the editorial board appointed by the Congress is best of all shown by their own catchword: "We are not serfs!" (*State of Siege*, p. 34.) The mentality of the bourgeois intellectual, who counts himself among the "elect minds" standing above mass organisation and mass discipline, is expressed here with remarkable clarity. To *explain* their refusal to work in the Party by saying that they "are not serfs" is *to give themselves away completely*, to confess to a total lack of arguments, an utter inability to furnish any motives, any sensible reasons for dissatisfaction. Plekhanov and I declare that their refusal is not justified by anything we have done; we request them to set forth their differences; and all they reply is: "We are not serfs" (adding that no bargain has yet been reached on the subject of co-optation).

To the individualism of the intellectual, which already manifested itself in the controversy over Paragraph 1, revealing its tendency to opportunist argument and anarchistic phrase-mongering, *all* proletarian organisation and discipline seems to be *serfdom*. The reading public will soon learn that in the eyes of these "Party members" and Party "officials," even a new *Party Congress* is a serf institution that is terrible and abhorrent to the "elect minds". . . . This "institution" is indeed terrible to people who are not averse to making use of the Party title but are conscious that this title of theirs *does not accord* with the interests and will of the Party.

The committee resolutions enumerated in my letter to the editors of the new *Iskra*, and published by Comrade Martov in his *State of Siege*, show with facts that the behaviour of the minority amounted all along to sheer *disobedience* of the decisions of the Congress and *disorganisation* of positive practical

work. Consisting of opportunists and people who detested *Iskra*, the minority strove to *rend the Party* and damaged and disorganised its work, thirsting to avenge their defeat at the Congress and sensing that by *honest and loyal* means (by explaining their case in the press or at a congress) they would *never* succeed in refuting the accusation of opportunism and intellectualist instability which at the Second Congress had been levelled against them. Realising that they could not *convince* the Party, they tried to gain their ends by *disorganising* the Party and *hampering all its work*. They were reproached with having (by their mistakes at the Congress) caused a crack in our pot; they replied to the reproach by trying *with all their might to smash the pot altogether*.

So distorted had their ideas become that boycott and refusal to work were proclaimed to be "*honest*\* methods" of struggle. Comrade Martov is now wriggling all around this delicate point. Comrade Martov is such a "man of principle" that he defends boycott . . . when practised by the minority, but condemns boycott when, his side happening to have become the majority, it threatens Martov himself!

We need not, I think, go into the question whether this is a squabble or a "difference of principle" as to what are honest methods of struggle in a Social-Democratic workers' party.

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After the unsuccessful attempts (of October 4 and 6) to obtain an explanation from the comrades who had started the "co-optation" row, nothing remained for the central institutions but to wait and see what would come of their verbal assurances that they would adhere to loyal methods of struggle. On October 10, the Central Committee addressed a circular letter to the League (see League Minutes, pp. 3-5), announcing that it was engaged in drafting Rules for the League and inviting the League members to assist. The Administration of the League had at that time decided against a congress of that body (by two votes to one; *ibid.*, p. 20). The replies received from minority supporters to this circular showed at once that the celebrated promise to be loyal and abide by the decisions of the Congress was just talk, and that, as a matter of fact, the minority had positively decided *not to obey* the central institutions of the Party, replying to their appeals to collaborate with *evasive excuses* full of sophistry and *anarchistic* phrase-mongering. In reply to the famous open letter of Deutsch, a member of the Administration (p. 10), Plekhanov, myself, and other supporters of the majority expressed our vigorous "protest against the gross violations of Party discipline by which an official

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\* Mining Area resolution (*State of Siege*, p. 38).

of the League permits himself to hamper the organisational activities of a Party institution and calls upon other comrades likewise to violate discipline and the Rules. Remarks such as, 'I do not consider myself at liberty to take part in such work on the invitation of the Central Committee', or, 'Comrades, we must on no account allow it [the Central Committee] to draw up new Rules for the League', etc., are agitational methods of a kind that can only arouse disgust in anyone who has the slightest conception of the meaning of the words party, organisation, and party discipline. Such methods are all the more disgraceful for the fact that they are being used against a newly created Party institution and are therefore an undoubted attempt to undermine confidence in it among Party comrades, and that, moreover, they are being employed under the cachet of a member of the League Administration and behind the back of the Central Committee' (p. 17).

Under such conditions, the League Congress promised to be nothing but a brawl.

From the outset, Comrade Martov continued his Congress tactics of "getting personal", this time with Comrade Plekhanov, by distorting private conversations. Comrade Plekhanov protested, and Comrade Martov was obliged to withdraw his accusations (League Minutes, pp. 39 and 134), which were a product of either irresponsibility or resentment.

The time for the report arrived. I had been the League's delegate at the Party Congress. A mere reference to the summary of my report (p. 43 et seq.)\* will show the reader that I gave a rough outline of that analysis of the voting at the Congress which, in greater detail, forms the contents of the present pamphlet. The central feature of the report was precisely the proof that, owing to their mistakes, Martov and Co. had landed in the opportunist wing of our Party. Although this report was made to an audience whose majority consisted of violent opponents, they could discover absolutely nothing in it which departed from loyal methods of Party struggle and controversy.

Martov's report, on the contrary, apart from minor "corrections" to particular points of my account (the incorrectness of these corrections we have shown above), was nothing but—a product of disordered nerves.

No wonder that the majority refused to carry on the fight in this atmosphere. Comrade Plekhanov entered a protest against the "*scene*" (p. 68)—it was indeed a regular "*scene*"!—and withdrew from the Congress without stating the objections he had already prepared on the substance of the report. Nearly all the other supporters of the majority also withdrew from the Congress,

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 73-83—Ed.

after filing a written protest against the "unworthy behaviour" of Comrade Martov (League Minutes, p. 75).

The methods of struggle employed by the minority became perfectly clear to all. We had accused the minority of committing a political mistake at the Congress, of having swung towards opportunism, of having formed a coalition with the Bundists, the Akimovs, the Brouckères, the Egorovs, and the Makhovs. The minority had been defeated at the Congress, and they had now "worked out" *two* methods of struggle, embracing all their endless variety of sorties, assaults, attacks, etc.

*First method*—disorganising all the activity of the Party, damaging the work, hampering all and everything "without statement of reasons".

*Second method*—making "scenes", and so on and so forth.\*

This "second method of struggle" is also apparent in the League's famous resolutions of "principle", in the discussion of which the "majority", of course, took no part. Let us examine these resolutions, which Comrade Martov has reproduced in his *State of Siege*.

The first resolution, signed by Comrades Trotsky, Fomin, Deutsch, and others, contains two theses directed against the "majority" of the Party Congress: 1) "The League expresses its profound regret that, owing to the manifestation at the Congress of tendencies which essentially run counter to the earlier policy of *Iskra*, due care was not given in drafting the Party Rules to providing sufficient safeguards of the independence and authority of the Central Committee." (League Minutes, p. 83.)

As we have already seen, this thesis of "principle" amounts to nothing but *Akimov* phrase-mongering, the *opportunist* character of which was exposed at the Party Congress *even* by Comrade Popov! In point of fact, the claim that the "majority" did not mean to safeguard the independence and authority of the Central Committee was never anything but *gossip*. It need only be mentioned that when Plekhanov and I were on the editorial board, *there was on the Council no predominance* of the Central Organ over the Central Committee, but when the Martovites joined the editorial board, the Central Organ *secured predominance* over the Central Committee on the Council! When we were on the editorial board, *practical workers in Russia predom-*

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\* I have already pointed out that it would be unwise to attribute to sordid motives even the most sordid manifestations of the squabbling that is so habitual in the atmosphere of émigré and exile colonies. It is a sort of epidemic disease engendered by abnormal conditions of life, disordered nerves, and so on. I *had* to give a true picture of this system of struggle here, because Comrade Martov has again resorted to it in its full scope in his "*State of Siege*".

inated on the Council over writers residing abroad; since the Martovites took over, the contrary has been the case. When we were on the editorial board, the Council *never once* attempted to interfere in any *practical* matter; since the unanimous co-optation *such interference has begun*, as the reading public will learn in detail in the near future.

Next thesis of the resolution we are examining: "...when constituting the official central bodies of the Party, the Congress ignored the need for maintaining continuity with the actually existing central bodies. . . ."

This thesis boils down to nothing but the question of the *personal* composition of the central bodies. The "minority" preferred to evade the fact that at the Congress the old central bodies had proved their unfitness and committed a number of mistakes. But most comical of all is the reference to "continuity" with respect to the Organising Committee. At the Congress, as we have seen nobody even hinted that the entire membership of the Organising Committee should be endorsed. At the Congress, Martov actually cried in a frenzy that a list containing three members of the Organising Committee was defamatory to him. At the Congress, the *final* list proposed by the "minority" contained *one* member of the Organising Committee (*Popov*, *Glebov* or *Fomin*, and *Trotsky*), whereas the list the "majority" put through contained *two* members of the Organising Committee out of three (*Travinsky*, *Vasilyev*, and *Glebov*). We ask, can this reference to "continuity" really be considered a "difference of principle"?

Let us pass to the other resolution, which was signed by four members of the old editorial board, headed by Comrade Axelrod. Here we find all those major accusations against the "majority" which have subsequently been repeated many times in the press. They can most conveniently be examined as formulated by the members of the editorial circle. The accusations are levelled against "the system of autocratic and bureaucratic government of the Party", against "bureaucratic centralism", which, as distinct from "genuinely Social-Democratic centralism", is defined as follows: it "places in the forefront, not internal union, but external, formal unity, achieved and maintained by purely mechanical means, by the systematic suppression of individual initiative and independent social activity": it is therefore "by its very nature incapable of organically uniting the component elements of society".

What "society" Comrade Axelrod and Co. are here referring to, heaven alone knows. Apparently, Comrade Axelrod was not quite clear himself whether he was penning a Zemstvo address on the subject of desirable government reforms, or pouring forth the complaints of the "minority". What is the implication of

"autocracy" in the Party, about which the dissatisfied "editors" clamour? Autocracy means the supreme, uncontrolled, non-accountable, non-elective rule of one individual. We know very well from the literature of the "minority" that by autocrat they mean *me*, and no one else. When the resolution in question was being drafted and adopted, I was on the Central Organ together with Plekhanov. Consequently, Comrade Axelrod and Co. were expressing the conviction that Plekhanov and all the members of the Central Committee "governed the Party", not in accordance with their own views of what the interests of the work required, but in accordance with the *will* of the autocrat Lenin. This accusation of autocratic government necessarily and inevitably implies pronouncing all members of the governing body except the autocrat to be mere tools in the hands of another, mere pawns and agents of another's will. And once again we ask, is this really a "difference of principle" on the part of the highly respected Comrade Axelrod?

Further, what external, formal unity are they here talking about, our "Party members" just returned from a Party Congress whose decisions they have solemnly acknowledged valid? Do they know of any other method of achieving unity in a party organised on any at all durable basis, except a party congress? If they do, why have they not the courage to declare frankly that they no longer regard the Second Congress as valid? Why do they not try to tell us their new ideas and new methods of achieving unity in a supposedly organised party?

Further, what "suppression of individual initiative" are they talking about, our individualist intellectuals whom the Central Organ of the Party has just been *exhorting* to set forth their differences, but who *instead* have engaged in bargaining about "co-optation"? And, in general, how could Plekhanov and I, or the Central Committee, have suppressed the initiative and independent activity of people who refused to engage in *any* "activity" in conjunction with us? How can anyone be "suppressed" in an institution or body in which he *refuses to have any part*? How could the unelected editors complain of a "system of government" when they refused to "*be governed*"? We *could not* have committed *any* errors in directing our comrades for the simple reason that they never worked under our direction at all.

It is clear, I think, that the cries about this celebrated bureaucracy are just a screen for dissatisfaction with the personal composition of the central bodies, a fig-leaf to cover up the violation of a pledge solemnly given at the Congress. You are a bureaucrat because you were appointed by the Congress not in accordance with my wishes, but against them; you are a formalist because you take your stand on the formal decisions of the Congress, and not



on my consent; you are acting in a grossly mechanical way because you cite the "mechanical" majority at the Party Congress and pay no heed to my wish to be co-opted; you are an autocrat because you refuse to hand over the power to the old snug little band who insist on their circle "continuity" all the more because they do not like the explicit disapproval of this circle spirit by the Congress.

These cries about bureaucracy have never had any *real* meaning except the one I have indicated.\* And this method of struggle only proves once again the intellectualist instability of the minority. They wanted to convince the Party that the selection of the central bodies was unfortunate. And how did they go about it? By criticism of *Iskra* as conducted by Plekhanov and me? No, that they were unable to offer. The method they used consisted in the refusal of a section of the Party to work under the direction of the hated central bodies. But no central institution of any party in the world can ever prove its ability to direct people who refuse to accept its direction. Refusal to accept the direction of the central bodies is tantamount to refusing to remain in the Party, it is tantamount to disrupting the Party; it is a method of *destroying*, not of *convincing*. And these efforts to destroy instead of convince show their lack of consistent principles, lack of faith in their own ideas.

They talk of bureaucracy. The word bureaucracy might be translated into Russian as concentration on place and position. Bureaucracy means subordinating the interests of the *work* to the interests of one's own *career*; it means focusing attention on *places* and ignoring the work itself; it means wrangling over *co-optation* instead of fighting for *ideas*. That bureaucracy of this kind is undesirable and detrimental to the Party is unquestionably true, and I can safely leave it to the reader to judge which of the two sides now contending in our Party is guilty of such bureaucracy. . . . They talk about grossly mechanical methods of achieving unity. Unquestionably, grossly mechanical methods are detrimental; but I again leave it to the reader to judge whether a grosser and more mechanical method of struggle of a new trend against an old one can be imagined than installing people in Party institutions before the Party has been convinced of the correctness of their new views, and before these views have even been set forth to the Party.

But perhaps the catchwords of the minority do mean something in principle, perhaps they do express some special group of ideas, irrespective of the petty and particular cause which undoubtedly

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\* It is enough to point out that Comrade Plekhanov ceased to be a supporter of "bureaucratic centralism" in the eyes of the minority once he put through the beneficent co-optation.

started the "swing" in the present case? Perhaps if we were to set aside the wrangling over "co-optation", these catchwords might turn out to be an expression of a different system of views?

Let us examine the matter from this angle. Before doing so, we must place on record that the first to attempt such an examination was Comrade Plekhanov at the League, who pointed out the minority's swing towards *anarchism* and *opportunism*, and that Comrade Martov (who is now highly offended because not everyone is ready to admit that his position is one of principle\*) preferred *completely to ignore* this incident in his *State of Siege*.

At the League Congress the general question was raised as to whether Rules that the League or a committee may draw up for itself are valid without the Central Committee's endorsement, and even if the Central Committee refuses to endorse them. Nothing could be clearer, one would think: Rules are a formal expression of organisation, and, according to Paragraph 6 of our Party Rules, the right to organise committees is explicitly vested in the Central Committee; Rules define the limits of a committee's autonomy, and the decisive voice in defining those limits belongs to the central and not to a local institution of the Party. *That is elementary*, and it was sheer childishness to argue with such an air of profundity that "organising" does not always imply "endorsing Rules" (as if the League itself had not of its own accord expressed the wish to be organised on the basis of formal Rules). But Comrade Martov has forgotten (temporarily, let us hope) even the ABC of Social-Democracy. In his opinion, the demand that Rules should be endorsed only indicated that "the earlier, revolutionary *Iskra* centralism is being replaced by bureaucratic centralism" (League Minutes, p. 95), and there, in fact—Comrade Martov declared in the same speech—lay the "principle" at issue (p. 96)—a principle which he preferred to ignore in his *State of Siege*!

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\* Nothing could be more comical than the new *Iskra's* grievance that Lenin refuses to see any differences of principle, or denies them. If your attitude had been based more on principle, you would the sooner have examined my repeated statements that you have swung towards opportunism. If your position had been based more on principle, you could not well have degraded an ideological struggle to a squabble over places. You have only yourselves to blame, for you have yourselves done everything to make it impossible to regard you as men of principle. Take Comrade Martov, for example: when speaking, in his *State of Siege*, of the League Congress, he says nothing about the dispute with Plekhanov over anarchism, but instead informs us that Lenin is a super-centre, that Lenin has only to wink his eye to have the centre issue orders, that the Central Committee rode roughshod over the League, etc. I have no doubt that by picking his topic in this way, Comrade Martov displayed the profundity of his ideals and principles.

Comrade Plekhanov answered Martov at once, requesting that expressions like bureaucracy, Jack-in-office, etc., be refrained from as "detracting from the dignity of the Congress" (p. 96). There followed an interchange with Comrade Martov, who regarded these expressions as "a characterisation of a certain trend from the standpoint of principle". *At that time*, Comrade Plekhanov, like all the other supporters of the majority, took these expressions at their real value, clearly realising that they related exclusively to the realm, if we may so put it, of "co-optation", and not of principle. However, he deferred to the insistence of the Martovs and Deutsches (pp. 96-97) and proceeded to examine their supposed principles *from the standpoint of principle*. "If that were so," said he (that is, if the committees were autonomous in shaping their organisation, in drawing up their Rules), "they would be autonomous in relation to the whole, to the Party. That is not even a Bundist view, it is a downright anarchistic view. That is just how the anarchists argue: the rights of individuals are unlimited; they may conflict; every individual determines the limits of his rights for himself. The limits of autonomy should be determined not by the group itself, but by the whole of which it forms a part. The Bund was a striking instance of the violation of this principle. Hence, the limits of autonomy are determined by the Congress, or by the highest body set up by the Congress. The authority of the central institution should rest on moral and intellectual prestige. There I, of course, agree. Every representative of the organisation must be concerned for the moral prestige of its institution. But it does not follow that, while prestige is necessary, authority is not. . . . To counterpose the power of authority to the power of ideas is anarchistic talk, which should have no place here" (p. 98). These propositions are as elementary as can be, they are in fact axioms, which it was strange even to put to the vote (p. 102), and which were called in question only because "concepts have now been confused" (loc. cit.). But the minority's intellectualist individualism had, inevitably, driven them to the point of wanting to sabotage the Congress, to refuse to submit to the majority; and that wish could not be justified except by *anarchistic talk*. It is very amusing to note that the minority had nothing to offer in reply to Plekhanov but *complaints* of his use of excessively strong words, like opportunism, anarchism, and so forth. Plekhanov quite rightly poked fun at these complaints by asking why "the words Jaurèsism and anarchism are not permissible, and the words *lèse majesté* and Jack-in-office are". No answer was given. This quaint sort of *qui pro quo* is always happening to Comrades Martov, Axelrod, and Co.: their new catchwords clearly bear the stamp of vexation; any reference to the fact offends them—they are, you see, men

of principle; but, they are told, if you deny *on principle* that the part should submit to the whole, you are anarchists, and again they are offended!— the expression is too strong! In other words, they want to give battle to Plekhanov, but only on condition that he does not hit back in earnest!

How many times Comrade Martov and various other “Mensheviks”<sup>\*</sup> have convicted me, no less childishly, of the following “contradiction”. They quote a passage from *What Is To Be Done?* or *A Letter to a Comrade* which speaks of ideological influence, a struggle for influence, etc., and contrast it to the “bureaucratic” method of influencing, by means of the Rules, to the “autocratic” tendency to rely on authority, and the like. How naïve they are! They have already forgotten that *previously* our Party was not a formally organised whole, but merely a sum of separate groups, and therefore no other relations except those of ideological influence were possible between these groups. *Now* we have become an organised Party, and this implies the establishment of authority, the transformation of the power of ideas into the power of authority, the subordination of lower Party bodies to higher ones. Why, it positively makes one uncomfortable to have to chew over such elementary things for the benefit of old associates, especially when one feels that at the bottom of it all is simply the minority’s refusal to submit to the majority in the matter of the elections! But *from the standpoint of principle* these endless exposures of my contradictions boil down to *nothing but* anachistic phrase-mongering. The new *Iskra* is not averse to enjoying the title and rights of a Party institution, but it does not want to submit to the majority of the Party.

If the talk about bureaucracy contains any principle at all, if it is not just an anarchistic denial of the duty of the part to submit to the whole, then what we have here is the *principle of opportunism*, which seeks to lessen the responsibility of individual intellectuals to the party of the proletariat, to lessen the influence of the central institutions, to enlarge the autonomy of the least steadfast elements in the Party, to reduce organisational relations to a purely platonic and verbal acceptance of them. We saw this at the Party Congress, where the Akimovs and Liebers made exactly the same sort of speeches about “monstrous” centralism as poured from the lips of Martov and Co. at the League Congress. That opportunism leads to the Martov and Axelrod “views” on organisation by its very nature, and not by chance, and not in Russia alone but the world over, we shall see later, when examining Comrade Axelrod’s article in the new *Iskra*.

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<sup>\*</sup> From the Russian *men'shinstvo*—“minority”, as “Bolshevik” comes from *bol'shinstvo*—“majority”—*T*

## P. LITTLE ANNOYANCES SHOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF A BIG PLEASURE

The League's rejection of the resolution declaring that its Rules must be endorsed by the Central Committee (League Minutes, p. 105) was, as the Party Congress majority at once unanimously noted, a "*crying violation of the Party Rules*". Regarded as the act of men of principle, this violation was sheer anarchism; while in the atmosphere of the post-Congress struggle, it inevitably created the impression that the Party minority were trying to "settle scores" with the Party majority (League Minutes, p. 112); it meant that they did not wish to obey the Party or to remain within the Party. And when the League refused to adopt a resolution on the Central Committee statement calling for changes in its Rules (pp. 124-25), it inevitably followed that this assembly which wanted to *be counted* an assembly of a Party organisation but at the same time not to obey the Party's central institution, had to be pronounced *unlawful*. Accordingly, the followers of the Party majority at once withdrew from this quasi-Party assembly, so as not to have any share in an indecent farce.

The individualism of the intellectual, with its platonic acceptance of organisational relations, which was revealed in the lack of steadfastness over Paragraph 1 of the Rules thus in practice reached the logical end I had predicted even in September, that is, a month and a half before, namely, the point of *disrupting* the Party organisation. And at that moment, on the evening of the day the League Congress ended, Comrade Plekhanov announced to his colleagues on both the Party's central institutions that he could not bear to "fire on his comrades", that "rather than have a split, it is better to put a bullet in one's brain", and that, to avert a greater evil, it was necessary to make the maximum personal concessions, over which, in point of fact (much more than over the principles to be discerned in the incorrect position on Paragraph 1), this destructive struggle was being waged. In order to give a more accurate characterisation of Comrade Plekhanov's right-about-face, which has acquired a certain general Party significance, I consider it advisable to rely not on private conversations, nor on private letters (that last resort in extremity), but on Plekhanov's own statement of the case to the whole Party, namely, his article "What Should Not Be Done" in No. 52 of *Iskra*, which was written just after the League Congress, after I had resigned from the editorial board of the Central Organ (November 1, 1903), and before the co-optation of the Martovites (November 26, 1903).

The fundamental idea of "What Should Not Be Done" is that in politics one must not be too stiff-necked, too harsh and un-

yielding; that it is sometimes necessary to avoid a split, to yield even to revisionists (among those moving towards us or among the inconsistent) and to anarchistic individualists. It was only natural that these abstract generalities should arouse universal perplexity among *Iskra* readers. One cannot help laughing when reading the proud and majestic statements of Comrade Plekhanov (in subsequent articles) that he had not been understood because of the novelty of his ideas and because people lacked a knowledge of dialectics. In reality, "What Should Not Be Done" could only be understood, at the time it was written, by some dozen people living in two Geneva suburbs whose names both begin with the same letter.<sup>214</sup> Comrade Plekhanov's misfortune was that he put into circulation among some ten thousand readers an agglomeration of hints, reproaches, algebraical symbols, and riddles which were intended only for these dozen or so people who had taken part in all the developments of the post-Congress struggle with the minority. This misfortune befell Comrade Plekhanov because he violated a basic principle of that dialectics to which he so unluckily referred, namely, that there is no abstract truth, that truth is always concrete. That is why it was out of place to lend an abstract form to the perfectly concrete idea of yielding to the Martovites after the League Congress.

Yielding—which Comrade Plekhanov advocated as a new war-cry—is legitimate and essential in two cases: when the yielder is convinced that those who are striving to make him yield are in the right (in which case honest political leaders frankly and openly admit their mistake), or when an irrational and harmful demand is yielded to in order to avert a greater evil. It is perfectly clear from the article in question that it is the latter case the author has in mind: he speaks plainly of yielding to revisionists and anarchistic individualists (that is, to the Martovites, as every Party member now knows from the League Minutes), and says that it is essential in order to avert a split. As we see, Comrade Plekhanov's supposedly novel idea amounts to no more than the not very novel piece of commonplace wisdom that little annoyances should not be allowed to stand in the way of a big pleasure, that a little opportunist folly and a little anarchistic talk is better than a big Party split. When Comrade Plekhanov wrote this article he clearly realised that the minority represented the opportunist wing of our Party and that they were fighting with anarchistic weapons. Comrade Plekhanov came forward with the plan to combat this minority by means of personal concessions, just as (again *si licet parva componere magnis*) the German Social-Democrats combated Bernstein. Bebel publicly declared at congresses of his Party that he did not know anyone who was so susceptible to the influence of environment as Comrade Bernstein (not Mr. Bernstein, as Comrade Ple-

khanov was once so fond of calling him, but Comrade Bernstein): let us take him into our environment, let us make him a member of the Reichstag, let us combat revisionism, not by inappropriate harshness (à la Sobakevich-Parvus<sup>215</sup>) towards the revisionist, but by "killing him with kindness"—as Comrade M. Beer, I recall, put it at a meeting of English Social-Democrats when defending German conciliatoriness, peaceableness, mildness, flexibility, and caution against the attack of the English Sobakevich—Hyndman. And in just the same way, Comrade Plekhanov wanted to "kill with kindness" the little anarchism and the little opportunism of Comrades Axelrod and Martov. True, while hinting quite plainly at the "anarchistic individualists", Comrade Plekhanov expressed himself in a deliberately vague way about the revisionists; he did so in a manner to create the impression that he was referring to the *Rabocheye Dyclo*-ists, who were swinging from opportunism towards orthodoxy, and not to Axelrod and Martov, who had begun to swing *from orthodoxy towards revisionism*. But this was only an innocent military ruse,\* a feeble bulwark that was incapable of withstanding the artillery fire of Party publicity.

And anyone who acquaints himself with the actual state of affairs at the political juncture we are describing, anyone who gains an insight into Comrade Plekhanov's mentality, will realise that I could not have acted in this instance otherwise than I did. I say this for the benefit of those supporters of the majority who have reproached me for surrendering the editorial board. When Comrade Plekhanov swung round after the League Congress and from being a supporter of the majority became a supporter of reconciliation at all costs, I was obliged to put the very best interpretation on it. Perhaps Comrade Plekhanov wanted in his article to put forward a programme for an amicable and honest peace? Any such programme boils down to a sincere admission of mistakes by both sides. What was the mistake Com-

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\* There was never any question after the Party Congress of making concessions to Comrades Martynov, Akimov, and Brouckère. I am not aware that they too demanded "co-optation". I even doubt whether Comrade Starover or Comrade Martov consulted Comrade Brouckère when they sent us their epistles and "notes" in the name of "half the Party". . . . At the League Congress Comrade Martov rejected, with the profound indignation of an unbending political stalwart, the very idea of a "union with Ryazanov or Martynov", of the possibility of a "deal" with them, or even of joint "service to the Party" (as an editor: *League Minutes*, p. 53). At the League Congress Comrade Martov sternly condemned "Martynov tendencies" (p. 88), and when Comrade Orthodox subtly hinted that Axelrod and Martov no doubt "consider that Comrades Akimov, Martynov, and others also have the right to get together, draw up Rules for themselves, and act in accordance with them as they see fit" (p. 99), the Martovites denied it, as Peter denied Christ (p. 100: "Comrade Orthodox's fears" "regarding the Akimovs, Martynovs, etc., "have no foundation").

rade Plekhanov laid at the door of the majority? An inappropriate, Sobakevich-like, harshness towards the revisionists. We do not know what Comrade Plekhanov had in mind by that: his witticism about the asses, or his extremely incautious—in Axelrod's presence—reference to anarchism and opportunism. Comrade Plekhanov preferred to express himself "abstractly", and, moreover, with a hint at the other fellow. That is a matter of taste, of course. But, after all, I had admitted my personal harshness openly both in the letter to the *Iskra*-ist and at the League Congress. How then could I refuse to admit that the majority were guilty of such a "mistake"? As to the minority, Comrade Plekhanov pointed to their mistake quite clearly, namely, revisionism (cf. his remarks about opportunism at the Party Congress and about Jaurèsism at the League Congress) and anarchism which had led to the verge of a split. Could I obstruct an attempt to secure an acknowledgement of these mistakes and undo their harm by means of personal concessions and "kindness" in general? Could I obstruct such an attempt when Comrade Plekhanov in "What Should Not Be Done" directly appealed to us to "*spare the adversaries*" among the revisionists who were revisionists "only because of a certain inconsistency"? And if I did not believe in this attempt, could I do otherwise than make a personal concession regarding the Central Organ and move over to the Central Committee in order to defend the position of the majority? I could not absolutely deny the feasibility of such attempts and take upon myself the full onus for the threatening split, if only because I had myself been inclined, in the letter of October 6, to attribute the wrangle to "personal irritation". But I did consider, and still consider, it my political duty to defend the position of the majority. To rely in this on Comrade Plekhanov would have been difficult and risky, for everything went to show that he was prepared to interpret his dictum that

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Comrade Martov put it very aptly when he said that I had moved over *avec armes et bagages*. Comrade Martov is very fond of military metaphors. campaign against the League. engagement, incurable wounds, etc., etc. To tell the truth, I too have a great weakness for military metaphors, especially just now, when one follows the news from the Pacific with such eager interest. But, Comrade Martov, if we are to use military language, the story goes like this. We capture two forts at the Party Congress. You attack them at the League Congress. After the first brief interchange of shots, my colleague, the commandant of one of the forts, opens the gates to the enemy. Naturally, I gather together the little artillery I have and move into the other fort, which is practically unfortified, in order to "stand siege" against the enemy's overwhelming numbers. I even make an offer of peace, for what chance do I stand against two powers? But in reply to my offer, the new allies bombard my last fort, I return the fire. Whereupon my former colleague—the commandant—exclaims in magnificent indignation. "Just look, good people, how bellicose this Chamberlain is!"



a leader of the proletariat has no right to give rein to his warlike inclinations when they run counter to political good sense'—to interpret it in a dialectical way to mean that if you had to fire, then it was better sense (considering the state of the weather in Geneva in November) to fire at the majority. To defend the majority's position was essential because when dealing with the question of the free (2) will of a revolutionary Comrade Plekhanov—in defiance of dialectics, which demands a concrete and comprehensive examination—modestly evaded the question of *confidence in a revolutionary* of confidence in a leader of the proletariat who was leading a definite wing of the Party. When speaking of anarchistic individualism and advising us to close our eyes 'at times' to violations of discipline and to yield sometimes to intellectualist license which is rooted in a sentiment that 'has nothing to do with devotion to the revolutionary idea' Comrade Plekhanov apparently forgot that we must also reckon with the free will of the majority of the Party and that it must be left *to the practical workers* to determine the *extent* of the concessions to be made to the anarchistic individualists. Easy as it is to fight childish anarchistic nonsense on the literary plane, it is very difficult to carry on practical work in the same organisation with an anarchistic individualist. A writer who took it upon himself to determine the extent of the concessions that might be made to anarchism in practice would only be betraying his inordinate and truly doctrinaire literary conceit. Comrade Plekhanov majestically remarked (for the sake of importance as Bazarov " used to say) that if a new split were to occur the workers would cease to understand us, yet at the same time he initiated an endless stream of articles in the new *Iskra* whose real and concrete meaning was bound to be incomprehensible not only to the workers but to the world at large. It is not surprising that when a member of the Central Committee read the proofs of 'What Should Not Be Done' he warned Comrade Plekhanov that his plan to somewhat curtail the size of a certain publication (the minutes of the Party Congress and the League (Congress) would be defeated by this very article which would excite curiosity offer for the judgement of the man in the street something that was piquant and at the same time quite incomprehensible to him and inevitably cause people to ask in

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We are having a heated and passionate argument in private. Suddenly one of us jumps up, flings open the window and begins to clamour against Sobakoviches, anarchistic individualists, revisionists, etc. Naturally a crowd of curious idlers gathers in the street and our enemies rub their hands in glee. Others of the disputants go to the window too and want to give a coherent account of the whole matter without hinting at things nobody knows anything about. Inexpunged the window is banged to on the plea that it is not worth

perplexity: "What has happened?" It is not surprising that owing to the abstractness of its arguments and the vagueness of its hints, this article of Comrade Plekhanov's caused jubilation in the ranks of the enemies of Social-Democracy—the dancing of the *cancan* in the columns of *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*<sup>218</sup> and ecstatic praises from the consistent revisionists in *Osvobozhdeniye*. The source of all these comical and sad misunderstandings, from which Comrade Plekhanov later tried so comically and so sadly to extricate himself, lay precisely in the violation of that basic principle of dialectics: concrete questions should be examined in all their concreteness. The delight of Mr. Struve, in particular, was quite natural: he was not in the least interested in the "good" aims (killing with kindness) which Comrade Plekhanov pursued (but might not achieve); Mr. Struve welcomed, and could not but welcome, that *swing towards the opportunist wing of our Party* which had begun in the new *Iskra*, as everybody can now plainly see. The Russian bourgeois democrats are not the only ones to welcome every swing towards opportunism, even the slightest and most temporary, in any Social-Democratic party. The estimate of a shrewd enemy is very rarely based on sheer misunderstanding: you can tell a man's mistakes by the people who praise him. And it is in vain that Comrade Plekhanov hopes the reader will be inattentive and tries to make out that the majority unconditionally objected to a personal concession in the matter of co-optation, and not to a desertion from the Left wing of the Party to the Right. The point is not that Comrade Plekhanov made a personal concession in order to avert a split (that was very praiseworthy), but that, though fully realising the need to *join issue* with the inconsistent revisionists and anarchistic individualists, he chose instead to join issue with the majority, with whom he parted company *over the extent* of the possible practical concessions to anarchism. The point is not that Comrade Plekhanov changed the personal composition of the editorial board, but that he betrayed his position of opposing revisionism and anarchism and ceased to defend that position in the Central Organ of the Party.

As to the Central Committee, which *at this time* was the sole organised representative of the majority, Comrade Plekhanov parted company with it then *exclusively over the possible extent of practical concessions to anarchism*. Nearly a month had elapsed since November 1, when my resignation had given a free hand to the policy of killing with kindness. Comrade

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while discussing *squabbles* (*Iskra*, No 53, p. 8, col. 2, line 24 up). It was not worth while *beginning in "Iskra"* on a discussion of "squabbles", Comrade Plekhanov<sup>217</sup>—that would be nearer the truth!

Plekhanov had had every opportunity through all sorts of contacts, to test the expedience of this policy. Comrade Plekhanov had in this period published his article 'What Should Not Be Done', which was—and remains—the Martovites' sole ticket of admittance, so to speak, to the editorial board. The watchwords—revisionism (which we should contend with, but sparing the adversary) and anarchistic individualism (which should be counted and killed with kindness)—were printed on this ticket in imposing italics. Do come in, gentlemen please, I will kill you with kindness—is what Comrade Plekhanov said by this invitation card to his new colleagues on the editorial board. Naturally, all that remained to the Central Committee was to say its last word (that is what ultimatum means—a last word is to a possible peace) about what in its opinion was the permissible extent of practical concessions to anarchistic individualism. Either you want peace—in which case here are a certain number of seats to prove our kindness, peaceableness, readiness to make concessions, etc. (we cannot allow you any more if peace is to be guaranteed in the Party, peace not in the sense of an absence of controversy but in the sense that the Party will not be destroyed by anarchistic individualism), take these seats and swing back again little by little from Akimov to Plekhanov. Or else you want to maintain and develop your point of view, to swing over altogether to Akimov (if only in the realm of organisational questions) and to convince the Party that you not Plekhanov are right—in which case form a writers' group of your own secure representation at the next Congress and set about winning a majority by an honest struggle by open controversy. This alternative which was quite explicitly submitted to the Martovites in the Central Committee ultimatum of November 25, 1903 (see *State of Siege* and *Commentary on the League Minutes*) was in full harmony

I shall not of course go into the time Martov cited over this Central Committee ultimatum in his *State of Siege* by quoting private conversations and so on. This is the second method of struggle I described in the previous section which only a specialist in nervous disorders could hope to disentangle. It is enough to say that Comrade Martov insists that there was an agreement with the Central Committee not to publish the negotiations, which agreement has not been discovered to this day in spite of a most assiduous search. Comrade Litvinsky who conducted the negotiations on behalf of the Central Committee informed me in writing that he considered me entitled to publish my letter to the editors outside of *Izvestia*.

But there was one phrase of Comrade Martov's that I particularly liked. That was the phrase 'Bonapartism of the worst type'. I find that Comrade Martov has brought in this category very appropriately. Let us examine dispassionately what the concept implies. In my opinion it implies acquiring power by *formally* legal means but *actually* in defiance of the will of the people (or of a party). Is that not so Comrade Martov? And if it is then I may safely leave it to the public to judge who has been guilty of this

with the letter Plekhanov and I had sent to the former editors on October 6, 1903: either it is a matter of personal irritation (in which case, *if the worst comes to the worst*, we might even "co-opt"), or it is a matter of a difference of principle (in which case you must *first* convince the Party, and only then talk about changing the personal composition of the central bodies). The Central Committee could the more readily leave it to the Martovites to make this delicate choice for themselves since *at this very time* Comrade Martov in his *profession de foi* (*Once More in the Minority*) wrote the following:

"*The minority lay claim to only one honour, namely, to be the first in the history of our Party to show that one can be 'defeated' and yet not form a new party.* This position of the minority follows from all their views on the organisational development of the Party; it follows from the consciousness of their strong ties with the Party's earlier work. The minority do not believe in the mystic power of 'paper revolutions', and see in the *deep roots* which their endeavours have in life a guarantee that *by purely ideological propaganda within the Party they will secure the triumph of their principles of organisation.*" (My italics.)

What proud and magnificent words! And how bitter it was to be taught by events that they were—*merely words*. . . I hope you will forgive me, Comrade Martov, but now *I claim on behalf of the majority* this "honour" which *you have not deserved*. The honour will indeed be a great one, one worth fighting for, for the circles have left us the tradition of an extraordinarily light-hearted attitude towards splits and an extraordinarily zealous application of the maxim: "either coats off, or let's have your hand!"

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The big pleasure (of having a united Party) was bound to outweigh, and did outweigh, the little annoyances (in the shape of the squabbling over co-optation). I resigned from the Central Organ, and Comrade Y (who had been delegated by Plekhanov and myself to the Party Council on behalf of the editorial board of the Central Organ) resigned from the Council. The Martovites replied to the Central Committee's last word as to peace with a letter (see publications mentioned) which was tanta-

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"Bonapartism of the worst type": Lenin and Comrade Y, who might have availed themselves of their *formal* right not to admit the Martovites, but *did not avail themselves* of it, though in doing so they would have been backed by the will of the Second Congress—or those who occupied the editorial board by *formally legitimate means* ("unanimous co-optation"), but who knew that *actually this was not in accordance with the will of the Second Congress* and who are afraid to have this will tested at the Third Congress.

mount to a declaration of war. Then, and only then, did I write my letter to the editorial board (*Iskra*, No. 53) on the subject of publicity.\* If it comes to talking about revisionism and discussing inconsistency, anarchistic individualism, and the defeat of various leaders, then, gentlemen, let us tell all that occurred, without reservation—that was the gist of this letter about publicity. The editorial board replied with angry abuse and the lordly admonition: do not dare to stir up “*the pettiness and squabbling of circle life*” (*Iskra*, No. 53). Is that so, I thought to myself: “the pettiness and squabbling of circle life”?... Well, *es ist mir recht*, gentlemen, there I agree with you. Why, that means that you directly class all this fuss over “co-optation” as *circle squabbling*. That is true. But what discord is this?—in the editorial of this same issue, No. 53, this same editorial board (we must suppose) talks about bureaucracy, formalism, and the rest.\*\* Do not dare to raise the question of the fight for co-optation to the Central Organ, for that would be squabbling. But we will raise the question of co-optation to the Central Committee, and will not call it squabbling, but a difference of principle on the subject of “formalism”. No, dear comrades, I said to myself, permit me not to permit you that. You want to fire at my fort, and yet demand that I surrender my artillery. What jokers you are! And so I wrote and published outside of *Iskra* my *Letter to the Editors (Why I Resigned from the “Iskra” Editorial Board)*,\*\*\* briefly relating what had really occurred, and asking yet again whether peace was not possible on the basis of the following division: you take the Central Organ, we take the Central Committee. Neither side will then feel “alien” in the Party, and we will argue about the swing towards opportunism, first in the press, and then, perhaps, at the Third Party Congress.

In reply to this mention of peace the enemy opened fire with all his batteries, including even the Council. Shells rained on my head. Autocrat, Schweitzer, bureaucrat, formalist, super-centre, one-sided, stiff-necked, obstinate, narrow-minded, suspicious, quarrelsome.... Very well, my friends! Have you finished? You have nothing more in reserve? Poor ammunition. I must say....

Now comes my turn. Let us examine the *content* of the new

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 115-18 —Ed.

\*\* As it subsequently turned out, the “discord” was explained very simply—it was a discord among the editors of the Central Organ. It was Plekhanov who wrote about “squabbling” (see his admission in “A Sad Misunderstanding”, No. 57), while the editorial, “Our Congress”, was written by Martov (*State of Siege*, p. 84). They were tugging in different directions.

\*\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 119-25 —Ed.

*Iskra's* new views on organisation and the relation of these views to that division of our Party into "majority" and "minority" the true character of which we have shown by our analysis of the debates and voting at the Second Congress.

### **Q. THE NEW *ISKRA*. OPPORTUNISM IN QUESTIONS OF ORGANISATION**

As the basis for an analysis of the principles of the new *Iskra* we should unquestionably take the two articles of Comrade Axelrod.\* The concrete meaning of some of his favourite catch-words has already been shown at length. Now we must try to leave their concrete meaning on one side and delve down to the line of thought that caused the "minority" to arrive (in connection with this or that minor and petty matter) at these particular slogans rather than any others, must examine the principles behind these slogans, irrespective of their origin, irrespective of the question of "co-optation". Concessions are all the fashion nowadays, so let us make a concession to Comrade Axelrod and take his "theory" "seriously".

Comrade Axelrod's basic thesis (*Iskra*, No. 57) is that "from the very outset our movement harboured two opposite trends, whose mutual antagonism could not fail to develop and to affect the movement parallel with its own development". To be specific: "In principle, the proletarian aim of the movement [in Russia] is the same as that of western Social-Democracy." But in our country the masses of the workers are influenced "by a social element alien to them", namely, the radical intelligentsia. And so, Comrade Axelrod establishes the existence of an antagonism between the proletarian and the radical-intellectual trend in our Party.

In this Comrade Axelrod is undoubtedly right. The existence of such an antagonism (and not in the Russian Social-Democratic Party alone) is beyond question. What is more, everyone knows that it is this antagonism that largely accounts for the division of present-day Social-Democracy into revolutionary (also known as orthodox) and opportunist (revisionist, ministerialist, reformist) Social-Democracy, which during the past ten years of our movement has become fully apparent in Russia too. Everyone also knows that the proletarian trend of the movement is expressed by orthodox Social-Democracy, while the

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\* These articles were included in the collection "*Iskra*" over *Two Years*, Part II, p. 122 et seq. (St. Petersburg, 1906). (Author's note to 1907 edition.—Ed.)

trend of the democratic intelligentsia is expressed by opportunist Social-Democracy.

But, after so closely approaching this piece of common knowledge, Comrade Axelrod begins timidly to back away from it. He does not make *the slightest attempt* to analyse how this division manifested itself in the history of Russian Social-Democracy in general, and at our Party Congress in particular, although it is about the Congress that he is writing! Like all the other editors of the new *Iskria*, Comrade Axelrod displays a *mortal fear* of the minutes of this Congress. This should not surprise us after all that has been said above, but in a "theoretician" who claims to be investigating the different trends in our movement it is certainly a queer case of *truth-phobia*. Backing away, because of this malady, from the latest and most accurate material on the trends in our movement, Comrade Axelrod seeks salvation in the sphere of pleasant daydreaming. He writes: "Has not legal Marxism, or semi-Marxism, provided our liberals with a literary leader? Why should not prankish history provide revolutionary bourgeois democracy with a leader from the school of orthodox, revolutionary Marxism?" All we can say about this daydream which Comrade Axelrod finds so pleasant is that if history does sometimes play pranks, that is no excuse for *pranks of thought* on the part of people who undertake to analyse history. When the liberal peeped out from under the cloak of the leader of semi-Marxism, those who wished (*and were able*) to trace his "trend" did not allude to possible pranks of history, but pointed to tens and hundreds of instances of that leader's mentality and logic, to all those characteristics of his literary make-up which betrayed the reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature.<sup>219</sup> And if Comrade Axelrod, setting out to analyse "the general-revolutionary and the proletarian trend in our movement", could produce *nothing, absolutely nothing*, in proof or evidence that certain representatives of that orthodox wing of the Party which he so detests showed such-and-such a trend, he thereby issued *a formal certificate of his own poverty*. Comrade Axelrod's case must be weak indeed if all he can do is allude to possible pranks of history!

Comrade Axelrod's other allusion—to the "Jacobins"—is still more revealing. Comrade Axelrod is probably aware that the division of present-day Social-Democracy into revolutionary and opportunist has long since given rise—and not only in Russia—to "historical parallels with the era of the great French Revolution". Comrade Axelrod is probably aware that the *Girondists of present-day Social-Democracy* everywhere and always resort to the terms "Jacobinism", "Blanquism", and so on to describe their opponents. Let us then not imitate Comrade Axelrod's truth-

phobia, let us consult the minutes of our Congress and see whether they offer any material for an analysis and examination of the trends we are considering and the parallels we are discussing.

First example: the Party Congress debate on the programme. Comrade Akimov ("fully agreeing" with Comrade Martynov) says: "The clause on the capture of political power [the dictatorship of the proletariat] has been formulated in such a way—as compared with the programmes of all other Social-Democratic parties—that it may be interpreted, and actually has been interpreted by Plekhanov, to mean that the role of the leading organisation will relegate to the background the class it is leading and separate the former from the latter. Consequently, the formulation of our political tasks is exactly the same as in the case of *Narodnaya Volya*." (Minutes, p. 124.) Comrade Plekhanov and other *Iskra*-ists take issue with Comrade Akimov and accuse him of opportunism. Does not Comrade Axelrod find that this dispute shows us (in actual fact, and not in the imaginary pranks of history) the antagonism between the *present-day Jacobins* and the *present-day Girondists* of Social-Democracy? And was it not because he found himself in the company of the *Girondists* of Social-Democracy (owing to the mistakes he committed) that Comrade Axelrod began talking about Jacobins?

Second example: Comrade Posadovsky declares that there is a "serious difference of opinion" over the "fundamental question" of "the absolute value of democratic principles" (p. 169). Together with Plekhanov, he denies their absolute value. The leaders of the "Centre" or Marsh (Egorov) and of the anti-*Iskra*-ists (Goldblatt) vehemently oppose this view and accuse Plekhanov of "imitating bourgeois tactics" (p. 170). *This is exactly Comrade Axelrod's idea of a connection between orthodoxy and the bourgeois trend*, the only difference being that in Axelrod's case it is vague and general, whereas Goldblatt linked it up with specific issues. Again we ask: does not Comrade Axelrod find that this dispute, too, shows us *palpably*, at our Party Congress, the antagonism between the Jacobins and the Girondists of present-day Social-Democracy? Is it not because he finds himself in the company of the Girondists that Comrade Axelrod raises this outcry against the Jacobins?

Third example: the debate on Paragraph 1 of the Rules. Who is it that defends "*the proletarian trend in our movement*"? Who is it that insists that the worker is not afraid of organisation, that the proletarian has no sympathy for anarchy, that he values the incentive to organise? Who is it that warns us against the bourgeois intelligentsia, permeated through and through with opportunism? *The Jacobins of Social-Democracy*. And who is it that tries to smuggle radical intellectuals into the Party? Who



is it that is concerned about professors, high-school students, free lances, the radical youth? *The Girondist Axelrod together with the Girondist Lieber.*

How clumsily Comrade Axelrod defends himself against the "false accusation of opportunism" that at our Party Congress was openly levelled at the majority of the Emancipation of Labour group! By taking up the hackneyed Bernsteinian refrain about Jacobinism, Blanquism, and so on, he defends himself in a manner that only bears out the accusation! He shouts about the menace of the radical intellectuals in order to drown out his own speeches at the Party Congress, which were full of concern for these intellectuals.

These "dreadful words"—Jacobinism and the rest—are expressive of *opportunism* and nothing else. A Jacobin who wholly identifies himself with the *organisation* of the proletariat—a proletariat *conscious* of its class interests—is a *revolutionary Social-Democrat*. A Girondist who sighs after professors and high-school students, who is afraid of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and who yearns for the absolute value of democratic demands is an *opportunist*. It is only opportunists who can still detect a danger in conspiratorial organisations today, when the idea of confining the political struggle to conspiracy has been refuted thousands of times in the press and has long been refuted and swept aside by the realities of life, and when the cardinal importance of mass political agitation has been elucidated and reiterated to the point of nausea. The real basis of this fear of conspiracy, of Blanquism, is not any feature to be found in the practical movement (as Bernstein and Co. have long, and vainly, been trying to make out), but the Girondist timidity of the bourgeois intellectual, whose mentality so often shows itself among the Social-Democrats of today. Nothing could be more comical than these laborious efforts of the new *Iskra* to utter a *new word* of warning (uttered hundreds of times before) against the tactics of the French conspirator revolutionaries of the forties and sixties (No. 62, editorial).<sup>220</sup> In the next issue of *Iskra*, the Girondists of present-day Social Democracy will no doubt show us a group of French conspirators of the forties for whom the importance of political agitation among the working masses, the importance of the labour press as the principal means by which the party influences the class, was an elementary truth they had learned and assimilated long ago.

However, the tendency of the new *Iskra* to repeat the elements and go back to the ABC while pretending to be uttering something new is not fortuitous; it is an inevitable consequence of the situation Axelrod and Martov find themselves in, now that they have landed in the opportunist wing of our Party.

There is nothing for it. They have to repeat the opportunist phrases, they have to *go back*, in order to try to find in the *remote past* some sort of justification for their position, which is indefensible from the point of view of the struggle at the Congress and of the shades and divisions in the Party that took shape there. To the Akimovite profundities about Jacobinism and Blanquism, Comrade Axelrod adds Akimovite lamentations to the effect that not only the Economists, but the "politicians" as well, were "one-sided", excessively "infatuated", and so on and so forth. Reading the high-flown disquisitions on this subject in the new *Iskra*, which conceitedly claims to be above all this one-sidedness and infatuation, one asks in perplexity: whose portrait is it they are painting? Where is it that they hear such talk?<sup>221</sup> Who does not know that the division of the Russian Social-Democrats into Economists and politicians has long been obsolete? Go through the files of *Iskra* for the last year or two before the Party Congress, and you will find that the fight against Economism subsided and came to an end altogether as far back as 1902; you will find, for example, that in July 1903 (No. 43), "the times of Economism" are spoken of as being "definitely over", Economism is considered "dead and buried", and any infatuations of the politicians are regarded as obvious atavism. Why, then, do the new editors of *Iskra* revert to this dead and buried division? Did we fight the Akimovs at the Congress on account of the mistakes they made in *Rabocheye Dyelo* two years ago? If we had, we should have been sheer idiots. But everyone knows that we did not, that it was not for their old, dead and buried mistakes in *Rabocheye Dyelo* that we fought the Akimovs at the Congress, but for the *new mistakes* they committed in their arguments and their voting at the Congress. It was not by their stand in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, but by their stand at the Congress, that we judged which mistakes were really a thing of the past and which still lived and called for controversy. By the time of the Congress the old division into Economists and politicians no longer existed; but various opportunist trends continued to exist. They found expression in the debates and voting on a number of issues, and finally led to a new division of the Party into "majority" and "minority". The whole point is that the new editors of *Iskra* are, for obvious reasons, trying to gloss over the connection between this new division and *contemporary* opportunism in our Party, and are, in consequence, compelled to go back from the new division to the old one. Their inability to explain the political origin of the new division (or their desire, in order to prove how accommodating they are, to cast a veil\* over its

\* See Plekhanov's article on "Economism" in No. 53 of *Iskra*. The subtitle of the article appears to contain a slight misprint. Instead of "Reflections on

origin) compels them to keep harping on a division that has long been obsolete. Everyone knows that the new division is based on a difference over questions of *organisation*, which began with the controversy over principles of organisation (Paragraph 1 of the Rules) and ended up with a "practice" worthy of anarchists. The old division into Economists and politicians was based mainly on a difference over questions of *tactics*.

In its efforts to justify this retreat from the more complex, truly topical and burning issues of Party life to issues that have long been settled and have now been dug up artificially, the new *Iskra* resorts to an amusing display of profundity for which there can be no other name than tail-ism. Started by Comrade Axelrod, there runs like a crimson thread through all the writing of the new *Iskra* the profound "idea" that content is more important than form, that programme and tactics are more important than organisation, that "the vitality of an organisation is in direct proportion to the volume and value of the content it puts into the movement", that centralism is not an "end in itself", not an "all-saving talisman", etc., etc. Great and profound truths! The programme is indeed more important than tactics, and tactics more important than organisation. The alphabet is more important than etymology, and etymology more important than syntax—but what would we say of people who, after failing in an examination in syntax, went about pluming and priding themselves on being left in a lower class for another year? Comrade Axelrod argued about principles of organisation like an opportunist (Paragraph 1), and behaved inside the organisation like an anarchist (League Congress)—and now he is trying to render Social-Democracy more profound. Sour grapes! What is organisation, properly speaking? Why, it is only a form. What is centralism? After all, it is not a talisman. What is syntax? Why, it is less important than etymology; it is only the form of combining the elements of etymology.... "Will not Comrade Alexandrov agree with us," the new editors of *Iskra* triumphantly ask, "when we say that the Congress did much more for the centralisation of Party work by drawing up a Party programme than by adopting Rules, however perfect the latter may seem?" (No. 56, Supplement.) It is to be hoped that this classical ut-

the Second Party Congress", it should apparently read, "on the *League Congress*" or even "on *Co-optation*". However appropriate concessions to personal claims may be under certain circumstances, it is quite inadmissible (from the Party, not the philistine standpoint) to confuse the issues that are agitating the Party and to substitute for the new mistake of Martov and Axelrod, who have begun to swing from orthodoxy towards opportunism, the old mistake (never recalled today by anyone except the new *Iskra*) of the Martynovs and Aki-movs, who perhaps may now be prepared to swing from opportunism towards orthodoxy on many questions of programme and tactics.

terance will acquire a historic fame no less wide and no less lasting than Comrade Krichevsky's celebrated remark that Social-Democracy, like mankind, always sets itself only such tasks as it can perform. For the new *Iskra's* piece of profundity is of exactly the same stamp. Why was Comrade Krichevsky's phrase held up to derision? Because he tried to justify the mistake of a section of the Social-Democrats in matters of tactics—their inability to set correct political tasks—by a commonplace which he wanted to palm off as philosophy. In exactly the same way the new *Iskra* tries to justify the mistake of a section of the Social-Democrats in matters of organisation—the intellectualist instability of certain comrades, which has led them to the point of anarchistic phrase-mongering—by the commonplace that the programme is more important than the Rules, that questions of programme are more important than questions of organisation! What is this but tail-ism? What is it but pluming oneself on having been left in a lower class for another year?

The adoption of a programme contributes more to the centralisation of the work than the adoption of Rules. How this commonplace, palmed off as philosophy, reeks of the mentality of the radical intellectual, who has much more in common with bourgeois decadence than with Social-Democracy! Why, the word centralisation is used in this famous phrase in a sense that is nothing but *symbolical*. If the authors of the phrase are unable or disinclined to think, they might at least have recalled the simple fact that the adoption of a programme together with the Bundists, far from leading to the centralisation of our common work, did not even save us from a split. Unity on questions of programme and tactics is an essential but by no means a sufficient condition for Party unity, for the centralisation of Party work (good God, what elementary things one has to spell out nowadays, when all concepts have been confused!). The latter requires, in addition, unity of organisation, which, in a party that has grown to be anything more than a mere family circle, is inconceivable without formal Rules, without the subordination of the minority to the majority and of the part to the whole. As long as we had no unity on the fundamental questions of programme and tactics, we bluntly admitted that we were living in a period of disunity and separate circles, we bluntly declared that before we could unite, lines of demarcation must be drawn; we did not even talk of the forms of a joint organisation, but exclusively discussed the new (at that time they really were new) problems of fighting opportunism on programme and tactics. At present, as we all agree, this fight has already produced a sufficient degree of unity, as formulated in the Party programme and the Party resolutions on tactics; we had to take the next step,

and, by common consent, we did take it, working out the *forms* of a united organisation that would merge all the circles together. But now these forms have been half destroyed and we have been dragged back, dragged back to anarchistic conduct, to anarchistic phrases, to the revival of a circle in place of a Party editorial board. And this step back is being justified on the plea that the alphabet is more helpful to literate speech than a knowledge of syntax!

The philosophy of tail-ism, which flourished three years ago in questions of tactics, is being resurrected today in relation to questions of organisation. Take the following argument of the new editors. "The militant Social-Democratic trend in the Party," says Comrade Alexandrov, "should be maintained not only by an ideological struggle, but by definite forms of organisation." Whereupon the editors edifyingly remark: "Not bad, this juxtaposition of ideological struggle and forms of organisation. The ideological struggle is a process, whereas the forms of organisation are only . . . forms [believe it or not, that is what they say—No. 56, Supplement, p. 4, bottom of col. 1!] designed to clothe a fluid and developing content—the developing practical work of the Party." That is positively in the style of the joke about a cannon-ball being a cannon-ball and a bomb a bomb! The ideological struggle is a process, whereas the forms of organisation are only forms clothing the content! The point at issue is whether our ideological struggle is to have forms of a *higher type* to clothe it, the forms of a party organisation, binding on all, or the forms of the old disunity and the old circles. We have been dragged back from higher to more primitive forms, and this is being justified on the plea that the ideological struggle is a process, whereas forms—are only forms. That is just how Comrade Krichevsky in bygone days tried to drag us back from tactics-as-a-plan to tactics-as-a-process.

Take the new *Iskra's* pompous talk about the "self-training of the proletariat", directed against those who are supposed to be in danger of missing the content because of the form (No. 58, editorial). Is this not Akimovism No. 2? Akimovism No. 1 justified the backwardness of a section of the Social-Democratic intelligentsia in formulating tactical tasks by talking about the more "profound" content of "the proletarian struggle" and the self-training of the proletariat. Akimovism No. 2 justifies the backwardness of a section of the Social-Democratic intelligentsia in the theory and practice of organisation by equally profound talk about organisation being merely a form and the self-training of the proletariat the important thing. Let me tell you gentlemen who are so solicitous about the younger brother that the proletariat is not afraid of organisation and discipline! The proletariat will do nothing to have the worthy professors and high-school students

who do not want to join an organisation recognised as Party members merely because they work under the control of an organisation. The proletariat is trained for organisation by its whole life, far more radically than many an intellectual prig. Having gained some understanding of our programme and our tactics, the proletariat will not start justifying backwardness in organisation by arguing that the form is less important than the content. It is not the proletariat, but *certain intellectuals* in our Party who lack *self-training* in the spirit of organisation and discipline, in the spirit of hostility and contempt for anarchistic talk. When they say that it is not ripe for organisation, the Akimovs No. 2 libel the proletariat just as the Akimovs No. 1 libelled it when they said that it was not ripe for the political struggle. The proletarian who has become a conscious Social-Democrat and feels himself a member of the Party will reject tail-ism in matters of organisation with the same contempt as he rejected tail-ism in matters of tactics.

Finally, consider the profound wisdom of the new *Iskra's* "Practical Worker". "Properly understood," he says, "the idea of a 'militant' centralist organisation uniting and centralising the revolutionaries' *activities* [the italics are to make it look more profound] can only materialise naturally if such activities *exist* [both new and clever!]; organisation itself, being a form [mark that!], can only grow *simultaneously* [the italics are the author's, as throughout this quotation] with the growth of the revolutionary work which is its content." (No. 57.) Does not this remind you very much of the character in the folk tale who, on seeing a funeral, cried: "Many happy returns of the day"? I am sure there is not a practical worker (in the genuine sense of the term) in our Party who does not understand that it is precisely the form of our activities (i.e., our organisation) that has long been lagging, and lagging desperately, behind their content, and that only the Simple Simons in the Party could shout to people who are lagging: "Keep in line; don't run ahead!" Compare our Party, let us say, with the Bund. There can be no question but that the *content*\* of the work of our Party is immeasurably richer, more varied, broader, and deeper than is the case with the Bund. The scope of our theoretical views is wider, our programme more

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\* I leave quite aside the fact that the *content* of our Party work was mapped out at the Congress (in the programme, etc.) in the spirit of revolutionary Social-Democracy only *at the cost of a struggle*, a struggle against those very anti-*Iskra*-ists and that very Marsh whose representatives numerically predominate in our "minority". On this question of "content" it would be interesting also to compare, let us say, six issues of the old *Iskra* (Nos. 46-51) with twelve issues of the new *Iskra* (No. 52-63). But that will have to wait for some other time.

developed, our influence among the mass of the workers (and not merely among the organised artisans) broader and deeper, our propaganda and agitation more varied; the pulse of the political work of both leaders and rank and file is more lively, the *popular* movements during demonstrations and general strikes more impressive, and our work among the non-proletarian strata more energetic. But the "form"? Compared with the Bund's, the "form" of our work is lagging unpardonably, lagging so that it is an eyesore and brings a blush of shame to the cheeks of anyone who does not merely "pick his teeth" when contemplating the affairs of his Party. The fact that the organisation of our work lags behind its content is our weak point, and it was our weak point long before the Congress, long before the Organising Committee was formed. The lame and undeveloped character of the form makes any serious step in the further development of the content impossible; it causes a shameful stagnation, leads to a waste of energy, to a discrepancy between word and deed. We have all been suffering wretchedly from this discrepancy, yet along come the Axelrods and "Practical Workers" of the new *Iskra* with their profound precept: the form must grow naturally, only simultaneously with the content!

That is where a small mistake on the question of organisation (Paragraph 1) will lead you if you try to *lend profundity* to nonsense and to find philosophical justification for opportunist talk. Marching slowly, in timid zigzags!<sup>222</sup>—we have heard this refrain in relation to questions of tactics; we are hearing it again in relation to questions of organisation. *Tail-ism in questions of organisation* is a natural and inevitable product of the mentality of the *anarchistic individualist* when he starts to elevate his anarchistic deviations (which at the outset may have been accidental) to a *system of views*, to special *differences of principle*. At the League Congress we witnessed the beginnings of this anarchism; in the new *Iskra* we are witnessing attempts to elevate it to a system of views. These attempts strikingly confirm what was already said at the Party Congress about the difference between the points of view of the bourgeois intellectual who attaches himself to the Social-Democratic movement and the proletarian who has become conscious of his class interests. For instance, this same "Practical Worker" of the new *Iskra* with whose profundity we are already familiar denounces me for visualising the Party "as an immense factory" headed by a director in the shape of the Central Committee (No. 57, Supplement). "Practical Worker" never guesses that this dreadful word of his immediately betrays the mentality of the bourgeois intellectual unfamiliar with either the practice or the theory of proletarian organisation. For the factory, which seems only a bogey

to some, represents that highest form of capitalist co-operation which has united and disciplined the proletariat, taught it to organise, and placed it at the head of all the other sections of the toiling and exploited population. And Marxism, the ideology of the proletariat trained by capitalism, has been and is teaching unstable intellectuals to distinguish between the factory as a means of exploitation (discipline based on fear of starvation) and the factory as a means of organisation (discipline based on collective work united by the conditions of a technically highly developed form of production). The discipline and organisation which come so hard to the bourgeois intellectual are very easily acquired by the proletariat just because of this factory "schooling". Mortal fear of this school and utter failure to understand its importance as an organising factor are characteristic of the ways of thinking which reflect the petty-bourgeois mode of life and which give rise to the species of anarchism that the German Social-Democrats call *Edelanarchismus*, that is, the anarchism of the "noble" gentleman, or aristocratic anarchism, as I would call it. This aristocratic anarchism is particularly characteristic of the Russian nihilist. He thinks of the Party organisation as a monstrous "factory"; he regards the subordination of the part to the whole and of the minority to the majority as "serfdom" (see Axelrod's articles); division of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him a tragicomical outcry against transforming people into "cogs and wheels" (to turn editors into contributors being considered a particularly atrocious species of such transformation); mention of the organisational Rules of the Party calls forth a contemptuous grimace and the disdainful remark (intended for the "formalists") that one could very well dispense with Rules altogether.

Incredible as it may seem, it was a didactic remark of just this sort that Comrade Martov addressed to me in *Iskra*, No. 58, quoting, for greater weight, my own words in *A Letter to a Comrade*. Well, what is it if not "aristocratic anarchism" and tailism to cite examples from the era of disunity, the era of the circles, to justify the preservation and glorification of the circle spirit and anarchy in the era of the Party?

Why did we not need Rules before? Because the Party consisted of separate circles without any organisational tie between them. Any individual could pass from one circle to another at his own "sweet will", for he was not faced with any formulated expression of the will of the whole. Disputes within the circles were not settled according to Rules, "*but by struggle and threats to resign*", as I put it in *A Letter to a Comrade*,\* summarising

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 231-52.—Ed.



the experience of a number of circles in general and of our own editorial circle of six in particular. In the era of the circles, this was natural and inevitable, but it never occurred to anybody to extol it, to regard it as ideal; everyone complained of the disunity, everyone was distressed by it and eager to see the isolated circles fused into a formally constituted party organisation. And now that this fusion has taken place, we are being dragged back and, under the guise of higher organisational views, treated to anarchistic phrase-mongering! To people accustomed to the loose dressing-gown and slippers of the Oblomov<sup>223</sup> circle domesticity, formal Rules seem narrow, restrictive, irksome, mean, and bureaucratic, a bond of serfdom and a fetter on the free "process" of the ideological struggle. Aristocratic anarchism cannot understand that formal Rules are needed precisely in order to replace the narrow circle ties by the broad Party tie. It was unnecessary and impossible to give formal shape to the internal ties of a circle or the ties between circles, for these ties rested on personal friendship or on an instinctive "confidence" for which no reason was given. The Party tie cannot and must not rest on either of these; it must be founded on *formal*, "bureaucratically" worded Rules (bureaucratic from the standpoint of the undisciplined intellectual), strict adherence to which can alone safeguard us from the wilfulness and caprices characteristic of the circles, from the circle wrangling that goes by the name of the free "process" of the ideological struggle.

The editors of the new *Iskra* try to trump Alexandrov with the didactic remark that "confidence is a delicate thing and cannot be hammered into people's hearts and minds" (No. 56, Supplement). The editors do not realise that by this talk about confidence, *naked* confidence, they are once more betraying their aristocratic anarchism and organisational tail-ism. When I was a member of a circle only—whether it was the circle of the six editors or the *Iskra* organisation—I was entitled to justify my refusal, say, to work with X merely on the grounds of lack of confidence, without stating reason or motive. But now that I have become a member of a party, I *have no right* to plead lack of confidence in general, for that would throw open the doors to all the freaks and whims of the old circles; I am *obliged* to give formal reasons for my "confidence" or "lack of confidence", that is, to cite a formally established principle of our programme, tactics or Rules; I must not just declare my "confidence" or "lack of confidence" without giving reasons, but must acknowledge that my decisions—and generally all decisions of any section of the Party—*have to be accounted for* to the whole Party; I am obliged to adhere to a *formally prescribed* procedure when giving expression to my "lack of confidence" or trying to secure

the acceptance of the views and wishes that follow from this lack of confidence. From the *circle* view that "confidence" does not have to be accounted for, we have already risen to the *Party* view which demands adherence to a formally prescribed procedure of expressing, accounting for, and *testing* our confidence; but the editors try to drag us back, and call their tail-ism new views on organisation!

Listen to the way our so-called Party editors talk about writers' groups that might demand representation on the editorial board. "We shall not get indignant and begin to shout about discipline," we are admonished by these aristocratic anarchists who have always and everywhere looked down on such a thing as discipline. We shall either "arrange the matter" (*sic!*) with the group, if it is sensible, or just laugh at its demands.

Dear me, what a lofty and noble rebuff to vulgar "factory" formalism! But in reality it is the old circle phraseology furnished up a little and served up to the Party by an editorial board which feels that it is not a Party institution, but the survival of an old circle. The intrinsic falsity of this position inevitably leads to the *anarchistic* profundity of elevating the disunity they hypocritically proclaim to be past and gone to a *principle* of Social-Democratic organisation. There is no need for any hierarchy of higher and lower Party bodies and authorities—aristocratic anarchism regards such a hierarchy as the bureaucratic invention of ministries, departments, etc. (see Axelrod's article); there is no need for the part to submit to the whole; there is no need for any "formal bureaucratic" definition of *Party* methods of "arranging matters" or of delimiting differences. Let the old circle wrangling be sanctified by pompous talk about "genuinely Social-Democratic" methods of organisation.

This is where the proletarian who has been through the school of the "factory" can and should teach a lesson to anarchistic individualism. The class-conscious worker has long since emerged from the state of infancy when he used to fight shy of the intellectual as such. The class-conscious worker appreciates the richer store of knowledge and the wider political outlook which he finds among Social-Democratic intellectuals. But as we proceed with the building of a *real* party, the class-conscious worker must learn to distinguish the mentality of the soldier of the proletarian army from the mentality of the bourgeois intellectual who parades anarchistic phrases; he must learn to *insist* that the duties of a Party member be fulfilled not only by the rank and file, but by the "people at the top" as well; he must learn to treat tail-ism in matters of organisation with the same contempt as he used, in days gone by, to treat tail-ism in matters of tactics!

Inseparably connected with Girondism and aristocratic an-

archism is the last characteristic feature of the new *Iskra's* attitude towards matters of organisation, namely, its defence of *autonomism* as against centralism. This is the meaning in principle (if it has any such meaning\*) of its outcry against bureaucracy and autocracy, of its regrets about "an undeserved disregard for the non-*Iskra*-ists" (who defended autonomism at the Congress), of its comical howls about a demand for "unquestioning obedience", of its bitter complaints of "Jack-in-office rule", etc., etc. The opportunist wing of any party always defends and justifies all backwardness, whether in programme, tactics, or organisation. The new *Iskra's* defence of backwardness in organisation (its tail-ism) is closely connected with the defence of *autonomism*. True, autonomism has, generally speaking, been so discredited already by the three years' propaganda work of the old *Iskra* that the new *Iskra* is ashamed, *as yet*, to advocate it openly; it still assures us of its sympathy for centralism, but shows it only by printing the word centralism in italics. Actually, it is enough to apply the slightest touch of criticism to the "principles" of the "genuinely Social-Democratic" (not anarchistic) quasi-centralism of the new *Iskra* for the autonomist standpoint to be detected at every step. Is it not now clear to all and sundry that on the subject of organisation Axelrod and Martov have swung over to Akimov? Have they not solemnly admitted it themselves in the significant words, "undeserved disregard for the non-*Iskra*-ists"? And what was it but autonomism that Akimov and his friends defended at our Party Congress?

It was autonomism (if not anarchism) that Martov and Axelrod defended at the League Congress when, with amusing zeal, they tried to prove that the part need not submit to the whole, that the part is autonomous in defining its relation to the whole, that the Rules of the League, in which that relation is formulated, are valid in defiance of the will of the Party majority, in defiance of the will of the Party centre. And it is autonomism that Comrade Martov is now openly defending in the columns of the new *Iskra* (No. 60) in the matter of the right of the Central Committee to appoint members to the local committees.<sup>224</sup> I shall not speak of the puerile sophistries which Comrade Martov used to defend autonomism at the League Congress, and is still using in the new *Iskra*\*\*—the important thing here is to note the

\* I leave aside here, as in this section generally, the "co optional" meaning of this outcry.

\*\* In enumerating various paragraphs of the Rules, Comrade Martov omitted the one which deals with the relation of the whole to the part: the Central Committee "allocates the Party forces" (Paragraph 6). Can one allocate forces without transferring people from one committee to another? It is positively awkward to have to dwell on such elementary things.

undoubted tendency to *defend autonomism against centralism*, which is a fundamental characteristic of opportunism in matters of organisation.

Perhaps the only attempt to *analyse* the concept bureaucracy is the distinction drawn in the new *Iskra* (No. 53) between the "formal *democratic* principle" (author's italics) and the "formal *bureaucratic* principle". This distinction (which, unfortunately, was no more developed or explained than the reference to the non-*Iskra*-ists) contains a grain of truth. Bureaucracy *versus* democracy is in fact centralism *versus* autonomism; it is the organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy as opposed to the organisational principle of opportunist Social-Democracy. The latter strives to proceed from the bottom upward, and, therefore, wherever possible and as far as possible, upholds autonomism and "democracy", carried (by the over-zealous) to the point of anarchism. The former strives to proceed from the top downward, and upholds an extension of the rights and powers of the centre in relation to the parts. In the period of disunity and separate circles, this top from which revolutionary Social-Democracy strove to proceed organisationally was inevitably one of the circles, the one enjoying most influence by virtue of its activity and its revolutionary consistency (in our case, the *Iskra* organisation). In the period of the restoration of actual Party unity and dissolution of the obsolete circles in this unity, this top is inevitably the *Party Congress*, as the supreme organ of the Party; the Congress as far as possible includes representatives of all the active organisations, and, by appointing the central institutions (often with a membership which satisfies the advanced elements of the Party more than the backward and is more to the taste of its revolutionary than its opportunist wing), makes them the top until the next Congress. Such, at any rate, is the case among the Social-Democratic Europeans, although little by little this custom, so abhorrent in principle to anarchists, is beginning to spread—not without difficulty and not without conflicts and squabbles—to the Social-Democratic Asiatics.

It is highly interesting to note that these fundamental characteristics of opportunism in matters of organisation (autonomism, aristocratic or intellectualist anarchism, tail-ism, and Girondism) are, *mutatis mutandis* (with appropriate modifications), to be observed in all the Social-Democratic parties in the world, wherever there is a division into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing (and where is there not?). Only quite recently this was very strikingly revealed in the German Social-Democratic Party, when its defeat at the elections in the 20th electoral division of Saxony (known as the Göhre in-

cident\*) brought the question of the *principles* of party organisation to the fore. That this incident should have become an issue of principle was largely due to the zeal of the German opportunists. Göhre (an exparson, author of the fairly well-known book *Drei Monate Fabrikarbeiter*,\*\* and one of the "heroes" of the Dresden Congress) is himself an extreme opportunist, and the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*Socialist Monthly*),<sup>226</sup> the organ of the consistent German opportunists, at once "took up the cudgels" on his behalf.

Opportunism in programme is naturally connected with opportunism in tactics and opportunism in organisation. The exposition of the "new" point of view was undertaken by Comrade Wolfgang Heine. To give the reader some idea of the political complexion of this typical intellectual, who on joining the Social-Democratic movement brought with him opportunist habits of thought, it is enough to say that Comrade Wolfgang Heine is something less than a German Comrade Akimov, and something more than a German Comrade Egorov.

Comrade Wolfgang Heine took the field in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* with no less pomp than Comrade Axelrod in the new *Iskra*. The very title of his article is priceless: "Democratic Observations on the Göhre Incident" (*Sozialistische Monatshefte*, No. 4, April). The contents are no less thunderous. Comrade W. Heine rises up in arms against "encroachments on the autonomy of the constituency", champions "the democratic principle", and protests against the interference of an "appointed authority" (i.e., the Central Party Executive) in the free election of deputies by the people. The point at issue, Comrade W. Heine admonishes us, is not a random incident, but a general "*tendency towards bureaucracy and centralism in the Party*", a tendency, he says, which was to be observed before, but which is now becoming particularly dangerous. It must be "recognised as a principle that the local institutions of the Party are the vehicles of Party life" (a plagiarism on Comrade Martov's pamphlet *Once More in the Minority*). We must not "accustom ourselves to having all important political decisions come from one centre", and must warn the Party against "a doctrinaire policy which loses contact with life" (borrowed from Comrade Martov's speech at the Party

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\* Göhre was returned to the Reichstag on June 16, 1903, from the 15th division of Saxony, but after the Dresden Congress<sup>225</sup> he resigned his seat. The electorate of the 20th division, which had fallen vacant on the death of Rosenow, wanted to put forward Göhre as candidate. The Central Party Executive and the Regional Party Executive for Saxony opposed this, and while they had no formal right to forbid Göhre's nomination, they succeeded in getting him to decline. The Social-Democrats were defeated at the polls.

\*\* *Three Months as a Factory Worker*.—Ed.

Congress to the effect that "life will assert itself"). Rendering his argument more profound, Comrade W. Heine says: "... If we go down to the roots of the matter and leave aside personal conflicts, which here, as everywhere, have played no small part, this bitterness against the *revisionists* [the italics are the author's and evidently hint at a distinction between fighting revisionism and fighting revisionists] will be found to be mainly expressive of the distrust of the Party officialdom for 'outsiders' [W. Heine had apparently not yet read the pamphlet about combating the state of siege, and therefore resorted to an Anglicism—*Outsidertum*], the distrust of tradition for the unusual, of the impersonal institution for everything individual [see Axelrod's resolution at the League Congress on the suppression of individual initiative]—in short, of that tendency which we have defined above as a tendency towards bureaucracy and centralism in the Party."

The idea of "discipline" inspires Comrade W. Heine with a no less noble disgust than Comrade Axelrod. . . . "The revisionists," he writes, "have been accused of lack of discipline for having written for the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, an organ whose Social-Democratic character has even been denied because it is not *controlled by the Party*. This very attempt to narrow down the concept 'Social-Democratic', this insistence on *discipline* in the sphere of ideological production, where absolute freedom should prevail [remember: the ideological struggle is a process whereas the forms of organisation are only forms], demonstrates the tendency towards bureaucracy and the suppression of individuality." And W. Heine goes on and on, fulminating against this detestable tendency to create "*one* big all-embracing organisation, as centralised as possible, *one* set of tactics, and *one* theory", against the demand for "implicit obedience", "blind submission", against "oversimplified centralism", etc., etc., literally "*à la* Axelrod".

The controversy started by W. Heine spread, and as there were no squabbles about co-optation in the German Party to obscure the issue, and as the German Akimovs display their complexion not only at congresses, but all the time, in a periodical of their own, the argument soon boiled down to an analysis of the principles of the orthodox and revisionist trends on the question of organisation. Karl Kautsky came forward (in the *Neue Zeit*, 1904, No. 28, in the article "*Wahlkreis und Partei*"—"Constituency and Party") as one of the spokesmen of the revolutionary trend (which, exactly as in our Party, was of course accused of "dictatorship", "inquisitorial" tendencies, and other dreadful things). W. Heine's article, he says, "expresses the line of thought of the whole revisionist trend". Not only in Germany, but in

France and Italy as well, the opportunists are all staunch supporters of autonomism, of a slackening of Party discipline, of reducing it to naught; everywhere their tendencies lead to *disorganisation* and to perverting "the democratic principle" into *anarchism*. "Democracy does not mean absence of authority," Karl Kautsky informs the opportunists on the subject of organisation, "democracy does not mean anarchy; it means the rule of the masses over their representatives, in distinction to other forms of rule, where the supposed servants of the people are in reality their masters." Kautsky traces at length the disruptive role played by opportunist autonomism in various countries; he shows that it is precisely the influx of "*a great number of bourgeois elements*"\* into the Social-Democratic movement that is strengthening opportunism, autonomism, and the tendency to violate discipline; and once more he reminds us that "organisation is the weapon that will emancipate the proletariat", that "organisation is the characteristic weapon of the proletariat in the class struggle".

In Germany, where opportunism is weaker than in France or Italy, "autonomist tendencies have so far led only to more or less passionate declamations against dictators and grand inquisitors, against excommunication\*\* and heresy-hunting, and to endless cavilling and squabbling, which would only result in endless strife if replied to by the other side".

It is not surprising that in Russia, where opportunism in the Party is even weaker than in Germany, autonomist tendencies should have produced fewer ideas and more "passionate declamations" and squabbling.

It is not surprising that Kautsky arrives at the following conclusion: "There is perhaps no other question on which revisionism in all countries, despite its multiplicity of form and hue, is so alike as on the question of organisation." Kautsky, too, defines the basic tendencies of orthodoxy and revisionism in this sphere with the help of the "dreadful word": *bureaucracy versus democracy*. We are told, he says, that to give the Party leadership the right to influence the selection of candidates (for parliament) by the constituencies is "a shameful encroachment on the democratic principle, which demands that all political activity proceed from the bottom upward, on the initiative of the masses themselves, and not from the top downward, in a bureaucratic way. . . . But if there is any democratic principle, it is

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\* Kautsky mentions *Jaurès* as an example. The more these people deviated towards opportunism, the more "they were bound to consider Party discipline an impermissible constraint on their free personality".

\*\* *Bannstrahl* excommunication. This is the German equivalent of the Russian "state of siege" and "emergency laws". It is the "dreadful word" of the German opportunists.

that the majority must have predominance over the minority, and not the other way round..." The election of a member of parliament by any constituency is an important matter for the Party as a whole, which should influence the nomination of candidates, if only through its representatives (*Vertrauensmänner*). "Whoever considers this too bureaucratic or centralistic let him suggest that candidates be nominated by the direct vote of the Party membership at large [*sämmtliche Parteigenossen*]. If he thinks this is not practicable, he must not complain of a lack of democracy when this function, like many others that concern the Party as a whole, is exercised by one or several Party bodies." It has long been "common law" in the German Party for constituencies to "come to a friendly understanding" with the Party leadership about the choice of candidates. "But the Party has grown too big for this tacit common law to suffice any longer. Common law ceases to be law when it ceases to be accepted as a matter of course, when its stipulations, and even its very existence, are called in question. Then it becomes necessary to formulate the law specifically, to codify it" . . . to go over to more "precise statutory definition" [*statutarische Festlegung*] and, accordingly, greater strictness [*grössere Straffheit*] of organisation".

Thus you have, in a different environment, the same struggle between the opportunist and the revolutionary wing of the Party on the question of organisation, the same conflict between autonomism and centralism, between democracy, and "bureaucracy", between the tendency to relax and the tendency to tighten organisation and discipline, between the mentality of the unstable intellectual and that of the staunch proletarian, between intellectualist individualism and proletarian solidarity. What, one asks, was the attitude to this conflict of *bourgeois democracy*—not the bourgeois democracy which prankish history has only promised in private to show to Comrade Axelrod some day, but the real and actual bourgeois democracy which in Germany has spokesmen no less shrewd and observant than our own gentlemen of *Osvobozhdeniye*? German bourgeois democracy at once reacted to the new controversy, and—like Russian bourgeois democracy, like bourgeois democracy everywhere and always—sided solidly with the opportunist wing of the Social-Democratic Party. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*,<sup>227</sup> leading organ of the German stock exchange, published a thunderous editorial (*Frankfurter*

\* It is highly instructive to compare these remarks of Kautsky's about the replacement of a tacitly recognised common law by a formally defined statutory law with that whole "change-over" which our Party in general, and the editorial board in particular, have been undergoing since the Party Congress. Cf. the speech of V. I. Zasulich (at the League Congress, p. 66 et seq.), who does not seem to realise the full significance of this change-over.



*Zeitung*, April 7, 1904, No. 97, evening edition) which shows that shameless plagiarising of Axelrod is becoming a veritable disease with the German press. The stern democrats of the Frankfurt stock exchange lash out furiously at the "absolutism" in the Social-Democratic Party, at the "party dictatorship", at the "autocratic rule of the Party authorities", at the "interdicts" which are intended "concurrently to chastise revisionism as a whole" (recall the "false accusation of opportunism"), at the insistence on "blind obedience", "deadening discipline", "servile subordination", and the transforming of Party members into "political corpses" (that is a good bit stronger than cogs and wheels!). "All distinctiveness of personality," the knights of the stock exchange indignantly exclaim at the sight of the undemocratic regime among the Social-Democrats, "all individuality is to be held in opprobrium, because it is feared that they might lead to the French order of things, to Jaurèsism and Millerandism, as was stated in so many words by Sindermann, who made the report on the subject" at the Party Congress of the Saxon Social-Democrats.

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And so, insofar as the new catchwords of the new *Iskra* on organisation contain any principles at all, there can be no doubt that they are opportunist principles. This conclusion is confirmed both by the whole analysis of our Party Congress, which divided into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing, and by the example of *all* European Social-Democratic parties, where opportunism in organisation finds expression in the same tendencies, in the same accusations, and very often in the same catchwords. Of course, the national peculiarities of the various parties and the different political conditions in different countries leave their impress and make German opportunism quite dissimilar from French, French opportunism from Italian, and Italian opportunism from Russian. But the similarity of the fundamental division of all these parties into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing, the similarity of the line of thought and the tendencies of opportunism in organisation stand out clearly in spite of all this difference of conditions.\* With large numbers of radical intellec-

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\* No one will doubt today that the old division of the Russian Social-Democrats into Economists and politicians on questions of tactics was similar to the division of the whole international Social-Democratic movement into opportunists and revolutionaries, although the difference between Comrades Martynov and Akimov, on the one hand, and Comrades von Vollmar and von Elm or Jaurès and Millerand, on the other, is very great. Nor can there be any doubt about the similarity of the main divisions on questions of organisation, in spite of the enormous difference between the conditions of

tuals in the ranks of our Marxists and our Social-Democrats, the opportunism which their mentality produces has been, and is, bound to exist in the most varied spheres and in the most varied forms. We fought opportunism on the fundamental problems of our world conception, on the questions of our programme, and the complete divergence of aims inevitably led to an irrevocable break between the Social-Democrats and the liberals who had corrupted our legal Marxism. We fought opportunism on tactical issues, and our divergence with Comrades Krichevsky and Akimov on these less important issues was naturally only temporary, and was not accompanied by the formation of different parties. We must now vanquish the opportunism of Martov and Axelrod on questions of organisation, which are, of course, less fundamental than questions of tactics, let alone of programme, but which have now come to the forefront in our Party life.

When we speak of fighting opportunism, we must never forget a characteristic feature of present-day opportunism in every sphere, namely, its vagueness, amorphousness, elusiveness. An opportunist, by his very nature, will always evade taking a clear and decisive stand, he will always seek a middle course, he will always wriggle like a snake between two mutually exclusive points of view and try to "agree" with both and reduce his differences of opinion to petty amendments, doubts, innocent and pious suggestions, and so on and so forth. Comrade Eduard Bernstein, an opportunist in questions of programme, "agrees" with the revolutionary programme of his party, and although he would no doubt like to have it "radically revised", he considers this untimely, inexpedient, not so important as the elucidation of "general principles" of "criticism" (which mainly consist in uncritically borrowing principles and catchwords from bourgeois democracy). Comrade von Vollmar, an opportunist in questions of tactics, also agrees with the old tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy and also confines himself mostly to declamations, petty amendments, and sneers rather than openly advocates any definite "ministerial" tactics.<sup>28</sup> Comrades Martov and Axelrod, opportunists in questions of organisation, have also failed so far to produce, though directly challenged to do so, any definite statement of principles that could be "fixed by statute"; they too would like, they most certainly would like, a "radical revision" of our Rules of Organisation (*Iskra*, No. 58, p. 2, col. 3), but they would prefer to devote themselves first to "general

politically unenfranchised and politically free countries. It is extremely characteristic that the highly principled editors of the new *Iskra*, while briefly touching on the controversy between Kautsky and Heine (No. 64), timidly evaded discussing the trends of principle manifested on questions of organisation by opportunism and orthodoxy generally.

problems of organisation" (for a really radical revision of our Rules, which, in spite of Paragraph 1, are centralist Rules, would inevitably lead, if carried out in the spirit of the new *Iskra*, to autonomism; and Comrade Martov, of course, does not like to admit even to himself that he tends *in principle* towards autonomism). Their "principles" of organisation therefore display all the colours of the rainbow. The predominant item consists of innocent passionate declamations against autocracy and bureaucracy, against blind obedience and cogs and wheels—declamations so innocent that it is still very difficult to discern in them what is really concerned with principle and what is really concerned with co-optation. But as it goes on, the thing gets worse: attempts to analyse and precisely define this detestable "bureaucracy" inevitably lead to autonomism; attempts to "lend profundity" to their stand and vindicate it inevitably lead to justifying backwardness, to tail-ism, to Girondist phrase-mongering. At last there emerges the principle of *anarchism*, as the sole really definite principle, which for that reason stands out in practice in particular relief (practice is always in advance of theory). Sneering at discipline—autonomism—anarchism—there you have the ladder which our opportunism in matters of organisation now climbs and now descends, skipping from rung to rung and skilfully dodging any definite statement of its principles. Exactly the same stages are displayed by opportunism in matters of programme and tactics: sneering at "orthodoxy", narrowness, and immobility—revisionist "criticism" and ministerialism—bourgeois democracy.

Those who recall the debate on Paragraph 1 will now clearly see that the mistake committed by Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod over Paragraph 1 had *inevitably* to lead when developed and deepened to opportunism in matters of organisation. Comrade Martov's fundamental idea of self-enrolment in the Party—was this same false 'democracy'—the idea of building the Party from the bottom upward. My idea, on the other hand, was 'bureaucratic' in the sense that the Party was to be built from the top downward, from the Party Congress to the individual Party organisation. The mentality of the bourgeois intellectual, anarchist phrase-mongering, and opportunist, tailist profundity were all already displayed in the debate on Paragraph 1. Comrade Martov says in his *Vote of Scize* (p. 20) that "new ideas are beginning to be worked out" by the new *Iskra*. That is true in the sense that he and Axelrod are really pushing ideas in a new direction beginning with Paragraph 1. The only trouble is that this direction is an opportunist one. The more they "work" in *this* direction and the more this work is cleared of squabbling over co-optation, the deeper will they sink in the mire. Comrade Plekhanov already perceived this clearly at the Party Congress, and in his article "What Should Not Be Done" warned them once again. I am prepared, he as much as said even to co-opt you, only don't continue along this road which can only lead to opportunism and anarchism. Martov and Axelrod would not follow this good advice. What? Not continue along this road? Agree with Lenin that the co-optation clamour is nothing but squabbling? Never! We'll show him that we are men of principle!—And

There is a close psychological connection between this hatred of discipline and that incessant nagging note of *injury* which is to be detected in all the writings of all opportunists today in general, and of our minority in particular. They are being persecuted, hounded, ejected, besieged, and bullied. There is far more psychological and political truth in these catchwords than was probably suspected even by the author of the pleasant and witty joke about bullies and bullied.<sup>229</sup> For you have only to take the minutes of our Party Congress to see that the minority are all those who suffer from a sense of injury, all those who at one time or another and for one reason or another were offended by the revolutionary Social-Democrats. There are the Bundists and the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, whom we "offended" so badly that they withdrew from the Congress; there are the *Yuzhny Rabochy*-ists, who were mortally offended by the slaughter of organisations in general and of their own in particular; there is Comrade Makhov, who had to put up with offence every time he took the floor (for every time he did, he invariably made a fool of himself); and lastly, there are Comrade Martov and Comrade Axelrod, who were offended by the "false accusation of opportunism" in connection with Paragraph 1 of the Rules and by their defeat in the elections. All these mortal offences were not the accidental outcome of impermissible witticisms, rude behaviour, frenzied controversy, slamming of doors, and shaking of fists, as so many philistines imagine to this day, but the inevitable political outcome of the whole three years' ideological work of *Iskra*. If in the course of these three years we were not just wagging our tongues, but giving expression to convictions which were to be translated into deeds, we could not but fight the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Marsh" at the Congress. And when, together with Comrade Martov, who had fought in the front line with visor up, we had offended such heaps of people, we had only to offend Comrade Axelrod and Comrade Martov ever such a little bit for the cup to overflow. Quantity was transformed into quality. The negation was negated. All the offended forgot their mutual scores, fell weeping into each other's arms, and raised the banner of "revolt against Leninism".\*

A revolt is a splendid thing when it is the advanced elements who revolt against the reactionary elements. When the revolutionary wing revolts against the opportunist wing, it is a good

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they have. They have clearly shown everyone that if they have any new principles at all, they are opportunist principles.

\* This amazing expression is Comrade Martov's (*State of Siege*, p. 68). Comrade Martov waited until there were five to one before raising the "revolt" against me alone. Comrade Martov argues very unskillfully: he wants to destroy his opponent by paying him the highest compliments.

thing. When the opportunist wing revolts against the revolutionary wing, it is a bad business.

Comrade Plekhanov is compelled to take part in this bad business in the capacity of a prisoner of war, so to speak. He tries to "vent his spleen" by fishing out isolated awkward phrases by the author of some resolution in favour of the "majority", and exclaiming: "Poor Comrade Lenin! A fine lot his orthodox supporters are!" (*Iskra*, No. 63, Supplement.)

Well, Comrade Plekhanov, all I can say is that if I am poor, the editors of the new *Iskra* are downright paupers. However poor I may be, I have not yet reached such utter destitution as to have to shut my eyes to the Party Congress and hunt for material for the exercise of my wit in the resolutions of committees. However poor I may be, I am a thousand times better off than those whose supporters do not utter an awkward phrase inadvertently, but on every issue—whether of organisation, tactics, or programme—adhere stubbornly and persistently to principles which are the very opposite of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy. However poor I may be, I have not yet reached the stage of having to *conceal from the public* the praises lavished on me by such supporters. And that is what the editors of the new *Iskra* have to do.

Reader, do you know what the Voronezh Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party stands for? If not, read the minutes of the Party Congress. You will learn from them that the line of that committee is wholly expressed by Comrade Akimov and Comrade Brouckère, who at the Congress fought the revolutionary wing of the Party all along the line, and who scores of times were ranked as opportunists by everybody, from Comrade Plekhanov to Comrade Popov. Well, this Voronezh Committee, in its January leaflet (No. 12, January 1904), makes the following statement:

"A great and important event in the life of our steadily growing Party took place last year, the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., a congress of the representatives of its organisations. Convening a Party congress is a very complicated matter, and under the prevailing monarchical regime, a very dangerous and difficult one. It is therefore not surprising that it was carried out *in a far from perfect way*, and that the Congress itself, although it passed off without mishap, did not live up to all the Party's expectations. The comrades whom the Conference of 1902 commissioned to convene the Congress were arrested, and *the Congress was arranged by persons who represented only one of the trends in Russian Social-Democracy, viz., the 'Iskra'-ists*. Many organisations of Social-Democrats who did not happen to be Iskra-ists were not invited to take part in the work of the Congress; *partly for this reason* the task of drawing up a *programme and Rules* for the Party was carried out by the Congress in an *extremely imperfect manner*; the delegates themselves admit that there are important flaws in the Rules 'which may lead to dangerous misunderstandings'. The *Iskra*-ists themselves split at the Congress, and many prominent mem-

ers of our R.S.D.L.P. who formerly appeared to be in full agreement with the *Iskra* programme of action have come to see that many of its views, advocated mainly by Lenin and Plekhanov, are impracticable. Although these last gained the upper hand at the Congress, the pulse of real life and the requirements of the practical work, in which all the non-*Iskra*-ists are taking part, are quickly correcting the mistakes of the theoreticians and have, since the Congress, already introduced important modifications. '*Iskra*' has changed greatly and promises to pay careful heed to the demands of all workers in the Social-Democratic movement generally. Thus, although the results of the Congress will have to be revised at the next Congress, and as is obvious to the delegates themselves, are unsatisfactory and therefore cannot be accepted by the Party as unimpeachable decisions, the Congress clarified the situation in the Party, provided much material for the further theoretical and organising activity of the Party, and was an experience of immense instructive value for the work of the Party as a whole. The decisions of the Congress and the Rules it drew up will be taken into account by all the organisations, but many will refrain from being guided by them exclusively, in view of their manifest imperfections.

"Fully realising the importance of the work of the Party as a whole, the Voronezh Committee actively responded in all matters concerning the organisation of the Congress. It fully appreciates the importance of what took place at the Congress and welcomes the change undergone by '*Iskra*', which has become the Central Organ (chief organ).

"Although the state of affairs in the Party and the Central Committee does not satisfy us as yet, we are confident that by joint efforts the difficult work of organising the Party will be perfected. In view of false rumours, the Voronezh Committee informs the comrades that there is no question of the Voronezh Committee leaving the Party. The Voronezh Committee perfectly realises what a dangerous precedent would be created by the withdrawal of a workers' organisation like the Voronezh Committee from the R.S.D.L.P., what a reproach this would be to the Party, and how disadvantageous it would be to workers' organisations which might follow this example. We must not cause new splits, but persistently strive to unite all class-conscious workers and socialists in one party. Besides, the Second Congress was not a constituent congress, but only a regular one. Expulsion from the Party can only be by decision of a Party court, and no organisation, not even the Central Committee, has the right to expel any Social-Democratic organisation from the Party. Furthermore, under Paragraph 8 of the Rules adopted by the Second Congress every organisation is autonomous in its local affairs, and the Voronezh Committee is accordingly fully entitled to put its views on organisation into practice and to advocate them in the Party."

The editors of the new *Iskra*, in quoting this leaflet in No. 61, reprinted the second half of this tirade, which we give here in large type; as for the first half, here printed in small type, the editors preferred to omit it.

They were ashamed.

## R. A FEW WORDS ON DIALECTICS. TWO REVOLUTIONS

A general glance at the development of our Party crisis will readily show that in the main, with minor exceptions, the composition of the two contending sides remained unchanged throughout. It was a struggle between the revolutionary wing and the opportunist wing in our Party. But this struggle passed through the most varied stages, and anyone who wants to find his bearings in the vast amount of literature already accumulated, the mass of fragmentary evidence, passages torn from their context, isolated accusations, and so on and so forth, must thoroughly familiarise himself with the peculiarities of each of these stages.

Let us enumerate the principal and clearly distinct stages: 1) The controversy over Paragraph 1 of the Rules. A purely ideological struggle over the basic principles of organisation. Plekhanov and I are in the minority. Martov and Axelrod propose an opportunist formulation and find themselves in the arms of the opportunists. 2) The split in the *Iskra* organisation over the lists of candidates for the Central Committee: Fomin or Vasilyev in a committee of five, Trotsky or Travinsky in a committee of three. Plekhanov and I gain the majority (nine to seven), partly because of the very fact that we were in the minority on Paragraph 1. Martov's coalition with the opportunists confirmed my worst fears over the Organising Committee incident. 3) Continuation of the controversy over details of the Rules. Martov is again saved by the opportunists. We are again in the minority and fight for the rights of the minority on the central bodies. 4) The seven extreme opportunists withdraw from the Congress. We become the majority and defeat the coalition (the *Iskra*-ist minority, the "Marsh", and the anti-*Iskra*-ists) in the elections. Martov and Popov decline to accept seats in our trios. 5) The post-Congress squabble over co-optation. An orgy of anarchistic behaviour and anarchistic phrase-mongering. The least stable and steadfast elements among the "minority," gain the upper hand. 6) To avert a split, Plekhanov adopts the policy of "killing with kindness". The "minority" occupy the editorial board of the Central Organ and the Council and attack the Central Committee with all their might. The squabble continues to pervade everything. 7) First attack on the Central Committee repulsed. The squabble seems to be subsiding somewhat. It becomes possible to discuss in comparative calm two purely ideological questions which profoundly agitate the Party: a) what is the political significance and explanation of the division of our Party into "majority" and "minority" which took shape at the Second Congress and superseded all earlier divisions? b) what is the sig-

nificance in principle of the new *Iskra's* new position on the question of organisation?

In each of these stages the circumstances of the struggle and the immediate object of the attack are materially different; each stage is, as it were, a separate battle in one general military campaign. Our struggle cannot be understood at all unless the concrete circumstances of each battle are studied. But once that is done, we see clearly that development does indeed proceed dialectically, by way of contradictions: the minority becomes the majority, and the majority becomes the minority; each side passes from the defensive to the offensive, and from the offensive to the defensive; the starting-point of ideological struggle (Paragraph 1) is "negated" and gives place to an all-pervading squabble\*; but then begins "the negation of the negation", and, having just about managed to "rub along" with our god-given wife on different central bodies, we return to the starting-point, the purely ideological struggle; but by now this "thesis" has been enriched by all the results of the "anti-thesis" and has become a higher synthesis, in which the isolated, random error over Paragraph 1 has grown into a quasi-system of opportunist views on matters of organisation, and in which the connection between this fact and the basic division of our Party into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing becomes increasingly apparent to all. In a word, not only do oats grow according to Hegel, but the Russian Social-Democrats war among themselves according to Hegel.

But the great Hegelian dialectics which Marxism made its own, having first turned it right side up, must never be confused with the vulgar trick of justifying the zigzags of politicians who swing over from the revolutionary to the opportunist wing of the Party, with the vulgar habit of lumping together particular statements, and particular developmental factors, belonging to different stages of a single process. Genuine dialectics does not justify the errors of individuals, but studies the inevitable turns, proving that they were inevitable by a detailed study of the process of development in all its concreteness. One of the basic principles of dialectics is that there is no such thing as abstract truth, truth is always concrete. . . . And, one thing more, the great Hegelian dialectics should never be confused with that vulgar worldly wisdom so well expressed by the Italian saying: *mettere la coda dove non va il capo* (sticking in the tail where the head will not go through).

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\* The difficult problem of drawing a line between squabbling and differences of principle now solves itself: all that relates to co-optation is squabbling; all that relates to analysis of the struggle at the Congress, to the controversy over Paragraph 1 and the swing towards opportunism and anarchism is a difference of principle.



The outcome of the dialectical development of our Party struggle has been two revolutions. The Party Congress was a real revolution, as Comrade Martov justly remarked in his *Once More in the Minority*. The wits of the minority are also right when they say: "The world moves through revolutions; well, we have made a revolution!" They did indeed make a revolution after the Congress; and it is true, too, that generally speaking the world does move through revolutions. But the concrete significance of each concrete revolution is not defined by this general aphorism; there are revolutions which are more like reaction, to paraphrase the unforgettable expression of the unforgettable Comrade Makhov. We must know whether it was the revolutionary or the opportunist wing of the Party that was the actual force that made the revolution, must know whether it was revolutionary or opportunist principles that inspired the fighters, before we can determine whether a particular concrete revolution moved the "world" (our Party) forward or backward.

Our Party Congress was unique and unprecedented in the entire history of the Russian revolutionary movement. For the first time a secret revolutionary party succeeded in emerging from the darkness of underground life into broad daylight, showing everyone the whole course and outcome of our internal Party struggle, the whole character of our Party and of each of its more or less noticeable components in matters of programme, tactics, and organisation. For the first time we succeeded in throwing off the traditions of circle looseness and revolutionary philistinism, in bringing together dozens of very different groups, many of which had been fiercely warring among themselves and had been linked solely by the force of an idea, and which were now prepared (in principle, that is) to sacrifice all their group aloofness and group independence for the sake of the great whole which we were for the first time actually creating—the Party. But in politics sacrifices are not obtained gratis, they have to be won in battle. The battle over the slaughter of organisations necessarily proved terribly fierce. The fresh breeze of free and open struggle blew into a gale. The gale swept away—and a very good thing that it did!—each and every remnant of all circle interests, sentiments, and traditions without exception, and for the first time created genuinely Party institutions.

But it is one thing to call oneself something, and another to be it. It is one thing to sacrifice the circle system in principle for the sake of the Party, and another to renounce one's own circle. The fresh breeze proved too fresh as yet for people used to musty philistinism. "The Party was unable to stand the strain of its first congress," as Comrade Martov rightly put it (inadvertently) in his *Once More in the Minority*. The sense of injury

over the slaughter of organisations was too strong. The furious gale raised all the mud from the bottom of our Party stream; and the mud took its revenge. The old hidebound circle spirit overpowered the still young party spirit. The opportunist wing of the Party, routed though it had been, got the better—temporarily, of course—of the revolutionary wing, having been reinforced by Akimov's accidental gain.

The result is the new *Iskra*, which is compelled to develop and deepen the error its editors committed at the Party Congress. The old *Iskra* taught the truths of revolutionary struggle. The new *Iskra* teaches the wordly wisdom of yielding and getting on with everyone. The old *Iskra* was the organ of militant orthodoxy. The new *Iskra* treats us to a recrudescence of opportunism—chiefly on questions of organisation. The old *Iskra* earned the honour of being detested by the opportunists, both Russian and West-European. The new *Iskra* has "grown wise" and will soon cease to be ashamed of the praises lavished on it by the extreme opportunists. The old *Iskra* marched unswervingly towards its goal, and there was no discrepancy between its word and its deed. The inherent falsity of the new *Iskra*'s position inevitably leads—independently even of anyone's will or intention—to political hypocrisy. It inveighs against the circle spirit in order to conceal the victory of the circle spirit over the party spirit. It hypocritically condemns splits, as if one can imagine any way of avoiding splits in any at all organised party except by the subordination of the minority to the majority. It says that heed must be paid to revolutionary public opinion, yet, while concealing the praises of the Akimovs, indulges in petty scandal-mongering about the committees of the revolutionary wing of the Party.\* How shameful! How they have disgraced our old *Iskra*!

One step forward, two steps back.... It happens in the lives of individuals, and it happens in the history of nations and in the development of parties. It would be the most criminal cowardice to doubt even for a moment the inevitable and complete triumph of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy, of proletarian organisation and Party discipline. We have already won a great deal, and we must go on fighting, undismayed by reverses, fighting steadfastly, scorning the philistine methods of circle wrangling, doing our very utmost to preserve the hard-won single Party tie linking all Russian Social-Democrats, and striving by dint of persistent and systematic work to give all Party mem-

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\* A stereotyped form has even been worked out for this charming pastime: our special correspondent X informs us that Committee Y of the majority has behaved badly to Comrade Z of the minority.

bers, and the workers in particular, a full and conscious understanding of the duties of Party members, of the struggle at the Second Party Congress, of all the causes and all the stages of our divergence, and of the utter disastrousness of opportunism, which, in the sphere of organisation as in the sphere of our programme and our tactics, helplessly surrenders to the bourgeois psychology, uncritically adopts the point of view of bourgeois democracy, and blunts the weapon of the class struggle of the proletariat.

In its struggle for power the proletariat has no other weapon but organisation. Disunited by the rule of anarchic competition in the bourgeois world, ground down by forced labour for capital, constantly thrust back to the "lower depths" of utter destitution, savagery, and degeneration, the proletariat can, and inevitably will, become an invincible force only through its ideological unification on the principles of Marxism being reinforced by the material unity of organisation, which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working class. Neither the senile rule of the Russian autocracy nor the senescent rule of international capital will be able to withstand this army. It will more and more firmly close its ranks, in spite of all zigzags and backward steps, in spite of the opportunist phrase-mongering of the Girondists of present-day Social-Democracy, in spite of the self-satisfied exaltation of the retrograde circle spirit, and in spite of the tinsel and fuss of *intellectualist* anarchism.

*Appendix***THE INCIDENT OF COMRADE GUSEV  
AND COMRADE DEUTSCH**

This incident is closely bound up with the so-called "false" (Comrade Martov's expression) list mentioned in the letter of Comrades Martov and Starover, which has been quoted in Section J. The substance of it is as follows. Comrade Gusev informed Comrade Pavlovich that this list, consisting of Comrades Stein, Egorov, Popov, Trotsky, and Fomin, had been communicated to him. Gusev, by Comrade Deutsch (Comrade Pavlovich's *Letter*, p. 12). Comrade Deutsch accused Comrade Gusev of "deliberate calumny" on account of this statement, and a comrades' arbitration court declared Comrade Gusev's "statement" "incorrect" (see the court's decision in *Iskra*, No. 62). After the *editorial board* of *Iskra* had published the court decision, *Comrade Martov* (not the editorial board this time) issued a special leaflet entitled *The Decision of the Comrades' Arbitration Court*, in which he reprinted in full, not only the decision of the court, but the whole report of the proceedings, together with a *postscript of his own*. In this postscript, Comrade Martov among other things spoke of "the disgraceful fact of the forgery of a list in the interests of a factional struggle". Comrades Lyadov and Gorin, who had been delegates to the Second Congress, replied to this leaflet with one of their own entitled *An Onlooker at the Arbitration Court*, in which they "vigorously protest against Comrade Martov permitting himself to go further than the court decision and to ascribe evil motives to Comrade Gusev", whereas the court did not find that there had been a deliberate calumny, but only that Comrade Gusev's statement was incorrect. Comrades Gorin and Lyadov explained at length that Comrade Gusev's statement might have been due to a quite natural mistake, and described as "*unworthy*" the conduct of Comrade Martov, who had himself made (and again made in his leaflet)

a number of erroneous statements, arbitrarily attributing evil intent to Comrade Gusev. There could be no evil intent there at all, they said. That, if I am not mistaken, is all the "literature" on this question, which I consider it my duty to help clear up.

First of all, it is essential that the reader have a clear idea of the time and conditions in which this list (of candidates for the Central Committee) appeared. As I have already stated in this pamphlet, the *Iskra* organisation conferred during the Congress about a list of candidates for the Central Committee which it could jointly submit to the Congress. The conference ended in disagreement: the majority of the *Iskra* organisation adopted a list consisting of Travinsky, Glebov, Vasilyev, Popov, and Trotsky, but the minority refused to yield and insisted on a list consisting of Travinsky, Glebov, Fomin, Popov, and Trotsky. The two sections of the *Iskra* organisation did not meet together again after the meeting at which these lists were put forward and voted on. Both sections entered the arena of free agitation at the Congress, wishing to have the issue between them settled by a vote of the Party Congress as a whole and each trying to win as many delegates as it could to its side. This free agitation at the Congress at once revealed the political fact I have analysed in such detail in this pamphlet, namely, that in order to gain the victory over us, it was essential for the *Iskra*-ist minority (headed by Martov) to have the support of the "Centre" (the Marsh) and of the anti-*Iskra*-ists. This was essential because the vast majority of the delegates who consistently upheld the programme, tactics, and organisational plans of *Iskra* against the onslaught of the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre" very quickly and very staunchly took their stand on our side. Of the thirty-three delegates (or rather votes) not belonging to the anti-*Iskra*-ists or the "Centre", we very quickly won twenty-four and concluded a "direct agreement" with them, forming a "compact majority". Comrade Martov, on the other hand, was left with only nine votes; to gain the victory, he needed all the votes of the anti-*Iskra*-ists and the "Centre"—with which groups he might join forces (as over Paragraph 1 of the Rules), might form a "coalition", that is, might have their support, but with which he *could not* conclude a direct agreement—could not do so because throughout the Congress he had fought these groups no less sharply than we had. Therein lay the tragicomedy of Comrade Martov's position! In his *State of Siege* Comrade Martov tries to annihilate me with the deadly venomous question: "We would respectfully request Comrade Lenin to answer explicitly—to whom at the Congress were the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group an outside element?" (P. 23, footnote.) I answer respectfully and explicitly: they were an outside element to Comrade Martov. And the proof is that whereas I very quickly concluded a direct agreement

with the *Iskra*-ists, Comrade Martov did not conclude, and could not have concluded, a direct agreement with *Yuzhny Rabochy*, nor with Comrade Makhov, nor with Comrade Brouckère.

Only when we have got a clear idea of this political situation can we understand the "crux" of this vexed question of the celebrated "false" list. Picture to yourself the actual state of affairs: the *Iskra* organisation has split, and we are freely campaigning at the Congress, defending our respective lists. During this defence, in the host of private conversations, the lists are varied in a hundred different combinations: a committee of three is proposed instead of five: all sorts of substitutions of one candidate for another are suggested. I very well recall, for instance, that the candidatures of Comrades Rusov, Osipov, Pavlovich, and Dyedov were suggested in private conversations among the majority, and then, after discussions and arguments, were withdrawn. It may very well be that other candidatures too were proposed of which I have no knowledge. In the course of these conversations each Congress delegate expressed his opinion, suggested changes, argued, and so on. It is highly unlikely that this was the case only among the majority. There is no doubt, in fact, that the same sort of thing went on among the minority, for their original five (Popov, Trotsky, Fomin, Glebov, and Travinsky) were later replaced, as we have seen from the letter of Comrades Martov and Starover, by a trio—Glebov, Trotsky, and Popov—Glebov, moreover, not being to their taste, so that they were very ready to substitute Fomin (see the leaflet of Comrades Lyadov and Gorin). It should not be forgotten that my demarcation of the Congress delegates into the groups defined in this pamphlet was made on the basis of an analysis undertaken postfactum; actually, during the election agitation these groups were only just beginning to emerge and the exchange of opinions among the delegates proceeded quite freely; no "wall" divided us, and each would speak to any delegate he wanted to discuss matters with in private. It is not at all surprising in these circumstances that among all the various combinations and lists there should appear, alongside the list of the minority of the *Iskra* organisation (Popov, Trotsky, Fomin, Glebov, and Travinsky), the not very different list: Popov, Trotsky, Fomin, Stein, and Egorov. The appearance of such a combination of candidates was very natural, because our candidates, Glebov and Travinsky, were patently not to the liking of the minority of the *Iskra* organisation (see their letter in Section J, where they remove Travinsky from the trio and expressly state that Glebov is a compromise). To replace Glebov and Travinsky by the Organising Committee members Stein and Egorov was perfectly natural, and it would have been strange if no one of the delegates belonging to the Party minority had thought of it.

Let us now examine the following two questions: 1) Who was the author of the list: Egorov, Stein, Popov, Trotsky, and Fomin? and 2) Why was Comrade Martov so profoundly incensed that such a list should be attributed to him? To give an *exact* answer to the first question, it would be necessary to question all the Congress delegates. That is now impossible. It would be necessary, in particular, to ascertain who of the delegates belonging to the Party minority (not to be confused with the *Iskra* organisation minority) had heard at the Congress of the lists that caused the split in the *Iskra* organisation; what they had thought of the respective lists of the majority and minority of the *Iskra* organisation; and whether they had not suggested or heard others suggest or express opinions about desirable changes in the list of the minority of the *Iskra* organisation. Unfortunately, these questions do not seem to have been raised in the arbitration court either, which (to judge by the text of its decision) did not even learn over just what lists of five the *Iskra* organisation split. Comrade Byelov, for example (whom I class among the "Centre"), "testified that he had been on good comradely terms with Deutsch, who used to give him his impressions of the work of the Congress, and that if Deutsch had been campaigning on behalf of any list he would have informed Byelov of the fact". It is to be regretted that it was not brought out whether Comrade Deutsch gave Comrade Byelov at the Congress his impressions as to the lists of the *Iskra* organisation, and if he did, what was Comrade Byelov's reaction to the list of five proposed by the *Iskra* organisation minority, and whether he did not suggest or hear others suggest any desirable changes in it. Because this was not made clear, we get that contradiction in the evidence of Comrade Byelov and Comrade Deutsch which has already been noted by Comrades Gorin and Lyadov, namely, that Comrade Deutsch, notwithstanding his own assertions to the contrary, did "campaign in behalf of certain Central Committee candidates" suggested by the *Iskra* organisation. Comrade Byelov further testified that "he had heard about the list circulating at the Congress a couple of days before the Congress closed, in private conversation, when he met Comrades Egorov and Popov and the delegates from the Kharkov Committee. Egorov had expressed surprise that his name had been included in a list of Central Committee candidates, as in his, Egorov's, opinion his candidature could not inspire sympathy among the Congress delegates, whether of the majority or of the minority". It is extremely significant that the reference here is apparently to the minority of the "*Iskra*" organisation, for among the rest of the Party Congress minority the candidature of Comrade Egorov, a member of the Organising Committee and a prominent speaker of the "Centre", not only

could, but in all likelihood would have been greeted sympathetically. Unfortunately, we learn nothing from Comrade Byelov as to the sympathy or antipathy of those among the Party minority who did not belong to the *Iskra* organisation. And yet that is just what is important, for Comrade Deutsch waxed indignant about this list having been attributed to the minority of the *Iskra* organisation, whereas it may have originated with the minority which did not belong to that organisation!

Of course, it is very difficult at this date to recall who first suggested this combination of candidates, and from whom each of us heard about it. I, for example, do not undertake to recall even just who among the majority first proposed the candidatures of Rusov, Dyedov, and the others I have mentioned. The only thing that sticks in my memory, out of the host of conversations, suggestions, and rumours of all sorts of combinations of candidates, is those "lists" which were directly put to the vote in the *Iskra* organisation or at the private meetings of the majority. These "lists" were mostly circulated orally (in my *Letter to the Editors of "Iskra"*, p. 4, line 5 from below, it is the combination of five candidates which I orally proposed at the meeting that I call a "list"); but it also happened very often that they were jotted down in notes, such as in general passed between delegates during the sittings of the Congress and were usually destroyed after the sittings.

Since we have no exact information as to the origin of this celebrated list, it can only be assumed that the combination of candidates which we have in it was either suggested by some delegate belonging to the Party minority, without the knowledge of the *Iskra* organisation minority, and thereafter began to circulate at the Congress in spoken and written form; or else that this combination was suggested at the Congress by some member of the *Iskra* organisation minority who subsequently forgot about it. The latter assumption seems to me the more likely one, for the following reasons: already at the Congress the *Iskra* organisation minority were *undoubtedly* sympathetic towards the candidature of Comrade Stein (see present pamphlet); and as to the candidature of Comrade Egorov, *this* minority did undoubtedly arrive at the idea after the Congress (for both at the League Congress and in *State of Siege* regret was expressed that the Organising Committee had not been endorsed as the Central Committee—and Comrade Egorov was a member of the Organising Committee). Is it then not natural to assume that this idea, which was evidently in the air, of converting the members of the Organising Committee into members of the Central Committee was voiced by some member of the minority in private conversation at the Party Congress too?



But instead of a natural explanation, Comrade Martov and Comrade Deutsch are determined to see here something *sordid*—a plot, a piece of dishonesty, the dissemination of “*deliberately false rumours with the object of defaming*”, a “*forgery in the interests of a factional struggle*”, and so forth. This morbid urge can only be explained by the unwholesome conditions of émigré life, or by an abnormal nervous condition, and I would not even have taken the question up if matters had not gone to the length of an unworthy attack upon a comrade’s honour. Just think: what grounds could Comrades Deutsch and Martov have had for detecting a sordid, evil intent in an incorrect statement, in an incorrect rumour? The picture which their morbid imaginations conjured up was apparently that the majority “defamed” them, not by pointing to the minority’s political mistake (Paragraph 1 and the coalition with the opportunists), but by ascribing to the minority “deliberately false” and “forged” lists. The minority preferred to attribute the matter not to their own mistake, but to sordid, dishonest, and disgraceful practices on the part of the majority! How irrational it was to seek for evil intent in the “incorrect statement”, we have already shown above, by describing the circumstances. It was clearly realised by the comrades’ arbitration court too, which did not find any calumny, or any evil intent, or anything disgraceful. Lastly, it is most clearly proved by the fact that at the Party Congress itself, prior to the elections, the minority of the *Iskra* organisation entered into discussions with the majority regarding this false rumour, and Comrade Martov even stated his views in a letter which was read at a meeting of all the twenty-four delegates of the majority! It never even occurred to the majority to conceal from the minority of the *Iskra* organisation that such a list was circulating at the Congress: Comrade Lensky told Comrade Deutsch about it (see the court decision); Comrade Plekhanov spoke of it to Comrade Zasulich (“You can’t talk to her, she seems to take me for Trepov,” Comrade Plekhanov said to me, and this joke, repeated many times after, is one more indication of the abnormal state of excitement the minority were in); and I informed Comrade Martov that his assurance (that the list was not his, Martov’s) was quite enough for me (League Minutes, p. 64). Comrade Martov (together with Comrade Starover, if I remember rightly) thereupon sent a note to us on the Bureau which ran roughly as follows: “The majority of the *Iskra* editorial board request to be allowed to attend the private meeting of the majority in order to refute the defamatory rumours which are being circulated about them.” Plekhanov and I replied on the same slip of paper, saying: “We have not heard any defamatory rumours. If a meeting of the editorial board is required, that should be arranged separately. Lenin,

Plekhanov." At the meeting of the majority held that evening, we related this to all the twenty-four delegates. To preclude all possible misunderstanding, it was decided to elect delegates from all the twenty-four of us jointly and send them to talk it over with Comrades Martov and Starover. The delegates elected, Comrades Sorokin and Sablina, went and explained that nobody was specifically attributing the list to Martov or Starover, particularly after their statement, and that it was of absolutely no importance whether this list originated with the minority of the *Iskra* organisation or with the Congress minority not belonging to that organisation. After all, we could not start an investigation at the Congress and question all the delegates about this list! But Comrades Martov and Starover, not content with this, sent us a letter containing a formal denial (see Section J). This letter was read out by our representatives, Comrades Sorokin and Sablina, at a meeting of the twenty-four. It might have seemed that the incident could be considered closed—not in the sense that the origin of the list had been ascertained (if anybody cared about that), but in the sense that the idea had been completely dispelled that there was any intention of "injuring the minority", or of "defaming" anybody, or of resorting to a "forgery in the interests of a factional struggle". Yet at the League Congress (pp. 63-64) Comrade Martov again brought forth this sordid story conjured up by a morbid imagination, and, what is more, made a number of *incorrect statements* (evidently due to his wrought-up condition). He said that the list included a Bundist. That was untrue. All the witnesses in the arbitration court, including Comrades Stein and Byelov, declared that the list had Comrade Egorov in it. Comrade Martov said that the list implied a coalition in the sense of a direct agreement. That was untrue, as I have already explained. Comrade Martov said that there were no other lists originating with the minority of the *Iskra* organisation (and likely to repel the majority of the Congress from this minority), "not even forged ones". That was untrue, for the entire majority at the Party Congress knew of no less than three lists which originated with Comrade Martov and Co., and which did not meet with the approval of the majority (see the leaflet by Lyadov and Gorin).

Why, in general, was Comrade Martov so incensed by this list? Because it signified a swing towards the Right wing of the Party. At that time Comrade Martov cried out against a "false accusation of opportunism" and expressed indignation at the "misrepresentation of his political position"; but now everybody can see that the question whether this list belonged to Comrade Martov and Comrade Deutsch could have had no political significance whatever, and that *essentially, apart from this or any*

*other list*, the accusation was not false, but true, and the characterisation of his political position absolutely correct.

The upshot of this painful and artificial affair of the celebrated false list is as follows:

1) One cannot but join Comrades Gorin and Lyadov in describing as unworthy Comrade Martov's attempt to asperse Comrade Gusev's honour by crying about a "disgraceful fact of the forgery of a list in the interests of a factional struggle".

2) With the object of creating a healthier atmosphere and of sparing Party members the necessity of taking every morbid extravagance seriously, it would perhaps be advisable at the Third Congress to adopt a rule such as is contained in the Rules of Organisation of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party. Paragraph 2 of these Rules runs: "No person can belong to the Party who is guilty of a gross violation of the principles of the Party programme or of dishonourable conduct. The question of continued membership in the Party shall be decided by a court of arbitration convened by the Party Executive. One half of the judges shall be nominated by the person demanding the expulsion, the other half by the person whose expulsion is demanded; the chairman shall be appointed by the Party Executive. An appeal against a decision of the court of arbitration may be made to the Control Commission or to the Party Congress." Such a rule might serve as a good weapon against all who frivolously level accusations (or spread rumours) of dishonourable conduct. If there were such a rule, all such accusations would once and for all be classed as indecent slanders unless their author had the moral courage to come forward *before the Party* in the role of accuser and seek for a verdict from the competent Party institution.

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## THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

Geneva, Wednesday, January 25 (12)

Events of the greatest historical importance are developing in Russia. The proletariat has risen against tsarism. The proletariat was driven to revolt by the government. There can hardly be any doubt now that the government deliberately allowed the strike movement to develop and a wide demonstration to be started more or less without hindrance in order to bring matters to a point where military force could be used. Its manoeuvre was successful. Thousands of killed and wounded—such is the toll of Bloody Sunday, January 9, in St. Petersburg. The army defeated unarmed workers, women, and children. The army vanquished the enemy by shooting prostrate workers. "We have taught them a good lesson!" the tsar's henchmen and their European flunkies from among the conservative bourgeoisie say with consummate cynicism.

Yes, it was a great lesson, one which the Russian proletariat will not forget. The most uneducated, backward sections of the working class, who naïvely trusted the tsar and sincerely wished to put peacefully before "the tsar himself" the petition of a tormented people, were all taught a lesson by the troops led by the tsar or his uncle, the Grand Duke Vladimir.

The working class has received a momentous lesson in civil war: the revolutionary education of the proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence. The slogan of the heroic St. Petersburg proletariat, "Death or freedom!" is reverberating throughout Russia. Events are developing with astonishing rapidity. The general strike in St. Petersburg is spreading. All industrial, public and political activities are paralysed. On Monday, January 10, still more violent clashes occurred between the workers and the military. Contrary to the mendacious government reports, blood is flowing in many parts of the capital. The workers

of Kolpino are rising. The proletariat is arming itself and the people. The workers are said to have seized the Sestroretsk Arsenal. They are providing themselves with revolvers, forging their tools into weapons, and procuring bombs for a desperate bid for freedom. The general strike is spreading to the provinces. Ten thousand have already ceased work in Moscow, and a general strike has been called there for tomorrow (Thursday, January 13). An uprising has broken out in Riga. The workers are demonstrating in Lodz, an uprising is being prepared in Warsaw, proletarian demonstrations are taking place in Helsingfors. Unrest is growing among the workers and the strike is spreading in Baku, Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Kovno, and Vilna. In Sevastopol, the naval stores and arsenals are ablaze, and the troops refuse to shoot at the mutineers. Strikes in Revel and in Saratov. Workers and reservists clash with the troops in Radom.

The revolution is spreading. The government is beginning to lose its head. From the policy of bloody repression it is attempting to change over to economic concessions and to save itself by throwing a sop to the workers or promising the nine-hour day. But the lesson of Bloody Sunday cannot be forgotten. The demand of the insurgent St. Petersburg workers—the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot—must become the demand of all the striking workers. Immediate overthrow of the government—this was the slogan with which even the St. Petersburg workers who had believed in the tsar answered the massacre of January 9; they answered through their leader, the priest Georgi Gapon, who declared after that bloody day: “We no longer have a tsar. A river of blood divides the tsar from the people. Long live the fight for freedom!”

Long live the revolutionary proletariat! say we. The general strike is rousing and rallying increasing masses of the working class and the urban poor. The arming of the people is becoming an immediate task of the revolutionary moment.

Only an armed people can be the real bulwark of popular liberty. The sooner the proletariat succeeds in arming, and the longer it holds its fighting positions as striker and revolutionary, the sooner will the army begin to waver; more and more soldiers will at last begin to realise what they are doing and they will join sides with the people against the fiends, against the tyrant, against the murderers of defenceless workers and of their wives and children. No matter what the outcome of the present uprising in St. Petersburg may be, it will, in any case, be the first step to a wider, more conscious, better organised uprising. The government may possibly succeed in putting off the day of reckoning, but the postponement will only make the next step of the revolutionary

onset more stupendous. This will only mean that the Social-Democrats will take advantage of this postponement to rally the organised fighters and spread the news about the start made by the St. Petersburg workers. The proletariat will join in the struggle, it will quit mill and factory and will prepare arms for itself. The slogans of the struggle for freedom will be carried more and more widely into the midst of the urban poor and of the millions of peasants. Revolutionary committees will be set up at every factory, in every city district, in every large village. The people in revolt will overthrow all the government institutions of the tsarist autocracy and proclaim the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly.

The immediate arming of the workers and of all citizens in general, the preparation and organisation of the revolutionary forces for overthrowing the government authorities and institutions—this is the practical basis on which revolutionaries of every variety can and must unite to strike the common blow. The proletariat must always pursue its own independent path, never weakening its connection with the Social-Democratic Party, always bearing in mind its great, ultimate objective, which is to rid mankind of all exploitation. But this independence of the Social-Democratic proletarian party will never cause us to forget the importance of a common revolutionary onset at the moment of actual revolution. We Social-Democrats can and must act independently of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionaries and guard the class independence of the proletariat. But we must go hand in hand with them during the uprising, when direct blows are being struck at tsarism, when resistance is offered the troops, when the bastilles of the accursed enemy of the entire Russian people are stormed.

The proletariat of the whole world is now looking eagerly towards the proletariat of Russia. The overthrow of tsarism in Russia, so valiantly begun by our working class, will be the turning-point in the history of all countries; it will facilitate the task of the workers of all nations, in all states, in all parts of the globe. Let, therefore, every Social-Democrat, every class-conscious worker bear in mind the immense tasks of the broad popular struggle that now rest upon his shoulders. Let him not forget that he represents also the needs and interests of the whole peasantry, of all who toil, of all who are exploited, of the whole people against their enemy. The proletarian heroes of St. Petersburg now stand as an example to all.

Long live the revolution!

Long live the insurgent proletariat!

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## TWO TACTICS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION<sup>230</sup>

### PREFACE

In a revolutionary period it is very difficult to keep abreast of events which provide an astonishing amount of new material for an appraisal of the tactical slogans of revolutionary parties. The present pamphlet was written before the Odessa events.\* We have already pointed out in *Proletary*<sup>232</sup> (No. 9—"Revolution Teaches")\*\* that these events have forced even those Social-Democrats who created the "uprising-as-process" theory and who rejected propaganda for a provisional revolutionary government actually to go over, or begin to go over, to their opponents' side. Revolution undoubtedly teaches with a rapidity and thoroughness which appear incredible in peaceful periods of political development. And, what is particularly important, it teaches not only the leaders, but the masses as well.

There is not the slightest doubt that the revolution will teach Social-Democratism to the masses of the workers in Russia. The revolution will confirm the programme and tactics of Social-Democracy in actual practice by demonstrating the true nature of the various classes of society, by demonstrating the bourgeois character of our democracy and the real aspirations of the peasantry, who, while being revolutionary in the bourgeois-democratic sense, carry within themselves not the idea of "socialisation", but the seeds of a new class struggle between the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat. The old illusions of the old Narodism, so clearly visible, for instance, in the draft programme of the "Socialist-Revolutionary Party" on the question of the development of capitalism in Russia, the question of the democratic character of our "society", and the question of the significance of a complete victory of a peasant uprising—all these illusions will be completely

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\* The reference is to the mutiny on the armoured cruiser *Potemkin* <sup>231</sup> (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—Ed.)

\*\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 148.—Ed.

and mercilessly dispelled by the revolution. For the first time, the various classes will be given their real political baptism. These classes will emerge from the revolution with a definite political physiognomy, for they will have revealed themselves not only in the programme and tactical slogans of their ideologists but also in open political action by the masses.

Undoubtedly, the revolution will teach us, and will teach the masses of the people. But the question that now confronts a militant political party is: shall we be able to teach the revolution anything? Shall we be able to make use of the correctness of our Social-Democratic doctrine, of our bond with the only thoroughly revolutionary class, the proletariat, to put a proletarian imprint on the revolution, to carry the revolution to a real and decisive victory, not in word but in deed, and to paralyse the instability, half-heartedness, and treachery of the democratic bourgeoisie?

It is to this end that we must direct all our efforts, and the achievement of that end will depend, on the one hand, on the accuracy of our appraisal of the political situation and the correctness of our tactical slogans, and, on the other hand, on whether these slogans will be backed by the real fighting strength of the masses of the workers. All the usual, regular, and current work of all organisations and groups of our Party, the work of propaganda, agitation, and organisation, is directed towards strengthening and expanding the ties with the masses. Necessary as this work always is it cannot be considered adequate at a time of revolution. In such a contingency the working class feels an instinctive urge for open revolutionary action, and we must learn to set the aims of this action correctly, and then make these aims as widely known and understood as possible. It must not be forgotten that the current pessimism about our ties with the masses very often serves as a screen for bourgeois ideas regarding the proletariat's role in the revolution. Undoubtedly, we still have a great deal to do in educating and organising the working class; but now the gist of the matter is: where should we place the main political emphasis in this work of education and organisation? On the trade unions and legally existing associations, or on an insurrection, on the work of creating a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government? Both serve to educate and organise the working class. Both are, of course, necessary. But in the present revolution the problem amounts to this: which is to be emphasised in the work of educating and organising the working class, the former or the latter?

The outcome of the revolution depends on whether the working class will play the part of a subsidiary to the bourgeoisie, a subsidiary that is powerful in the force of its onslaught against the autocracy, but impotent politically, or whether it will play



the part of leader of the people's revolution. The more intelligent representatives of the bourgeoisie are perfectly aware of this. That is why *Osvobozhdeniye* praises Akimovism,<sup>233</sup> Economism in Social-Democracy, the trend which is *now* bringing the trade unions and legally existing associations to the forefront. That is why Mr. Struve (in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72) welcomes the Akimovist tendency in the new-*Iskra* ideas. That is why he comes down so heavily on the detested revolutionary narrowness of the decisions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.<sup>234</sup>

It is exceptionally important at the present time for Social-Democrats to have correct tactical slogans for leading the masses. There is nothing more dangerous in a revolutionary period than belittling the importance of tactical slogans that are sound in principle. For example, *Iskra* in No. 104<sup>235</sup> actually goes over to the side of its opponents in the Social-Democratic movement, and yet, at the same time, it disparages the importance of slogans and tactical decisions that are ahead of the times and indicate the path along which the movement is proceeding, though with a number of failures, errors, etc. On the contrary, preparation of correct tactical decisions is of immense importance for a party which desires to lead the proletariat in the spirit of sound Marxist principles, and not merely to lag in the wake of events. In the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the Conference of the section that has split away from the Party,\* we have the most precise, most carefully considered, and most complete expression of tactical views—views not casually expressed by individual writers, but accepted by the responsible representatives of the Social-Democratic proletariat. Our Party is in advance of all the others, for it has a precise and generally accepted programme. It must also set the other parties an example of a principled attitude to its tactical resolutions, as distinct from the opportunism of the democratic *Osvobozhdeniye* bourgeoisie, and the revolutionary phrase-mongering of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. It was only during the revolution that they suddenly thought of coming forward with a "draft" programme and of investigating for the first time whether it is a bourgeois revolution that is going on before their eyes.

That is why we think it the most urgent task of the revolu-

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\* The Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (London, May 1905) was attended only by Bolsheviks, while Mensheviks alone participated in the "Conference" (Geneva, time the same). In the present pamphlet the latter are frequently referred to as the "new-*Iskra* group" because, while continuing to publish *Iskra*, they declared through their then adherent Trotsky that there was a gulf between the old and the new *Iskra*. (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—Ed.)

tionary Social-Democrats carefully to study the tactical resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the Conference, define what deviations from the principles of Marxism they contain, and get a clear understanding of the Social-Democratic proletariat's concrete tasks in a democratic revolution. It is to this work that the present pamphlet is devoted. The testing of our tactics from the standpoint of the principles of Marxism and of the lessons of the revolution is also necessary for those who really desire to pave the way for unity of tactics as a basis for the future complete unity of the whole Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and not to confine themselves solely to verbal admonitions.

July 1905

*N. Lenin*

## 1. AN URGENT POLITICAL QUESTION

At the present revolutionary juncture the question of the convocation of a popular constituent assembly is on the order of the day. Opinions are divided as to how this question should be solved. Three political trends are taking shape. The tsarist government admits the necessity of convening representatives of the people, but under no circumstances does it want to permit their assembly to be popular and constituent. It seems willing to agree, if we are to believe the newspaper reports on the work of the Bulygin Commission,<sup>236</sup> to a consultative assembly, which is to be elected without freedom of agitation, and by a system of restrictive qualifications or one that is restricted to certain social estates. Since it is led by the Social-Democratic Party, the revolutionary proletariat demands complete transfer of power to a constituent assembly, and for this purpose strives to achieve not only universal suffrage and complete freedom to conduct agitation, but also the immediate overthrow of the tsarist government and its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government. Finally, the liberal bourgeoisie, expressing its wishes through the leaders of the so-called "Constitutional-Democratic Party", does not demand the overthrow of the tsarist government; nor does it advance the slogan of a provisional government, or insist on real guarantees that the elections will be absolutely free and fair and that the assembly of representatives will be genuinely popular and genuinely constituent. As a matter of fact, the liberal bourgeoisie, the only serious social support of the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend, is striving to effect as peaceful a deal as possible between the tsar and the revolutionary people, a deal, moreover, that would give a maximum of power to itself, the bourgeoisie, and a minimum to the revolutionary people—the proletariat and the peasantry.

Such is the political situation at the present time. Such are the three main political trends, corresponding to the three main social

forces in contemporary Russia. We have already shown on more than one occasion in *Proletary* (Nos. 3, 4, 5)\* how the *Osvobozhdeniye* group use pseudo-democratic phrases to cover up their half-hearted, or, to put it more bluntly and plainly, their treacherous, perfidious policy towards the revolution. Let us now see how the Social-Democrats appraise the tasks of the moment. Excellent material for this is provided by the two resolutions quite recently adopted by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and by the "Conference" of the Party's break-away section. The question as to which of these resolutions appraises the political situation more correctly and defines the tactics of the revolutionary proletariat more correctly is of enormous importance, and every Social-Democrat who is anxious to perform his duties intelligently as propagandist, agitator, and organiser must study this question with the closest attention disregarding all irrelevant considerations.

By the Party's tactics we mean the Party's political conduct, or the character, direction, and methods of its political activity. Tactical resolutions are adopted by Party congresses in order to accurately define the political conduct of the Party as a whole with regard to new tasks or in view of a new political situation. Such a new situation has been created by the revolution that has started in Russia, i.e., the complete, decisive, and open break between the overwhelming majority of the people and the tsarist government. The new question concerns the practical methods of convening a genuinely popular and a genuinely constituent assembly (the theoretical question concerning such an assembly was officially settled by Social-Democracy long ago, before all other parties, in its Party programme). Since the people have broken with the government and the masses realise the necessity of setting up a new order, the party which set itself the object of overthrowing the government must necessarily consider what government should replace the old, deposed government. There arises a *new* question concerning a provisional revolutionary government. To give a complete answer to this question the party of the class-conscious proletariat must clarify: 1) the *significance* of a provisional revolutionary government in the revolution now in progress and in the entire struggle of the proletariat in general; 2) its *attitude* towards a provisional revolutionary government; 3) the precise conditions of Social-Democratic *participation* in this government; 4) the conditions under which pressure is to be brought to bear on this government from *below*, i.e., in the event of there being no Social-Democrats in it. Only when all these

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 486-94, 511-25.—Ed.

questions have been clarified, will the political conduct of the party in this sphere be principled, clear, and firm.

Let us now consider how the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party answers these questions. The following is the full text of the resolution:

*"Resolution on a Provisional Revolutionary Government"*

"Whereas:

1) both the direct interests of the proletariat and those of its struggle for the ultimate aims of socialism require the fullest possible measure of political freedom, and, consequently, the replacement of the autocratic form of government by the democratic republic;

2) the establishment of a democratic republic in Russia is possible only as a result of a victorious popular insurrection whose organ will be a provisional revolutionary government, which alone will be capable of securing complete freedom of agitation during the election campaign and of convening a constituent assembly that will really express the will of the people, an assembly elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot;

3) under the present social and economic order this democratic revolution in Russia will not weaken but strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie which at a certain juncture will inevitably go to any length to take away from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains of the revolutionary period as possible:

"Therefore the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party resolves:

a) that it is necessary to spread among the working class a concrete idea of the most probable course of the revolution, and of the necessity, at a certain moment in the revolution, for the appearance of a provisional revolutionary government, from which the proletariat will demand the realisation of all the immediate political and economic demands of our programme (the minimum programme);

b) that subject to the alignment of forces and other factors which cannot be exactly predetermined, representatives of our Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts and of defending the independent interests of the working class;

c) that an indispensable condition for such participation is strict control of its representatives by the Party, and the constant safeguarding of the independence of Social-Democracy which strives for the complete socialist revolution, and, consequently, is irreconcilably opposed to all the bourgeois parties;

d) that irrespective of whether participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government is possible or not, we must propagate among the broadest sections of the proletariat the idea that the armed proletariat, led by the Social-Democratic Party, must bring to bear constant pressure on the provisional government for the purpose of defending, consolidating, and extending the gains of the revolution."

## 2. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ON A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT?

As is evident from its title, the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party is devoted wholly and exclusively to the question of a provisional revolutionary government. Hence, the participation of Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government constitutes part of that question. On the other hand, the resolution deals with a provisional revolutionary government only, and with nothing else; consequently, the question of the "conquest of power" in general, etc., does not at all come into the picture. Was the Congress right in eliminating this and similar questions? Undoubtedly it was, because the political situation in Russia does not by any means turn such questions into immediate issues. On the contrary, the whole people have now raised the issue of the overthrow of the autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly. Party congresses should take up and decide not issues which this or that writer has happened to mention opportunely or inopportunely, but such as are of vital political importance by reason of the prevailing conditions and the objective course of social development.

Of what significance is a provisional revolutionary government in the present revolution and in the general struggle of the proletariat? The resolution of the Congress explains this by pointing at the very outset to the need for the "fullest possible measure of political liberty", both from the standpoint of the immediate interests of the proletariat and from the standpoint of the "final aims of socialism". And complete political liberty requires that the tsarist autocracy be replaced by a democratic republic, as our Party programme has already recognised. The stress the Congress resolution lays on the slogan of a democratic republic is necessary both as a matter of logic and in point of principle, for it is precisely complete liberty that the proletariat, as the foremost champion of

democracy, is striving to attain. Moreover, it is all the more advisable to stress this at the present time, because right now the monarchists, namely, the so-called Constitutional-"Democratic" or the *Osvobozhdeniye* Party in our country, are flying the flag of "democracy". To establish a republic it is absolutely necessary to have an assembly of people's representatives, which must be a popular (i.e., elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections, and secret ballot) and constituent assembly. That is exactly what is recognised further on in the Congress resolution. However the resolution does not stop at that. To establish a new order "that will really express the will of the people" it is not enough to term a representative assembly a constituent assembly. Such an assembly must have the authority and power to "constitute". Conscious of this the Congress resolution does not confine itself to the formal slogan of a "constituent assembly", but adds the material conditions which alone will enable such an assembly to carry out its task properly. This specification of the conditions enabling an assembly that is constituent in name to become one in fact is imperatively necessary, for, as we have more than once pointed out, the liberal bourgeoisie, as represented by the Constitutional-Monarchist Party, is deliberately distorting the slogan of a popular constituent assembly, and reducing it to a hollow phrase.

The Congress resolution states that a provisional revolutionary government *alone*, and one, moreover, that will be the organ of a victorious popular insurrection, can secure full freedom to conduct an election campaign and convene an assembly that will really express the will of the people. Is this thesis correct? Whoever took it into his head to dispute it would have to assert that it is possible for the tsarist government not to side with reaction, that it is capable of being neutral during the elections, that it will see to it that the will of the people really finds expression. Such assertions are so absurd that no one would venture to defend them openly; but they are being surreptitiously smuggled in under liberal colours by our *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry. Somebody must convene the constituent assembly; somebody must guarantee the freedom and fairness of the elections; somebody must invest such an assembly with full power and authority. Only a revolutionary government, which is the organ of the insurrection, can desire this in all sincerity, and be capable of doing all that is required to achieve this. The tsarist government will inevitably oppose it. A liberal government which has come to terms with the tsar and which does not rely in full on the popular uprising cannot sincerely desire this, and could not accomplish it, even if it most sincerely desired to. Therefore, the Congress resolution gives the only correct and entirely consistent democratic slogan.

But an appraisal of a provisional revolutionary government's significance would be incomplete and wrong if the class nature of the democratic revolution were lost sight of. The resolution, therefore, adds that a revolution will strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie. This is inevitable under the present, i.e., capitalist, social and economic system. And the strengthening of the bourgeoisie's rule over a proletariat that has secured some measure of political liberty must inevitably lead to a desperate struggle between them for power, must lead to desperate attempts on the part of the bourgeoisie "to take away from the proletariat the gains of the revolutionary period". Therefore, the proletariat, which is in the van of the struggle for democracy and heads that struggle, must not for a single moment forget the new antagonisms inherent in bourgeois democracy, or the new struggle.

Thus, the section of the resolution which we have just reviewed fully appraises the significance of a provisional revolutionary government both in its relation to the struggle for freedom and for a republic, in its relation to a constituent assembly, and in its relation to the democratic revolution which clears the ground for a new class struggle.

The next question is that of the proletariat's attitude in general towards a provisional revolutionary government. The Congress resolution answers this first of all by directly advising the Party to spread among the working class the conviction that a provisional revolutionary government is necessary. The working class must be made aware of this necessity. Whereas the "democratic" bourgeoisie keeps in the background the question of the overthrow of the tsarist government, we must bring it to the fore and insist on the need for a provisional revolutionary government. Moreover, we must outline for such a government a programme of action that will conform with the objective conditions of the present period and with the aims of proletarian democracy. This programme is the *entire* minimum programme of our Party, the programme of the immediate political and economic reforms which, on the one hand, can be fully realised on the basis of the existing social and economic relationships and, on the other hand, are requisite for the next step forward, for the achievement of socialism.

Thus, the resolution clearly defines the nature and the purpose of a provisional revolutionary government. In origin and basic character such a government must be the organ of a popular uprising. Its formal purpose must be to serve as an instrument for convening a national constituent assembly. The content of its activities must be the implementation of the minimum programme of proletarian democracy, the only programme capable of safeguarding



the interests of a people that has risen in revolt against the autocracy.

It might be argued that a provisional government, being only provisional, cannot carry out a constructive programme that has not yet received the approval of the entire people. Such an argument would merely be the sophistry of reactionaries and "absolutists". To refrain from carrying out a constructive programme means tolerating the existence of the feudal regime of a corrupt autocracy. Such a regime could be tolerated only by a government of traitors to the cause of the revolution, but not by a government that is the organ of a popular insurrection. It would be mockery for anyone to propose that we should refrain from exercising freedom of assembly pending the confirmation of such freedom by a constituent assembly, on the plea that the constituent assembly might not confirm freedom of assembly. It is equal mockery to object to the immediate execution of the minimum programme by a provisional revolutionary government.

Finally, we will note that the resolution, by making implementation of the minimum programme the provisional revolutionary government's task, eliminates the absurd and semi-anarchist ideas of giving immediate effect to the maximum programme, and the conquest of power for a socialist revolution. The degree of Russia's economic development (an objective condition), and the degree of class-consciousness and organisation of the broad masses of the proletariat (a subjective condition inseparably bound up with the objective condition) make the immediate and complete emancipation of the working class impossible. Only the most ignorant people can close their eyes to the bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution which is now taking place; only the most naïve optimists can forget how little as yet the masses of the workers are informed about the aims of socialism and the methods of achieving it. We are all convinced that the emancipation of the working classes must be won by the working classes themselves; a socialist revolution is out of the question unless the masses become class-conscious and organised, trained and educated in an open class struggle against the entire bourgeoisie. Replying to the anarchists' objections that we are putting off the socialist revolution, we say: we are not putting it off, but are taking the first step towards it in the only possible way, along the only correct path, namely, the path of a democratic republic. Whoever wants to reach socialism by any other path than that of political democracy, will inevitably arrive at conclusions that are absurd and reactionary both in the economic and the political sense. If any workers ask us at the appropriate moment why we should not go ahead and carry out our maximum programme we shall answer by pointing out how far from socialism the

masses of the democratically-minded people still are, how undeveloped class antagonisms still are, and how unorganised the proletarians still are. Organise hundreds of thousands of workers all over Russia; get the millions to sympathise with our programme! Try to do this without confining yourselves to high-sounding but hollow anarchist phrases—and you will see at once that achievement of this organisation and the spread of this socialist enlightenment depend on the fullest possible achievement of democratic transformations.

Let us continue. Once the significance of a provisional revolutionary government and the attitude of the proletariat toward it have been made clear, the following question arises: is it permissible for us to participate in such a government (action from above) and, if so, under what conditions? What should be our action from below? The resolution supplies precise answers to both these questions. It emphatically declares that it is *permissible* in principle for Social-Democrats to participate in a provisional revolutionary government (during the period of a democratic revolution, the period of struggle for a republic). By this declaration we once and for all dissociate ourselves both from the anarchists, who answer this question in the negative in principle, and from the tail-enders in Social-Democracy (like Martynov and the new-*Iskra* supporters), who *have tried to frighten* us with the prospect of a situation in which it might prove necessary for us to participate in such a government. By this declaration the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party irrevocably rejected the new-*Iskra* idea that the participation of Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government would be a variety of Millerandism, that it is impermissible in principle, as sanctifying the bourgeois order, etc.

It stands to reason, however, that the question of permissibility in principle does not solve the question of practical expediency. Under what conditions is this new form of struggle—the struggle “from above”, recognised by the Party Congress—expedient? It goes without saying that it is impossible at present to speak of concrete conditions, such as the relation of forces, etc., and the resolution, naturally, refrains from defining these conditions in advance. No intelligent person would venture at present to predict anything on this subject. What we can and must do is to determine the nature and aim of our participation. That is what is done in the resolution, which points to the two purposes for which we participate: 1) a relentless struggle against counter-revolutionary attempts, and 2) the defence of the independent interests of the working class. At a time when the liberal bourgeoisie is beginning to talk with such zeal about the psychology of reaction (see Mr. Struve’s most instructive “Open Letter” in

*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 71) in an attempt to frighten the revolutionary people and induce it to show compliance towards the autocracy—at such a time it is particularly appropriate for the party of the proletariat to call attention to the task of waging a real war against counter-revolution. In the final analysis force alone settles the great problems of political liberty and the class struggle, and it is our business to prepare and organise this force and to employ it actively, not only for defence but also for attack. The long reign of political reaction in Europe, which has lasted almost uninterruptedly since the days of the Paris Commune,<sup>237</sup> has made us too greatly accustomed to the idea that action can proceed only “from below”, has too greatly inured us to seeing only defensive struggles. We have now undoubtedly entered a new era—a period of political upheavals and revolutions has begun. In a period such as that which Russia is now passing through, it is impermissible to confine ourselves to old, stereotyped formulas. We must propagate the idea of action from above, must prepare for the most energetic, offensive action, and must study the conditions for and forms of such action. The Congress resolution brings two of these conditions into the forefront: one refers to the formal aspect of Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government (strict control by the Party over its representatives), the other, to the nature of such participation (without for an instant losing sight of the aim of effecting a complete socialist revolution).

Having thus explained all aspects of the Party's policy with regard to action “from above”—this new, hitherto almost unprecedented method of struggle—the resolution also provides for the eventuality that we shall not be able to act from above. We must in any case exercise pressure on the provisional revolutionary government from below. To be able to exercise this pressure from below, the proletariat must be armed—for in a revolutionary situation matters develop with exceptional rapidity to the stage of open civil war—and must be led by the Social-Democratic Party. The object of its armed pressure is “to defend, consolidate, and extend the gains of the revolution”, i.e., those gains which from the standpoint of the proletariat's interests must consist in fulfilling the whole of our minimum programme.

With this, we conclude our brief analysis of the Third Congress resolution on a provisional revolutionary government. As the reader will see, the resolution explains the importance of this new question, the attitude of the party of the proletariat toward it, and the policy the party must pursue both within a provisional revolutionary government and outside it.

Let us now consider the corresponding resolution of the “Conference”.

### 3. WHAT IS MEANT BY "THE REVOLUTION'S DECISIVE VICTORY OVER TSARISM"?

The resolution of the "Conference" is devoted to the question: *"The conquest of power and participation in a provisional government."*\* As we have already pointed out, there is confusion in the very manner in which the question is presented. On the one hand, the question is presented in a narrow way: it deals only with our participation in a provisional government and not with the Party's tasks in regard to a provisional revolutionary government in general. On the other hand, two totally different questions are confused, viz., the question of our participation in one of the stages of the *democratic* revolution and the question of the *socialist* revolution. Indeed, the "conquest of power" by Social-Democracy is precisely a socialist revolution, nor can it be anything else if we use these words in their direct and usual meaning. If, however, we are to understand these words to mean the conquest of power for a democratic revolution and not for a socialist revolution, then what is the point in talking not only about participation in a provisional revolutionary government but also about the "conquest of power" *in general*? Obviously our "conferees" were themselves not very certain as to what they should talk about—the democratic or the socialist revolution. Those who have followed the literature on this question know that this confusion was started by Comrade Martynov in his notorious *Two Dictatorships*; the new-Iskrists are reluctant to recall the manner in which this question was presented (even before January 9)<sup>238</sup> in that model of tail-ender writing. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that it exerted an ideological influence on the Conference.

But enough about the title of the resolution. Its contents reveal errors incomparably more serious and profound. Here is the first part:

"A decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism may be marked either by the establishment of a provisional government, which will emerge from a victorious popular insurrection, or by the revolutionary initiative of a representative institution of one kind or another, which, under direct revolutionary pressure from the people, decides to set up a popular constituent assembly."

Thus, we are told that a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism may be marked either by a victorious insurrection, or . . . by a representative institution's decision to set up a constituent assembly! What does that mean? How are we to understand it? A decisive victory may be marked by a "decision" to set up a con-

\* The full text of this resolution can be reconstructed by the reader from the quotations given on pp. 400, 403, 407, 431, and 433 of the pamphlet. (Author's note to the 1907 edition. See pp. 474, 479, 483, 512, 515 of the present volume.—Ed.)

stituent assembly?? And such a "victory" is put side by side with the establishment of a provisional government which will "emerge from a victorious popular insurrection"!! The Conference failed to note that a *victorious* popular insurrection and the *establishment* of a provisional government would signify the victory of the revolution *in actual fact*, whereas a "decision" to set up a constituent assembly would signify a victory of the revolution *in words* only.

The Conference of the new-*Iskra* Mensheviks fell into the very error that the liberals, the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, are constantly making. The *Osvobozhdeniye* group prattle about a "constituent" assembly, bashfully shutting their eyes to the fact that power and authority remain in the hands of the tsar and forgetting that to "constitute" one must possess the *power* to do so. The Conference also forgot that it is a far cry from a "decision" adopted by representatives—no matter who they are—to the fulfilment of that decision. The Conference also forgot that while power remains in the hands of the tsar all decisions of any representatives whatsoever will remain empty and miserable prattle, as was the case with the "decisions" of the Frankfort Parliament,<sup>239</sup> famous in the history of the German Revolution of 1848. In his *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* Marx, the representative of the revolutionary proletariat, castigated the Frankfort *Osvobozhdeniye*-type liberals with merciless sarcasm, precisely because they uttered fine words, adopted all sorts of democratic "decisions", "constituted" all kinds of liberties, while in fact they left power in the hands of the king and failed to organise an armed struggle against the military forces at the king's disposal. And while the Frankfort *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals were prattling, the king bided his time and consolidated his military forces, and the counter-revolution relying on real force utterly routed the democrats, with all their fine "decisions".

The Conference put on a par with a decisive victory the very thing that lacks the essential condition for victory. How was it possible for Social-Democrats, who recognise the republican programme of our Party, to commit such an error? To understand this strange phenomenon we must turn to the Third Congress's resolution on the break-away section of the Party.\* This resolution

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\* We cite this resolution in full. "The Congress places on record that since the time of the Party's fight against Economism certain trends have survived in the R.S.D.L.P. which are akin to Economism in varying degrees and respects, and betray a common tendency to belittle the importance of the class-conscious element in the proletarian struggle and to subordinate it to the element of spontaneity. On questions of organisation the representatives of these trends put forward, in theory, the organisation-as-process principle which is out of harmony with methodically conducted Party work, while in practice they systematically deviate from Party discipline in very many cases, and in other cases preach to the least enlightened section of the Party the idea of a

refers to the fact that various trends "akin to Economism" exist in our Party. Our "conferees" (it is not fortuitous that they are under the ideological guidance of Martynov) talk of the revolution in exactly the same way as the Economists talked of the political struggle or the eight-hour day. The Economists immediately brought forward the "theory of stages": 1) the struggle for rights, 2) political agitation, 3) political struggle; or 1) a ten-hour day, 2) a nine-hour day, 3) an eight-hour day. The results of this "tactics-as-process" are sufficiently well known to all. Now we are invited to make a preliminary and neat division of the revolution as well into the following stages: 1) the tsar convenes a representative institution; 2) this institution "decides" under pressure of the "people" to set up a constituent assembly; 3) ... the Mensheviks have not yet agreed among themselves as to the third stage; they have forgotten that the revolutionary pressure of the people will meet with the counter-revolutionary pressure of tsarism and that therefore either the "decision" will remain unfulfilled or the issue will be decided after all by the victory or the defeat of a popular insurrection. The Conference resolution duplicates the following Economist reasoning: a decisive victory of the workers may be marked either by the realisation of the eight-hour day in a revolutionary way, or by the granting of a ten-hour day and a "decision" to go over to a nine-hour day. ... The duplication is perfect.

The objection may be made to us that the authors of the resolution did not mean to *place on a par* the victory of an insurrection and the "decision" of a representative institution convened by the tsar, and that they only wanted to provide for the Party's tactics in either case. To this we shall answer: 1) The text of the resolution plainly and unambiguously describes the *decision* of a representative institution as "a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism". Perhaps that is the result of careless wording:

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wide application of the elective principle, without taking into consideration the objective conditions of Russian life, and so strive to undermine the only basis for Party ties that is possible at the present time. In tactical questions they betray a striving to narrow the scope of Party work, declaring their opposition to the Party pursuing completely independent tactics in relation to the liberal-bourgeois parties, denying that it is possible and desirable for our Party to assume the role of organiser in the people's insurrection and opposing the participation of the Party in a provisional democratic-revolutionary government under any conditions whatsoever.

"The Congress instructs all Party members everywhere to conduct an energetic ideological struggle against such partial deviations from the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy; at the same time, however, it is of the opinion that persons who share such views to any degree may belong to Party organisations on the indispensable condition that they recognise the Party congresses and the Party Rules and wholly submit to Party discipline." (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

perhaps it could be corrected after consulting the minutes, but, until corrected, the present wording can have only one meaning, and that meaning is entirely in keeping with the *Osvobozhdeniye* line of reasoning. 2) The *Osvobozhdeniye* line of reasoning into which the authors of the resolution have drifted stands out in far greater relief in other literary productions of the new-*Iskra* group. For instance, in its article "The Zemsky Sobor\* and our Tactics", *Sotsial-Demokrat*,<sup>240</sup> organ of the Tiflis Committee (published in the Georgian language; praised by *Iskra* in No. 100), goes so far as to say that "tactics" "which would make the Zemsky Sobor our centre of action" (about the convocation of which, we may add, nothing definite is known as yet!) "*are more to our advantage*" than the "tactics" of insurrection and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government. We shall again refer to this article later. 3) No objection can be made to a preliminary discussion of the tactics the Party should adopt both in the event of the victory of the revolution and in the event of its defeat, both in the event of a successful insurrection and in the event of the insurrection failing to develop into a serious force. It is possible that the tsarist government will succeed in convening a representative assembly for the purpose of striking a deal with the liberal bourgeoisie; providing for that eventuality, the Third Congress resolution speaks plainly about "hypocritical policy", "pseudo-democracy", "a travesty of popular representation, such as the so-called Zemsky Sobor".\*\* But the whole point is that this is not said

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National Assembly.—Ed.

The following is the text of this resolution on the attitude towards the tactics of the government on the eve of the revolution

"Whereas for purposes of self preservation, the government, during the present revolutionary period, while intensifying the usual measures of repression directed mainly against the class-conscious elements of the proletariat, at the same time 1) tries by means of concessions and promises of reform to corrupt the working class politically and thereby to divert it from the revolutionary struggle; 2) with the same object clothes its hypocritical policy of concessions in pseudo-democratic forms, ranging from an invitation to the workers to elect their representatives to commissions and conferences, to the establishment of a travesty of popular representation, such as the so-called Zemsky Sobor; 3) organises the so-called Black Hundreds<sup>241</sup> and incites against the revolution all those elements of the people in general who are reactionary, ignorant, or blinded by racial or religious hatred."

"The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves to call on all Party organisations.

a) while exposing the reactionary purpose of the government's concessions to emphasise in their propaganda and agitation the fact that, on the one hand, these concessions were wrested by force, and, on the other, that it is absolutely impossible for the autocracy to grant reforms satisfactory to the proletariat;

b) taking advantage of the election campaign to explain to the workers the real significance of these governmental measures and to show that it is necessary for the proletariat to convene by revolutionary means a constituent

in a resolution on a provisional revolutionary government, for it had nothing to do with a provisional revolutionary government. This eventuality defers the problem of the insurrection and of the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government; it alters this problem, etc. The point at issue today is not that all kinds of combinations are possible, that both victory and defeat are possible or that there may be direct or circuitous paths; the point is that it is impermissible for a Social-Democrat to cause confusion in workers' minds as to which is the genuinely revolutionary path; that it is impermissible to describe as a decisive victory, as *Osvobozhdeniye* does, something which lacks the *main* condition for victory. It is possible that we shall win even the eight-hour day, not at one stroke, but only in a long and roundabout way; but what would you say of a man who calls such impotence, such weakness as renders the proletariat *incapable* of counteracting procrastination, delays, haggling, treachery, and reaction—a victory for the workers? It is possible that the Russian revolution will end in an “abortive constitution”, as was once stated in *Uperyod*,\* but can this justify a Social-Democrat, who on the eve of a decisive struggle would call this abortion a “decisive victory over tsarism”? It is possible that at worst we shall not only fail to win a republic but that even the constitution will be illusory, a constitution “à la Shipov”,<sup>242</sup> but would it be pardonable for a Social-Democrat to tone down our republican slogan?

Of course, the new-Iskrists have not as yet gone so far as to tone it down. But the degree to which the revolutionary spirit has abandoned them, the degree to which lifeless pedantry has blinded them to the militant tasks of the moment, is most vividly shown by the fact that in their resolution they, of all things, *forgot* to say a word about the republic. This is incredible but it is a fact. All the slogans of Social-Democracy were endorsed, repeated, explained, and presented in detail in the various resolutions of the

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assembly on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and a secret ballot;

c) to organise the proletariat for the immediate realisation in a revolutionary way of the eight-hour working day and of the other immediate demands of the working class;

d) to organise armed resistance to the actions of the Black Hundreds and, in general, of all reactionary elements led by the government.” (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)

\* The newspaper *Uperyod*, which was published in Geneva, began to appear in January 1905 as the organ of the Bolshevik section of the Party. From January to May eighteen issues appeared. In May by virtue of the decision of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, *Proletary* replaced *Uperyod* as the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. (This Congress took place in London, in May; the Mensheviks did not appear there but organised their own “Conference” in Geneva.) (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—*Ed.*)



Conference—even the election of shop-stewards and deputies by the workers was not forgotten, but they simply found no occasion to mention the republic in a resolution on a provisional revolutionary government. To talk of the “victory” of the people’s insurrection, of the establishment of a provisional government without indicating what these “steps” and acts have to do with winning a republic amounts to writing a resolution with the intention of crawling along in the wake of the proletarian movement, and not of giving guidance to the proletariat’s struggle.

To sum up: the first part of the resolution 1) gave no explanation whatever of the significance of a provisional revolutionary government from the standpoint of the struggle for a republic and of securing a genuinely popular and genuinely constituent assembly; 2) quite confused the democratic consciousness of the proletariat by placing on a par with revolution’s decisive victory over tsarism a state of affairs in which precisely the main condition for a real victory is lacking.

#### 4. THE ABOLITION OF THE MONARCHY. THE REPUBLIC

Let us go over to the next section of the resolution:

“...in either case such a victory will inaugurate a new phase in the revolutionary epoch.

“The final abolition of the entire regime of the monarchy and social estates in the process of mutual struggle between the elements of politically emancipated bourgeois society for the satisfaction of their social interests and for the direct acquisition of power—such is the task in this new phase which the objective conditions of social development spontaneously evoke.

“Therefore, a provisional government that would undertake to carry out the tasks of this revolution, bourgeois in its historical nature, would, in regulating the mutual struggle between antagonistic classes of a nation in the process of emancipation, not only have to advance revolutionary development, but also to combat factors in that development threatening the foundations of the capitalist system.”

Let us examine this section which forms an independent part of the resolution. The basic idea in the arguments quoted above coincides with the one set forth in the third clause of the Congress resolution. However, collation of these parts of the two resolutions will at once reveal the following radical difference between them. The Congress resolution, which briefly describes the social and economic basis of the revolution, concentrates attention entirely on the clear-cut struggle of classes for definite gains, and places in the forefront the militant tasks of the proletariat. The resolution of the Conference, which carries a long, nebulous, and confused description of the socio-economic basis of the revolution, speaks

very vaguely about a struggle for definite gains, and leaves the militant tasks of the proletariat completely in the background. The resolution of the Conference speaks of the abolition of the old order in the process of mutual struggle among the various elements of society. The Congress resolution says that we, the party of the proletariat, must effect this abolition; that only the establishment of a democratic republic signifies genuine abolition of the old order; that we must win that republic; that we shall fight for it and for complete liberty, not only against the autocracy, but also against the bourgeoisie, when it attempts (and it will surely do so) to wrest our gains from us. The Congress resolution calls on a definite class to wage a struggle for a precisely defined immediate aim. The Conference resolution discourses on the mutual struggle of various forces. One resolution expresses the psychology of active struggle, the other that of the passive onlooker; one resounds with the call for live action, the other is steeped in lifeless pedantry. Both resolutions state that the present revolution is only our first step, which will be followed by a second: but from this, one resolution draws the conclusion that we must take this first step all the sooner, get it over all the sooner, win a republic, mercilessly crush the counter-revolution, and prepare the ground for the second step. The other resolution, however, oozes, so to speak, with verbose descriptions of the first step and (excuse the crude expression) simply masticates it. The Congress resolution takes the old, yet eternally new, ideas of Marxism (the bourgeois nature of a democratic revolution) as a preface or first premise, whence it draws conclusions as to the progressive tasks of the progressive class, which is fighting both for the democratic and for the socialist revolution. The Conference resolution does not go beyond the preface, chewing it over and over again, and trying to be clever about it.

This is the very distinction which has long divided the Russian Marxists into two wings: the moralising and the militant wings of the old days of "legal Marxism", and the economic and political wings of the period of the nascent mass movement. From the correct Marxist premise concerning the deep economic roots of the class struggle in general and of the political struggle in particular, the Economists have drawn the singular conclusion that we must turn our backs on the political struggle and retard its development, narrow its scope, and reduce its aims. The political wing, on the contrary, has drawn a different conclusion from these same premises, namely, that the deeper the roots of our present struggle, the more widely, the more boldly, the more resolutely, and with greater initiative must we wage this struggle. We have the very same controversy before us now, only under different circumstances and in a different form. From the premises that a democratic

revolution is far from being a socialist revolution, that the poor and needy are by no means the only ones to be "interested" in it, that it is deeply rooted in the inescapable needs and requirements of the *whole* of bourgeois society—from these premises we draw the conclusion that the advanced class must formulate its democratic aims all the more boldly, express them all the more sharply and completely, put forward the immediate slogan of a republic, and popularise the idea of the need to establish a provisional revolutionary government and to crush the counter-revolution ruthlessly. Our opponents, the new-*Iskra* group, however, deduce from these very same premises that the democratic conclusions should not be expressed fully, that the republic may be omitted from the practical slogans, that we can refrain from popularising the idea of the need for a provisional revolutionary government, that a mere decision to convene a constituent assembly can be termed a decisive victory, that there is no need to advance the task of combating counter-revolution as our active aim, so that it may be submerged in a nebulous (and, as we shall presently see, wrongly formulated) reference to a "process of mutual struggle". This is not the language of political leaders, but of archive fogeys.

The more closely one examines the various formulations in the resolution of the new-*Iskra* group, the clearer its aforementioned basic features become. We are told, for instance, of a "process of mutual struggle between the elements of politically emancipated bourgeois society". Bearing in mind the subject this resolution deals with (a provisional revolutionary government) one asks in astonishment, "If you are referring to the process of mutual struggle, how can you keep silent about the elements which are politically *enslaving* bourgeois society? Do the 'conferees' really imagine that, since they have assumed the revolution will be victorious, these elements have already disappeared?" Such an idea would be absurd in general and an expression of the greatest political naïveté and political short-sightedness in particular. After the revolution's victory over counter-revolution the latter will not disappear; on the contrary, it will inevitably start a new and even more desperate struggle. Since the purpose of our resolution is to analyse the tasks that will confront us when the revolution is victorious, it is our duty to devote tremendous attention to the tasks of repelling counter-revolutionary attacks (as is done in the Congress resolution), and not to submerge these immediate, urgent, and vital political tasks of a militant party in general discussions on what will happen *after* the present revolutionary period, or what will happen when a "politically *emancipated* society" already exists. Just as the Economists would, by repeating the truism that politics are subordinated to economics, cover up their incapacity to understand urgent political tasks, so the new-*Iskra* group, by

repeating the truism that struggles will take place in a politically *emancipated* society, cover up their incapacity to understand the urgent revolutionary tasks of that society's political *emancipation*.

Take the expression "the final abolition of the entire regime of the monarchy and social-estates". In plain language the final abolition of the monarchist system means the establishment of a democratic republic. But our good Martynov and his admirers think that this expression is far too clear and simple. They insist on making it "deeper" and putting it more "cleverly". As a result, we get, on the one hand, ridiculous and vain efforts to appear profound: on the other hand, we get a description instead of a slogan, a kind of melancholy retrospection instead of a stirring appeal to march forward. We get the impression not of living people eager to fight for a republic here and now, but of so many withered mummies who, *sub specie aeternitatis*,\* consider the question from the *plusquamperfectum* viewpoint.

Let us continue: "...the provisional government ... would undertake to carry out the tasks of this ... bourgeois revolution". ... Here we at once see the result of our conferees having overlooked a concrete question confronting the proletariat's political leaders. The concrete question of a provisional revolutionary government has been obscured from their field of vision by the question of the future series of governments which will carry out the aims of the bourgeois revolution in general. If you want to consider the question "historically", the example of any European country will show you that it was a series of governments, by no means "provisional", that carried out the historical aims of the bourgeois revolution, that even governments which defeated the revolution were nevertheless forced to carry out the historical aims of that defeated revolution. But what you speak of is not called a "provisional revolutionary government": that is the name given to the government of a revolutionary epoch, one that immediately replaces the overthrown government and rests on the people's insurrection, and not on some kind of representative institution coming from the people. A provisional revolutionary government is the organ of struggle for the immediate victory of the revolution, for the immediate repulsion of attempts at counter-revolution, and not at all an organ for the implementation of the historical aims of the bourgeois revolution in general. Let us leave it to the future historians of a future *Russkaya Starina* to determine exactly what aims of the bourgeois revolution we, or some government or other, shall have achieved—there will be time enough to do that thirty years from now; at present we must put forward slogans and give

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\* From the viewpoint of eternity (Latin).—Ed.

practical directives for the struggle for a republic and for the proletariat's most active participation in that struggle.

For the reasons stated, the final propositions in the foregoing section of the resolution quoted above are also unsatisfactory. The expression that the provisional government would have to "regulate" the mutual struggle among the antagonistic classes is most inapt, or at any rate awkwardly put; Marxists should not use such liberal-*Osvobozhdeniye* formulas, which would have us believe that it is possible to have governments which serve not as organs of the class struggle but as its "regulators". . . . The government would "not only have to advance revolutionary development but also to combat factors in that development threatening the foundations of the capitalist system". But it is the proletariat, in whose name the resolution speaks, that constitutes this "factor"! Instead of indicating just how the proletariat should "advance revolutionary development" at the present time (advance it farther than the constitutionalist bourgeoisie would care to go), instead of advice to make definite preparations for the struggle against the bourgeoisie when the latter turns against the conquests of the revolution, we are offered a general description of a process, a description which says nothing about the concrete aims of *our* activity. The new-*Iskra* manner of expressing its views reminds one of Marx's opinion (stated in his famous Theses on Feuerbach) of the old materialism, which was alien to the ideas of dialectics. The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways, said Marx; the point, however, is to *change* it.<sup>243</sup> Similarly, the new-*Iskra* group can give a tolerable description and explanation of the process of struggle taking place before their eyes, but they are altogether incapable of giving a correct slogan for this struggle. Good marchers but poor leaders, they disparage the materialist conception of history by ignoring the active, leading, and guiding part which can and must be played in history by parties that have realised the material prerequisites of a revolution and have placed themselves at the head of the progressive classes.

## 5. HOW SHOULD "THE REVOLUTION BE ADVANCED"?

Let us quote the next section of the resolution:

"Under such conditions, Social-Democracy must strive to maintain throughout the revolution a position which will best of all ensure it the possibility of advancing the revolution, will not tie the hands of Social-Democracy in its struggle against the inconsistent and self-seeking policy of the bourgeois parties, and will preserve it from being dissolved in bourgeois democracy.

"Therefore, Social-Democracy must not set itself the aim of seizing or sharing power in the provisional government, but must remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition."

The advice to occupy a position which best ensures the possibility of advancing the revolution pleases us very much indeed. We would only desire that this piece of good advice should be accompanied by a direct indication as to how Social-Democracy should further advance the revolution right now, in the present political situation, in a period of rumours, conjectures, and talk and schemes about the convocation of the people's representatives. Can the revolution now be further advanced by those who fail to understand the danger of the *Osvobozhdeniye* theory of "compromise" between the people and the tsar, by those who call a mere "decision" to convene a constituent assembly a victory, who do not set themselves the task of carrying on active propaganda of the idea of the need for a provisional revolutionary government, or who leave the slogan of a democratic republic in the background? Such people actually *pull the revolution back*, because, as far as *practical politics* are concerned, they have stopped at the level of the *Osvobozhdeniye* stand. What is the use of their recognising a programme which demands that the autocracy be replaced by a republic, if in a resolution on tactics that defines the Party's present and immediate tasks in the period of revolution they omit the slogan of a struggle for a republic? It is the *Osvobozhdeniye* position, the position of the constitutionalist bourgeoisie, that is now actually characterised by the fact that a decision to convene a popular constituent assembly is considered a decisive victory, while a prudent silence is maintained on the subject of a provisional revolutionary government and a republic! To *advance* the revolution, to take it beyond the limits to which the monarchist bourgeoisie advances it, it is necessary actively to produce, emphasise, and bring into the forefront slogans that will *preclude* the "inconsistency" of bourgeois democracy. At present there are *only two* such slogans: 1) a provisional revolutionary government, and 2) a republic, because the slogan of a popular constituent assembly *has been accepted* by the monarchist bourgeoisie (see the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League) and accepted for the very purpose of devitalising the revolution, preventing its complete victory, and enabling the big bourgeoisie to strike a huckster's bargain with tsarism. And now we see that of the two slogans, which alone are capable of advancing the revolution, the Conference completely forgot the slogan of a republic, and plainly put the slogan of a provisional revolutionary government on a par with the *Osvobozhdeniye* slogan of a popular constituent assembly, calling both the one and the other "a decisive victory of the revolution"!!

Indeed, such is the undoubted fact, which, we are sure, will serve as a landmark for the future historian of Russian Social-Democracy. The Conference of Social-Democrats held in May 1905 passed a resolution which contains fine words about the necessity of advancing the democratic revolution, but in fact pulls it back and goes no farther than the democratic slogans of the monarchist bourgeoisie.

The new-*Iskra* group likes to accuse us of ignoring the danger of the proletariat becoming dissolved in bourgeois democracy. We should like to see the person who would undertake to prove this charge on the basis of the text of the resolutions passed by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Our reply to our opponents is—a Social-Democratic Party which operates in a bourgeois society cannot take part in politics without marching, in certain cases, *side by side* with bourgeois democracy. The difference between us in this respect is that we march side by side with the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie, without merging with it, whereas you march side by side with the *liberal and the monarchist bourgeoisie*, without merging with it either. *That is how matters stand.*

The tactical slogans you have formulated in the name of the Conference *coincide* with the slogans of the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party, i.e., *the party of the monarchist bourgeoisie*; moreover, you have not even noticed or realised this coincidence, thus actually following in the *wake* of the *Osvobodnitsy* fraternity.

The tactical slogans we have formulated in the name of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party coincide with the slogans of the democratic-revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie. In Russia this bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie have not yet formed themselves into a big people's party. But only one who is utterly ignorant of what is now taking place in Russia can doubt that elements of such a party exist. We intend to guide (if the great Russian revolution makes progress) not only the proletariat, organised by the Social-Democratic Party, but also this petty bourgeoisie, which is capable of marching side by side with us.

Through its resolution the Conference unconsciously *descends* to the level of the liberal and monarchist bourgeoisie. Through its resolution, the Party Congress consciously *raises* to its own level those elements of revolutionary democracy that are capable of waging a struggle, and not acting as brokers.

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\* The Socialist-Revolutionaries are a terrorist group of intellectuals rather than the embryo of such a party, although the objective significance of this group's activities can be reduced to this very task of achieving the aims of the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie.

Such elements are mostly to be found among the peasants. In classifying the big social groups according to their political tendencies we can, without danger of serious error, identify revolutionary and republican democracy with the mass of the peasants—of course, in the same sense and with the same reservations and implied conditions that we can identify the working class with Social-Democracy. In other words, we can formulate our conclusions in the following terms as well: in a revolutionary period the Conference, through its *nation-wide\* political* slogans, unconsciously *descends to the level of the mass of the landlords*. Through its country-wide political slogans, the Party Congress *raises the mass of the peasants to a revolutionary level*. To anyone who, because of this conclusion, would accuse us of a penchant for paradoxes, we issue the following challenge: let him refute the proposition that, if we are not strong enough to bring the revolution to a successful conclusion, if the revolution *ends* in a “decisive victory” in the *Osvobozhdeniye* sense, i.e., only in the form of a representative assembly convened by the tsar, one that could be called a constituent assembly only in derision—then that will be a revolution in which the *landlord and big bourgeois* element will preponderate. On the other hand, if we are destined to live through a really great revolution, if history does not allow a “miscarriage” this time, if we are strong enough to carry the revolution to a successful conclusion, to a decisive victory, not in the *Osvobozhdeniye* or the new-*Iskra* sense of the word, then that will be a revolution in which the peasant and proletarian element will preponderate.

Some people may, perhaps, interpret our admission that such a preponderance is possible as renunciation of the view that the impending revolution will be bourgeois in character. This is very likely, considering how this concept is misused in *Iskra*. For this reason it will not be at all superfluous to dwell on this question.

## 6. WHENCE IS THE PROLETARIAT THREATENED WITH THE DANGER OF FINDING ITSELF WITH ITS HANDS TIED IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE INCONSISTENT BOURGEOISIE?

Marxists are absolutely convinced of the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution. What does that mean? It means that the democratic reforms in the political system, and the social and

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\* We are not referring here to the special peasant slogans which have been dealt with in separate resolutions.



economic reforms that have become a necessity for Russia, do not in themselves imply the undermining of capitalism, the undermining of bourgeois rule; on the contrary, they will, for the first time, really clear the ground for a wide and rapid, European, and not Asiatic, development of capitalism; they will, for the first time, make it possible for the bourgeoisie to rule as a class. The Socialist-Revolutionaries cannot grasp this idea, for they do not know the ABC of the laws of development of commodity and capitalist production; they fail to see that even the complete success of a peasant insurrection, even the redistribution of the whole of the land in favour of the peasants and in accordance with their desires ("general redistribution" or something of the kind) will not destroy capitalism at all, but will, on the contrary, give an impetus to its development and hasten the class disintegration of the peasantry itself. Failure to grasp this truth makes the Socialist-Revolutionaries unconscious ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie. Insistence on this truth is of enormous importance for Social-Democracy not only from the standpoint of theory but also from that of practical politics, for it follows therefrom that complete class independence of the party of the proletariat in the present "general democratic" movement is an indispensable condition.

But it does not by any means follow that a *democratic* revolution (bourgeois in its social and economic essence) would not be of *enormous* interest to the proletariat. It does not follow that the democratic revolution could not take place both in a form advantageous mainly to the big capitalist, the financial magnate, and the "enlightened" landlord, and in a form advantageous to the peasant and the worker.

The new-*Iskra* group completely misunderstands the meaning and significance of bourgeois revolution as a category. The idea that is constantly running through their arguments is that a bourgeois revolution is one that can be advantageous only to the bourgeoisie. And yet nothing can be more erroneous than such an idea. A bourgeois revolution is a revolution which does not depart from the framework of the bourgeois, i.e., capitalist, socio-economic system. A bourgeois revolution expresses the needs of capitalist development, and, far from destroying the foundations of capitalism, it effects the contrary—it broadens and deepens them. This revolution, therefore, expresses the interests not only of the working class but of the entire bourgeoisie as well. Since the rule of the bourgeoisie over the working class is inevitable under capitalism, it can well be said that a bourgeois revolution expresses the interests not so much of the proletariat as of the bourgeoisie. But it is quite absurd to think that a bourgeois revolution does not at all express proletarian interests. This absurd idea boils down either to the hoary Narodnik theory that a bourgeois revo-

lution runs counter to the interests of the proletariat, and that, therefore, we do not need bourgeois political liberty; or to anarchism which denies any participation of the proletariat in bourgeois politics, in a bourgeois revolution and in bourgeois parliamentarism. From the standpoint of theory this idea disregards the elementary propositions of Marxism concerning the inevitability of capitalist development on the basis of commodity production. Marxism teaches us that at a certain stage of its development a society which is based on commodity production and has commercial intercourse with civilised capitalist nations must inevitably take the road of capitalism. Marxism has irrevocably broken with the Narodnik and anarchist gibberish that Russia, for instance, can bypass capitalist development, escape from capitalism, or skip it in some way other than that of the class struggle, on the basis and within the framework of this same capitalism.

All these principles of Marxism have been proved and explained in minute detail in general and with regard to Russia in particular. And from these principles it follows that the idea of seeking salvation for the working class in anything save the further development of capitalism is *reactionary*. In countries like Russia the working class suffers not so much from capitalism as from the insufficient development of capitalism. The working class is, therefore, *most certainly interested* in the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism. The removal of all the remnants of the old order which hamper the broad, free, and rapid development of capitalism is of absolute *advantage* to the working class. The bourgeois revolution is precisely an upheaval that most resolutely sweeps away survivals of the past, survivals of the serf-owning system (which include not only the autocracy but the monarchy as well), and most fully guarantees the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism.

That is why a *bourgeois* revolution is *in the highest degree advantageous to the proletariat*. A bourgeois revolution is *absolutely* necessary in the interests of the proletariat. The more complete, determined, and consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more assured will the proletariat's struggle be against the bourgeoisie and for socialism. Only those who are ignorant of the ABC of scientific socialism can regard this conclusion as new, strange, or paradoxical. And from this conclusion, among other things, follows the thesis that *in a certain sense* a bourgeois revolution is *more advantageous* to the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie. This thesis is unquestionably correct in the following sense: it is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie to rely on certain remnants of the past, as against the proletariat, for instance, on the monarchy, the standing army, etc. It is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie for

the bourgeois revolution not to sweep away all remnants of the past too resolutely, but keep some of them, i.e., for this revolution not to be fully consistent, not to be complete, and not to be determined and relentless. Social-Democrats often express this idea somewhat differently by stating that the bourgeoisie betrays its own self, that the bourgeoisie betrays the cause of liberty, that the bourgeoisie is incapable of being consistently democratic. It is of greater advantage to the bourgeoisie for the necessary changes in the direction of bourgeois democracy to take place more slowly, more gradually, more cautiously, less resolutely, by means of reforms and not by means of revolution; for these changes to spare the "venerable" institutions of the serf-owning system (such as the monarchy) as much as possible; for these changes to develop as little as possible the independent revolutionary activity, initiative, and energy of the common people, i.e., the peasantry and especially the workers, for otherwise it will be easier for the workers, as the French say, "to change the rifle from one shoulder to the other", i.e., to turn against the bourgeoisie the weapon the bourgeois revolution will supply them with, the liberty the revolution will bring, and the democratic institutions that will spring up on the ground cleared of the serf-owning system.

On the other hand, it is more advantageous to the working class for the necessary changes in the direction of bourgeois democracy to take place by way of revolution and not by way of reform, because the way of reform is one of delay, procrastination, the painfully slow decomposition of the putrid parts of the national organism. It is the proletariat and the peasantry that suffer first of all and most of all from that putrefaction. The revolutionary path is one of rapid amputation, which is the least painful to the proletariat, the path of the immediate removal of what is putrescent, the path of least compliance with and consideration for the monarchy and the abominable, vile, rotten, and noxious institutions that go with it.

So it is not only because of the censorship, not only "for fear of the Jews", that our bourgeois-liberal press deplores the possibility of the revolutionary path, fears the revolution, tries to frighten the tsar with the bogey of revolution, seeks to avoid revolution, and grovels and toadies for the sake of miserable reforms as the foundation of the reformist path. This standpoint is shared not only by *Russkiye Uedomosti*, *Syn Otechestva*, *Nasha Zhizn*,<sup>245</sup> and *Nashi Dni*,<sup>245</sup> but also by the illegal, uncensored *Osvobozhdeniye*. The very position the bourgeoisie holds as a class in capitalist society inevitably leads to its inconsistency in a democratic revolution. The very position the proletariat holds as a class compels it to be consistently democratic. The bourgeoisie looks backward in fear of democratic progress which threatens

to strengthen the proletariat. The proletariat has nothing to lose but its chains, but with the aid of democratism it has the whole world to win. That is why the more consistent the bourgeois revolution is in achieving its democratic transformations, the less will it limit itself to what is of advantage exclusively to the bourgeoisie. The more consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more does it guarantee the proletariat and the peasantry the benefits accruing from the democratic revolution.

Marxism teaches the proletariat not to keep aloof from the bourgeois revolution, not to be indifferent to it, not to allow the leadership of the revolution to be assumed by the bourgeoisie but, on the contrary, to take a most energetic part in it, to fight most resolutely for consistent proletarian democratism, for the revolution to be carried to its conclusion. We cannot get out of the bourgeois-democratic boundaries of the Russian revolution, but we can vastly extend these boundaries, and within these boundaries we can and must fight for the interests of the proletariat, for its immediate needs and for conditions that will make it possible to prepare its forces for the future complete victory. There is bourgeois democracy and bourgeois democracy. The Zemstvo monarchist who favours an upper chamber and "asks" for universal suffrage, while secretly, on the sly, striking a bargain with tsarism for a docked constitution, is a bourgeois democrat too. The peasant, who has taken up arms against the landlords and the government officials, and with a "naïve republicanism" proposes "to send the tsar packing",<sup>\*</sup> is also a bourgeois democrat. There are bourgeois-democratic regimes like the one in Germany, and also like the one in England; like the one in Austria and also like those in America and Switzerland. He would be a fine Marxist indeed who in a period of democratic revolution failed to see this difference between the degrees of democratism and the difference between its forms, and confined himself to "clever" remarks to the effect that, after all, this is "a bourgeois revolution", the fruit of "bourgeois revolution".

Our new-Iskristis are just such clever fellows, who actually flaunt their short-sightedness. They confine themselves to disquisitions on the bourgeois character of revolution, just when and where it is necessary to be able to draw a distinction between republican-revolutionary and monarchist-liberal bourgeois democracy, to say nothing of the distinction between inconsistent bourgeois democratism and consistent proletarian democratism. They are satisfied—as if they had really become like the "man in the muffler"<sup>246</sup>—with doleful talk about a "process of mutual struggle of antagonistic classes", when the

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\* See *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 71, p. 337, footnote 2.

question is one of providing *democratic leadership* in the present revolution, of emphasising *progressive democratic* slogans, as distinct from the treacherous slogans of Mr. Struve and Co., of bluntly and straightforwardly stating the immediate aims of the really revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry, as distinct from the liberal haggling of the landlords and manufacturers. Such now is the gist of the matter, which you, gentlemen, have missed, namely: will our revolution result in a real, immense victory, or merely in a wretched deal; will it go so far as the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or will it "peter out" in a liberal constitution *à la* Shipov?

At first sight it may appear that in raising this question we are deviating entirely from our subject. However, that may appear so only at first sight. As a matter of fact, it is precisely this question that lies at the root of the difference in principle which has already become clearly marked between the Social-Democratic tactics of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the tactics initiated by the Conference of the new-*Iskra* supporters. The latter have already taken not two but three steps back resurrecting the mistakes of Economism in solving problems that are incomparably more complex, more important, and more vital to the workers' party, viz., questions of its tactics in time of revolution. That is why we must analyse the question we have raised with all due attention.

The above-quoted section of the new-Iskrists' resolution points to the danger of Social-Democracy tying its own hands in the struggle against the inconsistent policy of the bourgeoisie, of its becoming dissolved in bourgeois democracy. The thought of this danger pervades all specifically new-Iskrists' literature; it lies at the very heart of the principle involved in our Party split (ever since the bickering in the split was completely overshadowed by the turn towards Economism). Without any equivocation we admit that this danger really exists, that just at the present time, at the height of the Russian revolution, this danger has become particularly grave. The pressing and extremely responsible duty that devolves on all of us theoreticians or—as I should prefer to say of myself—publicists of Social-Democracy is to find out *from what direction* this danger actually threatens. For the source of our disagreement is not a dispute as to whether such a danger exists, but the dispute as to whether it is caused by the so-called tail-ism of the "Minority" or the so-called revolutionism of the "Majority".

To remove all misinterpretations and misunderstandings let us first of all note that the danger to which we are referring lies not in the subjective, but in the objective aspect of the matter, not in the formal stand which Social-Democracy will take in the

struggle, but in the material outcome of the entire present revolutionary struggle. The question is not whether this or that Social-Democratic group will want to dissolve in bourgeois democracy, or whether they realise that they are doing so. Nobody suggests that. We do not suspect any Social-Democrat of harbouring such a desire, and this is not at all a matter of desire. Nor is it a question of whether this or that Social-Democratic group will formally retain its separate identity, individuality, and independence of bourgeois democracy throughout the course of the revolution. They may not merely proclaim such "independence", but may even retain it formally, and yet *it may turn out* that their hands will nevertheless be tied in the struggle against the inconsistency of the bourgeoisie. The ultimate political outcome of the revolution may prove to be that, despite the formal "independence" of Social-Democracy, despite its complete organisational individuality as a separate party, it will in fact not be independent; it will not be able to place the imprint of its proletarian independence on the course of events; it will prove so weak that, on the whole and in the last analysis, its "dissolution" in bourgeois democracy will nevertheless be a historical fact.

That is what constitutes the real danger. Now let us see from what direction the danger threatens—from the deviation of Social-Democracy, as represented by the new *Iskra*, to the Right, as we believe; or from the deviation of Social-Democracy, as represented by the "Majority", *Uperyod*, etc., to the Left—as the new-*Iskra* group believes.

The answer to this question, as we have pointed out, is determined by the objective combination of the operation of the various social forces. The character of these forces has been defined theoretically by the Marxist analysis of Russian life; at present it is being determined in practice by open action by groups and classes in the course of the revolution. Now the entire theoretical analysis made by the Marxists long before the period we are now passing through, as well as all the practical observations of the development of revolutionary events, show that, from the standpoint of objective conditions, there are two possible courses and two possible outcomes of the revolution in Russia. The transformation of the economic and political system in Russia along bourgeois-democratic lines is inevitable and inescapable. No power on earth can prevent such a transformation, but the combined action of the existing forces which are effecting it may result in either of two things, may bring about either of two forms of that transformation. Either 1) matters will end in "the revolution's decisive victory over tsarism", or 2) the forces will be inadequate for a decisive victory, and matters will end in a deal between tsarism and the most "incon-

sistent" and most "self-seeking" elements of the bourgeoisie. By and large, all the infinite variety of details and combinations, which no one is able to foresee, lead to one outcome or the other.

Let us now consider these two possibilities, first, from the standpoint of their social significance and, secondly, from the standpoint of the position of Social-Democracy (its "dissolution" or "having its hands tied") in one outcome or the other.

What is meant by "the revolution's decisive victory over tsarism"? We have already seen that in using this expression the new-*Iskra* group fail to grasp even its immediate political significance. Still less do they seem to understand the class essence of this concept. Surely, we Marxists must not under any circumstances allow ourselves to be deluded by *words*, such as "revolution" or "the great Russian revolution", as do many revolutionary democrats (of the Gapon type). We must be perfectly certain in our minds as to what real social forces are opposed to "tsarism" (which is a real force perfectly intelligible to all) and are capable of gaining a "decisive victory" over it. The big bourgeoisie, the landlords, the factory owners, the "society" which follows the *Osvobozhdeniye* lead, cannot be such a force. We see that they do not even want a decisive victory. We know that owing to their class position they are incapable of waging a decisive struggle against tsarism: they are too heavily fettered by private property, by capital and land to enter into a decisive struggle. They stand in too great need of tsarism, with its bureaucratic, police, and military forces for use against the proletariat and the peasantry, to want it to be destroyed. No, the only force capable of gaining "a decisive victory over tsarism" is the *people*, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, if we take the main, big forces, and distribute the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie (also part of "the people") between the two. "The revolution's decisive victory over tsarism" means the establishment of the *revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*. Our new-*Iskra* group cannot escape from this conclusion, which *Uperyod* indicated long ago. No other force is capable of gaining a decisive victory over tsarism.

And such a victory will be precisely a dictatorship, i.e., it must inevitably rely on military force, on the arming of the masses, on an insurrection, and not on institutions of one kind or another established in a "lawful" or "peaceful" way. It can be only a dictatorship, for realisation of the changes urgently and absolutely indispensable to the proletariat and the peasantry will evoke desperate resistance from the landlords, the big bourgeoisie, and tsarism. Without a dictatorship it is impossible to break down that resistance and repel counter-revolutionary attempts. But of course it will be a democratic, not a socialist dictatorship. It will be unable (without a series of intermediary stages of revolutionary develop-

ment) to affect the foundations of capitalism. At best, it may bring about a radical redistribution of landed property in favour of the peasantry, establish consistent and full democracy, including the formation of a republic, eradicate all the oppressive features of Asiatic bondage, not only in rural but also in factory life, lay the foundation for a thorough improvement in the conditions of the workers and for a rise in their standard of living, and—last but not least—carry the revolutionary conflagration into Europe. Such a victory will not yet by any means transform our bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution; the democratic revolution will not immediately overstep the bounds of bourgeois social and economic relationships; nevertheless, the significance of such a victory for the future development of Russia and of the whole world will be immense. Nothing will raise the revolutionary energy of the world proletariat so much, nothing will shorten the path leading to its complete victory to such an extent, as this decisive victory of the revolution that has now started in Russia.

How far such a victory is probable is another question. We are not in the least inclined to be unreasonably optimistic on that score; we do not for a moment forget the immense difficulties of this task, but, since we are out to fight, we must desire victory and be able to point out the right road to it. Trends capable of leading to such a victory undoubtedly exist. True, our influence on the masses of the proletariat—the Social-Democratic influence—is as yet very, very inadequate; the revolutionary influence on the mass of the peasantry is quite insignificant; the proletarians, and especially the peasants, are still frightfully disunited, backward, and ignorant. However, revolution unites rapidly and enlightens rapidly. Every step in its development rouses the masses and attracts them with irresistible force to the side of the revolutionary programme, as the only programme that fully and consistently expresses their real and vital interests.

According to a law of mechanics, action and reaction are always equal. In history too, the destructive force of a revolution is to a considerable degree dependent on how strong and protracted the suppression of the striving for liberty has been, and how profound is the contradiction between the outmoded “superstructure” and the living forces of our times. The international political situation, too, is in many respects taking shape in a way most advantageous to the Russian revolution. The workers’ and peasants’ insurrection has already begun; it is sporadic, spontaneous, and weak, but it unquestionably and undoubtedly proves the existence of forces capable of waging a decisive struggle and marching towards a decisive victory.

If these forces prove inadequate tsarism will have time to conclude a deal, which is already being prepared at the two



extremes by the Bulygins and the Struves. Then the whole matter will end in a docked constitution, or, if the worst comes to the worst, even in a travesty of a constitution. This, too, will be a "bourgeois revolution", but it will be a miscarriage, a premature birth, an abortion. Social-Democracy entertains no illusions on that score; it knows the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie; it will not lose heart or abandon its persistent, patient, and sustained work of giving the proletariat class training, even in the most drab, humdrum days of bourgeois-constitutional "Shipov" bliss. Such an outcome would be more or less similar to that of almost all the nineteenth-century democratic revolutions in Europe, and our Party development would then proceed along the arduous, long, but familiar and beaten track.

The question now arises: in which outcome of the two possible will Social-Democracy find its hands actually tied in the struggle against the inconsistent and self-seeking bourgeoisie, find itself actually "dissolved", or almost so, in bourgeois democracy?

It is sufficient to put this question clearly to have a reply without a moment's difficulty.

If the bourgeoisie succeeds in frustrating the Russian revolution by coming to terms with tsarism, Social-Democracy will find its hands actually tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie; Social-Democracy will find itself "dissolved" in bourgeois democracy in the sense that the proletariat will not succeed in placing its clear imprint on the revolution, will not succeed in settling accounts with tsarism in the proletarian or, as Marx once said, "in the plebeian manner".

If the revolution gains a decisive victory—then we shall settle accounts with tsarism in the Jacobin, or, if you like, in the plebeian way. "The whole French terrorism," wrote Marx in 1848 in the famous *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, "was nothing but a plebeian manner of settling accounts with the enemies of the bourgeoisie, with absolutism, feudalism, and philistinism" (see Marx, *Nachlass*, Mehring's edition, Vol. III, p. 211).<sup>247</sup> Have those people who in a period of a democratic revolution try to frighten the Social-Democratic workers in Russia with the bogey of "Jacobinism" ever given thought to the significance of these words of Marx?

The new-*Iskra* group, the Girondists of contemporary Russian Social-Democracy, does not merge with the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, but actually, by reason of the nature of its slogans, it follows in the wake of the latter. And the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, i.e., the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, wishes to settle accounts with the autocracy in a reformist manner, gently and compliantly, so as not to offend the aristocracy, the nobles, or the Court—cautiously, without breaking anything—

kindly and politely as befits gentlemen in white gloves (like the ones Mr. Petrunkevich borrowed from a bashi-bazouk<sup>248</sup> to wear at the reception of "representatives of the people" [?] held by Nicholas the Bloodstained,<sup>249</sup> see *Proletary*, No. 5\*).

The Jacobins of contemporary Social-Democracy—the Bolsheviks, the *Uperiyod* supporters, the "Congress" group, *Proletary* supporters<sup>250</sup>—or whatever else we may call them—wish by their slogans to raise the revolutionary and republican petty bourgeoisie, and especially the peasantry, to the level of the consistent democratism of the proletariat, which fully retains its individuality as a class. They want the people, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, to settle accounts with the monarchy and the aristocracy in the "plebeian way", ruthlessly destroying the enemies of liberty, crushing their resistance by force, making no concessions whatever to the accursed heritage of serf-ownership, Asiatic barbarism, and human degradation.

This, of course, does not mean that we necessarily propose to imitate the Jacobins of 1793, and borrow their views, programme, slogans, and methods of action. Nothing of the kind. Our programme is not an old one but a new—the minimum programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. We have a new slogan: the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. If we live to see the real victory of the revolution we shall also have new methods of action in keeping with the nature and aims of the working-class party that is striving for a complete socialist revolution. By our parallel we merely want to explain that the representatives of the progressive class of the twentieth century, the proletariat, i.e., the Social-Democrats, are divided into two wings (the opportunist and the revolutionary) similar to those into which the representatives of the progressive class of the eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie, were divided, i.e., the Girondists and the Jacobins.

Only in the event of a complete victory of the democratic revolution will the proletariat have its hands free in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie; only in that event will it not become "dissolved" in bourgeois democracy, but will leave its proletarian, or rather proletarian-peasant, imprint on the whole revolution.

In a word, to avoid finding itself with its hands tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeois democracy the proletariat must be class-conscious and strong enough to rouse the peasantry to revolutionary consciousness, guide its assault, and thereby independently pursue the line of consistent proletarian democratism.

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 526-30.—Ed.

That is how matters stand in the question—so ineptly dealt with by the new-*Iskra* group—of the danger of our hands being tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie will always be inconsistent. There is nothing more naïve and futile than attempts to set forth conditions and points\* which, if satisfied, would enable us to consider that the bourgeois democrat is a sincere friend of the people. Only the proletariat can be a consistent fighter for democracy. It can become a victorious fighter for democracy only if the peasant masses join its revolutionary struggle. If the proletariat is not strong enough for this the bourgeoisie will be at the head of the democratic revolution and will impart an inconsistent and self-seeking nature to it. Nothing but a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry can prevent this.

Thus, we arrive at the indubitable conclusion that it is the new-*Iskra* tactics which, by its objective significance, is *playing into the hands of the bourgeois democrats*. The preaching of organisational diffuseness which goes to the length of plebiscites, the principle of compromise, and the divorcement of Party literature from the Party; belittling of the aims of insurrection; confusing of the popular political slogans of the revolutionary proletariat with those of the monarchist bourgeoisie; distortion of the requisites for "revolution's decisive victory over tsarism"—all these taken together produce that very policy of tail-ism in a revolutionary period, which bewilders the proletariat, disorganises it, confuses its understanding, and belittles the tactics of Social-Democracy instead of pointing out the only way to victory and getting all the revolutionary and republican elements of the people to adhere to the proletariat's slogan.

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To bear out this conclusion, reached by us through analysis of the resolution, let us approach this same question from other angles. Let us first see how in the Georgian *Sotsial-Demokrat* a naïve and outspoken Menshevik illustrates the new-*Iskra* tactics. Secondly, let us see who is actually making use of the new-*Iskra* slogans in the present political situation.

## 7. THE TACTICS OF "ELIMINATING THE CONSERVATIVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT"

The article in the organ of the Tiflis Menshevik "Committee" (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1), to which we have just referred, is entitled "The Zemsky Sobor and Our Tactics". Its author has

\* As was attempted by Starover in his resolution, annulled by the Third Congress,<sup>251</sup> and as the Conference attempts in an equally poor resolution.

not yet entirely forgotten our programme; he advances the slogan of a republic, but this is how he discusses tactics:

"It is possible to point to two ways of achieving this goal" (a republic): "either completely ignore the Zemsky Sobor that is being convened by the government and defeat the government by force of arms, form a revolutionary government and convene a constituent assembly, or declare the Zemsky Sobor the centre of our action, influencing its composition and activities by force of arms, forcibly compelling it to declare itself a constituent assembly, or convene a constituent assembly through it. These two tactics differ very sharply from each other. Let us see which of them is of more advantage to us."

This is how the Russian new-Iskristis set forth ideas subsequently incorporated in the resolution we have analysed. Note that this was written before the battle of Tsushima,<sup>252</sup> when the Bulygin "scheme" had not yet seen the light of day. Even the liberals were losing patience and voicing their distrust from the pages of the legal press; however, a Social-Democrat of the new-*Iskra* brand has proved more credulous than the liberals. He declares that the Zemsky Sobor "is being convened" and trusts the tsar so much that he proposes to make this as yet non-existent Zemsky Sobor (or, possibly, "State Duma" or "Advisory Legislative Assembly"?) the centre of our action. Being more outspoken and straightforward than the authors of the resolution adopted at the Conference, our Tiflisian does not put the two "tactics" (which he expounds with inimitable naïveté) on a par, but declares that the second is of greater "advantage". Just listen:

"The first tactic. As you know, the coming revolution is a bourgeois revolution, i.e., its purpose is to effect such changes in the present system as are of interest not only to the proletariat but to the whole of bourgeois society. All classes are opposed to the government, even the capitalists themselves. The militant proletariat and the militant bourgeoisie are in a certain sense marching together and jointly attacking the autocracy from different sides. The government is completely isolated and has no public sympathy. For this reason it is very easy to destroy it. The Russian proletariat, as a whole, is not yet sufficiently class-conscious and organised to be able to carry out the revolution by itself. And even if it were able to do so it would carry through a proletarian (socialist) revolution and not a bourgeois revolution. Hence, it is in our interest that the government should remain without allies, that it should be unable to divide the opposition, join hands with the bourgeoisie, and leave the proletariat in isolation. . . ."

So it is in the interests of the proletariat that the tsarist government should be unable to divide the bourgeoisie and the proletariat! Is it not by mistake that this Georgian organ is called *Sotsial-Demokrat* instead of *Osvobozhdeniye*? And note its peerless philosophy of democratic revolution! Is it not obvious that this poor Tiflisian is hopelessly confused by the pedantic

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\* Crossed out in the manuscript here are two question marks in parentheses which had been inserted in the quotation by Lenin.—Ed.

tail-ist interpretation of the concept "bourgeois revolution"? He discusses the question of the possible isolation of the proletariat in a democratic revolution, and *forgets* ... forgets a trifle ... the peasantry! Of the possible allies of the proletariat he knows and favours the Zemstvo landlords, but is not aware of the peasants. And this in the Caucasus! Well, were we not right when we said that in its reasoning the new *Iskra* was sinking to the level of the monarchist bourgeoisie instead of raising the revolutionary peasantry to the position of our ally?

"...Otherwise the defeat of the proletariat and the victory of the government are inevitable. This is just what the autocracy is striving for. In its Zemsky Sobor it will undoubtedly attract to its side representatives of the nobility, the Zemstvos, the cities, the universities, and similar bourgeois institutions." It will try to appease them with petty concessions, and thereby reconcile them to itself. Strengthened in this way, it will direct all its blows against the working people, who will have been isolated. It is our duty to prevent such an unfortunate outcome. But can this be done by the first method? Let us assume that we paid no attention whatever to the Zemsky Sobor, but started to prepare for insurrection ourselves, and one fine day came out in the streets armed and ready for battle. The result would be that we would be confronted not with one but with two enemies, the government and the Zemsky Sobor. While we were preparing, they were able to come to terms,<sup>\*\*\*</sup> enter into an agreement with each other, draw up a constitution advantageous to themselves, and divide power between them. This tactic is of direct advantage to the government, and we must reject it in the most energetic fashion...."

Now this is frank! So we must resolutely reject the "tactics" of preparing an insurrection because "meanwhile" the government would come to terms with the bourgeoisie. Can one find in the old literature of the most rabid Economism anything that would even approximate such a disgrace to revolutionary Social-Democracy? It is a fact that insurrections and outbreaks by workers and peasants are occurring, first in one place and then in another. The Zemsky Sobor, however, is a Bulygin promise. And the *Sotsial-Demokrat* of the city of Tiflis decides that the tactic of preparing an insurrection should be rejected, and a "centre of influence" should be awaited—the Zemsky Sobor ...

"...The second tactic, on the contrary, consists in bringing the Zemsky Sobor under our supervision, in not giving it the opportunity to act according to its own will,<sup>\*\*\*</sup> and enter into an agreement with the government<sup>\*\*\*</sup>"

Crossed out here in the manuscript is the following, written by Lenin: "The nobility, the universities, and other similar bourgeois institutions! One has to go back to *Rabochaya Mysl* to find such virginally vulgar 'Marxism'!"—Ed.

Crossed out here in the manuscript is the following, written by Lenin: "What Jacobinism! 'to prepare' for an uprising!"—Ed.

Crossed out here in the manuscript is the following, written by Lenin: "Ugh, what revolutionary spirit!"—Ed.

By what means can the Zemstvo people be deprived of their own will? Perhaps by use of a special sort of litmus-paper?

"We support the Zemsky Sobor inasmuch as it fights the autocracy, and we fight it whenever it becomes reconciled with the autocracy. By energetic intervention and by force we shall bring about a split among the deputies,\* rally the radicals to our side,\*\* eliminate the conservatives from the government, and thus put the whole\*\*\* Zemsky Sobor on the path of revolution. Thanks to such tactics, the government will always remain isolated, the opposition\*\*\*\* will be strong, and the establishment of a democratic system will thereby be facilitated."

Well, well! Let anyone now say that we exaggerate the new-Iskrists' turn to the most vulgar semblance of Economism. This is positively like the famous powder for exterminating flies: first you catch your fly, stick it on the flypaper, and the fly will die. Bring about a split among the deputies of the Zemsky Sobor by force, "eliminate the conservatives from the government"—and the whole Zemsky Sobor will take the path of revolution.... No "Jacobin" armed insurrection of any sort, but just like that, in genteel, almost parliamentary fashion, "influencing" the members of the Zemsky Sobor.

Poor Russia! It has been said that she always wears the old-fashioned bonnets that Europe has discarded. We have no parliament as yet, even Bulygin has not yet promised one, but we have an amount of parliamentary cretinism.<sup>253</sup>

"...How should this intervention be effected? First of all, we shall demand that the Zemsky Sobor be convened on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, direct elections by secret ballot. Simultaneously with the announcement of this electoral procedure, complete freedom to carry on the election campaign, i.e., freedom of assembly, speech, and the press, the inviolability of electors and candidates, and the release of all political prisoners, must be made law.\* ) The elections themselves must be fixed as late as possible, to give us sufficient time to inform and prepare the people. And since the drafting of the regulations governing the convocation of the Sobor has been entrusted to a commission headed by Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, we should also exert pressure on this commission and on its members.† ) If the Bulygin Commission refuses to satisfy our demands, ‡ ) and

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\* Heavens! This is certainly rendering tactics "profound"! There are no forces available to fight in the streets, but it is possible "to bring about a split among the deputies" by "force". Listen, comrade from Tiflis, lie if you must, but there's a limit. . . .

† Crossed out here in the manuscript is the following, written by Lenin: "poor Struve! and he passes for a radical! What a fate—to be united by force to the new Iskrists. . . ."—Ed.

‡ Crossed out here in the manuscript is the following, written by Lenin: "Hear, hear!"—Ed.

§ Crossed out here in the manuscript is the following, written by Lenin: "without the eliminated conservatives?"—Ed.

\*) In *Iskra*?

\*\*) By Nicholas?

\*\*\*) So this is what is meant by the tactic of "eliminating the conservatives from the government"!

\*\*\*\*) But surely such a thing cannot happen if we follow this correct and profound tactic!

giants suffrage only to property owners, then we must intervene in these elections and by revolutionary means make the voters elect progressive candidates and in the Zemsky Sobor demand a constituent assembly' Finally, we must by all possible measures—demonstrations, strikes, and insurrection if need be—compel the Zemsky Sobor to convene a constituent assembly or declare itself to be such. The armed proletariat must be the defender of the constituent assembly, and together both will march forward to a democratic republic.

"Such is the Social-Democratic tactics, and it alone will secure us victory."

Let not the reader imagine that this incredible nonsense comes from some new-*Iskra* maiden writer, a man with no authority or influence. No, this is stated in the *organ* of an entire committee of new-*Iskra* supporters, the Tillis Committee. More than that. This nonsense has been *openly endorsed* by "*Iskra*", in No. 100 of which we read the following about that issue of the *Sotsial-Demokrat*:

*"The first issue is edited in a lively and talented manner. The experienced hand of a capable editor and writer is perceptible. . . . It may be said with all confidence that the newspaper will carry out brilliantly the task it has set itself."*

Yes! If that task is to show clearly to all and sundry the utter ideological decay of the new-*Iskra* trend, then it has indeed been carried out "brilliantly". No one could have expressed new-*Iskra* degradation to liberal bourgeois opportunism in a more "lively, talented, and capable" manner.

## 8. THE "OSVOBOZHDENIYE" AND NEW-"ISKRA" TRENDS

Let us now proceed to another striking confirmation of the political significance of the new-*Iskra* trend.

In a splendid, remarkable, and most instructive article, entitled "How To Find Oneself" (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 71), Mr. Struve wages war against the "programmatic revolutionism" of our extreme parties. Mr. Struve is particularly displeased with me personally.<sup>254</sup> As far as I am concerned, Mr. Struve could not

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Crossed out here in the manuscript is the following, written by Lenin " 'make the voters elect'—'by revolutionary means'! What revolutionary Repetitionism<sup>254</sup> we come across!"—Ed.

Both the armed proletariat and the conservatives "eliminated from the government"?

"In comparison with the revolutionism of Mr. Lenin and his associates the revolutionism of the West-European Social-Democracy of Bebel, and even of Kautsky, is opportunism; but the foundations of even this already toned-down revolutionism have been undermined and washed away by history." A most irate thrust. Only Mr. Struve should not think he can lay all the blame on me, as he could on an opponent no longer alive. I have only to challenge Mr. Struve, though I am sure he will never accept such a challenge, to answer the following questions. When and where did I call the "revolutionism of Bebel

have pleased me more: I could not wish for a better ally in the fight against the renascent Economism of the new-*Iskra* group and the absence of principles displayed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. On some other occasion we shall relate how Mr. Struve and *Osvobozhdeniye* have proved in practice how utterly reactionary are the "amendments" to Marxism made in the Socialist-Revolutionaries' draft programme. We have already repeatedly<sup>\*</sup> spoken of the honest, faithful and real service rendered to me by Mr. Struve whenever he approved of the new-*Iskra* trend in principle, and we shall now speak of that once more.

Mr. Struve's article contains a number of very interesting statements, which we can note here only in passing. He intends "to create Russian democracy by relying on class collaboration and not on class struggle", in which case "the socially privileged intelligentsia" (something like the "cultured nobility" to which Mr. Struve makes obeisance with the grace of a true high-society ... lackey) will bring "the weight of its social position" (the weight of its money-bags) to this "non-class" party. Mr. Struve expresses the desire to acquaint the youth with the

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and Kautsky" opportunism? When and where did I ever claim to have created any sort of special trend in international Social-Democracy *not identical* with the trend of Bebel and Kautsky? When and where have there been brought to light differences between me, on the one hand, and Bebel and Kautsky, on the other—differences even slightly approximating in gravity the differences between Bebel and Kautsky, for instance, on the agrarian question in Breslau?<sup>255</sup> Let Mr. Struve try to answer these three questions.

To our readers we say: the liberal bourgeoisie *everywhere* and *always* resorts to the method of assuring its adherents in a given country that the Social-Democrats of that country are most unreasonable, whereas their comrades in a neighbouring country are "goody-goodies". The German bourgeoisie has *hundreds of times* held up "goody-goody" French socialists as models for the Bebels and the Kautskys. The French bourgeoisie quite recently pointed to "goody-goody" Bebel as a model for the French socialists. That is an old trick, Mr. Struve! You will find only children and ignoramuses swallowing such bait. The complete unanimity of international revolutionary Social-Democracy on all major questions of programme and tactics is a most incontrovertible fact.

<sup>\*</sup> Let us remind the reader that the article "What Should Not Be Done" (*Iskra*, No. 52) was vociferously hailed by *Osvobozhdeniye* as a "noteworthy turn" towards concessions to the opportunists. The principles underlying the new-*Iskra* ideas were especially lauded by *Osvobozhdeniye* in an item on the split among Russian Social-Democrats. Commenting on Trotsky's pamphlet, *Our Political Tasks*, *Osvobozhdeniye* noted the similarity between this author's ideas and what was once written and said by the *Rabocheye Dyelo* writers Krichevsky, Martynov, Akimov (see the leaflet entitled "An Obliging Liberal" published by *Uperyod*). (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 486-89.—Ed.) *Osvobozhdeniye* welcomed Martynov's pamphlet on the two dictatorships (see the item in *Uperyod* No. 9). (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 221-22.—Ed.) Finally, Starover's belated complaints about the old slogan of the old *Iskra*, "first draw a line of demarcation and then unite", met with particular sympathy from *Osvobozhdeniye*.



worthlessness "of the hackneyed radical opinion that the bourgeoisie has become frightened and has betrayed the proletariat and the cause of liberty". (We welcome this desire with all our heart. Nothing can confirm the correctness of this Marxist "hackneyed opinion" better than a war waged against it by Mr. Struve. Please, Mr. Struve, don't put off this splendid plan of yours!)

For the purposes of our subject it is important to note the *practical* slogans now being warred against by this politically sensitive representative of the Russian bourgeoisie who is so responsive to the slightest change in the weather. First, he is warring against the slogan of republicanism. Mr. Struve is firmly convinced that this slogan is "incomprehensible and foreign to the mass of the people" (he has forgotten to add: comprehensible to, but not to the advantage of, the bourgeoisie!). We should like to see what reply Mr. Struve would get from the workers in our study circles and at our mass meetings. Or perhaps the workers are not the people? And what about the peasants? They are sometimes given to what Mr. Struve calls "naïve republicanism" ("to send the tsar packing")—yet the liberal bourgeoisie believes that *naïve* republicanism will be replaced not by enlightened republicanism, but by enlightened monarchism! *Ça dépend*, Mr. Struve; it will depend on circumstances. Both tsarism and the bourgeoisie cannot but oppose a radical improvement in the condition of the peasantry at the expense of the landed estates, whereas the working class cannot but assist the peasantry in this respect.

Secondly, Mr. Struve asserts that "in a civil war the attacker is always in the wrong". This idea verges closely on the above-mentioned new-*Iskra* trends. We will not say, of course, that in civil war it is *always* advantageous to attack; no, sometimes defensive tactics is obligatory *for the time being*. But to apply to the Russia of 1905 a proposition like the one Mr. Struve has made means precisely to demonstrate a little of the "hackneyed radical opinion" ("the bourgeoisie takes fright and betrays the cause of liberty"). Whoever now refuses to attack the autocracy and reaction, whoever fails to prepare for such an attack, and whoever does not advocate it, has no right to call himself an adherent of revolution.

Mr. Struve condemns the slogans: "secrecy" and "rioting" (a riot being "an insurrection in miniature"). Mr. Struve despises both of these—and he does so from the standpoint of "the approach to the masses". We should like to ask Mr. Struve whether he can point to any passage in, for instance, *What Is To Be Done?*—the work, from his standpoint, of an extreme rev-

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\* See pp. 92-234 of the present volume.—*Fd.*

olutionary—which advocates rioting. As regards “secrecy”, is there really much difference between, for example, us and Mr. Struve? Are we not both working on “illegal” newspapers which are being smuggled into Russia “secretly” and serve the “secret” groups of either the *Osvobozhdeniye* League or the R.S.D.L.P.? Our workers’ mass meetings are often held “secretly”—we do commit that sin. But what about the meetings held by gentlemen of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League? Have you any grounds to brag, Mr. Struve, and look down upon contemptible partisans of contemptible secrecy?

True, strict secrecy is required in supplying the workers with arms. On this point Mr. Struve is rather more outspoken. Just listen: “As regards insurrection, or a revolution in the technical sense,” only mass propaganda in favour of a democratic programme can create the socio-psychological conditions for a general armed uprising. Thus, even from the point of view of an insurrection being the *inevitable* consummation of the present struggle for emancipation—a view I do not share—the imbuing of the masses with ideas of democratic reform is a most fundamental and most necessary task.”

Mr. Struve tries to evade the issue. He speaks of the inevitability of an insurrection instead of speaking of its necessity for the victory of the revolution. An insurrection—unprepared, spontaneous, sporadic—has already begun. No one can positively vouch that it will develop into a full-fledged and integral insurrection of the people, for that depends on the state of the revolutionary forces (which can be fully gauged only in the course of the struggle itself), on the behaviour of the government and the bourgeoisie, and on a number of other circumstances, which cannot be estimated with precision. It is pointless to speak of inevitability, in the meaning of absolute certainty with regard to some concrete event, to which Mr. Struve would reduce the matter. What you must speak of, if you would be a partisan of revolution, is whether insurrection is *necessary for the victory* of the revolution, whether it is necessary to proclaim it vigorously, to advocate it and make immediate and energetic preparations for it. Mr. Struve cannot fail to understand this difference: he does not, for instance, obscure the question of the need for universal suffrage—which to a democrat is indisputable—by questioning the inevitability of its attainment in the course of the present revolution—which, to people engaged in political activity, is disputable and of little account. By evading the issue of the need for an insurrection, Mr. Struve reveals the innermost

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<sup>1</sup> Crossed out here in the manuscript is the following, written by Lenin. “begins the plagiarism from the new-*Iskra*”.—Ed.

essence of the liberal bourgeoisie's political stand. In the first place, the bourgeoisie would prefer to come to terms with the autocracy rather than crush it; secondly, the bourgeoisie, in all cases, shifts the armed struggle on to the workers' shoulders. That is the *real* meaning of Mr. Struve's evasiveness. That is why he *backs out* of the question of the need for an insurrection, towards the question of its "socio-psychological conditions", and preliminary "propaganda". Just as in the Frankfort Parliament of 1848 the bourgeois windbags were busy drawing up resolutions, declarations, and decisions, engaging in "mass propaganda" and preparing the "socio-psychological conditions", when it was a matter of repelling the government's armed forces, when the movement had "led to the necessity" of an armed struggle, when verbal persuasion alone (which is a hundredfold necessary during the preparatory period) had become banal, bourgeois inactivity and cowardice—so Mr. Struve also evades the question of insurrection, and takes cover behind *phrases*. Mr. Struve shows us revealingly what many Social-Democrats turn a blind eye to, namely, that a revolutionary period differs from ordinary, everyday, preparatory periods in history in that the temper, excitement, and convictions of the masses must and do express themselves in *action*.

Vulgar revolutionism fails to see that words are action, too; this proposition is indisputable when applied to history *in general*, or to those periods of history when no open political mass action takes place. No putsches of any sort can replace or artificially evoke such action. Tail-ist revolutionaries fail to understand that when a revolutionary period has set in, when the old "superstructure" has cracked from top to bottom, when open political action by the classes and masses that are creating a new superstructure for themselves has become a fact, and when civil war has begun—it is apathy, lifelessness, pedantry, or else betrayal of the revolution and treachery to it to confine oneself to "words" *in the old way*, without advancing the *direct slogan* on the need to pass over to "action", and to try to avoid action by pleading the need for "psychological conditions" and "propaganda" in general. The democratic bourgeoisie's Frankfort windbags are a memorable historical example of just such treachery or of just such pedantic stupidity.

Would you like an instance provided by the history of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia to explain this difference between vulgar revolutionism and tail-ism in revolutionaries? We shall provide you with such an explanation. Call to mind the years 1901 and 1902, which are so recent, but already seem ancient history to us today. Demonstrations had begun. Vulgar revolutionism had raised a wail about "assault tactics" (*Rabocheve Dyelo*), "blood-thirsty leaflets" were being issued (of Berlin origin, if my

memory does not fail me), and attacks were being made on the "literary pretentiousness" and armchair nature of the idea of agitation being conducted on a country-wide scale through a newspaper (Nadezhdin).<sup>256</sup> On the contrary, revolutionaries' tail-ism found expression at the time in the teaching that "the economic struggle is the *best* means of political agitation". How did the revolutionary Social-Democrats behave? They attacked both these trends. They condemned pyrotechnic methods and the cries about assault tactics, for it was, or should have been, obvious to all that open mass action was a matter of the morrow. They condemned tail-ism and openly issued the slogan *even* of a popular insurrection, not in the meaning of a direct appeal (Mr. Struve would not discover any appeal to "riot" in our utterances of that period), but in the meaning of a *necessary* deduction, the meaning of "propaganda" (of which Mr. Struve has only now bethought himself—our worthy Mr. Struve is always several years behind the times), in the sense of preparing those very "socio-psychological conditions" on which the representatives of the bewildered and huckstering bourgeoisie are now "sadly and inappropriately" holding forth. *At that time* propaganda and agitation, agitation and propaganda were really brought to the fore by the objective state of affairs. *At that time* work on an all-Russia political newspaper, the weekly publication of which seemed an ideal, could be proposed (and was proposed in *What Is To Be Done?*) as the touchstone of the work of preparing for an insurrection. *At that time* slogans advocating mass agitation *instead* of direct armed action, preparation of the socio-psychological conditions for insurrection *instead* of pyrotechnics were revolutionary Social-Democracy's only correct slogans. *At the present time* these slogans have been overtaken by events; the movement has left them behind; they have become tatters, rags fit only to cover *Osvobozhdeniye* hypocrisy and new-*Iskra* tail-ism!

Or perhaps I am mistaken? Perhaps the revolution has not yet begun? Perhaps the time has not yet arrived for open political action by the classes? Perhaps there is no civil war yet, and the criticism of weapons should not yet be the *necessary* and obligatory successor, heir, trustee, and consummator of the weapon of criticism?

Get out of your study, look about you, and seek your answer in the streets. Has not the government itself started civil war by everywhere shooting down crowds of peaceful and unarmed citizens? Have not the armed Black Hundreds come out as an "argument" of the autocracy? Has not the bourgeoisie—even the bourgeoisie—recognised 'the need for a citizens' militia? Does not Mr. Struve himself, the ideally moderate and punctilious Mr.

Struve, say (alas, he does so only to evade the issue!) that "the open nature of revolutionary action" (that's what we are like today!) "is now one of the most important conditions for exerting an educational influence upon the mass of the people"?

Those who have eyes to see can have no doubt as to how the question of an insurrection must now be presented by partisans of revolution. Examine the *three* presentations of this question provided in those organs of the free press that are at all capable of influencing the *masses*.

Presentation one. The resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.\* It is publicly acknowledged and declared that the general democratic revolutionary movement *has already brought about the necessity* of an insurrection. The organisation of the proletariat for an insurrection has been placed on the order of the day as one of the essential, principal, and *indispensable* tasks of the Party. Instructions have been issued for *most energetic* measures to be taken to arm the proletariat and ensure the possibility of direct leadership of the insurrection.

Presentation two. An article in *Osvobozhdeniye*, with a statement of principles, by the "leader of the Russian constitutionalists" (as Mr. Struve was recently described by so influential

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The following is the text in full.

"1. Whereas the proletariat, being, by virtue of its position, the foremost and only consistently revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play the leading role in the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia.

"2. Whereas this movement at the present time has already led to the necessity of an armed uprising,

"3. Whereas the proletariat will inevitably take the most energetic part in this uprising, which participation will decide the destiny of the revolution in Russia;

"4. Whereas the proletariat can play the leading role in this revolution only if it is united in a single and independent political force under the banner of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which directs its struggle both ideologically and practically;

"5. Whereas only the performance of this role will ensure to the proletariat the most advantageous conditions for the struggle for socialism, against the propertied classes of bourgeois-democratic Russia;

"Therefore the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. holds that the task of organising the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of the armed uprising is one of the major and most urgent tasks of the Party at the present revolutionary moment.

"Accordingly, the Congress instructs all Party organisations

"a) to explain to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation, not only the political significance, but the practical organisational aspect of the impending armed uprising,

"b) to explain in that propaganda and agitation the role of mass political strikes, which may be of great importance at the beginning and during the progress of the uprising, and

"c) to take the most energetic steps towards arming the proletariat, as well

an organ of the European bourgeoisie as *Frankfurter Zeitung*) or the leader of the Russian progressive bourgeoisie. He does not share the opinion that an insurrection is inevitable. Secret activity and rioting are the specific methods of unreasonable revolutionism. Republicanism is the method of stunning. An insurrection is really a mere technical question, whereas "the fundamental and most necessary task" is to carry on mass propaganda and to prepare the socio-psychological conditions.

Presentation three. The resolution of the new-*Iskra* Conference. Our task is to prepare an insurrection. A planned insurrection is out of the question. Favourable conditions for an insurrection are created by the disorganisation of the government, by our agitation, and by our organisation. Only then "can technical combat preparations acquire more or less serious significance".

Is that all? Yes, that is all. Whether insurrection has become necessary is something the new-*Iskra* leaders of the proletariat do not yet know. Whether the task of organising the proletariat for the immediate struggle is an urgent one is not yet clear to them. It is not necessary to urge the adoption of the most energetic measures; it is far more important (in 1905, and not in 1902) to explain in general outline under what conditions these measures "may" acquire "more or less serious" significance. . . .

Do you see now, comrades of the new *Iskra*, where your turn to Martynovism has led you? Do you realise that your political philosophy has proved a rehash of the *Osvobozhdeniye* philosophy?—that (against your will, and without your being aware of it) you are following in the wake of the monarchist bourgeoisie? Is it now clear to you that, while repeating stale truths and perfecting yourselves in sophistry, you have lost sight of the fact that—in the memorable words of Pyotr Struve's memorable article—"the open nature of revolutionary *action* is now one of the most important conditions for exerting an educational influence upon the mass of the people"?

## 9. WHAT IS MEANT BY BEING A PARTY OF EXTREME OPPOSITION IN TIME OF REVOLUTION?

Let us return to the resolution on a provisional government. We have shown that new-Iskrist tactics does not push the revo-

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as drawing up a plan of the armed uprising and of direct leadership thereof, for which purpose special groups of Party workers should be formed as and when necessary." (Author's note to the 1907 edition.—Ed.)

lution forward—the possibility of which they would like to ensure by their resolution—but pulls it back. We have shown that it is precisely this tactics that *ties the hands* of Social-Democracy in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie and does not prevent its being dissolved in bourgeois democracy. The false premises of the resolution naturally lead to the following false conclusion: “Therefore, Social-Democracy must not set itself the aim of seizing or sharing power in the provisional government, but must remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition.” Consider the first half of this conclusion, which contains a statement of aims. Do the new-Iskristis declare that the revolution’s decisive victory over tsarism is the aim of Social-Democratic activity? They do. They are unable correctly to formulate the conditions of a decisive victory, and lapse into the *Osvobozhdeniye* formulation, but they do set themselves this aim. Further, do they associate a provisional government with insurrection? Yes, they do so directly by stating that a provisional government “will emerge from a victorious popular insurrection”. Finally, do they set themselves the aim of guiding the insurrection? Yes, they do. Like Mr. Struve they evade the admission that an insurrection is an urgent necessity, but at the same time, unlike Mr. Struve, they say that “Social-Democracy strives to *subordinate* it (the insurrection) to its influence and *leadership* and to use it in the interests of the working class”.

How nicely this hangs together, does it not? We set ourselves the *aim* of subordinating the insurrection of both the proletarian and *non-proletarian* masses to our influence and our leadership, and of using it in our interests. Hence, we set ourselves the aim of leading, in the insurrection, both the proletariat, and the revolutionary bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie (“the non-proletarian groups”), i.e., of “*sharing*” the leadership of the insurrection between the Social-Democracy and the revolutionary bourgeoisie. We set ourselves the aim of securing *victory* for the insurrection, which is to lead to the establishment of a provisional government (“which will emerge from a victorious popular insurrection”). *Therefore* ... therefore we must not set ourselves the aim of *seizing* power or of sharing it in a provisional revolutionary government!!

Our friends cannot *make* their arguments dovetail. They vacillate between the standpoint of Mr. Struve, who evades the issue of an insurrection, and the standpoint of revolutionary Social-Democracy, which calls upon us to undertake this *urgent* task. They vacillate between anarchism, which on principle condemns all participation in a provisional revolutionary government as betrayal of the proletariat, and Marxism, which demands such participation, given Social-Democracy’s guiding

influence in the insurrection.\* They have no independent stand whatever: neither that of Mr. Struve, who wants to come to terms with tsarism and is, therefore, compelled to resort to evasions and subterfuges on the question of insurrection, nor that of the anarchists, who condemn all action "from above" and all participation in a bourgeois revolution. The new-*Iskra* group confuses a deal with tsarism and a victory over the latter. They want to take part in a bourgeois revolution. They have gone somewhat beyond Martynov's *Two Dictatorships*. They even consent to lead an insurrection of the people—in order to renounce that leadership immediately after victory is won (or, perhaps, immediately before the victory?), i.e., *in order not to avail themselves of the fruits of victory*, but to turn all these fruits over *entirely to the bourgeoisie*. This is what they call "using the insurrection in the interests of the working class. . .".

There is no need to dwell on this muddle any longer. It will be more useful to examine how this muddle *originated* in the formulation which reads: "remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition".

This is one of the familiar propositions of international revolutionary Social-Democracy. It is a perfectly correct proposition. It has become a commonplace to all opponents of revisionism or opportunism in parliamentary countries. It has become generally accepted as the legitimate and necessary rebuff to "parliamentary cretinism", to Millerandism, Bernsteinism, and Italian reformism of the Turati brand. Our good new-Iskristes have learned this excellent proposition by heart and are zealously applying it . . . *quite inappropriately*. Categories of the parliamentary struggle are introduced into resolutions written for conditions in which no parliament exists. The concept "opposition", which is the reflection and the expression of a political situation in which no one seriously speaks of an *insurrection*, is meaninglessly applied to a situation in which insurrection *has begun* and in which all supporters of revolution are thinking and talking about leadership in it. The desire to "*remain*" with the old methods, i.e., action only "from below", is voiced with pomp and clamour *precisely at a time* when the revolution has confronted us with the necessity, in the event of a victorious insurrection, of acting *from above*.

No, our new-*Iskra* group is decidedly out of luck! Even when they formulate a correct Social-Democratic proposition they do not know how to apply it correctly. They have failed to understand that when the revolution gets under way, and there is revolution, civil war, insurrectionary outbursts, but still no parliament, terms and concepts of parliamentary struggle undergo a transformation

\* See *Proletary*, No. 3, "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government", article two, 1905. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 474-81.—Ed.)



and turn into their opposites. They do not realise that in the conditions under examination amendments are introduced by means of street demonstrations, interpellations are made by means of offensive action by armed citizens, and opposition to the government is effected by the forcible overthrow of that government.

Just as the well-known hero of our folk epos repeated good advice when it was out of place, our admirers of Martynov repeat the lessons of peaceful parliamentarism at a time when, as they themselves state, actual hostilities have begun. There is nothing more ridiculous than this pompous advancement of the slogan of "extreme opposition" in a resolution which begins by referring to a "decisive victory of the revolution" and to a "popular insurrection"! Try to conceive, gentlemen, what it means to be the "extreme opposition" in a period of insurrection. Does it mean exposing the government, or deposing it? Does it mean voting against the government, or defeating its armed forces in open battle? Does it mean refusing to replenish the government's exchequer, or the revolutionary seizure of that exchequer for the needs of the uprising, to arm the workers and peasants, and to convoke a constituent assembly? Are you not beginning to understand, gentlemen, that the term "extreme opposition" expresses only negative actions—exposing, voting against, refusing? Why is that so? Because this term applies only to the parliamentary struggle and, moreover, in a period when no one makes "decisive victory" the immediate object of the struggle. Are you not beginning to understand that things change cardinally in this respect, from the moment the politically oppressed people launch a determined attack along the whole front in desperate struggle for victory?

The workers ask us: Must the urgent business of insurrection be energetically begun? What is to be done to make the incipient insurrection victorious? What use should be made of victory? What programme can and should then be implemented? The new-Iskristis, who are making Marxism more profound, answer: we must remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition. . . . Well, were we not right in calling these knights past masters of philistinism?

### 10. "REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNES" AND THE REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

The Conference of the new-*Iskra* group did not keep to the anarchist stand into which the new *Iskra* had talked itself (action only "from below", not "from below and from above").

The absurdity of admitting the possibility of an insurrection and not admitting the possibility of victory and participation in a provisional revolutionary government was too glaring. The resolution, therefore, introduced certain reservations and restrictions into the Martynov-Martov solution of the question. Let us consider these reservations, as stated in the following section of the resolution:

"This tactic" ("to remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition") "does not, of course, in any way exclude the expediency of a partial and episodic seizure of power and the establishment of revolutionary communes in one city or another, or in one district or another, exclusively for the purpose of helping to spread the insurrection and of disrupting the government."

If that is the case, it means the admission in principle of action not only from below, but also from above. It means that the proposition laid down in L. Martov's well-known *feuilleton* in *Iskra* (No. 93) is discarded, and that the tactics of *Uperyod*, i.e., not only "from below", but also "from above", is acknowledged as correct.

Further, the seizure of power (even if partial, episodic, etc.) obviously presupposes participation not only of Social-Democrats, and not only of the proletariat. This follows from the fact that it is not the proletariat alone that is interested and takes an active part in a democratic revolution. It follows from the insurrection being a "popular" one, as is stated at the beginning of the resolution under examination, with "non-proletarian groups" (the words used in the Conference resolution on the uprising), i.e., the bourgeoisie, also taking part in it. Hence, the principle that any participation of socialists in a provisional revolutionary government jointly with the petty bourgeoisie is betrayal of the working class *was thrown overboard by the Conference*, which is what *Uperyod* sought to achieve. "Betrayal" does not cease to be betrayal because the action constituting it is partial, episodic, local, etc. Hence, the idea that participation in a provisional revolutionary government is tantamount to vulgar Jaurèsism *was thrown overboard by the Conference*, which is what *Uperyod* sought to achieve. A government does not cease to be a government because its power extends not to many cities but to a single city, not to many districts but to a single district, or because of the name it bears. Thus, *the theoretical presentation of this question, as attempted by the new Iskra, was discarded by the Conference.*

Let us see whether the restrictions the Conference imposed on the formation of revolutionary governments and on participation in them, which are now admitted in principle, are reasonable. We are not aware of the distinction between "episodic

and provisional".\* We are afraid that the former word, which is "new" and foreign, is merely a screen for lack of clear thinking. It *seems* "more profound", but actually it is only more obscure and confused. What is the difference between the "expediency" of a partial "seizure of power" in a city or district, and participation in a provisional revolutionary government of the entire state? Do not "cities" include a city like St. Petersburg where the events of January 9 took place? Do not districts include the Caucasus, which is bigger than many a state? Will not the problems (which at one time embarrassed the new *Iskra*) of what to do with the prisons, the police, the treasury, etc., confront us the moment we "seize power" even in a single city, let alone in a district? No one will deny, of course, that if we lack sufficient forces, if the insurrection is not wholly successful, or if the victory is indecisive, provisional revolutionary governments may possibly be set up in individual localities, in individual cities and the like. But what has all that got to do with the point at issue, gentlemen? Do not you yourselves, in the beginning of the resolution, speak of a "decisive victory of the revolution", a "victorious popular insurrection"? Since when have Social-Democrats taken over the job of the anarchists: splitting the attention and the aims of the proletariat, and directing its attention to the "partial", instead of the general, the single, the integral, and the complete? While presupposing "seizure of power" in a city, you yourselves speak of "extending the insurrection"—to another city, may we venture to think?—to all cities, may we dare to hope? Your conclusions, gentlemen, are as unsound and haphazard, as contradictory and confused, as your premises. The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. gave an exhaustive and clear answer to the question of a provisional revolutionary government in general. This answer covers all cases of local provisional governments as well. However, by artificially and arbitrarily isolating a *part* of the question, the Conference's answer merely *evades* the issue as a whole (and that unsuccessfully), and creates confusion.

What is meant by "revolutionary communes"? Does this concept differ from "a provisional revolutionary government", and, if so, in what respect? The gentlemen of the Conference do not know themselves. Confusion of revolutionary thought leads them, as very often happens, to *revolutionary phrase-mongering*. Indeed, the use of the words "revolutionary commune" in a resolution passed by representatives of Social-Democracy is revolutionary phrase-mongering and nothing else. Marx often condemned such phrase-mongering in which some "charming" terms from the *outworn past* are used to conceal the tasks of the future. In such cases the charm

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\* The first word was in scholarly use at the time, while the second was, and still is, colloquial Russian.—Tr.

of a term which has already played its part in history becomes so much useless and harmful tinsel, a child's rattle. We must give the workers and the whole people a clear and unambiguous notion as to *why* we want a provisional revolutionary government to be set up, and *exactly what changes* we shall bring about if we exercise decisive influence on the government on the very day following the victory of the popular insurrection which has already commenced. These are questions confronting political leaders.

The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. replied to these questions with absolute clarity, and drew up a complete programme of these changes—our Party's minimum programme. The word "commune", however, gives no answer at all; it only confuses people's minds with the distant echo of a sonorous phrase or empty rhetoric. The more we cherish, for instance, the memory of the Paris Commune of 1871, the less permissible is it to refer to it offhand, without analysing its mistakes and the special conditions attending it. To do so would mean repeating the absurd example of the Blanquists—whom Engels ridiculed—who (in 1874, in their "Manifesto") paid homage to every act of the Commune.<sup>257</sup> What reply will a conferee give to a worker who asks him about *this* "revolutionary commune", the one that is mentioned in the resolution? He will only be able to tell him that this is the name by which a certain workers' government is known in history, a government that was unable to, and could not, at that time, distinguish between the elements of a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution, a government that confused the tasks of fighting for a republic with those of fighting for socialism, was unable to launch an energetic military offensive against Versailles, made a mistake in failing to seize the Bank of France, etc. In short, whether in your answer you refer to the Paris Commune or to some other commune, your answer will be: it was a government *such as ours should not be*. A fine answer, indeed! Does it not testify to pedantic moralising and impotence on the part of a revolutionary, when a resolution says nothing about the practical programme of the Party and inappropriately begins giving lessons from history? Does this not reveal the very mistake we have unsuccessfully been accused of, i.e., confusing a democratic revolution with a socialist revolution, between which none of the "communes" was able to distinguish?

Extending the insurrection and disorganising the government are presented as the "exclusive" aim of a provisional government (so inappropriately termed a "commune"). Taken in its literal sense, the word "exclusive" eliminates all other aims; it is an echo of the absurd theory of "only from below". Such elimination of other aims is another instance of short-sightedness and lack of reflection. A "revolutionary commune", i.e., a revolutionary gov-

ernment, even if only in a single city, will inevitably have to administer (even if provisionally, "partly, episodically") *all* affairs of state, and it is the height of folly to hide one's head under one's wing and refuse to see this. This government will have to enact an eight-hour working day, establish workers' inspection of factories, institute free universal education, introduce the election of judges, set up peasant committees, etc.; in a word, it will certainly have to carry out a number of reforms. To designate these reforms as "helping to spread the insurrection" would be playing with words and deliberately causing greater confusion in a matter that calls for absolute clarity.

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The concluding part of the new-*Iskra* Conference resolution provides no fresh material for a criticism of basic Economist trends that have been revived in our Party, but it does illustrate, from a somewhat different angle, what has been said above.

Here is that concluding part:

"Only in one event should Social-Democracy on its own initiative direct its efforts towards seizing power and holding it as long as possible—namely, in the event of the revolution spreading to the advanced countries of Western Europe, where conditions for the achievement of socialism have already reached a certain [?] degree of maturity. In that event the limited historical scope of the Russian revolution can be considerably widened and the possibility will arise of entering on the path of socialist reforms.

"By basing its tactics on the expectation that during the entire revolutionary period the Social-Democratic Party will retain its stand of extreme revolutionary opposition to all governments that may succeed one another in the course of the revolution. Social-Democracy will best be able to prepare itself to utilise governmental power if it falls [??] into its hands."

The basic idea here is the one repeatedly formulated by *Uperyod*, which has stated that we must not be afraid (as Martynov is) of Social-Democracy's complete victory in a democratic revolution, i.e., of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, for such a victory will enable us to rouse Europe; after throwing off the yoke of the bourgeoisie, the socialist proletariat of Europe will in its turn help us to accomplish the socialist revolution. But see how the new-*Iskra* rendering impairs this idea. We shall not dwell on details: on the absurd assumption that power could "fall" into the hands of a class-conscious party which considers seizure of power harmful tactics; on the fact that in Europe the conditions for socialism have reached not a certain degree of maturity, but maturity in general; on the fact that our Party programme knows no socialist reforms, but only socialist revolution. Let us take the principal and basic difference between *Uperyod*'s idea and the one presented in the resolution. *Uperyod* set the revolutionary proletariat of Russia an active task: winning the battle for democracy and using this victory

to bring the revolution into Europe. The resolution fails to grasp this link between our "decisive victory" (not in the new-*Iskra* sense) and the revolution in Europe, and, therefore, it does not speak of the tasks of the proletariat or the prospects of the *latter's* victory, but of one of the possibilities in general: "in the event of the revolution spreading...". *Uperyod* pointedly and definitely indicated—and this was incorporated in the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—how "governmental power" can and must "be utilised" in the interests of the proletariat, bearing in mind what can be achieved immediately, at a given stage of social development, and what must first be achieved as a democratic prerequisite of the struggle for socialism. Here, too, the resolution lags hopelessly behind when it states: "will be able to prepare itself to utilise", but fails to say *how* it will be able, *how* it will prepare itself, and to utilise *for what purpose*. We have no doubt, for instance, that the new-Iskrists may be "able to prepare themselves to utilise" their leading position in the Party, but the point is that so far their experience of that utilisation, their preparation, does not hold out much hope of possibility becoming reality. . . .

*Uperyod* stated quite definitely wherein lies the real "possibility of retaining power"—namely, in the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry; in their joint mass strength, which is capable of outweighing all the forces of counter-revolution; in the inevitable concurrence of their interests in *democratic* reforms. Here, too, the resolution of the Conference gives us nothing positive; it merely evades the issue. Surely, the possibility of retaining power in Russia must be determined by the composition of the social forces in Russia herself, by the circumstances of the democratic revolution now taking place in our country. A victory of the proletariat in Europe (it is still quite a far cry from bringing the revolution into Europe to the victory of the proletariat) will give rise to a desperate counter-revolutionary struggle on the part of the Russian bourgeoisie—yet the resolution of the new-Iskrists does not say a word about this counter-revolutionary force whose significance was appraised in the resolution of the R.S.D.L.P.'s Third Congress. If, in our fight for a republic and democracy, we could not rely upon the peasantry as well as upon the proletariat, the prospect of our "retaining power" would be hopeless. But if it is not hopeless, if the "revolution's decisive victory over tsarism" opens up such a possibility, then we must indicate it, call actively for its transformation into reality, and issue practical slogans not only *for the contingency* of the revolution being brought into Europe, but also *for the purpose* of taking it there. The reference made by tail-ist Social-Democrats to the "limited historical scope of the Russian revolution" merely serves

to cover up their limited understanding of the aims of this democratic revolution, and of the proletariat's leading role in it!

One of the objections raised to the slogan of "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" is that dictatorship presupposes a "single will" (*Iskra*, No. 95), and that there can be no single will of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. This objection is unsound, for it is based on an abstract, "metaphysical" interpretation of the term "single will". There may be a single will in one respect and not in another. The absence of unity on questions of socialism and in the struggle for socialism does not preclude singleness of will on questions of democracy and in the struggle for a republic. To forget this would be tantamount to forgetting the logical and historical difference between a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution. To forget this would be tantamount to forgetting the character of the democratic revolution as one of *the whole people*: if it is "of the whole people", that means that there is "singleness of will" precisely in so far as this revolution meets the needs and requirements of the whole people. Beyond the bounds of democratism there can be no question of the proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie having a single will. Class struggle between them is inevitable, but it is in a democratic republic that this struggle will be the most thoroughgoing and widespread struggle of the people *for socialism*. Like everything else in the world, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has a past and a future. Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy, and privilege. In the struggle against this past, in the struggle against counter-revolution, a "single will" of the proletariat and the peasantry is possible, for here there is unity of interests.

Its future is the struggle against private property, the struggle of the wage-worker against the employer, the struggle for socialism. Here singleness of will is impossible.\* Here the path before us lies not from autocracy to a republic, but from a petty-bourgeois democratic republic to socialism.

Of course, in actual historical circumstances, the elements of the past become interwoven with those of the future: the two paths cross. Wage-labour with its struggle against private property exists under the autocracy as well: it arises even under serfdom. But this does not in the least prevent us from logically and historically distinguishing between the major stages of development. We all contrapose bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution; we all insist on the absolute necessity of strictly distinguishing between

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\* The development of capitalism, more extensive and rapid in conditions of liberty, will inevitably soon put an end to singleness of will: that will take place the sooner, the earlier counter-revolution and reaction are crushed

them; however, can it be denied that in the course of history individual, *particular* elements of the two revolutions become interwoven? Has the period of democratic revolutions in Europe not been familiar with a number of socialist movements and attempts to establish socialism? And will not the future socialist revolution in Europe still have to complete a great deal left undone in the field of democratism?

A Social-Democrat must never for a moment forget that the proletariat will inevitably have to wage a class struggle for socialism even against the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. This is beyond doubt. Hence, the absolute necessity of a separate, independent, strictly class party of Social-Democracy. Hence, the temporary nature of our tactics of "striking a joint blow" with the bourgeoisie and the duty of keeping a strict watch "over our ally, as over an enemy", etc. All this also leaves no room for doubt. However, it would be ridiculous and reactionary to deduce from this that we must forget, ignore, or neglect tasks which, although transient and temporary, are vital at the present time. The struggle against the autocracy is a temporary and transient task for socialists, but to ignore or neglect this task in any way amounts to betrayal of socialism and service to reaction. The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry is unquestionably only a transient, temporary socialist aim, but to ignore this aim in the period of a democratic revolution would be downright reactionary.

Concrete political aims must be set in concrete circumstances. All things are relative, all things flow, and all things change. German Social-Democracy does not put into its programme the demand for a republic. The situation in Germany is such that this question can in practice hardly be separated from that of socialism (although with regard to Germany too, Engels in his comments on the draft of the Erfurt Programme in 1891 warned against belittling the importance of a republic and of the struggle for a republic!).<sup>258</sup> In Russian Social-Democracy the question of eliminating the demand for a republic from its programme and its agitation has never even arisen, for in our country there can be no talk of an indissoluble link between the question of a republic and that of socialism. It was quite natural for a German Social-Democrat of 1898 not to place special emphasis on the question of a republic, and this evokes neither surprise nor condemnation. But in 1948 a German Social-Democrat who would have relegated to the background the question of a republic would have been a downright traitor to the revolution. There is no such thing as abstract truth. Truth is always concrete.

The time will come when the struggle against the Russian autocracy will end, and the period of democratic revolution will



have passed in Russia; it will then be ridiculous even to speak of "singleness of will" of the proletariat and the peasantry, about a democratic dictatorship, etc. When that time comes we shall deal directly with the question of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat and speak of it in greater detail. At present the party of the advanced class cannot but strive most energetically for the democratic revolution's decisive victory over tsarism. And a decisive victory means nothing else than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

*Note*<sup>259</sup>

1) We would remind the reader that in the polemic between *Iskra* and *Uperyod*, the former referred, among other things, to Engels's letter to Turati, in which Engels warned the (future) leader of the Italian reformists against confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist. The impending revolution in Italy, Engels wrote about the political situation in Italy in 1894, would be a petty-bourgeois, democratic and not a socialist revolution. *Iskra* reproached *Uperyod* with having departed from the principle laid down by Engels. This reproach was unjustified, because, on the whole, *Uperyod* (No. 14)\* fully acknowledged the correctness of Marx's theory of the distinction between the three main forces in nineteenth-century revolutions. According to this theory, the following forces take a stand against the old order, against the autocracy, feudalism, and the serf-owning system: 1) the liberal big bourgeoisie, 2) the radical petty bourgeoisie, 3) the proletariat. The first fights for nothing more than a constitutional monarchy; the second, for a democratic republic; the third, for a socialist revolution. To confuse the petty bourgeoisie's struggle for a complete democratic revolution with the proletariat's struggle for a socialist revolution threatens the socialist with political bankruptcy. Marx's warning to this effect is quite justified. It is, however, precisely for this very reason that the slogan of "revolutionary communes" is erroneous, because the very mistake made by the communes known to history was that of confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution. On the other hand, our slogan—a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry—fully safeguards us against this mistake. While recognising the incontestably bourgeois nature of a revolution incapable of *directly* overstepping the bounds of a mere democratic revolution our slogan *advances* this particular revolution and strives to give it forms most advantageous to the proletariat; consequently, it strives to make the utmost of the democratic revolution in order to attain the greatest success in the proletariat's further struggle of socialism.

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 275-92.—Ed.

## 11. A CURSORY COMPARISON BETWEEN SEVERAL OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AND THOSE OF THE "CONFERENCE"

The question of the provisional revolutionary government is at present the pivotal tactical question of the Social-Democratic movement. It is neither possible nor necessary to dwell in similar detail on the other resolutions of the Conference. We shall confine ourselves merely to referring briefly to several points which confirm the difference in principle, analysed above, between the tactical trend in the resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and that in the Conference resolutions.

Take the question of the attitude towards the government's tactics on the eve of revolution. Once again you will find a comprehensive answer to this question in a resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. This resolution takes into account all the multifarious conditions and tasks of the particular moment: exposure of the hypocrisy of the government's concessions; utilisation of "travesties of popular representation"; the revolutionary realisation of the working class's urgent demands (the principal one being the eight-hour working day), and, finally, resistance to the Black Hundreds. In the Conference resolutions this question is dealt with piecemeal in several sections: "resistance to the evil forces of reaction" is mentioned only in the preamble to the resolution on the attitude towards other parties. Participation in elections to representative bodies is considered apart from tsarism's "compromises" with the bourgeoisie. Instead of calling for the achievement of an eight-hour working day by revolutionary means a special resolution with the pretentious title "On the Economic Struggle" merely repeats (after high-flown and very stupid phrases about "the central place occupied by the labour question in Russian public life") the old slogan of campaigning for "the legislative institution of an eight-hour day". The inadequacy and the belatedness of this slogan at the present time are too obvious to require proof.

The question of open political action. The Third Congress takes into consideration the impending *radical* change in our activities. Secret activities and the development of the underground organisation must on no account be abandoned: this would be playing into the hands of the police and be of the utmost advantage to the government. But at the same time we must give thought to open action as well. Expedient forms of such action and, consequently, special bodies—less secret—must be *prepared* immediately for this purpose. Legal and semi-legal

associations must be made use of with a view to transforming them, as far as possible, into bases for the future open Social-Democratic Labour Party in Russia.

Here, too, the Conference splits up the issue and fails to bring forward any integral slogans. What strikes the eye is the ridiculous instruction to the Organising Committee to see to the "placement" of legally functioning publicists. Then there is the totally absurd decision "to subordinate to our influence the democratic newspapers that set themselves the aim of rendering assistance to the working-class movement". This is the professed aim of all our legal liberal newspapers, nearly all of which are of the *Osvobozhdeniye* trend. Why should not the *Iskra* Editorial Board themselves make a start in carrying out their advice and give us an example of how to subordinate *Osvobozhdeniye* to Social-Democratic influence? Instead of the slogan of utilising legally existing associations so as to establish bases for the *Party*, we are given, first, a particular piece of advice about "trade" unions only (Party members must be active in them), and, secondly, advice to guide "the revolutionary organisations of the workers"—"unofficially constituted organisations"—"revolutionary workers' clubs". How these "clubs" have come to be classed as unofficially constituted organisations, and what these "clubs" really are—goodness only knows. Instead of definite and clear instructions from a supreme Party body we have some thoughts jotted down at random and some rough drafts made by men of letters. There is no complete picture of the beginning of the Party's transition to an entirely new basis in all its work.

The "peasant question" was presented in entirely different ways by the Party Congress and the Conference. The Congress drew up a resolution on the "attitude to the peasant movement"; the Conference—on "work among the peasants". In the one case prominence is given to the task of guiding the entire revolutionary-democratic movement in the general national interests of the struggle against tsarism. In the other case the question is reduced to mere "work" among a particular section of society. In the one case a central practical slogan for our agitation is advanced calling for the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees in order to carry out all democratic changes. In the other, a "demand for the organisation of committees" is to be presented to a constituent assembly. Why should we wait for this constituent assembly? Will it really be constituent? Will it be stable without the preliminary and simultaneous establishment of revolutionary peasant committees? The Conference has lost sight of all these questions. Its decisions all reflect the general idea which we have been following up—namely, that in the bourgeois revolution we must do only our own special work, without pursu-

ing the aim of guiding the entire democratic movement, and of conducting that movement independently. Just as the Economists were constantly falling into the fallacy that the economic struggle is for the Social-Democrats, while the political struggle is for the liberals, so the new-*Iskra* supporters, in all their reasonings, keep falling into the idea that we should modestly sit in a corner out of the way of the bourgeois revolution, with the bourgeoisie doing the active work of carrying out the revolution.

Finally, note must also be taken of the resolution on the attitude toward other parties. The resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. speaks of exposing all limitedness and inadequacy in the bourgeois movement for emancipation, without entertaining the naïve idea of enumerating, from congress to congress, every possible instance of such limitedness, or of drawing a line of distinction between bad bourgeois and good bourgeois. Repeating the mistake made by Starover the Conference persistently searched for that line and developed the famous "litmus-paper" theory. Starover proceeded from a very good idea—that of presenting the severest possible conditions to the bourgeoisie. Only he forgot that any attempt to separate in advance bourgeois democrats that deserve approval, agreements, etc., from those that do not deserve them leads to a "formula" which is immediately scrapped by development and introduces confusion into proletarian class-consciousness. From real unity in the struggle the emphasis is shifted to declarations, promises, and slogans. Starover held that "universal and equal suffrage, direct elections and the secret ballot" was such a radical slogan. Hardly had two years elapsed when the "litmus-paper" proved its uselessness and the slogan of universal suffrage was taken over by the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, who thereby not only came no closer to Social-Democracy, but, on the contrary, tried by means of that very slogan to mislead the workers and divert them from socialism.

Now the new-Iskrists are presenting "conditions" that are even "severer". They are "demanding" from the enemies of tsarism "energetic and unequivocal (!?) support of every determined action by the organised proletariat", etc., up to, and including, "active participation in the self-arming of the people". The line has been carried much further—but nevertheless this line is *again already obsolete*, at once revealing its uselessness. Why, for instance, is there no slogan for a republic? How is it that the Social-Democrats—in the interests of "relentless revolutionary war against all the foundations of the system of social estates and the monarchy"—"demand" from the bourgeois democrats anything you like except the struggle for a republic?

That this question is not mere captiousness, that the new-Iskrists' mistake is of vital political significance is proved by the

Russian Liberation Union (see *Proletary*, No. 4).<sup>\*</sup> These "enemies of tsarism" will meet in full all the "requirements" of the new-*Iskra* supporters. And yet we have shown that the *Osvobozhdeniye* spirit reigns in the programme (or lack of programme) of this "Russian Liberation Union", and that the *Osvobozhdeniye* group can easily take it in tow. However, in the concluding section of the resolution the Conference declares that "Social-Democracy will continue to oppose, as *hypocritical friends of the people*, all those political parties which, though they display a liberal and democratic banner, refuse to render genuine support to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat". The Russian Liberation Union not only does not withhold this support, but offers it most insistently. Is that a guarantee that the leaders of this union are not "hypocritical friends of the people", even though they are "liberationists"?

You see: by inventing "conditions" in advance, and presenting "demands" that are ludicrous by reason of their redoubtable impotence, the new-Iskrists immediately put themselves in a ridiculous position. Their conditions and demands immediately prove inadequate when it comes to an appraisal of living realities. Their chase after formulas is hopeless, for no formula can embrace all the various manifestations of hypocrisy, inconsistency, and narrow-mindedness displayed by the bourgeois democrats. It is not a question of "litmus-paper", formulas, or written and printed demands, nor is it a question of drawing, in advance, a line of distinction between hypocritical and sincere "friends of the people"; it is a question of real unity in the struggle, of the Social-Democrats unabatingly criticising every "uncertain" step taken by bourgeois democracy. What is needed for "genuine consolidation of all the social forces interested in democratic change" is not the "points" over which the Conference laboured so assiduously and so vainly, but the ability to put forward genuinely revolutionary slogans. For this slogans are needed that will raise the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie to the level of the proletariat, and not lower the aims of the proletariat to the level of the monarchist bourgeoisie. What is needed for this is the most energetic participation in the insurrection, not sophistical evasion of the urgent task of an insurrection.

<sup>\*</sup> *Proletary*, No. 4, which appeared on June 4, 1905, contained a lengthy article entitled "A New Revolutionary Workers' Association" (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 499-510.—*Ed*). The article gives the contents of the appeals issued by this union, which assumed the name of the "Russian Liberation Union" and set itself the aim of convening a constituent assembly with the aid of an insurrection. Further, the article defines the attitude of Social-Democrats to such non-party unions. In what measure this union really existed and what its fate was in the revolution is absolutely unknown to us (Author's note to the 1907 edition — *Ed*).

## 12. WILL THE SWEEP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION BE DIMINISHED IF THE BOURGEOISIE RECOILS FROM IT?

The foregoing lines were already written when a copy came to hand of the resolutions adopted by the Caucasian Conference of the new-Iskrists, and published by *Iskra*. Even if we tried we could not invent anything better *pour la bonne bouche* (as a titbit).

The editors of *Iskra* remark with full justice: "On the fundamental question of tactics the Caucasian Conference also arrived at a decision *analogous*" (in truth!) "to that adopted by the All-Russia Conference" (i.e., of the new-*Iskra* group). "The question of Social-Democracy's attitude towards a provisional revolutionary government has been settled by the Caucasian comrades in the spirit of most outspoken opposition to the new method advocated by the *Uporyod* group and the delegates of the so-called Congress who joined it." "It must be admitted that the formulation of the proletarian party's tactics in a bourgeois revolution, as given by the Conference, is *most apt*."

What is true is true. No one could have given a more "apt" formulation of the fundamental error of the new-*Iskra* group. We shall quote this formulation in full, first mentioning parenthetically the blossoms, and then, at the end, the fruit.

Here is the resolution on a provisional government adopted by the Caucasian Conference of new-*Iskra* supporters:

"Whereas we consider it to be our task to take advantage of the revolutionary situation so as to deepen [of course! They should have added: "*à la* Martynov!") Social-Democratic consciousness in the proletariat [only to render the consciousness more profound, and not to win a republic? What a "profound" conception of revolution!] and in order to secure for the Party complete freedom to criticise the nascent bourgeois-state system [it is not our business to secure a republic! Our business is only to secure freedom of criticism. Anarchist ideas engender anarchist language: "bourgeois-state" system!], the Conference declares itself against the formation of a Social-Democratic provisional government, and entering such a government [recall the resolution passed by the Bakuninists ten months before the Spanish revolution and referred to by Engels: see *Proletary*, No. 3<sup>260</sup>], and considers it to be the most expedient course to exercise pressure from without [from below and not from above] upon the bourgeois provisional government in order to secure a feasible measure [!?] of democratisation of the state system. The Conference believes that the formation of a provisional government by Social-Democrats, or their entering such a government would lead, on the one hand, to the masses of the proletariat becoming disappointed in the Social-Democratic Party

and abandoning it, because the Social-Democrats, despite the seizure of power, would not be able to satisfy the pressing needs of the working class, including the establishment of socialism [a republic is not a pressing need! The authors in their innocence do not notice that they are speaking purely anarchist language, as if they were repudiating participation in bourgeois revolutions!], and, on the other hand, *would cause the bourgeois classes to recoil from the revolution and thus diminish its sweep.*"

That is the crux of the matter. That is where anarchist ideas become interwoven (as is constantly the case among the West-European Bernsteinians too) with the sheerest opportunism. Just imagine: these people will not enter a provisional government because that would cause the bourgeoisie to recoil from the revolution, thereby diminishing the sweep of the revolution! Here, indeed, we have the new-*Iskra* philosophy as a whole, in a pure and consistent form: since the revolution is a bourgeois revolution, we must bow to bourgeois philistinism and make way for it. If we are even in part, even for a moment, guided by the consideration that our participation may cause the bourgeoisie to recoil, we thereby simply hand over leadership of the revolution entirely to the bourgeois classes. We thereby place the proletariat entirely under the tutelage of the bourgeoisie (while retaining complete 'freedom of criticism'!!), compelling the proletariat to be moderate and meek, so that the bourgeoisie should not recoil. We emasculate the most vital needs of the proletariat, namely, its political needs—which the Economists and their imitators have never properly understood—so as not to make the bourgeoisie recoil. We go over completely from the platform of revolutionary struggle for the achievement of democracy to the extent required by the proletariat, to a platform of chaffering with the bourgeoisie, buying the bourgeoisie's voluntary consent ("so that it should not recoil") at the price of our principles, by betraying the revolution.

In two short lines, the Caucasian new-Iskrists managed to express the gist of the tactic of betraying revolution and converting the proletariat into a wretched appendage of the bourgeois classes. That which we deduced above from the errors of the new-*Iskra* tendency we now see elevated to a clear and definite principle, viz., following in the wake of the monarchist bourgeoisie. Since the establishment of a republic would make the bourgeoisie recoil (and is already doing so—Mr. Struve is an example), down with the fight for a republic. Since every energetic and consistent democratic demand on the part of the proletariat makes the bourgeoisie recoil, always and everywhere in the world—hide in your lairs, working men; act only from without; do not dream of using, in the interests of the revolu-

tion, the instruments and weapons of the "bourgeois-state" system; reserve for yourselves "freedom of criticism"!

The fundamental fallacy in their very conception of the term "bourgeois revolution" has come to the surface. The Martynov or new-*Iskra* "conception" of this term leads directly to the proletariat's cause being betrayed to the bourgeoisie.

Those who have forgotten the old Economism and do not study or remember it will find it difficult to understand the present resurgence of Economism. Call to mind the Bernsteinian *Credo*. From "purely proletarian" views and programmes its authors drew the following conclusion: we Social-Democrats must concern ourselves with economics, with the real working-class cause, with freedom to criticise all political chicanery, with really rendering Social-Democratic work more profound. Politics are for the liberals. God save us from falling into "revolutionism": that will make the bourgeoisie recoil. Those who will re-read the whole *Credo* or the Separate Supplement to No. 9 of *Rabochaya Mysl* (September 1899) will discern the entire course of this reasoning.

Today we have the same thing, only on a large scale, applied to an appraisal of the whole of the "great" Russian revolution—alas, vulgarised and reduced in advance to a travesty by the theoreticians of orthodox philistinism! We Social-Democrats must concern ourselves with freedom of criticism, with making class-consciousness more profound, with action from without. They, the bourgeois classes, must have freedom to act, a free field for revolutionary (read: liberal) leadership, freedom to effect "reforms" from above.

These vulgarisers of Marxism have never given thought to what Marx said about the need to replace the weapon of criticism by the criticism of weapons.<sup>261</sup> Taking the name of Marx in vain they, in actual fact, draw up resolutions on tactics wholly in the spirit of the Frankfort bourgeois windbags, who freely criticised absolutism and deepened democratic consciousness, but failed to understand that a time of a revolution is a time of action, of action from both above and below. By turning Marxism into sophistry they have turned the ideology of the advanced, the most determined, and energetic revolutionary class into an ideology of its most backward strata, of those who shrink from difficult revolutionary-democratic tasks, and leave them to the Struves to take care of.

If the bourgeois classes recoil from revolution because Social-Democrats enter a revolutionary government they will thereby "diminish the sweep" of the revolution.

Listen to that, Russian workers: the sweep of the revolution will be the mightier if it is effected by the Struves, who are not



scared of the Social-Democrats, and do not want victory over tsarism, but want to come to terms with it. The sweep of the revolution will be the mightier if the first of the two possible outcomes outlined above eventuates, i.e., if the monarchist bourgeoisie comes to terms with the autocracy on a "constitution" *à la* Shipov!

Social-Democrats, who write such disgraceful things in resolutions for the guidance of the whole Party, or who approve of such "apt" resolutions, are so blinded by sophistry, which has utterly driven the living spirit out of Marxism, that they fail to notice that these resolutions turn all their other fine words into empty phrases. Take any of their articles in *Iskra*, or even the notorious pamphlet written by our notorious Martynov—there you will read about a *popular* insurrection, about carrying the revolution to *completion*, about striving to rely upon the *common people* in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie. However, all these excellent things become miserable phrases as soon as you accept or approve the idea that "the sweep of the revolution" will be "diminished" as a consequence of the bourgeoisie's alienation. These are the alternatives, gentlemen: either we, together with the people, must strive to carry out the revolution and win complete victory over tsarism *despite* the inconsistent, self-seeking, and cowardly bourgeoisie, or else we do not accept this "despite", and are afraid that the bourgeoisie may "recoil" from the revolution; in the second case we are betraying the proletariat and the people to the bourgeoisie—the inconsistent, self-seeking, and cowardly bourgeoisie.

Don't take it into your heads to misinterpret my words. Don't shrill that you are being accused of deliberate treachery. No, you have always crawled towards the marsh, and have at last crawled into it, just as unconsciously as the Economists of old, who were irresistibly and irrevocably drawn down the inclined plane of "deeper" Marxism, until it at last became an anti-revolutionary, soulless, and lifeless intellectual pose.

Have you, gentlemen, ever given thought to real social forces that determine "the sweep of the revolution"? Let us disregard the foreign political forces, the international combinations, which have developed very favourably for us at the present time, but which we all leave out of the discussion, and rightly so, inasmuch as we are concerned with the question of Russia's internal forces. Examine these internal social forces. Aligned against the revolution are the autocracy, the imperial court, the police, the bureaucracy, the army, and a handful of the aristocracy. The deeper the indignation of the people grows, the less reliable the troops become, and the more the bureaucracy wavers. Moreover, the bourgeoisie, on the whole, is now in favour

of revolution, zealously speechifying about liberty and holding forth more and more frequently in the name of the people and even in the name of the revolution.\* But we Marxists all know from theory and from daily and hourly observation of our liberals, Zemstvo people, and *Osvobozhdeniye* supporters that the bourgeoisie is inconsistent, self-seeking, and cowardly in its support of the revolution. The bourgeoisie, in the mass, will inevitably turn towards counter-revolution, towards the autocracy, against the revolution, and against the people, as soon as its narrow, selfish interests are met, as soon as it "recoils" from consistent democracy (*and it is already recoiling from it!*). There remains the "people", that is, the proletariat and the peasantry: the proletariat alone can be relied on to march on to the end, for it goes far beyond the democratic revolution. That is why the proletariat fights in the forefront for a republic and contemptuously rejects stupid and unworthy advice to take into account the possibility of the bourgeoisie recoiling. The peasantry includes a great number of semi-proletarian as well as petty-bourgeois elements. This makes it also unstable, compelling the proletariat to rally in a strictly class party. However, the instability of the peasantry differs radically from that of the bourgeoisie, for at present the peasantry is interested not so much in the absolute preservation of private property as in the confiscation of the landed estates, one of the principal forms of private property. Without thereby becoming socialist, or ceasing to be petty-bourgeois, the peasantry is capable of becoming a wholehearted and most radical adherent of the democratic revolution. The peasantry will inevitably become such if only the course of revolutionary events, which brings it enlightenment, is not prematurely cut short by the treachery of the bourgeoisie and the defeat of the proletariat. Subject to this condition the peasantry will inevitably become a bulwark of the revolution and the republic, for only a completely victorious revolution can give the peasantry *everything* in the sphere of agrarian reforms—*everything* that the peasants desire, dream of, and truly need (not for the abolition of capitalism as the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" imagine, but) in order to emerge from the mire of semi-serfdom, from the gloom of oppression and servitude, in order to improve their living conditions, as much as they can be improved within the system of commodity production.

Moreover, it is not only by the prospect of radical agrarian reform that the peasantry is attached to the revolution, but by

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\* Of interest in this connection is Mr. Struve's open letter to Jaurès recently published by the latter in *L'Humanité*<sup>262</sup> and by Mr. Struve in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72.

all its general and permanent interests as well. Even when fighting with the proletariat, the peasantry stands in need of democracy, for only a democratic system is capable of accurately expressing its interests and ensuring its predominance as a mass, as the majority. The more enlightened the peasantry becomes (and since the war with Japan it is becoming enlightened at a pace unsuspected by many who are accustomed to measure enlightenment with the school yardstick), the more consistently and resolutely will it stand for a thoroughgoing democratic revolution; for, unlike the bourgeoisie, it has nothing to fear from the people's supremacy, but on the contrary stands to gain by it. A democratic republic will become the peasantry's ideal as soon as it begins to throw off its naïve monarchism, because the conscious monarchism of the bourgeois stockjobbers (with an upper chamber, etc.) implies for the peasantry the same absence of rights and the same oppression and ignorance as it suffers today, only slightly polished over with the varnish of European constitutionalism.

That is why, as a class, the bourgeoisie naturally and inevitably tends to come under the wing\* of the liberal-monarchist party, while the peasantry, in the mass, tends to come under the leadership of the revolutionary and republican party. That is why the bourgeoisie is incapable of carrying through the democratic revolution to its consummation, while the peasantry is capable of doing so, and we must exert all our efforts to help it do so.

The objection may be raised that this goes without saying, is all ABC, something that all Social-Democrats understand perfectly well. No, that is not the case; it is not understood by those who can talk about "the diminishing sweep" of the revolution as a consequence of the bourgeoisie falling away from it. Such people repeat the words of our agrarian programme, which they have learned by rote without understanding their meaning, for otherwise they would not be frightened by the concept of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which inevitably follows from the entire Marxist world outlook and from our programme; otherwise they would not restrict the sweep of the great Russian revolution to the limits to which the bourgeoisie is prepared to go. Such people defeat their abstract Marxist revolutionary phrases by their concrete anti-Marxist and anti-revolutionary resolutions.

Those who really understand the role of the peasantry in a victorious Russian revolution would not dream of saying that the sweep of the revolution will be diminished if the bourgeoisie recoils from it. For, in actual fact, the Russian revolution will begin to assume its real sweep, and will really assume the widest revolutionary sweep possible in the epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolution, only when the bourgeoisie recoils from it and

when the masses of the peasantry come out as active revolutionaries side by side with the proletariat. To be consistently carried through to the end, our democratic revolution must rely on forces capable of paralysing the inevitable inconsistency of the bourgeoisie (i.e., capable precisely of "making it recoil from the revolution", which the Caucasian adherents of *Iskra* fear so much because of their thoughtlessness).

*The proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to completion, allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the autocracy's resistance by force and paralyse the bourgeoisie's instability. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population, so as to crush the bourgeoisie's resistance by force and paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.* Such are the tasks of the proletariat, so narrowly presented by the new-*Iskra* group in all their arguments and resolutions on the sweep of the revolution.

One circumstance, however, should not be forgotten, one that is frequently lost sight of in discussions about the "sweep" of the revolution. It should not be forgotten that it is not a question of the difficulties presented by this problem, but of the way in which its solution is to be sought and attained. It is not a question of whether it is easy or difficult to render the sweep of the revolution mighty and invincible, but of how to act so as to make that sweep more powerful. It is on the fundamental nature of our activities, the direction they should follow, that our views differ. We emphasise this because inattentive and unscrupulous people only too frequently confuse two different problems, viz., that of the direction to be followed, i.e., the choice of one of two different roads, and that of the ease of attaining our goal, or the nearness of its attainment along a given road.

In the foregoing we have not dealt with this last problem at all because it has not evoked any disagreement or differences in the Party. The problem itself is, of course, extremely important and deserving of the most serious attention from all Social-Democrats. It would be unforgivable optimism to forget the difficulties involved in drawing into the movement the masses not only of the working class, but also of the peasantry. These difficulties have more than once wrecked efforts to carry through a democratic revolution to completion, the inconsistent and self-seeking bourgeoisie triumphing most of all, because it has "made capital" in the shape of monarchist protection against the people, at the same time "preserving the virginity" of liberalism... or of the *Osvobodnitsy* trend. However, difficulty does not imply impossibility. The important thing is to be confident that the path chosen is the right one, this confidence multiplying a hundredfold revolu-



tionary energy and revolutionary enthusiasm, which can perform miracles.

The depth of the rift among present-day Social-Democrats on the question of the path to be chosen can at once be seen by comparing the Caucasian resolution of the new-*Iskra* supporters with the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The Congress resolution says: the bourgeoisie is inconsistent and will without fail try to deprive us of the gains of the revolution. Therefore, make more energetic preparations for the fight, comrades and workers! Arm yourselves, win the peasantry over to your side! We shall not, without a struggle, surrender our revolutionary gains to the self-seeking bourgeoisie. The resolution of the Caucasian new-*Iskra* supporters says: the bourgeoisie is inconsistent and may recoil from the revolution. Therefore, comrades and workers, please do not think of joining a provisional government, for, if you do, the bourgeoisie will certainly recoil, and the sweep of the revolution will thereby be diminished!

One side says: advance the revolution to its consummation despite resistance or passivity on the part of the inconsistent bourgeoisie.

The other side says: do not think of independently advancing the revolution to completion, for if you do, the inconsistent bourgeoisie will recoil from it.

Are these not two diametrically opposite paths? Is it not obvious that one set of tactics absolutely excludes the other, that the first tactics is the only correct tactics of revolutionary Social Democracy, while the second is in fact purely *Osvobozhdeniye* tactics?

### 13. CONCLUSION. DARE WE WIN?

People who are superficially acquainted with the state of affairs in Russian Social-Democracy, or who judge as mere on-lookers, with no knowledge of the whole history of our inner-Party struggle since the days of Economism, very often dismiss the disagreements on tactics which have now taken shape, especially after the Third Congress, with the simple argument that there are two natural, inevitable, and quite reconcilable trends in every Social-Democratic movement. One side, they say, lays special emphasis on the ordinary, current, and everyday work, on the necessity of developing propaganda and agitation, of preparing forces, deepening the movement, etc., while the other side lays emphasis on the militant, general political, revolutionary tasks of the movement, points to the necessity of insurrection, and

advances the slogans of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship and a provisional revolutionary government. Neither side should exaggerate, they say; extremes are bad in both cases (and, generally speaking, everywhere in the world), etc., etc.

The cheap truism of the pedestrian (and "political" in quotation marks) wisdom undoubtedly contained in such arguments too often conceals an inability to understand the urgent and acute needs of the Party. Take the present-day tactical differences among Russian Social-Democrats. Of course, the special emphasis on the everyday, routine aspect of the work, such as we see in the new-*Iskra* arguments about tactics, could not of itself present any danger or give rise to any divergence of opinion regarding tactical slogans. But it is sufficient to compare the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party with the Conference resolutions for this divergence to become striking.

What, then, is the trouble? In the first place, it is not enough to speak in the abstract of two currents in the movement, and of the harmfulness of extremes. One must know concretely what ails a given movement at a given time, and what constitutes the real political danger to the Party at the present time. Secondly, one must know what real political forces profit by the tactical slogans advanced—or perhaps by the absence of certain slogans. If one were to listen to the new-*Iskrist*s one would arrive at the conclusion that the Social-Democratic Party is threatened with the danger of throwing overboard propaganda and agitation, the economic struggle, and criticism of bourgeois democracy, the danger of becoming inordinately absorbed in military preparations, armed attacks, the seizure of power, etc. Actually, however, real danger is threatening the Party from an entirely different quarter. Anyone who is at all familiar with the state of the movement—anyone who follows it carefully and thoughtfully, cannot fail to see the ridiculous aspect of the new-*Iskrist*s' fears. The entire work of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has already taken definite and unvarying shape, which absolutely guarantees that our main attention will be fixed on propaganda and agitation, extemporaneous and mass meetings, the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets, assisting in the economic struggle and championing the slogans of that struggle. There is not a single Party committee, not a single district committee, not a single central delegates' meeting or a single factory group where ninety-nine per cent of all the attention, energy, and time is not always and invariably devoted to these functions, which have become firmly established ever since the middle of the nineties. Only those who are entirely unfamiliar with the movement do not know that. Only very naïve or ill-informed people will accept

new *Iskra's* repetition of stale truths at their face value, when that is done with an air of great importance.

The fact is that, far from displaying excessive zeal with regard to the tasks of insurrection, to general political slogans and to giving leadership to the entire popular revolution, we, on the contrary, display a most striking *backwardness* in this very respect, a backwardness which constitutes our greatest weakness and is a real danger to the movement, which may degenerate, and in some places is degenerating, from one that is revolutionary in deed into one that is revolutionary in word. Among the many, many hundreds of organisations, groups, and circles that are conducting the work of the Party you will not find one which has not, since its very inception, conducted the kind of day-by-day work the new-*Iskra* wisecracks now talk of with the air of people who have discovered new truths. On the other hand, you will find only an insignificant percentage of groups and circles that have understood the tasks an insurrection entails, have begun to carry them out, and have realised the necessity of leading the entire popular revolution against tsarism, the necessity of advancing certain definite progressive slogans and no others, for that purpose.

We have incredibly fallen behind our progressive and genuinely revolutionary tasks; in very many instances we have not even become aware of them; here and there we have failed to notice that revolutionary-bourgeois democracy has gained strength owing to our backwardness in this respect. But, with their backs turned to the course of events and the requirements of the times, the new-*Iskra* writers keep insistently repeating. "Don't forget the old! Don't let yourselves be carried away by the new!" This is the unvarying *leit-motiv* in all the important resolutions of the Conference; whereas in the Congress resolutions you just as unvaryingly read: while confirming the old (but not stopping to masticate it over and over again precisely because it is old and has already been settled and recorded in literature, in resolutions and by experience), we bring forward a new task, draw attention to it, issue a new slogan, and demand that genuinely revolutionary Social-Democrats immediately set to work to put it into effect.

That is how matters really stand with regard to the question of the two trends in Social-Democratic tactics. The revolutionary period has presented new tasks, which only the totally blind can fail to see. Some Social-Democrats unhesitatingly recognise these tasks and place them on the order of the day, declaring: the armed uprising brooks no delay; prepare yourselves for it immediately and energetically; remember that it is indispensable for a decisive victory; bring forward slogans for a republic, for



a provisional government, for a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Other Social-Democrats, however, draw back, mark time, write prefaces instead of giving slogans; instead of seeing what is new, while confirming what is old, they masticate the latter tediously and at great length, inventing pretexts to avoid the new, unable to determine the conditions for a decisive victory or to bring forward slogans which alone are in line with a striving to achieve full victory.

The political outcome of this tail-ism stares us in the face. The fable about a *rapprochement* between the "majority" of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and revolutionary bourgeois democracy remains a fable unconfirmed by a single political fact, by a single important resolution of the "Bolsheviks" or a single document of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. On the other hand, the opportunist, monarchist bourgeoisie, as represented by the *Osvo-bozhdeniye*, has long been *welcoming* the trends in the "principles" advocated by the new-*Iskra* group, and is now actually using their stream to drive its mill and is adopting their catchwords and "ideas", which are directed against "secrecy" and "riots", against exaggerating the "technical" aspect of the revolution, against openly proclaiming the slogan of insurrection, against the "revolutionism" of extreme demands, etc., etc. The resolution of an entire Conference of "Menshevik" Social-Democrats in the Caucasus and the endorsement of that resolution by the editors of the new *Iskra* sums up the whole matter politically in no mistakable way: what if the bourgeoisie should recoil in case the proletariat takes part in a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship! This puts the matter in a nutshell and gives the finishing touches to the proletariat's transformation into an appendage to the monarchist bourgeoisie. The *political significance* of the new *Iskra*'s tail-ism is thereby proved in fact—not by a casual observation from some individual but by a resolution especially endorsed by an entire trend.

Anyone who gives thought to these facts will understand the real significance of stock references to two sides and two trends in the Social-Democratic movement. For a full-scale study of these trends one should take Bernsteinism. In exactly the same way the Bernsteinians have been dinning into our ears that it is they who understand the proletariat's true needs and the tasks of building up its forces, the task of deepening all the work, preparing the elements of a new society, and the task of propaganda and agitation. Bernstein says: we demand a frank recognition of that which is, thus sanctifying "movement" *without* any "ultimate aim", sanctifying defensive tactics alone, preaching the tactics of fear "lest the bourgeoisie recoil". So the

Bernsteinians raised an outcry against the "Jacobinism" of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, against "publicists" who fail to understand the "workers' initiative", etc., etc. In reality, as everyone knows, revolutionary Social-Democrats have never even thought of abandoning day-by-day, petty work, the mustering of forces, etc., etc. All they demanded was a clear understanding of the ultimate aim, a clear presentation of the revolutionary tasks: they wanted to raise the semi-proletarian and semi-petty-bourgeois strata to the revolutionary level of the proletariat—not to reduce the latter level to that of opportunist considerations such as "lest the bourgeoisie recoil". Perhaps the most vivid expression of this rift between the intellectual-opportunist wing and the proletarian-revolutionary wing of the Party was the question: *durfen wir siegen?* "Dare we win." Is it permissible for us to win? Would it not be dangerous for us to win? Ought we to win? This question, so strange at first sight, was however raised and had to be raised, because the opportunists were afraid of victory, were frightening the proletariat away from it, predicting that trouble would come of it and ridiculing slogans that straightforwardly called for it.

The same fundamental division into an intellectual-opportunist and proletarian-revolutionary trend exists among us too, with the very material difference, however, that here we are faced with the question of a democratic, not of a socialist revolution. The question "dare we win?", which seems so absurd at first sight, has been raised among us as well. It has been raised by Martynov in his *Two Dictatorships*, wherein he prophesies dire misfortune if we prepare well for an insurrection, and carry it out quite successfully. The question has been raised in all the new-*Iskra* literature dealing with a provisional revolutionary government, and persistent if futile efforts have all the time been made to liken Millerand's participation in a bourgeois-opportunist government to Varlin's participation<sup>263</sup> in a petty-bourgeois revolutionary government. It is embodied in the resolution: "lest the bourgeoisie recoil". And although Kautsky, for instance, now tries to wax ironical and says that our dispute about a provisional revolutionary government is like sharing out the meat before the bear is killed, this irony only proves that even clever and revolutionary Social-Democrats are liable to put their foot in it when they talk about something they know of only by hearsay. German Social-Democracy is not yet so near to killing its bear (carrying out a socialist revolution), but the dispute as to whether we "dare" kill the bear has been of enormous importance from the point of view of principles and of practical politics. Russian Social-Democrats are not yet so close to being able to "kill their bear" (carry out a democratic revolution), but the question as to

whether we "dare" kill it is of extreme importance to the whole future of Russia and that of Russian Social-Democracy. An army cannot be energetically and successfully mustered and led unless we are sure that we "dare" win.

Take our old Economists. They, too, clamoured that their opponents were conspirators and Jacobins (see *Rabocheye Dyelo*, especially No. 10, and Martynov's speech at the Second Congress, in the debate on the programme), that by plunging into politics they were divorcing themselves from the masses, that they were losing sight of the fundamentals of the working-class movement, ignoring the workers' initiative, etc., etc. In reality these supporters of "workers' initiative" were opportunist intellectuals, who tried to foist on the workers their own narrow and philistine conception of the task of the proletariat. In reality the opponents of Economism, as everyone can see from the old *Iskra*, did not neglect or relegate into the background any of the aspects of Social-Democratic work, nor did they in the least forget the economic struggle; at the same time they were able to present the urgent and immediate political tasks in their full scope and thus opposed the transformation of the workers' party into an "economic" appendage to the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Economists learned by rote that politics are based on economics and "understood" this to mean that the political struggle should be reduced to the level of the economic struggle. The new-Iskrists have learned by rote that in its economic essence, the democratic revolution is a bourgeois revolution, and "understand" this to mean that the democratic aims of the proletariat should be lowered to the level of bourgeois moderation, a level beyond which "the bourgeoisie will recoil". On the pretext of deepening their work, on the pretext of rousing the workers' initiative and pursuing a purely class policy, the Economists were actually delivering the working class into the hands of the liberal-bourgeois politicians, i.e., were leading the Party along a path whose objective significance was exactly such. On the same pretexts the new-Iskrists are actually betraying to the bourgeoisie the interests of the proletariat in the democratic revolution, i.e., are leading the Party along a path whose objective significance is exactly such. The Economists thought that leadership in the political struggle was not the concern of Social-Democrats, but, properly speaking, that of the liberals. The new-Iskrists think that the active conduct of the democratic revolution is no concern of Social-Democrats, but, properly speaking, that of the democratic bourgeoisie, for, they argue, the proletariat's guidance and pre-eminent part will "diminish the sweep" of the revolution.

In short, the new-Iskristis are imitators of Economism, not only in having their origin at the Second Party Congress, but also in the manner in which they now present the tactical tasks of the proletariat in the democratic revolution. They, too, constitute an intellectual-opportunist wing of the Party. In the sphere of organisation they made their *début* with the anarchist individualism of intellectuals and ended up with "disorganisation-as-process", establishing in the "Rules"<sup>264</sup> adopted by the Conference the separation of Party publishing activities from the Party organisation, and an indirect and practically four-stage system of elections, a system of Bonapartist plebiscites instead of democratic representation, and finally the principle of "agreements" between the part and the whole. In Party tactics they slid down the same inclined plane. In the "plan of the Zemstvo campaign"<sup>265</sup> they declared that addresses to the Zemstvo-ists were "the highest type of demonstration", and discerned only two active forces on the political scene (on the eve of January 9!)—the government and the bourgeois democrats. They made the urgent task of arming the people "more profound" by replacing a direct and practical slogan with a call to arm the people with a burning desire to arm themselves. In their official resolutions they have distorted and emasculated the tasks connected with an insurrection, with the establishment of a provisional government, and with a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. "Lest the bourgeoisie recoil"—this final chord of their latest resolution throws clear light on the question of where their path is leading the Party.

In its social and economic essence, the democratic revolution in Russia is a bourgeois revolution. It is, however, not enough merely to repeat this correct Marxist proposition. It has to be properly understood and properly applied to political slogans.

In general, all political liberty founded on present-day, i.e., capitalist, relations of production is bourgeois liberty. The demand for liberty expresses primarily the interests of the bourgeoisie. Its representatives were the first to raise this demand. Its supporters have everywhere used like masters the liberty they acquired, reducing it to moderate and meticulous bourgeois doses, combining it with the most subtle suppression of the revolutionary proletariat in peaceful times, and with savage suppression in times of storm.

But only rebel Narodniks, anarchists, and Economists could conclude therefrom that the struggle for liberty should be negated or disparaged. These intellectualist-philistine doctrines could be foisted on the proletariat only for a time and against its will. The proletariat has always realised instinctively that it needs political liberty, needs it more than anyone else, al-

though the immediate effect of that liberty will be to strengthen and organise the bourgeoisie. It is not by evading the class struggle that the proletariat expects to find its salvation, but by developing it, by extending its scope, its consciousness, organisation, and resoluteness. Whoever disparages the tasks of the political struggle transforms the Social-Democrat from a tribune of the people into a trade union secretary. Whoever disparages the proletarian tasks in a democratic bourgeois revolution transforms the Social-Democrat from a leader of the people's revolution into a leader of a free labour union.

Yes, the *people's* revolution. Social-Democracy has fought, and is quite rightly fighting, against the bourgeois-democratic abuse of the word "people". It demands that this word shall not be used to cover up failure to understand class antagonisms within the people. It insists categorically on the need for complete class independence for the party of the proletariat. However, it does not divide the "people" into "classes" so that the advanced class will become locked up within itself, will confine itself within narrow limits, and emasculate its activity for fear that the economic rulers of the world will recoil: it does that so that the advanced class, which does not suffer from the halfheartedness, vacillation, and indecision of the intermediate classes, should fight with all the greater energy and enthusiasm for the cause of the whole people, at the head of the whole people.

That is what the present-day new-Iskrists so often fail to understand, people who substitute for active political slogans in the democratic revolution a mere pedantic repetition of the word "class", declined in all cases and genders!

The democratic revolution is bourgeois in nature. The slogan of a general redistribution, or "land and freedom"—that most widespread slogan of the peasant masses, downtrodden and ignorant, yet passionately yearning for light and happiness—is a bourgeois slogan. But we Marxists should know that there is not, nor can there be, any other path to real freedom for the proletariat and the peasantry, than the path of bourgeois freedom and bourgeois progress. We must not forget that there is not, nor can there be at the present time, any other means of bringing socialism nearer, than complete political liberty, than a democratic republic, than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. As representatives of the advanced and only revolutionary class, revolutionary without any reservations, doubts, or looking back, we must confront the whole of the people with the tasks of the democratic revolution as extensively and boldly as possible and with the utmost initiative. To disparage these tasks means making a travesty of theoretical Marxism, distorting it in philistine fashion,

while in practical politics it means placing the cause of the revolution into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which will inevitably recoil from the task of consistently effecting the revolution. The difficulties that lie on the road to complete victory of the revolution are very great. No one will be able to blame the proletariat's representatives if, when they have done everything in their power, their efforts are defeated by the resistance of reaction, the treachery of the bourgeoisie, and the ignorance of the masses. But everybody, and, above all, the class-conscious proletariat, will condemn Social-Democracy if it curtails the revolutionary energy of the democratic revolution and dampens revolutionary ardour because it is afraid to win, because it is actuated by the consideration: lest the bourgeoisie recoil.

Revolutions are the locomotives of history, said MAIX.<sup>206</sup> Revolutions are festivals of the oppressed and the exploited. At no other time are the mass of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order, as at a time of revolution. At such times the people are capable of performing miracles, if judged by the limited, philistine yardstick of gradualist progress. But it is essential that leaders of the revolutionary parties, too, should advance their aims more comprehensively and boldly at such a time, so that their slogans shall always be in advance of the revolutionary initiative of the masses, serve as a beacon, reveal to them our democratic and socialist ideal in all its magnitude and splendour, and show them the shortest and most direct route to complete, absolute, and decisive victory. Let us leave to the opportunists of the *Osvobozhdeniye* bourgeoisie the task of inventing roundabout, circuitous paths of compromise, out of fear of the revolution and of the direct path. If we are forcibly compelled to drag ourselves along such paths we shall be able to fulfil our duty in petty, everyday work also. But first let the choice of path be decided in ruthless struggle. We shall be traitors, betrayers of the revolution, if we do not use this festive energy of the masses and their revolutionary ardour to wage a ruthless and self-sacrificing struggle for the direct and decisive path. Let the bourgeois opportunists contemplate the future reaction with craven fear. The workers will not be intimidated either by the thought that reaction intends to be terrible, or that the bourgeoisie proposes to recoil. The workers do not expect to make deals: they are not asking for petty concessions. What they are striving towards is ruthlessly to crush the reactionary forces, i.e., to set up a *revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*.

Of course, in stormy times greater dangers threaten the ship of our Party than in periods of the smooth "sailing" of liberal progress, which means the painfully steady sucking of the work-

ing class's life-blood by its exploiters. Of course, the tasks of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship are infinitely more difficult and more complex than the tasks of an "extreme opposition", or of an exclusively parliamentary struggle. But whoever is consciously capable of preferring smooth sailing and the course of safe "opposition" in the present revolutionary situation had better abandon Social-Democratic work for a while, had better wait until the revolution is over, until the festive days have passed, when humdrum, everyday life starts again, and his narrow routine standards no longer strike such an abominably discordant note, or constitute such an ugly distortion of the tasks of the advanced class.

At the head of the whole people, and particularly of the peasantry—for complete freedom, for a consistent democratic revolution, for a republic! At the head of all the toilers and the exploited—for socialism! Such in practice must be the policy of the revolutionary proletariat, such is the class slogan which must permeate and determine the solution of every tactical problem, every practical step of the workers' party during the revolution.

## EPILOGUE

### ONCE AGAIN THE *OSVOBOZHDENIYE* TREND, ONCE AGAIN THE NEW-*ISKRA* TREND.

*Osvobozhdeniye*, Nos. 71-72. and *Iskra*, Nos. 102-103, provide a wealth of additional material on the question dealt with in Chapter 8 of our pamphlet. Since it is quite impossible here to make use of all this rich material we shall confine ourselves to the most important points only: firstly, the kind of "realism" in Social-Democracy that *Osvobozhdeniye* praises, and why the latter should praise it; secondly, the relationship between the concepts of revolution and dictatorship.

### I. WHY DO BOURGEOIS LIBERAL REALISTS PRAISE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC "REALISTS"?

Articles entitled "The Split in Russian Social-Democracy" and "The Triumph of Common Sense" (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72) express an opinion on Social Democracy held by representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, an opinion of remarkable value to class-conscious proletarians. We cannot too strongly recommend to every Social-Democrat that he should read these articles in full and *ponder over* every sentence in them: We shall first of all reproduce the most important propositions in these two articles.

"It is fairly difficult," writes *Osvobozhdeniye*, "for an outside observer to grasp the real political meaning of the differences that have split the Social Democratic Party into two factions. A definition of the 'Majority' faction as the more radical and unswerving, as distinct from the 'Minority' which allows of certain compromises in the interests of the cause, is not quite exact, and in any case does not provide an exhaustive characterisation. At any rate the

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Crossed out here in the manuscript is "The judgement of the most sworn, the strongest (in modern society) and the cleverest enemies of Social-Democracy (among all its contemporary enemies) constitutes positively invaluable material for the Social-Democrats' own political education"—*Ed*



traditional dogmas of Marxist orthodoxy are observed by the 'Minority' faction with even greater zeal, perhaps, than by the Lenin faction. The following characterisation would appear to us to be more accurate. The fundamental political temper of the 'Majority' is abstract revolutionism, rebelliousness, and eagerness to stir up insurrection among the popular masses by any and every means and to immediately seize power on their behalf; to a certain extent this brings the 'Leninists' close to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and makes the idea of a Russian revolution of the whole people overshadow in their minds the idea of the class struggle. While in practice abjuring much of the narrow-mindedness of the Social-Democratic doctrine, the 'Leninists' are, on the other hand, thoroughly imbued with the narrow-mindedness of revolutionism; they renounce all practical work except the preparation of an immediate insurrection, ignore on principle all forms of legal and semi-legal agitation and any kind of practically useful compromise with other oppositional trends. On the contrary, the 'Minority', while steadfastly adhering to the doctrine of Marxism, at the same time preserves the realistic elements of the Marxist world outlook. Contraposing the interests of the 'proletariat' to those of the bourgeoisie is the fundamental idea of this group. On the other hand, however, the proletariat's struggle is conceived—of course within certain bounds dictated by the immutable dogmas of Social-Democracy—in realistically sober fashion, with a clear realisation of all the concrete conditions and aims of this struggle. Neither of the two factions pursues its basic point of view quite consistently, for in their ideological and political activities they are bound by the stringent formulas of the Social-Democratic catechism, which prevent the 'Leninists' from becoming unswerving rebels after the fashion of, at least, some Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the 'Iskra group' from becoming practical leaders of the real political movement of the working class."

After quoting the contents of the most important resolutions the *Osvobozhdeniye* writer goes on to illustrate his general "ideas" with several concrete remarks about them. In comparison with the Third Congress he says "the Minority Conference takes a totally different attitude towards insurrection." "In connection with the attitude towards an insurrection" there is a difference in the respective resolutions on a provisional government. A similar difference is revealed with regard to the workers' trade unions. In their resolution the 'Leninists' have not said a single word about this most important starting-point in the political education and organisation of the working class. The 'Minority', on the contrary, drew up a very weighty resolution. With regard to the liberals, both factions, he says, see eye to eye, but the Third Congress "repeats almost word for word the Plekhanov resolution on the attitude towards the liberals, adopted at the Second Congress, and rejects the Starover resolution adopted by the same Congress, which was more favourably inclined towards the liberals". Although the Congress and the Conference resolutions on the peasant movement coincide on the whole, "the 'Majority' lays more emphasis on the idea of the revolutionary confiscation of the landlords' estates and other land, while the 'Minority' wants to make the demand for democratic state and administrative reforms the basis of its agitation".

Finally, *Osvobozhdeniye* cites from No. 100 of *Iskra* a Menshevik resolution, whose main clause reads as follows: "Since underground work alone does not at present secure adequate participation of the masses in Party life and in some degree leads to the masses as such being contraposed to the Party as an illegal organisation, the latter must assume leadership of the trade union struggle of the workers on a legal basis, strictly linking up this struggle with the Social-Democratic tasks." Commenting on this resolution *Osvobozhdeniye* exclaims, "We heartily welcome this resolution as a triumph of common sense, as evidence that a definite section of the Social-Democratic Party is beginning to see the light with regard to tactics."

The reader now has before him all the noteworthy opinions of *Osvobozhdeniye*. It would, of course, be a most grave error to regard these opinions as correct in the sense of corresponding to the objective truth. Mistakes in them will easily be detected by every Social-Democrat at every step. It would be naïve to forget that these opinions are thoroughly imbued with the liberal bourgeoisie's interests and points of view, and that in this sense they are utterly biased and tendentious. They reflect the Social-Democrats' views in the same way as objects are reflected in a concave or convex mirror. It would, however, be an even greater mistake to forget that in the final analysis these bourgeois-distorted opinions reflect the actual interests of the bourgeoisie, which, as a class, undoubtedly understands correctly which trends in Social-Democracy are advantageous, close, akin, and agreeable to it, and which trends are harmful, distant, alien, and antipathetic. A bourgeois philosopher or a bourgeois publicist will never understand Social-Democracy properly, whether it is Menshevik or Bolshevik Social-Democracy. But if he is at all a sensible publicist, his class instinct will not fail him, and he will always grasp the essence of what one trend or another in the Social-Democratic movement may mean to the bourgeoisie, although he may present it in a distorted way. That is why our enemy's class instinct, his class opinion always deserves the closest attention from every class-conscious proletarian.

What, then, does the Russian bourgeoisie's class instinct, as voiced by *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents, tell us?

It quite definitely expresses its satisfaction with the trend represented by the new *Iskra*, praising it for realism, sober-mindedness, the triumph of common sense, the soundness of its resolutions, its having begun to see the light on questions of tactics, its practicalness, etc.—and it expresses dissatisfaction with the trend of the Third Congress, censuring it for its narrow-mindedness, revolutionism, rebelliousness, its repudiation of practically useful compromises, etc. The class instinct of the bourgeoisie suggests to it exactly what has been repeatedly proved in our literature with the aid of most precise facts, namely, that the new-*Iskra* supporters are the opportunist wing of the present-day Russian Social-Democratic movement, and their opponents—the revolutionary wing. The liberals cannot but sympathise with the trends in the former, and cannot but censure the trends in the latter. As ideologists of the bourgeoisie the liberals understand perfectly well that the bourgeoisie stands to gain by the “practicalness, sober-mindedness, and soundness” of the working class, by actually restricting its field of activity within the framework of capitalism, reforms, the trade union struggle, etc. The proletariat's “revolutionary narrow-mindedness”, its endeavours to

win the leadership in a popular Russian revolution in order to promote its own class aims—these things are dangerous and frightening to the bourgeoisie

That this is the actual significance of the world 'realism' in its *Osvobozhdeniye* sense is evident, among other things, from the way it was previously used by *Osvobozhdeniye* and by Mr. Struve. *Iskra* itself could not but admit that *such* was the significance of *Osvobozhdeniye*'s "realism." Take, for instance, the article entitled 'High Time' in the supplement to *Iskra* No. 73-74. The author of this article (a consistent exponent of the views of the "Marsh" at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party) frankly expressed the opinion that at the Congress Akimov played the part of the ghost of opportunism rather than of its real representative. And the editors of *Iskra* were forthwith obliged to correct the author of the article 'High Time' by stating in a note

This opinion cannot be agreed with. Comrade Akimov's views on the programme bear the clear imprint of opportunism, which fact is admitted even by the *Osvobozhdeniye* critic who—in one of its recent issues—stated that Comrade Akimov is an adherent of the realist and revisionist tendency.

Thus *Iskra* itself is perfectly aware that *Osvobozhdeniye*'s realism is simply opportunism and nothing else. If in attacking liberal realism (*Iskra* No. 102) *Iskra* now says nothing about *its having been praised by the liberals* for its realism, this silence is explained by the circumstance that such praise is bitterer than any censure. Such praise (which *Osvobozhdeniye* uttered not by mere chance and not for the first time) actually proves the affinity between liberal realism and those tendencies of Social Democratic realism (read opportunism) that stand out in every resolution of the new Iskrists in consequence of the fallacy of their entire tactical stand.

Indeed, the Russian bourgeoisie has already fully revealed its inconsistency and cupidity in the popular revolution—has revealed it in Mr. Struve's arguments in the entire tenor and content of the bulk of liberal newspapers and in the nature of the political utterances of most Zemstvo members, the bulk of the intellectuals, and in general of all the adherents of Messrs. Trubetskoi, Petrunkevich, Rodichev, and Co. Of course the bourgeoisie does not always reveal a clear understanding, but by and large its class instinct enables it to realise perfectly well that on the one hand the proletariat and the people are useful for *its* revolution as cannon fodder, as a battering ram against the autocracy, but that on the other hand the proletar-

Here the manuscript has: (Of the leaflet *An Obliging Liberal* published by *Upravod*). (See *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 486-89—*Id.*)

iat and the revolutionary peasantry will be terribly dangerous to it if they win a "decisive victory over tsarism" and carry the democratic revolution to completion. That is why the bourgeoisie strains every effort to induce the proletariat to be content with a "modest" role in the revolution, to be more sober-minded, practical and realistic, and let its activities be guided by the principle, "lest the bourgeoisie recoil".

Intellectual bourgeois know full well that they will not be able to get rid of the working-class movement. That is why they do not at all come out against the working-class movement as such, or against the proletariat's class struggle as such—no, they even pay lip service to the right to strike and to a genteel class struggle, since they understand the working-class movement and the class struggle in the Brentano or Hirsch-Duncker sense. In other words they are fully prepared to "yield" to the workers the right to strike and freedom of association (which in fact has already been almost won by the workers themselves), if only the workers renounce their "rebelliousness", their "narrow-minded revolutionism", their hostility to "compromises of practical use", their claims and aspirations to place upon the "revolution of the whole Russian people" the imprint of *their* class struggle, the imprint of proletarian consistency, proletarian determination, and "plebeian Jacobinism". That is why intellectual bourgeois all over Russia are exerting every effort, resorting to thousands of ways and means—books,<sup>2</sup> lectures, speeches, talks, etc., etc.—to imbue the workers with the ideas of (bourgeois) sober-mindedness, (liberal) practicalness, (opportunist) realism, (Brentano) class struggle, (Hirsch-Duncker) trade unions, etc. The last two slogans are particularly convenient for the bourgeois of the "Constitutional-Democratic" party, the *Osvobozhdeniye* party, since in appearance they coincide with Marxist slogans, and, with some minor omissions and slight distortions, can easily be confused with and sometimes even passed off as Social-Democratic slogans. For instance, the legal liberal newspaper *Rassvet* (which we shall some day try to discuss in greater detail with *Proletary* readers) frequently says such "outspoken" things about the class struggle, the possible deception of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, the working-class movement, the proletariat's initiative, etc., etc., that the inattentive reader or unenlightened worker might easily be led to believe that its "Social-Democratism" is genuine. Actually, however, it is a bourgeois imitation of Social-Democratism, an opportunist distortion and perversion of the concept of the class struggle.

At the root of all this gigantic bourgeois subterfuge (gigantic

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Prokopovitch, *The Labour Question in Russia*.

in the extent of its influence on the masses) lies an urge to reduce the working-class movement mainly to a trade union movement, to keep it as far away as possible from an independent policy (i.e., one that is revolutionary and directed towards a democratic dictatorship), "to make the idea of the class struggle overshadow, in the workers' minds, the idea of a Russian revolution of the whole people".

As the reader will perceive, we have turned the *Osvobozhdeniye* formulation upside down. This is an excellent formulation, one that excellently expresses two views upon the proletariat's role in a democratic revolution—the bourgeois view and the Social-Democratic view. The bourgeoisie wants to confine the proletariat to the trade union movement, and thereby to "make the idea of the (*Brentano*) class struggle overshadow in its mind the idea of a Russian revolution of the whole people"—fully in the spirit of the Bernsteinian authors of the *Credo*, who tried to make the idea of a "purely working-class movement" overshadow in the workers' minds the idea of political struggle. On the contrary, Social-Democracy wants to develop the proletariat's class struggle to the level of leadership in the Russian revolution of the whole people, i.e., to bring that revolution to the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The revolution in our country is one of the whole people, says the bourgeoisie to the proletariat. As a separate class, you should, therefore, confine yourselves to your class struggle; in the name of "common sense" you should devote your attention mainly to the trade unions and their legalisation; you should consider these trade unions as "the most important starting-point in your political education and organisation"; in a revolutionary situation you should for the most part draw up "sound" resolutions like the new-*Iskra* resolution; you should give heed to resolutions "more favourably inclined towards the liberals"; you should show preference for leaders with a tendency to become "practical leaders of the real political movement of the working class", and should "preserve the realistic elements of the Marxist world outlook" (if you have unfortunately already become infected with the "stringent formulas" of this "unscientific" catechism).

The revolution in our country is one of the whole people, the Social-Democrats say to the proletariat. As the most progressive and the only thoroughly revolutionary class, you should strive to play not merely a most active part in it, but the leading part as well. Therefore, you must not confine yourself within a narrowly conceived framework of the class struggle, understood mainly as the trade union movement; on the contrary, you must strive to extend the framework and the content of your class struggle so as to make it *include* not only *all* the aims of the pres-

ent, democratic Russian revolution of the whole people, but the aims of the subsequent socialist revolution as well. Therefore, without ignoring the trade union movement, or refusing to take advantage of even the slightest legal opportunities, you must in a revolutionary period bring into the forefront the tasks of an insurrection and the formation of a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government, as being the only way to the people's complete victory over tsarism, to the achievement of a democratic republic and genuine political freedom.

It would be superfluous to speak about the half-hearted and inconsistent stand, naturally so pleasing to the bourgeoisie, taken on this question by the new-*Iskra* resolutions because of their mistaken "line".

## II. COMRADE MARTYNOV AGAIN GIVES "PROFUNDITY" TO THE QUESTION

Let us pass on to Martynov's articles in Nos. 102 and 103 of *Iskra*. We shall, of course, make no reply to Martynov's attempts to prove the incorrectness of our interpretation, and the correctness of his own interpretation, of a number of quotations from Engels and Marx. These attempts are so trivial, Martynov's subterfuges so obvious, and the question so clear that it would be of no interest to dwell on this point again. Every thoughtful reader will be able easily to see through the simple wiles employed by Martynov in his full retreat, especially when the complete translations of Engels's pamphlet *The Bakuninists at Work* and Marx's *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* of March 1850, now being prepared by a group of *Proletary* collaborators, are published.<sup>267</sup> A single quotation from Martynov's article will suffice to make his retreat clear to the reader.

"*Iskra* 'admits,'" says Martynov in No. 103, "that setting up a provisional government is a possible and expedient way of furthering the revolution, but denies the expediency of Social-Democrats participating in a *bourgeois* provisional government, precisely so as to be able, in the future, to gain complete control of the state machinery for a socialist revolution." In other words, *Iskra* now admits the absurdity of all its fears concerning a revolutionary government's responsibility for the exchequer and the banks, concerning the danger and impossibility of taking over the "prisons", etc. But *Iskra* is only muddling things as previously, confusing democratic with socialist dictatorship. This muddle is unavoidable; it is a means to cover up the retreat.

But among the muddle-heads of the new *Iskra* Martynov stands out as Muddle-head No. 1, as a muddle-head of talent, if one

might say so. By confusing the question by his laboured efforts to 'give it profundity', he almost invariably "arrives" at new formulations which lay bare all the falseness of the stand he has taken. You will remember how in the days of Economism he rendered Plekhanov "more profound" and created the formulation 'economic struggle against the employers and the government'. In all Economist literature it would be difficult to find a more apt expression of this trend's falseness. It is the same today. Martynov serves the new *Iskra* zealously and almost every time he opens his mouth he furnishes us with new and excellent material for an appraisal of the new *Iskra*'s false position. In No. 102 he says that Lenin 'has imperceptibly put the concept of dictatorship in place of that of revolution' (p. 3, col. 2).

In essence, all the accusations the new *Iskra*'s have levelled at us can be reduced to this one. Indeed we are grateful to Martynov for this accusation! He has rendered us most invaluable service in the struggle against the new *Iskra* ideas by formulating his accusation in this way! We must positively beg the editors of *Iskra* to let Martynov loose against us more often for the purpose of making the attacks on *Proletary* "more profound" and for a 'truly principled' formulation of these attacks. For the more Martynov exerts himself to argue on the plane of principles, the worse do his arguments appear, and the more clearly does he reveal the gaps in the new-*Iskra* trend, the more successfully does he perform on himself and on his friends the useful *reductio ad absurdum* pedagogical operation (reducing the principles of the new *Iskra* to an absurdity).

*Uperiod* and *Proletary* use the concepts of dictatorship and revolution 'interchangeably'. *Iskra* does not want such 'interchangeability'. Just so, most esteemed Comrade Martynov! You have unwittingly stated a great truth. With this new formulation you have confirmed our contention that *Iskra* is lagging behind the revolution and straying into an *Oscobor-hulenny* formulation of its tasks, whereas *Uperiod* and *Proletary* are issuing slogans that advance the democratic revolution.

Is this something you don't understand, Comrade Martynov? In view of the importance of the question we shall try to give you a detailed explanation.

The bourgeois character of the democratic revolution expresses itself among other things in the fact that a number of classes, groups and sections of society which fully stand for recognition of private property and commodity production and are incapable of going beyond these bounds are compelled by force of circumstances to recognise the uselessness of the autocracy and of the whole feudal order in general, and join in the demand for liberty. The bourgeois character of *this* liberty which is demanded by

"society" and advocated in a flood of words (and only words!) from the landowners and the capitalists, is manifesting itself more and more clearly. At the same time the radical difference between the workers' and the bourgeoisie's struggle for liberty, between proletarian and liberal democratism, is also becoming more palpable. The working class and its class-conscious representatives are marching forward and carrying this struggle forward, not only unafraid of bringing it to completion, but striving to go far beyond the uttermost limits of the democratic revolution. Inconsistent and selfish, the bourgeoisie accepts the slogans of liberty hypocritically and only in part. Doomed to inevitable failure are all attempts to establish, by some particular line or by drawing up particular "points" (like those in Starover's resolution or that of the conferees), the limits beyond which this hypocrisy of the bourgeois friends of liberty, or, rather, this betrayal of liberty by its bourgeois friends, begins. That is because the bourgeoisie, caught between two fires (the autocracy and the proletariat), is capable of changing its position and slogans by a thousand ways and means, adapting itself by moving an inch to the left or an inch to the right, haggling and chaffering all the time. The task of proletarian democratism is not to invent such lifeless "points", but to criticise the developing political situation ceaselessly, to expose the ever new and unforeseeable inconsistencies and betrayals on the part of the bourgeoisie.

Recall the history of Mr. Struve's political pronouncements in the illegal press, the history of Social-Democracy's war with him, and you will clearly see how these tasks have been carried out by Social-Democracy, the champion of proletarian democratism. Mr. Struve began with a purely Shipov slogan: "Rights and an Authoritative Zemstvo" (see my article in *Zarya*, "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism"\*) . Social-Democracy exposed him and drove him towards a definitely constitutionalist programme. When these "shoves" took effect, thanks to the particularly rapid progress of revolutionary events, the struggle shifted to the *next* problem of democratism: not merely a constitution in general, but one providing for universal and equal suffrage, direct elections, and a secret ballot. When we "captured" this new position from the "enemy" (the adoption of universal suffrage by the *Osvobozhdeniye* League) we began to press further; we showed up the hypocrisy and falseness of a two-chamber system, and the fact that universal suffrage had not been fully recognised by the *Osvobozhdeniye* League; we pointed to their *monarchism* and showed up the

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 31-80.—Ed.



huckstering nature of their democratism, or, in other words, the *bartering away* of the interests of the great Russian revolution by these *Osvobozheniye* heroes of the money-bag.

Finally, the autocracy's obduracy, the tremendous progress of the civil war, and the hopelessness of the plight to which the monarchists have reduced Russia have begun to penetrate into even the thickest of skulls. The revolution became a *fact*. It was no longer necessary to be a revolutionary to acknowledge the revolution. The autocratic government has actually been disintegrating before our eyes. As has justly been remarked in the legal press by a certain liberal (Mr. Gredeskul), actual *disobedience* to this government has set in. Notwithstanding its apparent might the autocracy has proved impotent; the events attending the developing revolution have simply begun to thrust aside this parasitic organism, which is rotting alive. Compelled to base their activities (or, to put it more correctly, their shady political deals) on relationships as they are actually taking shape, the liberal bourgeois *have begun to see the necessity of recognising the revolution*. They do so not because they are revolutionaries, but despite the fact that they are *not* revolutionaries. They do so of necessity and against their will, glaring angrily at the success of the revolution, and levelling the accusation of revolutionism against the autocracy, which does not want to strike a bargain, but wants a life-and-death struggle. Born hucksters, they hate struggle and revolution, but circumstances force them to stand on the ground of revolution, for there is no other ground under their feet.

We are witnessing a highly instructive and highly comical spectacle. The bourgeois liberal prostitutes are trying to drape themselves in the toga of revolution. The *Osvobozhdeniye* people—*risum teneatis, amici!*\*—the *Osvobozhdeniye* people are beginning to speak in the name of the revolution! They are beginning to assure us that they “do not fear revolution” (Mr. Struve in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72)!!! They are voicing their claim “to be at the head of the revolution”!!!

This is a most significant phenomenon, one that characterises not only an advance in bourgeois liberalism, but even more so the advance of the real successes of the revolutionary movement, which has *compelled* recognition. Even the bourgeoisie is beginning to feel that it is more to its advantage to take its stand on the side of the revolution, for the autocracy is so shaky. On the other hand, however, this phenomenon, which testifies to the new and higher level reached by the entire movement, sets us new and higher tasks as well. The bourgeoisie's recognition

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Restrain your laughter, friends!

of the revolution cannot be sincere, irrespective of the personal integrity of one bourgeois ideologist or another. The bourgeoisie cannot but bring selfishness and inconsistency, the spirit of chaffering and petty reactionary dodges even into this higher stage of the movement. We must now formulate the immediate *concrete* tasks of the revolution in a *different* way, in the name of our programme, and in amplification of our programme. What was adequate yesterday is *inadequate today*. Yesterday, perhaps, the demand for the recognition of the revolution was adequate as an advanced democratic slogan. Today that is not enough. The revolution has forced even Mr. Struve to recognise it. The advanced class must now define exactly *the very content* of the urgent and pressing tasks of this revolution. While recognising the revolution, Messrs. the Struves again and again show their asses' ears and strike up the old tune about the possibility of a peaceful outcome, about Nicholas calling on the *Osvobozhdeniye* group to take power, etc., etc. The *Osvobozhdeniye* people recognise the revolution so as to emasculate and betray it the more safely for themselves. It is now our duty to show the proletariat and the whole people the inadequacy of the slogan of "revolution"; we must show how necessary it is to have a clear and unambiguous, consistent, and determined definition of *the very content* of the revolution. And this definition is provided by the one slogan that is capable of correctly expressing a "decisive victory" of the revolution, the slogan of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Abuse of terms is a most common practice in politics. The name "socialist", for example, has often been appropriated by supporters of English bourgeois liberalism ("We are all socialists now," said Harcourt), by supporters of Bismarck, and by friends of Pope Leo XIII. The term "revolution" also fully lends itself to abuse, and, at a certain stage in the development of the movement, such abuse is inevitable. When Mr. Struve began to speak in the name of revolution we could not but recall Thiers. A few days before the February revolution this monstrous gnome, this most perfect embodiment of the bourgeoisie's political venality sensed that a storm was brewing among the people, and announced from the parliamentary tribune that he *was of the party of revolution!* (See Marx's *The Civil War in France*.) The political significance of *Osvobozhdeniye's* joining the party of revolution is *exactly the same* as Thiers's. When the Russian Thiers begin to speak of their belonging to the party of revolution, that means that the slogan of revolution has become inadequate, is

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\* These words are in English in the original — Ed.

meaningless, and defines no tasks since the revolution has become a fact, and the most diverse elements are going over to its side.

Indeed, what is revolution from the Marxist point of view? The forcible demolition of the obsolete political superstructure, the contradiction between which and the new relations of production has caused its collapse at a certain moment. The contradiction between the autocracy and the entire structure of capitalist Russia and all the needs of her bourgeois-democratic development has now caused its collapse, all the more severe owing to the lengthy period in which this contradiction was artificially sustained. The superstructure is cracking at every joint, is yielding to pressure, and growing weaker. Through the representatives of the most diverse classes and groups, the people must now, by their own efforts, build themselves a new superstructure. At a certain stage of development, the uselessness of the old superstructure becomes obvious to all; the revolution is recognised by all. The task now is to define *which* classes must build the new superstructure, and *how* they are to build it. If this is not defined the slogan of revolution is empty and meaningless at the present time; for the feebleness of the autocracy makes "revolutionaries" even of the Grand Dukes and of *Moskovskiyce Uedomosti!* If this is not defined there can be no talk about the advanced democratic tasks of the advanced class. The slogan "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" provides that definition. This slogan defines the classes upon which the new "builders" of the new superstructure can and must rely, the character of the new superstructure (a "democratic" as distinct from a socialist dictatorship), and how it is to be built (dictatorship, i.e., the forcible suppression of resistance by force and the arming of the revolutionary classes of the people). Whoever now refuses to recognise this slogan of revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, the slogan of a revolutionary army, of a revolutionary government, and of revolutionary peasant committees, either hopelessly fails to understand the tasks of the revolution, is unable to define the new and higher tasks evoked by the present situation, or is deceiving the people, betraying the revolution, and misusing the slogan of "revolution".

Comrade Martynov and his friends are instances of the former, and Mr. Struve and the whole of the "Constitutional-Democratic" Zemstvo party—of the latter case.

Comrade Martynov was so sharp and shrewd that he charged us with having made the concepts of dictatorship and revolution "interchangeable" just at a time when the development of the revolution required that its tasks be defined by the slogan of dictatorship. Comrade Martynov has again been so unlucky as to be left behind, stranded at the stage before the last, *at the level*

reached by *Osvobozhdeniye*; for recognition of "revolution" (in word) and refusal to recognise the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry (i.e., revolution in deed) today amounts to taking the political stand of *Osvobozhdeniye*, i.e., is to the interests of the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie. Through Mr. Struve the liberal bourgeoisie is now expressing itself in favour of revolution. Through the revolutionary Social-Democrats the class-conscious proletariat is demanding a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. And at this stage the new-*Iskra* wisacre intervenes in the controversy and yells: "Don't dare make the ideas of dictatorship and revolution 'interchangeable'!" Well, is it not true that the false stand taken by the new-*Iskrist*s dooms them to be constantly dragging along at the tail end of *Osvobozhdeniye* trend?

We have shown that the *Osvobozhdeniye* people are ascending (not without prodding from the Social-Democrats) step by step in the matter of recognising democratism. At first, the issue in dispute between us was: Shipovism (rights and an authoritative Zemstvo) or constitutionalism? Then it was: limited suffrage or universal suffrage. Later: recognition of the revolution or a huckster's bargain with the autocracy? Finally, it is now: recognition of the revolution without the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or recognition of the demand for a dictatorship of these classes in the democratic revolution? It is possible and probable that the *Osvobozhdeniye* people (it makes no difference whether these are present ones, or their successors in the Left wing of the bourgeois democrats) will ascend another step, i.e., recognise in due course (perhaps by the time Comrade Martynov ascends another step) the slogan of dictatorship as well. This will inevitably be the case if the Russian revolution continues to forge ahead, and achieves a decisive victory. What will the position of Social-Democracy then be? The complete victory of the present revolution will mark the end of the democratic revolution and the beginning of a determined struggle for a socialist revolution. Satisfaction of the present-day demands of the peasantry, the utter rout of reaction and the achievement of a democratic republic will mark the utter limit of the revolutionism of the bourgeoisie, and even that of the petty bourgeoisie, and the beginning of the proletariat's real struggle for socialism. The more complete the democratic revolution, the sooner, the more widespread, the cleaner, and the more determined will the development of this new struggle be. The slogan of a "democratic" dictatorship expresses the historically limited nature of the present revolution and the necessity of a new struggle on the basis of the new order for the complete emancipation of the working class from all oppression and all exploitation. In other words,

when the democratic bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie ascends another step, when not only the revolution but the complete victory of the revolution becomes an accomplished fact, we shall "change" (perhaps amid the horrified cries of new and future Martynovs) the slogan of the democratic dictatorship to the slogan of a socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., of a full socialist revolution.

### III. THE VULGAR BOURGEOIS AND THE MARXIST VIEWS ON DICTATORSHIP

In his notes to Marx's articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of 1848, which he published, Mehring tells us that one of the reproaches levelled at this newspaper by bourgeois publications was that it had allegedly demanded "the immediate introduction of a dictatorship as the sole means of achieving democracy" (Marx, *Nachlass*, Vol. III, p. 53).<sup>268</sup> From the vulgar bourgeois standpoint the terms dictatorship and democracy are mutually exclusive. Failing to understand the theory of class struggle and accustomed to seeing in the political arena the petty squabbling of the various bourgeois circles and coteries, the bourgeois understands by dictatorship the annulment of all liberties and guarantees of democracy, arbitrariness of every kind, and every sort of abuse of power in a dictator's personal interests. In fact, it is precisely this vulgar bourgeois view that is manifested in the writings of our Martynov, who winds up his "new campaign" in the new *Iskra* by attributing the partiality of *Uperyod* and *Proletary* for the slogan of dictatorship to Lenin's "passionate desire to try his luck" (*Iskra*, No. 103, p. 3, col. 2). This charming explanation is wholly on a level with the bourgeois charges against the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* and against the preaching of dictatorship. Thus Marx too was accused (by bourgeois liberals, not Social-Democrats) of "supplanting" the concepts of revolution and dictatorship. In order to explain to Martynov the meaning of the term class dictatorship, as distinct from personal dictatorship, and the tasks of a democratic dictatorship, as distinct from those of a socialist dictatorship, it would not be amiss to dwell on the views of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.

"After a revolution," wrote the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* on September 14, 1848, "every provisional organisation of the state requires a dictatorship and an energetic dictatorship at that. From the very beginning we have reproached Camphausen" (the head of the Ministry after March 18, 1848) "for not acting dictatorially, for not having immediately smashed up

and eliminated the remnants of the old institutions. And while Herr Camphausen was lulling himself with constitutional illusions the defeated party (i.e., the party of reaction) strengthened its positions in the bureaucracy and in the army, and here and there even began to venture upon open struggle."<sup>269</sup>

These words, Mehring justly remarks, sum up in a few propositions all that was propounded in detail in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in long articles on the Camphausen Ministry. What do these words of Marx tell us? That a provisional revolutionary government *must* act dictatorially (a proposition which *Iskra* was totally unable to grasp since it was fighting shy of the slogan of dictatorship), and that the task of such a dictatorship is to destroy the remnants of the old institutions (which is precisely what was clearly stated in the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on the struggle against counter-revolution and was omitted in the resolution of the Conference, as shown above). Thirdly, and lastly, it follows from these words that Marx castigated the bourgeois democrats for entertaining "constitutional illusions" in a period of revolution and open civil war. The meaning of these words becomes particularly obvious from the article in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of June 6, 1848 "A constituent national assembly," Marx wrote, "must first of all be an active, revolutionary active assembly. The Frankfurt Assembly, however, is busying itself with school exercises in parliamentarism while allowing the government to act. Let us assume that this learned assembly succeeds, after mature consideration, in evolving the best possible agenda and the best constitution, but what is the use of the best possible agenda and of the best possible constitution, if the German governments have in the meantime placed the bayonet on the agenda?"<sup>270</sup>

That is the meaning of the slogan dictatorship. We can judge from this what Marx's attitude would have been towards resolutions which call a "decision to organise a constituent assembly" a decisive victory, or which invite us to "remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition!"

Major questions in the life of nations are settled only by force. The reactionary classes themselves are usually the first to resort to violence, to civil war; they are the first to "place the bayonet on the agenda", as the Russian autocracy has systematically and unswervingly been doing everywhere ever since January 9. And since such a situation has arisen, since the bayonet has really become the main point on the political agenda, since insurrection has proved imperative and urgent—constitutional illusions and school exercises in parliamentarism become merely a screen for the bourgeois betrayal of the revolution, a screen

to conceal the fact that the bourgeoisie is "recoiling" from the revolution. It is precisely the slogan of dictatorship that the genuinely revolutionary class must advance in that case.

On the question of the tasks of this dictatorship Marx wrote in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*: "The National Assembly should have acted dictatorially against the reactionary attempts of the obsolete governments, and thus gained for itself the power of public opinion against which all bayonets and rifle butts would have been shattered. . . . But this Assembly bores the German people instead of carrying them with it or being carried away by them."<sup>271</sup> In Marx's opinion, the National Assembly should have "eliminated from the regime actually existing in Germany everything that contradicted the principle of the sovereignty of the people", and then it should have "consolidated the revolutionary ground on which it stands in order to make the sovereignty of the people, won by the revolution, secure against all attacks."<sup>272</sup>

Consequently, in their content, the tasks which Marx set a revolutionary government or dictatorship in 1848 amounted first and foremost to a *democratic* revolution: defence against counter-revolution and the actual elimination of everything that contradicted the sovereignty of the people. That is nothing else than a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship.

To proceed: which classes, in Marx's opinion, could and should have achieved this task (to fully exercise in deed the principle of the people's sovereignty and beat off the attacks of the counter-revolution)? Marx speaks of the "people". But we know that he always fought ruthlessly against petty bourgeois illusions about the unity of the "people" and the absence of a class struggle within the people. In using the word "people" Marx did not thereby gloss over class distinctions, but united definite elements capable of bringing the revolution to completion.

After the victory of the Berlin proletariat on March 18, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* wrote, the results of the revolution proved twofold: "On the one hand, the arming of the people, the right of association, the actual achievement of the sovereignty of the people; on the other hand, the retention of the monarchy and the Camphausen-Hansmann Ministry, i.e., the government of representatives of the big bourgeoisie. Thus, the revolution had two series of results, which had inevitably to diverge. The people had achieved victory; they had won liberties of a decisively democratic nature, but immediate power did not pass into their hands, but into the hands of the big bourgeoisie. In short, the revolution was not consummated. The people let representatives of the big bourgeois form a ministry, and these representatives of the big bourgeois at once showed what they were after by offering an alliance to the old Prussian nobility

and bureaucracy. Arnim, Canitz, and Schwerin joined the ministry.

*"The upper bourgeoisie, ever anti-revolutionary, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with the reactionaries for fear of the people, that is to say, the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie."* (Italics ours.)<sup>273</sup>

Thus, not only a "decision to organise a constituent assembly", but even its actual convocation is insufficient for a decisive victory of the revolution! Even after a partial victory in an armed struggle (the victory of the Berlin workers over the troops on March 18, 1848) an "incomplete" revolution, a revolution "that has not been carried to completion", is possible. On what, then, does its completion depend? It depends on whose hands immediate power passes into, into the hands of the Petrunkeviches and Rodichevs, that is to say, the Camp-hausens and the Hansemanns, or into the hands of the *people*, i.e., the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie. In the first instance, the bourgeoisie will possess power, and the proletariat—"freedom of criticism", freedom to "remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition". Immediately after the victory the bourgeoisie will conclude an alliance with the reactionaries (this would inevitably happen in Russia too, if, for example, the St. Petersburg workers gained only a partial victory in street fighting with the troops and left it to Messrs. Petrunkeviches and Co. to form a government). In the second instance, a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, i.e., the complete victory of the revolution, would be possible.

It now remains to define more precisely what Marx really meant by "democratic bourgeoisie" (*demokratische Burgerschaft*), which, together with the workers, he called the people, in contradistinction to the big bourgeoisie.

A clear answer to this question is supplied by the following passage from an article in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of July 29, 1848: "...The German Revolution of 1848 is only a parody of the French Revolution of 1789.

"On August 4, 1789, three weeks after the storming of the Bastille, the French people in a single day prevailed over all feudal burdens.

"On July 11, 1848, four months after the March barricades, the feudal burdens prevailed over the German people. *Teste Gierke cum Hansemanno*\*.

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\* "Witnesses: Herr Gierke together with Herr Hansemann." Hansemann was a Minister who represented the party of the big bourgeoisie (Russian counterpart Trubetskoi or Rodichev, and the like); Gierke was Minister of Agriculture in the Hansemann Cabinet, who drew up a plan, a "bold" plan for "abolishing feudal burdens", professedly "without compensation", but in fact for abolishing only the



"The French bourgeoisie of 1789 did not for a moment leave its allies, the peasants, in the lurch. It knew that its rule was grounded in the destruction of feudalism in the countryside, the creation of a free landowning (*grundbesitzenden*) peasant class.

"The German bourgeoisie of 1848 is, without the least compunction, betraying the peasants, who are its most natural allies, the flesh of its flesh, and without whom it is powerless against the aristocracy.

"The continuance of feudal rights, their sanction under the guise of (illusory) redemption—such is the result of the German revolution of 1848. The mountain brought forth a mouse."<sup>274</sup>

This is a very instructive passage, which provides us with four important propositions: 1) The uncompleted German revolution differs from the completed French revolution in that the German bourgeoisie betrayed not only democracy in general, but also the peasantry in particular. 2) The creation of a free class of peasants is the foundation for the consummation of a democratic revolution. 3) The creation of such a class means the abolition of feudal services, the destruction of feudalism, but does not yet mean a socialist revolution. 4) The peasants are the "most natural" allies of the bourgeoisie, that is to say, of the democratic bourgeoisie, which without them is "powerless" against reaction.

With the proper allowances for concrete national peculiarities and with serfdom substituted for feudalism, all these propositions are fully applicable to the Russia of 1905. There is no doubt that by learning from the experience of Germany as elucidated by Marx, we can arrive at no other slogan for a decisive victory of the revolution than: a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. There is no doubt that the proletariat and the peasantry are the chief components of the "people" as contrasted by Marx in 1848 to the resisting reactionaries and the treacherous bourgeoisie. There is no doubt that in Russia, too, the liberal bourgeoisie and the gentlemen of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League are betraying and will betray the peasantry, i.e., will confine themselves to a pseudo-reform and take the side of the landlords in the decisive battle between them and the peasantry. In this struggle only the proletariat is capable of supporting the peasantry to the end. There is no doubt, finally, that in Russia, too, the success of the peasants' struggle, i.e., the transfer of the whole of the land

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minor and unimportant burdens, while preserving or granting compensation for the more essential ones. Herr Gierke was something like the Russian Kablukovs, Manuilovs, Hertensteins, and similar bourgeois liberal friends of the muzhik, who desire the "extension of peasant landownership" but do not wish to offend the landlords.

to the peasantry, will signify a complete democratic revolution, and constitute the social basis of the revolution carried through to its completion, but this will by no means be a socialist revolution, or the "socialisation" that the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, talk about. The success of the peasant insurrection, the victory of the democratic revolution will merely clear the way for a genuine and decisive struggle for socialism, on the basis of a democratic republic. In this struggle the peasantry, as a landowning class, will play the same treacherous, unstable part as is now being played by the bourgeoisie in the struggle for democracy. To forget this is to forget socialism, to deceive oneself and others regarding the real interests and tasks of the proletariat.

In order to leave no gaps in the presentation of the views held by Marx in 1848, it is necessary to note one essential difference between German Social-Democracy of that time (or the Communist Party of the proletariat, to use the language of that period) and present-day Russian Social-Democracy. Here is what Mehring says:

"The *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* appeared in the political arena as the 'organ of democracy'. There is no mistaking the trend running through all its articles. But in the direct sense it championed the interests of the bourgeois revolution against absolutism and feudalism more than the interests of the proletariat against those of the bourgeoisie. Very little is to be found in its columns about an independent working-class movement during the years of the revolution, although one should not forget that along with it there appeared, twice a week, under the editorship of Moll and Schapper, a special organ of the Cologne Workers' League.<sup>275</sup> At any rate the present-day reader will be struck by the little attention the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* paid to the German working class movement of its day, although Stephan Born, its most capable mind, was a pupil of Marx and Engels in Paris and Brussels, and in 1848 was their newspaper's Berlin correspondent. In his *Memoirs* Born says that Marx and Engels never expressed a single word in disapproval of his agitation among the workers. However, subsequent statements by Engels make it appear quite probable that they were at least dissatisfied with the methods of this agitation. Their dissatisfaction was justified inasmuch as Born was obliged to make many concessions to the as yet totally undeveloped class-consciousness of the proletariat in the greater part of Germany, concessions which do not stand the test of criticism from the viewpoint of the *Communist Manifesto*. Their dissatisfaction was unjustified inasmuch as Born managed nonetheless to maintain his agitation on a relatively high plane. . . . Without doubt, Marx and

Engels were historically and politically right in thinking that the primary interest of the working class was to drive the bourgeois revolution as far forward as possible. Nevertheless, remarkable proof of how the elementary instinct of the working-class movement is able to correct conceptions of the most brilliant thinkers is provided by the fact that in April 1849 they declared in favour of a specific workers' organisation and decided to participate in a workers' congress which was being prepared especially by the East Elbe (Eastern Prussia) proletariat.<sup>276</sup>

Thus, it was only in April 1849, after a revolutionary newspaper had been appearing for almost a year (the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* began publication on June 1, 1848), that Marx and Engels declared in favour of a special workers' organisation! Until then they were merely running an 'organ of democracy' unlinked by any organisational ties with an independent workers party. This fact, monstrous and improbable as it may appear from our present day standpoint clearly shows us the enormous difference between the German Social Democratic Party of those days and the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party of today. This fact shows how much less the proletarian features of the movement, the proletarian current within it were in evidence in the German democratic revolution (because of the backwardness of Germany in 1848 both economically and politically

its disunity as a state). This should not be forgotten (as it is forgotten, for instance, by Plekhanov) in appraising Marx's repeated declarations during this period and somewhat later about the need for organising an independent proletarian party. Marx arrived at this practical conclusion only as a result of the experience of the democratic revolution almost a year later — so philistine so petty-bourgeois was the whole atmosphere in Germany at the time. To us this conclusion is the well known and solid gain of half a century's experience of international Social Democracy — a gain on the basis of which we began to organise the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. In our case there can be no question for instance of revolutionary proletarian newspapers standing outside the Social Democratic Party of the proletariat or of their appearing even for a moment simply as "organs of democracy".

But the contrast which hardly began to reveal itself between Marx and Stephan Born exists in our case in a form which is the more developed by reason of the more powerful manifestation of the proletarian current in the democratic stream of our revolution. Speaking of the probable dissatisfaction of Marx and Engels with the agitation conducted by Stephan Born Mehring

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The text in parentheses was omitted in the printed editions — *Id*

expresses himself too mildly and too evasively. Here is what Engels wrote of Born in 1885 (in his preface to the *Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprozess zu Köln*, Zürich, 1885\*):

The members of the Communist League everywhere stood at the head of the extreme democratic movement, proving thereby that the League was an excellent school of revolutionary activity. "The compositor Stephan Born, who had worked in Brussels and Paris as an active member of the League, founded a Workers' Brotherhood [*Arbeiterverbrüderung*] in Berlin which became fairly widespread and existed until 1850. Born, a very talented young man, who, however, was too much in a hurry to become a political figure, 'fraternised' with the most miscellaneous ragtag and bobtail [*Krethi und Plethi*] in order to get a crowd together, and was not at all the man who could bring unity into the conflicting tendencies, light into the chaos. Consequently, in the official publications of the association the views represented in the *Communist Manifesto* were mingled hodgepodge with guild recollections and guild aspirations, fragments of Louis Blanc and Proudhon, protectionism, etc.; in short, they wanted to please everybody [*allen alles sein*]. In particular, strikes, trade unions, and producers' co-operatives were set going, and it was forgotten that above all it was a question of first conquering, by means of political victories, the field in which alone such things could be realised on a lasting basis. [Italics mine] When, afterwards, the victories of the reaction made the leaders of the Brotherhood realise the necessity of taking a direct part in the revolutionary struggle, they were naturally left in the lurch by the confused mass which they had grouped around themselves. Born took part in the Dresden uprising in May 1849, and had a lucky escape. But, in contrast to the great political movement of the proletariat, the Workers' Brotherhood proved to be a pure *Sonderbund* (separate league), which to a large extent existed only on paper and played such a subordinate role that the reaction did not find it necessary to suppress it until 1850, and its surviving branches until several years later. Born, whose real name was Buttermilch,\*\* has not become a political figure but a

\* *Revelations About the Cologne Communist Trial*, Zürich, 1885—Ed.

\*\* In translating Engels I made a mistake in the first edition by taking the word *Buttermilch* to be not a proper noun but a common noun. This mistake naturally afforded great delight to the Mensheviks. Koltsov wrote that I had "rendered Engels more profound" (reprinted in *Two Years*, a collection of articles) and Plekhanov even now recalls this mistake in *Tovarishch*<sup>271</sup>—in short, it afforded an excellent pretext to slur over the question of the two tendencies in the working-class movement of 1848 in Germany, the Born tendency (akin to our Economists) and the Marxist tendency. To take advantage of the mistake of an opponent, even if it concerns Born's name, is more than natural. But to use a correction as a translation to slur over the substance of the question of the two tactics is to dodge the real issue. (Author's note to the 1907 edition—Ed.)

petty Swiss professor, who no longer translates Marx into guild language, but the meek Renan into his own fulsome German."<sup>278</sup>

That is how Engels judged the two tactics of Social-Democracy in the democratic revolution!

Our new-Iskrists are also leaning towards Economism, and with such unreasonable zeal as to earn the praises of the monarchist bourgeoisie for "seeing the light". They too gather a motley crowd around themselves, flattering the Economists, demagogically attracting the undeveloped masses by the slogans of "initiative", "democracy", "autonomy", etc., etc; their workers' unions, too, often exist only on the pages of the Khlestakov-type<sup>279</sup> new *Iskra*. Their slogans and resolutions betray a similar failure to understand the tasks of the "great political movement of the proletariat".

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## LESSONS OF THE MOSCOW UPRISING

The publication of the book *Moscow in December 1905* (Moscow, 1906) could not have been more timely. It is an urgent task of the workers' party to assimilate the lessons of the December uprising. Unfortunately, this book is like a barrel of honey spoilt by a spoonful of tar: most interesting material—despite its incompleteness—and incredibly slovenly, incredibly trite conclusions. We shall deal with these conclusions on another occasion\*; at present we shall turn our attention to the burning political question of the day, to the lessons of the Moscow uprising.

The principal forms of the December movement in Moscow were the peaceful strike and demonstrations, and these were the only forms of struggle in which the vast majority of the workers took an active part. Yet, the December action in Moscow vividly demonstrated that the general strike, as an independent and predominant form of struggle, is out of date, that the movement is breaking out of these narrow bounds with elemental and irresistible force and giving rise to the highest form of struggle—an uprising.

In calling the strike, all the revolutionary parties, all the Moscow unions recognised and even intuitively felt that it must inevitably grow into an uprising. On December 6 the Soviet of Workers' Deputies resolved to "strive to transform the strike into an armed uprising". As a matter of fact, however, none of the organisations were prepared for this. Even the Joint Council of Volunteer Fighting Squads<sup>280</sup> spoke (*on December 9!*) of an uprising as of something remote, and it is quite evident that it had no hand in or control of the street fighting that took place. The organisations *failed to keep pace* with the growth and range of the movement.

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\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 189-93.—Ed.

The strike was growing into an uprising primarily as a result of the pressure of the objective conditions created after October.<sup>21</sup> A general strike could no longer take the government unawares: it had already organised the forces of counter revolution and they were ready for military action. The whole course of the Russian revolution after October and the sequence of events in Moscow in the December days strikingly confirmed one of Marx's profound propositions: revolution progresses by giving rise to a strong and united counter revolution, i.e. it compels the enemy to resort to more and more extreme measures of defence and in this way devises ever more powerful means of attack.<sup>22</sup>

December 7 and 8: a peaceful strike, peaceful mass demonstrations. Evening of the 8th the siege of the Aquarium.<sup>23</sup> The morning of the 9th the crowd in Strastnaya Square is attacked by the dragoons. Evening the Fiedler building is raided. Icebergs rise. The unorganised street crowd quite spontaneously and hesitatingly set up the first barricades.

The 10th: artillery fire is opened on the barricades and the crowds in the streets. Barricades are set up more deliberately and no longer in isolated case but on a really mass scale. The whole population is in the streets, all the main centres of the city are covered by a network of barricades. For several days the volunteer fighting units wage a stubborn guerrilla battle against the troops which exhausts the troops and compels Dubisov to beg for reinforcements. Only on December 15 did the superiority of the government forces become complete and on December 17 the Semionovsky Regiment<sup>24</sup> crushed Presnya District the last stronghold of the uprising.

From a strike and demonstrations to isolated barricades. From isolated barricades to the mass erection of barricades and street fighting against the troops. Over the heads of the organisation the mass proletarian struggle developed from a strike to an uprising. This is the greatest historic gain the Russian revolution achieved in December 1905 and like all preceding gains it was purchased at the price of enormous sacrifices. The movement was raised from a general political strike to a higher stage. It compelled the reaction to go *to the limit* in its resistance and so brought vastly nearer the moment when the revolution will also go to the limit in applying the means of attack. The reaction *cannot* go further than the shelling of barricades, buildings and crowds. But the revolution can go very much further than the Moscow volunteer fighting units: it can go very, very much further in breadth and depth. And the revolution has advanced far since December. The base of the revolutionary crisis has become immeasurably broader—the blade must now be sharpened to a keener edge.

The proletariat sensed sooner than its leaders the change in the objective conditions of the struggle and the need for a transition from the strike to an uprising. As is always the case, practice marched ahead of theory. A peaceful strike and demonstrations immediately ceased to satisfy the workers; they asked: What is to be done next? And they demanded more resolute action. The instructions to set up barricades reached the districts exceedingly late, when barricades were already being erected in the centre of the city. The workers set to work in large numbers, but *even this did not satisfy them*; they wanted to know: what is to be done next?—they demanded active measures. In December, we, the leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat, were like a commander-in-chief who has deployed his troops in such an absurd way that most of them took no active part in the battle. The masses of the workers demanded, but failed to receive, instructions for resolute mass action.

Thus, nothing could be more short-sighted than Plekhanov's view, seized upon by all the opportunists, that the strike was untimely and should not have been started, and that "they should not have taken to arms". On the contrary, we should have taken to arms more resolutely, energetically and aggressively; we should have explained to the masses that it was impossible to confine things to a peaceful strike and that a fearless and relentless armed fight was necessary. And now we must at last openly and publicly admit that political strikes are inadequate; we must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favour of an armed uprising and make no attempt to obscure this question by talk about "preliminary stages", or to befog it in any way. We would be deceiving both ourselves and the people if we concealed from the masses the necessity of a desperate, bloody war of extermination, as the immediate task of the coming revolutionary action.

Such is the first lesson of the December events. Another lesson concerns the character of the uprising, the methods by which it is conducted, and the conditions which lead to the troops coming over to the side of the people. An extremely biased view on this latter point prevails in the Right wing of our Party. It is alleged that there is no possibility of fighting modern troops; the troops must become revolutionary. Of course, unless the revolution assumes a mass character and affects the troops, there can be no question of serious struggle. That we must work among the troops goes without saying. But we must not imagine that they will come over to our side at one stroke, as a result of persuasion or their own convictions. The Moscow uprising clearly demonstrated how stereotyped and lifeless this view is. As a matter of fact, the wavering of the troops, which is inevitable



in every truly popular movement, leads to a real *fight for the troops* whenever the revolutionary struggle becomes acute. The Moscow uprising was precisely an example of the desperate, frantic struggle for the troops that takes place between the reaction and the revolution. Dubasov himself declared that of the fifteen thousand men of the Moscow garrison, only five thousand were reliable. The government restrained the waverers by the most diverse and desperate measures: they appealed to them, flattered them, bribed them, presented them with watches, money, etc.; they doped them with vodka, they lied to them, threatened them, confined them to barracks and disarmed them, and those who were suspected of being least reliable were removed by treachery and violence. And we must have the courage to confess, openly and unreservedly, that in this respect we lagged behind the government. We failed to utilise the forces at our disposal for such an active, bold, resourceful and aggressive fight for the wavering troops as that which the government waged and won. We have carried on work in the army and we will redouble our efforts in the future ideologically to "win over" the troops. But we shall prove to be miserable pedants if we forget that at a time of uprising there must also be a physical struggle for the troops.

In the December days, the Moscow proletariat taught us magnificent lessons in ideologically "winning over" the troops, as, for example, on December 8 in Strastnaya Square, when the crowd surrounded the Cossacks, mingled and fraternised with them, and persuaded them to turn back. Or on December 10, in Presnya District, when two working girls, carrying a red flag in a crowd of 10,000 people, rushed out to meet the Cossacks crying: "Kill us! We will not surrender the flag alive!" And the Cossacks were disconcerted and galloped away, amidst the shouts from the crowd: "Hurrah for the Cossacks!" These examples of courage and heroism should be impressed forever on the mind of the proletariat.

But here are examples of how we lagged behind Dubasov. On December 9, soldiers were marching down Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street singing the *Marseillaise*, on their way to join the insurgents. The workers sent delegates to meet them. Malakhov himself galloped at breakneck speed towards them. The workers were too late, Malakhov reached them first. He delivered a passionate speech, caused the soldiers to waver, surrounded them with dragoons, marched them off to barracks and locked them in. Malakhov reached the soldiers in time and we did not, although within two days 150,000 people had risen at our call, and these could and should have organised the patrolling of the streets. Malakhov surrounded the soldiers with dragoons, whereas we failed to surround the Malakhovs with bomb-throwers. We

could and should have done this; and long ago the Social-Democratic press (the old *Iskra*) pointed out that ruthless extermination of civil and military chiefs was our duty during an uprising. What took place in Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street was apparently repeated in its main features in front of the Nesvizhskiye Barracks and the Krutitskiye Barracks, and also when the workers attempted to "withdraw" the Ekaterinoslav Regiment, and when delegates were sent to the sappers in Alexandrov, and when the Rostov artillery on its way to Moscow was turned back, and when the sappers were disarmed in Kolomna, and so on. During the uprising we proved unequal to our task in the fight for the wavering troops.

The December events confirmed another of Marx's profound propositions, which the opportunists have forgotten, namely, that insurrection is an art and that the principal rule of this art is the waging of a desperately bold and irrevocably determined *offensive*.<sup>286</sup> We have not sufficiently assimilated this truth. We ourselves have not sufficiently learned, nor have we taught the masses, this art, this rule to attack at all costs. We must make up for this omission with all our energy. It is not enough to take sides on the question of political slogans; it is also necessary to take sides on the question of an armed uprising. Those who are opposed to it, those who do not prepare for it, must be ruthlessly dismissed from the ranks of the supporters of the revolution, sent packing to its enemies, to the traitors or cowards; for the day is approaching when the force of events and the conditions of the struggle will compel us to distinguish between enemies and friends according to this principle. It is not passivity that we should preach, not mere "waiting" until the troops "come over". No! We must proclaim from the housetops the need for a bold offensive and armed attack, the necessity at such times of exterminating the persons in command of the enemy, and of a most energetic fight for the wavering troops.

The third great lesson taught by Moscow concerns the tactics and organisation of the forces for an uprising. Military tactics depend on the level of military technique. This plain truth Engels demonstrated and brought home to all Marxists.<sup>287</sup> Military technique today is not what it was in the middle of the nineteenth century. It would be folly to contend against artillery in crowds and defend barricades with revolvers. Kautsky was right when he wrote that it is high time now, after Moscow, to review Engels's conclusions, and that Moscow had inaugurated "*new barricade tactics*". These tactics are the tactics of guerrilla warfare. The organisation required for such tactics is that of mobile and exceedingly small units, units of ten, three or even two persons. We often meet Social-Democrats now who scoff

whenever units of five or three are mentioned. But scoffing is only a cheap way of ignoring the *new* question of tactics and organisation raised by street fighting under the conditions imposed by modern military technique. Study carefully the story of the Moscow uprising, gentlemen, and you will understand what connection exists between "units of five" and the question of "new barricade tactics".

Moscow advanced these tactics, but failed to develop them far enough, to apply them to any considerable extent, to a really mass extent. There were too few volunteer fighting squads, the slogan of bold attack was not issued to the masses of the workers and they did not apply it; the guerrilla detachments were too uniform in character, their arms and methods were inadequate, their ability to lead the crowd was almost undeveloped. We must make up for all this and we shall do so by learning from the experience of Moscow, by spreading this experience among the masses and by stimulating their creative efforts to develop it still further. And the guerrilla warfare and mass terror that have been taking place throughout Russia practically without a break since December, will undoubtedly help the masses to learn the correct tactics of an uprising. Social-Democracy must recognise this mass terror and incorporate it into its tactics, organising and controlling it of course, subordinating it to the interests and conditions of the working-class movement and the general revolutionary struggle, while eliminating and ruthlessly lopping off the "hooligan" perversion of this guerrilla warfare which was so splendidly and ruthlessly dealt with by our Moscow comrades during the uprising and by the Letts during the days of the famous Lettish republics.<sup>288</sup>

There have been new advances in military technique in the very recent period. The Japanese War produced the hand grenade. The small-arms factories have placed automatic rifles on the market. Both these weapons are already being successfully used in the Russian revolution, but to a degree that is far from adequate. We can and must take advantage of improvements in technique, teach the workers' detachments to make bombs in large quantities, help them and our fighting squads to obtain supplies of explosives, fuses and automatic rifles. If the mass of the workers takes part in uprisings in the towns, if mass attacks are launched on the enemy, if a determined and skilful fight is waged for the troops, who after the Duma, after Sveaborg and Kronstadt<sup>289</sup> are wavering more than ever—and if we ensure participation of the rural areas in the general struggle—victory will be ours in the next all-Russia armed uprising.

Let us, then, develop our work more extensively and set our tasks more boldly, while mastering the lessons of the great days

of the Russian revolution. The basis of our work is a correct estimate of class interests and of the requirements of the nation's development at the present juncture. We are rallying, and shall continue to rally, an increasing section of the proletariat, the peasantry and the army under the slogan of overthrowing the tsarist regime and convening a constituent assembly by a revolutionary government. As hitherto, the basis and chief content of our work is to develop the political understanding of the masses. But let us not forget that, in addition to this general, constant and fundamental task, times like the present in Russia impose other, particular and special tasks. Let us not become pedants and philistines, let us not evade these special tasks of the moment, these special tasks of the given forms of struggle, by meaningless references to our permanent duties, which remain unchanged at all times and in all circumstances.

Let us remember that a great mass struggle is approaching. It will be an armed uprising. It must, as far as possible, be simultaneous. The masses must know that they are entering upon an armed, bloody and desperate struggle. Contempt for death must become widespread among them and will ensure victory. The onslaught on the enemy must be pressed with the greatest vigour: attack, not defence, must be the slogan of the masses, the ruthless extermination of the enemy will be their task; the organisation of the struggle will become mobile and flexible; the wavering elements among the troops will be drawn into active participation. And in this momentous struggle, the party of the class-conscious proletariat must discharge its duty to the full.

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## ON THE ROAD

A year of disintegration, a year of ideological and political disunity, a year of Party driftage lies behind us. The membership of all our Party organisations has dropped. Some of them—namely, those whose membership was least proletarian—have fallen to pieces. The Party's semi-legal institutions created by the revolution have been broken up time after time. Things reached a point when some elements within the Party, under the impact of the general break-up, began to ask whether it was necessary to preserve the old Social-Democratic Party, whether it was necessary to continue *its* work, whether it was necessary to go “underground” once more, and how this was to be done. And the extreme Right (the liquidationist trend, so called) answered this question in the sense that it was necessary to legalise ourselves at all costs, even at the price of an open renunciation of the Party programme, tactics and organisation. This was undoubtedly an ideological and political crisis as well as an organisational one.

The recent All-Russia Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party<sup>290</sup> has led the Party out on to the road, and evidently marks a turning-point in the development of the Russian working-class movement after the victory of the counter-revolution. The decisions of the conference, published in a special Report issued by the Central Committee of our Party, have been confirmed by the Central Committee, and therefore, pending the next Congress, stand as the decisions of the whole Party. These decisions give a very definite answer to the question of the causes and the significance of the crisis, as well as the means of overcoming it. By working in the spirit of the conference resolutions, by striving to make *all* Party workers realise clearly and fully the present tasks of the Party, our organisations will be able to strengthen and consolidate their forces for united and effective revolutionary Social-Democratic work.

The main cause of the Party crisis is indicated in the preamble of the resolution on organisation. This main cause is the wavering intellectual and petty-bourgeois elements, of which the workers' party had to rid itself; elements who joined the working-class movement mainly in the hope of an early triumph of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and could not stand up to a period of reaction. Their instability was revealed both in theory ("retreat from revolutionary Marxism": the resolution on the present situation) and in tactics (the "whittling down of slogans"), as well as in Party organisation. The class-conscious workers repelled this instability, came out resolutely against the liquidators, began to take the management and guidance of the Party organisations into their own hands. If this hard core of our Party was unable at the outset to overcome the elements of disunity and crisis, this was not only because the task was a great and difficult one amidst the triumph of the counter-revolution, but also because a certain indifference towards the Party showed itself among those workers who, although revolutionary-minded, were not sufficiently socialist-minded. It is precisely to the class-conscious workers of Russia that the decisions of the conference are addressed in the first place—as the crystallised opinion of Social-Democracy concerning the means of combating disunity and vacillation.

A Marxist analysis of present-day class relations and of the new policy of tsarism; an indication of the immediate aim of the struggle which our Party continues as before to set itself; an appreciation of the lessons of the revolution as regards the correctness of the revolutionary Social-Democrats' tactics; elucidation of the causes of the Party crisis; pointing out the role in combating it of the proletarian elements of the Party; solution of the problem of relations between the illegal and legal organisations; recognition of the necessity of utilising the Duma tribune and drawing up precise instructions for the guidance of our Duma group, linked with direct criticism of its mistakes—such was the principal content of the decisions of the conference, which provide a complete answer to the question of the party of the working class choosing a definite path in the present difficult period. Let us examine this answer more carefully.

The interrelation of classes in their political groupings remains the same as that which prevailed during the past period of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses. The overwhelming majority of the peasants cannot but strive for an agrarian revolution which would destroy semi-feudal landownership, and which cannot be achieved without the overthrow of tsarism. The triumph of reaction has borne down heavily on the democratic elements of the peasantry, which is incapable of forming a solid

organisation but despite all oppression despite the Black Hundred Duma despite the extreme instability of the Trudoviks,<sup>91</sup> the revolutionary mood of the peasant masses is clearly evidenced even by the debates in the Third Duma. The fundamental position of the proletariat in regard to the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia remains unaltered: to guide the democratic peasantry and to wrest it from the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie—the Cadet Party—which continues to draw closer and closer to the Octobrists<sup>92</sup> notwithstanding petty private squabbles and which recently has been striving to establish national liberalism and to support tsarism and reaction by chauvinist agitation. The struggle goes on as before—says the resolution—for the complete abolition of the monarchy and the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry.

The autocracy as hitherto is the principal enemy of the proletariat and of all democratic trends. It would be a mistake however to imagine that it remains unchanged. The Stolypin constitution and Stolypin's agrarian policy<sup>93</sup> mark a new stage in the break down of the old semi-patriarchal semi-feudal tsarism—a new step towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. The delegates from the Caucasus who wished either to delete such a characterisation of the present situation altogether or to substitute plutocratic for bourgeois were wrong. The autocracy has long been plutocratic but it is only after the first stage of the revolution under the impact of its blows, that the autocracy is becoming bourgeois both in its agrarian policy and its direct nationally organised alliance with certain strata of the bourgeoisie. The autocracy has been nursing the bourgeoisie for a long time now: the bourgeoisie by means of the ruble has long been winning its way to the top—securing influence on legislation and administration and a place beside the noble aristocracy. But the peculiar feature of the present situation is that the autocracy has been forced to set up a representative assembly for certain strata of the bourgeoisie to balance between them and the feudal landowners; to form an alliance of these sections in the Duma; it has been forced to abandon all the hopes it had placed in the patriarchalism of the muzhik and to seek support against the rural masses among the rich peasants who are ruining the village commune.

The autocracy cloaks itself with pseudo-constitutional institutions but at the same time its class essence is being exposed as never before owing to the alliance concluded by the tsar with the Purishkeviches and the Guchkovs and with no one else. The autocracy is attempting to take upon itself the fulfilment of those tasks of the bourgeois revolution which are objectively

necessary—the setting-up of a representative assembly of the people which would really manage the affairs of bourgeois society, and the purging of the countryside of medieval, entangled and antiquated agrarian relations. But the practical results of these new steps taken by the autocracy are, so far, exactly nil, and this only shows more clearly than ever that other forces and other means are necessary for the fulfilment of the historical task. In the minds of millions of people inexperienced in politics, the autocracy was hitherto contrasted with popular representation in general; now, the struggle is narrowing its aims, and is more concretely defining its task as the struggle for power in the state, which determines the character and significance of representation itself. That is why the Third Duma marks a special stage in the break-down of the old tsarism, in the intensification of its adventurist character, in the deepening of the old revolutionary aims, in the widening of the field of struggle (and of the numbers taking part in the struggle) for these aims.

We must get over this stage. The present new conditions require new forms of struggle. The use of the Duma tribune is an absolute necessity. A prolonged effort to educate and organise the masses of the proletariat becomes particularly important. The combination of illegal and legal organisation raises special problems before the Party. The popularisation and clarification of the experience of the revolution, which the liberals and liquidationist intellectuals are seeking to discredit, are necessary both for theoretical and practical purposes. But the tactical line of the Party—which must be able to take the new conditions into account in its methods and means of struggle—remains unchanged. The correctness of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics, states one of the resolutions of the conference, is confirmed by the experience of the mass struggle in 1905-07. The defeat of the revolution resulting from this first campaign revealed, not that the tasks were wrong, not that the immediate aims were “utopian”, not that the methods and means were mistaken, but that the forces were insufficiently prepared, that the revolutionary crisis was insufficiently wide and deep—and Stolypin and Co. are working to widen and deepen it with most praiseworthy zeal! Let the liberals and terrified intellectuals lose heart after the first genuinely mass battle for freedom, let them repeat like cowards: don't go where you have been beaten before, don't tread that fatal path again. The class-conscious proletariat will answer them: the great wars in history, the great problems of revolutions, were solved only by the advanced classes returning to the attack again and again—and they achieved victory after having learned the lessons of defeat. Defeated armies learn well. The revolutionary classes of Russia have been defeated in their



first campaign, but the revolutionary situation remains. In new forms and by other ways, sometimes much more slowly than we would wish, the revolutionary crisis is approaching, coming to a head again. We must carry on with the lengthy work of preparing larger masses for that crisis; this preparation must be more serious, taking account of higher and more concrete tasks; and the more successfully we do this work, the more certain will be our victory in the new struggle. The Russian proletariat can be proud of the fact that in 1905, under its leadership, a nation of slaves for the first time became a million-strong host, an army of the revolution, striking at tsarism. And now the same proletariat will know how to do persistently, staunchly and patiently the work of educating and training the new cadres of a still mightier revolutionary force.

As we have said, utilisation of the Duma tribune is an essential element of this work of education and training. The conference resolution on the Duma group indicates to our Party that road which comes nearest—if we are to seek instances in history—to the experience of German Social Democracy at the time of the Anti-Socialist Law. The illegal Party must know how to use, it must learn how to use, the legal Duma group; it must train up the latter into a Party organisation equal to its tasks. The most mistaken tactics, the most regrettable deviation from consistent proletarian work, dictated by the conditions of the present period, would be to raise the question of recalling the group from the Duma (there were two “otzovists”<sup>294</sup> at the conference, but they did not raise the question openly), or to refrain from directly and openly criticising its mistakes and from enumerating them in the resolution (as some delegates insisted at the conference). The resolution fully recognises that the group has committed mistakes for which it was not alone to blame, and which were quite similar to the inevitable mistakes of all our Party organisations. But there are other mistakes—departures from the *political line* of the Party. Since these departures occurred, since they were made by an organisation openly acting in the name of the whole Party, the Party was bound to declare clearly and definitely that these were deviations. In the history of West-European socialist parties there have been a number of instances of abnormal relations between the parliamentary groups and the Party; to this day these relations are quite often abnormal in the Latin countries, where the groups do not display sufficient Party spirit. We must from the very outset organise Social-Democratic parliamentarism in Russia on a different basis; we must at once establish team-work in this field—so that every Social-Democratic deputy may really feel that he has the Party behind him, that the Party is deeply

concerned over his mistakes and tries to straighten out his path—so that every Party worker may take part in the general Duma work of the Party, learning from the practical Marxist criticism of its steps, feeling it his duty to assist it, and striving to gear the special work of the group to the whole propaganda and agitation activity of the Party.

The conference was the first authoritative meeting of delegates from the biggest Party organisations to discuss the work of the Duma Social-Democratic group during the whole session. And the decision of the conference shows very clearly how our Party will shape its Duma work, how very exacting it will be in this field both to itself and to the group, how undeviatingly and consistently it proposes to work on developing genuinely Social-Democratic parliamentarism.

The question of our attitude to the Duma group has a tactical and an organisational aspect. In the latter respect the resolution on the Duma group is only the application of our general principles of organisational policy to a particular case, principles laid down by the conference in the resolution giving instructions on the question of organisation. The conference has recorded that two main tendencies exist in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on this question: one of them throws the weight of emphasis on the illegal Party organisation, the other—which is more or less akin to liquidationism—throws the weight of emphasis on the legal and semi-legal organisations. The point is that the present situation is characterised, as we have already pointed out, by a certain number of Party workers leaving the Party—especially intellectuals, but also some proletarians. The liquidationist trend raises the question as to whether it is the best, the most active elements that are abandoning the Party and choosing the legal organisation as their field of activity or whether it is the “vacillating intellectualist and petty-bourgeois elements” that are leaving the Party. Needless to say, by emphatically rejecting and condemning liquidationism, the conference replied that it was the latter elements. The most proletarian elements of the Party, and those elements of the intelligentsia that were most consistent in principle and most Social Democratic, remained true to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The desertions from the Party mean its purification, they mean getting rid of its least stable element, of its unreliable friends, of its “fellow-travellers” (*Mitläufer*), who always joined the proletariat for a while and who were recruited from among the petty bourgeoisie or from among the “declassed”, i.e., people thrown out of the orbit of some definite class.

From this evaluation of the principle of Party organisation logically follows the line of organisational policy adopted by the

conference To strengthen the illegal Party organisation to create Party cells in all spheres of work, to set up first of all 'entirely Party committees consisting of workers even if their number be small in each industrial enterprise to concentrate the functions of leadership in the hands of leaders of the Social Democratic movement from among the workers themselves—such is the task today Needless to say, the task of these cells and committees must be to utilise all the semi-legal and as far as possible legal organisations to maintain 'close contact with the masses' and to direct the work in such a way that Social Democracy responds to all the needs of the masses Every Party cell and workers committee must become a base for agitation propaganda and practical organising work among the masses i.e. they must go where the masses go and try at every step to push the consciousness of the masses in the direction of socialism to link up every specific question with the general tasks of the proletariat to transform every act of organisation into one of class consolidation to win by dint of energy and ideological influence (not by their ranks and title of course) the leading role in all the proletarian legal organisations Even if these cells and committees be very small at times they will be linked together by Party tradition and Party organisation by a definite class programme and two or three Social Democratic members of the Party will thus be able to avoid becoming submerged in an amorphous legal organisation and to pursue their *Party* line under all conditions in all circumstances and in all kinds of situations to influence their environment in the spirit of the whole Party and not allow the environment to swallow them up

Though mass organisations of one type or another may be dissolved though the legal trade unions may be hounded out of existence though every open act of workers initiative under a regime of counter revolution may be ruined by the police on one pretext or another—no power on earth can prevent the concentration of masses of workers in a capitalist country such as Russia has already become One way or another legally or semi-legally openly or covertly the working class will find its own rallying points the class conscious Party Social Democrats will everywhere and always march in front of the masses everywhere and always act together in order to influence the masses in the spirit of the Party And Social Democracy which has played in open revolution that it is the party of the class the party that succeeded in leading millions in strikes in the uprising of 1905 as well as in the elections of 1906-07 will now also be able to remain the party of the class the party of the masses the vanguard, which in the hardest times will not lose touch with the bulk of the army but will be able to help the latter over come

these hard times, consolidate its ranks once more, and train more and more new fighters.

Let the Black-Hundred diehards<sup>295</sup> rejoice and howl inside the Duma and outside it, in the capital and in the remote provinces, let the reaction rage—the ever so wise Mr. Stolypin cannot take a single step without bringing the precariously balancing autocracy nearer its fall, without creating a new tangle of political impossibilities and absurdities, without adding new and fresh forces to the ranks of the proletariat and to the ranks of the revolutionary elements of the peasant masses. A party which succeeds in consolidating itself for persistent work in contact with the masses, a party of the advanced class, which succeeds in organising its vanguard, and which directs its forces in such a way as to influence in a Social-Democratic spirit every sign of life of the proletariat—such a party will win no matter what happens

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## IN MEMORY OF HERZEN

One hundred years have elapsed since Herzen's birth. The whole of liberal Russia is paying homage to him studiously evading, however, the serious questions of socialism and taking pains to conceal that which distinguished Herzen the *revolutionary* from a liberal. The Right wing press, too, is commemorating the Herzen centenary falsely asserting that in his last years Herzen renounced revolution. And in the orations on Herzen that are made by the liberals and Narodniks abroad phrases mongering reigns supreme.

The working class party should commemorate the Herzen centenary not for the sake of philistine glorification but for the purpose of making clear its own tasks and ascertaining the place actually held in history by this writer who played a great part in paving the way for the Russian revolution.

Herzen belonged to the generation of revolutionaries among the nobility and landlords of the first half of the last century. The nobility gave Russia the Biron and Arakcheevs innumerable "drunken officers, bullies, gamblers, heroes of fairs, masters of hounds, roisterers, floggers, pimps" as well as amiable Manilovs. "But", wrote Herzen, "among them developed the men of December 14,"<sup>296</sup> a phalanx of heroes reared like Romulus and Remus, on the milk of a wild beast. They were veritable titans, hammered out of pure steel from head to foot, comrades-in-arms who deliberately went to certain death in order to awaken the young generation to a new life and to purify the children born in an environment of tyranny and servility."

Herzen was one of those children. The uprising of the Decembrists awakened and "purified" him. In the feudal Russia of the forties of the nineteenth century, he rose to a height which placed him on a level with the greatest thinkers of his time. He assimilated Hegel's dialectics. He realised that it was the

algebra of revolution". He went further than Hegel, following Feuerbach to materialism. The first of his *Letters on the Study of Nature*, "Empiricism and Idealism", written in 1844, reveals to us a thinker who even now stands head and shoulders above the multitude of modern empiricist natural scientists and the host of present-day idealist and semi-idealist philosophers. Herzen came right up to dialectical materialism, and halted—before historical materialism.

It was this "halt" that caused Herzen's spiritual shipwreck after the defeat of the revolution of 1848. Herzen had left Russia, and observed this revolution at close range. He was at that time a democrat, a revolutionary, a socialist. But his "socialism" was one of the countless forms and varieties of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois socialism of the period of 1848, which were dealt their death-blow in the June days of that year. In point of fact, it was not socialism at all, but so many sentimental phrases, benevolent visions, which were the expression *at that time* of the revolutionary character of the bourgeois democrats, as well as of the proletariat, which had not yet freed itself from the influence of those democrats.

Herzen's spiritual shipwreck, his deep scepticism and pessimism after 1848, was a shipwreck of the *bourgeois illusions* of socialism. Herzen's spiritual drama was a product and reflection of that epoch in world history when the revolutionary character of the bourgeois democrats was *already* passing away (in Europe), while the revolutionary character of the socialist proletariat had *not yet* matured. This is something the Russian knights of liberal verbiage, who are now covering up their counter-revolutionary nature by florid phrases about Herzen's scepticism, did not and could not understand. With these knights, who betrayed the Russian revolution of 1905, and have even forgotten to think of the great name of *revolutionary*, scepticism is a form of transition from democracy to liberalism, to that toadying, vile, foul and brutal liberalism which shot down the workers in 1848, restored the shattered thrones and applauded Napoleon III, and which Herzen *cursed*, unable to understand its class nature.

With Herzen, scepticism was a form of transition from the illusion of a bourgeois democracy that is "above classes" to the grim, inexorable and invincible class struggle of the proletariat. The proof: the *Letters to an Old Comrade*—to Bakunin—written by Herzen in 1869, a year before his death. In them Herzen breaks with the anarchist Bakunin. True, Herzen still sees this break as a mere disagreement on tactics and not as a gulf between the world outlook of the proletarian who is confident of the victory of his class and that of the petty bourgeois who has

despised of his salvation. True enough, in these letters as well, Herzen repeats the old bourgeois-democratic phrases to the effect that socialism must preach "a sermon addressed equally to workman and master, to farmer and townsman". Nevertheless, in breaking with Bakunin, Herzen turned his gaze, not to liberalism, but to the *International*—to the International led by Marx, to the International which had begun to "*rally the legions*" of the proletariat, to unite "*the world of labour*", which is "abandoning the world of those who enjoy without working".<sup>298</sup>

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Failing as he did to understand the bourgeois-democratic character of the entire movement of 1848 and of all the forms of pre-Marxian socialism, Herzen was still less able to understand the bourgeois nature of the Russian revolution. Herzen is the founder of "Russian" socialism, of "Narodism". He saw "socialism" in the emancipation of the peasants *with land*, in community land tenure and in the peasant idea of "the right to land". He set forth his pet ideas on this subject an untold number of times.

Actually, there is *not a grain* of socialism in this doctrine of Herzen's, as, indeed, in the whole of Russian Narodism, including the faded Narodism of the present-day Socialist-Revolutionaries. Like the various forms of "the socialism of 1848" in the West, this is the same sort of sentimental phrases, of benevolent visions, in which is expressed the *revolutionism* of the bourgeois peasant democracy in Russia. The more land the peasants would have received in 1861<sup>299</sup> and the less they would have had to pay for it, the more would the power of the feudal landlords have been undermined and the more rapidly, freely and widely would capitalism have developed in Russia. The idea of the "right to land" and of "equalised division of the land" is nothing but a formulation of the revolutionary aspiration for equality cherished by the peasants who are fighting for the complete overthrow of the power of the landlords, for the complete abolition of landlordism.

This was fully proved by the revolution of 1905: on the one hand, the proletariat came out quite independently at the head of the revolutionary struggle, having founded the Social-Democratic Labour Party; on the other hand, the revolutionary peasants (the Trudoviks and the Peasant Union<sup>300</sup>), who fought for every form of the abolition of landlordism even to "the abolition of private landownership", fought precisely as proprietors, as small entrepreneurs.

Today, the controversy over the "socialist nature" of the right to land, and so on, serves only to *obscure* and cover up the

really important and serious historical question concerning the difference of *interests* of the liberal bourgeoisie and the revolutionary peasantry in the Russian *bourgeois* revolution; in other words, the question of the liberal and the democratic, the "compromising" (monarchist) and the republican trends manifested in that revolution. This is exactly the question posed by Herzen's *Kolokol*,<sup>301</sup> if we turn our attention to the essence of the matter and not to the words, if we investigate the class struggle as the basis of "theories" and doctrines and not vice versa.

Herzen founded a free Russian press abroad, and that is the great service rendered by him. *Polyannaya Zvezda*<sup>302</sup> took up the tradition of the Decembrists. *Kolokol* (1857-67) championed the emancipation of the peasants with might and main. The slavish silence was broken.

But Herzen came from a landlord, aristocratic milieu. He had left Russia in 1847; he had not seen the revolutionary people and could have no faith in it. Hence his liberal appeal to the "upper ranks". Hence his innumerable sugary letters in *Kolokol* addressed to Alexander II the Hangman, which today one cannot read without revulsion. Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov and Serno-Solovyevich, who represented the new generation of revolutionary *raznochintsi*,<sup>303</sup> were a thousand times right when they reproached Herzen for these departures from democracy to liberalism. However, it must be said in fairness to Herzen that, much as he vacillated between democracy and liberalism, the democrat in him gained the upper hand nonetheless.

When Kavelin, one of the most repulsive exponents of liberal servility—who at one time was enthusiastic about *Kolokol* precisely because of its *liberal* tendencies—rose in arms against a constitution, attacked revolutionary agitation, rose against "violence" and appeals for it, and began to preach tolerance, Herzen *broke* with that liberal sage. Herzen turned upon Kavelin's "meagre, absurd, harmful pamphlet" written "for the private guidance of a government pretending to be liberal"; he denounced Kavelin's "sentimental political maxims" which represented "the Russian people as cattle and the government as an embodiment of intelligence". *Kolokol* printed an article entitled "Epitaph", which lashed out against "professors weaving the rotten cobweb of their superciliously paltry ideas, ex-professors, once open-hearted and subsequently embittered because they saw that the healthy youth could not sympathise with their scrofulous thinking." Kavelin at once recognised himself in this portrait.

When Chernyshevsky was arrested, the vile liberal Kavelin wrote: "I see nothing shocking in the arrests . . . the revolutionary



party considers all means fair to overthrow the government, and the latter defends itself by its own means." As if in retort to this Cadet, Herzen wrote concerning Chernyshevsky's trial: "And here are wretches, weed-like people, jellyfish, who say that we must not reprove the gang of robbers and scoundrels that is governing us."

When the liberal Turgenev wrote a private letter to Alexander II assuring him of his loyalty, and donated two gold pieces for the soldiers wounded during the suppression of the Polish insurrection, *Kolokol* wrote of "the grey-haired Magdalen (of the masculine gender) who wrote to the tsar to tell him that she knew no sleep because she was tormented by the thought that the tsar was not aware of the repentance that had overcome her". And Turgenev at once recognised himself.

When the whole band of Russian liberals scurried away from Herzen for his defence of Poland, when the whole of "educated society" turned its back on *Kolokol*, Herzen was not dismayed. He went on championing the freedom of Poland and lashing the suppressors, the butchers, the hangmen in the service of Alexander II. Herzen saved the honour of Russian democracy. "We have saved the honour of the Russian name," he wrote to Turgenev, "and for doing so we have suffered at the hands of the slavish majority."

When it was reported that a serf peasant had killed a landlord for an attempt to dishonour the serf's betrothed, Herzen commented in *Kolokol*: "Well done!" When it was reported that army officers would be appointed to supervise the "peaceable" progress of "emancipation", Herzen wrote: "The first wise colonel who with his unit joins the peasants instead of crushing them, will ascend the throne of the Romanovs." When Colonel Reiter shot himself in Warsaw (1860) because he did not want to be a helper of hangmen, Herzen wrote: "If there is to be any shooting, the ones to be shot should be the generals who give orders to fire upon unarmed people." When fifty peasants were massacred in Bezdna, and their leader, Anton Petrov, was executed (April 12, 1861), Herzen wrote in *Kolokol*:

"If only my words could reach you, toiler and sufferer of the land of Russia! . . . How well I would teach you to despise your spiritual shepherds, placed over you by the St. Petersburg Synod and a German tsar. . . . You hate the landlord, you hate the official, you fear them, and rightly so; but you still believe in the tsar and the bishop . . . do not believe them. The tsar is with them, and they are his men. It is him you now see—you, the father of a youth murdered in Bezdna, and you, the son of a father murdered in Penza. . . . Your shepherds are as ignorant as you, and as poor. . . . Such was another Anthony (not Bishop Anthony, but Anton of Bezdna) who suffered for you in Kazan. . . . The dead bodies of your martyrs will not perform forty-eight miracles, and praying to them will not cure a toothache, but their living memory may produce one miracle—your emancipation."

This shows how infamously and vilely Herzen is being slandered by our liberals entrenched in the slavish "legal" press, who magnify Herzen's weak points and say nothing about his strong points. It was not Herzen's fault but his misfortune that he could not see the revolutionary people in Russia itself in the 1840s. When *in the sixties* he came to see the revolutionary people, he sided fearlessly with the revolutionary democracy against liberalism. He fought for a victory of the people over tsarism, not for a deal between the liberal bourgeoisie and the landlords' tsar. He raised aloft the banner of revolution.

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In commemorating Herzen, we clearly see the three generations, the three classes, that were active in the Russian revolution. At first it was nobles and landlords, the Decembrists and Herzen. These revolutionaries formed but a narrow group. They were very far removed from the people. But their effort was not in vain. The Decembrists awakened Herzen. Herzen began the work of revolutionary agitation.

This work was taken up, extended, strengthened, and tempered by the revolutionary *raznochintsi*—from Chernyshevsky to the heroes of *Narodnaya Volya*. The range of fighters widened; their contact with the people became closer. "The young helmsmen of the gathering storm" is what Herzen called them. But it was not yet the storm itself.

The storm is the movement of the masses themselves. The proletariat, the only class that is thoroughly revolutionary, rose at the head of the masses and for the first time aroused millions of peasants to open revolutionary struggle. The first onslaught in this storm took place in 1905. The next is beginning to develop under our very eyes.

In commemorating Herzen, the proletariat is learning from his example to appreciate the great importance of revolutionary theory. It is learning that selfless devotion to the revolution and revolutionary propaganda among the people are not wasted even if long decades divide the sowing from the harvest. It is learning to ascertain the role of the various classes in the Russian and in the international revolution. Enriched by these lessons, the proletariat will fight its way to a free alliance with the socialist workers of all lands, having crushed that loathsome monster, the tsarist monarchy, against which Herzen was the first to raise the great banner of struggle by addressing his *free Russian word* to the masses.

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## DISRUPTION OF UNITY UNDER COVER OF OUTCRIES FOR UNITY

The questions of the present-day working-class movement are in many respects vexed questions, particularly for representatives of that movement's recent past (i.e., of the stage which historically has just drawn to a close). This applies primarily to the questions of so-called factionalism, splits, and so forth. One often hears intellectuals in the working-class movement making nervous, feverish and almost hysterical appeals not to raise these vexed questions. Those who have experienced the long years of struggle between the various trends among Marxists since 1900-01, for example, may naturally think it superfluous to repeat many of the arguments on the subject of these vexed questions.

But there are not many people left today who took part in the fourteen-year-old conflict among Marxists (not to speak of the eighteen- or nineteen-year-old conflict, counting from the moment the first symptoms of Economism appeared). The vast majority of the workers who now make up the ranks of the Marxists either do not remember the old conflict, or have never heard of it. To the overwhelming majority (as, incidentally, was shown by the opinion poll held by our journal<sup>304</sup>), these vexed questions are a matter of exceptionally great interest. We therefore intend to deal with these questions, which have been raised *as it were* anew (and for the younger generation of the workers they are really new) by Trotsky's "non-factional worker's journal", *Borba*.<sup>305</sup>

### I. "FACTIONALISM"

Trotsky calls his new journal "non-factional". He puts this word in the top line in his advertisements; this word is stressed by him in every key, in the editorial articles of *Borba* itself, as well as in the liquidationist *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta*,<sup>306</sup> which carried an article on *Borba* by Trotsky before the latter began publication.

What is this "non-factionalism"?

Trotsky's "workers' journal" is Trotsky's journal *for* workers, as there is not a trace in it of either workers' initiative, or any connection with working-class organisations. Desiring to write in a popular style, Trotsky, in his journal for workers, explains for the benefit of his readers the meaning of such foreign words as "territory", "factor", and so forth.

Very good. But why not also explain to the workers the meaning of the word "non-factionalism"? Is that word *more* intelligible than the words "territory" and "factor"?

No, that is not the reason. The reason is that the label "non-factionalism" is used by the worst representatives of the worst remnants of factionalism *to mislead* the younger generation of workers. It is worth while devoting a little time to explaining this.

Group-division was the main distinguishing feature of the Social-Democratic Party during a definite historical period. Which period? From 1903 to 1911.

To explain the nature of this group-division more clearly we must recall the concrete conditions that existed in, say, 1906-07. At that time the Party was united, there was no split, but group-division existed, i.e., in the united Party there were *virtually two* groups, two virtually separate organisations. The local workers' organisations were united, but on every important issue the two groups devised two sets of tactics. The advocates of the respective tactics disputed among themselves in the united workers' organisations (as was the case, for example, during the discussion of the slogan: a Duma, or Cadet, Ministry, in 1906, or during the elections of delegates to the London Congress in 1907), and questions were decided *by a majority vote*. One group was defeated at the Stockholm Unity Congress (1906), the other was defeated at the London Unity Congress (1907).<sup>307</sup>

These are commonly known facts in the history of organised Marxism in Russia.

It is sufficient to recall these commonly known facts to realise what glaring falsehoods Trotsky is spreading.

For over two years, since 1912, there has been *no* factionalism among the organised Marxists in Russia, no disputes over tactics in *united* organisations, at *united* conferences and congresses. There is a *complete* break between the Party, which in January 1912 formally announced that the liquidators *do not* belong to it, and the liquidators. Trotsky often calls this state of affairs a "split", and we shall deal with this appellation separately later on. But it remains an undoubted fact that the term "factionalism" *deviates from the truth*.

As we have said, this term is a repetition, an uncritical, un-

reasonable, senseless repetition of *what was true yesterday*, i.e., in the period that has already passed. When Trotsky talks to us about the "chaos of factional strife" (see No 1, pp 5, 6. and many others) we realise at once *which* period of the past his words echo.

Consider the present state of affairs from the viewpoint of the young Russian workers who now constitute nine-tenths of the organised Marxists in Russia. They see *three* mass expressions of the different views, or trends in the working-class movement: the Pravdists, gathered around a newspaper with a circulation of 40,000<sup>108</sup>; the liquidators (15,000 circulation) and the Left Narodniks (10,000 circulation). The circulation figures tell the reader about the *mass* character of a given tenet

The question arises, what has "chaos" got to do with it? Everybody knows that Trotsky is fond of high-sounding and empty phrases. But the catchword "chaos" is *not only* phrase-mongering, it signifies *also* the transplanting, or rather, a vain attempt to transplant, to Russian soil, in the present period, the relations that existed *abroad* in a *bygone* period. That is the whole point

There is no "chaos" whatever in the struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks. That, we hope, not *even* Trotsky will dare to deny. The struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks has been going on for over thirty years, ever since Marxism came into being. The cause of this struggle is the radical divergence of interests and viewpoints of two different classes, the proletariat and the peasantry. If there is any "chaos" anywhere, it is only in the heads of cranks who fail to understand this

What, then, remains? 'Chaos' in the struggle between the Marxists and the liquidators? That, too, is wrong, for a struggle against a *trend*, which the entire Party recognised as a trend and condemned as far back as 1908, cannot be called chaos. And everybody who has the least concern for the history of Marxism in Russia knows that liquidationism is most closely and inseparably connected, even as regards its leaders and supporters, with Menshevism (1903-08) and Economism (1894-1903). Consequently, here, too, we have a history extending over nearly twenty years. To regard the history of one's own Party as "chaos" reveals an unpardonable empty-headedness.

Now let us examine the present situation *from the point of view* of Paris or Vienna. At once the whole picture changes. *Besides* the Pravdists and liquidators, we see *no less than five Russian* groups claiming membership of one and the same Social-Democratic Party: Trotsky's group, two *Uperyod* groups, the "pro-Party Bolsheviks" and the "pro-Party Mensheviks"<sup>109</sup> All

Marxists in Paris and in Vienna (for the purpose of illustration I take two of the largest centres) are perfectly well aware of this.

Here Trotsky is right in a certain sense; this is indeed group-division, chaos indeed!

Groups within the Party, i.e., nominal unity (all *claim* to belong to one Party) and actual disunity (for, in fact, all the groups are independent of one another and enter into negotiations and agreements with each other as sovereign powers).

"Chaos", i.e., the absence of (1) objective and verifiable proof that these groups are linked with the working-class movement in Russia and (2) absence of any data to enable us to judge the actual ideological and political physiognomy of these groups. Take a period of two full years—1912 and 1913. As everybody knows, this was a period of the revival and upswing of the working-class movement, when every trend or tendency of a more or less *mass* character (and in politics this mass character alone counts) *could not but* exercise some influence on the Fourth Duma elections, the strike movement, the legal newspapers, the trade unions, the insurance election campaign, and so on. Throughout those two years, not one of these five groups abroad asserted itself in the slightest degree *in any* of the activities of the mass working-class movement in Russia just enumerated!

That is a fact that anybody can easily verify.

And that fact proves that we were right in calling Trotsky a representative of the "worst remnants of factionalism".

Although he claims to be non-factional, Trotsky is known to everybody who is in the least familiar with the working-class movement in Russia as the representative of "Trotsky's *Jaction*". Here we have group-division, for we see two essential symptoms of it: (1) nominal recognition of unity and (2) group segregation in fact. Here there are remnants of group-division, for there is no evidence whatever of any real connection with the mass working-class movement in Russia.

And lastly, it is the worst form of group-division, for there is *no* ideological and political definiteness. It cannot be denied that this definiteness is characteristic of both the Pravdists (even our determined opponent L. Martov admits that we stand "solid and disciplined" around universally known formal decisions on all questions) and the liquidators (they, or at all events the most prominent of them, have very definite features, namely, liberal, not Marxist).

It cannot be denied that some of the groups which, like Trotsky's, really exist exclusively from the Vienna-Paris, but by no means from the Russian, point of view, possess a degree of definiteness. For example, the *Machist* theories of the Machist *Uperyod* group are definite; the emphatic repudiation of these

theories and defence of Marxism, in addition to the theoretical condemnation of liquidationism, by the "pro-Party Mensheviks", are definite.

Trotsky, however, possesses no ideological and political definiteness, for his patent for "non-factionalism", as we shall soon see in greater detail, is merely a patent to *flit* freely to and fro, from one group to another.

To sum up:

1) Trotsky does not explain, nor does he understand, the historical significance of the *ideological* disagreements among the various Marxist trends and groups, although these disagreements run through the twenty years' history of Social-Democracy and concern the fundamental questions of the present day (as we shall show later on);

2) Trotsky fails to understand that the main specific features of *group-division* are nominal recognition of unity and actual disunity;

3) Under cover of "non-factionalism" Trotsky is championing the interests of a group abroad which particularly lacks definite principles and has no basis in the working-class movement in Russia.

All that glitters is not gold. There is much glitter and sound in Trotsky's phrases, but they are meaningless.

## II. THE SPLIT

"Although there is no group-division, i.e., nominal recognition of unity, but actual disunity, among you, Pravdists, there is something worse, namely, splitting tactics," we are told. This is exactly what Trotsky says. Unable to think out his ideas or to get his arguments to hang together, he rants against group-division at one moment, and at the next shouts: "Splitting tactics are winning one suicidal victory after another" (No. 1, p. 6).

This statement can have only one meaning: "The *Pravdists* are winning one victory after another" (this is an objective, verifiable fact, established by a study of the mass working-class movement in Russia during, say, 1912 and 1913), *but I, Trotsky*, denounce the Pravdists (1) as splitters, and (2) as suicidal politicians.

Let us examine this.

First of all we must express our thanks to Trotsky. Not long ago (from August 1912 to February 1914) he was at one with F. Dan, who, as is well known, threatened to "*kill*" anti-liquidationism, and called upon others to do so. At present Trotsky does not threaten to "*kill*" our trend (and our Party—don't be angry,

Citizen Trotsky, this is true!), he only prophesies that it will kill *itself*!

This is much milder, isn't it? It is almost "non-factional", isn't it?

But joking apart (although joking is the only way of retorting mildly to Trotsky's insufferable phrase-mongering).

"Suicide" is a mere empty phrase, mere "Trotskyism".

Splitting tactics are a grave political accusation. This accusation is repeated against us in a thousand different keys by the liquidators and by all the groups enumerated above, who, from the point of view of Paris and Vienna, actually exist.

And all of them repeat this grave political accusation in an amazingly frivolous way. Look at Trotsky. He admitted that "splitting tactics are winning [read: the Pravdistists are winning] one suicidal victory after another". To this he adds:

*"Numerous advanced workers, in a state of utter political bewilderment, themselves often become active agents of a split"* (No 1 p 6)

Are not these words a glaring example of irresponsibility on this question?

You accuse us of being splitters when all that we see in front of us in the arena of the working-class movement in Russia is liquidationism. So you think that our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong? Indeed, *all* the groups abroad that we enumerated above, no matter how much they may differ from each other, are agreed that our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong, that it is the attitude of "splitters". This, too, reveals the similarity (and fairly close political kinship) between *all* these groups and the liquidators.

If our attitude towards liquidationism is wrong in theory, in principle, then Trotsky should say so *straightforwardly*, and state *definitely*, without equivocation, why he thinks it is wrong. But Trotsky has been evading this extremely important point *for years*.

If our attitude towards liquidationism has been proved wrong in practice, by the experience of the movement, then this experience should be analysed; but Trotsky fails to do this either. "Numerous advanced workers," he admits, "become *active agents* of a split" (read: active agents of the Pravdist line, tactics, system and organisation).

What is the cause of the deplorable fact, which, as Trotsky admits, is confirmed by experience, that the *advanced* workers, the *numerous* advanced workers at that, stand for *Pravda*?

It is the "utter political bewilderment" of these advanced workers, answers Trotsky.



Needless to say, this explanation is highly flattering to Trotsky, to all five groups abroad, and to the liquidators. Trotsky is very fond of using, with the learned air of the expert, pompous and high-sounding phrases to explain historical phenomena in a way that is flattering to Trotsky. Since "numerous advanced workers" become "active agents" of a political and Party line which does not conform to Trotsky's line, Trotsky settles the question unhesitatingly, out of hand: these advanced workers are "in a state of utter political bewilderment", whereas he, Trotsky, is evidently "in a state" of political firmness and clarity, and keeps to the right line!... And this very same Trotsky, beating his breast, fulminates against factionalism, parochialism, and the efforts of intellectuals to impose their will on the workers!

Reading things like these, one cannot help asking oneself: is it from a lunatic asylum that such voices come?

The Party put the question of liquidationism, and of condemning it, before the "advanced workers" as far back as 1908, while the question of "splitting" away from a very definite group of liquidators (namely, the *Nasha Zarya* group<sup>10</sup>), i.e., that the only way to build up the Party was *without* this group and in opposition to it—this question was raised in January 1912, over two years ago. The overwhelming majority of the advanced workers declared *in favour of* supporting the "January (1912) line". Trotsky himself admits this fact when he talks about "victories" and about "numerous advanced workers". But Trotsky wriggles out of this simply by hurling *abuse* at these advanced workers and calling them "splitters" and "politically bewildered"!

From these facts sane people will draw a different conclusion. Where the *majority* of the class-conscious workers have rallied around precise and definite decisions, there we shall find *unity* of opinion and action, there we shall find the Party spirit, and the Party.

Where we see liquidators who have been "removed from office" by the workers, or half a dozen groups outside Russia, who for two years have produced *no* proof that they are connected with the mass working-class movement in Russia, there, indeed, we shall find bewilderment and *splits*. In now trying to persuade the workers *not to carry out the decisions* of that "united whole", which the Marxist Pravdists recognise, Trotsky is *trying* to disrupt the movement and cause a split.

These efforts are futile, but we must expose the arrogantly conceited leaders of intellectualist groups, who, while causing splits themselves, are shouting about others causing splits; who, after sustaining *utter defeat* at the hands of the "advanced workers" for the past two years or more, are with incredible insolence *flouting* the decisions and the will of these advanced workers and

saying that *they* are "politically bewildered" These are entirely the methods of Nozdrev, or of "Judas" Golovlyov.<sup>311</sup>

In reply to these repeated outcries about a split and in fulfilment of my duty as a publicist, I will not tire of repeating *precise*, unrefuted and irrefutable figures. In the Second Duma, 47 per cent of the deputies elected by the worker curia were Bolsheviks, in the Third Duma 50 per cent were Bolsheviks, and in the Fourth Duma 67 per cent.

There you have the majority of the "advanced workers", there you have the Party; there you have unity of opinion and action of the majority of the class-conscious workers.

To this the liquidators say (see Bulkin, L. M., in *Nasha Zarya* No. 3) that we base our arguments on the Stolypin curias. This is a foolish and unscrupulous argument. The Germans measure their successes by the results of elections conducted under the Bismarckian electoral law, which excludes women. Only people bereft of their senses would reproach the German Marxists for measuring their successes under the *existing* electoral law, without in the least justifying its reactionary restrictions.

And we, too, without justifying curias, or the curia system, measured our successes under the *existing* electoral law. There were curias in all three (Second, Third and Fourth) Duma elections; and *within* the worker curia, *within* the ranks of Social-Democracy, there was a *complete* swing against the liquidators. Those who do not wish to deceive themselves and others must admit this objective fact, namely, the victory of *working-class unity* over the liquidators.

The other argument is just as "clever": "Mensheviks and liquidators voted for (or took part in the election of) such-and-such a Bolshevik." Splendid! But does not the same thing apply to the 53 per cent *non*-Bolshevik deputies returned to the Second Duma, and to the 50 per cent returned to the Third Duma, and to the 33 per cent returned to the Fourth Duma?

If, instead of the figures on the deputies elected, we could obtain the figures on the electors, or workers' delegates, etc., we would gladly quote them. But these more detailed figures are *not* available, and consequently the "disputants" are simply throwing dust in people's eyes.

But what about the figures of the workers' groups that assisted the newspapers of the different trends? During *two* years (1912 and 1913), 2,801 groups assisted *Pravda*, and 750 assisted *Luch*.<sup>312</sup> These figures are verifiable and nobody has attempted to disprove them.

<sup>311</sup> A preliminary calculation made up to April 1, 1914, showed 4,000 groups for *Pravda* (commencing with January 1, 1912) and 1,000 for the liquidators and all their allies taken together.

Where is the *unity of action and will of the majority* of the "advanced workers", and where is the *flouting* of the will of the majority?

Trotsky's "non-factionalism" is, actually, splitting tactics in that it shamelessly flouts the will of the majority of the workers.

### III. THE BREAK-UP OF THE AUGUST BLOC

But there is still another method and a very important one of verifying the correctness and truthfulness of Trotsky's accusations about splitting tactics.

You consider that it is the Leninists who are splitters? Very well let us assume that you are right.

But if you are, why have not all the other sections and groups proved that unity is possible with the liquidators *without* the 'Leninists' and *against* the "splitters"? If we are splitters why have not you, uniters united among yourselves and with the liquidators? Had you done that you would have proved to the workers *by deeds* that unity is possible and beneficial!

Let us go over the chronology of events.

In January 1912 the Leninist splitters declared that they were a Party *without* and *against* the liquidators.

In March 1912 *all* the groups and factions liquidators, Trotskyists, Vperyodists, pro Party Bolsheviks and pro Party Mensheviks in their Russian news sheets and in the columns of the German Social Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts* united against these splitters. All of them unanimously in chorus in unison and in one voice vilified us and called us 'usurpers', 'mystifiers' and other no less affectionate and tender names.

Very well gentlemen! But what could have been easier for you than to unite *against* the 'usurpers' and to set the advanced workers an example of *unity*? Do you mean to say that if the advanced workers had seen on the one hand the unity of all against the usurpers, the unity of liquidators and *non* liquidators and on the other *isolated* "usurpers", splitters and so forth they would not have supported the former?

If disagreements are only invented, or exaggerated and so forth by the 'Leninists' and if unity between the liquidators, Plekhanovites, Vperyodists, Trotskyists, and so forth, is really *possible* why have you not proved this during the past two years by *your own example*?

In August 1912, a conference of 'united' was convened. *Disunity* started at once: the Plekhanovites refused to attend at all, the Vperyodists attended but walked out after protesting and exposing the fictitious character of the whole business.

The liquidators, the Letts, the Trotskyists (Trotsky and Semkovsky), the Caucasians, and the Seven "united". But did they? We stated at the time that they did not, that this was merely a screen to cover up liquidationism. Have the events disproved our statement?

Exactly eighteen months later, in February 1914, we found:

1. that the Seven was breaking up. Buryanov had left them.
2. that in the remaining new "Six", Chkheidze and Tulyakov, or somebody else, could not see eye to eye on the reply to be made to Plekhanov. They stated in the press that they would reply to him, *but they could not*.

3. that Trotsky, who for many months had practically vanished from the columns of *Luch*, had *broken away*, and had started "his own" journal, *Borba*. By calling this journal "non-factional". Trotsky clearly (clearly to those who are at all familiar with the subject) intimates that in his, Trotsky's opinion, *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch* had *proved to be* "factional", i.e., poor uniters.

If you are a uniter, my dear Trotsky, if you say that it is possible to unite with the liquidators, if you and they stand by the "fundamental ideas formulated in August 1912" (*Borba* No. 1, p. 6, Editorial Note), why *did not you yourself* unite with the liquidators in *Nasha Zarya* and *Luch*?

When, before Trotsky's journal appeared, *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* published some scathing comment stating that the physiognomy of this journal was "unclear" and that there had been "quite a good deal of talk in Marxist circles" about this journal, *Put Pravdy* (No. 37)\* was naturally obliged to expose this falsehood. It said: "There has been talk in Marxist circles" about a secret memorandum written by Trotsky *against* the *Luch* group: Trotsky's physiognomy and his breakaway from the August bloc were perfectly "clear".

4. An, the well-known leader of the Caucasian liquidators, who had attacked L. Sedov (for which he was given a public wiggling by F. Dan and Co.), now appeared in *Borba*. It remains "unclear" whether the Caucasians now desire to go with Trotsky or with Dan.

5. The Lettish Marxists, who were the only real organisation in the "August bloc", had *formally* withdrawn from it, stating (in 1914) in the resolution of their last Congress that:

*"the attempt on the part of the conciliators to unite at all costs with the liquidators (the August Conference of 1912) proved fruitless, and the uniters themselves became ideologically and politically dependent upon the liquidators."*

This statement was made, after eighteen months' experience, by an organisation which had itself been *neutral* and had not

desired to establish connection with *either* of the two centres. This decision of *neutrals* should carry all the more weight with Trotsky!

Enough, is it not?

Those who accused us of being splitters, of being unwilling or unable to get on with the liquidators, were *themselves* unable to get on with them. The August bloc proved to be a fiction and broke up.

By concealing this break-up from his readers, Trotsky is deceiving them.

The experience of our opponents has proved that we are right, has proved that the liquidators cannot be co-operated with.

#### IV. A CONCILIATOR'S ADVICE TO THE "SEVEN"

The editorial article in issue No. 1 of *Borba* entitled "The Split in the Duma Group" contains advice from a conciliator to the seven pro-liquidator (or inclining towards liquidationism) members of the Duma. The gist of this advice is contained in the following words:

First of all consult the Six whenever it is necessary to reach an agreement with other groups. " (P. 29)

This is the wise counsel which, among other things, is evidently the cause of Trotsky's disagreement with the liquidators of *Luch*. This is the opinion the Pravdists have held ever since the outbreak of the conflict between the two groups in the Duma, ever since the resolution of the Summer (1913) Conference<sup>11</sup> was adopted. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma has reiterated in the *press*, even after the split, that it continues to adhere to this position, in spite of the repeated refusals of the Seven.

From the very outset, since the time the resolution of the Summer Conference was adopted, we have been, and still are, of the opinion that *agreements* on questions concerning activities in the *Duma* are desirable and possible; if such agreements have been repeatedly arrived at with the petty-bourgeois peasant democrats (Trudoviks), they are all the more possible and necessary with the petty-bourgeois, liberal-labour politicians.

We must not exaggerate disagreements, but we must face the facts: the Seven are men, leaning towards liquidationism, who yesterday entirely followed the lead of Dan, and whose eyes today are travelling longingly from Dan to Trotsky and back again. The liquidators are a group of legalists who have broken away from the Party and are pursuing a liberal-labour policy. Since

they repudiate the "underground", there can be no question of unity with them in matters concerning Party organisation and the working-class movement. Whoever thinks differently is badly mistaken and fails to take into account the profound nature of the changes that have taken place since 1908.

But *agreements* on certain questions with this group, which stands outside or on the fringe of the Party, are, of course, permissible: we *must* always compel this group too like the Trudoviks, to choose between the workers' (Pravdist) policy and the liberal policy. For example on the question of fighting for freedom of the press the liquidators clearly revealed vacillation between the liberal formulation of the question which repudiated, or overlooked the illegal press and the opposite policy that of the workers.

Within the scope of a *Duma* policy in which the most important *extra-Duma* issues are not directly raised agreements with the seven liberal labour deputies are possible and desirable. On this point Trotsky has shifted his ground *from* that of the liquidators *to* that of the Party Summer (1913) Conference.

It should not be forgotten however that to a group standing outside the Party agreement means something entirely different from what Party people usually understand by the term. By 'agreement' in the Duma non-Party people mean *drawing up* a tactical resolution or line. To Party people agreement is an attempt to *enlist* others in the work of carrying out the Party line.

For example the Trudoviks have no party. By agreement they understand the 'voluntary'—so to speak 'drawing up' of a line today with the Cadets tomorrow with the Social Democrats. We however understand something entirely different by agreement with the Trudoviks. We have Party decisions on all the important questions of tactics and we shall never depart from these decisions by agreement with the Trudoviks we mean winning them over to our side *convincing* them that we are right and *not rejecting* joint action against the Black Hundreds and against the liberals.

How far Trotsky has forgotten (not for nothing has he associated with the liquidators) this elementary difference between the Party and non-Party point of view on agreements, is shown by the following argument of his:

The representatives of the International must bring together the two sections of our divided parliamentary group and jointly with them ascertain the points of agreement and points of disagreement. A detailed tactical resolution formulating the principles of parliamentary tactics may be drawn up. (No 1, pp 29-30)

Here you have a characteristic and typical example of the liquidationist presentation of the question! Trotsky's journal

forgets about the Party; such a trifle is hardly worth remembering!

When different parties in Europe (Trotsky is fond of inappropriately talking about Europeanism) come to an agreement or unite, what they do is this: their respective representatives meet and first of all ascertain the points of disagreement (precisely what the International proposed in relation to Russia, without including in the resolution Kautsky's ill-considered statement that "the old Party no longer exists"). Having ascertained the points of disagreement, the representatives decide *what decisions* (resolutions, conditions, etc.) on questions of tactics, organisation, etc., *should be submitted to the congresses of the two parties*. If they succeed in drafting unanimous decisions, the congresses decide whether to adopt them or not. If *differing* proposals are made, they too are submitted for final decision to the congresses of the two parties.

What appeals to the liquidators and Trotsky is only the *European* models of opportunism, but certainly not the models of European partisanship.

"A detailed tactical resolution" will be drawn up by the members of the Duma! This example should serve the Russian "advanced workers", with whom Trotsky has good reason to be so displeased, as a striking illustration of the lengths to which the groups in Vienna and Paris—who persuaded even Kautsky that there was "no Party" in Russia—go in their ludicrous project-mongering. But if it is sometimes possible to fool foreigners on this score, the Russian "advanced workers" (at the risk of provoking the terrible Trotsky to another outburst of displeasure) will laugh in the faces of these project-mongers.

"Detailed tactical resolutions," they will tell them, are drawn up among us (we do not know how it is done among you non-Party people) by Party congresses and conferences, for example, those of 1907, 1908, 1910, 1912 and 1913. We shall gladly acquaint uninformed foreigners, as well as forgetful Russians, with our Party decisions, and still more gladly ask the representatives of the Seven, or the August bloc members, or Left-wingers<sup>314</sup> or anybody else, to acquaint us with the resolutions of their congresses, or conferences, and to bring up at their next congress the definite question of the attitude they should adopt towards our resolutions, or towards the resolution of the neutral Lettish Congress of 1914, etc."

This is what the "advanced workers" of Russia will say to the various project-mongers, and this *has already been said* in the Marxist press, for example, by the organised Marxists of St. Petersburg. Trotsky chooses to ignore these published terms for the liquidators? So much the worse for Trotsky. It is our

duty to warn our readers how ridiculous that "unity" (the August type of "unity"?) project-mongering is which refuses to reckon with the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers of Russia.

## V. TROTSKY'S LIQUIDATIONIST VIEWS

As to the substance of his own views, Trotsky contrived to say as little as possible in his new journal. *Put Pravdy* (No. 37) has already commented on the fact that Trotsky has not said a word either on the question of the "underground" or on the slogan of working for a legal party, etc.\* That, among other things, is why we say that when attempts are made to form a separate organisation which is to have *no* ideological and political physiognomy, it is the *worst* form of factionalism.

Although Trotsky has refrained from openly expounding his views, quite a number of passages in his journal show what kind of ideas he has been trying to smuggle in.

In the very first editorial article in the first issue of his journal, we read the following:

"The pre-revolutionary Social-Democratic Party in our country was a *workers' party* only in ideas and aims. Actually, it was an organisation of the Marxist intelligentsia, which led the awakening working class." (5)

This is the old liberal and liquidationist tune, which is really the prelude to the *repudiation* of the Party. It is based on a distortion of the historical facts. The strikes of 1895-96 had already given rise to a *mass* working-class movement, which both in ideas and organisation was linked with the Social-Democratic movement. And in these strikes, in this economic and non-economic agitation, the "intelligentsia *led* the working class"!?

Or take the following exact statistics of political offences in the period 1901-03 compared with the preceding period.

OCCUPATIONS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE EMANCIPATION  
MOVEMENT PROSECUTED FOR POLITICAL OFFENCES  
(PER CENT)

Period	Agriculture	Industry and commerce	Liberal professions and students	No definite occupa- tion and no occupation
1884-90	7.1	15.1	53.3	19.9
1901-03	9.0	46.1	28.7	8.0

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 158-61.—Ed.



We see that in the eighties, when there was as yet *no* Social-Democratic Party in Russia, and when the movement was "Narodnik", the intelligentsia predominated, accounting for over half the participants.

But the picture underwent a complete change in 1901-03, when a Social-Democratic Party already existed, and when the old *Iskra* was conducting its work. The intelligentsia were now a *minority* among the participants of the movement, the *workers* ("industry and commerce") were far more numerous than the intelligentsia, and the workers and peasants together constituted more than half the total.

It was precisely in the conflict of trends within the Marxist movement that the petty-bourgeois intellectualist *wing* of the Social-Democracy made itself felt, beginning with Economism (1895-1903) and continuing with Menshevism (1903-08) and liquidationism (1908-14). Trotsky repeats the liquidationist slander against the Party and is afraid to mention the history of the twenty years' conflict of trends within the Party.

Here is another example.

"In its attitude towards parliamentarism, Russian Social Democracy passed through the same three stages . . . [as in other countries] . . . first 'boycottism' . . . then the acceptance in principle of parliamentary tactics, but . . . [that magnificent "but", the "but" which Shchedrin translated as. The ears never grow higher than the forehead, never! ] . . . for purely agitational purposes . . . and lastly, the presentation from the Duma rostrum . . . of current demands. . ." (No 1, p 34)

This, too, is a liquidationist distortion of history. The distinction between the second and third stages was invented in order to smuggle in a defence of reformism and opportunism. Boycottism as a stage in "the attitude of Social Democracy towards parliamentarism" never existed *either* in Europe (where anarchism has existed and continues to exist) *or* in Russia, where the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, for example, applied *only* to a definite institution, was *never* linked with "parliamentarism", and was engendered by the peculiar nature of the struggle between liberalism and Marxism for the continuation of the onslaught. Trotsky does not breathe a word about the way this struggle affected the conflict between the two trends in Marxism!

When dealing with history, one must explain concrete questions and the class roots of the different trends; anybody who wants to make a Marxist study of the struggle of classes and trends over the question of participation in the Bulygin Duma, will see therein the roots of the liberal-labour policy. But Trotsky "deals with" history only in order to *evade* concrete

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• Meaning the impossible —Ed.

questions and to *invent* a justification, or a semblance of justification, for the present-day opportunists!

"Actually, all trends," he writes, "employ the same methods of struggle and organisation." "The outcries about the liberal danger in our working-class movement are simply a crude and sectarian travesty of reality." (No. 1, pp. 5 and 35.)

This is a very clear and very vehement defence of the liquidators. But we will take the liberty of quoting at least one small fact, one of the very latest. Trotsky merely slings words about; we should like the workers themselves to ponder over the facts.

It is a fact that *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* for March 13 wrote the following:

*"Instead of emphasising the definite and concrete task that confronts the working class, viz., to compel the Duma to throw out the bill [on the press], a vague formula is proposed of fighting for the 'untailored slogans', and at the same time the illegal press is widely advertised, which can only lead to the relaxation of the workers' struggle for their legal press."*

This is a clear, precise and documentary defence of the liquidationist policy and a criticism of the *Pravda* policy. Well, will any literate person say that both trends employ "the same methods of struggle and organisation" on this question? Will any literate person say that the liquidators are *not* pursuing a liberal-labour policy on this question, that the liberal menace to the working-class movement is purely imaginary?

The reason why Trotsky avoids facts and concrete references is because they relentlessly refute all his angry outcries and pompous phrases. It is very easy, of course, to strike an attitude and say: "A crude and sectarian travesty." Or to add a still more stinging and pompous catch-phrase, such as "emancipation from conservative factionalism".

But is this not very cheap? Is not this weapon borrowed from the arsenal of the period when Trotsky posed in all his splendour before audiences of high-school boys?

Nevertheless, the "advanced workers", with whom Trotsky is so angry, would like to be told plainly and clearly: Do you or do you not approve of the "method of struggle and organisation" that is definitely expressed in the above-quoted appraisal of a definite political campaign? If you do, then you are pursuing a liberal-labour policy, betraying Marxism and the Party; to talk of "peace" or of "unity" with *such* a policy, with groups which pursue *such* a policy, means deceiving yourself and others.

If not, then say so plainly. Phrases will not astonish, satisfy or intimidate the present-day workers.

Incidentally, the policy advocated by the liquidators in the above-quoted passage is a foolish one even from the liberal point

of view, for the passage of a bill in the Duma depends on "Zemstvo-Octobrists" of the type of Bennigsen, who has already shown his hand in the committee.

\* \* \*

The old participants in the Marxist movement in Russia know Trotsky very well, and there is no need to discuss him for their benefit. But the younger generation of workers do not know him, and it is therefore necessary to discuss him, for he is typical of all the five groups abroad, which, in fact, are also vacillating between the liquidators and the Party.

In the days of the old *Iskra* (1901-03) these waverers, who flitted from the Economists to the Iskristis and back again, were dubbed "Tushino turncoats" (the name given in the *Troublous Times*<sup>345</sup> in Rus to fighting men who went over from one camp to another).

When we speak of liquidationism we speak of a definite ideological trend, which grew up in the course of many years, stems from Menshevism and Economism in the twenty years' history of Marxism, and is connected with the policy and ideology of a definite class—the liberal bourgeoisie.

The only ground the "Tushino turncoats" have for claiming that they stand above groups is that they "borrow" their ideas from one group one day and from another the next day. Trotsky was an ardent Iskrist in 1901-03, and Ryazanov described his role at the Congress of 1903 as "Lenin's cudgel". At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik, i.e., he deserted from the Iskristis to the Economists. He said that "between the old *Iskra* and the new lies a gulf". In 1904-05, he deserted the Mensheviks and occupied a vacillating position, now co-operating with Martynov (the Economist), now proclaiming his absurdly Left "permanent revolution" theory. In 1906-07 he approached the Bolsheviks, and in the spring of 1907 he declared that he was in agreement with Rosa Luxemburg.

In the period of disintegration, after long "non-factional" vacillation, he again went to the right, and in August 1912, he entered into a bloc with the liquidators. He has now deserted them again, although *in substance* he reiterates their shoddy ideas.

Such types are characteristic of the flotsam of past historical formations, of the time when the mass working-class movement in Russia was still dormant, and when every group had "ample room" in which to pose as a trend, group or faction, in short, as a "power", negotiating amalgamation with others.

The younger generation of workers should know exactly whom they are dealing with, when individuals come before them with

incredibly pretentious claims, unwilling absolutely to reckon with *either* the Party decisions, which since 1908 have defined and established our attitude towards liquidationism, *or* with the experience of the present-day working-class movement in Russia, which has actually brought about the *unity* of the majority on the basis of full recognition of the aforesaid decisions

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## THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Clause 9 of the Russian Marxists Programme which deals with the right of nations to self determination has (as we have already pointed out in *Prosveshcheniye*) given rise lately to a crusade on the part of the opportunists. The Russian liquidator Senkovsky, in the St Petersburg liquidationist newspaper, and the Bundist Liebman and the Ukrainian nationalist socialist Yurkevich in their respective periodicals have violently attacked this clause and treated it with supreme contempt. There is no doubt that this campaign of a motley array of opportunists against our Marxist Programme is closely connected with present day nationalist vacillations in general. Hence we consider a detailed examination of this question timely. We would mention, in passing, that none of the opportunists named above has offered a single argument of his own: they all merely repeat what Rosa Luxemburg said in her lengthy Polish article of 1905/09, 'The National Question and Autonomy'. In our exposition we shall deal mainly with the "original" arguments of this last-named author.

### 1. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS?

Naturally, this is the first question that arises when any attempt is made at a Marxist examination of what is known as self determination. What should be understood by that term? Should the answer be sought in legal definitions deduced from all sorts of "general concepts" of law? Or is it rather to be sought in a historical economic study of the national movements?

It is not surprising that the Semkovskys, Liebmans and Yurkeviches did not even think of raising this question, and shrugged it off by scoffing at the "obscurity" of the Marxist Programme, apparently unaware, in their simplicity, that the self-determination of nations is dealt with, not only in the Russian Programme of 1903, but in the resolution of the London International Congress of 1896 (with which I shall deal in detail in the proper place). Far more surprising is the fact that Rosa Luxemburg, who declaims a great deal about the supposedly abstract and metaphysical nature of the clause in question, should herself succumb to the sin of abstraction and metaphysics. It is Rosa Luxemburg herself who is continually lapsing into generalities about self-determination (to the extent even of philosophising amusingly on the question of how the will of the nation is to be ascertained), without anywhere clearly and precisely asking herself whether the gist of the matter lies in legal definitions or in the experience of the national movements throughout the world.

A precise formulation of this question, which no Marxist can avoid, would at once destroy nine-tenths of Rosa Luxemburg's arguments. This is not the first time that national movements have arisen in Russia, nor are they peculiar to that country alone. Throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked up with national movements. For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its consolidation in literature eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national movements. Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity and unimpeded development of language are the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commerce on a scale commensurate with modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its various classes and, lastly, for the establishment of a close connection between the market and each and every proprietor, big or little, and between seller and buyer.

Therefore, the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of *national states*, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied. The most profound economic factors drive towards this goal, and, therefore, for the whole of Western Europe, nay, for the entire civilised world, the national state is *typical* and normal for the capitalist period.

Consequently, if we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of nations, not by juggling with legal definitions, or "inventing" abstract definitions, but by examining the historico-economic conditions of the national movements, we must inevi-

tably reach the conclusion that the self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state.

Later on we shall see still other reasons why it would be wrong to interpret the right to self-determination as meaning anything but the right to existence as a separate state. At present, we must deal with Rosa Luxemburg's efforts to "dismiss" the inescapable conclusion that profound economic factors underlie the urge towards a national state.

Rosa Luxemburg is quite familiar with Kautsky's pamphlet *Nationality and Internationality*. (Supplement to *Die Neue Zeit* No. 1, 1907-08; Russian translation in the journal *Nauchnaya Mysl*, Riga, 1908.<sup>316</sup>) She is aware that, after carefully analysing the question of the national state in § 4 of that pamphlet, Kautsky\* arrived at the conclusion that Otto Bauer "underestimates the strength of the urge towards a national state" (p. 23 of the pamphlet). Rosa Luxemburg herself quotes the following words of Kautsky's: "The national state is the form *most suited* to present-day conditions, [i.e., capitalist, civilised, economically progressive conditions, as distinguished from medieval, pre-capitalist, etc.]; it is the form in which the state can best fulfil its tasks" (i.e., the tasks of securing the freest, widest and speediest development of capitalism). To this we must add Kautsky's still more precise concluding remark that states of mixed national composition (known as multinational states, as distinct from national states) are "always those whose internal constitution has for some reason or other remained abnormal or underdeveloped" (backward). Needless to say, Kautsky speaks of abnormality exclusively in the sense of lack of conformity with what is best adapted to the requirements of a developing capitalism.

The question now is: How did Rosa Luxemburg treat these historico-economic conclusions of Kautsky's? Are they right or wrong? Is Kautsky right in his historico-economic theory, or is Bauer, whose theory is basically psychological? What is the connection between Bauer's undoubted "national opportunism", his defence of cultural-national autonomy, his nationalistic infatuation ("an occasional emphasis on the national aspect", as Kautsky put it), his "enormous exaggeration of the national aspect and complete neglect of the international aspect" (Kautsky)—

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\* In 1916, when preparing the re-edition of the article, Lenin gave the following note to this passage: "We request the reader not to forget that up to 1909, up to his splendid pamphlet *The Road to Power*, Kautsky was an enemy of opportunism and that he became its advocate only in 1910-11, and more resolutely only in 1914-16."

and his underestimation of the strength of the urge to create a national state?

Rosa Luxemburg has not even raised this question. She has not noticed the connection. She has not considered the *sum total* of Bauer's theoretical views. She has not even drawn a line between the historico-economic and the psychological theories of the national question. She confines herself to the following remarks in criticism of Kautsky:

"This 'best' national state is only an abstraction, which can easily be developed and defended theoretically, but which does not correspond to reality." (*Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*,<sup>317</sup> 1908, No. 6, p. 499)

And in corroboration of this emphatic statement there follow arguments to the effect that the "right to self-determination" of small nations is made illusory by the development of the great capitalist powers and by imperialism. "Can one seriously speak," Rosa Luxemburg exclaims, "about the 'self-determination' of the formally independent Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbs, Greeks, partly even the Swiss, whose independence is itself a result of the political struggle and the diplomatic game of the 'concert of Europe'?" (P. 500.) The state that best suits these conditions is "not a national state, as Kautsky believes, but a predatory one". Some dozens of figures are quoted relating to the size of British, French and other colonial possessions.

After reading such arguments, one cannot help marvelling at the author's ability to misunderstand *the how and the why of things*. To teach Kautsky, with a serious mien, that small states are economically dependent on big ones, that a struggle is raging among the bourgeois states for the predatory suppression of other nations, and that imperialism and colonies exist—all this is a ridiculous and puerile attempt to be clever, for none of this has the slightest bearing on the subject. Not only small states, but even Russia, for example, is entirely dependent, economically, on the power of the imperialist finance capital of the "rich" bourgeois countries. Not only the miniature Balkan states, but even nineteenth-century America was, economically, a colony of Europe, as Marx pointed out in *Capital*.<sup>318</sup> Kautsky, like any Marxist, is, of course, well aware of this, but that has nothing whatever to do with the question of national movements and the national state.

For the question of the political self-determination of nations and their independence as states in bourgeois society, Rosa Luxemburg has substituted the question of their economic independence. This is just as intelligent as if someone, in discussing the programmatic demand for the supremacy of parliament, i.e., the assembly of people's representatives, in a bourgeois state,



were to expound the perfectly correct conviction that big capital dominates in a bourgeois country, whatever the regime in it.

There is no doubt that the greater part of Asia, the most densely populated continent, consists either of colonies of the "Great Powers", or of states that are extremely dependent and oppressed as nations. But does this commonly-known circumstance in any way shake the undoubted fact that in Asia itself the conditions for the most complete development of commodity production and the freest, widest and speediest growth of capitalism have been created only in Japan, i.e., only in an independent national state? The latter is a bourgeois state, and for that reason has itself begun to oppress other nations and to enslave colonies. We cannot say whether Asia will have had time to develop into a system of independent national states, like Europe, before the collapse of capitalism, but it remains an undisputed fact that capitalism, having awakened Asia, has called forth national movements everywhere in that continent, too, that the tendency of these movements is towards the creation of national states in Asia; that it is such states that ensure the best conditions for the development of capitalism. The example of Asia speaks *in favour* of Kautsky and *against* Rosa Luxemburg.

The example of the Balkan states likewise contradicts her, for anyone can now see that the best conditions for the development of capitalism in the Balkans are created precisely in proportion to the creation of independent national states in that peninsula.

Therefore, Rosa Luxemburg notwithstanding, the example of the whole of progressive and civilised mankind, the example of the Balkans and that of Asia prove that Kautsky's proposition is absolutely correct: the national state is the rule and the "norm" of capitalism; the multinational state represents backwardness, or is an exception. From the standpoint of national relations, the best conditions for the development of capitalism are undoubtedly provided by the national state. This does not mean, of course, that such a state, which is based on bourgeois relations, can eliminate the exploitation and oppression of nations. It only means that Marxists cannot lose sight of the powerful *economic* factors that give rise to the urge to create national states. It means that "self-determination of nations" in the Marxists' Programme *cannot*, from a historico-economic point of view, have any other meaning than political self-determination, state independence, and the formation of a national state.

The conditions under which the bourgeois-democratic demand for a "national state" should be supported from a Marxist, i.e. class-proletarian, point of view will be dealt with in detail below. For the present, we shall confine ourselves to the definition of the *concept* of "self-determination", and only note that Rosa

Luxemburg *knows* what this concept means ("national state"), whereas her opportunist partisans, the Liebmans, the Semkovskys, the Yurkeviches, *do not even know that!*

## 2. THE HISTORICALLY CONCRETE PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION

The categorical requirement of Marxist theory in investigating any social question is that it be examined within *definite* historical limits, and, if it refers to a particular country (e.g., the national programme for a given country), that account be taken of the specific features distinguishing that country from others in the same historical epoch.

What does this categorical requirement of Marxism imply in its application to the question under discussion?

First of all, it implies that a clear distinction must be drawn between the two periods of capitalism, which differ radically from each other as far as the national movement is concerned. On the one hand, there is the period of the collapse of feudalism and absolutism, the period of the formation of the bourgeois-democratic society and state, when the national movements for the first time become mass movements and in one way or another draw *all* classes of the population into politics through the press, participation in representative institutions, etc. On the other hand, there is the period of fully formed capitalist states with a long-established constitutional regime and a highly developed antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—a period that may be called the eve of capitalism's downfall.

The typical features of the first period are: the awakening of national movements and the drawing of the peasants, the most numerous and the most sluggish section of the population, into these movements, in connection with the struggle for political liberty in general, and for the rights of the nation in particular. Typical features of the second period are: the absence of mass bourgeois-democratic movements and the fact that developed capitalism, in bringing closer together nations that have already been fully drawn into commercial intercourse, and causing them to intermingle to an increasing degree, brings the antagonism between internationally united capital and the international working-class movement into the forefront.

Of course, the two periods are not walled off from each other; they are connected by numerous transitional links. the various countries differing from each other in the rapidity of their national development, in the national make-up and distribution of their population, and so on. There can be no question of the Marx-

ists of any country drawing up their national programme without taking into account all these general historical and concrete state conditions

It is here that we come up against the weakest point in Rosa Luxemburg's arguments. With extraordinary zeal, she embellishes her article with a collection of hard words directed against § 9 of our Programme which she declares to be 'sweeping', 'a platitude', 'a metaphysical phrase' and so on without end. It would be natural to expect an author who so admirably condemns metaphysics (in the Marxist sense, i.e., anti dialectics) and empty abstractions to set us an example of how to make a concrete historical analysis of the question. The question at issue is the national programme of the Marxists of a definite country—Russia in a definite period—the beginning of the twentieth century. But does Rosa Luxemburg raise the question as to *what historical* period Russia is passing through or *what are the concrete* features of the national question and the national movements of that *particular* country in that *particular* period?

No, she does not! *She says absolutely nothing about it!* In her work you will not find even the shadow of an analysis of how the national question stands in *Russia* in the present historical period or of the specific features of *Russia* in this particular respect!

We are told that the national question in the Balkans is presented differently from that in Ireland, that Marx appraised the Polish and Czech national movements in the concrete conditions of 1848 in such and such a way (a page of excerpts from Marx) that Engels appraised the struggle of the forest cantons of Switzerland against Austria and the Battle of Morgarten which took place in 1315 in such and such a way (a page of quotations from Engels with the appropriate comments from Kautsky), that Lassalle regarded the peasant war in Germany of the sixteenth century as reactionary etc.

It cannot be said that these remarks and quotations have any novelty about them, but at all events it is interesting for the reader to be occasionally reminded just how Marx, Engels and Lassalle approached the analysis of concrete historical problems in individual countries. And a perusal of these instructive quotations from Marx and Engels reveals most strikingly the ridiculous position Rosa Luxemburg has placed herself in. She preaches eloquently and angrily the need for a concrete historical analysis of the national question in different countries at different times, but she *does not make the least* attempt to determine *what* historical stage in the development of capitalism *Russia* is passing through at the beginning of the twentieth century or *what the specific features* of the national question in this

country are. Rosa Luxemburg gives examples of how *others* have treated the question in a Marxist fashion, as if deliberately stressing how often the road to hell is paved with good intentions and how often good counsel covers up unwillingness or inability to follow such advice in practice.

Here is one of her edifying comparisons. In protesting against the demand for the independence of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg refers to a pamphlet she wrote in 1898, proving the rapid "industrial development of Poland", with the latter's manufactured goods being marketed in Russia. Needless to say, no conclusion whatever can be drawn from this on the question of the *right* to self-determination; it only proves the disappearance of the old Poland of the landed gentry, etc. But Rosa Luxemburg always passes on imperceptibly to the conclusion that among the factors that unite Russia and Poland, the purely economic factors of modern capitalist relations now predominate.

Then our Rosa proceeds to the question of autonomy, and though her article is entitled "The National Question and Autonomy" *in general*, she begins to argue that the Kingdom of Poland has an *exclusive* right to autonomy (see *Prosveshcheniye*, 1913, No. 12'). To support Poland's right to autonomy, Rosa Luxemburg evidently judges the state system of Russia by her economic, political and sociological characteristics and everyday life—a totality of features which, taken together, produce the concept of "Asiatic despotism". (*Przegląd* No. 12, p. 137)

It is generally known that this kind of state system possesses great stability whenever completely patriarchal and pre-capitalist features predominate in the economic system and where commodity production and class differentiation are scarcely developed. However, if in a country whose state system is distinctly *pre-capitalist* in character there exists a nationally demarcated region where capitalism is *rapidly* developing, then the more rapidly that capitalism develops, the greater will be the antagonism between it and the *pre-capitalist* state system, and the more likely will be the separation of the progressive region from the whole—with which it is connected, not by "modern capitalistic", but by "Asiatically despotic" ties.

Thus, Rosa Luxemburg does not let her arguments to hang together even on the question of the social structure of the government in Russia with regard to bourgeois Poland; as for the concrete, historical, specific features of the national movements in Russia—she does not even raise that question.

That is a point we must now deal with

### 3. THE CONCRETE FEATURES OF THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA, AND RUSSIA'S BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REFORMATION

"Despite the elasticity of the principle of 'the right of nations to self-determination', which is a mere platitude, and, obviously, equally applicable not only to the nations inhabiting Russia, but also to the nations inhabiting Germany and Austria, Switzerland and Sweden, America and Australia, we do not find it in the programmes of any of the present-day socialist parties. . . ." (*Przegląd* No. 6, p. 483.)

This is how Rosa Luxemburg opens her attack upon § 9 of the Marxist programme. In trying to foist on us the conception that this clause in the programme is a "mere platitude", Rosa Luxemburg herself falls victim to this error, alleging with amusing boldness that this point is, "obviously, equally applicable" to Russia, Germany, etc.

Obviously, we shall reply, Rosa Luxemburg has decided to make her article a collection of errors in logic that could be used for schoolboy exercises. For Rosa Luxemburg's tirade is sheer nonsense and a mockery of the historically concrete presentation of the question.

If one interprets the Marxist programme in Marxist fashion, not in a childish way, one will without difficulty grasp the fact that it refers to bourgeois-democratic national movements. That being the case, it is "obvious" that this programme "sweepingly", and as a "mere platitude", etc., covers *all* instances of bourgeois-democratic national movements. No less obvious to Rosa Luxemburg, if she gave the slightest thought to it, is the conclusion that our programme refers *only* to cases where such a movement is actually in existence.

Had she given thought to these obvious considerations, Rosa Luxemburg would have easily perceived what nonsense she was talking. In accusing *us* of uttering a "platitude" she has used *against us* the argument that no mention is made of the right to self-determination in the programmes of countries where there are *no* bourgeois-democratic national movements. A remarkably clever argument!

A comparison of the political and economic development of various countries, as well as of their Marxist programmes, is of tremendous importance from the standpoint of Marxism, for there can be no doubt that all modern states are of a common capitalist nature and are therefore subject to a common law of development. But such a comparison must be drawn in a sensible way. The elementary condition for comparison is to find out whether the historical periods of development of the countries

concerned are at all *comparable*. For instance, only absolute ignoramuses (such as Prince Y. Trubetskoi in *Russkaya Mysl*<sup>31a</sup>) are capable of "comparing" the Russian Marxists' agrarian programme with the programmes of Western Europe, since our programme replies to questions that concern the *bourgeois-democratic* agrarian reform, whereas in the Western countries no such question arises.

The same applies to the national question. In most Western countries it was settled long ago. It is ridiculous to seek an answer to non-existent questions in the programmes of Western Europe. In this respect Rosa Luxemburg has lost sight of the most important thing—the difference between countries where bourgeois-democratic reforms have long been completed, and those where they have not.

The crux of the matter lies in this difference. Rosa Luxemburg's complete disregard of it transforms her verbose article into a collection of empty and meaningless platitudes.

The epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Western, continental Europe embraces a fairly definite period, approximately between 1789 and 1871. This was precisely the period of national movements and the creation of national states. When this period drew to a close, Western Europe had been transformed into a settled system of bourgeois states, which, as a general rule, were nationally uniform states. Therefore, to seek the right to self-determination in the programmes of West-European socialists at this time of day is to betray one's ignorance of the ABC of Marxism.

In Eastern Europe and Asia the period of bourgeois-democratic revolutions did not begin until 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey and China, the Balkan wars—such is the chain of world events of *our* period in our "Orient". And only a blind man could fail to see in this chain of events the awakening of a *whole series* of bourgeois-democratic national movements which strive to create nationally independent and nationally uniform states. It is precisely and solely because Russia and the neighbouring countries are passing through this period that we must have a clause in our programme on the right of nations to self-determination.

But let us continue the quotation from Rosa Luxemburg's article a little more. She writes:

"In particular, the programme of a party which is operating in a state with an extremely varied national composition, and for which the national question is a matter of first-rate importance—the programme of the Austrian Social Democratic Party—does not contain the principle of the right of nations to self-determination." (*Ibid*)

Thus, an attempt is made to convince the reader by the exam-

ple of Austria "in particular". Let us examine this example in the light of concrete historical facts and see just how sound it is.

In the first place, let us pose the fundamental question of the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In Austria, this revolution began in 1848 and was over in 1867. Since then, a more or less fully established bourgeois constitution has dominated for nearly half a century, and on its basis a legal workers' party is legally functioning.

Therefore, in the internal conditions of Austria's development (i.e., from the standpoint of the development of capitalism in Austria in general, and among its various nations in particular), there are *no* factors that produce leaps and bounds, a concomitant of which might be the formation of nationally independent states. In assuming, by her comparison, that Russia is in an analogous position in this respect, Rosa Luxemburg not only makes a fundamentally erroneous and anti-historical assumption, but also involuntarily slips into liquidationism.

Secondly, the profound difference in the relations between the nationalities in Austria and those in Russia is particularly important for the question we are concerned with. Not only was Austria for a long time a state in which the Germans preponderated, but the Austrian Germans laid claim to hegemony in the German nation as a whole. This "claim", as Rosa Luxemburg (who is seemingly so averse to commonplaces, platitudes, abstractions...) will perhaps be kind enough to remember, was shattered in the war of 1866. The German nation predominating in Austria found itself *outside the pale* of the independent German state which finally took shape in 1871. On the other hand, the Hungarians' attempt to create an independent national state collapsed under the blows of the Russian serf army as far back as 1849.

A very peculiar situation was thus created—a striving on the part of the Hungarians and then of the Czechs, not for separation from Austria, but, on the contrary, for the preservation of Austria's integrity, precisely in order to preserve national independence, which might have been completely crushed by more rapacious and powerful neighbours! Owing to this peculiar situation, Austria assumed the form of a dual state, and she is now being transformed into a triple state (Germans, Hungarians, Slavs).

Is there anything like this in Russia? Is there in our country a striving of the "subject peoples" for unity with the Great Russians in face of the danger of *worse* national oppression?

One need only pose this question in order to see that the comparison between Russia and Austria on the question of self-

determination of nations is meaningless, platitudinous and ignorant.

The peculiar conditions in Russia with regard to the national question are just the reverse of those we see in Austria. Russia is a state with a single national centre—Great Russia. The Great Russians occupy a vast, unbroken stretch of territory, and number about 70,000,000. The specific features of this national state are: first, that “subject peoples” (which, on the whole, comprise the majority of the entire population—57 per cent) inhabit the border regions; secondly, the oppression of these subject peoples is much stronger here than in the neighbouring states (and not even in the European states alone); thirdly, in a number of cases the oppressed nationalities inhabiting the border regions have compatriots across the border, who enjoy greater national independence (suffice it to mention the Finns, the Swedes, the Poles, the Ukrainians and the Rumanians along the western and southern frontiers of the state); fourthly, the development of capitalism and the general level of culture are often higher in the non-Russian border regions than in the centre. Lastly, it is in the neighbouring Asian states that we see the beginning of a phase of bourgeois revolutions and national movements which are spreading to some of the kindred nationalities within the borders of Russia.

Thus, it is precisely the special concrete, historical features of the national question in Russia that make the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination in the present period a matter of special urgency in our country.

Incidentally, even from the purely factual angle, Rosa Luxemburg’s assertion that the Austrian Social-Democrats’ programme does not contain any recognition of the right of nations to self-determination is incorrect. We need only open the Minutes of the Brünn Congress, which adopted the national programme,<sup>320</sup> to find the statements by the Ruthenian Social-Democrat Hankiewicz on behalf of the entire Ukrainian (Ruthenian) delegation (p. 85 of the Minutes), and by the Polish Social-Democrat Reger on behalf of the entire Polish delegation (p. 108), to the effect that one of the aspirations of the Austrian Social-Democrats of both the above-mentioned nations is to secure national unity, and the freedom and independence of their nations. Hence, while the Austrian Social-Democrats did not include the right of nations to self-determination directly in their programme, they did nevertheless allow the demand for national independence to be advanced by *sections* of the party. In effect, this means, of course, the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination! Thus, Rosa Luxemburg’s reference to Austria speaks *against* Rosa Luxemburg in *all* respects.



#### 4. "PRACTICALITY" IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION

Rosa Luxemburg's argument that § 9 of our Programme contains nothing "practical" has been seized upon by the opportunists. Rosa Luxemburg is so delighted with this argument that in some parts of her article this "slogan" is repeated eight times on a single page.

She writes: § 9 "gives no practical lead on the day-by-day policy of the proletariat, no practical solution of national problems".

Let us examine this argument, which elsewhere is formulated in such a way that it makes § 9 look quite meaningless, or else commits us to support all national aspirations.

What does the demand for "practicality" in the national question mean?

It means one of three things: support for all national aspirations; the answer "yes" or "no" to the question of secession by any nation; or that national demands are in general immediately "practicable".

Let us examine all three possible meanings of the demand for "practicality".

The bourgeoisie, which naturally assumes the leadership at the start of every national movement, says that support for all national aspirations is practical. However, the proletariat's policy in the national question (as in all others) supports the bourgeoisie only in a certain direction, but it never coincides with the bourgeoisie's policy. The working class supports the bourgeoisie only in order to secure national peace (which the bourgeoisie cannot bring about completely and which can be achieved only with *complete* democracy), in order to secure equal rights and to create the best conditions for the class struggle. Therefore, it is *in opposition to the practicality* of the bourgeoisie that the proletarians advance their *principles* in the national question; they always give the bourgeoisie *only conditional* support. What every bourgeoisie is out for in the national question is either privileges for *its own* nation, or exceptional advantages for it; this is called being "practical". The proletariat is opposed to all privileges, to all exclusiveness. To demand that it should be "practical" means following the lead of the bourgeoisie, falling into opportunism.

The demand for a "yes" or "no" reply to the question of secession in the case of every nation may seem a very "practical" one. In reality it is absurd; it is metaphysical in theory, while in practice it leads to subordinating the proletariat to the bourgeoisie's policy. The bourgeoisie always places its national demands in the forefront, and does so in categorical fashion. With the proletariat, however, these demands are subordinated to the interests of the class struggle. Theoretically, you cannot say

in advance whether the bourgeois-democratic revolution will end in a given nation seceding from another nation, or in its equality with the latter; *in either case*, the important thing for the proletariat is to ensure the development of its class. For the bourgeoisie it is important to hamper this development by pushing the aims of its "own" nation before those of the proletariat. That is why the proletariat confines itself, so to speak, to the negative demand for recognition of the *right* to self-determination, without giving guarantees to any nation, and without undertaking to give *anything at the expense* of another nation.

This may not be "practical", but it is in effect the best guarantee for the achievement of the most democratic of all possible solutions. The proletariat needs *only* such guarantees, whereas the bourgeoisie of every nation requires guarantees for *its own* interest, regardless of the position of (or the possible disadvantages to) other nations.

The bourgeoisie is most of all interested in the "feasibility" of a given demand—hence the invariable policy of coming to terms with the bourgeoisie of other nations, to the detriment of the proletariat. For the proletariat, however, the important thing is to strengthen its class against the bourgeoisie and to educate the masses in the spirit of consistent democracy and socialism.

This may not be "practical" as far as the opportunists are concerned, but it is the only real guarantee, the guarantee of the greater national equality and peace, despite the feudal landlords and the *nationalist* bourgeoisie.

The whole task of the proletarians in the national question is "unpractical" from the standpoint of the *nationalist* bourgeoisie of every nation, because the proletarians, opposed as they are to nationalism of every kind, demand "abstract" equality; they demand, as a matter of principle, that there should be no privileges, however slight. Failing to grasp this, Rosa Luxemburg, by her misguided eulogy of practicality, has opened the door wide for the opportunists, and especially for opportunist concessions to Great-Russian nationalism.

Why Great-Russian? Because the Great Russians in Russia are an oppressor nation, and opportunism in the national question will of course find expression among oppressed nations otherwise than among oppressor nations.

On the plea that its demands are "practical", the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations will call upon the proletariat to support its aspirations unconditionally. The most practical procedure is to say a plain "yes" in favour of the secession of a *particular* nation rather than in favour of all nations having the *right* to secede!

The proletariat is opposed to such practicality. While recognis-

ing equality and equal rights to a national state, it values above all and places foremost the alliance of the proletarians of all nations, and assesses any national demand, any national separation, *from the angle* of the workers' class struggle. This call for practicality is in fact merely a call for uncritical acceptance of bourgeois aspirations.

By supporting the right to secession, we are told, you are supporting the bourgeois nationalism of the oppressed nations. This is what Rosa Luxemburg says, and she is echoed by Semkovsky, the opportunist, who incidentally is the only representative of liquidationist ideas on this question, in the liquidationist newspaper!

Our reply to this is: No, it is to the bourgeoisie that a "practical" solution of this question is important. To the workers the important thing is to distinguish the *principles* of the two trends. *Insofar as* the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fights the oppressor, we are always, in every case, and more strongly than anyone else, *in favour*, for we are the staunchest and the most consistent enemies of oppression. But *insofar as* the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stands for *its own* bourgeois nationalism, we stand against. We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed nation.

If, in our political agitation, we fail to advance and advocate the slogan of the *right* to secession, we shall play into the hands, not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the feudal landlords and the absolutism of the *oppressor* nation. Kautsky long ago used this argument against Rosa Luxemburg, and the argument is indisputable. When, in her anxiety not to "assist" the nationalist bourgeoisie of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg rejects the *right* to secession in the programme of the Marxists *in Russia*, she is *in fact* assisting the Great-Russian Black Hundreds. She is in fact assisting opportunist tolerance of the privileges (and worse than privileges) of the Great Russians.

Carried away by the struggle against nationalism in Poland, Rosa Luxemburg has forgotten the nationalism of the Great Russians, although it is *this* nationalism that is the most formidable at the present time. It is a nationalism that is more feudal than bourgeois, and is the principal obstacle to democracy and to the proletarian struggle. The bourgeois nationalism of *any* oppressed nation has a general democratic content that is directed *against* oppression, and it is this content that we *unconditionally* support. At the same time we strictly distinguish it from the tendency towards national exclusiveness; we fight against the tendency of the Polish bourgeois to oppress the Jews, etc., etc.

This is "unpractical" from the standpoint of the bourgeois and the philistine, but it is the only policy in the national question that is practical, based on principles, and really promotes democracy, liberty and proletarian unity.

The recognition of the right to secession for all; the appraisal of each concrete question of secession from the point of view of removing all inequality, all privileges, and all exclusiveness.

Let us consider the position of an oppressor nation. Can a nation be free if it oppresses other nations? It cannot. The interests of the freedom of the Great-Russian population\* require a struggle against such oppression. The long, centuries-old history of the suppression of the movements of the oppressed nations, and the systematic propaganda in favour of such suppression coming from the "upper" classes have created enormous obstacles to the cause of freedom of the Great-Russian people itself, in the form of prejudices, etc.

The Great-Russian Black Hundreds deliberately foster these prejudices and encourage them. The Great-Russian bourgeoisie tolerates or condones them. The Great-Russian proletariat cannot achieve *its own* aims or clear the road to its freedom without systematically countering these prejudices.

In Russia, the creation of an independent national state remains, for the time being, the privilege of the Great-Russian nation alone. We, the Great-Russian proletarians, who defend no privileges whatever, do not defend this privilege either. We are fighting on the ground of a definite state; we unite the workers of all nations living in this state; we cannot vouch for any particular path of national development, for we are marching to our class goal along *all* possible paths.

However, we cannot move towards that goal unless we combat all nationalism, and uphold the equality of the various nations. Whether the Ukraine, for example, is destined to form an independent state is a matter that will be determined by a thousand unpredictable factors. Without attempting idle "guesses", we firmly uphold something that is beyond doubt: the right of the Ukraine to form such a state. We respect this right; we do not uphold the privileges of Great Russians with regard to Ukrainians; we *educate* the masses in the spirit of recognition of that right, in the spirit of rejecting *state* privileges for any nation.

In the leaps which all nations have made in the period of bourgeois revolutions, clashes and struggles over the right to a

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\* A certain L. VI in Paris considers this word un-Marxist. This L. VI is amusingly "*superklug*" (too clever by half). And "this too-clever-by-half" L. VI apparently intends to write an essay on the deletion of the words "population" "nation", etc., from our minimum programme (having in mind the class struggle!)

national state are possible and probable. We proletarians declare in advance that we *are opposed* to Great-Russian privileges, and this is what guides our entire propaganda and agitation.

In her quest for "practicality" Rosa Luxemburg has lost sight of the *principal* practical task both of the Great-Russian proletariat and of the proletariat of other nationalities: that of day-by-day agitation and propaganda against all state and national privileges, and for the right, the equal right of all nations, to their national state. This (at present) is our principal task in the national question, for only in this way can we defend the interests of democracy and the alliance of all proletarians of all nations on an equal footing.

This propaganda may be "unpractical" from the point of view of the Great-Russian oppressors, as well as from the point of view of the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations (both demand a *definite* "yes" or "no", and accuse the Social-Democrats of being "vague"). In reality it is this propaganda, and this propaganda alone, that ensures the genuinely democratic, the genuinely socialist education of the masses. This is the only propaganda to ensure the greatest chances of national peace in Russia, should she remain a multi-national state, and the most peaceful (and for the proletarian class struggle, harmless) division into separate national states, should the question of such a division arise.

To explain this policy—the only proletarian policy—in the national question more concretely, we shall examine the attitude of Great-Russian liberalism towards the "self-determination of nations", and the example of Norway's secession from Sweden.

### 5. THE LIBERAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISTS IN THE NATIONAL QUESTION

We have seen that the following argument is one of Rosa Luxemburg's "trump cards" in her struggle against the programme of the Marxists in Russia: recognition of the right to self-determination is tantamount to supporting the bourgeois nationalism of the oppressed nations. On the other hand, she says, if we take this right to mean no more than combating all violence against other nations, there is no need for a special clause in the programme, for Social-Democrats are, in general, opposed to all national oppression and inequality.

The first argument, as Kautsky irrefutably proved nearly twenty years ago, is a case of blaming other people for one's

own nationalism; in her fear of the nationalism of the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations, Rosa Luxemburg is *actually* playing into the hands of the Black-Hundred nationalism of the Great Russians! Her second argument is actually a timid evasion of the question whether or not recognition of national equality includes recognition of the right to secession. If it does, then Rosa Luxemburg admits that, in principle, § 9 of our Programme is correct. If it does not, then she does not recognise national equality. Shuffling and evasions will not help matters here!

However, the best way to test these and all similar arguments is to study the attitude of the *various classes* of society towards this question. For the Marxist this test is obligatory. We must proceed from what is objective; we must examine the relations between the classes on this point. In failing to do so, Rosa Luxemburg is guilty of those very sins of metaphysics, abstractions, platitudes, and sweeping statements, etc., of which she vainly tries to accuse her opponents.

We are discussing the Programme of the Marxists *in Russia*, i.e., of the Marxists of all the nationalities in Russia. Should we not examine the position of the *ruling* classes of Russia?

The position of the "bureaucracy" (we beg pardon for this inaccurate term) and of the feudal landlords of our united-nobility type<sup>321</sup> is well known. They definitely reject both the equality of nationalities and the right to self-determination. Theirs is the old motto of the days of serfdom: autocracy, orthodoxy, and the national essence—the last term applying only to the Great-Russian nation. Even the Ukrainians are declared to be an "alien" people and their very language is being suppressed.

Let us glance at the Russian bourgeoisie, which was "called upon" to take part—a very modest part, it is true, but nevertheless some part—in the government, under the "June Third"<sup>322</sup> legislative and administrative system. It will not need many words to prove that the Octobrists are following the Rights in this question. Unfortunately, some Marxists pay much less attention to the stand of the Great-Russian liberal bourgeoisie, the Progressists<sup>323</sup> and the Cadets. Yet he who fails to study that stand and give it careful thought will inevitably flounder in abstractions and groundless statements in discussing the question of the right of nations to self-determination.

Skilled though it is in the art of diplomatically evading direct answers to "unpleasant" questions, *Rech*,<sup>324</sup> the principal organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, was compelled, in its controversy with *Pravda* last year, to make certain valuable admissions. The trouble started over the All-Ukraine Students' Congress held in Lvov in the summer of 1913. Mr. Mogilyansky, the "Ukrainian expert" or Ukrainian correspondent of *Rech*,

wrote an article in which he poured vitriolic abuse ("ravings", "adventurism", etc.) on the idea that the Ukraine should secede, an idea which Dontsov, a nationalist-socialist, had advocated and the above-mentioned congress approved.

While in no way identifying itself with Mr. Dontsov, and declaring explicitly that he was a nationalist-socialist and that many Ukrainian Marxists did not agree with him *Rabochaya Pravda* stated that the *tone* of *Rech*, or, rather, the *way it formulated the question in principle*, was improper and reprehensible for a Great-Russian democrat, or for anyone desiring to pass as a democrat.\* Let *Rech* repudiate the Dontsovs if it likes, but, *from the standpoint of principle*, a Great-Russian organ of democracy, which it claims to be, cannot be oblivious of the *freedom* to secede, the *right* to secede.

A few months later, *Rech*, No. 331, published an "explanation" from Mr. Mogilyansky, who had learned from the Ukrainian newspaper *Shlyakhi*,<sup>325</sup> published in Lvov, of Mr. Dontsov's reply, in which, incidentally, Dontsov stated that "the chauvinist attacks in *Rech* have been properly sullied [branded?] only in the Russian Social-Democratic press". This "explanation" consisted of the thrice-repeated statement that "criticism of Mr. Dontsov's recipes" "has nothing in common with the repudiation of the right of nations to self-determination".

"It must be said," wrote Mr. Mogilyansky, "that even 'the right of nations to self-determination' is not a fetish [mark this!] beyond criticism: unwholesome conditions in the life of nations may give rise to unwholesome tendencies in national self-determination, and the fact that these are brought to light does not mean that the right of nations to self-determination has been rejected."

As you see, this liberal's talk of a "fetish" was quite in keeping with Rosa Luxemburg's. It was obvious that Mr. Mogilyansky was trying to evade a direct reply to the question whether or not he recognised the right to political self-determination, i.e., to secession.

The newspaper *Proletarskaya Pravda*, issue No. 4, for December 11, 1913, also put this question *point-blank* to Mr. Mogilyansky and to the Constitutional-Democratic Party.\*\*

Thereupon *Rech* (No. 340) published an unsigned, i.e., official, editorial statement replying to this question. This reply boils down to the following three points:

1) § 11 of the Constitutional-Democratic Party's programme speaks bluntly, precisely and clearly of the "right of nations to free cultural self-determination".

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 268-69.—Ed.

\*\* *Ibid.*, pp. 525-27.—Ed.

2) *Rech* affirms that *Proletarskaya Pravda* "hopelessly confuses" self-determination with separatism, with the secession of a given nation.

3) "*Actually, the Cadets have never pledged themselves to advocate the right of 'nations to secede' from the Russian state.*" (See the article "National-Liberalism and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", in *Proletarskaya Pravda* No. 12, December 20, 1913.\*)

Let us first consider the second point in the *Rech* statement. How strikingly it shows to the Semkovskys, Liebman, Yurkeviches and other opportunists that the hue and cry they have raised about the alleged "vagueness", or "indefiniteness", of the term "self-determination" is *in fact*, i.e., from the standpoint of objective class relationships and the class struggle in Russia, *simply a rehash* of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie's utterances!

*Proletarskaya Pravda* put the following three questions to the enlightened "Constitutional-Democratic" gentlemen of *Rech*: (1) do they deny that, throughout the entire history of international democracy, and especially since the middle of the nineteenth century, self-determination of nations has been understood to mean precisely political self-determination, the right to form an independent national state? (2) do they deny that the well-known resolution adopted by the International Socialist Congress in London in 1896 has the same meaning? and (3) do they deny that Plekhanov, in writing about self-determination as far back as 1902, meant precisely political self-determination? When *Proletarskaya Pravda* posed these three questions, *the Cadets fell silent!*

Not a word did they utter in reply, for they had nothing to say. They had to admit tacitly that *Proletarskaya Pravda* was absolutely right.

The liberals' outcries that the term "self-determination" is vague and that the Social-Democrats "hopelessly confuse" it with separatism are nothing more than attempts to *confuse* the issue, and evade recognition of a universally established democratic principle. If the Semkovskys, Liebman and Yurkeviches were not so ignorant, they would be ashamed to address the workers in a *liberal* vein.

But to proceed. *Proletarskaya Pravda* compelled *Rech* to admit that, in the programme of the Constitutional-Democrats, the term "cultural" self-determination means in effect the *repudiation of political* self-determination.

"Actually, the Cadets have never pledged themselves to advocate the right of 'nations to secede' from the Russian state"--

\* *Ibid.*, Vol. 20, pp. 56-58.—*Ed.*



it was not without reason that *Proletarskaya Pravda* recommended to *Novoye Uremya*<sup>326</sup> and *Zemshchina*<sup>327</sup> these words from *Rech* as an example of our Cadets' "loyalty". In its issue No. 13563, *Novoye Uremya*, which never, of course, misses an opportunity of mentioning "the Yids" and taking digs at the Cadets, nevertheless stated:

"What to the Social-Democrats, is an axiom of political wisdom [i.e., recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, to secede], is today beginning to cause disagreement even among the Cadets."

By declaring that they "have never pledged themselves to advocate the right of nations to secede from the Russian state", the Cadets have, in principle, taken exactly the same stand as *Novoye Uremya*. This is precisely one of the fundamentals of Cadet *national-liberalism*, of their kinship with the Purishkeviches, and of their dependence, political, ideological and practical, on the latter. *Proletarskaya Pravda* wrote: "The Cadets have studied history and know only too well what—to put it mildly—pogrom-like actions the practice of the ancient right of the Purishkeviches to 'grab 'em and hold 'em'<sup>328</sup> has often led to." Although perfectly aware of the feudal source and nature of the Purishkeviches' omnipotence, the Cadets are, nevertheless, taking their stand *on the basis* of the relationships and frontiers created by that very class. Knowing full well that there is much in the relationships and frontiers created or fixed by this class that is un-European and anti-European (we would say Asiatic if this did not sound undeservedly slighting to the Japanese and Chinese), the Cadets, nevertheless, accept them as the utmost limit.

Thus, they are adjusting themselves to the Purishkeviches, clinging to them, fearing to jeopardise their position, protecting them from the people's movement, from the democracy. As *Proletarskaya Pravda* wrote: "In effect, this means adapting oneself to the interests of the feudal-minded landlords and to the worst nationalist prejudices of the dominant nation, instead of systematically combating those prejudices."

Being men who are familiar with history and claim to be democrats, the Cadets do not even attempt to assert that the democratic movement, which is today characteristic of both Eastern Europe and Asia and is striving to change both on the model of the civilised capitalist countries, is bound to leave intact the boundaries fixed by the feudal epoch, the epoch of the omnipotence of the Purishkeviches and the disfranchisement of wide strata of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.

The fact that the question raised in the controversy between *Proletarskaya Pravda* and *Rech* was not merely a literary question,

but one that involved a real political issue of the day, was proved, among other things, by the last conference of the Constitutional-Democratic Party held on March 23-25, 1914; in the official report of this conference in *Rech* (No. 83, of March 26, 1914) we read:

"A particularly lively discussion also took place on national problems. The Kiev deputies, who were supported by N. V. Nekrasov and A. M. Kolyubakin, pointed out that the national question was becoming a key issue, which would have to be faced up to more resolutely than hitherto. F. F. Kokoshkin pointed out, however [this "however" is like Shchedrin's "but"—"the ears never grow higher than the forehead, never!"], that both the programme and past political experience demanded that 'elastic formulas' of 'political self-determination of nationalities' should be handled very carefully."

This most remarkable line of reasoning at the Cadet conference deserves serious attention from all Marxists and all democrats. (We will note in parentheses that *Kievskaya Mysl*,<sup>329</sup> which is evidently very well informed and no doubt presents Mr. Kokoshkin's ideas correctly, added that, of course, as a warning to his opponents, he laid special stress on the danger of the "disintegration" of the state.)

The official report in *Rech* is composed with consummate diplomatic skill designed to lift the veil as little as possible and to conceal as much as possible. Yet, in the main, what took place at the Cadet conference is quite clear. The liberal-bourgeois delegates, who were familiar with the state of affairs in the Ukraine, and the "Left" Cadets raised the question *precisely of the political* self-determination of nations. Otherwise, there would have been no need for Mr. Kokoshkin to urge that this "formula" should be "handled carefully".

The Cadet programme, which was of course known to the delegates at the Cadet conference, speaks of "cultural", *not* of political self-determination. Hence, Mr. Kokoshkin was *defending* the programme *against* the Ukrainian delegates, and *against* the Left Cadets; he was defending "cultural" self-determination *as opposed to* "political" self-determination. It is perfectly clear that in opposing "political" self-determination, in playing up the danger of the "disintegration of the state", and in calling the formula "political self-determination" an "*elastic*" one (quite in keeping with Rosa Luxemburg!), Mr. Kokoshkin was defending Great-Russian national-liberalism against the more "Left" or more democratic elements of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and also against the Ukrainian bourgeoisie.

Mr. Kokoshkin won the day at the Cadet conference, as is evident from the treacherous little word "however" in the *Rech* report; Great-Russian national-liberalism has triumphed among the Cadets. Will not this victory help to clear the minds of those

misguided individuals among the Marxists in Russia who, like the Cadets, have also begun to fear the "elastic formulas of political self-determination of nationalities"?

Let us, "however", examine the substance of Mr. Kokoshkin's line of thought. By referring to "past political experience" (i.e., evidently, the experience of 1905, when the Great-Russian bourgeoisie took alarm for its national privileges and scared the Cadet Party with its fears), and also by playing up the danger of the "disintegration of the state", Mr. Kokoshkin showed that he understood perfectly well that political self-determination can mean nothing else but the right to secede and form an independent national state. The question is—how should Mr. Kokoshkin's fears be appraised in the light of democracy in general, and the proletarian class struggle in particular?

Mr. Kokoshkin would have us believe that recognition of the right to secession increases the danger of the "disintegration of the state". This is the viewpoint of Constable Mymretsov, whose motto was "grab 'em and hold 'em". From the viewpoint of democracy in general, the very opposite is the case: recognition of the right to secession *reduces* the danger of the "disintegration of the state".

Mr. Kokoshkin argues exactly like the nationalists do. At their last congress they attacked the Ukrainian "Mazeppists". The Ukrainian movement, Mr. Savenko and Co. exclaimed, threatens to weaken the ties between the Ukraine and Russia, since Austrian Ukrainophilism is strengthening the Ukrainians' ties with Austria! It remains unexplained why Russia cannot try to "strengthen" her ties with the Ukrainians *through the same method* that the Savenkos blame Austria for using, i.e., by granting the Ukrainians freedom to use their own language, self-government and an autonomous Diet.

The arguments of the Savenkos and Kokoshkins are exactly alike, and from the purely logical point of view they are equally ridiculous and absurd. Is it not clear that the more liberty the Ukrainian nationality enjoys in any particular country, the stronger its ties with that country will be? One would think that this truism could not be disputed without totally abandoning all the premises of democracy. Can there be greater freedom of nationality, as such, than the freedom to secede, the freedom to form an independent national state?

To clear up this question, which has been so confused by the liberals (and by those who are so misguided as to echo them), we shall cite a very simple example. Let us take the question of divorce. In her article Rosa Luxemburg writes that the centralised democratic state, while conceding autonomy to its constituent parts, should retain the most important branches of legislation,

including legislation on divorce, under the jurisdiction of the central parliament. The concern that the central authority of the democratic state should retain the power to allow divorce can be readily understood. The reactionaries are opposed to freedom of divorce; they say that it must be "handled carefully", and loudly declare that it means the "disintegration of the family". The democrats, however, believe that the reactionaries are hypocrites, and that they are actually defending the omnipotence of the police and the bureaucracy, the privileges of one of the sexes, and the worst kind of oppression of women. They believe that in actual fact freedom of divorce will not cause the "disintegration" of family ties, but, on the contrary, will strengthen them on a democratic basis, which is the only possible and durable basis in civilised society.

To accuse those who support freedom of self-determination, i.e., freedom to secede, of encouraging separatism, is as foolish and hypocritical as accusing those who advocate freedom of divorce of encouraging the destruction of family ties. Just as in bourgeois society the defenders of privilege and corruption, on which bourgeois marriage rests, oppose freedom of divorce, so, in the capitalist state, repudiation of the right to self-determination, i.e., the right of nations to secede, means nothing more than defence of the privileges of the dominant nation and police methods of administration, to the detriment of democratic methods.

No doubt, the political chicanery arising from all the relationships existing in capitalist society sometimes leads members of parliament and journalists to indulge in frivolous and even nonsensical twaddle about one or another nation seceding. But only reactionaries can allow themselves to be frightened (or pretend to be frightened) by such talk. Those who stand by democratic principles, i.e., who insist that questions of state be decided by the mass of the population, know very well that there is a "tremendous distance"<sup>3,30</sup> between what the politicians prate about and what the people decide. From their daily experience the masses know perfectly well the value of geographical and economic ties and the advantages of a big market and a big state. They will, therefore, resort to secession only when national oppression and national friction make joint life absolutely intolerable and hinder any and all economic intercourse. In that case, the interests of capitalist development and of the freedom of the class struggle will be best served by secession.

Thus, from whatever angle we approach Mr. Kokoshkin's arguments, they prove to be the height of absurdity and a mockery of the principles of democracy. And yet there is a modicum of logic in these arguments, the logic of the class interests of the

Great-Russian bourgeoisie. Like most members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, Mr. Kokoshkin is a lackey of the moneybags of that bourgeoisie. He defends its privileges in general, and its *state* privileges in particular. He defends them hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder with Purishkevich, the only difference being that Purishkevich puts more faith in the feudalist cudgel, while Kokoshkin and Co. realise that this cudgel was badly damaged in 1905, and rely more on bourgeois methods of fooling the masses, such as frightening the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants with the spectre of the "disintegration of the state", and deluding them with phrases about blending "people's freedom" with historical tradition, etc.

The liberals' hostility to the principle of political self-determination of nations can have one, and only one, real class meaning: national-liberalism, defence of the state privileges of the Great-Russian bourgeoisie. And the opportunists among the Marxists in Russia, who today, under the Third of June regime, are against the right of nations to self-determination—the liquidator Semkovsky, the Bundist Liebman, the Ukrainian petty-bourgeois Yurkevich—are *actually* following in the wake of the national-liberals, and corrupting the working class with national-liberal ideas.

The interests of the working class and of its struggle against capitalism demand complete solidarity and the closest unity of the workers of all nations; they demand resistance to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie of every nationality. Hence, Social-Democrats would be deviating from proletarian policy and subordinating the workers to the policy of the bourgeoisie if they were to repudiate the right of nations to self-determination, i.e., the right of an oppressed nation to secede, or if they were to support all the national demands of the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations. It makes no difference to the hired worker whether he is exploited chiefly by the Great-Russian bourgeoisie rather than the non-Russian bourgeoisie, or by the Polish bourgeoisie rather than the Jewish bourgeoisie, etc. The hired worker who has come to understand his class interests is equally indifferent to the state privileges of the Great-Russian capitalists and to the promises of the Polish or Ukrainian capitalists to set up an earthly paradise when they obtain state privileges. Capitalism is developing and will continue to develop, anyway, both in integral states with a mixed population and in separate national states.

In any case the hired worker will be an object of exploitation. Successful struggle against exploitation requires that the proletariat be free of nationalism, and be absolutely neutral, so to speak, in the fight for supremacy that is going on among the bour-

geoisie of the various nations. If the proletariat of any one nation gives the slightest support to the privileges of its "own" national bourgeoisie, that will inevitably rouse distrust among the proletariat of another nation; it will weaken the international class solidarity of the workers and divide them, to the delight of the bourgeoisie. Repudiation of the right to self-determination or to secession inevitably means, in practice, support for the privileges of the dominant nation.

We will get even more striking confirmation of this if we take the concrete case of Norway's secession from Sweden.

## 6. NORWAY'S SECESSION FROM SWEDEN

Rosa Luxemburg cites precisely this example, and discusses it as follows:

"The latest event in the history of federative relations, the secession of Norway from Sweden—which at the time was hastily seized upon by the social-patriotic Polish press (see the Cracow *Naprzód*) as a gratifying sign of the strength and progressive nature of the tendency towards state secession—at once provided striking proof that federalism and its concomitant, separation, are in no way an expression of progress or democracy. After the so-called Norwegian 'revolution', which meant that the Swedish king was deposed and compelled to leave Norway, the Norwegians coolly proceeded to choose another king, formally rejecting, by a national referendum, the proposal to establish a republic. That which superficial admirers of all national movements and of all semblance of independence proclaimed to be a 'revolution' was simply a manifestation of peasant and petty-bourgeois particularism, the desire to have a king 'of their own' for their money instead of one imposed upon them by the Swedish aristocracy, and was, consequently, a movement that had absolutely nothing in common with revolution. At the same time, the dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway showed once more to what extent, in this case also, the federation which had existed until then was only an expression of purely dynastic interests and, therefore, merely a form of monarchism and reaction." (*Przegląd*.)

That is literally all that Rosa Luxemburg has to say on this score! Admittedly, it would have been difficult for her to have revealed the hopelessness of her position more saliently than she has done in this particular instance.

The question was, and is: do the Social-Democrats in a mixed national state need a programme that recognises the right to self-determination or secession?

What does the example of Norway, cited by Rosa Luxemburg, tell us on this point?

Our author twists and turns, exercises her wit and rails at *Naprzód*,<sup>331</sup> but she does not answer the question! Rosa Luxemburg speaks about everything under the sun so as to *avoid saying a single word* about the actual point at issue!

Undoubtedly, in wishing to have a king of their own for their money, and in rejecting, in a national referendum, the proposal to establish a republic, the Norwegian petty bourgeoisie displayed exceedingly bad philistine qualities. Undoubtedly, *Naprzód* displayed equally bad and equally philistine qualities in failing to notice this.

But what has all this to do with the case?

The question under discussion was the right of nations to self-determination and the attitude to be adopted by the socialist proletariat towards this right! Why, then, does not Rosa Luxemburg answer this question instead of beating about the bush?

To a mouse there is no stronger beast than the cat, it is said. To Rosa Luxemburg there is evidently no stronger beast than the "Fracy". "Fracy" is the popular term for the "Polish Socialist Party", its so-called revolutionary section, and the Cracow newspaper *Naprzód* shares the views of that "section". Rosa Luxemburg is so blinded by her fight against the nationalism of that "section" that she loses sight of everything except *Naprzód*.

If *Naprzód* says "yes", Rosa Luxemburg considers it her sacred duty to say an immediate "no", without stopping to think that by so doing she does not reveal independence of *Naprzód*. but, on the contrary, her ludicrous dependence on the "Fracy" and her inability to see things from a viewpoint any deeper and broader than that of the Cracow anthill. *Naprzód*, of course, is a wretched and by no means Marxist organ; but that should not prevent us from properly analysing the example of Norway, once we have chosen it.

To analyse this example in Marxist fashion, we must deal, not with the vices of the awfully terrible "Fracy", but, first, with the concrete historical features of the secession of Norway from Sweden, and secondly, with the tasks which confronted the *proletariat* of both countries in connection with this secession.

The geographic, economic and language ties between Norway and Sweden are as intimate as those between the Great Russians and many other Slav nations. But the union between Norway and Sweden was not a voluntary one, and in dragging in the question of "federation" Rosa Luxemburg was talking at random, simply because she did not know what to say. Norway was *ceded* to Sweden by the monarchs during the Napoleonic wars, against the will of the Norwegians, and the Swedes had to bring troops into Norway to subdue her.

Despite the very extensive autonomy which Norway enjoyed (she had her own parliament, etc.), there was constant friction between Norway and Sweden for many decades after the union,

and the Norwegians strove hard to throw off the yoke of the Swedish aristocracy. At last, in August 1905, they succeeded: the Norwegian parliament resolved that the Swedish king was no longer king of Norway, and in the referendum held later among the Norwegian people, the overwhelming majority (about 200,000 as against a few hundred) voted for complete separation from Sweden. After a short period of indecision, the Swedes resigned themselves to the fact of secession.

This example shows us on what grounds cases of the secession of nations are practicable, and actually occur, under modern economic and political relationships, and the *form* secession sometimes assumes under conditions of political freedom and democracy.

No Social-Democrat will deny—unless he would profess indifference to questions of political freedom and democracy (in which case he is naturally no longer a Social-Democrat)—that this example *virtually* proves that it is the *bounden duty* of class-conscious workers to conduct systematic propaganda and prepare the ground for the settlement of conflicts that may arise over the secession of nations, not in the “Russian way”, but *only in the way* they were settled in 1905 between Norway and Sweden. This is exactly what is meant by the demand in the programme for the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination. But Rosa Luxemburg tried to get around a fact that was repugnant to her theory by violently attacking the philistinism of the Norwegian philistines and the Cracow *Naprzód*; for she understood perfectly well that this historical fact *completely refutes* her phrases about the right of nations to self-determination being a “utopia”, or like the right “to eat off gold plates”, etc. Such phrases only express a smug and opportunist belief in the immutability of the present alignment of forces among the nationalities of Eastern Europe.

To proceed. In the question of the self-determination of nations, as in every other question, we are interested, first and foremost, in the self-determination of the proletariat within a given nation. Rosa Luxemburg modestly evaded this question too, for she realised that an analysis of it on the basis of the example of Norway, which she herself had chosen, would be disastrous to her “theory”.

What position did the Norwegian and Swedish proletariat take, and indeed had to take, in the conflict over secession? After Norway seceded, the class-conscious workers of Norway would naturally have voted for a republic,\* and if some social-

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Since the majority of the Norwegian nation was in favour of a monarchy while the proletariat wanted a republic, the Norwegian proletariat was, generally speaking, confronted with the alternative: either revolution, if conditions



ists voted otherwise it only goes to show how much dense, philistine opportunism there sometimes is in the European socialist movement. There can be no two opinions about that, and we mention the point only because Rosa Luxemburg is trying to obscure the issue by speaking *off the mark*. We do not know whether the Norwegian socialist programme made it obligatory for Norwegian Social-Democrats to hold particular views on the question of secession. We will assume that it did not, and that the Norwegian socialists left it an open question as to what extent the autonomy of Norway gave sufficient scope to wage the class struggle freely, or to what extent the eternal friction and conflicts with the Swedish aristocracy hindered freedom of economic life. But it cannot be disputed that the Norwegian proletariat had to oppose this aristocracy and support Norwegian peasant democracy (with all its philistine limitations).

And the Swedish proletariat? It is common knowledge that the Swedish landed proprietors, abetted by the Swedish clergy, advocated war against Norway. Inasmuch as Norway was much weaker than Sweden, had already experienced a Swedish invasion, and the Swedish aristocracy carries enormous weight in its own country, this advocacy of war presented a grave danger. We may be sure that the Swedish Kokoshkins spent much time and energy in trying to corrupt the minds of the Swedish people by appeals to "handle" the "elastic formulas of political self-determination of nations carefully", by painting horrific pictures of the danger of the "disintegration of the state" and by assuring them that "people's freedom" was compatible with the traditions of the Swedish aristocracy. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the Swedish Social-Democrats would have betrayed the cause of socialism and democracy if they had not fought with all their might to combat both the landlord and the "Kokoshkin" ideology and policy, and if they had failed to demand, *not only* equality of nations in general (to which the Kokoshkins also subscribe), but also the right of nations to self-determination, Norway's freedom to secede.

The close alliance between the Norwegian and Swedish workers, their complete fraternal class solidarity, *gained* from the Swedish workers' recognition of the right of the Norwegians to secede. This convinced the Norwegian workers that the Swedish workers were not infected with Swedish nationalism, and that they placed fraternity with the Norwegian proletarians above the privileges of the Swedish bourgeoisie and aristocracy. The dissolution of the ties imposed upon Norway by the monarchs of Europe

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were ripe for it, or submission to the will of the majority and prolonged propaganda and agitation work

and the Swedish aristocracy strengthened the ties between the Norwegian and Swedish workers. The Swedish workers have proved that in spite of *all* the vicissitudes of bourgeois policy—bourgeois relations may quite possibly bring about a repetition of the forcible subjection of the Norwegians to the Swedes!—they will be able to preserve and defend the complete equality and class solidarity of the workers of both nations in the struggle against both the Swedish and the Norwegian bourgeoisie.

Incidentally, this reveals how groundless and even frivolous are the attempts sometimes made by the "Fracy" to "use" our disagreements with Rosa Luxemburg against Polish Social-Democracy. The "Fracy" are not a proletarian or a socialist party, but a petty-bourgeois nationalist party, something like Polish Social-Revolutionaries. There never has been, nor could there be, any question of unity between the Russian Social-Democrats and this party. On the other hand, no Russian Social-Democrat has ever "repented" of the close relations and unity that have been established with the Polish Social-Democrats. The Polish Social-Democrats have rendered a great historical service by creating the first really Marxist, proletarian party in Poland, a country imbued with nationalist aspirations and passions. Yet the service the Polish Social-Democrats have rendered is a great one, not because Rosa Luxemburg has talked a lot of nonsense about § 9 of the Russian Marxists' Programme, but despite that sad circumstance.

The question of the "right to self-determination" is of course not so important to the Polish Social-Democrats as it is to the Russian. It is quite understandable that in their zeal (sometimes a little excessive, perhaps) to combat the nationalistically blinded petty bourgeoisie of Poland the Polish Social-Democrats should overdo things. No Russian Marxist has ever thought of blaming the Polish Social-Democrats for being opposed to the secession of Poland. These Social-Democrats err only when, like Rosa Luxemburg, they try to deny the necessity of including the recognition of the right to self-determination in the Programme of the *Russian* Marxists.

Virtually, this is like attempting to apply relationships, understandable by Cracow standards, to all the peoples and nations inhabiting Russia, including the Great Russians. It means being "Polish nationalists the wrong way round", not Russian, not international Social-Democrats.

For international Social-Democracy stands for the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination. This is what we shall now proceed to discuss.

## 7. THE RESOLUTION OF THE LONDON INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS, 1896

This resolution reads:

"This Congress declares that it stands for the full right of all nations to self-determination [*Selbstbestimmungsrecht*] and expresses its sympathy for the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military national or other absolutism. This Congress calls upon the workers of all these countries to join the ranks of the class-conscious [*Klassenbewusste*—those who understand their class interests] workers of the whole world in order jointly to fight for the defeat of international capitalism and for the achievement of the aims of international Social-Democracy."

As we have already pointed out, our opportunists—Semkovsky, Liebman and Yurkevich—are simply unaware of this resolution. But Rosa Luxemburg knows it and quotes the full text, which contains the same expression as that contained in our programme, viz., "self-determination".

How does Rosa Luxemburg remove this obstacle from the path of her "original" theory?

Oh, quite simply ... the whole emphasis lies in the second part of the resolution ... its declarative character ... one can refer to it only by mistake!

The feebleness and utter confusion of our author are simply amazing. Usually it is only the opportunists who talk about the consistent democratic and socialist points in the programme being mere declarations, and cravenly avoid an open debate on them. It is apparently not without reason that Rosa Luxemburg has this time found herself in the deplorable company of the Semkovskys, Liebman and Yurkeviches. Rosa Luxemburg does not venture to state openly whether she regards the above resolution as correct or erroneous. She shifts and shuffles as if counting on the inattentive or ill-informed reader, who forgets the first part of the resolution by the time he has started reading the second, or who has never heard of the discussion that took place in the socialist press *prior* to the London Congress.

Rosa Luxemburg is greatly mistaken, however, if she imagines that, in the sight of the class-conscious workers of Russia, she can get away with trampling upon the resolution of the International on such an important fundamental issue, without even deigning to analyse it critically.

Rosa Luxemburg's point of view was voiced during the discussions which took place prior to the London Congress, mainly

\* See the official German report of the London Congress: *Verhandlungen und Beschlüsse des internationalen sozialistischen Arbeiter- und Gewerkschaftskongresses zu London vom 27. Juli bis 1. August 1896*. Berlin, 1896, S. 18. A Russian pamphlet has been published containing the decisions of international congresses in which the word "self-determination" is wrongly translated as "autonomy".

in the columns of *Die Neue Zeit*, organ of the German Marxists; *in essence this point of view was defeated in the International!* That is the crux of the matter, which the Russian reader must particularly bear in mind.

The debate turned on the question of Poland's independence. Three points of view were put forward:

1. That of the "Fracy", in whose name Haecker spoke. They wanted the International to include in *its own* programme a demand for the independence of Poland. The motion was not carried and this point of view was defeated in the International.

2. Rosa Luxemburg's point of view, viz., the Polish socialists should not demand independence for Poland. This point of view entirely precluded the proclamation of the right of nations to self-determination. It was likewise defeated in the International.

3. The point of view which was elaborated at the time by K. Kautsky, who opposed Rosa Luxemburg and proved that her materialism was extremely "one-sided": according to Kautsky, the International could not at the time make the independence of Poland a point in its programme; but the Polish socialists were fully entitled to put forward such a demand. From the socialists' point of view it was undoubtedly a mistake to ignore the tasks of national liberation in a situation where national oppression existed.

The International's resolution reproduces the most essential and fundamental propositions in this point of view: on the one hand, the absolutely direct, unequivocal recognition of the full right of all nations to self-determination; on the other hand, the equally unambiguous appeal to the workers for *international* unity in their class struggle.

We think that this resolution is absolutely correct, and that, to the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is this resolution, with both its parts being taken as an integral whole, that gives the only correct lead to the proletarian class policy in the national question.

Let us deal with the three above-mentioned viewpoints in somewhat greater detail.

As is known, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels considered it the bounden duty of the whole of West-European democracy, and still more of Social-Democracy, to give active support to the demand for Polish independence. For the period of the 1840s and 1860s, the period of the bourgeois revolutions in Austria and Germany, and the period of the "Peasant Reform" in Russia, this point of view was quite correct and the only one that was consistently democratic and proletarian. So long as the masses of the people in Russia and in most of the Slav countries were

still sunk in torpor, so long as *there were no* independent, mass, democratic movements in those countries, the liberation movement of the *gentry* in Poland assumed an immense and paramount importance from the point of view, not only of Russian, not only of Slav, but of European democracy as a whole.\*<sup>332</sup>

But while Marx's standpoint was quite correct for the forties, fifties and sixties or for the third quarter of the nineteenth century, it has ceased to be correct by the twentieth century. Independent democratic movements, and even an independent proletarian movement, have arisen in most Slav countries, even in Russia, one of the most backward Slav countries. Aristocratic Poland has disappeared, yielding place to capitalist Poland. Under such circumstances Poland could not but lose her *exceptional* revolutionary importance.

The attempt of the P.S.P. (the Polish Socialist Party, the present-day "Fracy") in 1896 to "establish" for all time the point of view Marx had held in a *different epoch* was an attempt to use the *letter* of Marxism against the *spirit* of Marxism. The Polish Social-Democrats were therefore quite right in attacking the extreme nationalism of the Polish petty bourgeoisie and pointing out that the national question was of secondary importance to Polish workers, in creating for the first time a purely proletarian party in Poland and proclaiming the extremely important principle that the Polish and the Russian workers must maintain the closest alliance in their class struggle.

But did this mean that at the beginning of the twentieth century the International could regard the principle of political self determination of nations, or the right to secede, as unnecessary to Eastern Europe and Asia? This would have been the height of absurdity, and (theoretically) tantamount to admitting that the bourgeois-democratic reform of the Turkish, Russian and Chinese states had been consummated; indeed it would have been tantamount (in practice) to opportunism towards absolutism.

No. At a time when bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and Asia have begun, in this period of the awakening

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It would be a very interesting piece of historical research to compare the position of a noble Polish rebel in 1863 with that of the All-Russia revolutionary democrat, Chernyshevsky, who (like Marx), was able to appreciate the importance of the Polish movement, and with that of the Ukrainian petty bourgeois Dragomanov who appeared much later and expressed the views of a peasant, so ignorant and sluggish, and so attached to his dung heap, that his legitimate hatred of the Polish gentry blinded him to the significance which their struggle had for All-Russia democracy. (Cf. Dragomanov, *Historical Poland and Great-Russian Democracy*.) Dragomanov richly deserved the fervent kisses which were subsequently bestowed on him by Mr. P. B. Struve, who by that time had become a national-liberal.

and intensification of national movements and of the formation of independent proletarian parties, the task of these parties with regard to national policy must be twofold: recognition of the right of all nations to self-determination, since bourgeois-democratic reform is not yet completed and since working-class democracy consistently, seriously and sincerely (and not in a liberal, Kokoshkin fashion) fights for equal rights for nations; then, a close, unbreakable alliance in the class struggle of the proletarians of all nations in a given state, throughout all the changes in its history, irrespective of any reshaping of the frontiers of the individual states by the bourgeoisie.

It is this twofold task of the proletariat that the 1896 resolution of the International formulates. That is the substance, the underlying principle, of the resolution adopted by the Conference of Russian Marxists held in the summer of 1913. Some people profess to see a "contradiction" in the fact that while point 4 of this resolution, which recognises the right to self-determination and secession, seems to "concede" the maximum to nationalism (in reality, the recognition of the *right of all* nations to self-determination implies the maximum of *democracy* and the minimum of nationalism), point 5 warns the workers against the nationalist slogans of the bourgeoisie of any nation and demands the unity and amalgamation of the workers of all nations in internationally united proletarian organisations. But this is a "contradiction" only for extremely shallow minds, which, for instance, cannot grasp why the unity and class solidarity of the Swedish and the Norwegian proletariat *gained* when the Swedish workers upheld Norway's freedom to secede and form an independent state.

## 8. THE UTOPIAN KARL MARX AND THE PRACTICAL ROSA LUXEMBURG

Calling Polish independence a "utopia" and repeating this *ad nauseam*, Rosa Luxemburg exclaims ironically: Why not raise the demand for the independence of Ireland?

The "practical" Rosa Luxemburg evidently does not know what Karl Marx's attitude to the question of Irish independence was. It is worth while dwelling upon this, so as to show how a *concrete* demand for national independence was analysed from a genuinely Marxist, not opportunist, standpoint.

It was Marx's custom to "sound out" his socialist acquaintances, as he expressed it, to test their intelligence and the strength of their convictions.<sup>333</sup> After making the acquaintance of Lopatin, Marx wrote to Engels on July 5, 1870, expressing a highly

flattering opinion of the young Russian socialist but adding at the same time:

"*Poland* is his weak point. On this point he speaks quite like an Englishman—say, an English Chartist of the old school—about Ireland."

Marx questions a socialist belonging to an oppressor nation about his attitude to the oppressed nation and at once reveals a defect *common* to the socialists of the dominant nations (the English and the Russian): failure to understand their socialist duties towards the downtrodden nations, their echoing of the prejudices acquired from the bourgeoisie of the "dominant nation".

Before passing on to Marx's positive declarations on Ireland, we must point out that in general the attitude of Marx and Engels to the national question was strictly critical, and that they recognised its historically conditioned importance. Thus, Engels wrote to Marx on May 23, 1851, that the study of history was leading him to pessimistic conclusions in regard to Poland, that the importance of Poland was temporary—only until the agrarian revolution in Russia. The role of the Poles in history was one of "bold (hotheaded) foolishness". "And one cannot point to a single instance in which Poland has successfully represented progress, even in relation to Russia, or done anything at all of historical importance." Russia contains more of civilisation, education, industry and the bourgeoisie than "the Poland of the indolent gentry". "What are Warsaw and Cracow compared to St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa!" Engels had no faith in the success of the Polish gentry's insurrections.

But all these thoughts, showing the deep insight of genius, by no means prevented Engels and Marx from treating the Polish movement with the most profound and ardent sympathy twelve years later, when Russia was still dormant and Poland was seething.

When drafting the Address of the International in 1864, Marx wrote to Engels (on November 4, 1864) that he had to combat Mazzini's nationalism, and went on to say: "Inasmuch as international politics occurred in the Address, I spoke of countries, not of nationalities, and denounced Russia, not the *minores gentium*\*." Marx had no doubt as to the subordinate position of the national question as compared with the "labour question". But his theory is as far from ignoring national movements as heaven is from earth.

Then came 1866. Marx wrote to Engels about the "Proudhonist clique" in Paris which "declares nationalities to be an absurdity, attacks Bismarck and Garibaldi. As polemics against

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The lesser nations —Ed.

chauvinism their doings are useful and explicable. But as believers in Proudhon (Lafargue and Longuet, two very good friends of mine here, also belong to them), who think all Europe must and will sit quietly on their hind quarters until the gentlemen in France abolish poverty and ignorance—they are grotesque.” (Letter of June 7, 1866.)

“Yesterday,” Marx wrote on June 20, 1866, “there was a discussion in the International Council on the present war. . . . The discussion wound up, as was to be foreseen, with ‘the question of nationality’ in general and ‘the attitude we take towards it. . . . The representatives of ‘Young France’ (*non-workers*) came out with the announcement that all nationalities and even nations were ‘antiquated prejudices’. Proudhonised Stirnerism. . . . The whole world waits until the French are ripe for a social revolution. . . . The English laughed very much when I began my speech by saying that our friend Lafargue and others, who had done away with nationalities, had spoken ‘French’ to us, i.e., a language which nine-tenths of the audience did not understand. I also suggested that by the negation of nationalities he appeared, quite unconsciously, to understand their absorption by the model French nation.”

The conclusion that follows from all these critical remarks of Marx’s is clear: the working class should be the last to make a fetish of the national question, since the development of capitalism does not necessarily awaken *all* nations to independent life. But to brush aside the mass national movements once they have started, and to refuse to support what is progressive in them means, in effect, pandering to *nationalistic prejudices*, that is, recognising “one’s own nation” as a model nation (or, we would add, one possessing the exclusive privilege of forming a state).<sup>1</sup>

But let us return to the question of Ireland.

Marx’s position on this question is most clearly expressed in the following extracts from his letters:

“I have done my best to bring about this demonstration of the English workers in favour of Fenianism<sup>335</sup>. . . . I used to think the separation of Ireland from England impossible. I now think it inevitable, although after the separation there may come federation.” This is what Marx wrote to Engels on November 2, 1867.

In his letter of November 30 of the same year he added:

“...what shall we advise the *English* workers? In my opinion they must make the *Repeal of the Union*” [Ireland with England,

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. also Marx’s letter to Engels of June 3, 1867: “... I have learned with real pleasure from the Paris letters to *The Times*<sup>336</sup> about the pro-Polish exclamations of the Parisians against Russia. . . . Mr. Proudhon and his little doctrinaire clique are not the French people.”



i.e., the separation of Ireland from England] (in short, the affair of 1783, only democratised and adapted to the conditions of the time) an article of their *pronunziamento*. This is the only legal and therefore only possible form of Irish emancipation which can be admitted in the programme of an *English* party. Experience must show later whether a mere personal union can continue to subsist between the two countries. . . .

"... What the Irish need is:

"(1) Self-government and independence from England;

"(2) An agrarian revolution. . . ."

Marx attached great importance to the Irish question and delivered hour-and-a-half lectures on this subject at the German Workers' Union (letter of December 17, 1867)

In a letter dated November 20, 1868, Engels spoke of "the hatred towards the Irish found among the English workers", and almost a year later (October 24, 1869), returning to this subject, he wrote:

"*Il n'y a qu'un pas* [it is only one step] from Ireland to Russia . . . Irish history shows what a misfortune it is for one nation to have subjugated another. All the abominations of the English have their origin in the Irish Pale. I have still to plough my way through the Cromwellian period, but this much seems certain to me, that things would have taken another turn in England, too, but for the necessity of military rule in Ireland and the creation of a new aristocracy there."

Let us note, in passing, Marx's letter to Engels of August 18, 1869:

"The Polish workers in Posen have brought a strike to a victorious end with the help of their colleagues in Berlin. This struggle against Monsieur le Capital—even in the lower form of the strike—is a more serious way of getting rid of national prejudices than peace declamations from the lips of bourgeois gentlemen."

The policy on the Irish question pursued by Marx in the International may be seen from the following:

On November 18, 1869, Marx wrote to Engels that he had spoken for an hour and a quarter at the Council of the International on the question of the attitude of the British Ministry to the Irish Amnesty, and had proposed the following resolution:

"Resolved,

"that in his reply to the Irish demands for the release of the imprisoned Irish patriots Mr. Gladstone deliberately insults the Irish nation;

"that he clogs political amnesty with conditions alike degrading to the victims of misgovernment and the people they belong to;

"that having, in the teeth of his responsible position, publicly

and enthusiastically cheered on the American slaveholders' rebellion, he now steps in to preach to the Irish people the doctrine of passive obedience;

"that his whole proceedings with reference to the Irish Amnesty question are the true and genuine offspring of that '*policy of conquest*', by the fiery denunciation of which Mr. Gladstone ousted his Tory rivals from office;

"that the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association express their admiration of the spirited, firm and high-souled manner in which the Irish people carry on their Amnesty movement;

"that this resolution be communicated to all branches of, and workingmen's bodies connected with, the International Workingmen's Association in Europe and America."

On December 10, 1869, Marx wrote that his paper on the Irish question to be read at the Council of the International would be couched as follows:

"Quite apart from all phrases about 'international' and 'humane' justice for Ireland—which are taken for granted in the International Council—it is in the direct and absolute interest of the English working class to get rid of their present connexion with Ireland. And this is my fullest conviction, and for reasons which in part I can not tell the English workers themselves. For a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working-class ascendancy. I always expressed this point of view in the *New York Tribune*<sup>136</sup> [an American paper to which Marx contributed for a long time]. Deeper study has now convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will *never accomplish anything* until it has got rid of Ireland. . . . The English reaction in England had its roots in the subjugation of Ireland." (Marx's italics.)

Marx's policy on the Irish question should now be quite clear to our readers.

Marx, the "utopian", was so "unpractical" that he stood for the separation of Ireland, which half a century later has not yet been achieved.

What gave rise to Marx's policy, and was it not mistaken?

At first Marx thought that Ireland would not be liberated by the national movement of the oppressed nation, but by the working-class movement of the oppressor nation. Marx did not make an Absolute of the national movement, knowing, as he did, that only the victory of the working class can bring about the complete liberation of all nationalities. It is impossible to estimate beforehand all the possible relations between the bourgeois liberation movements of the oppressed nations and the proletarian emancipation movement of the oppressor nation (the

very problem which today makes the national question in Russia so difficult)

However, it so happened that the English working class fell under the influence of the liberals for a fairly long time became an appendage to the liberals and by adopting a liberal labour policy left itself leaderless. The bourgeois liberation movement in Ireland grew stronger and assumed revolutionary forms. Marx reconsidered his view and corrected it. 'What a misfortune it is for a nation to have subjugated another! The English working class will never be free until Ireland is freed from the English yoke. Reaction in England is strengthened and fostered by the enslavement of Ireland (just as reaction in Russia is fostered by her enslavement of a number of nations!')

And in proposing in the International a resolution of sympathy with the Irish nation', the Irish people (the clever I. V. I. would probably have berated poor Marx for forgetting about the class struggle!) Marx advocated the *separation* of Ireland from England although after the separation there may come federation.

What were the theoretical grounds for Marx's conclusion? In England the bourgeois revolution had been consummated long ago. But it had not yet been consummated in Ireland: it is being consummated only now after the lapse of half a century by the reforms of the English Liberals. If capitalism had been overthrown in England as quickly as Marx had at first expected there would have been no room for a bourgeois democratic and racial national movement in Ireland. But since it had arisen Marx advised the English workers to support it, give it a revolutionary impetus and see it through in the interests of *their own* liberty.

The economic ties between Ireland and England in the 1860s were of course, even closer than Russia's present ties with Poland and the Ukraine, etc. The 'unpracticality' and 'unpracticability' of the separation of Ireland (if only owing to geographical conditions and England's immense colonial power) were quite obvious. Though in principle an enemy of federalism Marx in this instance granted the possibility of federation as well.

By the way it is not difficult to see why from a Social Democratic point of view the right to self-determination means *not* federation nor autonomy (although speaking in the abstract both come under the category of self-determination). The right to federation is simply meaningless since federation implies a bilateral contract. It goes without saying that Marxists do not include the defence of federalism in general in their programme. As far as autonomy is concerned Marxists defend not the 'right to autonomy' but autonomy *itself* as a general universal principle of a democratic state with mixed national composition and a great variety of geographical and other conditions. Consequently the recognition of the right of nations to autonomy is as absurd as that of the right of nations to federation.

*if only* the emancipation of Ireland was achieved in a revolutionary, not reformist way, through a movement of the mass of the people of Ireland supported by the working class of England. There can be no doubt that only such a solution of the historical problem would have been in the best interests of the proletariat and most conducive to rapid social progress.

Things turned out differently. Both the Irish people and the English proletariat proved weak. Only now, through the sordid deals between the English Liberals and the Irish bourgeoisie, is the Irish problem *being solved* (the example of Ulster shows with what difficulty) through the land reform (with compensation) and Home Rule (not yet introduced). Well then? Does it follow that Marx and Engels were "utopians", that they put forward "impracticable" national demands, or that they allowed themselves to be influenced by the Irish petty-bourgeois nationalists (for there is no doubt about the petty-bourgeois nature of the Fenian movement), etc.?

No. In the Irish question, too, Marx and Engels pursued a consistently proletarian policy, which really educated the masses in a spirit of democracy and socialism. Only such a policy could have saved both Ireland and England half a century of delay in introducing the necessary reforms, and prevented these reforms from being mutilated by the Liberals to please the reactionaries.

The policy of Marx and Engels on the Irish question serves as a splendid example of the attitude the proletariat of the oppressor nations should adopt towards national movements, an example which has lost none of its immense *practical* importance. It serves as a warning against that "servile haste" with which the philistines of all countries, colours and languages hurry to label as "utopian" the idea of altering the frontiers of states that were established by the violence and privileges of the landlords and bourgeoisie of one nation.

If the Irish and English proletariat had not accepted Marx's policy and had not made the secession of Ireland their slogan, this would have been the worst sort of opportunism, a neglect of their duties as democrats and socialists, and a concession to *English* reaction and the *English* bourgeoisie.

## 9. THE 1903 PROGRAMME AND ITS LIQUIDATORS

The Minutes of the 1903 Congress, at which the Programme of the Russian Marxists was adopted, have become a great rarity, and the vast majority of the active members of the working-class movement today are unacquainted with the motives and

derlying the various points (the more so since not all the literature relating to it enjoys the blessings of legality ) It is therefore necessary to analyse the debate that took place at the 1903 Congress on the question under discussion

Let us state first of all that however meagre the Russian Social-Democratic literature on the "right of nations to self-determination" may be, it nevertheless shows clearly that this right has always been understood to mean the right to secession The Semkovskys, Liebman and Yurkevichs who doubt this and declare that § 9 is "vague", etc., do so only because of their sheer ignorance or carelessness As far back as 1902, Plekhanov in *Zarya*, defended "the right to self-determination" in the draft programme, and wrote that this demand, while not obligatory upon bourgeois democrats, was 'obligatory upon Social-Democrats' "If we were to forget it or hesitate to advance it, Plekhanov wrote, for fear of offending the national prejudices of our fellow-countrymen of Great-Russian nationality the call 'workers of all countries, unite!' would be a shameful lie on our lips" <sup>337</sup>

This is a very apt description of the fundamental argument in favour of the point under consideration, so apt that it is not surprising that the 'anythingarian' critics of our programme have been timidly avoiding it The abandonment of this point, no matter for what motives, is *actually* a 'shameful' concession to *Great-Russian* nationalism But why Great Russian when it is a question of the right of *all* nations to self-determination? Because it refers to secession *from* the Great Russians The interests of the *unity of the proletarians*, the interests of their class solidarity call for recognition of the right of *nations to secede*—that is what Plekhanov admitted twelve years ago in the words quoted above Had our opportunists given thought to this they would probably not have talked so much nonsense about self-determination

At the 1903 Congress, which adopted the draft programme that Plekhanov advocated the main work was done by the *Programme Commission* Unfortunately no Minutes of its proceedings were kept, they would have been particularly interesting on this point, for it was *only* in the Commission that the representatives of the Polish Social-Democrats, Warszawski and Hlanecki, tried to defend their views and to dispute "recognition of the right to self-determination" Any reader who goes to the trouble

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In 1916 Lenin gave the following note to this passage We request the reader not to forget that in 1903 Plekhanov was one of the chief opponents of opportunism far removed from his deplorably famous turn about to opportunism and subsequently to chauvinism

of comparing their arguments (set forth in the speech by Warszawski and the statement by him and Hanecki pp. 134-36 and 388-90 of the Congress Minutes) with those which Rosa Luxemburg advanced in her Polish article, which we have analysed, will find them identical.

How were these arguments treated by the Programme Commission of the Second Congress, where Plekhanov, more than anyone else, spoke against the Polish Marxists? They were mercilessly ridiculed! The absurdity of proposing to the Marxists of *Russia* that they should reject the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination was demonstrated so plainly and clearly that the Polish Marxists *did not even venture to repeat their arguments at the plenary meeting of the Congress!* They left the Congress, convinced of the hopelessness of their case at the supreme assembly of Marxists—Great-Russian, Jewish, Georgian, and Armenian.

Needless to say, this historic episode is of very great importance to everyone seriously interested in *his own* programme. The fact that the Polish Marxists' arguments were completely defeated at the Programme Commission of the Congress, and that the Polish Marxists gave up the attempt to defend their views at the plenary meeting of the Congress is very significant. No wonder Rosa Luxemburg maintained a "modest" silence about it in her article in 1908—the recollection of the Congress must have been too unpleasant! She also kept quiet about the ridiculously inept proposal made by Warszawski and Hanecki in 1903, on behalf of all Polish Marxists, to "amend" § 9 of the Programme, a proposal which neither Rosa Luxemburg nor the other Polish Social-Democrats have ventured (or will ever venture) to repeat.

But although Rosa Luxemburg, concealing her defeat in 1903, has maintained silence over these facts, those who take an interest in the history of their Party will make it their business to ascertain them and give thought to their significance.

On leaving the 1903 Congress, Rosa Luxemburg's friends submitted the following statement:

"We propose that Clause 7 [now Clause 9] of the draft programme read as follows: § 7. *Institutions guaranteeing full freedom of cultural development to all nations incorporated in the state.*" (P. 390 of the Minutes)

Thus, the Polish Marxists at that time put forward views on the national question that were so vague that *instead of* self-determination they practically proposed the notorious "cultural-national autonomy", only under another name!

This sounds almost incredible, but unfortunately it is a fact. At the Congress itself, attended though it was by five Bundist-

with five votes and three Caucasians with six votes, without counting Kostrov's consultative voice, *not a single* vote was cast for the *rejection* of the clause about self-determination. Three votes were cast for the proposal to add "cultural-national autonomy" to this clause (in favour of Goldblatt's formula: "the establishment of institutions guaranteeing the nations full freedom of cultural development") and four votes for Lieber's formula ("the right of nations to freedom in their cultural development").

Now that a Russian liberal party—the Constitutional-Democratic Party—has appeared on the scene, we know that in *its* programme the political self-determination of nations has been replaced by "cultural self-determination". Rosa Luxemburg's Polish friends, therefore, were "*combating*" the nationalism of the P.S.P., and did it so successfully that they proposed the substitution of a *liberal* programme for the Marxist programme! And in the same breath they accused our programme of being opportunist; no wonder this accusation was received with laughter by the Programme Commission of the Second Congress!

How was "self-determination" understood by the delegates to the Second Congress, of whom, as we have seen, *not one* was opposed to "self-determination of nations"?

The following three extracts from the Minutes provide the answer:

"*Martynov* is of the opinion that the term 'self-determination' should not be given a broad interpretation: it merely means the right of a nation to establish itself as a separate polity, not regional self-government" (p. 171). *Martynov* was a member of the Programme Commission, in which the arguments of Rosa Luxemburg's friends were repudiated and ridiculed. *Martynov* was then an Economist in his views, and a violent opponent of *Iskra*; had he expressed an opinion that was not shared by the majority of the Programme Commission he would certainly have been repudiated.

Bundist Goldblatt was the first to speak when the Congress, after the Commission had finished its work, discussed § 8 (the present Clause 9) of the Programme

He said:

"No objections can be raised to the 'right to self-determination' When a nation is fighting for independence, that should not be opposed. If Poland refuses to enter into lawful marriage with Russia she should not be interfered with, as Plekhanov put it I agree with this opinion within these limits" (pp. 175-76).

Plekhanov had not spoken on this subject at all at the plenary meeting of the Congress. Goldblatt was referring to what Plekhanov had said at the Programme Commission, where the "right to self-determination" had been explained in a simple

yet detailed manner to mean the right to secession. Lieber, who spoke after Goldblatt, remarked:

"Of course, if any nationality finds that it cannot live within the frontiers of Russia, the Party will not place any obstacles in its way" (p. 176).

The reader will see that at the Second Congress of the Party, which adopted the programme, it was unanimously understood that self-determination meant "only" the right to secession. Even the Bundists grasped this truth at the time, and it is only in our own deplorable times of continued counter-revolution and all sorts of "apostasy" that we can find people who, bold in their ignorance, declare that the programme is "vague". But before devoting time to these sorry would-be Social-Democrats, let us first finish with the attitude of the Poles to the programme.

They came to the Second Congress (1903) declaring that unity was necessary and imperative. But they left the Congress after their "reverses" in the Programme Commission, and their *last word* was a written statement, printed in the Minutes of the Congress, containing the above-mentioned proposal to *substitute* cultural-national autonomy for self-determination.

In 1906 the Polish Marxists joined the Party; *neither* upon joining *nor* afterwards (at the Congress of 1907, the conferences of 1907<sup>338</sup> and 1908, or the plenum of 1910<sup>339</sup>) *did they introduce* a single proposal to amend § 9 of the Russian Programme!

That is a fact.

And, despite all utterances and assurances, this fact definitely proves that Rosa Luxemburg's friends regarded the question as having been settled by the debate at the Programme Commission of the Second Congress, as well as by the decision of that Congress, and that they tacitly acknowledged their mistake and corrected it by joining the Party in 1906, after they had left the Congress in 1903, without a single attempt to raise the question of amending § 9 of the Programme through *Party* channels.

Rosa Luxemburg's article appeared over her signature in 1908—of course, it never entered anyone's head to deny Party publicists the right to criticise the programme—and, *since* the writing of this article, *not a single* official body of the Polish Marxists has raised the question of revising § 9

Trotsky was therefore rendering a great disservice to certain admirers of Rosa Luxemburg when he wrote, on behalf of the editors of *Borba*, in issue No. 2 of that publication (March 1914):

"The Polish Marxists consider that 'the right to national self-determination' is entirely devoid of political content and should be deleted from the programme" (p. 25).



The obliging Trotsky is more dangerous than an enemy! Trotsky could produce *no* proof, except "private conversations" (i.e., simply gossip, on which Trotsky always subsists), for classifying "Polish Marxists" in general as supporters of every article by Rosa Luxemburg. Trotsky presented the "Polish Marxists" as people devoid of honour and conscience, incapable of respecting even their own convictions and the programme of their Party. How obliging Trotsky is!

When, in 1903, the representatives of the Polish Marxists walked out of the Second Congress *over* the right to self-determination, Trotsky could have said *at the time* that they regarded this right as devoid of content and subject to deletion from the programme.

But after that the Polish Marxists *joined* the Party whose programme this was, and they have never introduced a motion to amend it.\*

Why did Trotsky withhold these facts from the readers of his journal? Only because it pays him to speculate on fomenting differences between the Polish and the Russian opponents of liquidationism and to deceive the Russian workers on the question of the programme.

Trotsky has never yet held a firm opinion on any important question of Marxism. He always contrives to worm his way into the cracks of any given difference of opinion, and desert one side for the other. At the present moment he is in the company of the Bundists and the liquidators. And these gentlemen do not stand on ceremony where the Party is concerned.

Listen to the Bundist Liebman.

"When, fifteen years ago," this gentleman writes, "the Russian Social-Democrats included the point about the right of every nationality to 'self-determination' in their programme, everyone (!) asked himself. What does this fashionable (!) term really mean? No answer was forthcoming (!). This word was left (!) wrapped in mist. And indeed, at the time it was difficult to dispel that mist. The moment had not come when this point could be made concrete—it was said—so let it remain wrapped in mist (!) for the time being and practice will show what content should be put into it."

Isn't it magnificent, the way this "ragamuffin"<sup>340</sup> mocks at the Party programme?

And why does he mock at it?

Because he is an absolute ignoramus, who has never learnt

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We are informed that the Polish Marxists attended the Summer Conference of the Russian Marxists in 1913 with *only* a consultative voice and did not vote at all on the right to self-determination (secession), declaring their opposition to this right in general. Of course, they had a perfect right to act the way they did, and, as hitherto, to agitate in Poland against secession. But this is not quite what Trotsky said; for the Polish Marxists did not demand the "deletion" of §9 "from the programme."

anything or even read any Party history, but merely happened to land in liquidationist circles where going about in the nude is considered the "right" thing to do as far as knowledge of the Party and everything it stands for is concerned.

Pomyalovsky's seminary student boasts of having "spat into a barrel of sauerkraut".<sup>341</sup> The Bundist gentlemen have gone one better. They let the Liebmans loose to spit publicly into their own barrel. What do the Liebmans care about the fact that the International Congress has passed a decision, that at the Congress of their own Party two representatives of their own Bund proved that they were quite able (and what "severe" critics and determined enemies of *Iskra* they were!) to understand the meaning of "self-determination" and were even in agreement with it? And will it not be easier to liquidate the Party if the "Party publicists" (no jokes, please!) treat its history and programme after the fashion of the seminary student?

Here is a second "ragamuffin", Mr. Yurkevich of *Dzvin*.<sup>342</sup> Mr. Yurkevich must have had the Minutes of the Second Congress before him, because he quotes Plekhanov, as repeated by Goldblatt, and shows that he is aware of the fact that self-determination can only mean the right to secession. This, however, does not prevent him from spreading slander about the Russian Marxists among the Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie, alleging that they stand for the "state integrity" of Russia. (No. 7-8 1913, p. 83, etc.) Of course, the Yurkeviches could not have invented a better method than such slander to alienate the Ukrainian democrats from the Great-Russian democrats. And such alienation is in line with the entire policy of the group of *Dzvin* publicists who advocate the *separation* of the Ukrainian workers in a *special* national organisation!\*

It is quite appropriate, of course, that a group of nationalist philistines, who are engaged in splitting the ranks of the proletariat—and objectively this is the role of *Dzvin*—should disseminate such hopeless confusion on the national question. Needless to say, the Yurkeviches and Liebmans, who are "terribly" offended when they are called "near-Party men", do not say a word, not a single word, as to how *they* would like the problem of the right to secede to be settled in the programme.

But here is the third and principal "ragamuffin", Mr. Senkovsky, who, addressing a Great-Russian audience through the columns of a liquidationist newspaper, lashes at § 9 of the Programme and at the same time declares that "for certain reasons he does not approve of the proposal" to delete this clause!

\* See particularly Mr. Yurkevich's preface to Mr. Levinsky's book (written in Ukrainian) *Outline of the Development of the Ukrainian Working-Class Movement in Galicia*, Kiev, 1914.

This is incredible, but it is a fact

In August 1912, the liquidators' conference 'raised the national question officially. For eighteen months not a single article has appeared on the question of § 9, except the one written by Mr Semkovsky. And in this article the author *repudiates* the programme "without approving", however "for *certain* reasons" (is this a secrecy disease?) the proposal to amend it. We may be sure that it would be difficult to find anywhere in the world similar examples of opportunism or even worse—renunciation of the Party, and a desire to liquidate it.

A single example will suffice to show what Semkovsky's arguments are like.

What are we to do, he writes, with Poland? Let us leave it side by side with the proletariat of all Russia without any special title while the reactionary forces of the bourgeoisie try to separate Poland from Russia and let them make a vote in favour of secession by referendum. Should we let us in Soviet Russia let a central parliament vote together with our Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and other not to violate the right of self-determination of the peoples? (Novaya Rabochaya Gazeta No. 1)

From this it is evident that Mr Semkovsky does not even understand the *point at issue*. It did not occur to him that the right to secession presupposes the settlement of the question by a parliament (Diet) referendum or not he *should* not be *not* by a central parliament.

The childish perplexity over the question "What are we to do", if under democracy the majority are for reaction serves to screen the right and live issue when *both* the Puriškeviches and the Kokoshkins consider the very idea of secession criminal. Perhaps the proletarians of *all* Russia ought not to help the Puriškeviches and the Kokoshkins today, but should go against them and fight the reactionary classes of Poland!

Such is the sheer rubbish published in the liquidators' organ of which Mr L. Martov is one of the ideological leaders, the self-same L. Martov who drafted the programme and spoke in favour of its adoption in 1903, and even subsequently wrote in favour of the right to secede. Apparently L. Martov is now changing according to the rule

*No clever man is needed there  
Better send Read,  
And I shall wait and see . . .*

He sends Read-Semkovsky along and allows our programme to be distorted and endlessly muddled up in a daily paper whose new readers are unacquainted with it!

Yes. Liquidationism has gone a long way—there are even very many prominent ex-Social-Democrats who have not a trace of Party spirit left in them.

Rosa Luxemburg cannot, of course, be classed with the Liebmans, Yurkeviches and Semkovskys, but the fact that it was this kind of people who seized upon her error shows with particular clarity the opportunism she has lapsed into.

## 10. CONCLUSION

To sum up.

As far as the theory of Marxism in general is concerned, the question of the right to self-determination presents no difficulty. No one can seriously question the London resolution of 1896, or the fact that self-determination implies only the right to secede, or that the formation of independent national states is the tendency in all bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

A difficulty is to some extent created by the fact that in Russia the proletariat of both the oppressed and oppressor nations are fighting, and must fight, side by side. The task is to preserve the unity of the proletariat's class struggle for socialism, and to resist all bourgeois and Black-Hundred nationalist influences. Where the oppressed nations are concerned, the separate organisation of the proletariat as an independent party sometimes leads to such a bitter struggle against local nationalism that the perspective becomes distorted and the nationalism of the oppressor nation is lost sight of.

But this distortion of perspective cannot last long. The experience of the joint struggle waged by the proletarians of various nations has demonstrated all too clearly that we must formulate political issues from the all-Russia, not the "Cracow" point of view. And in all-Russia politics it is the Purishkeviches and the Kokoshkins who are in the saddle. Their ideas predominate, and their persecution of non-Russians for "separatism", for *thinking* about secession, is being preached and practised in the Duma, in the schools, in the churches, in the barracks, and in hundreds and thousands of newspapers. It is this Great-Russian nationalist poison that is polluting the entire all-Russia political atmosphere. This is the misfortune of one nation, which, by subjugating other nations, is strengthening reaction throughout Russia. The memories of 1849 and 1863 form a living political tradition, which, unless great storms arise, threatens to hamper every democratic and especially every Social-Democratic movement for decades to come.

There can be no doubt that however natural the point of view

of certain Marxists belonging to the oppressed nations (whose "misfortune" is sometimes that the masses of the population are blinded by the idea of their "own" national liberation) may appear at times, *in reality* the objective alignment of class forces in Russia makes refusal to advocate the right to self-determination tantamount to the worst opportunism, to the infection of the proletariat with the ideas of the Kokoshkins. And these ideas are, essentially, the ideas and the policy of the Purishkeviches.

Therefore, although Rosa Luxemburg's point of view could at first have been excused as being specifically Polish, "Cracow" narrow-mindedness, it is inexcusable today, when nationalism and, above all, governmental Great-Russian nationalism, has everywhere gained ground, and when policy is being shaped by this *Great-Russian nationalism*. In actual fact, it is being seized upon by the opportunists of *all* nations who fight shy of the idea of "storms" and "leaps", believe that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is over, and follow in the wake of the liberalism of the Kokoshkins.

Like any other nationalism, Great-Russian nationalism passes through various phases, according to the classes that are dominant in the bourgeois country at any given time. Up to 1905, we almost exclusively knew national-reactionaries. After the revolution, *national-liberals* arose in our country.

In our country this is virtually the stand adopted both by the Octobrists and by the Cadets (Kokoshkin), i.e., by the whole of the present-day bourgeoisie.

Great-Russian national-democrats will *inevitably* appear later on. Mr. Peshekhonov, one of the founders of the "Popular Socialist" Party,<sup>345</sup> already expressed this point of view (in the issue of *Russkoye Bogatstvo* for August 1906) when he called for caution in regard to the peasants' nationalist prejudices. However much others may slander us Bolsheviks and accuse us of "idealising" the peasant, we always have made and always will make a clear distinction between peasant intelligence and peasant prejudice, between peasant strivings for democracy and opposition to Purishkevich, and the peasant desire to make peace with the priest and the landlord.

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It is not difficult to understand that the recognition by the Marxists of the *whole of Russia* and first and foremost by the Great Russians of the *right of nations to secede* in no way precludes *agitation* against secession by Marxists of a particular *oppressed* nation, just as the recognition of the right to divorce does not preclude agitation against divorce in a particular case. We think, therefore, that there will be an inevitable increase in the number of Polish Marxists who laugh at the non-existent "contradiction now being encouraged" by Semkovsky and Trotsky.

Even now, and probably for a fairly long time to come, proletarian democracy must reckon with the nationalism of the Great-Russian peasants (not with the object of making concessions to it, but in order to combat it).<sup>\*</sup> The awakening of nationalism among the oppressed nations, which became so pronounced after 1905 (let us recall, say, the group of "Federalist-Autonomists" in the First Duma, the growth of the Ukrainian movement, of the Moslem movement, etc.), will inevitably lead to greater nationalism among the Great-Russian petty bourgeoisie in town and country'side. The slower the democratisation of Russia, the more persistent, brutal and bitter will be the national persecution and bickering among the bourgeoisie of the various nations. The particularly reactionary nature of the Russian Purishkeviches will simultaneously give rise to (and strengthen) "separatist" tendencies among the various oppressed nationalities, which sometimes enjoy far greater freedom in neighbouring states.

In this situation, the proletariat of Russia is faced with a two-fold or, rather, a two-sided task: to combat nationalism of every kind, above all, Great-Russian nationalism; to recognise not only fully equal rights for all nations in general, but also equality of rights as regards polity, i.e., the right of nations to self-determination, to secession. And at the same time, it is their task, in the interests of a successful struggle against all and every kind of nationalism among all nations, to preserve the unity of the proletarian struggle and the proletarian organisations, amalgamating these organisations into a close-knit international association despite bourgeois strivings for national exclusiveness.

Complete equality of rights for all nations: the right of nations to self-determination, the unity of the workers of all nations—such is the national programme that Marxism, the experience of the whole world, and the experience of Russia, teach the workers

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It would be interesting to trace the changes that take place in Polish nationalism, for example in the process of its transformation from gentry nationalism into bourgeois nationalism and then into peasant nationalism. In his book *Das polnische Gemeinwesen im preussischen Staat* (*The Polish Community in the Prussian State*, there is a Russian translation), Ludwig Bernhard, who shares the view of a German Kokoshkin, describes a very typical phenomenon: the formation of a sort of 'peasant republic' by the Poles in Germany in the form of a close alliance of the various co-operatives and other associations of Polish peasants in their struggle for nationality, religion, and "Polish" land. German oppression has welded the Poles together and segregated them after first awakening the nationalism of the gentry, then of the bourgeoisie and finally of the peasant masses (especially after the campaign the Germans launched in 1873 against the use of the Polish language in schools). Things are moving in the same direction in Russia, and not only with regard to Poland.

This article had been set up when I received No 3 of *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta*, in which Mr VI Kosovsky writes the following about the recognition of the right of all nations to self-determination

Taken mechanically from the resolution of the First Congress of the Party (1898) which in turn had borrowed it from the decisions of international socialist congresses, it was given as is evident from the debate the same meaning at the 1903 Congress as was ascribed to it by the Socialist International re political self determination the self determination of nations in the field of political independence. Thus the formula national self determination which implies the right to territorial separation does not in any way affect the question of how national relations *within* a given state or union should be regulated for nationalities that cannot or have no desire to leave the existing state.

It is evident from this that Mr VI Kosovsky has seen the Minutes of the Second Congress of 1903 and understands perfectly well the real (and only) meaning of the term self-determination. Compare this with the fact that the editors of the Bund newspaper *Zvit* let Mr Liebman Joose to scoff at the programme and to declare that it is vague! Queer "party" ethics among these Bundists. The Lord alone knows why Kosovsky should declare that the Congress took over the principle of self-determination *mechanically*. Some people want to object, but how, why, and for what reason— they do not know.

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Nos 4 and 6

Signed O. Hyu

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## THE WAR AND RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY<sup>346</sup>

The European war which the governments and the bourgeois parties of all countries have been preparing for decades, has broken out. The growth of armaments, the extreme intensification of the struggle for markets in the latest—the imperialist—stage of capitalist development in the advanced countries, and the dynastic interests of the more backward East-European monarchies were inevitably bound to bring about this war, and have done so. Seizure of territory and subjugation of other nations, the ruining of competing nations and the plunder of their wealth distracting the attention of the working masses from the internal political crises in Russia, Germany, Britain and other countries, disuniting and nationalist stultification of the workers, and the extermination of their vanguard so as to weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat—these comprise the sole actual content, importance and significance of the present war.

It is primarily on Social Democracy that the duty rests of revealing the true meaning of the war, and of ruthlessly exposing the falsehood, sophistry and 'patriotic' phrase-mongering spread by the ruling classes, the landowners and the bourgeoisie, in defence of the war.

One group of belligerent nations is headed by the German bourgeoisie. It is hoodwinking the working class and the toiling masses by asserting that this is a war in defence of the fatherland, freedom and civilisation, for the liberation of the peoples oppressed by tsarism, and for the destruction of reactionary tsarism. In actual fact, however, this bourgeoisie, which servilely grovels to the Prussian Junkers, headed by Wilhelm II, has always been a most faithful ally of tsarism, and an enemy of the revolutionary movement of Russia's workers and peasants. In fact, whatever the outcome of the war, this bourgeoisie will



together with the Junkers exert every effort to support the tsarist monarchy against a revolution in Russia.

In fact, the German bourgeoisie has launched a robber campaign against Serbia with the object of subjugating her and throttling the national revolution of the Southern Slavs, at the same time sending the bulk of its military forces against the richer countries Belgium and France, so as to plunder richer competitors. In fact the German bourgeoisie which has been spreading the fable that it is waging a war of defence, chose the moment it thought most favourable for war making use of its latest improvements in military matériel and forestalling the rearmament already planned and decided upon by Russia and France.

The other group of belligerent nations is headed by the British and the French bourgeoisie who are hoodwinking the working class and the toiling masses by a saying that they are waging a war for the defence of their countries for freedom and civilisation and against German militarism and despotism. In actual fact this bourgeoisie has long been spending thousands of millions to hire the troops of Russian tsarism, the most reactionary and barbarous monarchy in Europe and prepare them for an attack on Germany.

In fact the struggle of the British and the French bourgeoisie is aimed at the seizure of the German colonies and the ruin of a rival nation whose economic development has been more rapid. In pursuit of this noble aim the advanced democratic nations are helping the savage tsarist regime to still more throttle Poland the Ukraine, etc. and more thoroughly crush the revolution in Russia.

Neither group of belligerents is inferior to the other in spoils, atrocities and the boundless brutality of war; however, to hoodwink the proletariat and distract its attention from the only genuine war of liberation namely a civil war against the bourgeoisie both of its own and of foreign countries—to achieve so lofty an aim—the bourgeoisie of each country is trying with the help of false phrases about patriotism to extol the significance of its own national war asserting that it is sent to defeat the enemy not for plunder and the seizure of territory but for the 'liberation' of all other peoples except its own.

But the harder the governments and the bourgeoisie of all countries try to disunite the workers and pit them against one another, and the more savagely they enforce for this lofty aim, martial law and the military censorship (measures which even now, in wartime are applied against the internal foe more harshly than against the external) the more pressingly is it the duty of the class conscious proletariat to defend its class

solidarity, its internationalism, and its socialist convictions against the unbridled chauvinism of the "patriotic" bourgeois cliques in all countries. If class-conscious workers were to give up this aim, this would mean renunciation of their aspirations for freedom and democracy, to say nothing of their socialist aspirations.

It is with a feeling of the most bitter disappointment that we have to record that the socialist parties of the leading European countries have failed to discharge this duty, the behaviour of these parties' leaders, particularly in Germany, bordering on downright betrayal of the cause of socialism. At this time of supreme and historic importance, most of the leaders of the present Socialist International, the Second (1889-1911), are trying to substitute nationalism for socialism. As a result of their behaviour, the workers' parties of these countries did not oppose the governments' criminal conduct, but called upon the working class to *identify* its position with that of the imperialist governments. The leaders of the International committed an act of treachery against socialism by voting for war credits, by reiterating the chauvinist ("patriotic") slogans of the bourgeoisie of their "own" countries, by justifying and defending the war, by joining the bourgeois governments of the belligerent countries, and so on and so forth. The most influential socialist leaders and the most influential organs of the socialist press of present-day Europe hold views that are chauvinist, bourgeois and liberal, and in no way socialist. The responsibility for thus disgracing socialism falls primarily on the German Social-Democrats, who were the strongest and most influential party in the Second International. But neither can one justify the French socialists, who have accepted ministerial posts in the government of that very bourgeoisie which betrayed its country and allied itself with Bismarck so as to crush the Commune.

The German and the Austrian Social-Democrats are attempting to justify their support for the war by arguing that they are thereby fighting against Russian tsarism. We Russian Social-Democrats declare that we consider such justification sheer sophistry. In our country the revolutionary movement against tsarism has again assumed tremendous proportions during the past few years. This movement has always been headed by the working class of Russia. The political strikes of the last few years, which have involved millions of workers, have had as their slogan the overthrow of tsarism and the establishment of a democratic republic. During his visit to Nicholas II on the very eve of the war, Poincaré, President of the French Republic, could see for himself, in the streets of St. Petersburg, barricades put up by Russian workers. The Russian proletariat has not

flinched from any sacrifice to rid humanity of the disgrace of the tsarist monarchy. We must, however, say that if there is anything that, under certain conditions, can delay the downfall of tsarism, anything that can help tsarism in its struggle against the whole of Russia's democracy, then that is the present war, which has placed the purses of the British, the French and the Russian bourgeois at the disposal of tsarism, to further the latter's reactionary aims. If there is anything that can hinder the revolutionary struggle of Russia's working class against tsarism, then that is the behaviour of the German and the Austrian Social-Democratic leaders, which the chauvinist press of Russia is continually holding up to us as an example.

Even assuming that German Social-Democracy was so weak that it was compelled to refrain from all revolutionary action, it should not have joined the chauvinist camp, or taken steps which gave the Italian socialists reason to say that the German Social-Democratic leaders were dishonouring the banner of the proletarian International.

Our Party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, has made, and will continue to make, great sacrifices in connection with the war. The whole of our working-class legal press has been suppressed. Most working-class associations have been disbanded, and a large number of our comrades have been arrested and exiled. Yet our parliamentary representatives—the Russian Social-Democratic Labour group in the Duma—considered it their imperative socialist duty not to vote for the war credits, and even to walk out of the Duma, so as to express their protest the more energetically; they considered it their duty to brand the European governments' policy as imperialist.<sup>347</sup> Though the tsar's government has increased its tyranny tenfold, the Social Democratic workers of Russia are already publishing their first illegal manifestos against the war,<sup>348</sup> thus doing their duty to democracy and to the International.

While the collapse of the Second International has given rise to a sense of burning shame in revolutionary Social-Democrats—as represented by the minority of German Social-Democrats and the finest Social-Democrats in the neutral countries, while socialists in both Britain and France have been speaking up against the chauvinism of most Social-Democratic parties, while the opportunists, as represented for instance, by the German *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, which have long held a national-liberal stand, are with good reason celebrating their victory over European socialism—the worst possible service is being rendered to the proletariat by those who vacillate between opportunism and revolutionary Social-Democracy (like the "Centre" in the German Social-Democratic Party), by those who are try-

ing to hush up the collapse of the Second International or to disguise it with diplomatic phrases.

On the contrary, this collapse must be frankly recognised and its causes understood, so as to make it possible to build up a new and more lasting socialist unity of the workers of all countries.

The opportunists have wrecked the decisions of the Stuttgart, Copenhagen and Basle congresses,<sup>349</sup> which made it binding on socialists of all countries to combat chauvinism in all and any conditions, made it binding on socialists to reply to any war begun by the bourgeoisie and governments, with intensified propaganda of civil war and social revolution. The collapse of the Second International is the collapse of opportunism, which developed from the features of a now bygone (and so-called "peaceful") period of history, and in recent years has come practically to dominate the International. The opportunists have long been preparing the ground for this collapse by denying the socialist revolution and substituting bourgeois reformism in its stead; by rejecting the class struggle with its inevitable conversion at certain moments into civil war, and by preaching class collaboration; by preaching bourgeois chauvinism under the guise of patriotism and the defence of the fatherland, and ignoring or rejecting the fundamental truth of socialism, long ago set forth in the *Communist Manifesto*, that the workingmen have no country: by confining themselves, in the struggle against militarism, to a sentimental, philistine point of view, instead of recognising the need for a revolutionary war by the proletarians of all countries, against the bourgeoisie of all countries; by making a fetish of the necessary utilisation of bourgeois parliamentarianism and bourgeois legality, and forgetting that illegal forms of organisation and propaganda are imperative at times of crisis. The natural "appendage" to opportunism—one that is just as bourgeois and hostile to the proletarian, i.e., the Marxist, point of view—namely, the anarcho-syndicalist trend, has been marked by a no less shamefully smug reiteration of the slogans of chauvinism, during the present crisis.

The aims of socialism at the present time cannot be fulfilled, and real international unity of the workers cannot be achieved, without a decisive break with opportunism, and without explaining its inevitable fiasco to the masses.

It must be the primary task of Social-Democrats in every country to combat that country's chauvinism. In Russia this chauvinism has overcome the bourgeois liberals (the "Constitutional-Democrats"), and part of the Narodniks—down to the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the "Right" Social-Democrats. (In particular, the chauvinist utterances of E. Smirnov, P. Maslov

and G. Plekhanov, for example, should be branded; they have been taken up and widely used by the bourgeois "patriotic" press.)

In the present situation, it is impossible to determine, from the standpoint of the international proletariat, the defeat of which of the two groups of belligerent nations would be the lesser evil for socialism. But to us Russian Social Democrats there cannot be the slightest doubt that, from the standpoint of the working class and of the toiling masses of all the nations of Russia, the defeat of the tsarist monarchy, the most reactionary and barbarous of governments, which is oppressing the largest number of nations and the greatest mass of the population of Europe and Asia, would be the lesser evil.

The formation of a republican United States of Europe should be the immediate political slogan of Europe's Social-Democrats. In contrast with the bourgeoisie, which is ready to "promise" anything in order to draw the proletariat into the mainstream of chauvinism, the Social-Democrats will explain that this slogan is absolutely false and meaningless without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, the Austrian and the Russian monarchies.

Since Russia is most backward and has not yet completed its bourgeois revolution, it still remains the task of Social-Democrats in that country to achieve the three fundamental conditions for consistent democratic reform, viz., a democratic republic (with complete equality and self-determination for all nations), confiscation of the landed estates, and an eight-hour working day. But in all the advanced countries the war has placed on the order of the day the slogan of socialist revolution, a slogan that is the more urgent, the more heavily the burden of war presses upon the shoulders of the proletariat, and the more active its future role must become in the re-creation of Europe, after the horrors of the present "patriotic" barbarism in conditions of the tremendous technological progress of large-scale capitalism. The bourgeoisie's use of wartime laws to gag the proletariat makes it imperative for the latter to create illegal forms of agitation and organisation. Let the opportunists "preserve" the legal organisations at the price of treachery to their convictions—revolutionary Social-Democrats will utilise the organisational experience and links of the working class so as to create illegal forms of struggle for socialism, forms appropriate to a period of crisis, and to unite the workers, not with the chauvinist bourgeoisie of their respective countries, but with the workers of all countries. The proletarian International has not gone under and will not go under. Notwithstanding all obstacles, the masses of the workers will create a new

International. Opportunism's present triumph will be short-lived. The greater the sacrifices imposed by the war the clearer will it become to the mass of the workers that the opportunists have betrayed the workers' cause and that the weapons must be turned against the government and the bourgeoisie of each country.

The conversion of the present imperialist war into a civil war is the only correct proletarian slogan, one that follows from the experience of the Commune, and outlined in the Basle resolution (1912); it has been dictated by all the conditions of an imperialist war between high'y developed bourgeois countries. However difficult that transformation may seem at any given moment, socialists will never relinquish systematic, persistent and undeviating preparatory work in this direction now that war has become a fact.

It is only along this path that the proletariat will be able to shake off its dependence on the chauvinist bourgeoisie, and, in one form or another and more or less rapidly, take decisive steps towards genuine freedom for the nations and towards socialism.

Long live the international fraternity of the workers against the chauvinism and patriotism of the bourgeoisie of all countries!

Long live a proletarian International, freed from opportunism!

*Central Committee  
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour  
Party*

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## ON THE NATIONAL PRIDE OF THE GREAT RUSSIANS

What a lot of talk, argument and vociferation there is nowadays about nationality and the fatherland! Liberal and radical cabinet ministers in Britain, a host of "forward-looking" journalists in France (who have proved in full agreement with their reactionary colleagues), and a swarm of official Cadet and progressive scribblers in Russia (including several Narodniks and "Marxists")—all have effusive praise for the liberty and independence of their respective countries, the grandeur of the principle of national independence. Here one cannot tell where the venal eulogist of the butcher Nicholas Romanov or of the brutal oppressors of Negroes and Indians ends, and where the common philistine, who from sheer stupidity or spinelessness drifts with the stream, begins. Nor is that distinction important. We see before us an extensive and very deep ideological trend, whose origins are closely interwoven with the interests of the landowners and the capitalists of the dominant nations. Scores and hundreds of millions are being spent every year for the propaganda of ideas advantageous to those classes: it is a pretty big mill-race that takes its waters from all sources—from Menshikov, a chauvinist by conviction, to chauvinists for reason of opportunism or spinelessness, such as Plekhanov and Maslov, Rubanovich and Smirnov, Kropotkin and Burtsev.

Let us, Great-Russian Social Democrats, also try to define our attitude to this ideological trend. It would be unseemly for us, representatives of a dominant nation in the far east of Europe and a goodly part of Asia, to forget the immense significance of the national question—especially in a country which has been rightly called the "prison of the peoples", and particularly at a time when, in the far east of Europe and in Asia, capitalism is awakening to life and self-consciousness a number of "new" nations, large and small; at a moment when the tsarist monarchy

has called up millions of Great Russians and non-Russians, so as to "solve" a number of national problems in accordance with the interests of the Council of the United Nobility and of the Guchkovs, Krestovnikovs, Dolgorukovs, Kutlers and Rodichevs.

Is a sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians? Certainly not! We love our language and our country, and we are doing our very utmost to raise *her* toiling masses (i.e., nine-tenths of *her* population) to the level of a democratic and socialist consciousness. To us it is most painful to see and feel the outrages, the oppression and the humiliation our fair country suffers at the hands of the tsar's butchers, the nobles and the capitalists. We take pride in the resistance to these outrages put up from our midst, from the Great Russians; in *that* midst having produced Radishchev, the Decembrists and the revolutionary commoners of the seventies; in the Great-Russian working class having created, in 1905, a mighty revolutionary party of the masses; and in the Great-Russian peasantry having begun to turn towards democracy and set about overthrowing the clergy and the landed proprietors.

We remember that Chernyshevsky, the Great-Russian democrat, who dedicated his life to the cause of revolution, said half a century ago: "A wretched nation, a nation of slaves, from top to bottom—all slaves."<sup>350</sup> The overt and covert Great-Russian slaves (slaves with regard to the tsarist monarchy) do not like to recall these words. Yet, in our opinion, these were words of genuine love for our country, a love distressed by the absence of a revolutionary spirit in the masses of the Great-Russian people. There was none of that spirit at the time. There is little of it now, but it already exists. We are full of national pride because the Great-Russian nation, *too*, has created a revolutionary class, because it, *too*, has proved capable of providing mankind with great models of the struggle for freedom and socialism, and not only with great pogroms, rows of gallows, dungeons, great famines and great servility to priests, tsars, landowners and capitalists.

We are full of a sense of national pride, and for that very reason we *particularly* hate *our* slavish past (when the landed nobility led the peasants into war to stifle the freedom of Hungary, Poland, Persia and China), and our slavish present, when these selfsame landed proprietors, aided by the capitalists, are leading us into a war in order to throttle Poland and the Ukraine, crush the democratic movement in Persia and China, and strengthen the gang of Romanovs, Bobrinskys and Purishkeviches, who are a disgrace to our Great-Russian national dignity. Nobody is to be blamed for being born a slave; but a slave who not only eschews a striving for freedom but justifies and eulogises his slavery (c.g., calls the throttling of Poland and the Ukraine, etc., a "defence



of the fatherland" of the Great Russians)—such a slave is a lick-spittle and a boor, who arouses a legitimate feeling of indignation, contempt, and loathing.

"No nation can be free if it oppresses other nations,"<sup>351</sup> said Marx and Engels, the greatest representatives of consistent nineteenth century democracy, who became the teachers of the revolutionary proletariat. And, full of a sense of national pride, we Great-Russian workers want, come what may, a free and independent, a democratic, republican and proud Great Russia, one that will base its relations with its neighbours on the human principle of equality, and not on the feudalist principle of privilege, which is so degrading to a great nation. Just because we want that, we say: it is impossible, in the twentieth century and in Europe (even in the far east of Europe), to "defend the fatherland" otherwise than by using every revolutionary means to combat the monarchy, the landowners and the capitalists of one's *own* fatherland, i.e., the *worst* enemies of our country. We say that the Great Russians cannot "defend the fatherland" otherwise than by desiring the defeat of tsarism in any way, this as the lesser evil to nine-tenths of the inhabitants of Great Russia. For tsarism not only oppresses those nine-tenths economically and politically, but also demoralises, degrades, dishonours and prostitutes them by teaching them to oppress other nations and to cover up this shame with hypocritical and quasi-patriotic phrases.

The objection may be advanced that, besides tsarism and under its wing, another historical force has arisen and become strong, viz., Great-Russian capitalism, which is carrying on progressive work by economically centralising and welding together vast regions. This objection, however, does not excuse, but on the contrary still more condemns our socialist-chauvinists, who should be called tsarist-Purishkevich socialists (just as Marx called the Lassalleans Royal-Prussian socialists<sup>352</sup>). Let us even assume that history will decide in favour of Great-Russian dominant-nation capitalism, and against the hundred and one small nations. That is not impossible, for the entire history of capital is one of violence and plunder, blood and corruption. We do not advocate preserving small nations at all costs; *other conditions being equal*, we are decidedly for centralisation and are opposed to the petty-bourgeois ideal of federal relationships. Even if our assumption were true, however, it is, firstly, not our business, or that of democrats (let alone of socialists), to help Romanov-Bohrinsky-Purishkevich throttle the Ukraine, etc. In his own Junker fashion, Bismarck accomplished a progressive historical task, but he would be a fine "Marxist" indeed who, on such grounds, thought of justifying socialist support for Bismarck! Moreover, Bismarck promoted economic development by bringing together the disunited Ger-

mans, who were being oppressed by other nations. The economic prosperity and rapid development of Great Russia, however, require that the country be liberated from Great-Russian oppression of other nations—that is the difference that our admirers of the true-Russian would-be Bismarcks overlook.

Secondly, if history were to decide in favour of Great-Russian dominant-nation capitalism, it follows hence that the *socialist* role of the Great-Russian proletariat, as the principal driving force of the communist revolution engendered by capitalism, will be all the greater. The proletarian revolution calls for a prolonged education of the workers in the spirit of the *fullest* national equality and brotherhood. Consequently, the interests of the Great-Russian proletariat require that the masses be systematically educated to champion—most resolutely, consistently, boldly and in a revolutionary manner—complete equality and the right to self-determination for all the nations oppressed by the Great Russians. The interests of the Great Russians' national pride (understood, not in the slavish sense) coincide with the *socialist* interests of the Great-Russian (and all other) proletarians. Our model will always be Marx, who, after living in Britain for decades and becoming half-English, demanded freedom and national independence for Ireland in the interests of the socialist movement of the British workers.

In the second hypothetical case we have considered, our home-grown socialist-chevynists, Plekhanov, etc. etc., will prove traitors, not only to their own country—a free and democratic Great Russia, but also to the proletarian brotherhood of all the nations of Russia, i.e. to the cause of socialism.

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## ON THE SLOGAN FOR A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

In No. 10 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*,<sup>1</sup> we reported that a conference of our Party's groups abroad<sup>2</sup> had decided to defer the question of the "United States of Europe" slogan pending a discussion in the press on the *economic* aspect of the matter.

At our conference the debate on this question assumed a purely political character. Perhaps this was partly caused by the Central Committee's Manifesto having formulated this slogan as a forthright political one (the immediate *political* slogan—as it says there)—not only did it advance the slogan of a republican United States of Europe, but expressly emphasised that this slogan is meaningless and false without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies.

It would be quite wrong to object to such a presentation of the question *within the limits* of a political appraisal of this slogan—e.g. to argue that it obscures or weakens, etc. the slogan of a socialist revolution. Political changes of a truly democratic nature—and especially political revolutions—can under no circumstances whatsoever either obscure or weaken the slogan of a socialist revolution. On the contrary they always bring it closer, extend its basis and draw new sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the semi-proletarian masses into the socialist struggle. On the other hand, political revolutions are inevitable in the course of the socialist revolution, which should not be regarded as a single act, but as a period of turbulent political and economic upheavals, the most intense class struggle, civil war, revolutions, and counter-revolutions.

But while the slogan of a republican United States of Europe—if accompanied by the revolutionary overthrow of the three most reactionary monarchies in Europe headed by the Russian—is quite

invulnerable as a political slogan, there still remains the highly important question of its economic content and significance. From the standpoint of the economic conditions of imperialism—i.e., the export of capital and the division of the world by the “advanced” and “civilised” colonial powers—a United States of Europe, under capitalism, is either impossible or reactionary.

Capital has become international and monopolist. The world has been carved up by a handful of Great Powers, i.e., powers successful in the great plunder and oppression of nations. The four Great Powers of Europe—Britain, France, Russia and Germany, with an aggregate population of between 250,000,000 and 300,000,000, and an area of about 7,000,000 square kilometres—possess colonies with a population of *almost 500 million* (494,500,000) and an area of 64,600,000 square kilometres, i.e., almost half the surface of the globe (133,000,000 square kilometres, exclusive of Arctic and Antarctic regions). Add to this the three Asian states—China, Turkey and Persia, now being rent piecemeal by thugs that are waging a war of “liberation”, namely, Japan, Russia, Britain and France. Those three Asian states, which may be called semi-colonies (in reality they are now 90 per cent colonies), have a total population of 360,000,000 and an area of 14,500,000 square kilometres (almost one and a half times the area of all Europe).

Furthermore, Britain, France and Germany have invested capital abroad to the value of no less than 70,000 million rubles. The business of securing “legitimate” profits from this tidy sum—these exceed 3,000 million rubles annually—is carried out by the national committees of the millionaires, known as governments, which are equipped with armies and navies and which provide the sons and brothers of the millionaires with jobs in the colonies and semi-colonies as viceroys, consuls, ambassadors, officials of all kinds, clergymen, and other leeches.

That is how the plunder of about a thousand million of the earth's population by a handful of Great Powers is organised in the epoch of the highest development of capitalism. No other organisation is possible under capitalism. Renounce colonies, “spheres of influence”, and the export of capital? To think that it is possible means coming down to the level of some snivelling parson who every Sunday preaches to the rich on the lofty principles of Christianity and advises them to give the poor, well, if not millions, at least several hundred rubles yearly.

A United States of Europe under capitalism is tantamount to an agreement on the partition of colonies. Under capitalism, however, no other basis and no other principle of division are possible except force. A multi-millionaire cannot share the “national income” of a capitalist country with anyone otherwise than “in

proportion to the capital invested" (with a bonus thrown in, so that the biggest capital may receive more than its share). Capitalism is private ownership of the means of production, and anarchy in production. To advocate a "just" division of income on such a basis is sheer Proudhonism, stupid philistinism. No division can be effected otherwise than in "proportion to strength", and strength changes with the course of economic development. Following 1871, the rate of Germany's accession of strength was three or four times as rapid as that of Britain and France, and of Japan about ten times as rapid as Russia's. There is and there can be no other way of testing the real might of a capitalist state than by war. War does not contradict the fundamentals of private property—on the contrary, it is a direct and inevitable outcome of those fundamentals. Under capitalism the smooth economic growth of individual enterprises or individual states is impossible. Under capitalism, there are no other means of restoring the periodically disturbed equilibrium than crises in industry and wars in politics.

Of course, *temporary* agreements are possible between capitalists and between states. In this sense a United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the *European* capitalists... but to what end? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty *against* Japan and America, who have been badly done out of their share by the present partition of colonies, and the increase of whose might during the last fifty years has been immeasurably more rapid than that of backward and monarchist Europe, now turning senile. Compared with the United States of America, Europe as a whole denotes economic stagnation. On the present economic basis, i.e., under capitalism, a United States of Europe would signify an organisation of reaction to retard America's more rapid development. The times when the cause of democracy and socialism was associated only with Europe alone have gone for ever.

A United States of the World (not of Europe alone) is the state form of the unification and freedom of nations which we associate with socialism—until the time when the complete victory of communism brings about the total disappearance of the state, including the democratic. As a separate slogan, however, the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first, because it merges with socialism; second, because it may be wrongly interpreted to mean that the victory of socialism in a single country is impossible, and it may also create misconceptions as to the relations of such a country to the others.

Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone. After expropriat-

ing the capitalists and organising their own socialist production, the victorious proletariat of that country will arise *against* the rest of the world—the capitalist world—attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring uprisings in those countries against the capitalists, and in case of need using even armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. The political form of a society wherein the proletariat is victorious in overthrowing the bourgeoisie will be a democratic republic, which will more and more concentrate the forces of the proletariat of a given nation or nations, in the struggle against states that have not yet gone over to socialism. The abolition of classes is impossible without a dictatorship of the oppressed class, of the proletariat. A free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states.

It is for these reasons and after repeated discussions at the conference of R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad, and following that conference, that the Central Organ's editors have come to the conclusion that the slogan for a United States of Europe is an erroneous one.

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**EDITORIAL COMMENT BY  
SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT  
ON THE MANIFESTO ON WAR  
ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE R.S.D.L.P.**

**ON THE SLOGAN FOR A UNITED  
STATES OF EUROPE**

The demand for a United States of Europe, as advanced by the Central Committee's Manifesto, which accompanied it with a call for the overthrow of the monarchies in Russia, Austria, and Germany, is distinct from the pacifist interpretation of this slogan by Kautsky and others.

Issue No. 44 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, our Party's Central Organ, carries an editorial proving the economic erroneousness of the United States of Europe slogan.\* Either this is a demand that cannot be implemented under capitalism, inasmuch as it presupposes the establishment of a planned world economy, with a partition of colonies, spheres of influence, etc., among the individual countries, or else it is a reactionary slogan, one that signifies a temporary union of the Great Powers of Europe with the aim of enhancing the oppression of colonies and of plundering the more rapidly developing countries—Japan and America.

Written in August 1915

Published in the pamphlet *Socialism and War*,  
issued by the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editorial  
board, Geneva, August 1915

*Collected Works, Vol. 1*  
1914

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\* See pp. 629-32 of the present volume --Ed

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# IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM<sup>355</sup>

A POPULAR OUTLINE

## PREFACE

The pamphlet here presented to the reader was written in the spring of 1916, in Zurich. In the conditions in which I was obliged to work there I naturally suffered somewhat from a shortage of French and English literature and from a serious dearth of Russian literature. However, I made use of the principal English work on imperialism, the book by J. A. Hobson, with all the care that, in my opinion, that work deserves.

This pamphlet was written with an eye to the tsarist censorship. Hence, I was not only forced to confine myself strictly to an exclusively theoretical, specifically economic analysis of facts, but to formulate the few necessary observations on politics with extreme caution, by hints, in an allegorical language—in that accursed Aesopian language—to which tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up the pen to write a “legal” work.

It is painful, in these days of liberty, to re-read the passages of the pamphlet which have been distorted, cramped, compressed in an iron vice on account of the censor. That the period of imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution; that social-chauvinism (socialism in words, chauvinism in deeds) is the utter betrayal of socialism, complete desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie; that this split in the working-class movement is bound up with the objective conditions of imperialism, etc.—on these matters I had to speak in a “slavish” tongue, and I must refer the reader who is interested in the subject to the articles I wrote abroad in 1914-17, a new edition of which is soon to appear. Special attention should be drawn to a passage on pages 119-20.\* In order to show the reader, in a guise acceptable to the censors, how shamelessly untruthful the capitalists and the social-chauvin-

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\* See p. 726 of the present volume.—*Ed.*



ists who have deserted to their side (and whom Kautsky opposes so inconsistently) are on the question of annexations; in order to show how shamelessly they *screen* the annexations of *their* capitalists, I was forced to quote as an example—Japan! The careful reader will easily substitute Russia for Japan, and Finland, Poland, Courland, the Ukraine, Khiva, Bokhara, Estonia or other regions peopled by non-Great Russians, for Korea.

I trust that this pamphlet will help the reader to understand the fundamental economic question, that of the economic essence of imperialism, for unless this is studied, it will be impossible to understand and appraise modern war and modern politics

*Author*

Petrograd April 26, 1917

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## PREFACE TO THE FRENCH AND GERMAN EDITIONS <sup>156</sup>

### I

As was indicated in the preface to the Russian edition, this pamphlet was written in 1916, with an eye to the tsarist censorship. I am unable to revise the whole text at the present time, nor, perhaps, would this be advisable, since the main purpose of the book was, and remains, to present, on the basis of the summarised returns of irrefutable bourgeois statistics, and the admissions of bourgeois scholars of all countries, a *composite picture* of the world capitalist system in its international relationships at the beginning of the twentieth century—on the eve of the first world imperialist war.

To a certain extent it will even be useful for many Communists in advanced capitalist countries to convince themselves by the example of this pamphlet, *legal from the standpoint of the tsarist censor*, of the possibility, and necessity, of making use of even the slight remnants of legality which still remain at the disposal of the Communists, say, in contemporary America or France after the recent almost wholesale arrests of Communists, in order to explain the utter falsity of social-pacifist views and hopes for "world democracy". The most essential of what should be added to this censored pamphlet I shall try to present in this preface.

### II

It is proved in the pamphlet that the war of 1914-18 was imperialist (that is, an annexationist, predatory, war of plunder) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies and spheres of influence of finance capital, etc.

Proof of what was the true social, or rather, the true class character of the war is naturally to be found, not in the diplomatic history of the war, but in an analysis of the *objective* position of

the ruling *classes* in *all* the belligerent countries. In order to depict this objective position one must not take examples or isolated data (in view of the extreme complexity of the phenomena of social life it is always possible to select any number of examples or separate data to prove any proposition) but *all* the data on the *basis* of economic life in *all* the belligerent countries and the *whole* world.

It is precisely irrefutable summarised data of this kind that I quoted in describing the *partition of the world* in 1876 and 1914 (in Chapter VI) and the division of the world's *railways* in 1890 and 1913 (in Chapter VII). Railways are a summation of the basic capitalist industries: coal, iron and steel—a summation and the most striking index of the development of world trade and bourgeois democratic civilisation. How the railways are linked up with large-scale industry with monopolies, syndicates, cartels, trusts, banks and the financial oligarchy is shown in the preceding chapters of the book. The uneven distribution of the railways, their uneven development—sums up, as it were, modern monopolist capitalism on a world wide scale. And this summary proves that imperialist wars are absolutely inevitable under *such* an economic system *as long as* private property in the means of production exists.

The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilising enterprise, that is what it is in the opinion of the bourgeois professors who are paid to depict capitalist life in bright colours, and in the opinion of petty bourgeois philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist thricks which in thousands of different intercrossings bind these enterprises with private property in the means of production in general have converted this railway construction into an instrument for oppressing *a thousand million* people (in the colonies and semi colonies); that is more than half the population of the globe that inhabits the dependent countries, as well as the wage-slaves of capital in the civilised countries.

Private property based on the labour of the small proprietor, free competition, democracy—all the catchwords with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and the peasants—are things of the distant past. Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of 'advanced' countries. And this 'booty' is shared between two or three powerful world plunderers armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain, Japan) who are dividing the whole world into *their* war over the division of *their* booty.

## III

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk<sup>357</sup> dictated by monarchist Germany, and the subsequent much more brutal and despicable Treaty of Versailles<sup>358</sup> dictated by the "democratic" republics of America and France and also by "free" Britain, have rendered a most useful service to humanity by exposing both imperialism's hired coolies of the pen and petty-bourgeois reactionaries who, although they call themselves pacifists and socialists, sang praises to "Wilsonism",<sup>359</sup> and insisted that peace and reforms were possible under imperialism.

The tens of millions of dead and maimed left by the war—a war to decide whether the British or German group of financial plunderers is to receive the most booty—and those two "peace treaties", are with unprecedented rapidity opening the eyes of the millions and tens of millions of people who are downtrodden, oppressed, deceived and duped by the bourgeoisie. Thus, out of the universal ruin caused by the war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which, however prolonged and arduous its stages may be, cannot end otherwise than in a proletarian revolution and in its victory.

The Basle Manifesto of the Second International, which in 1912 gave an appraisal of the very war that broke out in 1914 and not of war in general (there are different kinds of wars, including revolutionary wars)—this Manifesto is now a monument exposing to the full the shameful bankruptcy and treachery of the heroes of the Second International.

That is why I reproduce this Manifesto as a supplement to the present edition, and again and again I urge the reader to note that the heroes of the Second International are as assiduously avoiding the passages of this Manifesto which speak precisely, clearly and definitely of the connection between that impending war and the proletarian revolution, as a thief avoids the scene of his crime.

## IV

Special attention has been devoted in this pamphlet to a criticism of Kautskyism, the international ideological trend represented in all countries of the world by the "most prominent theoreticians", the leaders of the Second International (Otto Bauer and Co. in Austria, Ramsay MacDonald and others in Britain, Albert Thomas in France, etc., etc.) and a multitude of socialists, reformists, pacifists, bourgeois democrats and parsons.

This ideological trend is, on the one hand, a product of the disintegration and decay of the Second International, and, on the

other hand, the inevitable fruit of the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, whose entire way of life holds them captive to bourgeois and democratic prejudices.

The views held by Kautsky and his like are a complete renunciation of those same revolutionary principles of Marxism that writer has championed for decades, especially, by the way, in his struggle against socialist opportunism (of Bernstein, Millerand, Hyndman, Gompers, etc.). It is not a mere accident, therefore, that Kautsky's followers all over the world have now united in practical politics with the extreme opportunists (through the Second, or Yellow International)<sup>360</sup> and with the bourgeois governments (through bourgeois coalition governments in which socialists take part).

The growing world proletarian revolutionary movement in general, and the communist movement in particular, cannot dispense with an analysis and exposure of the theoretical errors of Kautskyism. The more so since pacifism and "democracy" in general, which lay no claim to Marxism whatever, but which, like Kautsky and Co., are obscuring the profundity of the contradictions of imperialism and the inevitable revolutionary crisis to which it gives rise, are still very widespread all over the world. To combat these tendencies is the bounden duty of the party of the proletariat, which must win away from the bourgeoisie the small proprietors who are duped by them, and the millions of working people who enjoy more or less petty-bourgeois conditions of life.

## V

A few words must be said about Chapter VIII, "Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism". As already pointed out in the text, Hilferding, ex-"Marxist", and now a comrade-in-arms of Kautsky and one of the chief exponents of bourgeois, reformist policy in the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany,<sup>361</sup> has taken a step backward on this question compared with the *frankly* pacifist and reformist Englishman, Hobson. The international split of the entire working-class movement is now quite evident (the Second and the Third Internationals). The fact that armed struggle and civil war is now raging between the two trends is also evident—the support given to Kolchak and Denikin in Russia by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries against the Bolsheviks; the fight the Scheidemanns and Noskes have conducted in conjunction with the bourgeoisie against the Spartacists<sup>362</sup> in Germany; the same thing in Finland, Poland, Hungary, etc. What is the economic basis of this world-historical phenomenon?

It is precisely the parasitism and decay of capitalism, characteristic of its highest historical stage of development, i.e., imperialism. As this pamphlet shows, capitalism has now singled out a *handful* (less than one-tenth of the inhabitants of the globe; less than one-fifth at a most "generous" and liberal calculation) of exceptionally rich and powerful states which plunder the whole world simply by "clipping coupons". Capital exports yield an income of eight to ten thousand million francs per annum, at pre-war prices and according to pre-war bourgeois statistics. Now, of course, they yield much more.

Obviously, out of such enormous *superprofits* (since they are obtained over and above the profits which capitalists squeeze out of the workers of their "own" country) it is *possible to bribe* the labour leaders and the upper stratum of the labour aristocracy. And that is just what the capitalists of the "advanced" countries are doing: they are bribing them in a thousand different ways, direct and indirect, overt and covert.

This stratum of workers-turned-bourgeois, or the labour aristocracy, who are quite philistine in their mode of life, in the size of their earnings and in their entire outlook, is the principal prop of the Second International, and in our days, the principal *social* (not military) *prop of the bourgeoisie*. For they are the *real agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class movement*, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class, real vehicles of reformism and chauvinism. In the civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie they inevitably, and in no small numbers, take the side of the bourgeoisie, the "Versaillais" against the "Communards".<sup>36</sup>

Unless the economic roots of this phenomenon are understood and its political and social significance is appreciated, not a step can be taken toward the solution of the practical problems of the communist movement and of the impending social revolution.

Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat. This has been confirmed since 1917 on a world-wide scale.

July 6, 1920

N. Lenin

Н. ЛЕНИНЪ (ВЛ. ИЛЬИНЪ).

# ИМПЕРІАЛИЗМЪ, КАКЪ НОВѢЙШІЙ ЭТАПЪ КАПИТАЛИЗМА.

(Популярный очеркъ)

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СКЛАДЪ ИЗДАНІЯ:

Книжный складъ и магазинъ „Жизнь и Знаніе“  
Петроградъ, Поварской пер., 2, кв 9 и 10 Тел. 227—42  
1917 г.

Cover of V. I. Lenin's book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, 1917 Reduced





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During the last fifteen to twenty years, especially since the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the economic and also the political literature of the two hemispheres has more and more often adopted the term "imperialism" in order to describe the present era. In 1902, a book by the English economist J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism*, was published in London and New York. This author, whose point of view is that of bourgeois social-reformism and pacifism which, in essence, is identical with the present point of view of the ex-Marxist, Karl Kautsky, gives a very good and comprehensive description of the principal specific economic and political features of imperialism. In 1910, there appeared in Vienna the work of the Austrian Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital* (Russian edition, Moscow, 1912). In spite of the mistake the author makes on the theory of money, and in spite of a certain inclination on his part to reconcile Marxism with opportunism, this work gives a very valuable theoretical analysis of "the latest phase of capitalist development", as the subtitle runs. Indeed, what has been said of imperialism during the last few years, especially in an enormous number of magazine and newspaper articles, and also in the resolutions, for example, of the Chemnitz<sup>364</sup> and Basle congresses which took place in the autumn of 1912, has scarcely gone beyond the ideas expounded, or more exactly, summed up by the two writers mentioned above. . . .

Later on, I shall try to show briefly, and as simply as possible, the connection and relationships between the *principal* economic features of imperialism. I shall not be able to deal with the non-economic aspects of the question, however much they deserve to be dealt with. References to literature and other notes which, perhaps, would not interest all readers, are to be found at the end of this pamphlet.<sup>365</sup>

## I. CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND MONOPOLIES

The enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises are one of the most characteristic features of capitalism. Modern production censuses give most complete and most exact data on this process.

In Germany, for example, out of every 1,000 industrial enterprises, large enterprises, i.e., those employing more than 50 workers, numbered three in 1882, six in 1895 and nine in 1907; and out of every 100 workers employed, this group of enterprises employed 22, 30 and 37, respectively. Concentration of production, however, is much more intense than the concentration of workers, since labour in the large enterprises is much more productive. This is shown by the figures on steam-engines and electric motors. If we take what in Germany is called industry in the broad sense of the term, that is, including commerce, transport, etc., we get the following picture. Large-scale enterprises, 30,588 out of a total of 3,265,623, that is to say, 0.9 per cent. These enterprises employ 5,700,000 workers out of a total of 14,400,000, i.e., 39.4 per cent; they use 6,600,000 steam horse power out of a total of 8,800,000, i.e., 75.3 per cent, and 1,200,000 kilowatts of electricity out of a total of 1,500,000, i.e., 77.2 per cent.

Less than one-hundredth of the total number of enterprises utilise *more than three-fourths* of the total amount of steam and electric power! Two million nine hundred and seventy thousand small enterprises (employing up to five workers), constituting 91 per cent of the total, utilise only 7 per cent of the total amount of steam and electric power! Tens of thousands of huge enterprises are everything; millions of small ones are nothing.

In 1907, there were in Germany 586 establishments employing one thousand and more workers, nearly *one-tenth* (1,380,000) of the total number of workers employed in industry, and they consumed *almost one-third* (32 per cent) of the total amount of steam and electric power.\* As we shall see, money capital and the banks make this superiority of a handful of the largest enterprises still more overwhelming, in the most literal sense of the word, i.e., millions of small, medium and even some big "proprietors" are in fact in complete subjection to some hundreds of millionaire financiers.

In another advanced country of modern capitalism, the United States of America, the growth of the concentration of production is still greater. Here statistics single out industry in the narrow sense of the word and classify enterprises according to the value

of their annual output. In 1904 large-scale enterprises with an output valued at one million dollars and over numbered 1,900 (out of 216,180, i.e., 0.9 per cent). These employed 1,400,000 workers (out of 5,500,000, i.e., 25.6 per cent) and the value of their output amounted to \$5,600,000,000 (out of \$14,800,000,000, i.e., 38 per cent). Five years later, in 1909, the corresponding figures were: 3,060 enterprises (out of 268,491, i.e., 1.1 per cent) employing 2,000,000 workers (out of 6,600,000, i.e., 30.5 per cent) with an output valued at \$9,000,000,000 (out of \$20,700,000,000, i.e., 43.8 per cent).\*

Almost half the total production of all the enterprises of the country was carried on by *one-hundredth part* of these enterprises! These 3,000 giant enterprises embrace 258 branches of industry. From this it can be seen that at a certain stage of its development concentration itself, as it were, leads straight to monopoly, for a score or so of giant enterprises can easily arrive at an agreement, and on the other hand, the hindrance to competition, the tendency towards monopoly, arises from the huge size of the enterprises. This transformation of competition into monopoly is one of the most important—if not the most important—phenomena of modern capitalist economy, and we must deal with it in greater detail. But first we must clear up one possible misunderstanding.

American statistics speak of 3,000 giant enterprises in 259 branches of industry, as if there were only a dozen enterprises of the largest scale for each branch of industry.

But this is not the case. Not in every branch of industry are there large-scale enterprises; and moreover, a very important feature of capitalism in its highest stage of development is so-called *combination* of production, that is to say, the grouping in a single enterprise of different branches of industry, which either represent the consecutive stages in the processing of raw materials (for example, the smelting of iron ore into pig-iron, the conversion of pig-iron into steel, and then, perhaps, the manufacture of steel goods)—or are auxiliary to one another (for example, the utilisation of scrap, or of by-products, the manufacture of packing materials, etc.).

"Combination," writes Hilferding, "levels out the fluctuations of trade and therefore assures to the combined enterprises a more stable rate of profit. Secondly, combination has the effect of eliminating trade. Thirdly, it has the effect of rendering possible technical improvements, and, consequently, the acquisition of superprofits over and above those obtained by the 'pure' [i.e., non-combined] enterprises. Fourthly, it strengthens the position of the combined enterprises relative to the 'pure' enterprises,

strengthens them in the competitive struggle in periods of serious depression, when the fall in prices of raw materials does not keep pace with the fall in prices of manufactured goods.”\*

The German bourgeois economist, Heymann, who has written a book especially on “mixed”, that is, combined, enterprises in the German iron industry, says: “Pure enterprises perish, they are crushed between the high price of raw material and the low price of the finished product.” Thus we get the following picture: “There remain, on the one hand, the big coal companies, producing millions of tons yearly, strongly organised in their coal syndicate, and on the other, the big steel plants, closely allied to the coal mines, having their own steel syndicate. These giant enterprises, producing 400,000 tons of steel per annum, with a tremendous output of ore and coal and producing finished steel goods, employing 10,000 workers quartered in company houses, and sometimes owning their own railways and ports, are the typical representatives of the German iron and steel industry. And concentration goes on further and further. Individual enterprises are becoming larger and larger. An ever-increasing number of enterprises in one, or in several different industries, join together in giant enterprises, backed up and directed by half a dozen big Berlin banks. In relation to the German mining industry, the truth of the teachings of Karl Marx on concentration is definitely proved; true, this applies to a country where industry is protected by tariffs and freight rates. The German mining industry is ripe for expropriation.”\*\*

Such is the conclusion which a bourgeois economist who, by way of exception, is conscientious, had to arrive at. It must be noted that he seems to place Germany in a special category because her industries are protected by higher tariffs. But this is a circumstance which only accelerates concentration and the formation of monopolist manufacturers’ associations, cartels, syndicates, etc. It is extremely important to note that in free-trade Britain, concentration *also* leads to monopoly, although somewhat later and perhaps in another form. Professor Hermann Levy, in his special work of research entitled *Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts*, based on data on British economic development, writes as follows:

“In Great Britain it is the size of the enterprise and its high technical level which harbour a monopolist tendency. This, for one thing, is due to the great investment of capital per enterprise, which gives rise to increasing demands for new capital for the new

\* *Finance Capital*, Russ. ed., pp. 286-87.

\*\* Hans Gideon Heymann, *Die gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisen-gewerbe*, Stuttgart, 1904, S. 256, 278.

enterprises and thereby renders their launching more difficult. Moreover (and this seems to us to be the more important point), every new enterprise that wants to keep pace with the gigantic enterprises that have been formed by concentration would here produce such an enormous quantity of surplus goods that it could dispose of them only by being able to sell them profitably as a result of an enormous increase in demand; otherwise, this surplus would force prices down to a level that would be unprofitable both for the new enterprise and for the monopoly combines." Britain differs from other countries where protective tariffs facilitate the formation of cartels in that monopolist manufacturers' associations, cartels and trusts arise in the majority of cases only when the number of the chief competing enterprises has been reduced to "a couple of dozen or so". "Here the influence of concentration on the formation of large industrial monopolies in a whole sphere of industry stands out with crystal clarity."

Half a century ago, when Marx was writing *Capital*, free competition appeared to the overwhelming majority of economists to be a "natural law". Official science tried, by a conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, who by a theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism had proved that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact. Economists are writing mountains of books in which they describe the diverse manifestations of monopoly, and continue to declare in chorus that "Marxism is refuted". But facts are stubborn things, as the English proverb says, and they have to be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. The facts show that differences between capitalist countries, e.g., in the matter of protection or free trade, only give rise to insignificant variations in the form of monopolies or in the moment of their appearance; and that the rise of monopolies, as the result of the concentration of production, is a general and fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism.

For Europe, the time when the new capitalism *definitely* superseded the old can be established with fair precision; it was the beginning of the twentieth century. In one of the latest compilations on the history of the "formation of monopolies", we read:

"Isolated examples of capitalist monopoly could be cited from the period preceding 1860; in these could be discerned the embryo of the forms that are so common today; but all this undoubtedly represents the prehistory of the cartels. The real beginning of modern monopoly goes back, at the earliest, to the sixties. The

first important period of development of monopoly commenced with the international industrial depression of the seventies and lasted until the beginning of the nineties." "If we examine the question on a European scale, we will find that the development of free competition reached its apex in the sixties and seventies. It was then that Britain completed the construction of her old-style capitalist organisation. In Germany, this organisation had entered into a fierce struggle with handicraft and domestic industry, and had begun to create for itself its own forms of existence."

"The great revolution commenced with the crash of 1873, or rather, the depression which followed it and which, with hardly discernible interruptions in the early eighties, and the unusually violent, but short-lived boom round about 1889, marks twenty-two years of European economic history." "During the short boom of 1889-90, the system of cartels was widely resorted to in order to take advantage of favourable business conditions. An ill-considered policy drove prices up still more rapidly and still higher than would have been the case if there had been no cartels, and nearly all these cartels perished ingloriously in the smash. Another five-year period of bad trade and low prices followed, but a new spirit reigned in industry; the depression was no longer regarded as something to be taken for granted: it was regarded as nothing more than a pause before another boom."

"The cartel movement entered its second epoch: instead of being a transitory phenomenon, the cartels have become one of the foundations of economic life. They are winning one field of industry after another, primarily, the raw materials industry. At the beginning of the nineties the cartel system had already acquired—in the organisation of the coke syndicate on the model of which the coal syndicate was later formed—a cartel technique which has hardly been improved on. For the first time the great boom at the close of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03 occurred entirely—in the mining and iron industries at least—under the aegis of the cartels. And while at that time it appeared to be something novel, now the general public takes it for granted that large spheres of economic life have been, as a general rule, removed from the realm of free competition."\*

Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies are the following: (1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex of development of free competition: monopoly is in the barely discernible, embryonic stage. (2) After the crisis of 1873, a lengthy period

\* Th. Vogelstein, "Die finanzielle Organisation der kapitalistischen Industrie und die Monopolbildungen" in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, VI Abt. Tübingen, 1914. Cf., also by the same author: *Organisationsformen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika*, Bd. I, Lpz., 1910.

of development of cartels; but they are still the exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a transitory phenomenon. (3) The boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03. Cartels become one of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.

Cartels come to an agreement on the terms of sale, dates of payment, etc. They divide the markets among themselves. They fix the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the profits among the various enterprises, etc.

The number of cartels in Germany was estimated at about 250 in 1896 and at 385 in 1905, with about 12,000 firms participating.\* But it is generally recognised that these figures are underestimations. From the statistics of German industry for 1907 we quoted above, it is evident that even these 12,000 very big enterprises probably consume more than half the steam and electric power used in the country. In the United States of America, the number of trusts in 1900 was estimated at 185 and in 1907, 250. American statistics divide all industrial enterprises into those belonging to individuals, to private firms or to corporations. The latter in 1904 comprised 23.6 per cent, and in 1909, 25.9 per cent, i.e., more than one-fourth of the total industrial enterprises in the country. These employed in 1904, 70.6 per cent, and in 1909, 75.6 per cent, i.e., more than three-fourths of the total wage-earners. Their output at these two dates was valued at \$10,900,000,000 and \$16,300,000,000, i.e., 73.7 per cent and 79.0 per cent of the total, respectively.

At times cartels and trusts concentrate in their hands seven- or eight-tenths of the total output of a given branch of industry. The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, at its foundation in 1893, concentrated 86.7 per cent of the total coal output of the area, and in 1910 it already concentrated 95.4 per cent.\*\* The monopoly so created assures enormous profits, and leads to the formation of technical production units of formidable magnitude. The famous Standard Oil Company in the United States was founded in 1900: "It has an authorised capital of \$150,000,000. It issued \$100,000,000 common and \$106,000,000 preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907 the following dividends were paid on the latter: 48, 48, 45, 44, 36, 40, 40, 40 per cent in the respective years, i.e., in all, \$367,000,000. From 1882 to 1907, out of total

Dr Riesser, *Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland*, 4. Aufl., 1912, S. 149; Robert Liefmann, *Kartelle und Trusts und die Weiterbildung der volkswirtschaftlichen Organisation*, 2. Aufl., 1910, S. 25.

Dr Fritz Kestner, *Der Organisationszwang. Eine Untersuchung über die Kämpfe zwischen Kartellen und Aussenseitern*, Berlin, 1912, S. 11.

net profits amounting to \$889,000,000, \$606,000,000 were distributed in dividends, and the rest went to reserve capital.”\* “In 1907 the various works of the United States Steel Corporation employed no less than 210,180 people. The largest enterprise in the German mining industry, Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-gesellschaft, in 1908 had a staff of 46,048 workers and office employees.”\*\* In 1902, the United States Steel Corporation already produced 9,000,000 tons of steel.\*\*\* Its output constituted in 1901, 66.3 per cent, and in 1908, 56.1 per cent of the total output of steel in the United States.\*\*\*\* The output of ore was 43.9 per cent and 46.3 per cent, respectively.

The report of the American Government Commission on Trusts states: “Their superiority over competitors is due to the magnitude of their enterprises and their excellent technical equipment. Since its inception, the Tobacco Trust has devoted all its efforts to the universal substitution of mechanical for manual labour. With this end in view it has bought up all patents that have anything to do with the manufacture of tobacco and has spent enormous sums for this purpose. Many of these patents at first proved to be of no use, and had to be modified by the engineers employed by the trust. At the end of 1906, two subsidiary companies were formed solely to acquire patents. With the same object in view, the trust has built its own foundries, machine shops and repair shops. One of these establishments, that in Brooklyn, employs on the average 300 workers; here experiments are carried out on inventions concerning the manufacture of cigarettes, cheroots, snuff, tinfoil for packing, boxes, etc. Here, also, inventions are perfected.”\*\*\*\*\* “Other trusts also employ what are called development engineers whose business it is to devise new methods of production and to test technical improvements. The United States Steel Corporation grants big bonuses to its workers and engineers for all inventions that raise technical efficiency, or reduce cost of production.”\*)

In German large-scale industry, e.g., in the chemical industry, which has developed so enormously during these last few decades, the promotion of technical improvement is organised in the same

\* R. Liefmann, *Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Eine Studie über den modernen Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen*, 1. Aufl., Jena, 1909, S. 212

\*\* *Ibid.*, S. 218.

\*\*\* Dr. S. Tschierschky, *Kartell und Trust*, Göttingen, 1903, S. 13.

\*\*\*\* Th. Vogelstein, *Organisationsformen*, S. 275.

\*\*\*\*\* *Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Tobacco Industry*, Washington, 1909, p. 266, cited according to Dr. Paul Tafel: *Die nordamerikanischen Trusts und ihre Wirkungen auf den Fortschritt der Technik*, Stuttgart, 1913, S. 48.

\*) Dr. P. Tafel, *ibid.*, S. 49.



wav. By 1908 the process of concentration of production had already given rise to two main "groups" which, in their way, were also in the nature of monopolies. At first these groups constituted "dual alliances" of two pairs of big factories, each having a capital of from twenty to twenty-one million marks—on the one hand, the former Meister Factory in Höchst and the Casella Factory in Frankfurt am Main; and on the other hand, the aniline and soda factory at Ludwigshafen and the former Bayer Factory at Elberfeld. Then, in 1905, one of these groups, and in 1908 the other group, each concluded an agreement with yet another big factory. The result was the formation of two "triple alliances", each with a capital of from forty to fifty million marks. And these "alliances" have already begun to "approach" each other, to reach "an understanding" about prices, etc.\*

Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is immense progress in the socialisation of production. In particular, the process of technical invention and improvement becomes socialised.

This is something quite different from the old free competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of touch with one another, and producing for an unknown market. Concentration has reached the point at which it is possible to make an approximate estimate of all sources of raw materials (for example the iron ore deposits) of a country and even, as we shall see, of several countries, or of the whole world. Not only are such estimates made, but these sources are captured by gigantic monopolist associations. An approximate estimate of the capacity of markets is also made, and the associations "divide" them up amongst themselves by agreement. Skilled labour is monopolised, the best engineers are engaged; the means of transport are captured—railways in America, shipping companies in Europe and America. Capitalism in its imperialist stage leads directly to the most comprehensive socialisation of production; it, so to speak, drags the capitalists, against their will and consciousness, into some sort of a new social order, a transitional one from complete free competition to complete socialisation.

Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the private property of a few. The general framework of formally recognised free competition remains, and the yoke of a few monopolists on the rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable.

\* Riesser, *op. cit.*, third edition, p. 547 et seq. The newspapers (June 1916) report the formation of a new gigantic trust which combines the chemical industry of Germany.

The German economist, Kestner, has written a book especially devoted to "the struggle between the cartels and outsiders", i.e., the capitalists outside the cartels. He entitled his work *Compulsory Organisation*, although, in order to present capitalism in its true light, he should, of course, have written about compulsory submission to monopolist associations. It is instructive to glance at least at the list of the methods the monopolist associations resort to in the present-day, the latest, the civilised struggle for "organisation": (1) stopping supplies of raw materials (... "one of the most important methods of compelling adherence to the cartel"); (2) stopping the supply of labour by means of "alliances" (i.e., of agreements between the capitalists and the trade unions by which the latter permit their members to work only in cartelised enterprises); (3) stopping deliveries; (4) closing trade outlets; (5) agreements with the buyers, by which the latter undertake to trade only with the cartels; (6) systematic price cutting (to ruin "outside" firms, i.e., those which refuse to submit to the monopolists. Millions are spent in order to sell goods for a certain time below their cost price: there were instances when the price of petrol was thus reduced from 40 to 22 marks, i.e., almost by half!); (7) stopping credits; (8) boycott.

Here we no longer have competition between small and large, between technically developed and backward enterprises. We see here the monopolists throttling those who do not submit to them, to their yoke, to their dictation. This is how this process is reflected in the mind of a bourgeois economist:

"Even in the purely economic sphere," writes Kestner, "a certain change is taking place from commercial activity in the old sense of the word towards organisational-speculative activity. The greatest success no longer goes to the merchant whose technical and commercial experience enables him best of all to estimate the needs of the buyer, and who is able to discover and, so to speak, 'awaken' a latent demand; it goes to the speculative genius [?!] who knows how to estimate, or even only to sense in advance, the organisational development and the possibilities of certain connections between individual enterprises and the banks. . . ."

Translated into ordinary human language this means that the development of capitalism has arrived at a stage when, although commodity production still "reigns" and continues to be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in reality been undermined and the bulk of the profits go to the "geniuses" of financial manipulation. At the basis of these manipulations and swindles lies socialised production; but the immense progress of mankind, with achieved this socialisation, goes to benefit . . . the speculators. We shall see later how "on these

grounds" reactionary, petty-bourgeois critics of capitalist imperialism dream of going *back* to "free", "peaceful", and "honest" competition.

"The prolonged raising of prices which results from the formation of cartels," says Kestner, "has hitherto been observed only in respect of the most important means of production, particularly coal, iron and potassium, but never in respect of manufactured goods. Similarly, the increase in profits resulting from this raising of prices has been limited only to the industries which produce means of production. To this observation we must add that the industries which process raw materials (and not semi-manufactures) not only secure advantages from the cartel formation in the shape of high profits, to the detriment of the finished goods industry, but have also secured a *dominating position* over the latter, which did not exist under free competition."<sup>4</sup>

The words which I have italicised reveal the essence of the case which the bourgeois economists admit so reluctantly and so rarely, and which the present-day defenders of opportunism, led by Kautsky, so zealously try to evade and brush aside. Domination, and the violence that is associated with it, such are the relationships that are typical of the "latest phase of capitalist development"; this is what inevitably had to result, and has resulted, from the formation of all-powerful economic monopolies.

I shall give one more example of the methods employed by the cartels. Where it is possible to capture all or the chief sources of raw materials, the rise of cartels and formation of monopolies is particularly easy. It would be wrong, however, to assume that monopolies do not arise in other industries in which it is impossible to corner the sources of raw materials. The cement industry, for instance, can find its raw materials everywhere. Yet in Germany this industry too is strongly cartelised. The cement manufacturers have formed regional syndicates: South German, Rhine-Westphalian, etc. The prices fixed are monopoly prices: 230 to 280 marks a car-load, when the cost price is 180 marks! The enterprises pay a dividend of from 12 to 16 per cent—and it must not be forgotten that the "geniuses" of modern speculation know how to pocket big profits besides what they draw in dividends. In order to prevent competition in such a profitable industry, the monopolists even resort to various stratagems: they spread false rumours about the bad situation in their industry; anonymous warnings are published in the newspapers, like the following: "Capitalists, don't invest your capital in the cement industry!";

lastly, they buy up "outsiders" (those outside the syndicates) and pay them compensation of 60,000, 80,000 and even 150,000 marks.\* Monopoly hews a path for itself everywhere without scruple as to the means, from paying a "modest" sum to buy off competitors, to the American device of employing dynamite against them.

The statement that cartels can abolish crises is a fable spread by bourgeois economists who at all costs desire to place capitalism in a favourable light. On the contrary, the monopoly created in *certain* branches of industry increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capitalist production *as a whole*. The disparity between the development of agriculture and that of industry, which is characteristic of capitalism in general, is increased. The privileged position of the most highly cartelised, so-called *heavy* industry, especially coal and iron, causes "a still greater lack of co-ordination" in other branches of industry—as Jeidels, the author of one of the best works on "the relationship of the German big banks to industry", admits.\*\*

"The more developed an economic system is," writes Liefmann, an unblushing apologist of capitalism, "the more it resorts to risky enterprises, or enterprises in other countries, to those which need a great deal of time to develop, or finally, to those which are only of local importance."\*\*\* The increased risk is connected in the long run with a prodigious increase of capital, which, as it were, overflows the brim, flows abroad, etc. At the same time the extremely rapid rate of technical progress gives rise to increasing elements of disparity between the various spheres of national economy, to anarchy and crises. Liefmann is obliged to admit that: "In all probability mankind will see further important technical revolutions in the near future which will also affect the organisation of the economic system" . . . electricity and aviation. . . . "As a general rule, in such periods of radical economic change, speculation develops on a large scale." . . .\*\*\*\*

Crises of every kind—economic crises most frequently, but not only these—in their turn increase very considerably the tendency towards concentration and towards monopoly. In this connection, the following reflections of Jeidels on the significance of the crisis of 1900, which, as we have already seen, marked the turning-point in the history of modern monopoly, are exceedingly instructive:

\* L. Eschwege, "Zement" in *Die Bank*, 1909, 1, S. 115 et seq.

\*\* Jeidels, *Das Verhältnis der deutschen Grossbanken zur Industrie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Eisenindustrie*, Leipzig, 1905, S. 271.

\*\*\* Liefmann, *Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften*, S. 434.

\*\*\*\* *Ibid.*, S. 465-66.

Monopoly! This is the last word in the "latest phase of capitalist development". But we shall only have a very insufficient, incomplete, and poor notion of the real power and the significance of modern monopolies if we do not take into consideration the part played by the banks.

## II. BANKS AND THEIR NEW ROLE

As banking develops and becomes concentrated in a small number of establishments, the banks grow from modest middlemen into powerful monopolies having at their command almost the whole of the money capital of all the capitalists and small businessmen and also the larger part of the means of production and sources of raw materials in any one country and in a number of countries. This transformation of numerous modest middlemen into a handful of monopolists is one of the fundamental processes in the growth of capitalism into capitalist imperialism; for this reason we must first of all examine the concentration of banking.

· Jeldels, op. cit., S. 108.

In 1907-08, the combined deposits of the German joint-stock banks, each having a capital of more than a million marks, amounted to 7,000 million marks; in 1912-13, these deposits already amounted to 9,800 million marks, an increase of 40 per cent in five years; and of the 2,800 million increase, 2,750 million was divided among 57 banks, each having a capital of more than 10 million marks. The distribution of the deposits between big and small banks was as follows:\*

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEPOSITS

	In 9 big Berlin banks	In the other 46 banks with a capi- tal of more than 10 million marks	In 115 banks with a capital of 1-10 million marks	In small banks (with a capital of less than a mil- lion marks)
1907-08 . . . .	47	32.5	16.5	4
1912-13 . . . .	49	36	12	3

The small banks are being squeezed out by the big banks, of which only nine concentrate in their hands almost half the total deposits. But we have left out of account many important details, for instance, the transformation of numerous small banks into actual branches of the big banks, etc. Of this I shall speak later on.

At the end of 1913, Schulze-Gaevernitz estimated the deposits in the nine big Berlin banks at 5,100 million marks, out of a total of about 10,000 million marks. Taking into account not only the deposits, but the total bank capital, this author wrote: "At the end of 1909, the nine big Berlin banks, *together with their affiliated banks*, controlled 11,300 million marks, that is, about 83 per cent of the total German bank capital. The Deutsche Bank, which *together with its affiliated banks* controls nearly 3,000 million marks, represents, parallel to the Prussian State Railway Administration, the biggest and also the most decentralised accumulation of capital in the Old World."

I have emphasised the reference to the "affiliated" banks because it is one of the most important distinguishing features of modern capitalist concentration. The big enterprises, and the banks in particular, not only completely absorb the small ones, but also "annex" them, subordinate them, bring them into their "own" group or "concern" (to use the technical term) by acquiring "holdings" in their capital, by purchasing or exchanging shares, by a system of credits, etc., etc. Professor Liefmann has

\* Alfred Lansburgh, "Fünf Jahre deutsches Bankwesen" in *Die Bank*, 1913, No 8, S. 728

Schulze-Gaevernitz, "Die deutsche Kreditbank" in *Grundriss der Sozial-ökonomik*, Tübingen, 1915, S. 12, 137.

written a voluminous "work" of about 500 pages describing modern "holding and finance companies";\* unfortunately adding very dubious "theoretical" reflections to what is frequently undigested raw material. To what results this "holding" system leads in respect of concentration is best illustrated in the book written on the big German banks by Riese, himself a banker. But before examining his data, let us quote a concrete example of the "holding" system.

The Deutsche Bank "group" is one of the biggest, if not the biggest, of the big banking groups. In order to trace the main threads which connect all the banks in this group, a distinction must be made between holdings of the first and second and third degree, or what amounts to the same thing, between dependence (of the lesser banks on the Deutsche Bank) in the first, second and third degree. We then obtain the following picture

		Direct or 1st degree depen- dence	2nd degree de- pendence	3rd degree de- pendence
The Deutsche Bank has holdings	Permanently . . .	in 17 other banks	9 of the 17 have holdings in 34 other banks	4 of the 9 have holdings in 7 other banks
	For an indefinite period . . . . .	in 5 other banks	-	
	Occasionally . . .	in 8 other banks	5 of the 8 have holdings in 14 other banks	2 of the 5 have holdings in 2 other banks
	Totals . . . . .	in 30 other banks	14 of the 30 have holdings in 48 other banks	6 of the 14 have holdings in 9 other banks

Included in the eight banks "occasionally" dependent on the Deutsche Bank in the "first degree", are three foreign banks: one Austrian (the Wiener Bankverein) and two Russian (the Siberian Commercial Bank and the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade). Altogether, the Deutsche Bank group comprises, directly and indirectly, partially and totally, 87 banks: and the total capital—its own and that of others which it controls—is estimated at between two and three thousand million marks.

It is obvious that a bank which stands at the head of such a group, and which enters into agreement with half a dozen other

\* R. Liefmann, *Beteiligungs- und Finanzierungsgesellschaften Eine Studie über den modernen Kapitalismus und das Effektenwesen*, 1. Aufl., Jena, 1909. S. 212.

\* Alfred Lansburgh, "Das Beteiligungssystem im deutschen Bankwesen" in *Die Bank*, 1910, 1, S. 500.

banks only slightly smaller than itself for the purpose of conducting exceptionally big and profitable financial operations like floating state loans, has already outgrown the part of "middle-man" and has become an association of a handful of monopolists.

The rapidity with which the concentration of banking proceeded in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century is shown by the following data which we quote in an abbreviated form from Riesser:

#### SIX BIG BERLIN BANKS

Year	Branches in Germany	Deposit banks and exchange offices	Constant holdings in German joint- stock banks	Total establish- ments
1895 . . . .	16	14	1	42
1900 . . . .	21	40	8	80
1911 . . . .	104	276	63	450

We see the rapid expansion of a close network of channels which cover the whole country, centralising all capital and all revenues, transforming thousands and thousands of scattered economic enterprises into a single national capitalist, and then into a world capitalist economy. The "decentralisation" that Schulze-Gaevernitz, as an exponent of present-day bourgeois political economy, speaks of in the passage previously quoted, really means the subordination to a single centre of an increasing number of formerly relatively "independent", or rather, strictly local economic units. In reality it is *centralisation*, the enhancement of the role, importance and power of monopolist giants.

In the older capitalist countries this "banking network" is still more close. In Great Britain and Ireland, in 1910, there were in all 7,151 branches of banks. Four big banks had more than 400 branches each (from 447 to 689); four had more than 200 branches each, and eleven more than 100 each.

In France, *three* very big banks, Crédit Lyonnais, the Comptoir National and the Société Générale, extended their operations and their network of branches in the following manner.<sup>2</sup>

	Number of branches and offices			Capital (000,000 francs)	
	In the provinces	In Paris	Total	Own capital	Deposits used as capital
1870 . . . . .	47	17	64	200	427
1890 . . . . .	192	66	258	265	1,245
1909 . . . . .	1,033	196	1,229	887	4,363

<sup>2</sup> Eugen Kaufmann, *Das französische Bankwesen*, Tübingen, 1911, S. 356 und 362.



In order to show the "connections" of a big modern bank, Riesser gives the following figures of the number of letters dispatched and received by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, one of the biggest banks in Germany and in the world (its capital in 1914 amounted to 300 million marks):

	Letters received	Letters dispatched
1852 . . . . .	6,135	6,292
1870 . . . . .	85,800	87,513
1900 . . . . .	533,102	626,043

The number of accounts of the big Paris bank, the Crédit Lyonnais, increased from 28,535 in 1875 to 633,539 in 1912.\*

These simple figures show perhaps better than lengthy disquisitions how the concentration of capital and the growth of bank turnover are radically changing the significance of the banks. Scattered capitalists are transformed into a single collective capitalist. When carrying the current accounts of a few capitalists, a bank, as it were, transacts a purely technical and exclusively auxiliary operation. When, however, this operation grows to enormous dimensions we find that a handful of monopolists subordinate to their will all the operations, both commercial and industrial, of the whole of capitalist society; for they are enabled—by means of their banking connections, their current accounts and other financial operations—first, to *ascertain exactly* the financial position of the various capitalists, then to *control* them, to influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating or hindering credits, and finally to *entirely determine* their fate, determine their income, deprive them of capital, or permit them to increase their capital rapidly and to enormous dimensions, etc.

We have just mentioned the 300 million marks capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft of Berlin. This increase of the capital of the bank was one of the incidents in the struggle for hegemony between two of the biggest Berlin banks—the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto. In 1870, the first was still a novice and had a capital of only 15 million marks, while the second had a capital of 30 million marks. In 1908, the first had a capital of 200 million, while the second had 170 million. In 1914, the first increased its capital to 250 million and the second, by merging with another first-class big bank, the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein, increased its capital to 300 million. And, of course, this struggle for hegemony went hand in hand with the more and more frequent conclusion of "agreements" of an increasingly durable character between the two banks. The following are the conclusions that

this development forces upon banking specialists who regard economic questions from a standpoint which does not in the least exceed the bounds of the most moderate and cautious bourgeois reformism.

Commenting on the increase of the capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft to 300 million marks, the German review, *Die Bank*, wrote: "Other banks will follow this same path and in time the three hundred men, who today govern Germany economically, will gradually be reduced to fifty, twenty-five or still fewer. It cannot be expected that this latest move towards concentration will be confined to banking. The close relations that exist between individual banks naturally lead to the bringing together of the industrial syndicates which these banks favour. . . . One fine morning we shall wake up in surprise to see nothing but trusts before our eyes, and to find ourselves faced with the necessity of substituting state monopolies for private monopolies. However, we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, except that we have allowed things to follow their own course, slightly accelerated by the manipulation of stocks."<sup>\*</sup>

This is an example of the impotence of bourgeois journalism which differs from bourgeois science only in that the latter is less sincere and strives to obscure the essence of the matter, to hide the forest behind the trees. To be "surprised" at the results of concentration, to "reproach" the government of capitalist Germany, or capitalist "society" ("ourselves"), to fear that the introduction of stocks and shares might "accelerate" concentration in the same way as the German "cartel" specialist Tschierschky fears the American trusts and "prefers" the German cartels on the grounds that they "may not, like the trusts, excessively accelerate technical and economic progress"<sup>\*\*</sup>—is not all this a sign of impotence?

But facts remain facts. There are no trusts in Germany; there are "only" cartels—but Germany is *governed* by not more than three hundred magnates of capital, and the number of these is constantly diminishing. At all events, banks greatly intensify and accelerate the process of concentration of capital and the formation of monopolies in all capitalist countries, notwithstanding all the differences in their banking laws.

The banking system "possesses, indeed, the form of universal book-keeping and distribution of means of production on a social scale, but solely the form", wrote Marx in *Capital* half a century ago (Russ. trans., Vol. III, part II, p. 144<sup>366</sup>). The figures we

\* A. Lansburgh, "Die Bank mit den 300 Millionen" in *Die Bank*, 1914, I, S. 426

\*\* S. Tschierschky, op. cit., S. 126.

have quoted on the growth of bank capital, on the increase in the number of the branches and offices of the biggest banks, the increase in the number of their accounts, etc., present a concrete picture of this "universal book-keeping" of the *whole* capitalist class; and not only of the capitalists, for the banks collect, even though temporarily, all kinds of money revenues—of small businessmen, office clerks, and of a tiny upper stratum of the working class. "Universal distribution of means of production"—that, from the formal aspect, is what *grows* out of the modern banks, which, numbering some three to six of the biggest in France, and six to eight in Germany, control millions and millions. In *substance*, however, the distribution of means of production is not at all "universal", but private, i.e., it conforms to the interests of big capital, and primarily, of huge, monopoly capital, which operates under conditions in which the masses live in want, in which the whole development of agriculture hopelessly lags behind the development of industry, while within industry itself the "heavy industries" exact tribute from all other branches of industry.

In the matter of socialising capitalist economy the savings-banks and post-offices are beginning to compete with the banks; they are more "decentralised", i.e., their influence extends to a greater number of localities, to more remote places, to wider sections of the population. Here is the data collected by an American commission on the comparative growth of deposits in banks and savings-banks\*:

	DEPOSITS (000,000,000 MARKS)						
	Britain		France		Germany		
	Banks	Savings banks	Banks	Savings banks	Banks	Credit societies	Savings banks
880 . .	8.4	1.6	?	0.9	0.5	0.4	2.6
1888	12.4	2.0	1.5	2.1	1.1	0.4	4.5
1908	23.2	4.2	3.7	4.2	7.1	2.2	13.9

As they pay interest at the rate of 4 per cent and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent on deposits, the savings-banks must seek "profitable" investments for their capital, they must deal in bills mortgages, etc. The boundaries between the banks and the savings-banks "become more and more obliterated". The Chambers of Commerce of Bochum and Erfurt, for example, demand that savings-banks be "prohibited" from engaging in "purely" banking business, such as discounting bills; they demand the limitation of the "banking" operations of the post-office.<sup>3</sup> The banking magnates

<sup>\*</sup> *Statistics of the National Monetary Commission* quoted in *Die Bank*, 1910, 2 S. 1200

*Die Bank*, 1913, S. 811, 1022; 1914, S. 713

seem to be afraid that state monopoly will steal upon them from an unexpected quarter. It goes without saying, however, that this fear is no more than an expression of the rivalry, so to speak, between two department managers in the same office; for, on the one hand, the millions entrusted to the savings-banks are in the final analysis actually controlled by *these very same* bank capital magnates, while, on the other hand, state monopoly in capitalist society is merely a means of increasing and guaranteeing the income of millionaires in some branch of industry who are on the verge of bankruptcy.

The change from the old type of capitalism, in which free competition predominated, to the new capitalism, in which monopoly reigns, is expressed, among other things, by a decline in the importance of the Stock Exchange. The review, *Die Bank*, writes: "The Stock Exchange has long ceased to be the indispensable medium of circulation that it formerly was when the banks were not yet able to place the bulk of new issues with their clients."\*

"'Every bank is a Stock Exchange', and the bigger the bank, and the more successful the concentration of banking, the truer does this modern aphorism ring."\*\* "While formerly, in the seventies, the Stock Exchange, flushed with the exuberance of youth" (a "subtle" allusion to the Stock Exchange crash of 1873,<sup>367</sup> the company promotion scandals,<sup>368</sup> etc.), "opened the era of the industrialisation of Germany, nowadays the banks and industry are able to 'manage it alone'. The domination of our big banks over the Stock Exchange . . . is nothing else than the expression of the completely organised German industrial state. If the domain of the automatically functioning economic laws is thus restricted, and if the domain of conscious regulation by the banks is considerably enlarged, the national economic responsibility of a few guiding heads is immensely increased," so writes the German Professor Schulze-Gaevernitz,<sup>\*\*\*</sup> an apologist of German imperialism, who is regarded as an authority by the imperialists of all countries, and who tries to gloss over the "mere detail" that the "conscious regulation" of economic life by the banks consists in the fleecing of the public by a handful of "completely organised" monopolists. The task of a bourgeois professor is not to lay bare the entire mechanism, or to expose all the machinations of the bank monopolists, but rather to present them in a favourable light.

\* *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, S. 316.

\*\* Dr Oscar Stillich, *Geld- und Bankwesen*, Berlin, 1907, S. 169

\*\*\* Schulze-Gaevernitz, "Die deutsche Kreditbank" in *Grundriss der Sozial-ökonomik*, Tübingen, 1915. S. 101

In the same way, Riesser, a still more authoritative economist and himself a banker, makes shift with meaningless phrases in order to explain away undeniable facts: "...the Stock Exchange is steadily losing the feature which is absolutely essential for national economy as a whole and for the circulation of securities in particular—that of being not only a most exact measuring-rod, but also an almost automatic regulator of the economic movements which converge on it."\*

In other words, the old capitalism, the capitalism of free competition with its indispensable regulator, the Stock Exchange, is passing away. A new capitalism has come to take its place, bearing obvious features of something transient, a mixture of free competition and monopoly. The question naturally arises: *into what* is this new capitalism "developing"? But the bourgeois scholars are afraid to raise this question.

"Thirty years ago, businessmen, freely competing against one another, performed nine-tenths of the work connected with their business other than manual labour. At the present time, nine-tenths of this 'brain work' is performed by *employees*. Banking is in the forefront of this evolution."\*\* This admission by Schulze-Gaevernitz brings us once again to the question: *into what* is this new capitalism, capitalism in its imperialist stage, developing?

Among the few banks which remain at the head of all capitalist economy as a result of the process of concentration, there is naturally to be observed an increasingly marked tendency towards monopolist agreements, towards a *bank trust*. In America, not nine, but *two* very big banks, those of the multimillionaires Rockefeller and Morgan, control a capital of eleven thousand million marks.\*\*\* In Germany the absorption of the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein by the Disconto-Gesellschaft to which I referred above, was commented on in the following terms by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, an organ of Stock Exchange interests:

"The concentration movement of the banks is narrowing the circle of establishments from which it is possible to obtain credits, and is consequently increasing the dependence of big industry upon a small number of banking groups. In view of the close connection between industry and the financial world, the freedom of movement of industrial companies which need banking capital is restricted. For this reason, big industry is watching the growing trustification of the banks with mixed feelings.

\* Riesser, op. cit., 4th ed., S. 629.

\*\* Schulze-Gaevernitz, "Die deutsche Kreditbank" in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, Tübingen, 1915, S. 151.

\*\*\* *Die Bank*, 1912, 1, S. 435.

Indeed, we have repeatedly seen the beginnings of certain agreements between the individual big banking concerns, which aim at restricting competition.”\*

Again and again, the final word in the development of banking is monopoly.

As regards the close connection between the banks and industry, it is precisely in this sphere that the new role of the banks is, perhaps, most strikingly felt. When a bank discounts a bill for a firm, opens a current account for it, etc., these operations, taken separately, do not in the least diminish its independence, and the bank plays no other part than that of a modest middleman. But when such operations are multiplied and become an established practice, when the bank “collects” in its own hands enormous amounts of capital, when the running of a current account for a given firm enables the bank—and this is what happens—to obtain fuller and more detailed information about the economic position of its client, the result is that the industrial capitalist becomes more completely dependent on the bank.

At the same time a personal link-up, so to speak, is established between the banks and the biggest industrial and commercial enterprises, the merging of one with another through the acquisition of shares, through the appointment of bank directors to the Supervisory Boards (or Boards of Directors) of industrial and commercial enterprises, and vice versa. The German economist, Jcidels, has compiled most detailed data on this form of concentration of capital and of enterprises. Six of the biggest Berlin banks were represented by their directors in 344 industrial companies; and by their board members in 407 others, making a total of 751 companies. In 289 of these companies they either had two of their representatives on each of the respective Supervisory Boards, or held the posts of chairmen. We find these industrial and commercial companies in the most diverse branches of industry: insurance, transport, restaurants, theatres, art industry, etc. On the other hand, on the Supervisory Boards of these six banks (in 1910) were fifty-one of the biggest industrialists, including the director of Krupp, of the powerful “Hapag” (Hamburg-America Line), etc., etc. From 1895 to 1910, each of these six banks participated in the share and bond issues of many hundreds of industrial companies (the number ranging from 281 to 419).\*\*

The “personal link-up” between the banks and industry is supplemented by the “personal link-up” between both of them

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Quoted by Schulze-Gaevernitz, *op. cit.*, S. 155.

\* Jcidels, *op. cit.*; Riesser, *op. cit.*

and the government. "Seats on Supervisory Boards," writes Jeidels, "are freely offered to persons of title, also to ex-civil servants, who are able to do a great deal to facilitate [!] relations with the authorities." . . . "Usually, on the Supervisory Board of a big bank, there is a member of parliament or a Berlin city councillor."

The building and development, so to speak, of the big capitalist monopolies is therefore going on full steam head in all "natural" and "supernatural" ways. A sort of division of labour is being systematically developed among the several hundred kings of finance who reign over modern capitalist society:

"Simultaneously with this widening of the sphere of activity of certain big industrialists [joining the boards of banks, etc.] and with the assignment of provincial bank managers to definite industrial regions, there is a growth of specialisation among the directors of the big banks. Generally speaking, this specialisation is only conceivable when banking is conducted on a large scale, and particularly when it has widespread connections with industry. This division of labour proceeds along two lines: on the one hand, relations with industry as a whole are entrusted to one director, as his special function; on the other, each director assumes the supervision of several separate enterprises, or of a group of enterprises in the same branch of industry or having similar interests. . . . [Capitalism has already reached the stage of organised *supervision* of individual enterprises] One specialises in German industry, sometimes even in West German industry alone [the West is the most industrialised part of Germany], others specialise in relations with foreign states and foreign industry, in information on the characters of industrialists and others, in Stock Exchange questions, etc. Besides, each bank director is often assigned a special locality or a special branch of industry: one works chiefly on Supervisory Boards of electric companies, another, on chemical, brewing, or beet sugar plants, a third, in a few isolated industrial enterprises, but at the same time works on the Supervisory Boards of insurance companies. . . . In short, there can be no doubt that the growth in the dimensions and diversity of the big banks' operations is accompanied by an increase in the division of labour among their directors with the object (and result) of, so to speak, lifting them somewhat out of pure banking and making them better experts, better judges of the general problems of industry and the special problems of each branch of industry, thus making them more capable of acting within the respective bank's industrial sphere of influence. This system is supplemented by the banks' endeavours to elect to their Supervisory Boards men who are experts in industrial affairs, such

as industrialists, former officials, especially those formerly in the railway service or in mining," etc.\*

We find the same system only in a slightly different form in French banking. For instance, one of the three biggest French banks, the *Crédit Lyonnais*, has organised a financial research service (*service des études financières*), which permanently employs over fifty engineers, statisticians, economists, lawyers, etc. This costs from six to seven hundred thousand francs annually. The service is in turn divided into eight departments: one specialises in collecting information on industrial establishments, another studies general statistics, a third, railway and steamship companies, a fourth, securities, a fifth, financial reports, etc.\*\*

The result is, on the one hand, the ever-growing merger, or, as N. I. Bukharin aptly calls it, coalescence, of bank and industrial capital and, on the other hand, the growth of the banks into institutions of a truly "universal character". On this question I find it necessary to quote the exact terms used by Jeidels, who has best studied the subject:

"An examination of the sum total of industrial relationships reveals the *universal character* of the financial establishments working on behalf of industry. Unlike other kinds of banks, and contrary to the demand sometimes expressed in the literature that banks should specialise in one kind of business or in one branch of industry in order to prevent the ground from slipping from under their feet—the big banks are striving to make their connections with industrial enterprises as varied as possible in respect of the locality or branches of industry and are striving to eliminate the unevenness in the distribution of capital among localities and branches of industry resulting from the historical development of individual enterprises." "One tendency is to make the connections with industry general; another tendency is to make them durable and close. In the six big banks both these tendencies are realised, not in full, but to a considerable extent and to an equal degree."

Quite often industrial and commercial circles complain of the "terrorism" of the banks. And it is not surprising that such complaints are heard, for the big banks "command", as will be seen from the following example. On November 19, 1901, one of the big, so-called Berlin "D" banks (the names of the four biggest banks begin with the letter D) wrote to the Board of Directors of the German Central Northwest Cement Syndicate in the

\* Jeidels, op. cit., S. 157.

\*\* An article by Eug. Kaufmann on French banks in *Die Bank*, 1909, 2, S 851 et seq



following terms: "As we learn from the notice you published in a certain newspaper of the 18th inst., we must reckon with the possibility that the next general meeting of your syndicate, to be held on the 30th of this month, may decide on measures which are likely to effect changes in your enterprise which are unacceptable to us. We deeply regret that, for these reasons, we are obliged henceforth to withdraw the credit which had hitherto been allowed you. . . . But if the said next general meeting does not decide upon measures which are unacceptable to us, and if we receive suitable guarantees on this matter for the future, we shall be quite willing to open negotiations with you on the grant of a new credit."\*

As a matter of fact, this is small capital's old complaint about being oppressed by big capital, but in this case it was a whole syndicate that fell into the category of "small" capital! The old struggle between small and big capital is being resumed at a new and immeasurably higher stage of development. It stands to reason that the big banks' enterprises, worth many millions, can accelerate technical progress with means that cannot possibly be compared with those of the past. The banks, for example, set up special technical research societies, and, of course, only "friendly" industrial enterprises benefit from their work. To this category belong the Electric Railway Research Association, the Central Bureau of Scientific and Technical Research, etc.

The directors of the big banks themselves cannot fail to see that new conditions of national economy are being created: but they are powerless in the face of these phenomena.

"Anyone who has watched, in recent years," writes Jærdels, "the changes of incumbents of directorships and seats on the Supervisory Boards of the big banks, cannot fail to have noticed that power is gradually passing into the hands of men who consider the active intervention of the big banks in the general development of industry to be necessary and of increasing importance. Between these new men and the old bank directors, disagreements on this subject of a business and often of a personal nature are growing. The issue is whether or not the banks, as credit institutions, will suffer from this intervention in industry, whether they are sacrificing tried principles and an assured profit to engage in a field of activity which has nothing in common with their role as middlemen in providing credit, and which is leading the banks into a field where they are more than ever before exposed to the blind forces of trade fluctuations. This is the opinion of many of the older bank directors, while most of the young men consider active intervention in industry to be a necessity

\* Dr. Oscar Stillich, *Geld- und Bankwesen*, Berlin, 1907, S. 148

as great as that which gave rise, simultaneously with big modern industry, to the big banks and modern industrial banking. The two parties are agreed only on one point: that there are neither firm principles nor a concrete aim in the new activities of the big banks.”\*

The old capitalism has had its day. The new capitalism represents a transition towards something. It is hopeless, of course, to seek for “firm principles and a concrete aim” for the purpose of “reconciling” monopoly with free competition. The admission of the practical men has quite a different ring from the official praises of the charms of “organised” capitalism sung by its apologists. Schulze-Gaevernitz, Liefmann and similar “theoreticians”.

At precisely what period were the “new activities” of the big banks finally established? Jeidels gives us a fairly exact answer to this important question:

“The connections between the banks and industrial enterprises, with their new content, their new forms and their new organs, namely, the big banks which are organised on both a centralised and a decentralised basis, were scarcely a characteristic economic phenomenon before the nineties; in one sense, indeed, this initial date may be advanced to the year 1897, when the important ‘mergers’ took place and when, for the first time, the new form of decentralised organisation was introduced to suit the industrial policy of the banks. This starting-point could perhaps be placed at an even later date, for it was the crisis of 1900 that enormously accelerated and intensified the process of concentration of industry and of banking, consolidated that process, for the first time transformed the connection with industry into the actual monopoly of the big banks, and made this connection much closer and more active.”\*\*

Thus, the twentieth century marks the turning-point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital.

### III. FINANCE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY

“A steadily increasing proportion of capital in industry,” writes Hilferding, “ceases to belong to the industrialists who employ it. They obtain the use of it only through the medium of the banks which, in relation to them, represent the owners

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Jeidels, *op. cit.*, S. 183-84  
*Ibid.*, S. 181.

of the capital. On the other hand, the bank is forced to sink an increasing share of its funds in industry. Thus, to an ever greater degree the banker is being transformed into an industrial capitalist. This bank capital, i.e., capital in money form, which is thus actually transformed into industrial capital, I call 'finance capital'." "Finance capital is capital controlled by banks and employed by industrialists."\*

This definition is incomplete insofar as it is silent on one extremely important fact—on the increase of concentration of production and of capital to such an extent that concentration is leading, and has led, to monopoly. But throughout the whole of his work, and particularly in the two chapters preceding the one from which this definition is taken, Hilferding stresses the part played by *capitalist monopolies*.

The concentration of production: the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks with industry—such is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the content of that concept.

We now have to describe how, under the general conditions of commodity production and private property, the "business operations" of capitalist monopolies inevitably lead to the domination of a financial oligarchy. It should be noted that German—and not only German—bourgeois scholars, like Riesser, Schulze-Gaevernitz, Liefmann and others, are all apologists of imperialism and of finance capital. Instead of revealing the "mechanics" of the formation of an oligarchy, its methods, the size of its revenues "inpeccable and peccable", its connections with parliaments, etc., etc., they obscure or gloss over them. They evade these "vexed questions" by pompous and vague phrases, appeals to the "sense of responsibility" of bank directors, by praising "the sense of duty" of Prussian officials, giving serious study to the petty details of absolutely ridiculous parliamentary bills for the "supervision" and "regulation" of monopolies, playing spillikins with theories, like, for example, the following "scholarly" definition, arrived at by Professor Liefmann: "***Commerce is an occupation having for its object the collection, storage and supply of goods.***"\*\* (The Professor's bold-face italics.) . . . From this it would follow that commerce existed in the time of primitive man, who knew nothing about exchange, and that it will exist under socialism!

But the monstrous facts concerning the monstrous rule of the financial oligarchy are so glaring that in all capitalist countries, in America, France and Germany, a whole literature has sprung

\* R. Hilferding. *Finance Capital*, Moscow, 1912 (in Russian), pp. 338-39.

\*\* R. Liefmann, op. cit., S. 476.

up, written from the *bourgeois* point of view, but which, nevertheless, gives a fairly truthful picture and criticism—petty-bourgeois, naturally—of this oligarchy.

Paramount importance attaches to the “holding system”, already briefly referred to above. The German economist, Heymann, probably the first to call attention to this matter, describes the essence of it in this way:

“The head of the concern controls the principal company [literally: the “mother company”]; the latter reigns over the subsidiary companies [“daughter companies”] which in their turn control still other subsidiaries [“grandchild companies”], etc. In this way, it is possible with a comparatively small capital to dominate immense spheres of production. Indeed, if holding 50 per cent of the capital is always sufficient to control a company, the head of the concern needs only one million to control eight million in the second subsidiaries. And if this ‘interlocking’ is extended, it is possible with one million to control sixteen million, thirty-two million, etc.”\*

As a matter of fact, experience shows that it is sufficient to own 40 per cent of the shares of a company in order to direct its affairs,\*\* since in practice a certain number of small, scattered shareholders find it impossible to attend general meetings, etc. The “democratisation” of the ownership of shares, from which the bourgeois sophists and opportunist so-called “Social-Democrats” expect (or say that they expect) the “democratisation of capital”, the strengthening of the role and significance of small-scale production, etc., is, in fact, one of the ways of increasing the power of the financial oligarchy. Incidentally, this is why, in the more advanced, or in the older and more “experienced” capitalist countries, the law allows the issue of shares of smaller denomination. In Germany, the law does not permit the issue of shares of less than one thousand marks denomination, and the magnates of German finance look with an envious eye at Britain, where the issue of one-pound shares (=20 marks, about 10 rubles) is permitted. Siemens, one of the biggest industrialists and “financial kings” in Germany, told the Reichstag on June 7, 1900, that “the one-pound share is the basis of British imperialism”\*\*\*. This merchant has a much deeper and more “Marxist” understanding of imperialism than a certain disreputable writer who is held to be one of the founders of Russian Marxism<sup>369</sup> and believes that imperialism is a bad habit of a certain nation. . . .

\*Hans Gideon Heymann, *Die gemischten Werke im deutschen Grosseisen-gewerbe*, Stuttgart, 1904, S. 268-69.

\*\* Liefmann, *Beteiligungsgesellschaften*, etc., S. 258 of the first edition

\*\*\* Schulze-Gacvernitz in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, V, 2, S. 110.

But the "holding system" not only serves enormously to increase the power of the monopolists; it also enables them to resort with impunity to all sorts of shady and dirty tricks to cheat the public, because formally the directors of the "mother company" are not legally responsible for the "daughter company", which is supposed to be "independent", and *through the medium* of which they can "pull off" *anything*. Here is an example taken from the German review, *Die Bank*, for May 1914:

"The Spring Steel Company of Kassel was regarded some years ago as being one of the most profitable enterprises in Germany. Through bad management its dividends fell from 15 per cent to nil. It appears that the Board, without consulting the shareholders, had loaned *six million marks* to one of its 'daughter companies', the Hassia Company, which had a nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands of marks. This commitment, amounting to nearly treble the capital of the 'mother company', was never mentioned in its balance-sheets. This omission was quite legal and could be hushed up for two whole years because it did not violate any point of company law. The chairman of the Supervisory Board, who as the responsible head had signed the false balance-sheets, was, and still is, the president of the Kassel Chamber of Commerce. The shareholders only heard of the loan to the Hassia Company long afterwards, when it had been proved to be a mistake"... (the writer should put this word in inverted commas) ... "and when Spring Steel shares dropped nearly 100 per cent, because those in the know were getting rid of them...."

"*This typical example of balance-sheet jugglery, quite common in joint-stock companies, explains why their Boards of Directors are willing to undertake risky transactions with a far lighter heart than individual businessmen. Modern methods of drawing up balance-sheets not only make it possible to conceal doubtful undertakings from the ordinary shareholder, but also allow the people most concerned to escape the consequence of unsuccessful speculation by selling their shares in time when the individual businessman risks his own skin in everything he does....*

"The balance-sheets of many joint-stock companies put us in mind of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from which the visible inscription had first to be erased in order to discover beneath it another inscription giving the real meaning of the document. [Palimpsests are parchment documents from which the original inscription has been erased and another inscription imposed.]

"The simplest and, therefore, most common procedure for

making balance-sheets indecipherable is to divide a single business into several parts by setting up 'daughter companies'—or by annexing them. The advantages of this system for various purposes—legal and illegal—are so evident that big companies which do not employ it are quite the exception.”\*

As an example of a huge monopolist company that extensively employs this system, the author quotes the famous General Electric Company (the A.E.G., to which I shall refer again later on). In 1912, it was calculated that this company held shares in 175 to 200 other companies dominating them, of course, and thus controlling a total capital of about 1,500 million marks.\*\*

None of the rules of control, the publication of balance-sheets, the drawing up of balance-sheets according to a definite form, the public auditing of accounts, etc., the things about which well-intentioned professors and officials—that is, those imbued with the good intention of defending and prettyfying capitalism—discourse to the public, are of any avail; for private property is sacred, and no one can be prohibited from buying, selling, exchanging or hypothecating shares, etc.

The extent to which this “holding system” has developed in the big Russian banks may be judged by the figures given by E. Agahd, who for fifteen years was an official of the Russo-Chinese Bank and who, in May 1914, published a book, not altogether correctly entitled *Big Banks and the World Market*\*\*\*. The author divides the big Russian banks into two main groups: (a) banks that come under the “holding system”, and (b) “independent” banks—“independence”, however, being arbitrarily taken to mean independence of *foreign* banks. The author divides the first group into three subgroups: (1) German holdings, (2) British holdings, and (3) French holdings, having in view the “holdings” and domination of the big foreign banks of the particular country mentioned. The author divides the capital of the banks into “productively” invested capital (industrial and commercial undertakings), and “speculatively” invested capital (in Stock Exchange and financial operations), assuming, from his petty-bourgeois reformist point of view, that it is possible, under capitalism, to separate the first form of investment from the second and to abolish the second form.

Here are the figures he supplies:

\* L. Eschwege, “Tochtergesellschaften” in *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, S. 545.

\*\* Kurt Heinig, “Der Weg des Elektrotrusts” in *Die Neue Zeit*, 1912, 30 Jahrg., 2, S. 484.

\*\*\* E. Agahd, *Grossbanken und Weltmarkt. Die wirtschaftliche und politische Bedeutung der Grossbanken im Weltmarkt unter Berücksichtigung ihres Einflusses auf Russlands Volkswirtschaft und die deutsche-russischen Beziehungen*, Berlin, 1914.

## BANK ASSETS

(According to Reports for October November 1913)  
000,000 rubles

Groups of Russian banks	Capital invested		
	Productively	Speculatively	Total
a 1) Four banks: Siberian Commercial, Russian, International, and Discount Bank	413 7	859 1	1,272 8
a 2) Two banks: Commercial and Industrial, and Russo-British . . . . .	239 3	169 1	408 4
a 3) Five banks: Russian Asiatic, St. Petersburg Private, Azov-Don, Union Moscow, Russo-French Commercial	711 8	661 2	1,373
(11 banks) Total . . . a)	1,364 8	1,689 4	3,054 2
b) Eight banks: Moscow Merchants, Volga-Kama, Junker and Co., St. Petersburg Commercial (formerly Wawelberg), Bank of Moscow (formerly Ryabushinsky), Moscow Discount, Moscow Commercial, Moscow Private	504 2	391 1	895 3
(19 banks) Total . . .	1,869 0	2,080 5	3,949 5

According to these figures, of the approximately 4,000 million rubles making up the "working" capital of the big banks, *more than three-fourths*, more than 3,000 million, belonged to banks, which in reality were only "daughter companies" of foreign banks, and chiefly of Paris banks (the famous trio: Union Parisienne, Paris et Pays-Bas and Société Générale), and of Berlin banks (particularly the Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft). Two of the biggest Russian banks—the Russian (Russian Bank for Foreign Trade) and the International (St. Petersburg International Commercial Bank), between 1906 and 1912 increased their capital from 44 to 98 million rubles, and their reserves from 15 million to 39 million "employing three-fourths German capital". The first bank belongs to the Berlin Deutsche Bank "concern" and the second to the Berlin Disconto-Gesellschaft. The worthy Agahd is deeply indignant at the majority of the shares being held by the Berlin banks, so that the Russian shareholders are, therefore, powerless. Naturally, the country which exports capital skims the

cream; for example, the Berlin Deutsche Bank, before placing the shares of the Siberian Commercial Bank on the Berlin market, kept them in its portfolio for a whole year, and then sold them at the rate of 193 for 100, that is, at nearly twice their nominal value, "earning" a profit of nearly six million rubles, which Hilferding calls "promoter's profits".

Our author puts the total "capacity" of the principal St. Petersburg banks at 8,235 million rubles, well over 8,000 million, and the "holdings", or rather, the extent to which foreign banks dominated them, he estimates as follows: French banks, 55 per cent; British, 10 per cent; German, 35 per cent. The author calculates that of the total of 8,235 million rubles of functioning capital, 3,687 million rubles, or over 40 per cent, fall to the share of the Produgol and Prodamet syndicates and the syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and cement industries. Thus, owing to the formation of capitalist monopolies, the merging of bank and industrial capital has also made enormous strides in Russia.

Finance capital, concentrated in a few hands and exercising a virtual monopoly, exacts enormous and ever-increasing profits from the floating of companies, issue of stock, state loans, etc., strengthens the domination of the financial oligarchy and levies tribute upon the whole of society for the benefit of monopolists. Here is an example, taken from a multitude of others, of the "business" methods of the American trusts, quoted by Hilferding. In 1887, Havenmeyer founded the Sugar Trust by amalgamating fifteen small firms, whose total capital amounted to 6,500,000 dollars. Suitably "watered", as the Americans say, the capital of the trust was declared to be 50 million dollars. This "over-capitalisation" anticipated the monopoly profits, in the same way as the United States Steel Corporation anticipates its monopoly profits in buying up as many iron ore fields as possible. In fact, the Sugar Trust set up monopoly prices, which secured it such profits that it could pay 10 per cent dividend on capital "watered" *sevenfold, or about 70 per cent on the capital actually invested at the time the trust was formed!* In 1909, the capital of the Sugar Trust amounted to 90 million dollars. In twenty-two years, it had increased its capital more than tenfold.

In France the domination of the "financial oligarchy" (*Against the Financial Oligarchy in France*, the title of the well-known book by Lysis, the fifth edition of which was published in 1908) assumed a form that was only slightly different. Four of the most powerful banks enjoy, not a relative, but an "absolute monopoly" in the issue of bonds. In reality, this is a "trust of big banks". And monopoly ensures monopoly profits from bond issues. Usually a borrowing country does not get more than 90 per cent of the sum of the loan, the remaining 10 per cent goes to the banks



and other middlemen. The profit made by the banks out of the Russo-Chinese loan of 400 million francs amounted to 8 per cent; out of the Russian (1904) loan of 800 million francs the profit amounted to 10 per cent; and out of the Moroccan (1904) loan of 62,500,000 francs it amounted to 18.75 per cent. Capitalism, which began its development with petty usury capital, is ending its development with gigantic usury capital. "The French," says Lysis, "are the usurers of Europe." All the conditions of economic life are being profoundly modified by this transformation of capitalism. With a stationary population, and stagnant industry, commerce and shipping, the "country" can grow rich by usury. "Fifty persons, representing a capital of eight million francs, can control 2,000 million francs deposited in four banks." The "holding system", with which we are already familiar, leads to the same result. One of the biggest banks, the Société Générale, for instance, issues 61,000 bonds for its "daughter company", the Egyptian Sugar Refineries. The bonds are sold at 150 per cent, i.e., the bank gains 50 centimes on the franc. The dividends of the new company were found to be fictitious, the "public" lost from 90 to 100 million francs. "One of the directors of the Société Générale was a member of the board of directors of the Sugar Refineries." It is not surprising that the author is driven to the conclusion that "the French Republic is a financial monarchy"; "it is the complete domination of the financial oligarchy; the latter dominates over the press and the government."

The extraordinarily high rate of profit obtained from the issue of bonds, which is one of the principal functions of finance capital, plays a very important part in the development and consolidation of the financial oligarchy. "There is not a single business of this type within the country that brings in profits even approximately equal to those obtained from the flotation of foreign loans," says *Die Bank*.\*

"No banking operation brings in profits comparable with those obtained from the issue of securities!" According to the *German Economist*, the average annual profits made on the issue of industrial stock were as follows:

	per cent
1895 . . . . .	38.6
1896 . . . . .	36.1
1897 . . . . .	66.7
1898 . . . . .	67.7
1899 . . . . .	66.9
1900 . . . . .	55.2

\* Lysis, *Contre l'oligarchie financière en France*, 5 éd. Paris 1908 pp. 11, 12, 26, 39, 40, 48.

\*\* *Die Bank*, 1913, No 7, S. 630.

"In the ten years from 1891 to 1900, *more than a thousand million marks* were 'earned' by issuing German industrial stock."\*

During periods of industrial boom, the profits of finance capital are immense, but during periods of depression, small and unsound businesses go out of existence, and the big banks acquire "holdings" in them by buying them up for a mere song, or participate in profitable schemes for their "reconstruction" and "reorganisation". In the "reconstruction" of undertakings which have been running at a loss, "the share capital is written down, that is, profits are distributed on a smaller capital and continue to be calculated on this smaller basis. Or, if the income has fallen to zero, new capital is called in, which, combined with the old and less remunerative capital, will bring in an adequate return." "Incidentally," adds Hilferding, "all these reorganisations and reconstructions have a twofold significance for the banks: first, as profitable transactions; and secondly, as opportunities for securing control of the companies in difficulties."\*\*

Here is an instance. The Union Mining Company of Dortmund was founded in 1872. Share capital was issued to the amount of nearly 40 million marks and the market price of the shares rose to 170 after it had paid a 12 per cent dividend for its first year. Finance capital skimmed the cream and earned a trifle of something like 28 million marks. The principal sponsor of this company was that very big German Disconto-Gesellschaft which so successfully attained a capital of 300 million marks. Later, the dividends of the Union declined to nil; the shareholders had to consent to a "writing down" of capital, that is, to losing some of it in order not to lose it all. By a series of "reconstructions", more than 73 million marks were written off the books of the Union in the course of thirty years. "At the present time, the original shareholders of the company possess only 5 per cent of the nominal value of their shares"\*\*\* but the banks "earned something" out of every "reconstruction".

Speculation in land situated in the suburbs of rapidly growing big towns is a particularly profitable operation for finance capital. The monopoly of the banks merges here with the monopoly of ground-rent and with monopoly of the means of communication, since the rise in the price of land and the possibility of selling it profitably in lots, etc., is mainly dependent on good means of communication with the centre of the town: and these means of communication are in the hands of large companies which are

\* Stillich, op. cit., S. 143, also W. Sombart, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert*, 2. Aufl., 1909, S. 526, Anlage b.

\*\* *Finance Capital*, p. 172.

\*\*\* Stillich, op. cit., S. 138 and Liefmann, op. cit., S. 51.

connected with these same banks through the holding system and the distribution of seats on the boards. As a result we get what the German writer, L. Eschwege, a contributor to *Die Bank* who has made a special study of real estate business and mortgages, etc., calls a "bog". Frantic speculation in suburban building lots; collapse of building enterprises like the Berlin firm of Boswau and Knauer, which acquired as much as 100 million marks with the help of the "sound and solid" Deutsche Bank--the latter, of course, acting through the holding system, i.e., secretly, behind the scenes--and got out of it with a loss of "only" 12 million marks, then the ruin of small proprietors and of workers who get nothing from the fictitious building firms, fraudulent deals with the "honest" Berlin police and administration for the purpose of gaining control of the issue of cadastral certificates, building licences, etc., etc.\*

"American ethics", which the European professors and well-meaning bourgeois so hypocritically deplore, have, in the age of finance capital, become the ethics of literally every large city in any country.

At the beginning of 1914, there was talk in Berlin of the formation of a "transport trust", i.e., of establishing "community of interests" between the three Berlin transport undertakings: the city electric railway, the tramway company and the omnibus company. "We have been aware," wrote *Die Bank*, "that this plan was contemplated ever since it became known that the majority of the shares in the bus company had been acquired by the other two transport companies. . . . We may fully believe those who are pursuing this aim when they say that by uniting the transport services, they will secure economies, part of which will in time benefit the public. But the question is complicated by the fact that behind the transport trust that is being formed are the banks, which, if they desire, can subordinate the means of transportation, which they have monopolised, to the interests of their real estate business. To be convinced of the reasonableness of such a conjecture, we need only recall that the interests of the big bank that encouraged the formation of the Electric Railway Company were already involved in it at the time the company was formed. That is to say: the interests of this transport undertaking were interlocked with the real estate interests. The point is that the eastern line of this railway was to run across land which this bank sold at an enormous profit for itself and for several partners in the transactions when it became certain the line was to be laid down"\*\*\*

\* In *Die Bank*, 1913, S. 952, L. Eschwege, *Der Sumpf*; *ibid*, 1912, 1, S. 223 et seq.

\*\*\* "Verkehrstrust" in *Die Bank*, 1914, 1, S. 89

A monopoly, once it is formed and controls thousands of millions, inevitably penetrates into *every* sphere of public life, regardless of the form of government and all other "details". In German economic literature one usually comes across obsequious praise of the integrity of the Prussian bureaucracy, and allusions to the French Panama scandal<sup>370</sup> and to political corruption in America. But the fact is that *even* bourgeois literature devoted to German banking matters constantly has to go far beyond the field of purely banking operations; it speaks, for instance, about "the attraction of the banks" in reference to the increasing frequency with which public officials take employment with the banks, as follows: "How about the integrity of a state official who in his innermost heart is aspiring to a soft job in the Behrenstrasse?"\* (The Berlin street where the head office of the Deutsche Bank is situated.) In 1909, the publisher of *Die Bank*, Alfred Lansburgh, wrote an article entitled "The Economic Significance of Byzantinism", in which he incidentally referred to Wilhelm II's tour of Palestine, and to "the immediate result of this journey, the construction of the Baghdad railway, that fatal 'great product of German enterprise', which is more responsible for the 'encirclement' than all our political blunders put together".\*\* (By encirclement is meant the policy of Edward VII to isolate Germany and surround her with an imperialist anti-German alliance.) In 1911, Eschwege, the contributor to this same magazine to whom I have already referred, wrote an article entitled "Plutocracy and Bureaucracy", in which he exposed, for example, the case of a German official named Völker, who was a zealous member of the Cartel Committee and who, it turned out some time later, obtained a lucrative post in the biggest cartel, the Steel Syndicate. Similar cases, by no means casual, forced this bourgeois author to admit that "the economic liberty guaranteed by the German Constitution has become in many departments of economic life, a meaningless phrase" and that under the existing rule of the plutocracy, "even the widest political liberty cannot save us from being converted into a nation of unfree people".\*\*\*

As for Russia. I shall confine myself to one example. Some years ago, all the newspapers announced that Davydov, the director of the Credit Department of the Treasury, had resigned his post to take employment with a certain big bank at a salary which, according to the contract, would total over one million rubles in the course of several years. The Credit Department is

\* "Der Zug zur Bank" in *Die Bank*, 1909, 1, S. 79.

\*\* *Ibid.*, S. 301.

\*\*\* *Ibid.*, 1911, 2, S. 825; 1913, 2, S. 962

an institution, the function of which is to "co-ordinate the activities of all the credit institutions of the country" and which grants subsidies to banks in St. Petersburg and Moscow amounting to between 800 and 1,000 million rubles.\*

It is characteristic of capitalism in general that the ownership of capital is separated from the application of capital to production, that money capital is separated from industrial or productive capital, and that the rentier who lives entirely on income obtained from money capital, is separated from the entrepreneur and from all who are directly concerned in the management of capital. Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of capitalism in which this separation reaches vast proportions. The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital means the predominance of the rentier and of the financial oligarchy; it means that a small number of financially "powerful" states stand out among all the rest. The extent to which this process is going on may be judged from the statistics on emissions, i.e., the issue of all kinds of securities.

In the *Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute*, A. Neymarck\*\* has published very comprehensive, complete and comparative figures covering the issue of securities all over the world, which have been repeatedly quoted in part in economic literature. The following are the totals he gives for four decades:

TOTAL ISSUES IN FRANCS PER DECADE  
(000,000,000)

1871— 80 . . . . .	76.1
1881— 90 . . . . .	64.5
1891—1900 . . . . .	100.4
1901— 10 . . . . .	197.8

In the 1870s the total amount of issues for the whole world was high, owing particularly to the loans floated in connection with the Franco-Prussian War, and the company-promotion boom which set in in Germany after the war. On the whole, the increase was relatively not very rapid during the three last decades of the nineteenth century, and only in the first ten years of the twentieth century is an enormous increase of almost 100 per cent to be observed. Thus the beginning of the twentieth century marks the turning-point, not only in the growth of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts), of which we have already spoken, but also in the growth of finance capital.

\* F. Agahd, op. cit., S. 202.

*Bulletin de l'institut international de statistique*, t. XIX, livr. II, La Haye, 1912. Data concerning small states, second column, are estimated by adding 20 per cent to the 1902 figures.

Neymarck estimates the total amount of issued securities current in the world in 1910 at about 815,000 million francs. Deducting from this sum amounts which might have been duplicated, he reduces the total to 575,000-600,000 million, which is distributed among the various countries as follows (I take 600,000 million):

## FINANCIAL SECURITIES CURRENT IN 1910

(000,000,000 francs)

Great Britain . . . . .	142	} 479	Holland . . . . .	12.5
United States . . . . .	132		Belgium . . . . .	7.5
France . . . . .	115		Spain . . . . .	7.5
Germany . . . . .	95		Switzerland . . . . .	6.25
Russia . . . . .	31		Denmark . . . . .	3.75
Austria-Hungary . . . . .	24		Sweden, Norway, Rumania, etc. . . . .	2.5
Italy . . . . .	14			
Japan . . . . .	12		<i>Total</i> . . . . .	600

From these figures we at once see standing out in sharp relief four of the richest capitalist countries, each of which holds securities to amounts ranging approximately from 100,000 to 150,000 million francs. Of these four countries, two, Britain and France, are the oldest capitalist countries, and, as we shall see, possess the most colonies; the other two, the United States and Germany, are capitalist countries leading in the rapidity of development and the degree of extension of capitalist monopolies in industry. Together, these four countries own 479,000 million francs, that is, nearly 80 per cent of the world's finance capital. In one way or another, nearly the whole of the rest of the world is more or less the debtor to and tributary of these international banker countries, these four "pillars" of world finance capital.

It is particularly important to examine the part which the export of capital plays in creating the international network of dependence on and connections of finance capital.

#### IV. EXPORT OF CAPITAL

Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition held undivided sway, was the export of *goods*. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of *capital*.

Capitalism is commodity production at its highest stage of development, when labour-power itself becomes a commodity. The growth of internal exchange, and, particularly, of international exchange, is a characteristic feature of capitalism. The uneven and spasmodic development of individual enterprises, individual branches of industry and individual countries is inevitable under

the capitalist system. England became a capitalist country before any other, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, having adopted free trade, claimed to be the "workshop of the world", the supplier of manufactured goods to all countries, which in exchange were to keep her provided with raw materials. But in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, *this* monopoly was already undermined; for other countries, sheltering themselves with "protective" tariffs, developed into independent capitalist states. On the threshold of the twentieth century we see the formation of a new type of monopoly: firstly, monopolist associations of capitalists in all capitalistically developed countries; secondly, the monopolist position of a few very rich countries, in which the accumulation of capital has reached gigantic proportions. An enormous "surplus of capital" has arisen in the advanced countries.

It goes without saying that if capitalism could develop agriculture, which today is everywhere lagging terribly behind industry, if it could raise the living standards of the masses, who in spite of the amazing technical progress are everywhere still half-starved and poverty-stricken, there could be no question of a surplus of capital. This "argument" is very often advanced by the petty-bourgeois critics of capitalism. But if capitalism did these things it would not be capitalism; for both uneven development and a semi-starvation level of existence of the masses are fundamental and inevitable conditions and constitute premises of this mode of production. As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will be utilised not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The export of capital is made possible by a number of backward countries having already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse; main railways have either been or are being built in those countries, elementary conditions for industrial development have been created, etc. The need to export capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become "overripe" and (owing to the backward state of agriculture and the poverty of the masses) capital cannot find a field for "profitable" investment.

Here are approximate figures showing the amount of capital invested abroad by the three principal countries\*:

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\* Hobson, *Imperialism*, London, 1902, p. 56; Riesser, op. cit., S. 395 und 404; P. Arndt in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 7, 1916, S. 35; Neymarck in *Bulletin*; Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, p. 492; Lloyd George, Speech in the House of Commons, May 4, 1915, reported in the *Daily Telegraph*, May 5,

## CAPITAL INVESTED ABROAD

(000,000,000 francs)

Year	Great Britain	France	Germany
1862 . . . . .	3.6	—	—
1872 . . . . .	15.0	10(1869)	—
1882 . . . . .	22.0	15(1880)	?
1893 . . . . .	42.0	20(1890)	?
1902 . . . . .	62.0	27-37	12.5
1914 . . . . .	75-100.0	60	44.0

This table shows that the export of capital reached enormous dimensions only at the beginning of the twentieth century. Before the war the capital invested abroad by the three principal countries amounted to between 175,000 million and 200,000 million francs. At the modest rate of 5 per cent, the income from this sum should reach from 8,000 to 10,000 million francs a year—a sound basis for the imperialist oppression and exploitation of most of the countries and nations of the world, for the capitalist parasitism of a handful of wealthy states!

How is this capital invested abroad distributed among the various countries? *Where* is it invested? Only an approximate answer can be given to these questions, but it is one sufficient to throw light on certain general relations and connections of modern imperialism.

## DISTRIBUTION (APPROXIMATE) OF FOREIGN

CAPITAL IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE GLOBE

(circa 1910)

	Great Britain	France	Germany	Total
		(000,000,000 marks)		
Europe . . . . .	4	23	18	45
America . . . . .	37	4	10	51
Asia, Africa and Australia	29	8	7	44
<i>Total . . .</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>140</i>

The principal spheres of investment of British capital are the British colonies, which are very large also in America (for example, Canada), not to mention Asia, etc. In this case, enormous exports of capital are bound up most closely with vast

1915; B. Harms, *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, Jena, 1912, S. 235 et seq.; Dr. Siegmund Schilder, *Entwicklungstendenzen der Weltwirtschaft*, Berlin, 1912, Band 1, S. 150; George Paish, "Great Britain's Capital Investments, etc.", in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXIV, 1910-11, p. 167 et seq.; Georges Diouritch, *L'Expansion des banques allemandes à l'étranger, ses rapports avec le développement économique de l'Allemagne*, Paris, 1909, p. 84.



colonies, of the importance of which for imperialism I shall speak later. In the case of France the situation is different. French capital exports are invested mainly in Europe, primarily in Russia (at least ten thousand million francs). This is mainly *loan* capital, government loans, and not capital invested in industrial undertakings. Unlike British colonial imperialism, French imperialism might be termed usury imperialism. In the case of Germany, we have a third type; colonies are inconsiderable, and German capital invested abroad is divided most evenly between Europe and America.

The export of capital influences and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it is exported. While, therefore, the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development in the capital-exporting countries, it can only do so by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the world.

The capital-exporting countries are nearly always able to obtain certain "advantages", the character of which throws light on the peculiarity of the epoch of finance capital and monopoly. The following passage, for instance, appeared in the Berlin review, *Die Bank*, for October 1913:

"A comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is lately being played on the international capital market. Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or secretly coming into the big money market with demands, sometimes very persistent, for loans. The money markets are not very bright at the moment and the political outlook is not promising. But not a single money market dares to refuse a loan for fear that its neighbour may forestall it, consent to grant a loan and so secure some reciprocal service. In these international transactions the creditor nearly always manages to secure some extra benefit: a favourable clause in a commercial treaty, a coaling station, a contract to construct a harbour, a fat concession, or an order for guns."<sup>2</sup>

Finance capital has created the epoch of monopolies, and monopolies introduce everywhere monopolist principles: the utilisation of "connections" for profitable transactions takes the place of competition on the open market. The most usual thing is to stipulate that part of the loan granted shall be spent on purchases in the creditor country, particularly on orders for war materials, or for ships, etc. In the course of the last two decades (1890-1910), France has very often resorted to this method. The export of capital thus becomes a means of encouraging the export of commodities. In this connection, transactions between par-

ticularly big firms assume a form which, as Schilder\* “mildly” puts it, “borders on corruption”. Krupp in Germany, Schneider in France, Armstrong in Britain are instances of firms which have close connections with powerful banks and governments and which cannot easily be “ignored” when a loan is being arranged.

France, when granting loans to Russia, “squeezed” her in the commercial treaty of September 16, 1905, stipulating for certain concessions to run till 1917. She did the same in the commercial treaty with Japan of August 19, 1911. The tariff war between Austria and Serbia, which lasted, with a seven months’ interval, from 1906 to 1911, was partly caused by Austria and France competing to supply Serbia with war materials. In January 1912, Paul Deschanel stated in the Chamber of Deputies that from 1908 to 1911 French firms had supplied war materials to Serbia to the value of 45 million francs.

A report from the Austro-Hungarian Consul at San-Paulo (Brazil) states: “The Brazilian railways are being built chiefly by French, Belgian, British and German capital. In the financial operations connected with the construction of these railways the countries involved stipulate for orders for the necessary railway materials.”

Thus finance capital, literally, one might say, spreads its net over all countries of the world. An important role in this is played by banks founded in the colonies and by their branches. German imperialists look with envy at the “old” colonial countries which have been particularly “successful” in providing for themselves in this respect. In 1904, Great Britain had 50 colonial banks with 2,279 branches (in 1910 there were 72 banks with 5,449 branches); France had 20 with 136 branches; Holland, 16 with 68 branches; and Germany had “only” 13 with 70 branches.\*\* The American capitalists, in their turn, are jealous of the English and German: “In South America,” they complained in 1915, “five German banks have forty branches and five British banks have seventy branches. . . . Britain and Germany have invested in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in the last twenty-five years approximately four thousand million dollars, and as a result together enjoy 46 per cent of the total trade of these three countries.”\*\*\*

\* Schilder, op. cit., S. 346, 350, 371.

\*\* Riesser, op. cit., 4th ed., S. 375; Diouritch, p. 283.

\*\*\* *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. LIX, May 1915, p. 301. In the same volume on p. 331, we read that the well-known statistician Paish, in the last issue of the financial magazine *The Statist*, estimated the amount of capital exported by Britain, Germany, France, Belgium and Holland at \$40,000 million, i.e., 200,000 million francs.

The capital-exporting countries have divided the world among themselves in the figurative sense of the term. But finance capital has led to the *actual* division of the world.

## V. DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG CAPITALIST ASSOCIATIONS

Monopolist capitalist associations, cartels, syndicates and trusts first divided the home market among themselves and obtained more or less complete possession of the industry of their own country. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market. As the export of capital increased, and as the foreign and colonial connections and "spheres of influence" of the big monopolist associations expanded in all ways, things "naturally" gravitated towards an international agreement among these associations, and towards the formation of international cartels.

This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and production, incomparably higher than the preceding stages. Let us see how this supermonopoly develops.

The electrical industry is highly typical of the latest technical achievements and is most typical of capitalism at the *end* of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. This industry has developed most in the two leaders of the new capitalist countries, the United States and Germany. In Germany, the crisis of 1900 gave a particularly strong impetus to its concentration. During the crisis, the banks, which by that time had become fairly well merged with industry, enormously accelerated and intensified the ruin of relatively small firms and their absorption by the large ones. "The banks," writes Jcidels, "refused a helping hand to the very firms in greatest need of capital, and brought on first a frenzied boom and then the hopeless failure of the companies which had not been connected with them closely enough."<sup>\*</sup>

As a result, after 1900, concentration in Germany progressed with giant strides. Up to 1900 there had been seven or eight "groups" in the electrical industry. Each consisted of several companies (altogether there were 28) and each was backed by from 2 to 11 banks. Between 1908 and 1912 all these groups were merged into two, or one. The following diagram shows the process.

\* Jcidels, *op. cit.*, S. 232.

## GROUPS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY

Prior to 1900:	Felten & Lahmeyer Guillaume	Union A.F.G.	Siemens & Halske	Schuckert & Co.	Bergmann	Kumner
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	Felten & Lahmeyer	A.E.G. (G.E.C.)	Siemens & Halske-Schuckert	Bergmann	Failed in 1900	
By 1912:	A.E.G. (G.E.C.)		Siemens & Halske-Schuckert			
	(in close "co-operation" since 1908)					

The famous A.E.G. (General Electric Company), which grew up in this way, controls 175 to 200 companies (through the "holding" system), and a total capital of approximately 1,500 *million marks*. Of direct agencies abroad alone, it has thirty-four, of which twelve are joint-stock companies, in more than ten countries. As early as 1904 the amount of capital invested abroad by the German electrical industry was estimated at 233 million marks. Of this sum, 62 million were invested in Russia. Needless to say, the A.E.G. is a huge "combine"—its manufacturing companies alone number no less than sixteen—producing the most diverse articles, from cables and insulators to motor-cars and flying machines.

But concentration in Europe was also a component part of the process of concentration in America, which developed in the following way:

General Electric Company		
United States:	Thomson-Houston Co. establishes a firm in Europe	Edison Co. establishes in Europe the French Edison Co. which transfers its patents to the German firm
Germany:	Union Electric Co.	General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)
<hr/>		
General Electric Co. (A.E.G.)		

Thus, *two* electrical "great powers" were formed: "there are no other electrical companies in the world *completely* independent of them," wrote Heinig in his article "The Path of the Electric Trust". An idea, although far from complete, of the turnover and the size of the enterprises of the two "trusts" can be obtained from the following figures:

	Turnover (000,000 marks)	Number of employees	Net profits (000,000 marks)
America: General Electric			
Co. (G.E.C.) . . . . . 1907	252	28,000	35 4
1910	298	32,000	45 6
Germany: General Electric			
Co. (A.E.G.) . . . . . 1907	216	30,700	14.5
1911	362	60,800	21.7

And then, in 1907, the German and American trusts concluded an agreement by which they divided the world between them. Competition between them ceased. The American General Electric Company (G.E.C.) "got" the United States and Canada. The German General Electric Company (A.E.G.) "got" Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the Balkans. Special agreements, naturally secret, were concluded regarding the penetration of "daughter companies" into new branches of industry, into "new" countries formally not yet allotted. The two trusts were to exchange inventions and experiments.\*

The difficulty of competing against this trust, actually a single world-wide trust controlling a capital of several thousand million, with "branches", agencies, representatives, connections, etc., in every corner of the world, is self-evident. But the division of the world between two powerful trusts does not preclude *redivision* if the relation of forces changes as a result of uneven development, war, bankruptcy, etc.

An instructive example of an attempt at such a redivision, of the struggle for redivision, is provided by the oil industry.

"The world oil market," wrote Jeidels in 1905, "is even today still divided between two great financial groups—Rockefeller's American Standard Oil Co., and Rothschild and Nobel, the controlling interests of the Russian oilfields in Baku. The two groups are closely connected. But for several years five enemies have been threatening their monopoly":\* (1) the exhaustion of the American oilfields; (2) the competition of the firm of Mantashev of Baku; (3) the Austrian oilfields; (4) the Rumanian oilfields; (5) the overseas oilfields, particularly in the Dutch colonies (the extremely rich firms, Samuel, and Shell, also connected with British capital). The three last groups are connected with the big German banks, headed by the huge Deutsche Bank. These

\* Riesser, op. cit.; Diouritch, op. cit., p. 239; Kurt Heinig, op. cit.

\*\* Jeidels, op. cit., S. 192-93.

banks independently and systematically developed the oil industry in Rumania, for example, in order to have a foothold of their "own". In 1907, the foreign capital invested in the Rumanian oil industry was estimated at 185 million francs, of which 74 million was German capital.\*

A struggle began for the "division of the world", as, in fact, it is called in economic literature. On the one hand, the Rockefeller "oil trust" wanted to lay its hands on *everything*; it formed a "daughter company" *right* in Holland, and bought up oilfields in the Dutch Indies, in order to strike at its principal enemy, the Anglo-Dutch Shell trust. On the other hand, the Deutsche Bank and the other German banks aimed at "retaining" Rumania "for themselves" and at uniting her with Russia against Rockefeller. The latter possessed far more capital and an excellent system of oil transportation and distribution. The struggle had to end, and did end in 1907, with the utter defeat of the Deutsche Bank, which was confronted with the alternative: either to liquidate its "oil interests" and lose millions, or submit. It chose to submit, and concluded a very disadvantageous agreement with the "oil trust". The Deutsche Bank agreed "not to attempt anything which might injure American interests". Provision was made, however, for the annulment of the agreement in the event of Germany establishing a state oil monopoly.

Then the "comedy of oil" began. One of the German finance kings, von Gwinner, a director of the Deutsche Bank, through his private secretary, Stauss, launched a campaign for a state oil monopoly. The gigantic machine of the huge German bank and all its wide "connections" were set in motion. The press bubbled over with "patriotic" indignation against the "yoke" of the American trust, and, on March 15, 1911, the Reichstag, by an almost unanimous vote, adopted a motion asking the government to introduce a bill for the establishment of an oil monopoly. The government seized upon this "popular" idea, and the game of the Deutsche Bank, which hoped to cheat its American counterpart and improve its business by a state monopoly, appeared to have been won. The German oil magnates already saw visions of enormous profits, which would not be less than those of the Russian sugar refiners. . . . But, firstly, the big German banks quarrelled among themselves over the division of the spoils. The Disconto-Gesellschaft exposed the covetous aims of the Deutsche Bank; secondly, the government took fright at the prospect of a struggle with Rockefeller, for it was very doubtful whether Germany could be sure of obtaining oil from other sources (the Rumanian output was small); thirdly, just at that time the 1913

\* Diouritch, *op cit.*, pp. 245-46.

credits of a thousand million marks were voted for Germany's war preparations. The oil monopoly project was postponed. The Rockefeller "oil trust" came out of the struggle, for the time being, victorious.

The Berlin review, *Die Bank*, wrote in this connection that Germany could fight the oil trust only by establishing an electricity monopoly and by converting water-power into cheap electricity. "But," the author added, "the electricity monopoly will come when the producers need it, that is to say, when the next great crash in the electrical industry is imminent, and when the gigantic, expensive power stations now being put up at great cost everywhere by private electrical concerns, which are already obtaining certain franchises from towns, from states, etc., can no longer work at a profit. Water-power will then have to be used. But it will be impossible to convert it into cheap electricity as state expense; it will also have to be handed over to a 'private monopoly controlled by the state', because private industry has already concluded a number of contracts and has stipulated for heavy compensation. . . . So it was with the nitrate monopoly, so it is with the oil monopoly, so it will be with the electric power monopoly. It is time our state socialists, who allow themselves to be blinded by a beautiful principle, understood, at last, that in Germany the monopolies have never pursued the aim, nor have they had the result, of benefiting the consumer, or even of handing over to the state part of the promoter's profits; they have served only to facilitate, at the expense of the state, the recovery of private industries which were on the verge of bankruptcy."<sup>4</sup>

Such are the valuable admissions which the German bourgeois economists are forced to make. We see plainly here how private and state monopolies are interwoven in the epoch of finance capital: how both are but separate links in the imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division of the world.

In merchant shipping, the tremendous development of concentration has ended also in the division of the world. In Germany two powerful companies have come to the fore: the Hamburg-Amerika and the Norddeutscher Lloyd, each having a capital of 200 million marks (in stocks and bonds) and possessing shipping tonnage to the value of 185 to 189 million marks. On the other hand, in America, on January 1, 1903, the International Mercantile Marine Co., known as the Morgan trust, was formed; it united nine American and British steamship companies, and possessed a capital of 120 million dollars (480 million marks). As early as 1903, the German giants and this American-British

<sup>4</sup> *Die Bank*, 1912, 1, S. 1036; 1912, 2, S. 629; 1913, 1, S. 388.

trust concluded an agreement to divide the world with a consequent division of profits. The German companies undertook not to compete in the Anglo-American traffic. Which ports were to be "allotted" to each was precisely stipulated; a joint committee of control was set up, etc. This agreement was concluded for twenty years, with the prudent provision for its annulment in the event of war.\*

Extremely instructive also is the story of the formation of the International Rail Cartel. The first attempt of the British, Belgian and German rail manufacturers to form such a cartel was made as early as 1884, during a severe industrial depression. The manufacturers agreed not to compete with one another in the home markets of the countries involved, and they divided the foreign markets in the following quotas: Great Britain, 66 per cent; Germany, 27 per cent; Belgium, 7 per cent. India was reserved entirely for Great Britain. Joint war was declared against a British firm which remained outside the cartel, the cost of which was met by a percentage levy on all sales. But in 1886 the cartel collapsed when two British firms retired from it. It is characteristic that agreement could not be achieved during subsequent boom periods.

At the beginning of 1904, the German steel syndicate was formed. In November 1904, the International Rail Cartel was revived, with the following quotas: Britain, 53.5 per cent; Germany, 28.83 per cent; Belgium, 17.67 per cent. France came in later and received 4.8 per cent, 5.8 per cent and 6.4 per cent in the first, second and third year respectively, over and above the 100 per cent limit, i.e., out of a total of 104.8 per cent, etc. In 1905, the United States Steel Corporation entered the cartel; then Austria and Spain. "At the present time," wrote Vogelstein in 1910, "the division of the world is complete, and the big consumers, primarily the state railways—since the world has been parcelled out without consideration for their interests—can now dwell like the poet in the heavens of Jupiter."

Let me also mention the International Zinc Syndicate which was established in 1909 and which precisely apportioned output among five groups of factories: German, Belgian, French, Spanish and British; and also the International Dynamite Trust, which, Liefmann says, is "quite a modern, close alliance of all the German explosives manufacturers who, with the French and American dynamite manufacturers, organised in a similar manner, have divided the whole world among themselves, so to speak".\*\*\*

Riesser, *op. cit.*, S. 125

\* \* Vogelstein, *Organisationsformen*, S. 100

Liefmann, *Kartelle und Trusts*, 2 A. S. 161.



Liefmann calculated that in 1897 there were altogether about forty international cartels in which Germany had a share, while in 1910 there were about a hundred.

Certain bourgeois writers (now joined by Karl Kautsky, who has completely abandoned the Marxist position he had held, for example, in 1909) have expressed the opinion that international cartels, being one of the most striking expressions of the internationalisation of capital, give the hope of peace among nations under capitalism. Theoretically, this opinion is absolutely absurd, while in practice it is sophistry and a dishonest defence of the worst opportunism. International cartels show to what point capitalist monopolies have developed, and *the object* of the struggle between the various capitalist associations. This last circumstance is the most important; it alone shows us the historico-economic meaning of what is taking place; for the *forms* of the struggle may and do constantly change in accordance with varying, relatively specific and temporary causes, but the *substance* of the struggle, its class *content*, positively *cannot* change while classes exist. Naturally, it is in the interests of, for example, the German bourgeoisie, to whose side Kautsky has in effect gone over in his theoretical arguments (I shall deal with this later), to obscure the *substance* of the present economic struggle (the division of the world) and to emphasise now this and now another *form* of the struggle. Kautsky makes the same mistake. Of course, we have in mind not only the German bourgeoisie, but the bourgeoisie all over the world. The capitalists divide the world, not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits. And they divide it "in proportion to capital", "in proportion to strength", because there cannot be any other method of division under commodity production and capitalism. But strength varies with the degree of economic and political development. In order to understand what is taking place, it is necessary to know what questions are settled by the changes in strength. The question as to whether these changes are "purely" economic or *non-economic* (e.g., military) is a secondary one, which cannot in the least affect fundamental views on the latest epoch of capitalism. To substitute the question of the form of the struggle and agreements (today peaceful, tomorrow warlike, the next day warlike again) for the question of the *substance* of the struggle and agreements between capitalist associations is to sink to the role of a sophist.

The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist associations grow up, *based on* the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political al-

liances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the "struggle for spheres of influence"

## VI. DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG THE GREAT POWERS

In his book, on "the territorial development of the European colonies", A. Supan,\* the geographer, gives the following brief summary of this development at the end of the nineteenth century:

### PERCENTAGE OF TERRITORY BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COLONIAL POWERS

(Including the United States)

	1876	1900	Increase or decrease
Africa . . . . .	40.8	90.4	+ 79.6
Polynesia . . . . .	56.8	98.9	+ 42.1
Asia . . . . .	51.5	56.6	+ 5.1
Australia . . . . .	100.0	100.0	—
America . . . . .	27.5	27.2	— 0.3

"The characteristic feature of this period," he concludes, "is, therefore, the division of Africa and Polynesia." As there are no unoccupied territories—that is, territories that do not belong to any state—in Asia and America, it is necessary to amplify Supan's conclusion and say that the characteristic feature of the period under review is the final partitioning of the globe—final, not in the sense that *repartition* is impossible; on the contrary, repartitions are possible and inevitable—but in the sense that the colonial policy of the capitalist countries has *completed* the seizure of the unoccupied territories on our planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the future *only* redistribution is possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one "owner" to another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an "owner".

Hence, we are living in a peculiar epoch of world colonial policy, which is most closely connected with the "latest stage in the development of capitalism", with finance capital. For this reason, it is essential first of all to deal in greater detail with

\* A. Supan, *Die territoriale Entwicklung der europäischen Kolonien*, 1906.  
S. 254

the facts, in order to ascertain as exactly as possible what distinguishes this epoch from those preceding it, and what the present situation is. In the first place, two questions of fact arise here: is an intensification of colonial policy, a sharpening of the struggle for colonies, observed precisely in the epoch of finance capital? And how, in this respect, is the world divided at the present time?

The American writer, Morris, in his book on the history of colonisation,\* made an attempt to sum up the data on the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Germany during different periods of the nineteenth century. The following is a brief summary of the results he has obtained:

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS

Year	Great Britain		France		Germany	
	Area (000,000 sq. m.)	Pop. (000,000)	Area (000,000 sq. m.)	Pop. (000,000)	Area (000,000 sq. m.)	Pop. (000,000)
1815—30 . . . .	2	126.4	0.02	0.5	—	—
1860 . . . . .	2.5	145.1	0.2	3.4	—	—
1880 . . . . .	7.7	267.9	0.7	7.5	—	—
1899 . . . . .	9.3	309.0	3.7	56.4	1.0	14.7

For Great Britain, the period of the enormous expansion of colonial conquests was that between 1860 and 1880, and it was also very considerable in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. For France and Germany this period falls precisely in these twenty years. We saw above that the development of pre-monopoly capitalism, of capitalism in which free competition was predominant, reached its limit in the 1860s and 1870s. We now see that it is *precisely after that period* that the tremendous "boom" in colonial conquests begins, and that the struggle for the territorial division of the world becomes extraordinarily sharp. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that capitalism's transition to the stage of monopoly capitalism, to finance capital, is *connected* with the intensification of the struggle for the partitioning of the world.

Hobson, in his work on imperialism, marks the years 1884-1900 as the epoch of intensified "expansion" of the chief European states. According to his estimate, Great Britain during these years acquired 3,700,000 square miles of territory with 57,000,000 inhabitants; France, 3,600,000 square miles with 36,500,000; Ger-

\* Henry C. Morris, *The History of Colonization*, New York, 1900, Vol. II. p. 58; Vol. I. p. 419; Vol. II, p. 304.

many, 1,000,000 square miles with 14,700,000; Belgium, 900,000 square miles with 30,000,000; Portugal, 800,000 square miles with 9,000,000 inhabitants. The scramble for colonies by all the capitalist states at the end of the nineteenth century and particularly since the 1880s is a commonly known fact in the history of diplomacy and of foreign policy.

In the most flourishing period of free competition in Great Britain, i.e., between 1840 and 1860, the leading British bourgeois politicians were *opposed* to colonial policy and were of the opinion that the liberation of the colonies, their complete separation from Britain, was inevitable and desirable. M. Beer, in an article, "Modern British Imperialism",\* published in 1898, shows that in 1852, Disraeli, a statesman who was generally inclined towards imperialism, declared: "The colonies are mill-stones round our necks." But at the end of the nineteenth century the British heroes of the hour were Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, who openly advocated imperialism and applied the imperialist policy in the most cynical manner!

It is not without interest to observe that even then these leading British bourgeois politicians saw the connection between what might be called the purely economic and the socio-political roots of modern imperialism. Chamberlain advocated imperialism as a "true, wise and economical policy", and pointed particularly to the German, American and Belgian competition which Great Britain was encountering in the world market. Salvation lies in monopoly, said the capitalists as they formed cartels, syndicates and trusts. Salvation lies in monopoly, echoed the political leaders of the bourgeoisie, hastening to appropriate the parts of the world not yet shared out. And Cecil Rhodes, we are informed by his intimate friend, the journalist Stead, expressed his imperialist views to him in 1895 in the following terms: "I was in the East End of London [a working-class quarter] yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 'bread! bread!' and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism. . . . My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists."\*\*

That was said in 1895 by Cecil Rhodes, millionaire, a king of finance, the man who was mainly responsible for the Anglo-Boer

\* *Die Neue Zeit*, XVI, I, 1898, S. 302

\*\* *Ibid.*, S. 304.

War. True, his defence of imperialism is crude and cynical, but in substance it does not differ from the "theory" advocated by Messrs. Maslov, Südekum, Potresov, David, the founder of Russian Marxism and others. Cecil Rhodes was a somewhat more honest social-chauvinist. . . .

To present as precise a picture as possible of the territorial division of the world and of the changes which have occurred during the last decades in this respect, I shall utilise the data furnished by Supan in the work already quoted on the colonial possessions of all the powers of the world. Supan takes the years 1876 and 1900; I shall take the year 1876—a year very aptly selected, for it is precisely by that time that the pre-monopolist stage of development of West-European capitalism can be said to have been, in the main, completed—and the year 1914, and instead of Supan's figures I shall quote the more recent statistics of Hübner's *Geographical and Statistical Tables*. Supan gives figures only for colonies; I think it useful, in order to present a complete picture of the division of the world, to add brief data on non-colonial and semi-colonial countries, in which category I place Persia, China and Turkey: the first of these countries is already almost completely a colony, the second and third are becoming such

We thus get the following result:

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OF THE GREAT POWERS  
(000,000 square kilometres and 000,000 inhabitants)

	Colonies				Metropolitan countries		Total	
	1876		1914		1914		1914	
	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.
Great Britain . . . .	22.5	251.9	33.5	393.5	0.3	46.5	33.8	440.0
Russia . . . . .	17.0	15.9	17.4	33.2	5.4	136.2	22.8	169.4
France . . . . .	0.9	6.0	10.6	55.5	0.5	39.6	11.1	95.1
Germany . . . . .	—	—	2.9	12.3	0.5	64.9	3.4	77.2
United States . . . .	—	—	0.3	9.7	9.4	97.0	9.7	106.7
Japan . . . . .	—	—	0.3	19.2	0.4	53.0	0.7	72.2
<i>Total for 6 Great Powers . . . . .</i>	40.4	273.8	65.0	523.4	16.5	437.2	81.5	960.6
Colonies of other powers (Belgium, Holland, etc.) . . . .						9.9		45.3
Semi-colonial countries (Persia, China, Turkey) . . . .						14.5		361.2
Other countries . . . . .						28.0		289.9
<i>Total for the world . . . . .</i>						133.9		1,657.0

We clearly see from these figures how "complete" was the partition of the world at the turn of the twentieth century. After 1876 colonial possessions increased to enormous dimensions, by more than fifty per cent, from 40,000,000 to 65,000,000 square kilometres for the six biggest powers; the increase amounts to 25,000,000 square kilometres, fifty per cent more than the area of the metropolitan countries (16,500,000 square kilometres). In 1876 three powers had no colonies, and a fourth, France, had scarcely any. By 1914 these four powers had acquired colonies with an area of 14,100,000 square kilometres, i.e., about half as much again as the area of Europe, with a population of nearly 100,000,000. The unevenness in the rate of expansion of colonial possessions is very great. If, for instance, we compare France, Germany and Japan, which do not differ very much in area and population, we see that the first has acquired almost three times as much colonial territory as the other two combined. In regard to finance capital, France, at the beginning of the period we are considering, was also, perhaps, several times richer than Germany and Japan put together. In addition to, and on the basis of, purely economic conditions, geographical and other conditions also affect the dimensions of colonial possessions. However strong the process of levelling the world, of levelling the economic and living conditions in different countries, may have been in the past decades as a result of the pressure of large-scale industry, exchange and finance capital, considerable differences still remain; and among the six countries mentioned we see, firstly, young capitalist countries (America, Germany, Japan) whose progress has been extraordinarily rapid; secondly, countries with an old capitalist development (France and Great Britain), whose progress lately has been much slower than that of the previously mentioned countries, and thirdly, a country most backward economically (Russia), where modern capitalist imperialism is enmeshed, so to speak, in a particularly close network of pre-capitalist relations.

Alongside the colonial possessions of the Great Powers, we have placed the small colonies of the small states, which are, so to speak, the next objects of a possible and probable "redivision" of colonies. These small states mostly retain their colonies only because the big powers are torn by conflicting interests, friction, etc., which prevent them from coming to an agreement on the division of the spoils. As to the "semi-colonial" states, they provide an example of the transitional forms which are to be found in all spheres of nature and society. Finance capital is such a great, such a decisive, you might say, force in all economic and in all international relations, that it is capable of subjecting, and actually does subject, to itself even states enjoying the fullest political independence; we shall shortly see examples of this. Of course, finance

capital finds most "convenient", and derives the greatest profit from, a *form* of subjection which involves the loss of the political independence of the subjected countries and peoples. In this respect, the semi-colonial countries provide a typical example of the "middle stage". It is natural that the struggle for these semi-dependent countries should have become particularly bitter in the epoch of finance capital, when the rest of the world has already been divided up.

Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism. But "general" disquisitions on imperialism, which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: "Greater Rome and Greater Britain."<sup>\*</sup> Even the capitalist colonial policy of *previous* stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital.

The principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism is the domination of monopolist associations of big employers. These monopolies are most firmly established when *all* the sources of raw materials are captured by one group, and we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist associations exert every effort to deprive their rivals of all opportunity of competing, to buy up, for example, ironfields, oilfields, etc. Colonial possession alone gives the monopolies complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle against competitors, including the case of the adversary wanting to be protected by a law establishing a state monopoly. The more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate the struggle for the acquisition of colonies.

"It may be asserted," writes Schilder, "although it may sound paradoxical to some, that in the more or less foreseeable future the growth of the urban and industrial population is more likely to be hindered by a shortage of raw materials for industry than by a shortage of food." For example, there is a growing shortage of timber—the price of which is steadily rising—of leather, and of raw materials for the textile industry. "Associations of manufacturers are making efforts to create an equilibrium between agriculture and industry in the whole of world economy; as an example of this we might mention the International Federation

\* C. P. Lucas, *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*, Oxford, 1912, or the Earl of Cromer's *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, London, 1910.

of Cotton Spinners' Associations in several of the most important industrial countries, founded in 1904, and the European Federation of Flax Spinners' Associations, founded on the same model in 1910.”\*

Of course, the bourgeois reformists, and among them particularly the present-day adherents of Kautsky, try to belittle the importance of facts of this kind by arguing that raw materials “could be” obtained in the open market without a “costly and dangerous” colonial policy; and that the supply of raw materials “could be” increased enormously by “simply” improving conditions in agriculture in general. But such arguments become an apology for imperialism, an attempt to paint it in bright colours, because they ignore the principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism: monopolies. The free market is becoming more and more a thing of the past; monopolist syndicates and trusts are restricting it with every passing day, and “simply” improving conditions in agriculture means improving the conditions of the masses, raising wages and reducing profits. Where, except in the imagination of sentimental reformists, are there any trusts capable of concerning themselves with the condition of the masses instead of the conquest of colonies?

Finance capital is interested not only in the already discovered sources of raw materials but also in potential sources, because present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and land which is useless today may be improved tomorrow if new methods are devised (to this end a big bank can equip a special expedition of engineers, agricultural experts, etc.), and if large amounts of capital are invested. This also applies to prospecting for minerals, to new methods of processing up and utilising raw materials, etc., etc. Hence, the inevitable striving of finance capital to enlarge its spheres of influence and even its actual territory. In the same way that the trusts capitalise their property at two or three times its value, taking into account its “potential” (and not actual) profits and the further results of monopoly, so finance capital in general strives to seize the largest possible amount of land of all kinds in all places, and by every means, taking into account potential sources of raw materials and fearing to be left behind in the fierce struggle for the last remnants of independent territory, or for the repartition of those territories that have been already divided.

The British capitalists are exerting every effort to develop cotton growing in *their* colony, Egypt (in 1904, out of 2,300,000 hectares of land under cultivation, 600,000, or more than one-fourth, were under cotton); the Russians are doing the same in

\* Schilder, op. cit., S. 38-42.



*their* colony, Turkestan, because in this way they will be in a better position to defeat their foreign competitors, to monopolise the sources of raw materials and form a more economical and profitable textile trust in which *all* the processes of cotton production and manufacturing will be "combined" and concentrated in the hands of one set of owners.

The interests pursued in exporting capital also give an impetus to the conquest of colonies, for in the colonial market it is easier to employ monopoly methods (and sometimes they are the only methods that can be employed) to eliminate competition, to ensure supplies, to secure the necessary "connections", etc.

The non-economic superstructure which grows up on the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology, stimulates the striving for colonial conquest. "Finance capital does not want liberty, it wants domination," as Hilferding very truly says. And a French bourgeois writer, developing and supplementing, as it were, the ideas of Cecil Rhodes quoted above,<sup>5</sup> writes that social causes should be added to the economic causes of modern colonial policy: "Owing to the growing complexities of life and the difficulties which weigh not only on the masses of the workers, but also on the middle classes, 'impatience, irritation and hatred are accumulating in all the countries of the old civilisation and are becoming a menace to public order; the energy which is being hurled out of the definite class channel must be given employment abroad in order to avert an explosion at home'."<sup>6</sup>

Since we are speaking of colonial policy in the epoch of capitalist imperialism, it must be observed that finance capital and its foreign policy, which is the struggle of the great powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise to a number of *transitional* forms of state dependence. Not only are the two main groups of countries, those owning colonies, and the colonies themselves, but also the diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, typical of this epoch. We have already referred to one form of dependence—the semi-colony. An example of another is provided by Argentina.

"South America, and especially Argentina," writes Schulze-Gaevernitz in his work on British imperialism, "is so dependent financially on London that it ought to be described as almost

<sup>5</sup> See p. 692 of the present volume.—Ed.

<sup>6</sup> Wahl, *La France aux colonies* quoted by Henri Russier, *Le Partage de l'Océanie*, Paris, 1905, p. 165.

a British commercial colony.”\* Basing himself on the reports of the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Buenos Aires for 1909, Schilder estimated the amount of British capital invested in Argentina at 8,750 million francs. It is not difficult to imagine what strong connections British finance capital (and its faithful “friend”, diplomacy) thereby acquires with the Argentine bourgeoisie, with the circles that control the whole of that country’s economic and political life.

A somewhat different form of financial and diplomatic dependence, accompanied by political independence, is presented by Portugal. Portugal is an independent sovereign state, but actually, for more than two hundred years, since the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), it has been a British protectorate. Great Britain has protected Portugal and her colonies in order to fortify her own positions in the fight against her rivals, Spain and France. In return Great Britain has received commercial privileges, preferential conditions for importing goods and especially capital into Portugal and the Portuguese colonies, the right to use the ports and islands of Portugal, her telegraph cables, etc., etc.\*\* Relations of this kind have always existed between big and little states, but in the epoch of capitalist imperialism they become a general system, they form part of the sum total of “divide the world” relations and become links in the chain of operations of world finance capital.

In order to finish with the question of the division of the world, I must make the following additional observation. This question was raised quite openly and definitely not only in American literature after the Spanish-American War, and in English literature after the Anglo-Boer War, at the very end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth; not only has German literature, which has “most jealously” watched “British imperialism”, systematically given its appraisal of this fact. This question has also been raised in French bourgeois literature as definitely and broadly as is thinkable from the bourgeois point of view. Let me quote Driault, the historian, who, in his book, *Political and Social Problems at the End of the Nineteenth Century*, in the chapter “The Great Powers and the Division of the World”, wrote the following: “During the past few years, all the free territory of the globe, with the exception of China, has been occupied by the powers of Europe and North America. This has already brought about several conflicts and shifts of

\* Schultze-Gaevernitz, *Britischer Imperialismus und englischer Freihandel zu Beginn des 20-ten Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig, 1906, S. 318. Sartorius v. Waltershausen says the same in *Das volkswirtschaftliche System der Kapitalanlage im Auslande*, Berlin, 1907, S. 46.

\*\* Schilder, op. cit., Vol. I, S. 160-61.

spheres of influence, and these foreshadow more terrible upheavals in the near future. For it is necessary to make haste. The nations which have not yet made provision for themselves run the risk of never receiving their share and never participating in the tremendous exploitation of the globe which will be one of the most essential features of the next century [i.e., the twentieth]. That is why all Europe and America have lately been afflicted with the fever of colonial expansion, of 'imperialism', that most noteworthy feature of the end of the nineteenth century." And the author added: "In this partition of the world, in this furious hunt for the treasures and the big markets of the globe, the relative strength of the empires founded in this nineteenth century is totally out of proportion to the place occupied in Europe by the nations which founded them. The dominant powers in Europe, the arbiters of her destiny, are *not* equally preponderant in the whole world. And, as colonial might, the hope of controlling as yet unassessed wealth, will evidently react upon the relative strength of the European powers, the colonial question—'imperialism', if you will—which has already modified the political conditions of Europe itself, will modify them more and more."\*

## VII. IMPERIALISM, AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM

We must now try to sum up, to draw together the threads of what has been said above on the subject of imperialism. Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves in all spheres. Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly. Free competition is the basic feature of capitalism, and of commodity production generally; monopoly is the exact opposite of free competition, but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our eyes, creating large-scale industry and forcing out small industry, replacing large-scale by still larger-scale industry, and carrying concentration of production and capital to the point where out of it has grown and is growing monopoly: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and merging

\* J.-E. Driault, *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, Paris, 1900, p. 299

with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks, which manipulate thousands of millions. At the same time the monopolies, which have grown out of free competition, do not eliminate the latter, but exist above it and alongside it, and thereby give rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts. Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system.

If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism. Such a definition would include what is most important, for, on the one hand, finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists; and, on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which has extended without hindrance to territories unseized by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.

But very brief definitions, although convenient, for they sum up the main points, are nevertheless inadequate, since we have to deduce from them some especially important features of the phenomenon that has to be defined. And so, without forgetting the conditional and relative value of all definitions in general, which can never embrace all the concatenations of a phenomenon in its full development, we must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following five of its basic features:

(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital", of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.

We shall see later that imperialism can and must be defined differently if we bear in mind not only the basic, purely economic concepts—to which the above definition is limited—but also the historical place of this stage of capitalism in relation to capitalism in general, or the relation between imperialism and the

two main trends in the working-class movement. The thing to be noted at this point is that imperialism, as interpreted above, undoubtedly represents a special stage in the development of capitalism. To enable the reader to obtain the most well-grounded idea of imperialism, I deliberately tried to quote as extensively as possible *bourgeois* economists who have to admit the particularly incontrovertible facts concerning the latest stage of capitalist economy. With the same object in view, I have quoted detailed statistics which enable one to see to what degree bank capital, etc., has grown, in what precisely the transformation of quantity into quality, of developed capitalism into imperialism, was expressed. Needless to say, of course, all boundaries in nature and in society are conventional and changeable, and it would be absurd to argue, for example, about the particular year or decade in which imperialism "definitely" became established.

In the matter of defining imperialism, however, we have to enter into controversy, primarily, with Karl Kautsky, the principal Marxist theoretician of the epoch of the so-called Second International—that is, of the twenty-five years between 1889 and 1914. The fundamental ideas expressed in our definition of imperialism were very resolutely attacked by Kautsky in 1913, and even in November 1914, when he said that imperialism must not be regarded as a "phase" or stage of economy, but as a policy, a definite policy "preferred" by finance capital: that imperialism must not be "identified" with "present-day capitalism"; that if imperialism is to be understood to mean "all the phenomena of present-day capitalism"—cartels, protection, the domination of the financiers, and colonial policy—then the question as to whether imperialism is necessary to capitalism becomes reduced to the "flattest tautology", because, in that case, "imperialism is naturally a vital necessity for capitalism", and so on. The best way to present Kautsky's idea is to quote his own definition of imperialism, which is diametrically opposed to the substance of the ideas which I have set forth (for the objections coming from the camp of the German Marxists, who have been advocating similar ideas for many years already, have been long known to Kautsky as the objections of a definite trend in Marxism).

Kautsky's definition is as follows:

"Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex all large areas of *agrarian* [Kautsky's italics] territory, irrespective of what nations inhabit it."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Die Neue Zeit*, 1914, 2 (B 32), S. 909, Sept. 11, 1914; cf. 1915, 2, S. 107 et seq.

This definition is of no use at all because it one-sidedly, i.e., arbitrarily, singles out only the national question (although the latter is extremely important in itself as well as in its relation to imperialism), it arbitrarily and *inaccurately* connects this question *only* with industrial capital in the countries which annex other nations, and in an equally arbitrary and inaccurate manner pushes into the forefront the annexation of agrarian regions.

Imperialism is a striving for annexations—this is what the *political* part of Kautsky's definition amounts to. It is correct, but very incomplete, for politically, imperialism is, in general, a striving towards violence and reaction. For the moment, however, we are interested in the *economic* aspect of the question, which Kautsky *himself* introduced into *his* definition. The inaccuracies in Kautsky's definition are glaring. The characteristic feature of imperialism is *not* industrial *but* finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of *finance* capital, and the weakening of industrial capital, that from the eighties onwards gave rise to the extreme intensification of annexationist (colonial) policy. The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex *not only* agrarian territories, but even most highly industrialised regions (German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine), because (1) the fact that the world is already partitioned obliges those contemplating a *redivision* to reach out for *every kind* of territory, and (2) an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several great powers in the striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine *his* hegemony. (Belgium is particularly important for Germany as a base for operations against Britain; Britain needs Baghdad as a base for operations against Germany, etc.)

Kautsky refers especially—and repeatedly—to English writers who, he alleges, have given a purely political meaning to the word "imperialism" in the sense that he, Kautsky, understands it. We take up the work by the English writer Hobson, *Imperialism*, which appeared in 1902, and there we read:

"The new imperialism differs from the older, first, in substituting for the ambition of a single growing empire the theory and the practice of competing empires, each motivated by similar lusts of political aggrandisement and commercial gain; secondly, in the dominance of financial or investing over mercantile interests."

We see that Kautsky is absolutely wrong in referring to English writers generally (unless he meant the vulgar English impe-

\* Hobson, *Imperialism*, London, 1902, p. 324.

realists, or the avowed apologists for imperialism). We see that Kautsky, while claiming that he continues to advocate Marxism, as a matter of fact takes a step backward compared with the *social-liberal* Hobson, who *more correctly* takes into account two "historically concrete" (Kautsky's definition is a mockery of historical concreteness!) features of modern imperialism: (1) the competition between *several* imperialisms, and (2) the predominance of the financier over the merchant. If it is chiefly a question of the annexation of agrarian countries by industrial countries, then the role of the merchant is put in the forefront.

Kautsky's definition is not only wrong and un-Marxist. It serves as a basis for a whole system of views which signify a rupture with Marxist theory and Marxist practice all along the line. I shall refer to this later. The argument about words which Kautsky raises as to whether the latest stage of capitalism should be called imperialism or the stage of finance capital is not worth serious attention. Call it what you will, it makes no difference. The essence of the matter is that Kautsky detaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations as being a policy "preferred" by finance capital, and opposes to it another bourgeois policy which, he alleges, is possible on this very same basis of finance capital. It follows, then, that monopolies in the economy are compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent, non-annexationist methods in politics. It follows, then, that the territorial division of the world, which was completed during this very epoch of finance capital, and which constitutes the basis of the present peculiar forms of rivalry between the biggest capitalist states, is compatible with a non-imperialist policy. The result is a slurring-over and a blunting of the most profound contradictions of the latest stage of capitalism, instead of an exposure of their depth; the result is bourgeois reformism instead of Marxism.

Kautsky enters into controversy with the German apologist of imperialism and annexations, Cunow, who clumsily and cynically argues that imperialism is present-day capitalism; the development of capitalism is inevitable and progressive; therefore imperialism is progressive; therefore, we should grovel before it and glorify it! This is something like the caricature of the Russian Marxists which the Narodniks drew in 1894-95. They argued: if the Marxists believe that capitalism is inevitable in Russia, that it is progressive, then they ought to open a tavern and begin to implant capitalism! Kautsky's reply to Cunow is as follows: imperialism is not present-day capitalism; it is only one of the forms of the policy of present-day capitalism. This policy we can and should fight, fight imperialism, annexations, etc.

The reply seems quite plausible, but in effect it is a more subtle and more disguised (and therefore more dangerous) advocacy of conciliation with imperialism, because a "fight" against the policy of the trusts and banks that does not affect the economic basis of the trusts and banks is mere bourgeois reformism and pacifism, the benevolent and innocent expression of pious wishes. Evasion of existing contradictions, forgetting the most important of them, instead of revealing their full depth—such is Kautsky's theory, which has nothing in common with Marxism. Naturally, such a "theory" can only serve the purpose of advocating unity with the Cunows!

"From the purely economic point of view," writes Kautsky, "it is not impossible that capitalism will yet go through a new phase, that of the extension of the policy of the cartels to foreign policy, the phase of ultra-imperialism,"\* i.e., of a superimperialism, of a union of the imperialisms of the whole world and not struggles among them, a phase when wars shall cease under capitalism, a phase of "the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital".\*\*

We shall have to deal with this "theory of ultra-imperialism" later on in order to show in detail how decisively and completely it breaks with Marxism. At present, in keeping with the general plan of the present work, we must examine the exact economic data on this question. "From the purely economic point of view". Is "ultra-imperialism" possible, or is it ultra-nonsense?

If the purely economic point of view is meant to be a "pure" abstraction, then all that can be said reduces itself to the following proposition: development is proceeding towards monopolies, hence, towards a single world monopoly, towards a single world trust. This is indisputable, but it is also as completely meaningless as is the statement that "development is proceeding" towards the manufacture of foodstuffs in laboratories. In this sense the "theory" of ultra-imperialism is no less absurd than a "theory of ultra-agriculture" would be.

If, however, we are discussing the "purely economic" conditions of the epoch of finance capital as a historically concrete epoch which began at the turn of the twentieth century, then the best reply that one can make to the lifeless abstractions of "ultra-imperialism" (which serve exclusively a most reactionary aim: that of diverting attention from the depth of *existing* antagonisms) is to contrast them with the concrete economic realities of the present-day world economy. Kautsky's utterly meaningless talk about ultra-imperialism encourages, among other things, that

\* *Die Neue Zeit*, 1914, 2 (B. 32), S. 921, Sept. 11, 1914. Cf. 1915, 2, S. 107 et seq.

\*\* *Ibid.*, 1915, 1, S. 144, April 30, 1915.



profoundly mistaken idea which only brings grist to the mill of the apologists of imperialism, i.e., that the rule of finance capital *lessens* the unevenness and contradictions inherent in the world economy, whereas in reality it *increases* them.

R. Calwer, in his little book, *An Introduction to the World Economy*,\* made an attempt to summarise the main, purely economic, data that enable one to obtain a concrete picture of the internal relations of the world economy at the turn of the twentieth century. He divides the world into five "main economic areas", as follows: (1) Central Europe (the whole of Europe with the exception of Russia and Great Britain); (2) Great Britain; (3) Russia; (4) Eastern Asia; (5) America; he includes the colonies in the "areas" of the states to which they belong and "leaves aside" a few countries not distributed according to areas, such as Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia in Asia, Morocco and Abyssinia in Africa, etc.

Here is a brief summary of the economic data he quotes on these regions.

Principal economic areas	Area	Pop	Transport		Trade	Industry		
	Million sq km	Millions	Railways (thous. km.)	Mercantile fleet (million tons)	Imports exports (thous. million marks)	Output		
						Of coal (m l iron tons)	Of pig iron (million tons)	Number of cotton spindles (millions)
1) Central Europe	27.6 (23.6)**	388 (146)	204	8	41	251	15	26
2) Britain	28.9 (28.6)**	398 (355)	140	11	25	249	9	51
3) Russia	22	131	63	1	3	16	3	7
4) Eastern Asia	21	389	8	1	2	8	0.02	2
5) America	30	148	379	6	14	245	14	19

We see three areas of highly developed capitalism (high development of means of transport, of trade and of industry): the Central European, the British and the American areas. Among these are three states which dominate the world: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Imperialist rivalry and the struggle between these countries have become extremely keen because

R. Calwer, *Einführung in die Weltwirtschaft*, Berlin, 1906.

The figures in parentheses show the area and population of the colonies.

Germany has only an insignificant area and few colonies; the creation of "Central Europe" is still a matter for the future, it is being born in the midst of a desperate struggle. For the moment the distinctive feature of the whole of Europe is political disunity. In the British and American areas, on the other hand, political concentration is very highly developed, but there is a vast disparity between the immense colonies of the one and the insignificant colonies of the other. In the colonies, however, capitalism is only beginning to develop. The struggle for South America is becoming more and more acute.

There are two areas where capitalism is little developed: Russia and Eastern Asia. In the former, the population is extremely sparse, in the latter it is extremely dense; in the former political concentration is high, in the latter it does not exist. The partitioning of China is only just beginning, and the struggle for it between Japan, the U.S., etc., is continually gaining in intensity.

Compare this reality—the vast diversity of economic and political conditions, the extreme disparity in the rate of development of the various countries, etc., and the violent struggles among the imperialist states—with Kautsky's silly little fable about "peaceful" ultra-imperialism. Is this not the reactionary attempt of a frightened philistine to hide from stern reality? Are not the international cartels which Kautsky imagines are the embryos of "ultra-imperialism" (in the same way as one "can" describe the manufacture of tablets in a laboratory as ultra-agriculture in embryo) an example of the division *and the redivision* of the world, the transition from peaceful division to non-peaceful division and vice versa? Is not American and other finance capital, which divided the whole world peacefully with Germany's participation in, for example, the international rail syndicate, or in the international mercantile shipping trust, now engaged in *redividing* the world on the basis of a new relation of forces that is being changed by methods *anything but* peaceful?

Finance capital and the trusts do not diminish but increase the differences in the rate of growth of the various parts of the world economy. Once the relation of forces is changed, what other solution of the contradictions can be found *under capitalism* than that of *force*? Railway statistics\* provide remarkably exact data on the different rates of growth of capitalism and finance capital in world economy. In the last decades of imperialist development, the total length of railways has changed as follows:

\* *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1915; Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen, 1892.* Minor details for the distribution of railways among the colonies of the various countries in 1890 had to be estimated approximately.

	Railways (000 kilometres)		
	1890	1913	+
Europe . . . . .	224	346	+ 122
U.S. . . . .	268	411	+ 143
All colonies . . . . .	82	210	+ 128
Independent and semi-independent states of Asia and America . . . .	43	137	+ 94
	125 } 347		+ 222
<i>Total</i>	617	1,104	

Thus, the development of railways has been most rapid in the colonies and in the independent (and semi-independent) states of Asia and America. Here, as we know, the finance capital of the four or five biggest capitalist states holds undisputed sway. Two hundred thousand kilometres of new railways in the colonies and in the other countries of Asia and America represent a capital of more than 40,000 million marks newly invested on particularly advantageous terms, with special guarantees of a good return and with profitable orders for steel works, etc., etc.

Capitalism is growing with the greatest rapidity in the colonies and in overseas countries. Among the latter, *new* imperialist powers are emerging (e.g., Japan). The struggle among the world imperialisms is becoming more acute. The tribute levied by finance capital on the most profitable colonial and overseas enterprises is increasing. In the division of this "booty", an exceptionally large part goes to countries which do not always stand at the top of the list in the rapidity of the development of their productive forces. In the case of the biggest countries, together with their colonies, the total length of railways was as follows:

	(000 kilometres)		
	1890	1913	
U.S. . . . .	268	413	+ 145
British Empire . . . . .	107	208	+ 101
Russia . . . . .	32	78	+ 46
Germany . . . . .	43	68	+ 25
France . . . . .	41	63	+ 22
<i>Total for 5 powers . . . . .</i>	491	830	+ 339

Thus, about 80 per cent of the total existing railways are concentrated in the hands of the five biggest powers. But the concentration of the *ownership* of these railways, the concentration of finance capital, is immeasurably greater since the French and British millionaires, for example, own an enormous amount of shares and bonds in American, Russian and other railways.

Thanks to her colonies, Great Britain has increased the length of "her" railways by 100,000 kilometres, four times as much as Germany. And yet, it is well known that the development of productive forces in Germany, and especially the development of the coal and iron industries, has been incomparably more rapid during this period than in Britain—not to speak of France and Russia. In 1892, Germany produced 4,900,000 tons of pig iron and Great Britain produced 6,800,000 tons; in 1912, Germany produced 17,600,000 tons and Great Britain, 9,000,000 tons. Germany, therefore, had an overwhelming superiority over Britain in this respect.\* The question is: what means other than war could there be *under capitalism* to overcome the disparity between the development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and spheres of influence for finance capital on the other?

### VIII. PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM

We now have to examine yet another significant aspect of imperialism to which most of the discussions on the subject usually attach insufficient importance. One of the shortcomings of the Marxist Hilferding is that on this point he has taken a step backward compared with the non-Marxist Hobson. I refer to parasitism, which is characteristic of imperialism.

As we have seen, the deepest economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly. This is capitalist monopoly, i.e., monopoly which has grown out of capitalism and which exists in the general environment of capitalism, commodity production and competition, in permanent and insoluble contradiction to this general environment. Nevertheless, like all monopoly, it inevitably engenders a tendency of stagnation and decay. Since monopoly prices are established, even temporarily, the motive cause of technical and, consequently, of all other progress disappears to a certain extent and, further, the *economic* possibility arises of deliberately retarding technical progress. For instance, in America, a certain Owens invented a machine which revolutionised the manufacture of bottles. The German bottle-manufacturing cartel purchased Owens's patent, but pigeon-holed it, refrained from utilising it. Certainly, monopoly under capitalism can never completely, and for a very long period of time, eliminate competition in the world market (and this, by the by, is one of the

\* Cf also Edgar Crammond, "The Economic Relations of the British and German Empires" in *The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, July 1914, p 777 et seq

reasons why the theory of ultra-imperialism is so absurd). Certainly, the possibility of reducing the cost of production and increasing profits by introducing technical improvements operates in the direction of change. But the *tendency* to stagnation and decay, which is characteristic of monopoly, continues to operate, and in some branches of industry, in some countries, for certain periods of time, it gains the upper hand.

The monopoly ownership of very extensive, rich or well-situated colonies operates in the same direction.

Further, imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries, amounting, as we have seen, to 100,000-150,000 million francs in securities. Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather, of a stratum of rentiers, i.e., people who live by "clipping coupons", who take no part in any enterprise whatever, whose profession is idleness. The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still more completely isolates the rentiers from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labour of several overseas countries and colonies.

"In 1893," writes Hobson, "the British capital invested abroad represented about 15 per cent of the total wealth of the United Kingdom."\* Let me remind the reader that by 1915 this capital had increased about two and a half times. "Aggressive imperialism," says Hobson further on, "which costs the tax-payer so dear, which is of so little value to the manufacturer and trader . . . is a source of great gain to the investor. . . . The annual income Great Britain derives from commissions in her whole foreign and colonial trade, import and export, is estimated by Sir R. Giffen at £18,000,000 [nearly 170 million rubles] for 1899, taken at 2½ per cent, upon a turnover of £800,000,000." Great as this sum is, it cannot explain the aggressive imperialism of Great Britain, which is explained by the income of £90 million to £100 million from "invested" capital, the income of the rentiers.

The income of the rentiers is *five times greater* than the income obtained from the foreign trade of the biggest "trading" country in the world! This is the essence of imperialism and imperialist parasitism.

For that reason the term "rentier state" (*Rentnerstaat*), or usurer state, is coming into common use in the economic literature that deals with imperialism. The world has become divided into a handful of usurer states and a vast majority of debtor states. "At the top of the list of foreign investments," says Schulze-Gaevernitz, "are those placed in politically dependent or allied countries: Great Britain grants loans to Egypt, Japan, China

and South America. Her navy plays here the part of bailiff in case of necessity. Great Britain's political power protects her from the indignation of her debtors."\* Sartorius von Waltershausen in his book, *The National Economic System of Capital Investments Abroad*, cites Holland as the model "rentier state" and points out that Great Britain and France are now becoming such.\*\* Schilder is of the opinion that five industrial states have become "definitely pronounced creditor countries": Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. He does not include Holland in this list simply because she is "industrially little developed".\*\*\* The United States is a creditor only of the American countries.

"Great Britain," says Schulze-Gaevernitz, "is gradually becoming transformed from an industrial into a creditor state. Notwithstanding the absolute increase in industrial output and the export of manufactured goods, there is an increase in the relative importance of income from interest and dividends, issues of securities, commissions and speculation in the whole of the national economy. In my opinion it is precisely this that forms the economic basis of imperialist ascendancy. The creditor is more firmly attached to the debtor than the seller is to the buyer."\*\*\* In regard to Germany, A. Lansburgh, the publisher of the Berlin *Die Bank*, in 1911, in an article entitled "Germany—a Rentier State", wrote the following: "People in Germany are ready to sneer at the yearning to become rentiers that is observed in France. But they forget that as far as the bourgeoisie is concerned the situation in Germany is becoming more and more like that in France."\*\*\*\*

The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to influence all the socio-political conditions of the countries concerned, in general, and the two fundamental trends in the working-class movement, in particular. To demonstrate this in the clearest possible manner let me quote Hobson, who is a most reliable witness, since he cannot be suspected of leaning towards Marxist orthodoxy; on the other hand, he is an Englishman who is very well acquainted with the situation in the country which is richest in colonies, in finance capital, and in imperialist experience.

With the Anglo-Boer War fresh in his mind, Hobson describes the connection between imperialism and the interests of the

\* Schulze-Gaevernitz, *Britischer Imperialismus*, S. 320 et seq

\*\* Sartorius von Waltershausen *Das volkswirtschaftliche System etc* Berlin 1907, Buch IV

\*\*\* Schilder, op cit, S 493

\*\*\*\* Schulze-Gaevernitz op cit S 122  
*Die Bank*, 1911, 1, S 10-11

"financiers", their growing profits from contracts, supplies, etc., and writes: "While the directors of this definitely parasitic policy are capitalists, the same motives appeal to special classes of the workers. In many towns most important trades are dependent upon government employment or contracts; the imperialism of the metal and shipbuilding centres is attributable in no small degree to this fact." Two sets of circumstances, in this writer's opinion, have weakened the old empires: (1) "economic parasitism", and (2) the formation of armies recruited from subject peoples. "There is first the habit of economic parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its provinces, colonies, and dependencies in order to enrich its ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence." And I shall add that the economic possibility of such bribery, whatever its form may be, requires high monopolist profits.

As for the second circumstance, Hobson writes: "One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism is the reckless indifference with which Great Britain, France and other imperial nations are embarking on this perilous dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. Most of the fighting by which we have won our Indian Empire has been done by natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, great standing armies are placed under British commanders; almost all the fighting associated with our African dominions, except in the southern part, has been done for us by natives."

Hobson gives the following economic appraisal of the prospect of the partitioning of China: "The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the South of England, in the Riviera and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and tradesmen and a larger body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production of the more perishable goods; all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and manufactures flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa. . . We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western states, a European federation of great powers which, so far from forwarding the cause of world civilisation, might introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced industrial nations, whose upper classes drew vast tribute from Asia and Africa, with which they supported great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services under the control

of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who would scout such a theory [it would be better to say: prospect] as undeserving of consideration examine the economic and social condition of districts in Southern England today which are already reduced to this condition, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be rendered feasible by the subjection of China to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, investors, and political and business officials, draining the greatest potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to consume it in Europe. The situation is far too complex, the play of world forces far too incalculable, to render this or any other single interpretation of the future very probable; but the influences which govern the imperialism of Western Europe today are moving in this direction, and, unless counteracted or diverted, make towards some such consummation.”\*

The author is quite right: *if* the forces of imperialism had not been counteracted they would have led precisely to what he has described. The significance of a “United States of Europe” in the present imperialist situation is correctly appraised. He should have added, however, that, also *within* the working-class movement, the opportunists, who are for the moment victorious in most countries, are “working” systematically and undeviatingly in this very direction. Imperialism, which means the partitioning of the world, and the exploitation of other countries besides China, which means high monopoly profits for a handful of very rich countries, makes it economically possible to bribe the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives shape to, and strengthens opportunism. We must not, however, lose sight of the forces which counteract imperialism in general, and opportunism in particular, and which, naturally, the social-liberal Hobson is unable to perceive.

The German opportunist, Gerhard Hildebrand, who was once expelled from the Party for defending imperialism, and who could today be a leader of the so-called “Social-Democratic” Party of Germany, supplements Hobson well by his advocacy of a “United States of Western Europe” (without Russia) for the purpose of “joint” action . . . against the African Negroes, against the “great Islamic movement”, for the maintenance of a “powerful army and navy”, against a “Sino-Japanese coalition”,\*\* etc.

The description of “British imperialism” in Schulze-Gaevernitz’s book reveals the same parasitical traits. The national income of Great Britain approximately doubled from 1865 to 1898.

\* Hobson, op. cit., pp. 103, 205, 144, 335, 386.

\*\* Gerhard Hildebrand, *Die Erschütterung der Industriegherrschaft und des Industriesozialismus*, 1910, S. 229, et seq.



while the income "from abroad" increased *ninefold* in the same period. While the "merit" of imperialism is that it "trains the Negro to habits of industry" (you cannot manage without coercion...), the "danger" of imperialism lies in that "Europe will shift the burden of physical toil—first agricultural and mining, then the rougher work in industry—on to the coloured races, and itself be content with the role of rentier, and in this way, perhaps, pave the way for the economic, and later, the political emancipation of the coloured races".

An increasing proportion of land in England is being taken out of cultivation and used for sport, for the diversion of the rich. As far as Scotland—the most aristocratic place for hunting and other sports—is concerned, it is said that "it lives on its past and on Mr. Carnegie" (the American multimillionaire). On horse racing and fox hunting alone England annually spends £14,000,000 (nearly 130 million rubles). The number of rentiers in England is about one million. The percentage of the productively employed population to the total population is declining:

	Population England and Wales (000 000)	Workers in basic industries (000 000)	Per cent of total population
1851	17.9	4 1	23
1901	32 5	4 9	15

And in speaking of the British working class the bourgeois student of "British imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century" is obliged to distinguish systematically between the "*upper stratum*" of the workers and the "*lower stratum of the proletariat proper*". The upper stratum furnishes the bulk of the membership of co-operatives, of trade unions, of sporting clubs and of numerous religious sects. To this level is adapted the electoral system, which in Great Britain is still "*sufficiently restricted to exclude the lower stratum of the proletariat proper*"<sup>1</sup> In order to present the condition of the British working class in a rosy light, only this upper stratum—which constitutes a *minority* of the proletariat—is usually spoken of. For instance, "the problem of unemployment is mainly a London problem and that of the lower proletarian stratum, to which the politicians attach little importance..."<sup>2</sup> He should have said: to which the bourgeois politicians and the "socialist" opportunists attach little importance.

One of the special features of imperialism connected with the facts I am describing, is the decline in emigration from imperial-

<sup>1</sup> Schulze-Gaevernitz, *Britischer Imperialismus*, S. 301

ist countries and the increase in immigration into these countries from the more backward countries where lower wages are paid. As Hobson observes, emigration from Great Britain has been declining since 1884. In that year the number of emigrants was 242,000, while in 1900, the number was 169,000. Emigration from Germany reached the highest point between 1881 and 1890, with a total of 1,453,000 emigrants. In the course of the following two decades, it fell to 544,000 and to 341,000. On the other hand, there was an increase in the number of workers entering Germany from Austria, Italy, Russia and other countries. According to the 1907 census, there were 1,342,294 foreigners in Germany, of whom 440,800 were industrial workers and 257,329 agricultural workers.\* In France, the workers employed in the mining industry are, "in great part", foreigners: Poles, Italians and Spaniards.\*\* In the United States, immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe are engaged in the most poorly paid jobs, while American workers provide the highest percentage of overseers or of the better-paid workers.\*\*\* Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged sections also among the workers, and to detach them from the broad masses of the proletariat.

It must be observed that in Great Britain the tendency of imperialism to split the workers, to strengthen opportunism among them and to cause temporary decay in the working-class movement, revealed itself much earlier than the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries; for two important distinguishing features of imperialism were already observed in Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century—vast colonial possessions and a monopolist position in the world market. Marx and Engels traced this connection between opportunism in the working-class movement and the imperialist features of British capitalism systematically, during the course of several decades. For example, on October 7, 1858, Engels wrote to Marx: "The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat *alongside* the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent justifiable." Almost a quarter of a century later, in a letter dated August 11, 1881, Engels speaks of the "worst English trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men sold to, or at least paid by, the middle class". In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: "You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well,

\* *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Bd. 211.

\*\* Henger, *Die Kapitalsanlage der Franzosen*, Stuttgart, 1913.

\*\*\* Hourwich, *Immigration and Labour*, New York, 1913

exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies."<sup>\*</sup> (Engels expressed similar ideas in the press in his preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, which appeared in 1892.)

This clearly shows the causes and effects. The causes are: (1) exploitation of the whole world by this country; (2) its monopolist position in the world market; (3) its colonial monopoly. The effects are: (1) a section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois; (2) a section of the proletariat allows itself to be led by men bought by, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie. The imperialism of the beginning of the twentieth century completed the division of the world among a handful of states, each of which today exploits (in the sense of drawing superprofits from) a part of the "whole world" only a little smaller than that which England exploited in 1858; each of them occupies a monopolist position in the world market thanks to trusts, cartels, finance capital and creditor and debtor relations, each of them enjoys to some degree a colonial monopoly (we have seen that out of the total of 75,000,000 sq. km., which comprise the *whole* colonial world, 65,000,000 sq. km., or 86 per cent, belong to six powers; 61,000,000 sq. km., or 81 per cent, belong to three powers).

The distinctive feature of the present situation is the prevalence of such economic and political conditions that are bound to increase the irreconcilability between opportunism and the general and vital interests of the working-class movement: imperialism has grown from an embryo into the predominant system; capitalist monopolies occupy first place in economics and politics; the division of the world has been completed; on the other hand, instead of the undivided monopoly of Great Britain, we see a few imperialist powers contending for the right to share in this monopoly, and this struggle is characteristic of the whole period of the early twentieth century. Opportunism cannot now be completely triumphant in the working-class movement of one country for decades as it was in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century; but in a number of countries it has grown ripe, overripe, and rotten, and has become completely merged with bourgeois policy in the form of "social-chauvinism".<sup>\*\*</sup>

<sup>\*</sup> *Briefwechsel von Marx und Engels*, Bd. II, S. 290; IV, 433.—Karl Kautsky, *Sozialismus und Kolonialpolitik*, Berlin, 1907, S. 79, this pamphlet was written by Kautsky in those infinitely distant days when he was still a Marxist.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Russian social-chauvinism in its overt form, represented by the Potresovs, Chkhenskis, Maslovs, etc., and in its covert form (Chkheidze, Skobelev, Axelrod, Martov, etc.), also emerged from the Russian variety of opportunism, namely, liquidationism.

## IX. CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM

By the critique of imperialism, in the broad sense of the term, we mean the attitude of the different classes of society towards imperialist policy in connection with their general ideology.

The enormous dimensions of finance capital concentrated in a few hands and creating an extraordinarily dense and widespread network of relationships and connections which subordinates not only the small and medium, but also the very small capitalists and small masters, on the one hand, and the increasingly intense struggle waged against other national state groups of financiers for the division of the world and domination over other countries, on the other hand, cause the propertied classes to go over entirely to the side of imperialism. "General" enthusiasm over the prospects of imperialism, furious defence of it and painting it in the brightest colours—such are the signs of the times. Imperialist ideology also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from the other classes. The leaders of the present-day, so-called, "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany are justly called "social-imperialists", that is, socialists in words and imperialists in deeds; but as early as 1902, Hobson noted the existence in Britain of "Fabian imperialists" who belonged to the opportunist Fabian Society.

Bourgeois scholars and publicists usually come out in defence of imperialism in a somewhat veiled form; they obscure its complete domination and its deep-going roots, strive to push specific and secondary details into the forefront and do their very best to distract attention from essentials by means of absolutely ridiculous schemes for "reform", such as police supervision of the trusts or banks, etc. Cynical and frank imperialists who are bold enough to admit the absurdity of the idea of reforming the fundamental characteristics of imperialism are a rarer phenomenon.

Here is an example. The German imperialists attempt, in the magazine *Archives of World Economy*, to follow the national emancipation movements in the colonies, particularly, of course, in colonies other than those belonging to Germany. They note the unrest and the protest movements in India, the movement in Natal (South Africa), in the Dutch East Indies, etc. One of them, commenting on an English report of a conference held on June 28-30, 1910, of representatives of various subject nations and races, of peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe who are under foreign rule, writes as follows in appraising the speeches delivered at this conference: "We are told that we must fight imperialism; that the ruling states should recognise the right of subject peoples to independence; that an international tribunal should supervise the fulfilment of treaties concluded between the great

powers and weak peoples. Further than the expression of these pious wishes they do not go. We see no trace of understanding of the fact that imperialism is inseparably bound up with capitalism in its present form and that, therefore (!!), an open struggle against imperialism would be hopeless, unless, perhaps, the fight were to be confined to protests against certain of its especially abhorrent excesses.”\* Since the reform of the basis of imperialism is a deception, a “pious wish”, since the bourgeois representatives of the oppressed nations go no “further” forward, the bourgeois representative of an oppressing nation goes “further” *backward*, to servility towards imperialism under cover of the claim to be “scientific”. That is also “logic”!

The questions as to whether it is possible to reform the basis of imperialism, whether to go forward to the further intensification and deepening of the antagonisms which it engenders, or backward, towards allaying these antagonisms, are fundamental questions in the critique of imperialism. Since the specific political features of imperialism are reaction everywhere and increased national oppression due to the oppression of the financial oligarchy and the elimination of free competition, a petty-bourgeois-democratic opposition to imperialism arose at the beginning of the twentieth century in nearly all imperialist countries. Kautsky not only did not trouble to oppose, was not only unable to oppose this petty-bourgeois reformist opposition, which is really reactionary in its economic basis, but became merged with it in practice, and this is precisely where Kautsky and the broad international Kautskian trend deserted Marxism.

In the United States, the imperialist war waged against Spain in 1898 stirred up the opposition of the “anti-imperialists”, the last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy who declared this war to be “criminal”, regarded the annexation of foreign territories as a violation of the Constitution, declared that the treatment of Aguinaldo, leader of the Filipinos (the Americans promised him the independence of his country, but later landed troops and annexed it), was “Jingo treachery”, and quoted the words of Lincoln: “When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs others, it is no longer self-government; it is despotism.”\*\* But as long as all this criticism shrank from recognising the inseverable bond between imperialism and the trusts, and, therefore, between imperialism and the foundations of capitalism, while it shrank from joining the forces engendered by large-scale capitalism and its development—it remained a “pious wish”.

This is also the main attitude taken by Hobson in his critique

\* *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd II, S 193.

\*\* J Patouillet, *L'impérialisme américain*, Dijon, 1904, p 272

of imperialism. Hobson anticipated Kautsky in protesting against the "inevitability of imperialism" argument, and in urging the necessity of "increasing the consuming capacity" of the people (under capitalism!). The petty-bourgeois point of view in the critique of imperialism, the omnipotence of the banks, the financial oligarchy, etc., is adopted by the authors I have often quoted, such as Agahd, A. Lansburgh, L. Eschwege, and among the French writers Victor Berard, author of a superficial book entitled *England and Imperialism* which appeared in 1900. All these authors, who make no claim to be Marxists, contrast imperialism with free competition and democracy, condemn the Baghdad railway scheme, which is leading to conflicts and war, utter "pious wishes" for peace, etc. This applies also to the compiler of international stock and share issue statistics, A. Neymarck, who, after calculating the thousands of millions of francs representing "international" securities, exclaimed in 1912: "Is it possible to believe that peace may be disturbed . . . that, in the face of these enormous figures, anyone would risk starting a war?"\*

Such simple-mindedness on the part of the bourgeois economists is not surprising; moreover, *it is in their interest* to pretend to be so naïve and to talk "seriously" about peace under imperialism. But what remains of Kautsky's Marxism, when, in 1914, 1915 and 1916, he takes up the same bourgeois-reformist point of view and affirms that "everybody is agreed" (imperialists, pseudo-socialists and social-pacifists) on the matter of peace? Instead of an analysis of imperialism and an exposure of the depths of its contradictions, we have nothing but a reformist "pious wish" to wave them aside, to evade them.

Here is a sample of Kautsky's economic criticism of imperialism. He takes the statistics of the British export and import trade with Egypt for 1872 and 1912; it seems that this export and import trade has grown more slowly than British foreign trade as a whole. From this Kautsky concludes that "we have no reason to suppose that without military occupation the growth of British trade with Egypt would have been less, simply as a result of the mere operation of economic factors". "The urge of capital to expand . . . can be best promoted, not by the violent methods of imperialism, but by peaceful democracy."\*\*

This argument of Kautsky's, which is repeated in every key by his Russian armour-bearer (and Russian shielder of the social-chauvinists), Mr. Spectator, constitutes the basis of Kautskian critique of imperialism, and that is why we must deal with it in greater detail. We will begin with a quotation from Hilferding.

\* *Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique*, T. XIX, livr II, p. 225

\*\* Kautsky, *Nationalstaat, imperialistischer Staat und Staatenbund*, Nürnberg, 1915, S. 72, 70.

whose conclusions Kautsky on many occasions, and notably in April 1915, has declared to have been "unanimously adopted by all socialist theoreticians".

"It is not the business of the proletariat," writes Hilferding, "to contrast the more progressive capitalist policy with that of the now bygone era of free trade and of hostility towards the state. The reply of the proletariat to the economic policy of finance capital, to imperialism, cannot be free trade, but socialism. The aim of proletarian policy cannot today be the ideal of restoring free competition—which has now become a reactionary ideal—but the complete elimination of competition by the abolition of capitalism."<sup>\*</sup>

Kautsky broke with Marxism by advocating in the epoch of finance capital a "reactionary ideal", "peaceful democracy", "the mere operation of economic factors", for *objectively* this ideal drags us back from monopoly to non-monopoly capitalism, and is a reformist swindle.

Trade with Egypt (or with any other colony or semi-colony) "would have grown more" *without* military occupation, without imperialism, and without finance capital. What does this mean? That capitalism would have developed more rapidly if free competition had not been restricted by monopolies in general, or by the "connections", yoke (i.e., also the monopoly) of finance capital, or by the monopolist possession of colonies by certain countries?

Kautsky's argument can have no other meaning; and *this* "meaning" is meaningless. Let us assume that free competition, without any sort of monopoly, *would* have developed capitalism and trade more rapidly. But the more rapidly trade and capitalism develop, the greater is the concentration of production and capital which *gives rise* to monopoly. And monopolies have *already* arisen—precisely *out of* free competition! Even if monopolies have now begun to retard progress, it is not an argument in favour of free competition, which has become impossible after it has given rise to monopoly.

Whichever way one turns Kautsky's argument, one will find nothing in it except reaction and bourgeois reformism.

Even if we correct this argument and say, as Spectator says, that the trade of the colonies with Britain is now developing more slowly than their trade with other countries, it does not save Kautsky; for it is *also* monopoly, *also* imperialism that is beating Great Britain, only it is the monopoly and imperialism of another country (America, Germany). It is known that the cartels have given rise to a new and peculiar form of protective tariffs, i.e., goods suitable for export are protected (Engels noted this in Vol. III of *Capital*<sup>371</sup>). It is known, too, that the cartels and

<sup>\*</sup> *Finance Capital*, p. 567.

finance capital have a system peculiar to themselves, that of "exporting goods at cut-rate prices", or "dumping", as the English call it: within a given country the cartel sells its goods at high monopoly prices, but sells them abroad at a much lower price to undercut the competitor, to enlarge its own production to the utmost, etc. If Germany's trade with the British colonies is developing more rapidly than Great Britain's, it only proves that German imperialism is younger, stronger and better organised than British imperialism, is superior to it; but it by no means proves the "superiority" of free trade, for it is not a fight between free trade and protection and colonial dependence, but between two rival imperialisms, two monopolies, two groups of finance capital. The superiority of German imperialism over British imperialism is more potent than the wall of colonial frontiers or of protective tariffs. to use this as an "argument" *in favour* of free trade and "peaceful democracy" is banal, it means forgetting the essential features and characteristics of imperialism, substituting petty-bourgeois reformism for Marxism.

It is interesting to note that even the bourgeois economist, A Lansburgh, whose criticism of imperialism is as petty-bourgeois as Kautsky's, nevertheless got closer to a more scientific study of trade statistics. He did not compare one single country, chosen at random, and one single colony with the other countries: he examined the export trade of an imperialist country: (1) with countries which are financially dependent upon it, and borrow money from it, and (2) with countries which are financially independent. He obtained the following results:

EXPORT TRADE OF GERMANY (000 000 marks)

EXPORT TRADE OF GERMANY (100,000 MARKS)				
		1889	1908	Per cent increase
To countries financially dependent on Germany	Rumania	48 2	70 8	47
	Portugal	19 0	32 8	73
	Argentina	60 7	147 0	143
	Brazil	48 7	84 5	73
	Chile	28 3	52 4	85
	Turkey	29 9	64 0	114
<i>Total</i>		234 8	451 5	92
To countries financially independent of Germany	Great Britain	651 8	997 4	53
	France .	210 2	437 9	108
	Belgium	137 2	322 8	135
	Switzerland	177 4	401 1	127
	Australia	21 2	64 5	205
	Dutch East Indies	8 8	40 7	363
<i>Total</i>		1,206 6	2,264 4	87



Lansburgh did not draw *conclusions* and therefore, strangely enough, failed to observe that *if* the figures prove anything at all, they prove that *he is wrong*, for the exports to countries financially dependent on Germany have grown *more rapidly*, if only slightly, than exports to the countries which are financially independent (I emphasise the “if”, for Lansburgh’s figures are far from complete.)

Tracing the connection between exports and loans, Lansburgh writes:

“In 1890-91, a Rumanian loan was floated through the German banks, which had already in previous years made advances on this loan. It was used chiefly to purchase railway materials in Germany. In 1891, German exports to Rumania amounted to 55 million marks. The following year they dropped to 39.4 million marks and, with fluctuations, to 25.4 million in 1900. Only in very recent years have they regained the level of 1891, thanks to two new loans

“German exports to Portugal rose, following the loans of 1888-89, to 21,100,000 (1890); then, in the two following years, they dropped to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000, and regained their former level only in 1903.

“The figures of German trade with Argentina are still more striking. Loans were floated in 1888 and 1890; German exports to Argentina reached 60,700,000 marks (1889). Two years later they amounted to only 18,600,000 marks, less than one-third of the previous figure. It was not until 1901 that they regained and surpassed the level of 1889, and then only as a result of new loans floated by the state and by municipalities, with advances to build power stations, and with other credit operations.

“Exports to Chile, as a consequence of the loan of 1889, rose to 45,200,000 marks (in 1892), and a year later dropped to 22,500,000 marks. A new Chilean loan floated by the German banks in 1906 was followed by a rise of exports to 84,700,000 marks in 1907, only to fall again to 52,400,000 marks in 1908.”\*

From these facts Lansburgh draws the amusing petty-bourgeois moral of how unstable and irregular export trade is when it is bound up with loans, how bad it is to invest capital abroad instead of “naturally” and “harmoniously” developing home industry, how “costly” are the millions in bakshish that Krupp has to pay in floating foreign loans, etc. But the facts tell us clearly: the increase in exports is connected with *just these* swindling tricks of finance capital, which is not concerned with bourgeois morality, but with skinning the ox twice—first, it pockets the profits from the loan; then it pockets other profits from the *same*

loan which the borrower uses to make purchases from Krupp, or to purchase railway material from the Steel Syndicate, etc.

I repeat that I do not by any means consider Lansburgh's figures to be perfect; but I had to quote them because they are more scientific than Kautsky's and Spectator's and because Lansburgh showed the correct way to approach the question. In discussing the significance of finance capital in regard to exports, etc., one must be able to single out the connection of exports especially and solely with the tricks of the financiers, especially and solely with the sale of goods by cartels, etc. Simply to compare colonies with non-colonies, one imperialism with another imperialism, one semi-colony or colony (Egypt) with all other countries, is to evade and to obscure the very *essence* of the question.

Kautsky's theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism and serves only as a preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportunists and the social-chauvinists, precisely for the reason that it evades and obscures the very profound and fundamental contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions between monopoly and free competition which exists side by side with it, between the gigantic "operations" (and gigantic profits) of finance capital and "honest" trade in the free market, the contradiction between cartels and trusts, on the one hand, and non-cartelised industry, on the other, etc.

The notorious theory of "ultra-imperialism", invented by Kautsky, is just as reactionary. Compare his arguments on this subject in 1915, with Hobson's arguments in 1902.

Kautsky: "... Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question."

Hobson: "Christendom thus laid out in a few great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilised dependencies, seems to many the most legitimate development of present tendencies, and one which would offer the best hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-Imperialism."

Kautsky called ultra-imperialism or super-imperialism what Hobson, thirteen years earlier, described as inter-imperialism. Except for coining a new and clever catchword, replacing one Latin prefix by another, the only progress Kautsky has made in the sphere of "scientific" thought is that he gave out as Marxism what Hobson, in effect, described as the cant of English parsons

After the Anglo-Boer War it was quite natural for this highly honourable caste to exert their main efforts to *console* the British middle class and the workers who had lost many of their relatives on the battlefields of South Africa and who were obliged to pay higher taxes in order to guarantee still higher profits for the British financiers. And what better consolation could there be than the theory that imperialism is not so bad; that it stands close to inter- (or ultra-) imperialism, which can ensure permanent peace? No matter what the good intentions of the English parsons, or of sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, i.e., real, social significance of Kautsky's "theory" is this: it is a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary "ultra-imperialism" of the future. Deception of the masses—that is all there is in Kautsky's "Marxist" theory.

Indeed, it is enough to compare well-known and indisputable facts to become convinced of the utter falsity of the prospects which Kautsky tries to conjure up before the German workers (and the workers of all lands). Let us consider India, Indo-China and China. It is known that these three colonial and semi-colonial countries, with a population of six to seven hundred million, are subjected to the exploitation of the finance capital of several imperialist powers: Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.A., etc. Let us assume that these imperialist countries form alliances against one another in order to protect or enlarge their possessions, their interests and their spheres of influence in these Asiatic states; these alliances will be "inter-imperialist", or "ultra-imperialist" alliances. Let us assume that *all* the imperialist countries conclude an alliance for the "peaceful" division of these parts of Asia; this alliance would be an alliance of "internationally united finance capital". There are actual examples of alliances of this kind in the history of the twentieth century—the attitude of the powers to China, for instance.<sup>372</sup> We ask, is it "conceivable", assuming that the capitalist system remains intact—and this is precisely the assumption that Kautsky does make—that such alliances would be more than temporary, that they would eliminate friction, conflicts and struggle in every possible form?

The question has only to be presented clearly for any other than a negative answer to be impossible. This is because the only conceivable basis under capitalism for the division of spheres of influence, interests, colonies, etc., is a calculation of the *strength* of those participating, their general economic, financial, military strength, etc. And the strength of these participants in the division does not change to an equal degree, for the *even*

development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry, or countries is impossible under capitalism. Half a century ago Germany was a miserable, insignificant country, if her capitalist strength is compared with that of the Britain of that time; Japan compared with Russia in the same way. Is it "conceivable" that in ten or twenty years' time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained *unchanged*? It is out of the question.

Therefore, in the realities of the capitalist system, and not in the banal philistine fantasies of English parsons, or of the German "Marxist", Kautsky, "inter-imperialist" or "ultra-imperialist" alliances, no matter what form they may assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing *all* the imperialist powers, are *inevitably* nothing more than a "truce" in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars; the one conditions the other, producing alternating forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle on *one and the same* basis of imperialist connections and relations within world economics and world politics. But in order to pacify the workers and reconcile them with the social-chauvinists who have deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie, over-wise Kautsky *separates* one link of a single chain from another, separates the present peaceful (and ultra-imperialist, nay, ultra-ultra-imperialist) alliance of *all* the powers for the "pacification" of China (remember the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion<sup>373</sup>) from the non-peaceful conflict of tomorrow, which will prepare the ground for another "peaceful" general alliance for the partition, say, of Turkey, on the day after tomorrow, *etc.*, *etc.* Instead of showing the living connection between periods of imperialist peace and periods of imperialist war, Kautsky presents the workers with a lifeless abstraction in order to reconcile them to their lifeless leaders.

An American writer, Hill, in his *A History of the Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* refers in his preface to the following periods in the recent history of diplomacy: (1) the era of revolution; (2) the constitutional movement; (3) the present era of "commercial imperialism".\* Another writer divides the history of Great Britain's "world policy" since 1870 into four periods: (1) the first Asiatic period (that of the struggle against Russia's advance in Central Asia towards India); (2) the African period (approximately 1885-1902): that of the struggle against France for the partition of Africa (the "Fashoda incident"<sup>374</sup> of 1898 which brought her within a hair's breadth of war with

\* David Jayne Hill, *A History of the Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, Vol. I, p. X.

France); (3) the second Asiatic period (alliance with Japan against Russia); and (4) the "European" period, chiefly anti-German.\* "The political patrol clashes take place on the financial field," wrote the banker, Riesser, in 1905, in showing how French finance capital operating in Italy was preparing the way for a political alliance of these countries, and how a conflict was developing between Germany and Great Britain over Persia, between all the European capitalists over Chinese loans, etc. Behold, the living reality of peaceful "ultra-imperialist" alliances in their inseparable connection with ordinary imperialist conflicts!

Kautsky's obscuring of the deepest contradictions of imperialism, which inevitably boils down to painting imperialism in bright colours, leaves its traces in this writer's criticism of the political features of imperialism. Imperialism is the epoch of finance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom. Whatever the political system, the result of these tendencies is everywhere reaction and an extreme intensification of antagonisms in this field. Particularly intensified become the yoke of national oppression and the striving for annexations, i.e., the violation of national independence (for annexation is nothing but the violation of the right of nations to self-determination). Hilferding rightly notes the connection between imperialism and the intensification of national oppression. "In the newly opened-up countries," he writes, "the capital imported into them intensifies antagonisms and excites against the intruders the constantly growing resistance of the peoples who are awakening to national consciousness; this resistance can easily develop into dangerous measures against foreign capital. The old social relations become completely revolutionised, the age-long agrarian isolation of 'nations without history' is destroyed and they are drawn into the capitalist whirlpool. Capitalism itself gradually provides the subjugated with the means and resources for their emancipation and they set out to achieve the goal which once seemed highest to the European nations: the creation of a united national state as a means to economic and cultural freedom. This movement for national independence threatens European capital in its most valuable and most promising fields of exploitation, and European capital can maintain its domination only by continually increasing its military forces."<sup>3</sup>

To this must be added that it is not only in newly opened-up countries, but also in the old, that imperialism is leading to annexation, to increased national oppression, and, consequently,

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\* Schilder, *op. cit.*, S. 178.  
*Finance Capital*, p. 487.

also to increasing resistance. While objecting to the intensification of political reaction by imperialism, Kautsky leaves in the shade a question that has become particularly urgent, viz., the impossibility of unity with the opportunists in the epoch of imperialism. While objecting to annexations, he presents his objections in a form that is most acceptable and least offensive to the opportunists. He addresses himself to a German audience, yet he obscures the most topical and important point, for instance, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany. In order to appraise this "mental aberration" of Kautsky's I shall take the following example. Let us suppose that a Japanese condemns the annexation of the Philippines by the Americans. The question is: will many believe that he does so because he has a horror of annexations as such, and not because he himself has a desire to annex the Philippines? And shall we not be constrained to admit that the "fight" the Japanese is waging against annexations can be regarded as being sincere and politically honest only if he fights against the annexation of Korea by Japan, and urges freedom for Korea to secede from Japan?

Kautsky's theoretical analysis of imperialism, as well as his economic and political critique of imperialism, are permeated *through and through* with a spirit, absolutely irreconcilable with Marxism, of obscuring and glossing over the fundamental contradictions of imperialism and with a striving to preserve at all costs the crumbling unity with opportunism in the European working-class movement.

## X. THE PLACE OF IMPERIALISM IN HISTORY

We have seen that in its economic essence imperialism is monopoly capitalism. This in itself determines its place in history, for monopoly that grows out of the soil of free competition, and precisely out of free competition, is the transition from the capitalist system to a higher socio-economic order. We must take special note of the four principal types of monopoly, or principal manifestations of monopoly capitalism, which are characteristic of the epoch we are examining.

Firstly, monopoly arose out of the concentration of production at a very high stage. This refers to the monopolist capitalist associations, cartels, syndicates and trusts. We have seen the important part these play in present-day economic life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, monopolies had acquired complete supremacy in the advanced countries, and although the first steps towards the formation of the cartels were taken by countries enjoying the protection of high tariffs (Germany,

America), Great Britain, with her system of free trade, revealed the same basic phenomenon, only a little later, namely, the birth of monopoly out of the concentration of production.

Secondly, monopolies have stimulated the seizure of the most important sources of raw materials, especially for the basic and most highly cartelised industries in capitalist society: the coal and iron industries. The monopoly of the most important sources of raw materials has enormously increased the power of big capital, and has sharpened the antagonism between cartelised and non-cartelised industry.

Thirdly, monopoly has sprung from the banks. The banks have developed from modest middleman enterprises into the monopolists of finance capital. Some three to five of the biggest banks in each of the foremost capitalist countries have achieved the "personal link-up" between industrial and bank capital, and have concentrated in their hands the control of thousands upon thousands of millions which form the greater part of the capital and income of entire countries. A financial oligarchy, which throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception—such is the most striking manifestation of this monopoly.

Fourthly, monopoly has grown out of colonial policy. To the numerous "old" motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for spheres of influence, i.e., for spheres for profitable deals, concessions, monopoly profits and so on, economic territory in general. When the colonies of the European powers, for instance, comprised only one-tenth of the territory of Africa (as was the case in 1876), colonial policy was able to develop by methods other than those of monopoly—by the "free grabbing" of territories, so to speak. But when nine-tenths of Africa had been seized (by 1900), when the whole world had been divided up, there was inevitably ushered in the era of monopoly possession of colonies and, consequently, of particularly intense struggle for the division and the redivision of the world.

The extent to which monopolist capital has intensified all the contradictions of capitalism is generally known. It is sufficient to mention the high cost of living and the tyranny of the cartels. This intensification of contradictions constitutes the most powerful driving force of the transitional period of history, which began from the time of the final victory of world finance capital.

Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination and not for freedom, the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the richest or most powerful nations—all these have given birth to those distinctive character-

istics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism. More and more prominently there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, the creation of the "rentier state", the usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie to an ever-increasing degree lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by "clipping coupons". It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain countries betray, to a greater or lesser degree, now one and now another of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before; but this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general, its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (Britain).

In regard to the rapidity of Germany's economic development, Riesser, the author of the book on the big German banks, states: "The progress of the preceding period (1818-70), which had not been exactly slow, compares with the rapidity with which the whole of Germany's national economy, and with it German banking, progressed during this period (1870-1905) in about the same way as the speed of the mail coach in the good old days compares with the speed of the present-day automobile . . . which is whizzing past so fast that it endangers not only innocent pedestrians in its path, but also the occupants of the car." In its turn, this finance capital which has grown with such extraordinary rapidity is not unwilling, precisely because it has grown so quickly, to pass on to a more "tranquil" possession of colonies which have to be seized—and not only by peaceful methods—from richer nations. In the United States, economic development in the last decades has been even more rapid than in Germany, *and for this very reason*, the parasitic features of modern American capitalism have stood out with particular prominence. On the other hand, a comparison of, say, the republican American bourgeoisie with the monarchist Japanese or German bourgeoisie shows that the most pronounced political distinction diminishes to an extreme degree in the epoch of imperialism—not because it is unimportant in general, but because in all these cases we are talking about a bourgeoisie which has definite features of parasitism.

The receipt of high monopoly profits by the capitalists in one of the numerous branches of industry, in one of the numerous countries, etc., makes it economically possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers, and for a time a fairly considerable minority of them, and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given nation against all the others.



The intensification of antagonisms between imperialist nations for the division of the world increases this urge. And so there is created that bond between imperialism and opportunism, which revealed itself first and most clearly in Great Britain, owing to the fact that certain features of imperialist development were observable there much earlier than in other countries. Some writers, L. Martov, for example, are prone to wave aside the connection between imperialism and opportunism in the working-class movement—a particularly glaring fact at the present time—by resorting to “official optimism” (*à la* Kautsky and Huysmans) like the following: the cause of the opponents of capitalism would be hopeless if it were progressive capitalism that led to the increase of opportunism, or, if it were the best-paid workers who were inclined towards opportunism, etc. We must have no illusions about “optimism” of this kind. It is optimism in respect of opportunism; it is optimism which serves to conceal opportunism. As a matter of fact the extraordinary rapidity and the particularly revolting character of the development of opportunism is by no means a guarantee that its victory will be durable: the rapid growth of a painful abscess on a healthy body can only cause it to burst more quickly and thus relieve the body of it. The most dangerous of all in this respect are those who do not wish to understand that the fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism.

From all that has been said in this book on the economic essence of imperialism, it follows that we must define it as capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism. It is very instructive in this respect to note that bourgeois economists, in describing modern capitalism, frequently employ catchwords and phrases like “interlocking”, “absence of isolation”, etc.; “in conformity with their functions and course of development”, banks are “not purely private business enterprises; they are more and more outgrowing the sphere of purely private business regulation”. And this very Riesser, whose words I have just quoted, declares with all seriousness that the “prophecy” of the Marxists concerning “socialisation” has “not come true”!

What then does this catchword “interlocking” express? It merely expresses the most striking feature of the process going on before our eyes. It shows that the observer counts the separate trees, but cannot see the wood. It slavishly copies the superficial, the fortuitous, the chaotic. It reveals the observer as one who is overwhelmed by the mass of raw material and is utterly incapable of appreciating its meaning and importance. Ownership of shares, the relations between owners of private property

"interlock in a haphazard way". But underlying this interlocking, its very base, are the changing social relations of production. When a big enterprise assumes gigantic proportions, and, on the basis of an exact computation of mass data, organises according to plan the supply of primary raw materials to the extent of two-thirds, or three-fourths, of all that is necessary for tens of millions of people; when the raw materials are transported in a systematic and organised manner to the most suitable places of production, sometimes situated hundreds or thousands of miles from each other; when a single centre directs all the consecutive stages of processing the material right up to the manufacture of numerous varieties of finished articles; when these products are distributed according to a single plan among tens and hundreds of millions of consumers (the marketing of oil in America and Germany by the American oil trust)—then it becomes evident that we have socialisation of production, and not mere "interlocking"; that private economic and private property relations constitute a shell which no longer fits its contents, a shell which must inevitably decay if its removal is artificially delayed, a shell which may remain in a state of decay for a fairly long period (if, at the worst, the cure of the opportunist abscess is protracted), but which will inevitably be removed.

The enthusiastic admirer of German imperialism, Schulze-Gaevernitz, exclaims:

"Once the supreme management of the German banks has been entrusted to the hands of a dozen persons, their activity is even today more significant for the public good than that of the majority of the Ministers of State. . . . (The "interlocking" of bankers, ministers, magnates of industry and rentiers is here conveniently forgotten.) If we imagine the development of those tendencies we have noted carried to their logical conclusion we will have: the money capital of the nation united in the banks; the banks themselves combined into cartels; the investment capital of the nation cast in the shape of securities. Then the forecast of that genius Saint-Simon will be fulfilled: "The present anarchy of production, which corresponds to the fact that economic relations are developing without uniform regulation, must make way for organisation in production. Production will no longer be directed by isolated manufacturers, independent of each other and ignorant of man's economic needs; that will be done by a certain public institution. A central committee of management, being able to survey the large field of social economy from a more elevated point of view, will regulate it for the benefit of the whole of society, will put the means of production into suitable hands, and above all will take care that there be constant harmony between production and consumption. Institutions already exist which

have assumed as part of their functions a certain organisation of economic labour, the banks.' We are still a long way from the fulfilment of Saint-Simon's forecast, but we are on the way towards it: Marxism, different from what Marx imagined, but different only in form."<sup>2</sup>

A crushing "refutation" of Marx, indeed, which retreats a step from Marx's precise, scientific analysis to Saint-Simon's guess-work, the guess-work of a genius, but guess-work all the same.

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## THE NASCENT TREND OF IMPERIALIST ECONOMISM<sup>375</sup>

The old Economism of 1894-1902 reasoned thus: the Narodniks have been refuted; capitalism has triumphed in Russia. Consequently, there can be no question of political revolution. The practical conclusion: either "economic struggle be left to the workers and political struggle to the liberals"—that is a curvet to the right—or, instead of political revolution, a general strike for socialist revolution. That curvet to the left was advocated in a pamphlet, now forgotten, of a Russian Economist of the late nineties.<sup>376</sup>

Now a new Economism is being born. Its reasoning is similarly based on the two curvets: "Right"—we are against the "right to self-determination" (i.e., against the liberation of oppressed peoples, the struggle against annexations—that has not yet been fully thought out or clearly stated). "Left"—we are opposed to a minimum programme (i.e., opposed to struggle for reforms and democracy) as "contradictory" to socialist revolution.

It is more than a year now since this nascent trend was revealed to several comrades at the Berne Conference in the spring of 1915. At that time, happily, only one comrade, who met with *universal* disapproval, insisted on these ideas of imperialist Economism right up to the end of the Conference and formulated them in writing in special "theses". *No one* associated himself with these theses.<sup>377</sup>

Subsequently two others associated themselves with this comrade's theses against self-determination (unaware that the question was inextricably linked with the general line of the aforementioned "theses"<sup>378</sup>). But the appearance of the "Dutch programme" in February 1916, published in No. 3 of the *Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee*,<sup>379</sup> immediately brought out this "misunderstanding" and again compelled the author of the original

theses to *restate* his imperialist Economism, this time, too, as a whole, and not merely in application to one allegedly "partial" issue.

It is absolutely necessary again and again to *warn* the comrades concerned that they have *landed themselves in a quagmire*, that their "ideas" have *nothing in common either with Marxism or revolutionary Social-Democracy*. We can no longer leave the matter "in the dark": that would only encourage ideological confusion and direct it into the *worst possible channel* of equivocation, "private" conflicts, incessant "friction", etc. Our duty, on the contrary, is to insist, in the most emphatic and categorical manner, on the *obligation* thoroughly to think out and analyse questions raised for discussion.

In its theses on self-determination\* (which appeared in German as a reprint from No. 2 of *Vorbote*<sup>380</sup>), the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editorial board purposely brought the matter into the press in an *impersonal*, but most detailed form, emphasising in particular the *link* between self-determination and the *general* question of the struggle for reforms, for democracy, the impermissibility of ignoring the *political* aspect, etc. In his comments on the editorial board's theses, the author of the original theses (imperialist Economism) comes out in *solidarity with the Dutch programme*, thereby clearly demonstrating that self-determination is by no means a "partial" question, as exponents of the nascent trend maintain, but a general and basic one.

The Dutch programme was laid before representatives of the Zimmerwald Left<sup>381</sup> on February 5-8, 1916, at the Bern meeting of the International Socialist Committee.<sup>382</sup> Not a single member of the Zimmerwald Left, *not even Radek*, spoke in favour of the programme, for it combines, indiscriminately, such points as "expropriation of the banks" and "repeal of customs tariffs", "abolition of the first Senate chamber", etc. The Zimmerwald Left unanimously, with practically no comment, in fact merely with a shrug of the shoulders, dismissed the Dutch programme as patently and wholly unsuitable.

However, the author of the original theses, written in the spring of 1915, was so fond of the programme that he declared: "Substantially, that is all I said too" (in the spring of 1915), "the Dutch have *thought things out*": "*with them the economic aspect is expropriation of the banks and large-scale production [enterprises], the political aspect is a republic and so on. Absolutely correct!*"

The fact, however, is that the Dutch did not "think things out", but produced an *unthought out* programme. It is the sad fate of

Russia that some among us grasp at precisely what is not thought out in the newest novelty. . . .

The author of the 1915 theses believes that the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors lapsed into a contradiction when they "themselves" urged "expropriation of the banks", and even added the word "immediately" (plus "dictatorial measures") in § 8 ("Concrete Measures"). "And how I was reproached for this very thing in Berne!" the author of the 1915 theses exclaims indignantly, recalling the Berne debates in the spring of 1915.

He forgets or fails to see this "minor" point: in § 8 the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors clearly distinguish *two* eventualities: I. The socialist revolution has *begun*. In that event, they say: "immediate expropriation of the banks", etc. II. The socialist revolution has *not* begun, and in that event we shall have to postpone talking about these good things.

Since the socialist revolution, in the above-mentioned sense, has obviously not *yet* begun, the Dutch programme is incongruous. And the author of the theses adds his bit of "*profundity*" by reverting (he always seems to slip on the same spot!) to his old mistake of turning political demands (like "abolition of the first chamber") into a "*political formula for social revolution*".

Having marked time for a whole year, the author returned to his old mistake. That is the "crux" of his misadventures: he can not solve the problem of *how to link the advent of imperialism with the struggle for reforms and democracy*—just as the Economism of blessed memory could not link the advent of capitalism with the struggle for democracy.

Hence—complete confusion concerning the "unachievability" of democratic demands under imperialism.

Hence—ignoring of the political struggle now, at present, immediately, and at all times, which is impermissible for a Marxist (and permissible only for a *Rabochaya Mysl* Economist).

Hence—the knack of persistently "sliding" from *recognition* of imperialism to *apology* for imperialism (just as the Economists of blessed memory slid from recognition of capitalism to apology for capitalism).

And so on, and so forth.

A detailed examination of the errors the author of the 1915 theses commits in his comments on the *Sotsial-Demokrat* self-determination theses is impossible, for *every line is wrong!* After all, you cannot write pamphlets or books in reply to "comments" if the initiators of imperialist Economism spend a whole year marking time and stubbornly refuse to concern themselves with what ought to be their direct party duty if they want to take a serious attitude to political issues, namely: a considered and articulate statement of what they designate as "our differences".

I am therefore obliged to confine myself to a brief review of how the author applies his basic error and how he "supplements" it.

He believes that I contradict myself: in 1914 (in *Prosveshcheniye*) I wrote that it was absurd to look for self-determination "in the programmes of West-European socialists",\* but in 1916 I proclaim self-determination to be especially urgent.

It did not occur (!) to the author that these "programmes" were drawn up in 1875, 1880, 1891!<sup>383</sup>

Now let us take his objections (to the *Sotsial-Demokrat* self-determination theses) point by point.

§ 1. The same Economist refusal to see and pose *political* questions. *Since* socialism creates the economic basis for the abolition of national oppression in the political sphere, *therefore* our author refuses to formulate our *political tasks* in this sphere! That's ridiculous!

*Since* the victorious proletariat does not wage wars against the bourgeoisie of other countries, *therefore* the author refuses to formulate our political tasks in relation to national oppression!! These are all examples of downright violation of Marxism and logic, or, if you like, manifestations of the *logic* of the fundamental errors of imperialist Economism.

§ 2. The opponents of self-determination are hopelessly confused in their references to its being "unachievable".

The *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors explain to them *two* possible interpretations of unachievability and their error in *both* cases.

Yet the author of the 1915 theses, without even trying to give *his* interpretation of "unachievability", i.e. *accepting* our explanation that two different things are confused here, *persistence in that confusion!!*

He ties crises to "imperialist" "policy": our expert on political economy *has forgotten* that there were crises *before* imperialism!

To maintain that self-determination is unachievable *economically* is to confuse the issue, the editors explain. The author does *not* reply, does *not* state that he considers self-determination unachievable *economically*; he abandons his dubious position and jumps over to politics (unachievable "all the same") though he has been told with the utmost clarity that *politically* a republic is just as "unachievable" under imperialism as self-determination.

Cornered, the author "jumps" again: he accepts a republic and the whole minimum programme only as a "political formula for social revolution"!!!

He refuses to defend the "economic" unachievability of self-

determination and jumps to politics, maintaining that political un-achievability applies to the minimum programme as a whole. Here again there is not a grain of Marxism, not a grain of logic, save the *logic of imperialist Economism*.

The author wants *imperceptibly* (without stopping to think, without producing anything articulate, without making any effort to work out his programme) to jettison the Social-Democratic Party minimum programme! No wonder he has been marking time for a whole year!

The question of combating *Kautskyism* is again not a partial, but a *general* and *basic* question of modern times: the author does *not understand* this struggle. Just as the Economists turned the struggle against the Narodniks into an apology for capitalism, so the author turns the struggle against Kautskyism into an apology for imperialism (that applies also to § 3).

The mistake of the Kautskyites lies in the fact that they present in a reformist manner such demands, and at such a time, that can be presented only in a revolutionary manner (but the author lapses into the position that their mistake is to advance these demands altogether, just as the Economists "understood" the struggle against Narodism to mean that the slogan "Down with the autocracy" was Narodism).

The mistake of Kautskyism lies in projecting *correct* democratic demands into the past, to peaceful capitalism, and not into the future, to the social revolution (the author, however, falls into the position of regarding these demands as incorrect).

§ 3. See above. The author bypasses *also* the question of "federation". The same old fundamental mistake of the same old Economism: inability to pose *political* questions.\*

§ 4. "From self-determination follows defence of the fatherland," the author obstinately repeats. His mistake here is to make negation of defence of the fatherland a *shibboleth*, deduce it *not* from the concrete historical features of a *given* war, but apply it "in general". That is not Marxism.

The author has been told long ago—try to think up a formula of struggle against national oppression or inequality which (for formula) does *not* justify "defence of the fatherland". You cannot devise such a formula, and the author has not challenged that.

Does that mean that we reject the fight against national oppression if it *could* be interpreted to imply defence of the fatherland?

No, for we are opposed not to "defence of the fatherland" "in

\* "We are not afraid of disintegration", the author writes, "we do not defend national boundaries". Now, just try to give that a precise political formulation! You *simply cannot do it* and that's where the trouble lies: you are hampered by Economist blindness on questions of *political democracy*.



general" (see our Party resolutions\*), but to using this fraudulent slogan to *embellish* the present *imperialist* war.

The author *wants* to pose the question of "defence of the fatherland" in a *basically incorrect* and *unhistorical* way (but he cannot; he has been trying in vain for a whole year. . .).

His reference to "dualism" shows that he does *not understand* the difference between monism and dualism.

If I "unite" a shoe brush and a mammal, will that be "monism"?

If I say that to reach goal *a* we must

$$(c) \rightarrow a \leftarrow (b)$$

travel to the left from point (*b*) and to the right from point (*c*), will that be "dualism"?

Is the position of the proletariat with regard to national oppression the same in oppressing and oppressed nations? No, it is not the same, not the same *economically*, *politically*, *ideologically*, *spiritually*, etc.

Meaning?

Meaning that some will approach in *one* way, others in *another* way *the same* goal (the merger of nations) from *different* starting-points. Denial of that is the "monism" that unites a shoe brush and a mammal.

"It is *not* proper to say this [i.e., to *urge* self-determination] to the proletarians of an oppressed nation"—that is how the author "interprets" the editors' theses.

That's amusing!! There is *nothing of the kind* in the theses. The author has either not read them to the end or has not given them any thought at all.

§ 5. See above on Kautskyism.

§ 6. The author is told there are three *types* of countries in the world. He "objects" and snatches out "cases". That is casuistry, not politics.

You want a concrete "case": "How about Belgium"?

See the Lenin and Zinoviev pamphlet: it says that we would be *for* the defence of Belgium (even *by war*) if this concrete war were different.\*\*

You do not agree with that?

Then say so!!

You have *not properly thought out* the question of *why* Social-Democrats are against "defence of the fatherland".

We are not against it for the reasons you believe, because your presentation of the question (vain efforts, not really a presentation) goes against history. That is my reply to the author.

\* See *Collected Works*, Vol 21, pp 159-60 — Ed.

*Ibid* pp 305-06.—Ed.

To describe as "sophistry" the fact that while *justifying wars for the elimination of national oppression*, we do not justify the present imperialist war, which on *both* sides is being waged to *increase* national oppression—is to use "strong" words without giving the matter *the least bit of thought*.

The author *wants* to pose the question of "defence of the fatherland" from a more "Left" position, but the result (for a whole year now) is utter confusion!

§ 7. The author *criticises*: "The question of 'peace terms' is not touched upon at all."

Strange criticism: failure to deal with a question we did not even raise!!

But what is "touched upon" and discussed is the question of *annexations*, on which the imperialist Economists are utterly confused, this time *together* with the Dutch and Radek.

Either you reject the immediate slogan *against old and new annexations*—(no less "unachievable" under imperialism than self-determination, in Europe as well as in the colonies)—and in that case you pass from concealed to open apology for imperialism.

Or you accept the slogan (as Radek has done in the press)—and in that case you accept self-determination of nations under a different name!!

§ 8. The author proclaims "Bolshevism on a West-European scale" ("not your position", he adds).

I attach no importance to this desire to cling to the word "Bolshevism", for I know *such* "old Bolsheviks" from whom God save us. I can only say that the author's proclamation of "Bolshevism on a West-European scale" is, I am deeply convinced, neither Bolshevism nor Marxism, but a minor variant of the same old Economism.

In my view it is highly intolerable, flippant and non-Party to proclaim for a whole year the *new Bolshevism* and leave things at that. Is it not time to *think* matters out and give the comrades an articulate and integrated *exposé* of "Bolshevism on a West-European scale"?

The author has not proved and will not prove the difference between colonies and oppressed nations in Europe (as applied to the question under discussion).

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The Dutch and the P.S.D.' rejection of self-determination is *not only*, and even not so much, the result of confusion, for Gorter factually accepts it, and so does the Zimmerwald statement.

of the Poles, but rather the result of the *special* position of their *nations* (small nations with *centuries-old* traditions and pretensions to *Great-Power status*).

It is extremely thoughtless and naïve to take over and mechanically and uncritically repeat what in others has developed over decades of struggle against the nationalist bourgeoisie and its deception of the people. Here we have a case of people taking over *precisely* what should not be taken over.

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Signed *N. Lenin*

*Collected Works*, Vol.  
pp. 13-21

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## THE MILITARY PROGRAMME OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION<sup>384</sup>

Among the Dutch, Scandinavian and Swiss revolutionary Social-Democrats who are combating the social-chauvinist lies about "defence of the fatherland" in the present imperialist war, there have been voices in favour of replacing the old Social Democratic minimum-programme demand for a "militia", or "the armed nation", by a new demand: "disarmament". The *Jugend-Internationale*<sup>385</sup> has inaugurated a discussion on this issue and published, in No. 3, an editorial supporting disarmament. There is also, we regret to note, a concession to the "disarmament" idea in R. Grimm's latest theses.<sup>386</sup> Discussions have been started in the periodicals *Neues Leben*<sup>387</sup> and *Vorbote*.

Let us take a closer look at the position of the disarmament advocates.

### I

Their principal argument is that the disarmament demand is the clearest, most decisive, most consistent expression of the struggle against all militarism and against all war.

But in this principal argument lies the disarmament advocates' principal error. Socialists cannot, without ceasing to be socialists, be opposed to all war.

Firstly, socialists have never been, nor can they ever be, opposed to revolutionary wars. The bourgeoisie of the imperialist "Great" Powers has become thoroughly reactionary, and the war *this* bourgeoisie is now waging we regard as a reactionary, slave-owners' and criminal war. But what about a war *against* this bourgeoisie? A war, for instance, waged by peoples oppressed by and dependent upon this bourgeoisie, or by colonial peoples for liberation? In § 5 of the *Internationale* group theses we read

"National wars are no longer possible in the era of this unbridled imperialism." That is obviously wrong.

The history of the twentieth century, this century of "unbridled imperialism", is replete with colonial wars. But what we Europeans, the imperialist oppressors of the majority of the world's peoples, with our habitual, despicable European chauvinism, call "colonial wars" are often national wars, or national rebellions of these oppressed peoples. One of the main features of imperialism is that it accelerates capitalist development in the most backward countries, and thereby extends and intensifies the struggle against national oppression. That is a fact, and from it inevitably follows that imperialism must often give rise to national wars. *Junius*, who defends the above-quoted "theses" in her pamphlet, says that in the imperialist era every national war against an imperialist Great Power leads to the intervention of a rival imperialist Great Power. Every national war is thus turned into an imperialist war. But that argument is wrong too. This *can* happen, but does not always happen. Many colonial wars between 1900 and 1914 did not follow that course. And it would be simply ridiculous to declare, for instance, that after the present war, if it ends in the utter exhaustion of all the belligerents, "there can be no" national, progressive, revolutionary wars "of any kind", waged, say, by China in alliance with India Persia, Siam, etc., against the Great Powers.

To deny all possibility of national wars under imperialism is wrong in theory, obviously mistaken historically, and tantamount to European chauvinism in practice: we who belong to nations that oppress hundreds of millions in Europe, Africa, Asia, etc., are invited to tell the oppressed peoples that it is "impossible" for them to wage war against "our" nations!

Secondly, civil war is just as much a war as any other. He who accepts the class struggle cannot fail to accept civil wars, which in every class society are the natural, and under certain conditions inevitable, continuation, development and intensification of the class struggle. That has been confirmed by every great revolution. To repudiate civil war, or to forget about it, is to fall into extreme opportunism and renounce the socialist revolution.

Thirdly, the victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke eliminate all wars in general. On the contrary, it presupposes wars. The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in different countries. It cannot be otherwise under commodity production. From this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in *all* countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while

the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois. This is bound to create not only friction, but a direct attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the socialist state's victorious proletariat. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie. Engels was perfectly right when, in his letter to Kautsky of September 12, 1882, he clearly stated that it was possible for *already victorious* socialism to wage "defensive wars". What he had in mind was defence of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries.

Only after we have overthrown, finally vanquished and expropriated the bourgeoisie of the whole world, and not merely of one country, will wars become impossible. And from a scientific point of view it would be utterly wrong—and utterly unrevolutionary—for us to evade or gloss over the most important thing: crushing the resistance of the bourgeoisie—the most difficult task, and one demanding the greatest amount of fighting, in the *transition* to socialism. The "social" parsons and opportunists are always ready to build dreams of future peaceful socialism. But the very thing that distinguishes them from revolutionary Social-Democrats is that they refuse to think about and reflect on the fierce class struggle and class wars needed to achieve that beautiful future.

We must not allow ourselves to be led astray by words. The term "defence of the fatherland", for instance, is hateful to many because both avowed opportunists and Kautskyites use it to cover up and gloss over the bourgeois lie about the *present* predatory war. This is a fact. But it does not follow that we must no longer see through to the meaning of political slogans. To accept "defence of the fatherland" in the present war is no more nor less than to accept it as a "just" war, a war in the interests of the proletariat—no more nor less, we repeat, because invasions may occur in any war. It would be sheer folly to repudiate "defence of the fatherland" *on the part* of oppressed nations in their wars *against* the imperialist Great Powers, or on the part of a victorious proletariat in *its* war against some Galliffet of a bourgeois state.

Theoretically, it would be absolutely wrong to forget that every war is but the continuation of policy by other means. The present imperialist war is the continuation of the imperialist policies of two groups of Great Powers, and these policies were engendered and fostered by the sum total of the relationships of the imperialist era. But this very era must also necessarily engender and foster policies of struggle against national oppression and of proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie and,

consequently, also the possibility and inevitability, first, of revolutionary national rebellions and wars; second, of proletarian wars and rebellions *against* the bourgeoisie; and, third, of a combination of both kinds of revolutionary war, etc.

## II

To this must be added the following general consideration.

An oppressed class which does not strive to learn to use arms, to acquire arms, only deserves to be treated like slaves. We cannot, unless we have become bourgeois pacifists or opportunists, forget that we are living in a class society from which there is no way out, nor can there be, save through the class struggle. In every class society, whether based on slavery, serfdom, or, as at present, on wage-labour, the oppressor class is always armed. Not only the modern standing army, but even the modern militia—and even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, Switzerland, for instance—represent the bourgeoisie armed *against* the proletariat. That is such an elementary truth that it is hardly necessary to dwell upon it. Suffice it to point to the use of troops against strikers in all capitalist countries.

A bourgeoisie armed against the proletariat is one of the biggest, fundamental and cardinal facts of modern capitalist society. And in face of this fact, revolutionary Social-Democrats are urged to “demand” “disarmament”! That is tantamount to complete abandonment of the class-struggle point of view, to renunciation of all thought of revolution. Our slogan must be: arming of the proletariat to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie. These are the only tactics possible for a revolutionary class, tactics that follow logically from, and are dictated by, the whole *objective development* of capitalist militarism. Only *after* the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historic mission, to consign all armaments to the scrap-heap. And the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but *only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before.*

If the present war rouses among the reactionary Christian socialists, among the whimpering petty bourgeoisie, *only* horror and fright, only aversion to all use of arms, to bloodshed, death, etc., then we must say: Capitalist society is and has always been *horror without end*. If this most reactionary of all wars is now preparing for that society an *end in horror*, we have no reason to fall into despair. But the disarmament “demand”, or more correctly, the dream of disarmament, is, objectively, nothing but an expression of despair at a time when, as everyone

can see, the bourgeoisie itself is paving the way for the only legitimate and revolutionary war—civil war against the imperialist bourgeoisie.

A lifeless theory, some might say, but we would remind them of two world-historical facts: the role of the trusts and the employment of women in industry, on the one hand, and the Paris Commune of 1871 and the December 1905 uprising in Russia, on the other.

The bourgeoisie makes it its business to promote trusts, drive women and children into the factories, subject them to corruption and suffering, condemn them to extreme poverty. We do not "demand" such development, we do not "support" it. We fight it. But *how* do we fight? We explain that trusts and the employment of women in industry are progressive. We do not want a return to the handicraft system, pre-monopoly capitalism, domestic drudgery for women. Forward through the trusts, etc., and beyond them to socialism!

With the necessary changes that argument is applicable also to the present militarisation of the population. Today the imperialist bourgeoisie militarises the youth as well as the adults; tomorrow, it may begin militarising the women. Our attitude should be: All the better! Full speed ahead! For the faster we move, the nearer shall we be to the armed uprising against capitalism. How can Social-Democrats give way to fear of the militarisation of the youth, etc., if they have not forgotten the example of the Paris Commune? This is not a "lifeless theory" or a dream. It is a fact. And it would be a sorry state of affairs indeed if, all the economic and political facts notwithstanding, Social-Democrats began to doubt that the imperialist era and imperialist wars must inevitably bring about a repetition of such facts.

A certain bourgeois observer of the Paris Commune, writing to an English newspaper in May 1871, said: "If the French nation consisted entirely of women, what a terrible nation it would be!" Women and teen-age children fought in the Paris Commune side by side with the men. It will be no different in the coming battles for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Proletarian women will not look on passively as poorly armed or unarmed workers are shot down by the well-armed forces of the bourgeoisie. They will take to arms, as they did in 1871, and from the cowed nations of today—or more correctly, from the present-day labour movement, disorganised more by the opportunists than by the governments—there will undoubtedly arise, sooner or later, but with absolute certainty, an international league of the "terrible nations" of the revolutionary proletariat.

The whole of social life is now being militarised. Imperialism



is a fierce struggle of the Great Powers for the division and redivision of the world. It is therefore bound to lead to further militarisation in all countries, even in neutral and small ones. How will proletarian women oppose this? Only by cursing all war and everything military, only by demanding disarmament? The women of an oppressed and really revolutionary class will never accept that shameful role. They will say to their sons: "You will soon be grown up. You will be given a gun. Take it and learn the military art properly. The proletarians need this knowledge not to shoot your brothers, the workers of other countries, as is being done in the present war, and as the traitors to socialism are telling you to do. They need it to fight the bourgeoisie of their own country, to put an end to exploitation, poverty and war, and not by pious wishes, but by defeating and disarming the bourgeoisie."

If we are to shun such propaganda, precisely such propaganda, in connection with the present war, then we had better stop using fine words about international revolutionary Social-Democracy, the socialist revolution and war against war.

### III

The disarmament advocates object to the "armed nation" clause in the programme also because it more easily leads, they allege, to concessions to opportunism. The cardinal point, namely, the relation of disarmament to the class struggle and to the social revolution, we have examined above. We shall now examine the relation between the disarmament demand and opportunism. One of the chief reasons why it is unacceptable is precisely that, together with the illusions it creates, it inevitably weakens and devitalises our struggle against opportunism.

Undoubtedly, this struggle is the main, immediate question now confronting the International. Struggle against imperialism that is not closely linked with the struggle against opportunism is either an empty phrase or a fraud. One of the main defects of Zimmerwald and Kienthal<sup>388</sup>—one of the main reasons why these embryos of the Third International may possibly end in a fiasco—is that the question of fighting opportunism was not even raised openly, let alone solved in the sense of proclaiming the need to break with the opportunists. Opportunism has triumphed—temporarily—in the European labour movement. Its two main shades are apparent in all the big countries: first, the avowed, cynical, and therefore less dangerous social-imperialism of Messrs. Plekhanov, Scheidemann, Legien, Albert Thomas and Sembat, Vandervelde, Hyndman, Henderson, et al.; second.

the concealed, Kautskyite opportunism: Kautsky-Haase and the Social-Democratic Labour Group in Germany<sup>389</sup>; Longuet, Pressemane, Mayéras, et al., in France; Ramsay MacDonald and the other leaders of the Independent Labour Party in England; Martov, Chkhcheidze, et al., in Russia; Trèves and the other so-called Left reformists in Italy.

Avowed opportunism is openly and directly opposed to revolution and to incipient revolutionary movements and outbursts. It is in direct alliance with the governments, varied as the forms of this alliance may be—from accepting ministerial posts to participation in the war industries committees (in Russia).<sup>390</sup> The masked opportunists, the Kautskyites, are much more harmful and dangerous to the labour movement, because they hide their advocacy of alliance with the former under a cloak of plausible, pseudo-“Marxist” catchwords and pacifist slogans. The fight against both these forms of prevailing opportunism must be conducted in *all* fields of proletarian politics: parliament, the trade unions, strikes, the armed forces, etc. The main distinguishing feature of *both* these forms of prevailing opportunism is that the concrete question of the *connection between the present war and revolution, and the other concrete questions of revolution*, are hushed up, concealed, or treated with an eye to police prohibitions. And this despite the fact that before the war the connection between *this* impending war and the proletarian revolution was emphasised innumerable times, both unofficially, and officially in the Basle Manifesto.<sup>391</sup> The main defect of the disarmament demand is its evasion of all the concrete questions of revolution. Or do the advocates of disarmament stand for an altogether new kind of revolution, unarmed revolution?

To proceed. We are by no means opposed to the fight for reforms. And we do not wish to ignore the sad possibility—if the worst comes to the worst—of mankind going through a second imperialist war, if revolution does not come out of the present war, in spite of the numerous outbursts of mass unrest and mass discontent and in spite of our efforts. We favour a programme of reforms directed *also* against the opportunists. They would be only too glad if we left the struggle for reforms entirely to them and sought escape from sad reality in a nebulous “disarmament” fantasy. “Disarmament” means simply running away from unpleasant reality, not fighting it.

In such a programme we would say something like this: “To accept the defence of the fatherland slogan in the 1914-16 imperialist war is to corrupt the labour movement with the aid of a bourgeois lie.” Such a concrete reply to a concrete question would be more correct theoretically, much more useful to the proletariat and more unbearable to the opportunists, than the disarma-

ment demand and repudiation of "all and any" defence of the fatherland. And we could add: "The bourgeoisie of all the imperialist Great Powers—England, France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, Japan, the United States—has become so reactionary and so intent on world domination, that *any* war waged by *the bourgeoisie of those* countries is bound to be reactionary. The proletariat must not only oppose all such wars, but must also wish for the defeat of its 'own' government in such wars and utilise its defeat for revolutionary insurrection, if an insurrection to prevent the war proves unsuccessful."

On the question of a militia, we should say: We are not in favour of a bourgeois militia; we are in favour only of a proletarian militia. Therefore, "not a penny, not a man", not only for a standing army, but even for a bourgeois militia, even in countries like the United States, or Switzerland, Norway, etc. The more so that in the freest republican countries (e.g., Switzerland) we see that the militia is being increasingly Prussianised, particularly in 1907 and 1911, and prostituted by being used against strikers. We can demand popular election of officers, abolition of all military law, equal rights for foreign and native-born workers (a point particularly important for those imperialist states which, like Switzerland, are more and more blatantly exploiting larger numbers of foreign workers, while denying them all rights). Further, we can demand the right of every hundred, say, inhabitants of a given country to form voluntary military-training associations, with free election of instructors paid by the state, etc. Only under these conditions could the proletariat acquire military training for *itself* and not for its slave-owners; and the need for such training is imperatively dictated by the interests of the proletariat. The Russian revolution showed that every success of the revolutionary movement, even a partial success like the seizure of a certain city, a certain factory town, or winning over a certain section of the army, inevitably *compels* the victorious proletariat to carry out just such a programme.

Lastly, it stands to reason that opportunism can never be defeated by mere programmes; it can only be defeated by deeds. The greatest, and fatal, error of the bankrupt Second International was that its words did not correspond to its deeds, that it cultivated the habit of hypocritical and unscrupulous revolutionary phrase-mongering (note the present attitude of Kautsky and Co. towards the Basle Manifesto). Disarmament as a social idea, i.e., an idea that springs from, and can affect, a certain social environment, and is not the invention of some crackpot, springs, evidently, from the peculiar "tranquil" conditions prevailing, by way of exception, in certain small states, which have for a fairly

long time stood aside from the world's path of war and bloodshed, and hope to remain in that way. To be convinced of this, we have only to consider the arguments advanced, for instance, by the Norwegian advocates of disarmament. "We are a small country," they say. "Our army is small; there is nothing we can do against the Great Powers [and, consequently, nothing we can do to resist forcible involvement in an imperialist *alliance* with one or the other Great-Power group]. . . . We want to be left in peace in our backwoods and continue our backwoods politics, demand disarmament, compulsory arbitration, permanent neutrality, etc." ("permanent" after the Belgian fashion, no doubt?).

The petty striving of petty states to hold aloof, the petty-bourgeois desire to keep as far away as possible from the great battles of world history, to take advantage of one's relatively monopolistic position in order to remain in hidebound passivity—this is the *objective* social environment which may ensure the disarmament idea a certain degree of success and a certain degree of popularity in some of the small states. That striving is, of course, reactionary and is based entirely on illusions, for, in one way or another, imperialism draws the small states into the vortex of world economy and world politics.

In Switzerland, for instance, the imperialist environment objectively prescribes *two* courses to the labour movement: the opportunists, in alliance with the bourgeoisie, are seeking to turn the country into a republican-democratic monopolistic federation that would thrive on profits from imperialist bourgeois tourists, and to make this "tranquil" monopolistic position as profitable and as tranquil as possible.

The genuine Swiss Social-Democrats are striving to use Switzerland's relative freedom and her "international" position to help the victory of the close alliance of the revolutionary elements in the European workers' parties. Switzerland, thank God, does not have "a separate language of her own", but uses three world languages, the three languages spoken in the adjacent belligerent countries.

If twenty thousand Swiss party members were to pay a weekly levy of two centimes as a sort of "extra war tax", we would have twenty thousand francs per annum, a sum more than sufficient periodically to publish in three languages and distribute among the workers and soldiers of the belligerent countries—in spite of the bans imposed by the general staffs—all the truthful evidence about the incipient revolt of the workers, their fraternising in the trenches, their hope that the weapons will be used for revolutionary struggle against the imperialist bourgeoisie of their "own" countries, etc.

That is not new. It is being done by the best papers, like *La Sentinelle*,<sup>392</sup> *Volk recht*<sup>393</sup> and the *Berner Tagwacht*,<sup>394</sup> although, unfortunately, on an inadequate scale. Only through such activity can the splendid decision of the Aarau Party Congress<sup>395</sup> become something more than merely a splendid decision.

The question that interests us now is: Does the disarmament demand correspond to this revolutionary trend among the Swiss Social-Democrats? It obviously does not. Objectively, disarmament is an extremely national, a specifically national programme of small states. It is certainly not the international programme of international revolutionary Social-Democracy.

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Signed *N. Lenin*

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of Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol XIX

*Collected Works*, Vol 23,  
pp 77-87



**NOTES**  
**INDEXES**





## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Lenin wrote this article for the Encyclopaedic Dictionary published by the Granat Brothers, which was then the most popular in Russia. In the preface for the pamphlet edition in 1918 Lenin gave the date of writing as 1913, from memory. Actually he began it in the spring of 1914 in Poronin, but had to interrupt it being too busy with his work in guiding the Party and the newspaper *Pravda*. Lenin resumed his work on the article only in September that year, after he had moved to Berne, and finished it in the first half of November.

The article was published in 1915 in Volume 28 of the Dictionary with the "Bibliography of Marxism" appended to it; it was signed "V. Ilyin". For censorship reasons the editors omitted two chapters: "Socialism" and "Tactics of the Class Struggle of the Proletariat" and made a number of changes in the text.

In 1918 the Priboi Publishers put out the article in pamphlet form exactly as published in the Dictionary but without the "Bibliography".

The full text of the article according to the manuscript was first published by the Lenin Institute of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee in the collection of Lenin's articles *Marx, Engels, Marxism*, which appeared in 1925. In this volume the article is given without the "Bibliography". p. 15

- <sup>2</sup> *Mensheviks*—an opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic movement

They became known as Mensheviks at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, when during the elections to the Party central bodies the revolutionary Social-Democrats led by Lenin won the majority (*bolshinstvo*) while the opportunists found themselves in the minority (*menshinstvo*); hence the names *Bolsheviks* and *Mensheviks*.

During the 1905-07 revolution the Mensheviks opposed the hegemony of the working class in the revolution and its alliance with the peasantry and demanded agreement with the liberal bourgeoisie, which, they maintained, should lead the revolution. In the years of reaction which followed the defeat of the revolution most of the Mensheviks became liquidators: they demanded the liquidation of the revolutionary illegal party of the working class. After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917 the Mensheviks accepted posts in the bourgeois Provisional Government, supported its imperialist policy and opposed the socialist revolution being prepared by the Bolsheviks.

After the October Socialist Revolution the Mensheviks became an openly counter-revolutionary party organising and participating in conspiracies and revolts against Soviet power. p. 15

<sup>1</sup> *Left Hegelians* or *Young Hegelians*—an idealist trend in German philosophy in the 1830s and 1840s. The Young Hegelians tried to draw radical conclusions from Hegel's philosophy to prove the necessity for a bourgeois reform of Germany.

The leaders of the trend were David Strauss, the Bauer brothers, Max Stirner and some others. For a time Feuerbach and also Marx and Engels in their youth adhered to the Young Hegelians. Then Marx and Engels broke with them and criticised the idealist and petty bourgeois essence of the trend in *The Holy Family* (1844) and *The German Ideology* (1845/46).  
p. 16

<sup>4</sup> Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 3, Moscow 1973, p. 344).  
p. 16

<sup>5</sup> *Rheinische Zeitung für Politik, Handel und Gewerbe* (Rhenish Gazette on Politics, Trade and Manufacture)—a daily newspaper that appeared in Cologne from January 1, 1842 to March 31, 1843. It was founded by representatives of the Rhenish bourgeoisie who were opposed to Prussian absolutism. Some Left Hegelians were invited to contribute to the new paper. Marx became a collaborator in April 1842 and was one of the paper's editors from October of that year. Under Marx the *Rheinische Zeitung* began to take on a more definite revolutionary democratic character. In January 1843, the Prussian government issued an order to close down the newspaper from April 1, 1843 and to establish a particularly strict censorship in the meantime. In connection with the plan of the newspaper shareholders to make it more moderate, Marx resigned on March 1, 1843.  
p. 16

<sup>6</sup> This Bibliography, written by Lenin for the article 'Karl Marx', is not included in this edition.  
p. 17

<sup>7</sup> The reference is to the article 'Justification of the Correspondent from the Mosel' by Karl Marx.  
p. 17

<sup>8</sup> The reference is to the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (German-French Annals), a magazine edited by Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge and published in German in Paris. Only the first issue, a double one, appeared in February 1844. It included works by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels which marked the final transition of Marx and Engels to materialism and communism.

Publication of the magazine was discontinued mainly as a result of basic differences of opinion between Marx and the bourgeois radical Ruge.  
p. 17

<sup>9</sup> Karl Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction' (see Marx and Engels, *On Religion*, Moscow 1972, p. 45).  
p. 17

<sup>10</sup> *Proudhonism*—an unscientific trend in petty bourgeois socialism hostile to Marxism, so called after its ideologist, the French anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon criticised big capitalist property from the petty bourgeois position and dreamed of perpetuating small private ownership. He proposed the foundation of peoples' and exchange banks with the aid of which the workers would be able to acquire the means of production, become handicraftsmen and ensure the just marketing of their produce. Proudhon did not understand the historic role of the proletariat and displayed a negative attitude to the class struggle, the proletarian revolution,

and the dictatorship of the proletariat, as an anarchist he denied the need for the state. Marx subjected Proudhonism to ruthless criticism in his work *Poverty of Philosophy* p 17

- <sup>11</sup> *The Communist League*—the first international communist organisation of the proletariat founded under the guidance of Marx and Engels in London early in June 1847

Marx and Engels helped to work out the programmatic and organisational principles of the League, they wrote its programme—the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, published in February 1848

The Communist League was the predecessor of the International Working Men's Association (the First International). It existed until November 1852 its prominent members later playing a leading role in the First International p 17

- <sup>12</sup> The reference is to the bourgeois revolution in France in February 1848 p 18

- <sup>1</sup> The reference is to the bourgeois revolutions in Germany and Austria which began in March 1848 p 18

- <sup>1</sup> *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (New Rhenish Gazette) was published in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19 1849. Marx and Engels directed the newspaper. Marx being its editor in chief. It was characterised *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* as 'the finest and unsurpassed organ of the revolutionary proletariat' (*Collected Works*, Vol 21 p 51). Despite persecution and the obstacles placed in its way by the police the newspaper staunchly defended the interests of revolutionary democracy, the interests of the proletariat. Because of Marx's banishment from Prussia in May 1849 and the persecution of the other editors *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* had to cease publication p 18

- <sup>1</sup> The reference is to the mis-demonstration in Paris organised by the Montagne, the party of the petty bourgeoisie in protest against the infringement by the President and the majority in the Legislative Assembly of the constitutional ideas established in the revolution of 1848. The demonstration was dispersed by the government p 18

- <sup>10</sup> The reference is to Marx's pamphlet *Herr Vogt* which was written in reply to the slanderous pamphlet by Vogt, a Bonapartist agent provocateur *My Process Against "Allgemeine Zeitung"* p 18

- <sup>17</sup> The reference is to the "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association" p 18

- <sup>15</sup> *Bakuninism*—a trend called after its leader Mikhail Bakunin an enemy of anarchism and enemy of Marxism and scientific socialism

The Bakuninists conducted a stubborn struggle against the Marxist theory and tactics in the working class movement. The basic postulate of Bakuninism was the rejection of all forms of state including the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bakuninists did not understand the historical role of the proletariat. They maintained that a secret revolutionary society made up of outstanding people would lead popular revolts. Their tactics of conspiracy and terrorism was sheer gambling and hostile to the Marxist theory of insurrection p 19

- <sup>11</sup> See Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family* Moscow 1956 p 168 p 20

- <sup>20</sup> See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 29. p. 20
- <sup>21</sup> Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 65, 86, 55, 38. p. 20
- <sup>22</sup> *Agnosticism*—an idealist philosophical theory asserting that the world is unknowable, that the human mind is limited and cannot know anything beyond the realm of sensations. Agnosticism has various forms: some agnostics recognise the objective existence of the material world but deny the possibility of knowing it, others deny the existence of the material world on the plea that man cannot know whether anything exists beyond his sensations.  
*Criticism*—Kant gave this name to his idealist philosophy, considering the criticism of man's cognitive ability to be the purpose of that philosophy. Kant's criticism led him to the conviction that human reason cannot know the nature of things.  
*Positivism*—a widespread trend in bourgeois philosophy and sociology, founded by Comte (1798-1857), a French philosopher and sociologist. The positivists deny the possibility of knowing inner regularities and relations and deny the significance of philosophy as a method of knowing and changing the objective world. They reduce philosophy to a summary of the data provided by the various branches of science and to a superficial description of the results of direct observation, i.e., to "positive" facts. Positivism considers itself to be "above" both materialism and idealism but it is actually nothing more than a variety of subjective idealism p. 21
- <sup>23</sup> Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 347). p. 21
- <sup>24</sup> Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 16, 36. p. 22
- <sup>25</sup> Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, pp. 362-63, 339, 362). p. 22
- <sup>26</sup> Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1962, p. 40. p. 22
- <sup>27</sup> Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 351). p. 23
- <sup>28</sup> See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 352. p. 23
- <sup>29</sup> See Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 20-21. p. 24
- <sup>30</sup> *The Restoration*—the period in France between 1814 and 1830 when power was in the hands of the Bourbons, restored to the throne after their overthrow by the French bourgeois revolution in 1792. p. 26
- <sup>31</sup> See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, pp. 108-09, 117-18, 116. p. 27
- <sup>32</sup> See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 20. p. 27
- <sup>33</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, pp. 78-79. p. 28
- <sup>34</sup> Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, 1971, p. 30. p. 28

- <sup>35</sup> See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 167. p. 28
- <sup>36</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 164. p. 29
- <sup>37</sup> See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, pp. 713, 714-15. p. 32
- <sup>38</sup> *The Theory of Marginal Utility*—a vulgar, bourgeois apologetic economic theory that originated in the 1870s to counteract Marx's theory of value. According to this theory the value of commodities is estimated by their usefulness and not the amount of social labour expended on their production. p. 32
- <sup>39</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, pp. 798-99. p. 35
- <sup>40</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 699. p. 35
- <sup>41</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, pp. 601-02. p. 35
- <sup>42</sup> Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, pp. 276-77. p. 35
- <sup>43</sup> Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 451. p. 35
- <sup>44</sup> See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 276. p. 35
- <sup>45</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, pp. 806, 807. p. 36
- <sup>46</sup> See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, pp. 474-75. p. 36
- <sup>47</sup> See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 460, 454. p. 38
- <sup>48</sup> See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, pp. 124-25. p. 38
- <sup>49</sup> See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 328. p. 38
- <sup>50</sup> Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1962, p. 385. p. 39
- <sup>51</sup> See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 330. p. 39
- <sup>52</sup> See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 470. p. 39
- <sup>53</sup> *Die Neue Zeit* (New Times)—a theoretical magazine of the German Social Democratic Party published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923.  
Some works by Marx and Engels first appeared in *Die Neue Zeit*. Engels helped the editors of the magazine with his advice and often criticised their deviations from Marxism. Beginning with the middle nineties, after Engels' death, *Die Neue Zeit* regularly published articles by revisionists. During the First World War of 1914-18 it took a Centrist position and actually supported the social-chauvinists. p. 39
- <sup>54</sup> See Marx's letter to Engels, April 9, 1863 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 140). p. 40
- <sup>55</sup> Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, 1973, p. 150. p. 40
- <sup>56</sup> See Marx's letter to Engels, February 5, 1851. p. 41
- <sup>57</sup> Engels's letters to Marx, December 17, 1857 and October 7, 1858 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 110). p. 41

<sup>58</sup> *Chartism*—the first mass revolutionary movement of the British workers in the 1830s and 1840s. The Chartists published their petition to Parliament, the People's Charter (hence their name), and fought for its demands: universal suffrage, abolition of the property qualifications for Parliamentary candidates, etc. Mass meetings and demonstrations involving millions of workers and artisans were held throughout the country for many years.

Parliament did not approve the People's Charter and rejected all the petitions.

The government subjected the Chartists to brutal reprisals and arrested their leaders. The movement was crushed but it had a tremendous influence on the subsequent development of the international working-class movement. p. 41

<sup>59</sup> See Engels' letter to Marx of April 8, 1863, Marx's letter to Engels of April 9, 1863 and also Marx's letter to Engels of April 2, 1866. p. 41

<sup>60</sup> See Engels' letters to Marx dated November 19, 1869 and August 11, 1881. p. 41

<sup>61</sup> See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 136. p. 41

<sup>62</sup> The reference is to the democratic uprising for national liberation in the Cracow Republic which in 1815 was placed under the joint control of Austria, Prussia and Russia. The rebels set up a National Government which issued a manifesto proclaiming abolition of feudal services and promising to give the peasants land without redemption. In its other proclamations it announced the establishment of national workshops with higher wages and the introduction of equal rights for all citizens. Soon, however, the uprising was suppressed. p. 41

<sup>63</sup> Karl Marx, "The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-Revolution" (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1 Moscow, 1973, p. 141). p. 42

<sup>64</sup> See Marx's letter to Engels, April 16, 1856 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 92). p. 42

<sup>65</sup> See Engels' letters to Marx dated January 27, 1865 and February 5, 1865. p. 42

<sup>66</sup> See Engels' letters to Marx dated June 11, 1863, November 24, 1863, September 4, 1864, January 27, 1865, October 22, 1867 and December 6, 1867 and Marx's letters to Engels dated June 12, 1863, December 10, 1864, February 3, 1865 and December 17, 1867. p. 43

<sup>67</sup> See Marx's letter to Kugelmann, April 12, 1871 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 263). p. 43

<sup>68</sup> *The Exceptional Law Against Socialists* was promulgated in Germany in 1878. Under this law all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, all workers' organisations, and the working-class press were prohibited; socialist literature was confiscated and Social-Democrats were persecuted to reprisals and banished. The Social-Democratic Party, however, managed to organise its work in underground conditions and at the same time made wide use of legal opportunities to strengthen its contacts with the masses. The law was annulled in 1890 under pressure of the growing mass movement. p. 43

- <sup>69</sup> See Marx's letters to Engels dated July 23, 1877, August 1, 1877 and September 10, 1879 and Engels' letters to Marx dated August 20, 1879 and September 9, 1879. p. 43
- <sup>70</sup> The article was written by Lenin on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of Marx's death and published in *Prosveshcheniye* No. 3 for 1913.  
*Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment)—a Bolshevik theoretical monthly published legally in St. Petersburg from December 1911 to June 1914. The circulation of the magazine reached 5,000 copies. Lenin directed the work of the magazine from abroad, first from Paris, then from Cracow and Poronin; he edited articles and regularly corresponded with the editors.  
 On the eve of the First World War the magazine was closed down by the tsarist government. Publication was resumed in the autumn of 1917 but only one issue (a double one) appeared. p. 44
- <sup>71</sup> The reference is to Engels' *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*. p. 45
- <sup>72</sup> See Note 10. p. 50
- <sup>73</sup> The reference is to *Bernsteinism*, an opportunist, anti-Marxist trend in the international Social-Democratic movement which arose in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century and was named after its founder Eduard Bernstein, the most outspoken advocate of revisionism. After Engels' death Bernstein set out to revise the revolutionary teachings of Marx in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism and tried to turn the Social-Democratic Party into a petty-bourgeois party of social reform.  
 In Russia Bernsteinism was supported by the "legal Marxists", Economists, Bundists and Mensheviks. p. 50
- <sup>74</sup> *Neo-Kantians*—adherents of Neo-Kantianism, a reactionary trend in bourgeois philosophy which arose in Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century. The Neo-Kantians resuscitated the more reactionary, idealist conceptions of Kant's philosophy and rejected the elements of materialism that it contained. They preached resurrection of Kant's idealism and opposed dialectical and historical materialism with the slogan "Back to Kant".  
 Lenin subjected Neo-Kantianism to a comprehensive criticism in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. p. 51
- <sup>75</sup> See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973. p. 98. p. 51
- <sup>76</sup> Lenin fulfilled his promise in *Materialism and Empirio Criticism*, published in May 1909 (see *Collected Works*, Vol. 14). p. 51
- <sup>77</sup> *The Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets)*—the principal party of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie in Russia formed in October 1905. It consisted of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo functionaries from the nobility and bourgeois intellectuals. Trying to hoodwink the working masses, the Cadets called themselves the "Party of People's Freedom" but actually did not go beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Cadets became implacable enemies of Soviet power and participated in all the armed counter-revolutionary actions and foreign military interventions. They did not cease their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activities even when they emigrated to other countries after the defeat of the interventionists and whiteguards. p. 54

<sup>78</sup> *Millerandism*—an opportunist trend in the Social-Democratic movement named after the French reformist socialist Millerand, who, in 1899, entered the reactionary bourgeois government of France and supported its anti-popular policy. p. 54

<sup>79</sup> *Guesdists*—a revolutionary, Marxist trend in the French socialist movement at the turn of the century led by Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue. In 1882, after the split in the Workers' Party of France at its Saint-Etienne Congress, the Guesdists formed a party of their own, retaining the old name.

In 1901 champions of revolutionary class struggle led by Guesde united to form the Socialist Party of France, they were also called Guesdists after their leader. In 1905 they joined the reformist French Socialist Party. During the First World War of 1914-18 Guesde, Sembat and its other leaders betrayed the cause of the working class and went over to social-chauvinism.

*Jaurèsists*—followers of the French socialist Jean Leon Jaurès, who in the 1890s together with Millerand formed the group of "independent socialists", and headed the Right, reformist wing of the French socialist movement. Under the pretext of "freedom of criticism" the Jaurèsists sought to revise the Marxist principles and preached class collaboration of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In 1902 they formed the French Socialist Party, which took a reformist position.

*Broussists* (Possibilists) (Paul Brousse, Benoît Malon and others)—a petty-bourgeois, reformist trend in the French socialist movement of the 1880s which diverted the proletariat from revolutionary methods of struggle. The Possibilists founded the Workers' Social-Revolutionary Party. They renounced the revolutionary programme and tactics of the proletariat and glossed over the socialist aims of the working-class movement, maintaining that the workers should limit their struggle to the "possible" (hence their name). The Possibilists had influence mainly in the economically less developed regions and over more backward sections of the working class.

Subsequently mos. of the Possibilists joined the reformist French Socialist Party founded under the sponsorship of Jaurès in 1902. p. 55

<sup>80</sup> *The Social-Democratic Federation of Britain* was founded in 1884. Along with reformists (Hyndman and others) and anarchists, the Social-Democratic Federation included a group of revolutionary Social-Democrats, supporters of Marxism (Harry Quelch, Tom Mann, Edward Aveling, Eleanor Marx-Aveling and others) who constituted the Left wing of the socialist movement in Britain. Engels criticised the Federation for dogmatism and sectarianism and for its lack of contact with the mass working-class movement in Britain and disregard of the specific features of this movement. In 1907 the Social-Democratic Federation was renamed the Social-Democratic Party, which in 1911, together with Left elements from the Independent Labour Party formed the British Socialist Party. In 1920 this party played an important part in founding the Communist Party of Great Britain. p. 55

<sup>81</sup> *The Independent Labour Party of Britain*—a reformist organisation founded by the leaders of the "new trade unions" in 1893, at the time of the revival of the strike movement and the intensification of the workers' struggle for independence from the bourgeois parties. The I.L.P. included members of the "new trade unions" and of a number of old trade unions, intellectuals and petty bourgeois who were under the influence of the Fabians. Its leader was Keir Hardie. The main demands of the Party programme were the collective ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, an eight-hour working day, prohibition of child labour, introduction of social insurance and unemployment benefits.



Lenin wrote that the Independent Labour Party was "an opportunist party that has always been dependent on the bourgeoisie", that it was "independent' only of socialism, but very dependent on liberalism" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 494 and Vol. 18, p. 360). p. 55

- <sup>82</sup> Brouckère of the Belgian Workers' Party and his supporters declared against the socialists' participation in the reactionary bourgeois government and waged a struggle against Vandervelde, who headed the Belgian revisionists. Brouckère later adopted an opportunist position. p. 55

- <sup>83</sup> *Integralists*—supporters of "integral" socialism, a variety of petty-bourgeois socialism. It was a centrist trend in the Italian Socialist Party and was led by Enrico Ferri. In the 1900s the Integralists, on a number of questions, opposed the reformists who took an extremely opportunist position and collaborated with the reactionary bourgeoisie. p. 55

- <sup>84</sup> *Revolutionary syndicalism*—a petty-bourgeois, semi-anarchist trend that arose in the working-class movement in some West-European countries at the close of the last century.

The syndicalists denied the need for working-class political struggle the leading role of the party and proletarian dictatorship, holding that the trade unions (syndicates) could overthrow capitalism without a revolution, by way of a workers' general strike, and take over control of the economy. p. 55

- <sup>85</sup> *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth)—a monthly magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1876 to 1918. In the early 1890s it became the organ of the Narodniks and from 1893 waged a struggle against the Russian Social-Democrats. In 1906 the magazine became the organ of the semi-Cadet Popular Socialist Party. p. 57

- <sup>86</sup> *Moskovskiye Uedomosti* (Moscow Recorder)—one of the oldest Russian newspapers, published by Moscow University from 1756. Between 1863 and 1887 it was edited and published by M. N. Katkov, an ultra-reactionary and chauvinist, the bitterest enemy of progressive social ideas. He turned the newspaper into a monarchist-nationalist organ, reflecting the views of the most reactionary sections of the landowners and the clergy. In 1905 *Moskovskiye Uedomosti* became one of the main organs of the Black Hundreds; was closed down at the end of 1917. p. 57

- <sup>87</sup> *Narodism*—a petty-bourgeois trend in the Russian revolutionary movement which arose in the 1860s and 1870s of the nineteenth century. The Narodniks wanted to abolish the autocracy and give the land owned by the landlords to the peasants. They considered themselves socialists, but their socialism was utopian.

The Narodniks believed that capitalism was a fortuitous phenomenon in Russia with no prospect of development and therefore considered the peasantry, and not the proletariat, to be the main revolutionary force and regarded the village commune as the embryo of socialism. They denied the role of the masses in historical development, maintaining that history is made by heroes, outstanding personalities, whom they opposed to the passive crowd. Trying to rouse the peasants to struggle against the autocracy, the Narodniks went to the villages, "among the people" (hence their name), but found no support there.

Narodism evolved through several stages, from revolutionary democracy to liberalism.

In the 1880s and 1890s the Narodniks adopted the policy of reconciliation with tsarism, expressed the interests of the kulaks and waged a struggle against Marxism. p. 57

<sup>88</sup> *The disciples*—followers of Marx and Engels. This term was used by the legal press in the 1890s as a synonym for Marxists. p. 57

<sup>89</sup> *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (Fatherland Notes)—a literary and political journal published in St. Petersburg from 1820 onwards. From 1839 it became the best progressive journal of its day. In the 1860s it gathered around itself the revolutionary-democratic intellectuals of Russia.

*Otechestvenniye Zapiski* was continually harassed by the censors and in April 1884 it was closed down by the tsarist government. p. 58

<sup>90</sup> *The Peasant Reform of 1861* abolished serfdom in Russia. It was made necessary by the entire course of Russia's economic development and the growth of the mass movement among the peasantry against feudal exploitation. The Peasant Reform marked a step in Russia's transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. On February 19, 1861 Alexander II signed the Manifesto and Regulation on the peasants freed from serf dependence. In all, 22,500,000 serfs formerly belonging to landowners were "emancipated". Landed proprietorship, however, remained. The peasants' lands were proclaimed the property of the landowners. The peasant could only get an allotment of land of the size established by law, and even then with the landowner's consent, and he had to redeem it, i.e., to pay for it. Land redemption instalments were to be paid to the tsarist government which paid a fixed sum to the landowners. After the Reform the landowners had approximately 71,500,000 dessiatines of land, while the peasants had 33,700,000 dessiatines, that is, the landowners had "cut off" one-fifth or even two-fifths of the peasants' land.

The Peasant Reform merely undermined but did not abolish the old corvée system of farming. The landowners secured possession of the best parts of the peasants' allotments (the "cut-off" lands—woods, meadows, watering places, grazing lands, etc.) without which the peasants could not conduct independent farming. Until the redemption arrangements were completed, the peasants were considered "temporarily bound" and either rendered corvée service to the landowner or paid quit-rent. The redemption of their own allotments was a sheer plunder of the peasants by the landowners and the tsarist government.

Lenin called the Peasant Reform of 1861 the first act of mass violence against the peasantry in the interests of nascent capitalism in agriculture p. 58

<sup>91</sup> *The Manchester School*—representatives of a trend in bourgeois political economy who demanded freedom of trade and non-interference of the state in private economic activities. The trend arose in Britain at the end of the eighteenth century; it was headed by Richard Cobden and John Bright. Its adherents were known as Free Traders or Manchesterians after the Manchester manufacturers who were the main supporters of Free Trade in the 1830s and 1840s. Free trade tendencies manifested themselves in the policy of France, Germany, Russia and other countries. The free trade policy was theoretically substantiated in the works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. p. 61

<sup>92</sup> *Collective responsibility*—a compulsory measure making the peasants of each village commune collectively responsible for timely and full payments and for the fulfilment of all sorts of services to the state and the landowners (payment of taxes and land redemption instalments, provision of recruits for the army, etc.). This form of bondage was retained after serfdom had been abolished and remained in force until 1906 p. 61

- <sup>93</sup> *The village (land) commune* was in Russia the communal form of peasant use of land characterised by compulsory crop rotation and undivided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective responsibility, periodical redistribution of the land without the right to refuse an allotment and prohibition of purchase or sale of the allotted land.

The Russian village commune dates back to ancient times and in the course of its historical development it gradually became one of the mainstays of feudalism in Russia. The landowners and the tsarist government used the village commune to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze land redemption payments and taxes out of the people.

In 1906 the tsarist minister Stolypin issued a law favouring the kulaks which allowed peasants to leave the commune and sell their allotments. This law marked the beginning of the official abolition of the village commune system and intensified the differentiation of the peasantry. In the nine years following the adoption of the law over two million peasant families withdrew from the communes.

p. 63

- <sup>94</sup> *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local government bodies introduced in the central gubernias of tsarist Russia in 1864 and headed by the nobility.

The powers of the *Zemstvos* were limited to purely local economic problems: hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc. Their activities were controlled by the provincial governors and the Minister of the Interior, who could rescind any decisions disapproved by the government.

p. 66

- <sup>95</sup> Engels described Skaldin as a liberal conservative in his article 'Sozialismus aus Russland' (Social Relations in Russia).

p. 67

- <sup>96</sup> In writing about the ideological heritage of the 1860s Lenin was compelled for reasons of censorship to refer to Skaldin. In actual fact Lenin regarded N. G. Chernyshevsky as the chief representative of the heritage.

In a letter Lenin sent from his place of exile in Siberia to A. N. Potresov on January 26, 1899, he wrote: 'nowhere do I propose acceptance of Skaldin's heritage. That one must take over the heritage from other people is indisputable. It seems to me that my defense (from possible attacks of opponents) will be the note on page 237 (present volume p. 67-147) where it was precisely Chernyshevsky I had in mind and where I gave reasons why it was inconvenient for me to take him as a parallel.' (*Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 28).

p. 67

- <sup>97</sup> *Letters from the Countryside* by the Narodnik writer A. N. Engelhardt received wide publicity. His letters were published in the journal *Otechestvennye Zapiski* between 1872 and 1881; the twelfth was printed in 1887.

p. 68

- <sup>98</sup> *Zemledelcheskaya Gazeta* (Agricultural Gazette)—organ of the Ministry of State Properties (from 1894—the Ministry of State Properties and Agriculture), appeared in St. Petersburg from 1834 to 1917.

p. 72

- <sup>99</sup> *Vestnik Yevropy* (European Messenger)—a liberal bourgeois monthly, historical-political and literary magazine which appeared in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. It contained articles directed against the revolutionary Marxists.

p. 73

- <sup>100</sup> Lenin refers here to Skaldin, whose book he is quoting (see Skaldin, *In the Backwoods and in the Capital*, St. Petersburg, 1870, p. 285).

p. 75

- <sup>101</sup> *Novoye Slovo* (New Word)—a monthly scientific, literary and political magazine published in St. Petersburg from 1894 by liberal Narodniks.

- Early in 1897 it was taken over by the "legal Marxists"—P. B. Struve, M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky and others. In December 1897 it was closed down by the tsarist government. p. 81
- <sup>102</sup> See Karl Marx, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, p. 110. p. 82
- <sup>103</sup> *N. Beltov* was the pseudonym under which G. V. Plekhanov published his book *The Development of the Momist View of History*; it appeared legally in St. Petersburg in 1895. p. 82
- <sup>104</sup> The reference is to G. V. Plekhanov's article "Concerning the Materialist Conception of History" published in *Novoye Slovo* No. 12, in September 1897. It was signed N. Kamensky. p. 88
- <sup>105</sup> *Schmollers Jahrbuch* (Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich) (Legislative, Administrative and Economic Yearbook for the German Empire)—a politico-economic magazine published from 1877 by the German bourgeois economists and Katheder-Socialists, F. Holtzendorf and L. Brentano, and from 1881 by G. Schmoller. p. 90
- <sup>106</sup> *Nedelya* (Week)—a liberal-Narodnik political and literary newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1901. It was opposed to fighting the autocracy and preached the so-called theory of "minor matters", i.e., appealed to the intelligentsia to abstain from revolutionary struggle and engage in "cultural activity". p. 90
- <sup>107</sup> The book *What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement* was planned by Lenin as early as the spring of 1901 and he started working on it in the autumn of 1901. In December Lenin published in *Iskra* No. 12 his article "A Talk with Defenders of Economism", which he later called a conspectus of *What Is To Be Done?* The work on the book was finished in January 1902. In February 1902 he wrote the Preface and early in March the book was published by Dietz in Stuttgart.
- What Is To Be Done?* played an important part in the struggle for building a revolutionary Marxist party of the working class in Russia, and achieving the victory of the Leninist *Iskra* trend in the committees and organisations of the R.S.D.L.P. and at the Second Party Congress in 1903.
- In 1902 and 1903 the book was widely distributed among the Social-Democratic organisations throughout Russia.
- In November 1907 *What Is To Be Done?* was published in the collection *Twelve Years* with some changes.
- The text given in this volume is that of 1902 verified with the 1907 edition. p. 92
- <sup>108</sup> The article "Where To Begin?" printed as the editorial of *Iskra* No. 4, contained answers to the questions which at that time were the most important for the social-democratic movement in Russia: the character and main content of political agitation, organisation tasks and the plan to build a militant, all-Russia Marxist party.
- The article was programmatic for the revolutionary Social-Democrats and was widely disseminated in Russia and abroad. Local Social-Democratic organisations read it in *Iskra* and republished it as a pamphlet.
- Lenin's organisational and tactical ideas set forth in "Where To Begin?" and fully elaborated in the book *What Is To Be Done?* were guiding principles in everyday practical work to build the Marxist party in Russia. p. 92

- <sup>109</sup> *Iskra* (The Spark)—the first All-Russia illegal Marxist newspaper, which was founded by Lenin in 1900 and played a decisive part in creating the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class.

The first issue of Lenin's *Iskra* was published in Leipzig in December 1900, the following issues were published in Munich; from July 1902 it was published in London, and from the spring of 1903 in Geneva. The Editorial Board consisted of V. I. Lenin, G. V. Plekhanov, L. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, A. N. Potresov and Vera Zasulich. Lenin was actually Editor-in-Chief and the leader of *Iskra*. He published articles on all important questions of Party organisation and the class struggle of the proletariat in Russia.

*Iskra* became a rallying centre for the Party forces, a centre for the training of leading Party workers. In a number of Russian cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Samara and others) groups and committees of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party were organised according to Lenin's *Iskra* line, and in January 1902 the congress of *Iskra* followers in Samara founded the *Iskra* organisation in Russia.

On the initiative and with the direct participation of Lenin, the Editorial Board of *Iskra* drew up a draft programme of the Party (published in *Iskra* No. 21) and prepared the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held in July and August 1903. By a special resolution the Congress noted the exceptional role played by *Iskra* in the struggle to build the Party and declared it the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. It approved the editorial board consisting of Lenin, Plekhanov and Martov. Martov insisted that all the six former editors should be retained and refused to participate despite the decision of the Congress, therefore Nos. 46 to 51 were edited by Lenin and Plekhanov. Later Plekhanov went over to the Menshevik position and demanded that all the former Menshevik editors, notwithstanding their rejection by the Congress, be placed on the Editorial Board. Lenin could not agree to this, and in October 19 (November 1), 1903 he left the *Iskra* Editorial Board; he was co-opted to the Central Committee and from there conducted the struggle against the Menshevik opportunists. Issue No. 52 of *Iskra* was edited by Plekhanov alone. On November 13 (26), 1903, Plekhanov, on his own initiative and in violation of the will of the Congress, co-opted all the former Menshevik editors to the Editorial Board. Beginning with issue No. 52 the Mensheviks turned *Iskra* into their own organ. n. 92

- <sup>110</sup> Negotiations between the Social-Democratic organisations abroad—the Union of Russian Social-Democrats, the Bund Committee Abroad, the *Sotsial-Demokrat* revolutionary organisation and the *Iskra* and *Zarya* organisation abroad—were conducted in the spring and summer of 1901 on the initiative and through the mediation of the *Borba* group for the purpose of reaching an agreement on unification. Representatives of these organisations met in June 1901 at a conference in Geneva (known either as the "June" or "Geneva" Conference) to prepare a unity conference.

The Unity Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad was held in Zurich on September 21 and 22 (October 4 and 5), 1901. It was attended by six representatives of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* organisation (Lenin, Krupskaya, Martov and others), eight members of the *Sotsial Demokrat* revolutionary organisation which included three members of the Emancipation of Labour group (Plekhanov, Axelrod and Zasulich), sixteen members of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats (including five members of the Bund Committee Abroad) and three members of the *Borba* group. The opportunist amendments and addenda to the June resolution, adopted by the Third Congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats, were announced at the conference. In view of this the revolutionary section of the conference—members of the *Iskra* and *Zarya* and *Sotsial-Demokrat*

organisations—read out a statement of the impossibility of unification and left the conference. On Lenin's initiative these organisations merged in October 1901 to form the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad.

- <sup>111</sup> *Rabocheye Dyelo* (The Workers' Cause)—journal, organ of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. It was published in Geneva from April 1899 to February 1902; altogether twelve numbers appeared in nine issues. The editorial board of *Rabocheye Dyelo* was the Economists' centre abroad. *Rabocheye Dyelo* supported Bernstein's slogan of "freedom of criticism", took an opportunist stand on the tactical and organisational questions of the Russian Social-Democratic movement, and denied the revolutionary potentialities of the peasantry. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists represented the extreme Right, opportunist wing of the Party. p. 92
- <sup>112</sup> *Economism*—an opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic movement at the turn of the century. The Economists asserted that the task of the working-class movement was only economic struggle for better working conditions, a shorter working day, higher wages, etc., maintaining that the political struggle against tsarism was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the need for an independent political workers' party, the importance of revolutionary theory in the working-class movement and refused to carry out socialist propaganda among the workers. p. 92
- <sup>113</sup> *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Workers' Gazette)—an illegal newspaper issued by the Kiev group of Social-Democrats. Altogether two issues appeared. The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in March 1898 recognised *Rabochaya Gazeta* the official organ of the Party. After the Congress the Central Committee members and the editors of *Rabochaya Gazeta* were arrested and the printing-press destroyed, so that issue No. 3, which was ready to go to press, never appeared. In 1899 an attempt was made to resume publication of the newspaper; Lenin tells of this in his *What Is To Be Done?*, Chapter V. A (pp. 212-16). p. 92
- <sup>114</sup> *Lassalleans* and *Eisenachers*—two parties in the German working-class movement in the sixties and early seventies of the nineteenth century between whom a sharp struggle was waged, mainly over questions of tactics and especially over the most urgent political questions in the Germany of that time—the ways to unification of the country. *Lassalleans*—supporters and followers of Ferdinand Lassalle, a German petty-bourgeois socialist; they were members of the General Association of German Workers founded in 1863 at a congress of workers' societies in Leipzig. The first president of the General Association was Lassalle, who drew up its programme and formulated its basic tactics. The struggle for universal suffrage was proclaimed the political programme of the Association and the setting up of workers' production associations subsidised by the state its economic programme. In their practical activities Lassalle and his followers supported Bismarck's great power policy. On a number of occasions Marx and Engels sharply criticised the theory, tactics and organisational principles of the Lassalleans as opportunism in the German working-class movement. *Eisenachers*—members of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany, founded in 1869 at the Inaugural Congress in Eisenach. The leaders of the Eisenachers were August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, who were under the ideological influence of Marx and Engels. The Eisenach programme stated that the Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany considered itself as "a section of the International Working Men's Association and shared its aspirations". Thanks to the regular

advice and criticism given by Marx and Engels, the Eisenachers pursued a more consistent revolutionary policy than did Lassalle's General Association of German Workers; in particular, on the question of German reunification they followed "the democratic and proletarian path and struggled against any concessions to Prussianism, Bismarckism or nationalism" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 298).

The foundation of the German Empire in 1871 eliminated the main tactical difference between the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers; in 1875 under the influence of the growing working-class movement and of increased government repressions, the two parties united at the Gotha Congress to form the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany, later renamed the Social-Democratic Party of Germany. On the programme adopted at the Gotha Congress see Note 143.

p. 95

- <sup>115</sup> *Fabians*—members of the Fabian Society, a British reformist organisation that took its name from the Roman general Fabius Maximus Cunctator (the Delayer), famous for his delaying tactics and avoidance of a decisive battle against Hannibal. It was founded in 1884. The Fabians were mostly bourgeois intellectuals—scientists, writers and politicians (for instance, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Bernard Shaw, Ramsay MacDonald). They denied the need for the proletarian class struggle and the socialist revolution and asserted that the transition from capitalism to socialism is possible only by small reforms and a gradual transformation of the society. Lenin described the Fabian movement as "an *extreme opportunist trend*" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 358). In 1900 the Fabian Society joined the Labour Party.

p. 95

- <sup>116</sup> This refers to the British Social-Democratic Federation. See Note 80 p. 95

- <sup>117</sup> *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will)—secret political organisation of Narodnik terrorists formed in August 1879 as a result of the split in the Narodnik organisation Zemlya i Volya. While still adhering to the Narodnik utopian-socialist ideas, Narodnaya Volya members took the way of political struggle, regarding the overthrow of the autocracy and the achievement of political freedom as their main task. They fought heroically against the tsarist autocracy but, proceeding from the erroneous theory of active "heroes" and a passive "mass", they hoped to reorganise society without the participation of people, by their own efforts, through individual terrorism. After the assassination of Alexander II on March 1 1881, the government crushed the organisation. Repeated attempts to revive it in the eighties ended in failure.

p. 95

- <sup>118</sup> See Note 78.

p. 95

- <sup>119</sup> *Russian critics*—so-called "legal Marxists". "*Legal Marxism*"—a socio-political trend that arose in the 1890s among the bourgeois liberal intelligentsia in Russia. Struve, Bulgakov, Tugan-Baranovsky and other "legal Marxists" called themselves Marxists but they accepted from Marx's teaching only the theory of the inevitability of the feudal system giving way to capitalism and rejected the "revolutionary soul" of Marxism—the theory of the inevitable doom of capitalism, of the socialist revolution and the transition to socialism. The "legal Marxists" criticised the Narodniks, who denied the inevitability of capitalist development in Russia, in the legal press and praised the capitalist system. Subsequently they became enemies of Marxism and joined the bourgeois Constitutional-Democratic Party.

p. 95

- <sup>120</sup> *The Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was founded in 1894 on the initiative of the Emancipation of Labour group on the condition

that all its members accepted the group's programme. The group was entrusted with editing the Union's publications; in March 1895 it placed its printing-press at the disposal of the Union.

The First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (March 1898) recognised the Union as the Party's representative abroad. Later the opportunists—the Economists, also known as the “Young”—gained the upper hand in the Union. The opportunist majority at the First Congress of the Union held in Zurich in November 1898 refused to support the Manifesto adopted at the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. The struggle within the Union lasted until its Second Congress in Geneva in April 1900 and continued at the congress. As a result the Emancipation of Labour group and its supporters left the Congress and formed the independent *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation.

At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. representatives of the Union adopted an extreme opportunist position and left the Congress after it recognised the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad as the only Party organisation abroad. The Union was dissolved by a decision of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 98

- <sup>121</sup> *Zarya* (Dawn)—a Marxist scientific and political journal published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* Editorial Board. Altogether four numbers (in three issues) appeared.

*Zarya* criticised international and Russian revisionism and defended the theoretical principles of Marxism. p. 98

- <sup>122</sup> The *Mountain* and the *Gironde*—the names of the two political groups of the bourgeoisie during the French bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. *La Montagne* (Mountain) was the name given to the Jacobins, the most determined representatives of the revolutionary class of that period, the bourgeoisie, who advocated the abolition of absolutism and of the feudal system. The Girondists, on the other hand, vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution and chose the path of compromise with the monarchy.

Lenin applied the name “Socialist Gironde” to the opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, and “Mountain” or proletarian Jacobins to the revolutionary Social-Democrats. After the R.S.D.L.P. split into the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, Lenin on many occasions stressed the point that the Mensheviks were the Girondist trend in the working-class movement in Russia. p. 98

- <sup>123</sup> *Bezzaglavtsi*—a semi-Cadet, semi-Menshevik group of Russian bourgeois intellectuals formed at the time of the decline of the revolution of 1905-07. The political weekly *Bez Zaglaviya* (Without a Title) from which they took their name was published in St. Petersburg from January to May 1906 under the editorship of Prokopovich. The Bezzaglavtsi professed non-partisanship but actually advocated the ideas of bourgeois liberalism and opportunism and supported revisionism in international and Russian Social-Democracy. p. 99

- <sup>124</sup> The reference is to the Congress of the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany held in Gotha from May 27 to 29, 1877. When the question of the Party press was discussed by the Congress, attempts were made by some delegates (Most, Vahlteich) to censure *Vorwärts*, the Central Organ of the Party, for printing Engels articles against Dühring, which were published in book form in 1878 under the title *Anti-Dühring. Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*. These attempts were defeated as was also the attempt to censure Engels for the sharpness of his polemics. However, for practical reasons the Congress decided to continue the discussion on theoretical questions in a supplement and not in the newspaper itself. p. 99



- <sup>125</sup> *Vorwärts* (Forward)—a daily newspaper, the Central Organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Berlin from 1891. Engels waged a struggle in its columns against all manifestations of opportunism. In the late nineties, after Engels' death, the control of the newspaper fell into the hands of the Right wing of the Party and it regularly published articles by opportunists.  
During the First World War of 1914-18 *Vorwärts* took a social-chauvinist stand. After the Great October Socialist Revolution it conducted anti-Soviet propaganda; ceased publication in 1933. p. 99
- <sup>126</sup> *Katheder-Socialists*—representatives of a trend in bourgeois political economy in the 1870s-1880s who preached bourgeois liberal reformism from their university chairs (*Katheder* in German), under the guise of socialism. They maintained that the bourgeois state was "above classes", that it could reconcile the hostile classes and gradually introduce socialism without affecting the interests of the capitalists and taking into account as much as possible the demands of the working people. In Russia their views were preached by the "legal Marxists". p. 99
- <sup>127</sup> *Nozdryov*—a character from Gogol's *Dead Souls* famous for his scandalous behaviour and roguery; the author called this landowner "an historical personage" for the reason that wherever he went he left behind him a scandalous "history". p. 100
- <sup>128</sup> *The Hanover Resolution*—resolution on "Attacks on the Fundamental Views and Tactics of the Party", adopted by the German Social-Democratic Party Congress held at Hanover from October 9 to 14, 1899. The resolution condemned the attempts of the opportunist wing of the German Social-Democratic Party, whose ideological leader was Bernstein, to revise the fundamental principles of Marxism, change the tactics of the Social-Democratic Party and transform it into a party of democratic reform. However, the absence in the resolution of sharp criticism of revisionism and those who actually advocated it was censured by the Left Social-Democrats (Rosa Luxemburg and others). Bernstein's supporters voted for the resolution. p. 100
- <sup>129</sup> *The Lubeck Resolution* was passed by the Lubeck Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party held between September 22 and 28, 1901 and was directed against Eduard Bernstein, who, after the Hanover Congress of 1899, far from ceasing his attacks on the programme and tactics of the Social-Democratic Party, intensified them and carried them to non-Party circles. During the discussion and in the resolution proposed by Bebel and accepted by an overwhelming majority of the delegates, Bernstein was given a direct warning. But the question of the incompatibility of revision of Marxism with Party membership was not raised as a matter of principle. p. 100
- <sup>130</sup> *The Stuttgart Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party*, held on October 3-8, 1898, was the first congress to discuss the question of revisionism in the German Social-Democratic Party. A statement from Bernstein, who was in emigration and could not attend, was read to the Congress; it amplified and defended the opportunist views he had previously set forth in a number of articles. There was, however, no unity among his opponents at the Congress. Some (Bebel, Kautsky and others) called for combining ideological struggle against Bernsteinism with cautious tactics within the Party to avoid a split. The others (Rosa Luxemburg, Parvus)—the minority—adopted a more resolute position and urged a broader and more vigorous discussion without fearing a possible split. The Congress did not adopt any

resolution on this question but it was clear from the discussion and from its other decisions that most delegates at the Congress remained loyal to the ideas of revolutionary Marxism. p. 101

- <sup>131</sup> Quoted from the article "What Has Happened?" by A. N. Potresov (Starover) published in No. 1 of *Zarya* in April 1901. p. 101

- <sup>132</sup> "*The Author Who Got a Swelled Head*"—the title of one of Maxim Gorky's stories. p. 103

- <sup>133</sup> Lenin refers to his article "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book (The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature)" published in 1895 in the collection *Material for a Characterisation of Our Economic Development* and republished in 1907 in Lenin's collection *Twelve Years* and to the preface to the collection, which deals with the situation at the time and the history leading up to the appearance of this article. p. 103

- <sup>134</sup> Bernstein's book *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (The Promotion of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy) was published in 1901 in Russian under several different titles: 1) *Historical Materialism*; 2) *Social Problems*; 3) *Problems of Socialism and the Tasks of Social-Democracy*. p. 104

- <sup>135</sup> "*A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats*" was written by Lenin in August 1899, in exile. It was directed against the *Credo*, the manifesto of the group of Economists (S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, and others). The "Protest" was discussed and unanimously approved at a conference of seventeen Marxist exiles called by Lenin in the village of Yermakovskoye, Minusinsk Uyezd. Exiles in Turukhansk and Orlov (Vyatka Gubernia) subscribed to the "Protest".

Lenin sent a copy of the "Protest" abroad to the Emancipation of Labour group. Plekhanov published it early in 1900 in the collection *Uademecum for the Editors of "Rabocheye Dyelo"*. p. 105

- <sup>136</sup> *Byloye* (The Past)—a journal devoted mainly to the history of Narodism and earlier social movements and published with long intervals from 1900 to 1926. p. 105

- <sup>137</sup> *Rabochaya Mysl* (Workers' Thought)—an Economist newspaper published from October 1897 to December 1902. Altogether 16 issues appeared. It was edited by K. M. Takhtarev and others.

Lenin criticised the newspaper's views as a Russian variety of international opportunism in his articles published in *Iskra* and his book *What Is To Be Done?* p. 105

- <sup>138</sup> *Uademecum for the Editors of "Rabocheye Dyelo"*. A collection of material published by the Emancipation of Labour group, with a preface by G. U. Plekhanov (Geneva, February 1900) was directed against opportunism in the R.S.D.I.P., mainly against the Economism of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and its organ *Rabocheye Dyelo*. p. 105

- <sup>139</sup> *Profession de foi* (creed, programme)—a manifesto setting forth the opportunist views of the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.I.P., written at the end of 1899. The manifesto had much in common with the *Credo* of the Economists. p. 105

- <sup>140</sup> *The Emancipation of Labour group* was the first Russian Marxist group. It was founded by G. V. Plekhanov in Geneva (Switzerland) in 1883. The group did much to disseminate Marxism in Russia and dealt a serious blow at Narodism, the main ideological obstacle to the spread of Marxism and the development of the social-Democratic movement in Russia. Two drafts of a programme for the Russian Social-Democrats (1883 and 1885) written by Plekhanov and published by the Emancipation of Labour group marked an important step in preparing and building the Social-Democratic Party in Russia. The Emancipation of Labour group established contacts with the international working-class movement and from the First Congress of the Second International in Paris in 1889 represented the Russian Social-Democrats at all its congresses. The group, however, made some serious mistakes; it overestimated the role of the liberal bourgeoisie and underestimated the revolutionary potentiality of the peasantry as a reserve in the proletarian revolution. These errors were the germ of the future Menshevik views of Plekhanov and other members of the group. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the Emancipation of Labour group "only laid the theoretical foundations for the Social-Democratic movement and took the first step towards the working-class movement" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 278). Early in 1900 the group issued "Announcement on the Resumption of Publications by the Emancipation of Labour group" written by Axelrod in December 1899. It was published as a separate leaflet and in *Vademecum for the Editors of "Rabocheye Dyelo"*. The programme of the group's literary activities set forth in the "Announcement" was carried out only with the publication of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. p. 108
- <sup>141</sup> *The Third Congress of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad* was held in Zurich in the second half of September 1901. Its decisions showed the final victory of opportunism in the Union. The Congress adopted amendments and addenda to the draft agreement and treaty of the Russian Social-Democratic organisations abroad drawn up at the Geneva Conference in June 1901, which were avowedly opportunist. This predetermined the failure of the "unity" conference of the R.S.D.L.P. organisations abroad which was held a few days after the Third Congress of the Union. The Congress also approved the instructions for the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo* which actually encouraged the revisionists. p. 108
- <sup>142</sup> Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 11 p. 109
- <sup>143</sup> *The Gotha Programme*—the programme adopted by the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany at the Gotha Congress in 1875, when the two socialist parties united: the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers who were led by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht and were influenced by the ideas of Marx and Engels. The programme suffered from eclecticism and opportunism, since the Eisenachers made concessions to the Lassalleans on the most important questions and accepted their formulations. Marx and Engels subjected the Gotha draft programme to scathing criticism, considering it as a retrograde step compared with the Eisenach Programme of 1869. p. 109
- <sup>144</sup> The reference is to P. B. Axelrod's pamphlet, *The Question of the Present Tasks and Tactics of the Russian Social-Democrats*, Geneva, 1898, p. 109
- <sup>145</sup> Lenin refers to the mass strike of St Petersburg textile workers in May-June 1896. The strike was directed by the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, which issued leaflets calling on the workers to stand solidly and steadfastly in defence of their rights. It published and distributed the strikers' main demands, entitled "What the Workers of St. Petersburg Textile Mills Demand". a 10½ hour working

day, increased rates, payment of wages on time, etc. The St. Petersburg strikes gave an impetus to the strike movement throughout Russia and forced the tsarist government to speed up the review of the factory laws and issue the law of June 2 (14), 1897, by which the working day at factories was reduced to 11½ hours. p. 113

- <sup>146</sup> The pamphlet *On Agitation* was written by A. Kremer (later an organiser of the Bund) in Vilno in 1894. The pamphlet summarised the experience gained in Social-Democratic work in Vilno and exerted a great influence on Russian Social-Democrats, since it called on them to reject narrow study-circle propaganda and go over to mass agitation among the workers on issues of their everyday needs and demands. However, its exaggeration of the role and significance of the purely economic struggle to the detriment of political agitation on issues of general democratic demands was the embryo of the future Economism. p. 115

- <sup>147</sup> *The League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class*, founded by Lenin in the autumn of 1895, united some twenty Marxist workers' study circles in St. Petersburg. The work of the League of Struggle was organised on principles of centralism and strict discipline. It was headed by the Central Group under Lenin's direction.

In December 1895, the tsarist government dealt the League a heavy blow: during the night of December 8 (December 20) a considerable number of League members were arrested, Lenin among them; the first issue of *Rabocheye Deyelo* which was ready to go to press, was seized.

While in prison, Lenin continued to guide the work of the League, to help with advice. He sent from prison letters and leaflets written in cipher and wrote the pamphlet *On Strikes* (the manuscript has not been found), and "Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Social-Democratic Party".

The significance of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class lay, to use Lenin's expression, in its being the germ of a revolutionary party that took its support from the working class and led the class struggle of the proletariat.

The old members of the League who had escaped arrest took part in preparing and holding the First Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and in drawing up the Manifesto of that Congress. However, the long absence of the founding members of the League of Struggle, Lenin above all, who were in exile in Siberia, made it easier for the "Young" and the Economists to pursue an opportunist policy and, from 1897, to plant the ideas of trade-unionism and Bernsteinism on Russian soil through their newspaper *Rabochaya Mysl*. In the latter half of 1898 the control of the League fell into the hands of most avowed Economists—the *Rabochaya Mysl* people. p. 115

- <sup>148</sup> The editorial "To the Russian Workers" written by Lenin for *Rabocheye Deyelo* has not been found.

*Russkaya Starina* (The Russian Antiquary)—a monthly magazine dealing with historical problems, was published in St. Petersburg from 1870 to 1918. p. 115

- <sup>149</sup> This refers to the brutal suppression of the strike at the Bolshaya Textile Mills in Yaroslavl on April 27 (May 9), 1895. This strike of over 4,000 workers was caused by the introduction of new rates, which resulted in a reduction of wages.

Lenin wrote an article on the Yaroslavl strike of 1895 but it has not been found. p. 115

- <sup>150</sup> *S. Petersburgsky Rabochy Listok* (St. Petersburg Workers' Paper)—newspaper of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. Two issues appeared.

The newspaper put forward the task of combining the economic struggle of the working class with extensive political demands and stressed the need to organise a working-class party.

p. 116

- <sup>151</sup> The reference is to the meetings of V. I. Lenin, A. A. Vaneyev, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, I. Martov and other founding members of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, that is "veterans" who had been released from prison for three days before being sent into exile to Siberia, with the "young" representatives of the League. The meetings, which were held in St. Petersburg between February 14 and 17 (February 26- March 1), 1897, revealed differences of principle on the questions of organisation and tactics.

p. 117

- <sup>152</sup> *Listok Rabotnika* (The Workingman's Paper) was published irregularly in Geneva from 1896 to 1898 by the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad; altogether there appeared 10 issues. Issues 1-8 were edited by the Emancipation of Labour Group. But after the majority of the Union Abroad went over to Economism, the Emancipation of Labour group refused to edit its publication, and No. 9-10 of the newspaper (November 1898) was edited by the Economists.

p. 117

- <sup>153</sup> Tsarist gendarmes wore blue uniforms.

p. 118

- <sup>154</sup> V. V.—pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov, an ideologist of liberal Narodism in the 1880s-1890s. By the "V.V.s of Russian Social-Democracy" Lenin means the Economists, who represented the opportunist trend in the Russian Social-Democratic movement.

p. 119

- <sup>155</sup> *The Vienna Congress of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party*, held on November 2-6, 1901, adopted a new Party programme to replace the old Heintfeld Programme of 1888. In the draft of the new programme drawn up by a special commission (Victor Adler and others) on the instructions of the Brunn Congress of 1899, considerable concessions were made to Bernsteinism, and this evoked criticism.

p. 120

- <sup>156</sup> *The Hirsch-Duncker Unions*—reformist trade unions founded in Germany in 1868 by Max Hirsch and Franz Duncker, prominent members of the bourgeois Progressist Party. The organisers of these unions advocated "harmony" of the interests of labour and capital and considered that capitalists could also be admitted into trade unions. They denied the need for strikes and maintained that workers could be emancipated from the yoke of capital within the framework of capitalist society by legislation of the bourgeois state and with the aid of trade union organisation. They held that the chief task of trade unions was to mediate between workers and employers and accumulate funds. Their activities were restricted in the main to those of mutual benefit societies and cultural educational organisations.

p. 123

- <sup>157</sup> *The Self-Emancipation of the Workers Group*—a small group of Economists formed in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1898. It existed only a few months and published a manifesto setting forth its aims, a set of rules and several leaflets addressed to the workers.

p. 124

- <sup>158</sup> *Nakanune* (On the Eve)—a monthly journal expressing Narodnik views. It was published in Russian in London from January 1899 to February 1902—

altogether 37 issues. The journal was a rallying point for representatives of various petty-bourgeois parties and trends. p. 125

- <sup>159</sup> The polemic between the Emancipation of Labour group and the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo* began in April 1899 when issue No. 1 of *Rabocheye Dyelo* published a review of Lenin's pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* (Geneva, 1898). The editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo* denied the opportunist character of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and the increasing influence of the Economists in Social-Democratic organisations in Russia and maintained in the review that "the substance of the pamphlet coincided entirely with the editorial programme of *Rabocheye Dyelo*" and that the editors did not know "what 'young' comrades Axelrod was talking about" in the preface to the pamphlet.

In his "Letter to the Editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo*" written in August 1899 P. B. Axelrod showed the inconsistency of *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s efforts to identify the position of revolutionary Social-Democracy outlined in Lenin's pamphlet *The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats* with that of the Economists in Russia and abroad. In February 1900 the Emancipation of Labour group published a collection *Vademecum for the Editors of "Rabocheye Dyelo"* with a preface written by G. V. Plekhanov. Plekhanov refuted the statement of the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo* and showed the actual prevalence of opportunism and Economism among the Russian Social-Democratic emigrants grouped round the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

The polemic with *Rabocheye Dyelo* was later carried on in the columns of *Iskra* and *Zarya*. p. 125

- <sup>160</sup> The reference is to the newspaper *Der Sozialdemokrat*, central organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany at the time of the Anti-Socialist Law. It was published in Zurich from September 28, 1879 to September 22, 1888 and in London from October 1, 1888 to September 27, 1890. In 1879 and 1880 the newspaper was edited by Georg Vollmar and from January 1881 by Eduard Bernstein, who at that time was strongly influenced by Frederick Engels. Engels' ideological guidance gave *Der Sozialdemokrat* a Marxist line. After the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Law *Der Sozialdemokrat* ceased publication and the newspaper *Vorwärts* again became the central organ of the party. p. 128

- <sup>161</sup> *Nartsis Tuporylov* (Narcissus Blunt-Snout) was the pseudonym under which L. Martov published his satirical poem "Hymn of the Contemporary Russian Socialist" in *Zarya* No. 1, April 1901. It ridiculed the Economists and their adaptation to the spontaneous movement. p. 130

- <sup>162</sup> The reference is to the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. See Note 120. p. 136

- <sup>163</sup> *Rural superintendent*—an office instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to increase the power of the landowners over the peasantry. The rural superintendents appointed from among the local landed nobility were granted tremendous administrative and juridical powers, including the right to arrest peasants and subject them to corporal punishment p. 136

- <sup>164</sup> *The Bund* (The General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuanian, Poland and Russia) was founded in 1897 at the founding Congress of Jewish Social-Democratic Groups in Vilno. It embraced mainly the semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the western region of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.I. P. at its First Congress in March 1898 as "an autonomous organisation, independent only with regard to questions affecting the Jewish proletariat

specifically" After the Second Congress of the RSDLP turned down the Bund's demand that it should be recognised the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat the Bund withdrew from the Party but rejoined it in 1906 on the basis of a decision of the Fourth (Unity) Congress

Within the RSDLP the Bund constantly supported the Party's opportunist wing—the Economists, Mensheviks, liquidators—and waged a struggle against the Bolsheviks. In 1917 the Bund supported the counter-revolutionary Provisional Government and sided with the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution. During the foreign military intervention and the Civil War the Bund's leaders made common cause with the forces of counter-revolution. At the same time there was a turn among the rank and file towards collaboration with the Soviet power. In March 1921 the Bund dissolved itself, part of the membership joining the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the basis of the general rules of admission. p. 137

- 100 *Land redemption payments*—the money which according to the Regulation of February 19 1861 on the abolition of serfdom in Russia the peasants were compelled to pay to the landowners as redemption for the allotments assigned to them. The total sum of redemption payments amounted to nearly 1,000,000 rubles which considerably exceeded the real price of the land. Thus the peasants were actually to pay not only for the land which had for a long time been in their use but also for their personal freedom. The land redemption payments were an unbearable burden for the peasants and led to their mass ruin and pauperisation.

The peasant movement at the time of the first Russian revolution of 1905–07 compelled the tsarist government to cancel the land redemption payments as from January 1907. p. 110

- 101 *Swoboda* (Freedom)—a journal published in Switzerland by the revolutionary socialist *Swoboda* group. Only two issues appeared, No. 1 in 1901 and No. 2 in 1902. In its publications the *Swoboda* group advocated the ideas of Economism and terrorism and supported the *ist* *Iskra* group in Russia. The *Swoboda* group ceased to exist in 1903. p. 145

- 102 The reference is to the mass revolutionary actions by students and workers—political demonstrations, hunger strikes, strikes to keep alive in February and March 1901 in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Kazan, Tomsk and other cities in Russia. p. 11

- 103 Marx and Engels *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 137. p. 22

- 104 The letter in *Iskra* No. 7 (August 1901) was from St. Petersburg, however. It was published in the section "Workers' Movement and Letter from the Factories." The letter testified to the great influence of Lenin's *Iskra* among the advanced workers. p. 163

- 105 *Kosaya* (Russia)—a moderate liberal daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1899 to 1907. p. 164

- 106 *The Brentano concept of the class struggle*. Brentanism—a bourgeois liberal theory recognising the non-revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat (V. I. Lenin *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 323) and preaching the possibility of solving the labour question within the framework of capitalism by factory legislation and the organisation of workers in trade unions. It was named after Lupo Brentano, one of the leading champions of Kathedra socialism in bourgeois political economy. p. 166

- <sup>172</sup> The reference is to the Labour-Against-Capital group founded in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1899. The group consisted of several workers and intellectuals and adhered to Economism. It had no firm contacts with the workers' movement in St. Petersburg and ceased to exist after the arrest of almost all its members in the summer of 1899. p. 171
- <sup>173</sup> This apparently refers to Lenin's first meeting with A. S. Martynov in 1901. Martynov described this meeting in his reminiscences. p. 177
- <sup>174</sup> See Note 119. p. 181
- <sup>175</sup> *Afanasy Ivanovich and Pulkheria Ivanovna*—a patriarchal family of petty landowners in Gogol's *Old-Time Landowners*. p. 181
- <sup>176</sup> Lenin refers to the circle of Social-Democrats ("veterans") led by him in St. Petersburg; the circle formed the basis of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class set up in 1895. p. 190
- <sup>177</sup> *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom)—a secret organisation of revolutionary Narodniks formed in the autumn of 1876 in St. Petersburg.
- The *Zemlya i Volya* group regarded the peasants as the main revolutionary force in Russia and sought to raise the peasantry in rebellion against tsarism. They conducted revolutionary work in a number of Russian gubernias—Tambov, Voronezh and others.
- Owing to the failure of their revolutionary work among the peasantry and the increasing government persecution a terrorist faction was formed within the organisation in 1879; the faction refused to conduct revolutionary propaganda among the peasants and considered terrorism against members of the tsarist government to be the chief means of revolutionary struggle against tsarism. At a congress held in Voronezh that year *Zemlya i Volya* split into two organisations: *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will), which adopted terrorism as its general line and Chorny Peredel (General Redistribution), which adhered to the *Zemlya i Volya* policy. Subsequently some members of the latter group—Plekhanov, Axelrod, Vera Zasulich, Deutsch and Ignatov, adopted Marxist positions and in 1883 set up in Switzerland the first Russian Marxist organisation, the Emancipation of Labour group. p. 196
- <sup>178</sup> The reference is to the pamphlet *Report on the Russian Social-Democratic Movement to the International Socialist Congress in Paris, 1900*. The Report was written by the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo* on the instructions of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad and published by the Union in Geneva in 1901. p. 203
- <sup>179</sup> The reference is to a polemical remark in R.M.'s article "Our Reality" published in the "*Separate Supplement*" to *Rabochaya Mysl* which Lenin quotes in Chapter III, B of his book *What Is To Be Done?* (see this volume, p. 141 ff.). p. 207
- <sup>180</sup> *Yuzhny Rabochy* (The Southern Worker)—a Social-Democratic newspaper illegally published by a group of the same name from January 1900 to April 1903. Twelve issues appeared.
- Yuzhny Rabochy* opposed Economism and terrorism and upheld the need to develop a mass revolutionary movement but, as distinct from the *Iskra*, which proposed to build up a centralised Marxist party around an all-Russia political newspaper, the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group advanced a plan to restore the R.S.D.I.P. by setting up regional Social-Democratic unions.
- The group carried on extensive revolutionary activities in Russia but at the same time it revealed opportunist tendencies in the question of the



attitude to the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasant movement and pursued the separatist plan of founding its own all Russia newspaper parallel to *Iskra*

At the Second Congress of the RSDLP the delegates of the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group took up a Centrist position. The Congress passed a decision to dissolve the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group together with all other independent Social Democratic groups and organisations p. 205

- <sup>181</sup> The reference is to the leaflet *Questions of the Condition of the Working Class in Russia* (1898) and the pamphlet *Questions for the Gathering of Information on the Condition of the Working Class in Russia* (1899) published by *Rabochaya Mysl*. The leaflet contained 17 and the pamphlet 15 questions on the labour and living conditions of workers p. 210

- <sup>182</sup> The strike movement of 1885 involved many textile enterprises in Vladimir, Moscow, Tver and other gubernias of the industrial centre of Russia. The best known of them was the January strike of the workers at the Nikolayev Mill belonging to Savva Morozov. The principal demands of the workers were reduction of fines, regulation of the system for hiring workers, etc. The strike was directed by the advanced worker P. A. Moiseyenko, I. I. Ivanov and V. S. Volkov. The Morozov strike in which 10,000 workers took part was crushed by the troops. 3 workers who participated in the strike were committed for trial and over 600 workers were flogged. Under pressure of the strike movement of 1885 the tsarist government had to issue a law on fines on June 3 (15) 1886 p. 210

- <sup>183</sup> See Note 14 p. 210

- <sup>184</sup> Lenin added this footnote for purposes of secrecy. The facts are enumerated in the order in which they actually took place p. 211

- <sup>185</sup> *The League of Russian Revolutionary Social Democracy* (League) was founded on Lenin's initiative in October 1901. The League's constitution provided for the *Sotsial Demokrat* revolutionary organisation, which included the participation of Labour groups united to form the League. The League's task was to disseminate the ideas of revolutionary Social Democracy and prepare the foundation of a militant Social Democratic organisation. According to the League Rules it was the representative abroad of the *Iskra* organisation.

After the Second Congress of the RSDLP the Mensheviks withdrew themselves from the League and founded a separate organisation, the Bolsheviks. At the Second Congress of the League in October 1901 the Mensheviks adopted new Rules for the League. The League's Party Rules approved by the Second Congress of the RSDLP in 1903, but prior to the League was a bulwark of Menshevism, it existed until 1905 p. 211

- <sup>186</sup> Lenin cites the article by D. I. Pisarev, 'Blunder of Immature Thinkers' p. 211

- <sup>187</sup> *Istok Rabochego Dviza* (*Rabocheye Dvizo* Supplement) was published in Geneva. Eight issues appeared at irregular intervals between June 1900 and July 1901 p. 212

- <sup>188</sup> Lenin refers to the following passage from Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: 'Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-histories occur as it were twice. He forgets to add the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.' Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1971, p. 98 p. 226

- <sup>189</sup> A wave of student demonstrations swept over Russia in November and December 1901 and was supported by the workers. p. 229
- <sup>190</sup> *Janizaries*—regular infantry of the Turkish Sultan's army formed in the 14th century. They were the main police force under the sultans and were noted for their extreme brutality. The janizaries were disbanded in 1826. Lenin applied this name to the tsarist police. p. 230
- <sup>191</sup> *The International Socialist Bureau* (I. S. B.)—the permanent executive body and information centre of the Second International. It was founded on the decision of the Paris Congress of the Second International in September 1900 and consisted of representatives of the Socialist Parties of all countries. G. V. Plekhanov and B. N. Krichevsky were elected representatives of the Russian Social-Democrats. Lenin was a member of the I.S.B. from 1905 as a representative of the R.S.D.L.P. The International Socialist Bureau ceased to exist in 1914. p. 235
- <sup>192</sup> *The Sotsial-Demokrat revolutionary organisation* was founded by the Emancipation of Labour group and its supporters in May 1909, after the split of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad at its Second Congress. In October 1901, on Lenin's initiative, it united with the *Iskra* organisation abroad to form the League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy Abroad. p. 236
- <sup>193</sup> This Social-Democratic group, which was formed in Paris in 1900, adopted in May 1901, the name of *Borba* (Struggle). In an attempt to reconcile the revolutionary and opportunist trends in Russian Social-Democracy, the *Borba* group took the initiative of convening a conference of Social-Democratic organisations abroad—the *Iskra* and *Zarya* Editorial Board, the *Sotsial-Demokrat* organisation, the Bund Committee Abroad and the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad—which was held in Geneva in 1901. The group also participated in the "Unity" Conference in October 1901. Because of its deviation from Social-Democratic views and tactics, its disorganising activities and its lack of contact with Social-Democratic organisations in Russia, the *Borba* group was not allowed to participate in the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. By decision of the Second Congress, the *Borba* group was dissolved. p. 236
- <sup>194</sup> *Iskra* No. 18 (March 10, 1902) published in the section "Party Life" an item entitled "*Zarya's* polemic with the Editors of *Vorwärts*", summing up the controversy. p. 239
- <sup>195</sup> Lenin devoted several months to writing *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (*The Crisis in Our Party*), making a careful study of the minutes and resolutions of the Second Party Congress published in January 1904, of the speeches of each of the delegates, and of the political groupings at the Congress, and of the Central Committee and Party Council documents. The book was published in May 1904.
- In this work Lenin dealt a crushing blow at Menshevik opportunism in matters of organisation. Its immense historic significance lies in the fact that Lenin developed the Marxist doctrine of the revolutionary proletarian party and elaborated its organisational principles, gave the first exhaustive criticism of opportunism and showed the danger of belittling the importance of organisation for the working-class movement.
- The book evoked furious attacks of the Mensheviks. Plekhanov demanded that the Central Committee disavow it and the conciliators on the Central Committee tried to prevent its publication and circulation.

Despite all the efforts of the opportunists, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* was published and widely distributed among the advanced workers of Russia. p. 242

<sup>196</sup> *The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* took place between July 17 (30) and August 10 (23), 1903. Thirteen sessions were held in Brussels but then because of the police persecution the Congress moved to London.

The main items on the agenda were: the approval of the programme and rules of the R.S.D.L.P. and the election of Party central bodies. Lenin and his supporters carried on a determined struggle against the opportunists at the Congress.

The Congress unanimously (with one abstention) adopted the Party programme which formulated the immediate tasks of the proletariat in the forthcoming bourgeois-democratic revolution (minimum programme) and the tasks aimed at achieving the victory of the socialist revolution and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat (maximum programme).

During the discussion of the Party Rules a sharp struggle developed on the principles of Party organisation.

Lenin and his supporters aimed at building a militant, revolutionary party of the working class and considered it necessary that the Rules should keep out of the Party all unstable and vacillating elements. However, Martov's formulation, which made it easy for the unstable elements to enter the party, was supported at the Congress by the anti-*Iskra* group, the "Marsh" (the Centre) and the "mild" (inconsistent) *Iskrists* and was adopted by a small majority. In the main, however, the Congress adopted the Rules drawn up by Lenin and also passed several resolutions on tactical questions.

A split took place at the Congress between the consistent *Iskrists* headed by Lenin and inconsistent *Iskrists*, supporters of Martov. At the elections to the Party central bodies the revolutionary Social-Democrats led by Lenin won the majority (*bolshinstvo*) and the opportunists found themselves in the minority (*menshinstvo*): hence the names *Bolsheviks* and *Mensheviks*.

The Congress was of great importance for the development of the working-class movement in Russia. It put an end to provincialism and the circle spirit in the Social-Democratic movement and laid the foundations of a Marxist, revolutionary party in Russia, the Bolshevik Party. p. 242

<sup>197</sup> *The Conference of 1902*—a conference of representatives of R.S.D.L.P. committees and organisations held in Belostok on March 23-25 (April 5-10), 1902. The Economists and the Bundists, who supported them, intended to turn this conference into the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. so as to consolidate their position in Russian Social Democracy and paralyse the growing influence of *Iskra*. The attempt, however, was unsuccessful. The conference elected an Organising Committee to prepare for the Second Party Congress, but shortly after the conference most of the delegates were arrested, among them two members of the Organising Committee. A new Organising Committee to prepare for the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was set up in November 1902 at the Pskov Conference of representatives from the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the *Iskra* organisation in Russia and the *Yuzhny Rabochy* group p. 245

<sup>198</sup> The Menshevik *Iskra* published in the Supplement to No. 57, January 15, 1904, an article by the former Economist, A. Martynov, in which he opposed the organisational principles of the Bolsheviks and made attacks on Lenin. In a note to the article, the editors of *Iskra* formally stated their disagreement with some of the author's ideas but on the whole approved the article and agreed with its main theses. p. 260

- <sup>199</sup> *Cut-off lands*—the lands which were cut off from the peasants' allotments in favour of the landowners in 1861, when serfdom was abolished in Russia. Subsequently the landowners leased those lands to the peasants on onerous terms p. 267
- <sup>200</sup> *General Redistribution*—a slogan popular among the peasants of tsarist Russia and expressing their desire for a general redistribution of the land p. 268
- <sup>201</sup> The *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (SRs)—a petty-bourgeois party formed in Russia at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 through the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and circles. The views of the SRs were an eclectic mixture of Narodism and revisionism.
- The Bolshevik Party exposed the SRs' attempts to pose as socialists; it waged a stubborn struggle against them to gain influence over the peasantry and revealed the harmful effect which their tactics of individual terrorism had on the working class movement. At the same time, on definite conditions, the Bolsheviks concluded temporary agreements with the SRs in the struggle against tsarism. In the years of the first Russian revolution the Right wing of the party broke away and formed the legal *Trudovik* Popular Socialist Party, close in its views to the Cadets; the Left wing became the semi-anarchist league of 'Maximists'. During the Stolypin reaction (1907–10) the Socialist Revolutionary Party suffered a complete ideological and organisational break-up, and during the First World War most of the Socialist Revolutionaries adopted social chauvinist positions.
- After the victory of the February bourgeois democratic revolution in 1917 the SRs formed with the Mensheviks and Cadets the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois landowner Provisional Government which included leaders of their party, Kerensky, Avksentyev and Chernov.
- The SR Party refused to support the peasants' demand for abolition of the big landed estates and indeed advocated their maintenance. The SR Ministers in the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against the peasants who had seized land and estate.
- During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the SRs vigorously supported the interventionists and whiteguards took part in counter-revolutionary plots and organised terrorist acts against Soviet statesmen and Communist Party leaders p. 271
- <sup>1</sup> *Mamlovcism*—a term derived from the name of the landowner Mamlov, a character in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. Mamlov is a typical philistine, starchy, sentimentalist and empty visionary p. 286
- <sup>202</sup> The reference is to an incident which occurred in Hamburg in 1900 in connection with the conduct of a group of 127 members of the Free Bricklayers' Union who performed piece work during a strike in violation of the instructions of the trade union centre. The Hamburg unions complained to the local Social Democratic Party on suspicions about the strike-breaking activities of the Social Democratic members of the group and the question was referred to the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party of Germany for investigation. A court of arbitration appointed by the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party condemned the conduct of these Social Democrats but turned down the proposal that they be expelled from the Party p. 259
- <sup>203</sup> In his resolution rejected by the Congress, S. Zbarowski (Kostich) proposed the following formulation of Clause 1 of the Party Rules: 'Any person accepting the programme of the Party and rendering the Party financial and regular personal assistance under the guidance of a Party organisation shall be regarded by the latter as a Party member' p. 293

- <sup>201</sup> There were sixteen members of the *Iskra* organisation present at the Second Congress of the RSDLP—nine of them belonged to the majority headed by Lenin p. 302
- <sup>202</sup> *Ivan Ivanovich* and *Ivan Nikiforovich* are characters from Gogol's *Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich Quarrelled with Ivan Nikiforovich* p. 04
- <sup>203</sup> *The 1895 Congress of German Social-Democrats* was held in Breslau from October 6 to October 12. The main point on the agenda was the draft agrarian programme that was proposed by the commission on the agrarian question set up by decision of the Frankfurt Congress of 1892. The draft agrarian programme contained a number of serious errors—in particular a tendency to turn the proletarian party into a popular party. Not only the opportunists, but also August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht defended the draft for which they were censured at the Congress by Party comrades. The draft agrarian programme was sharply criticised by Karl Kautsky, Clara Zetkin and a number of other Social Democrats present at the Congress. The Congress rejected it by a majority vote (115 to 63), p. 307
- <sup>204</sup> In her speech at the 1895 Congress of German Social Democrats Clara Zetkin quoted from memory words from Goethe's  *Faust* which Gretchen addresses to Faust reproaching him for his friendship with Meville p. 305
- <sup>205</sup> Lenin is referring to Gleb Maximilianovich Kizhizhnikov p. 328
- <sup>210</sup> *Osvobodhdeniye* ('Liberation')—a fortnightly journal published abroad from June 15 (July 1) 1902 to October 31 (15) 1903 under the editorship of Pyotr司徒. It was the mouthpiece of the Russian liberal monarchist bourgeoisie. In 1903 the *Osvobodhdeniye* League formally founded the journal taking definite shape in January 1904 and existing until October 1904. Later its members became the nucleus of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets) which came into being in October 1905 p. 30
- <sup>211</sup> Lenin is referring to a speech made by the Economist V. P. Akimov during the discussion of the Party programme at the Second Congress of the RSDLP. One of Akimov's objections against the *Iskra* draft programme was that it did not mention the word 'proletariat' in the nominative case—a subject of the sentence—but only in the genitive ('party of the proletariat'). This Akimov claimed showed a tendency to isolate the party from the proletariat p. 36
- <sup>212</sup> The *Organic Committee* and the *St. Petersburg Workers' Organisation* were in the hands of the Economists. I was elected to them. They carried out its organisational plan for building a Marxist party p. 36
- <sup>213</sup> This new member of the Central Committee was I. V. Jentik who came to Geneva from Russia in September 1900 p. 36
- <sup>214</sup> Probably two Geneva suburbs—Carriac and Cluse—where they appeared the Majority and the Minority p. 36
- <sup>215</sup> *Sobalouch*—a character from Gogol's *Dead Souls* p. 37
- <sup>216</sup> *Bazarov*—the principal character in屠格涅夫's novel *Father and Son* p. 37
- <sup>217</sup> Together with Lenin's 'Letter to Iskra' *Iskra* No. 53 (November 23, 1902) printed an editorial reply written by Plekhanov. In his letter Lenin proposed a full discussion in the paper of the differences of principle between the

- Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Plekhanov rejected this describing the differences as "the squabbling of circle life". p. 380
- <sup>218</sup> *Revolutionnaya Rossiya* (Revolutionary Russia)—an illegal Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper published from the end of 1900 in Russia by the League of Socialist-Revolutionaries; from January 1902 to December 1905 it was published abroad (in Geneva) as the official organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. p. 380
- <sup>219</sup> The reference is to the views of P. B. Struve, leading representative of "legal Marxism", and his book *Critical Remarks on the Subject of Russia's Economic Development* (1894). Already in this early work Struve's bourgeois-apologetic thinking was clearly discernible. The views of Struve and the other "legal Marxists" were attacked by Lenin in a paper read to a St. Petersburg Marxist circle in the autumn of 1894, entitled "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature". At the close of 1894 and the beginning of 1895, Lenin used this paper as the basis of his essay "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book". p. 385
- <sup>220</sup> Lenin is referring to L. Martov's *Iskra* article "Is This the Way to Prepare?", in which Martov opposed preparations for an all-Russia armed uprising, regarding them as utopian conspiracy. p. 387
- <sup>221</sup> A quotation from Lermontov's poem *Journalist, Reader and Writer*. p. 388
- <sup>222</sup> A line from the satirical *Hymn of the Contemporary Russian Socialist* published in *Zarya* No. 1 (April 1901) and ridiculing the Economists and their trailing after the spontaneous movement. Signed Nartsis Tuporylov (Narcissus Blunt-Snout), the *Hymn* was written by Martov. p. 393
- <sup>223</sup> *Obломov*—the main character in Goncharov's novel of the same name, an embodiment of supine inertia and a passive, vegetating existence p. 395
- <sup>224</sup> This refers to Martov's article "Next in Turn" published in *Iskra* on February 25, 1904. In this article Martov proposed that local Party committees should be independent of the Central Committee of the RSDLP in deciding the question of membership of local committees, and attacked the Moscow Committee, which had discussed this question and adopted a resolution on the compliance of the Moscow Committee with all instructions of the Central Committee, on the basis of Clause 9 of the Party Rules. p. 397
- <sup>225</sup> The *Dresden Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party* was held on September 13-20, 1903. The main question on the agenda was the tactics of the Party and the struggle against revisionism. The revisionist views of Eduard Bernstein, Paul Göhre, Eduard David, Wolfgang Heine and some other German Social-Democrats were subjected to criticism. However, the Congress was not consistent in the struggle against revisionism; the revisionists among the German Social-Democrats were not expelled from the Party and continued to spread their opportunist views after the Congress. p. 399
- <sup>226</sup> The *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (Socialist Monthly)—the chief organ of the opportunists in the German Social-Democratic Party and one of the organs of international opportunism. It was published in Berlin from 1897 to 1933. During the First World War (1914-18) it took a social-chauvinist stand p. 399
- <sup>227</sup> The *Frankfurter Zeitung* (Frankfort Gazette)—a daily newspaper of the big German financiers. It was published in Frankfort on the Main from 1856 to 1943. p. 402

228 For "ministerial" tactics, ministerialism, ministerial socialism or Millerandism see Note 78 p 404

229 This refers to the humorous article "A Short Constitution of the RSDI P" written by I. Martov and published as a supplement to his article "Next in Line" (*Iskra* No 58, January 25 1904). Martov waxed ironical over the organisational principles of Bolshevism and complained of an allegedly unjust attitude to the Mensheviks. In his 'constitution' he wrote of 'bullies' and "bullied", meaning the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks p 406

230 *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* was written in June and July 1905 after the Third Congress of the RSDI P and the Menshevik Conference in Geneva which was held at the same time as the Congress.

The publication of *Two Tactics* was an important event in the life of the Party. The book was distributed illegally in a number of towns in Russia and was studied in underground Party and workers' circles.

In February 1907 the St. Petersburg Press Committee banned the book regarding the ideas expressed in it as a criminal action against the tsarist government. In March the St. Petersburg Court confirmed the ban and in December it issued an injunction to the effect that "N. Lenin's pamphlet *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* shall be destroyed." However, the tsarist government did not succeed in implementing this decision.

Lenin supplemented the text with new footnotes and had the work included in the first volume of his collection *Later Years* which was published in St. Petersburg in mid-November 1907. This is what he said of the significance of *Two Tactics* in his preface to the collection. Here are expounded already in a systematic way fundamental tactical differences with the Mensheviks. The resolutions of the spring Third Congress of the RSDI P (Bolsheviks) in London and of the Menshevik Conference in Geneva have given final shape to these differences and brought them to a radical divergence in the evaluation of our whole bourgeois revolution from the point of view of the tasks of the proletariat p 415

231 The mutiny on the armoured cruiser *Potemkin* broke out on June 14 (27 1905). The crew brought the warship to Odessa where a general strike was in progress. However, the favourable conditions that had arisen for joint action by the Odessa workers and the sailors of the *Potemkin* were not utilised. After eleven days of cruising in the Black Sea the crew of the *Potemkin* were forced by shortage of food and coal to take their vessel to a Rumanian port and surrender to the authorities. Most of the sailors remained abroad. Those who returned to Russia were arrested and court-martialled.

The *Potemkin* mutiny was unsuccessful but the fact that the crew of a big naval vessel had joined the revolution marked an important stage in the development of the struggle against the autocracy p 42

232 *Proletary* (The Proletarian) - an illegal Bolshevik weekly central organ of the RSDI P founded in accordance with a resolution of the Third Congress of the Party. Lenin was appointed its editor in chief by decision of a plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee on April 27 (May 10) 1905. *Proletary* was published in Geneva from May 14 (27) to November 15 (25), 1905; twenty-six issues appeared p 425

233 *Akimovism* - a term derived from the name of V. P. Akimov (Makhnovets), an outstanding representative of Economism and one of the most extreme opportunists p 427

- <sup>234</sup> The *Third Congress of the RSDLP* was held in London between April 12 and April 27 (April 25 and May 10) 1905. It was prepared by the Bolsheviks and guided by Lenin. The Mensheviks refused to participate in the Congress and convened their own conference in Geneva.

The Congress was attended by thirty-eight delegates: twenty-four with the right to vote and fourteen with voice but no vote.

The Congress examined the cardinal problems of the revolution developing in Russia and defined the tasks of the proletariat and its Party. The agenda consisted of the following items: Report of the Organising Committee; the armed uprising; attitude towards the government's policy on the eve of the revolution; the provisional revolutionary government; attitude towards the peasant movement; the Party Rules; attitude towards the break-away group of the RSDLP; attitude towards the non-Russian Social Democratic organisations; attitude towards the liberals; practical agreements with the Socialist Revolutionaries; propaganda and agitation; reports of the Central Committee and the delegates of the local committees.

Lenin drafted the resolutions on all the main questions discussed by the Congress and spoke on the participation of the Social Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government, on the resolution concerning support of the peasant movement, on the armed uprising, the attitude towards the government's tactics on the eve of the revolution, the relations between workers and intellectuals in the Social Democratic organisations, the Party Rules, on the report of the Central Committee and a number of other questions. The Congress outlined the strategic plan and tactical line of the Party in the bourgeois democratic revolution and put forward the task of organising an armed uprising as the Party's main and most urgent task. It pointed out that a victorious popular armed uprising should result in the formation of a provisional revolutionary government which must suppress the resistance of the counter-revolution, carry out the minimum programme of the RSDLP and prepare the conditions for transition to a socialist revolution.

The Congress reviewed the Party Rules; it adopted Lenin's wording of Clause 1 (on Party membership) in place of the two centres (the Central Committee and the Central Organ); it established a single competent Party centre—the Central Committee; it defined precisely the rights of the Central Committee and its relations with the local committees.

The Congress condemned the Mensheviks' actions, their opportunism in organisational and tactical questions. In view of the fact that the Mensheviks had gained control of *Iskra* and turned it into an opportunist organ, the Third Congress of the RSDLP entrusted the Central Committee with the task of founding a new Central Organ, the newspaper *Proletary*. By a decision of the plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee of April 27 (May 10) 1905, Lenin was appointed its editor in chief. p. 42.

- <sup>235</sup> The references to the new Menshevik *Iskra* (beginning with issue No. 52) the Menshevik turned *Iskra* into their own organ) p. 12.

- <sup>236</sup> The *Bulygin Commission*—a special conference convened in accordance with an imperial ukase of February 18 (March 3) 1905 and headed by Minister of the Interior Bulygin. It was composed of big landowners representing the reactionary gentry. The Commission drafted a Bill for the establishment of a State Duma and the Regulations on the Duma elections. The Bill and the Regulations were made public together with the tsar's Manifesto on August 6 (19) 1905. The right to elect to the Duma was granted only to landowners, capitalists and an insignificant number of peasant householders. Being an advisory body under the tsar, the Duma had no legislative powers and could only discuss certain questions.



The Bolsheviks called upon the workers and peasants to boycott the Bulygin Duma. The elections to the Duma did not take place: the government's attempt to convene it failed under the impact of the developing revolution and the October political strike. p. 429

- <sup>237</sup> The *Paris Commune of 1871*—a revolutionary government of the working class established by the proletarian revolution in Paris; this first government of proletarian dictatorship lasted for 72 days—from March 18 to May 28, 1871. p. 437

- <sup>238</sup> See pp. 421-24 of this volume. p. 438

- <sup>239</sup> The *Frankfort Parliament*—an all-German National Assembly established after the revolution of March 1848. It met in Frankfort-on-the-Main on May 18, 1848. Its chief task was to do away with the fragmentation of Germany and to work out an imperial constitution. However, the Assembly was afraid to take supreme power into its hands and was unable to adopt a firm stand on the cardinal questions of the German revolution of 1848-49 because of the cowardice and vacillations of its liberal majority and the irresoluteness and inconsistency of its petty bourgeois left wing. In June 1849 it was dispersed by the troops of the Württemberg government. p. 439

- <sup>240</sup> *Sotsial-Demokrat* (The Social-Democrat)—a Menshevik Georgian-language newspaper published in Tiflis from April 7 (20), 1905, to November 13 (26), 1905, a total of six issues being brought out. Its editor-in-chief was Noi Jordania, leader of the Georgian Mensheviks.

The article "The Zemsky Sobor and Our 'Tactics'", which was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1 for April 7 (20), 1905, was written by Jordania. Lenin criticised it in detail in Chapter 7 of *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (see this volume, pp. 461-65). p. 441

- <sup>241</sup> *The Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs formed by the tsarist police to fight against the revolutionary movement. They assassinated revolutionaries, attacked progressive intellectuals and organised anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 441

- <sup>242</sup> A constitution "à la Shipov"—Lenin's name for the draft of state structure drawn up by Dmitry Shipov, a moderate liberal leader of the *Zemstvo* movement's Right wing. In an attempt to curb the sweep of the revolution and also to obtain certain concessions from the tsarist government in favour of the *Zemstvos*, Shipov proposed the creation of an advisory representative body under the tsar. By such a deal the moderate liberals wanted to deceive the masses, preserve the monarchy, and at the same time win certain political rights for themselves. p. 442

- <sup>243</sup> See Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, pp. 13, 15). p. 447

- <sup>244</sup> *Nasha Zhizn* (Our Life)—a liberal daily which appeared in St. Petersburg, with intervals, from November 6 (19), 1904, to July 11 (24), 1906. p. 453

- <sup>245</sup> *Nashi Dni* (Our Days)—a liberal daily published in St. Petersburg from December 18 (31), 1904, to February 5 (18), 1905. Publication was resumed on December 7 (20), 1905, but only two issues came out. p. 453

- <sup>246</sup> *The man in the muffler*—the chief character in Chekhov's story of the same name, a man typifying the narrow-minded philistine who abhors all innovations or initiative. p. 454

- <sup>247</sup> Lenin is referring to the book *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle. Herausgegeben von Franz Mehring*, Bd. III, Stuttgart, 1902, S. 211. p. 459
- <sup>248</sup> A *bashi-bazouk*—a soldier belonging to irregular Turkish units (18th-19th cent.), notoriously turbulent and cruel. p. 460
- <sup>249</sup> The reference is to the audience granted to the Zemstvo deputation by Nicholas II on June 6 (19), 1905. The deputation handed in a petition with the request to convene representatives of the people in order to establish a "renewed constitution". The petition contained neither the demand for universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot, nor the demand for guaranteed free elections. p. 460
- <sup>250</sup> The *Uperyod* supporters, the "Congress" group, the *Proletary* supporters—various names given to the Bolsheviks; they derive from the Third Congress convened by the Bolsheviks, and from their publications *Uperyod* and *Proletary*. p. 460
- <sup>251</sup> The reference is to the resolution on the attitude towards the liberals tabled by Starover (pseudonym of Alexander Potresov) and adopted at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 461
- <sup>252</sup> The reference is to the naval engagement near the Island of Tsushima, which took place on May 14-15 (27-28), 1905, during the Russo-Japanese war, and ended in the defeat of the Russian fleet. p. 462
- <sup>253</sup> The expression "parliamentary cretinism", which is often met in Lenin's writings, was coined by Marx and Engels.  
This expression was applied by Lenin to those opportunists who considered the parliamentary system all-powerful, and parliamentary activities the sole or at least the main form of political struggle in all conditions. p. 464
- <sup>254</sup> *Repetilov*—a character in Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. Lenin used the name to denote revolutionary-minded individuals carried away by events and having neither theoretical nor social grounding. p. 465
- <sup>255</sup> Lenin is referring to differences of opinion revealed during the discussion of the draft agrarian programme at the Breslau Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party, which was held from October 6 to October 12, 1895 (see Note 207). p. 466
- <sup>256</sup> The reference is to the pamphlet *The Eve of Revolution. Narodnik Review of the Questions of Theory and Tactics*. It was written by Y. O. Zelensky under the pseudonym of L. Nadezhdin and published in 1901. Lenin sharply criticised this pamphlet in his work *What Is To Be Done?* (see this volume, pp. 92-241) p. 470
- <sup>257</sup> Lenin has in view the programme published in 1874 by the London Blanquist group of former members of the Paris Commune (see F. Engels, "Flüchtlingsliteratur. II. Programm der blanquistischen Kommune-Flüchtlinge", *Internationales ans dem Volksstaat*, Berlin, 1957, S. 47-56).  
The *Blanquists* were adherents of a trend in the French socialist movement headed by the outstanding revolutionary and representative of French utopian communism, Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881).  
The *Blanquists* denied the class struggle and expected "that mankind will be emancipated from wage slavery, not by the proletarian class struggle, but through a conspiracy hatched by a small minority of intellectuals"

(V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 392). They took no account of the concrete situation required for an uprising to be victorious, and showed their disdain for ties with the masses by substituting activities by a handful of plotters for revolutionary party work. p. 478

- 258 *The Erfurt Programme of the German Social-Democratic Party* was adopted in October 1891 at the Congress in Erfurt. Compared with the Gotha Programme (1875), it was a step forward, being based on the Marxist teaching that the capitalist mode of production must inevitably perish and yield place to the socialist mode of production; it stressed the need for the working class to wage a political struggle, indicating the role of the party as the leader of this struggle, etc. However, the Erfurt Programme, too, contained serious concessions to opportunism. It was extensively criticised by Frederick Engels, this being essentially a criticism of the opportunism of the entire Second International, whose parties regarded the Erfurt Programme as a kind of model. However, the leadership of German Social-Democracy concealed Engels' criticism from the party rank and file, and his most important remarks were ignored when the final text of the Programme was drawn up. Lenin considered that the Erfurt Programme's silence on the dictatorship of the proletariat was its chief defect and a cowardly concession to opportunism p. 482

- 259 Lenin wrote this note to Chapter 10 of *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* on separate sheets during his work on the book. In the manuscript of the note he made a remark. "To be inserted in paragraph 10." However, it was inserted neither in the first edition of the book (1905), nor in the collection *Twelve Years* (1907), in which *Two Tactics* was included. It first appeared in 1926, in *Lenin Miscellany V* p. 483

- 260 Lenin is referring to his article "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government" (Article Two), published in *Proletary* No. 3, in which he quotes Engels' article "The Bakuninists at Work. Review of the Uprising in Spain in the Summer of 1873". In this article Engels criticises the Bakunist resolution Lenin mentions here (see F. Engels, *The Bakuninists at Work*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971). p. 488

- 261 The reference is to Marx's words in his *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*. p. 490

- 262 *L'Humanité*—a daily paper founded in 1904 by Jean Jaurès as the organ of the French Socialist Party. In 1905 the paper greeted the revolution which had begun in Russia. During the First World War (1914-18), it was the mouthpiece of the extreme Right wing of the French Socialist Party, occupying a chauvinist position.

In 1919 the paper was headed by Marcel Cachin, an outstanding figure in the French and international working-class movement. In 1918-20 *L'Humanité* opposed the imperialist policy of the French Government which sent its troops to fight against the Soviet country.

Soon after the split in the Socialist Party at the Tours Congress (December 1920) and the formation of the Communist Party of France, the paper became the latter's Central Organ. p. 492

- 263 Lenin is referring to Louis Eugène Varlin, prominent figure in the French working-class movement and member of the First International, who was on the Paris Commune's Council in 1871. p. 500

- 264 The reference is to the "Rules of Organisation" adopted at the Geneva Conference of the Mensheviks in 1905. p. 502

- <sup>265</sup> Lenin is referring to the Menshevik plan of supporting the "Zemstvo campaign", conducted by the bourgeois liberals from the autumn of 1904 to January 1905. The campaign was carried on in the form of congresses, meetings and banquets at which speeches were made and resolutions adopted in the spirit of moderate constitutional demands. In his article "The Zemstvo Campaign and *Iskra's* Plan" Lenin subjected the Mensheviks' position on this question to a severe criticism. p. 502
- <sup>266</sup> See Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 277). p. 504
- <sup>267</sup> Engels' article "The Bakuninists at Work. Review of the Uprising in Spain in the Summer of 1873" was translated into Russian under Lenin's editorship and was published as a pamphlet in Geneva in 1905 by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. A second edition came out in 1906 in St. Petersburg.  
*The Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League*, written by Marx and Engels in March 1850, was published in Russian in 1906 in the supplement to the pamphlet: Karl Marx, *The Cologne Communist Trial*, which was brought out by the Molot Publishers in St. Petersburg. p. 512
- <sup>268</sup> Lenin is referring to Franz Mehring's introduction to the book *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle*. Herausgegeben von Franz Mehring, Bd. III, Stuttgart, 1902, S. 53.  
 Below, on pp. 91-92, Lenin quotes the same introduction by Franz Mehring (op. cit., S. 81-82). p. 519
- <sup>269</sup> Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, "Die Krisis und die Kontrerevolution", Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969, S. 402 (see also Marx and Engels, *Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung"*, 1848-49, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 124). p. 520
- <sup>270</sup> Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, "Programme der radikal-demokratischen Partei und der Linken zu Frankfurt", Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969, S. 40 (see also Marx and Engels, *Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung"*, 1848-49, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 31). p. 520
- <sup>271</sup> Ibid., S. 41 (ibid., p. 32). p. 521
- <sup>272</sup> Engels, "Die Frankfurter Versammlung" (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969, S. 14; see also *Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung"*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 22).  
 Engels' authorship of this article was established when the fifth volume of the second Russian edition of the *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels was being prepared for the press. p. 252
- <sup>273</sup> Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, "Die Berliner Debatte über die Revolution", Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969, S. 64-65 (see also *Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung"*, 1848-49, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 35-36). p. 522
- <sup>274</sup> Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 5, "Der Gesetzentwurf über die Aufhebung der Feudallasten", Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969, S. 282-283 (see also *Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung"*, 1848-49, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 76). p. 523

- 275 The organ of the Cologne Workers' League was originally called *Zeitung des Arbeiter-Vereins zu Köln*, with the subtitle *Freiheit, Brüderlichkeit, Arbeit* (Freedom, Brotherhood, Labour). The paper was published under this title from April to October 1848 and was edited by members of the Communist League: by Andreas Gottschalk till July 1848, and then by Joseph Moll. Forty issues came out during that period. Much space was devoted to the activities of the Cologne Workers' League and of other workers' societies in the Rhine Province. On October 26, the Cologne Workers' League resumed publication of the paper under the title *Freiheit, Brüderlichkeit, Arbeit*. It was published till June 24, 1849, thirty-two issues being brought out.  
p. 524
- 276 Marx Engels, *Werke*, Bd 6, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1968 S 426, 584, 587-88  
p. 525
- 277 Lenin is referring to G. V. Plekhanov's article "Is This Possible?" in the newspaper *Tovarishch* No. 381, September 26 (October 9), 1907.  
*Tovarishch* (The Comrade)—a bourgeois daily that was published in St. Petersburg from March 15(28), 1906, to December 30, 1907 (January 12, 1908). Though formally not the organ of any particular party it was in fact the mouthpiece of the Left Cadets; Sergei Prokopovich and Yekaterina Kuskova were among its active contributors. It also published contributions from Mensheviks.  
p. 526
- 278 See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3 Moscow, 1973, pp. 185-86  
p. 527
- 279 *Khlestakov*—the principal character in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*, an arrant boaster and liar.  
p. 527
- 280 The *Joint Council of Volunteer Fighting Squads* was formed in Moscow at the end of October 1905. Originally intended for the fight against the Black Hundreds, it was retained during the December uprising. However, its Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik majority disorganised its work. It lagged behind the revolutionary events and failed to fulfil its mission. p. 528
- 281 The reference is to the *general political strike* launched by decision of the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. The strike began on October 7(20) on the Moscow-Kazan railway. It spread rapidly to all industrial centres and became an all-Russia strike involving over two million people. The slogans of the strike were: overthrow the autocracy actively boycott the Bulygin Duma, convene a constituent assembly and establish a democratic republic. The tsarist government took fright at the growth of the revolutionary movement and made some hasty concessions. On October 17 the tsar issued a manifesto promising "civil liberties" and a "legislative" Duma.  
The Bolsheviks exposed the falsity of the tsar's manifesto and called upon the people to continue the struggle. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries welcomed the manifesto and appealed to the workers' end the strike. The tsarist government, supported by the bourgeoisie, took advantage of the treachery of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries and launched an offensive. A wave of violence and persecution swept over the country.  
In view of the situation that had developed, the Moscow City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. on October 22 (November 4) called off the general strike. The October general political strike showed the strength and power of the working-class movement and gave impetus to the revolutionary movement in the countryside, the army and navy. The October general strike prepared the proletariat for the December uprising.  
p. 529

- <sup>282</sup> Lenin cites the proposition put forward by Marx in his *Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 205). p. 529
- <sup>283</sup> On the evening of December 8(21), 1905, soldiers and police cordoned off the Aquarium Gardens (in Sadovo-Triumfalnaya Square), where a crowded meeting was being held in the theatre. Thanks to the selfless efforts of the workers' volunteer squads guarding the meeting, bloodshed was avoided. Those who possessed arms were enabled to escape through a broken fence, but the other participants in the meeting who went out through the gate were searched and beaten up and many were arrested. p. 529
- <sup>284</sup> The Fiedler school building (at Chis'iye Prudy) was regularly used for party meetings. On the evening of December 9(22), 1905, when a meeting was being held there, it was surrounded by troops. The participants in the meeting, mostly members of volunteer squads, refused to surrender and barricaded themselves in the building. The troops opened artillery and machine-gun fire. More than 30 persons were killed or wounded; 120 were arrested. p. 529
- <sup>285</sup> The *Semyonovsky Guards Regiment* was sent from St. Petersburg to Moscow in December 1905 to suppress the uprising of the Moscow workers. p. 529
- <sup>286</sup> This refers to Engels' *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, which was published in 1851-52 as a series of articles in the newspaper *New York Daily Tribune* over the signature of Marx, who originally intended to write them but being preoccupied with his economic researches, handed over the task to Engels. In writing the articles Engels constantly consulted Marx, who also read them through, before they were sent to the press. Not until 1913, when the correspondence between Marx and Engels was published, did it become known that the work had been written by Engels. p. 532
- <sup>287</sup> Engels expounded this proposition on a number of occasions in his works, notably in *Anti-Dühring*. p. 532
- <sup>288</sup> In December 1905 various Latvian towns were seized by armed detachments of insurgent workers, agricultural labourers and peasants. Guerrilla war against the tsarist troops began. In January 1906 the uprising in Latvia was suppressed by punitive expeditions. p. 533
- <sup>289</sup> Lenin is referring to the revolts at Sveaborg and Kronstadt in July 1906. p. 533
- <sup>290</sup> Lenin has in view the Fifth All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., which was held in Paris from December 21 to December 27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909). p. 535
- <sup>291</sup> *Trudoviks*—a group of petty-bourgeois democrats in the Duma, consisting of peasants and Narodnik-minded intellectuals. The Trudovik group was constituted in April 1906 from the peasant deputies to the First Duma. In the Duma the Trudoviks vacillated between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, their vacillations being due to the very class nature of the peasants, who are petty proprietors. Since the Trudoviks represented the peasant masses to a certain extent, the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the Duma aimed at agreements with them on separate issues with a view to waging a joint struggle against the tsarist autocracy and the Cadets. In 1917 the Trudovik group merged with the Popular Socialist Party and gave active support to the bourgeois Provisional Government. After

the October Socialist Revolution the Trudoviks sided with the bourgeois counter-revolution.

p. 537

- <sup>292</sup> *Octobrists*—members of the Union of October Seventeen formed in Russia after the publication of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905. This counter-revolutionary party represented and defended the interests of the big industrialists and those landowners who farmed on capitalist lines. It was headed by a well-known industrialist and Moscow house owner, A. I. Guchkov, and a big landed proprietor, M. V. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists gave full support to the foreign and domestic policy of the tsarist government.

p. 537

- <sup>293</sup> Lenin is referring to the agrarian laws drafted by Stolypin. A ukase, "On Amendments to Certain Enactments Regarding Peasant Land Tenure and Ownership", was issued on November 9 (22), 1906; after being passed by the Duma and the Council of State, it became known as the Law of June 14, 1910. Another ukase was issued on November 15 (28), 1906, "On the Issue of Loans by the Peasant Land Bank on Security of Allotment Lands". Under these laws the peasant was given the right to take possession of his allotment as private property and withdraw from the village commune to his *otrub* or *khutor*. The *otrub* or *khutor* peasant could receive a loan from the Peasant Bank to acquire land. The object of Stolypin's agrarian reform was to create a mainstay for the autocracy in the countryside in the shape of a class of kulaks, while preserving the landed estates and destroying the village communes.

This policy hastened capitalist evolution of agriculture along the most painful, "Prussian" path, while preserving the power, property and privileges of the feudal landowners; it intensified the forcible expropriation of the bulk of the peasants, and accelerated the development of a peasant bourgeoisie, which was enabled to buy up cheaply the allotments of the poor peasants.

Lenin called the Stolypin agrarian legislation of 1906 (and the Law promulgated on June 14 (27), 1910) the second step, after the 1861 Reform, towards converting the feudal autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy.

Stolypin's agrarian policy did not do away with the fundamental antagonism between the peasantry as a whole and the landowners, and led to the still greater impoverishment of the peasant masses and the aggravation of class contradictions between the kulaks and the rural poor.

p. 537

- <sup>294</sup> *Otzovists*—an opportunist group among the Bolsheviks which appeared in 1908. Under the guise of revolutionary phrases they demanded the recall of Social-Democratic deputies from the Third Duma and the cessation of work in legal organisations. Being of the opinion that in the conditions of reaction the Party must conduct only illegal work, the *otzovists* refused to participate in the Duma, in trade unions, co-operatives and other mass legal and semi-legal organisations. They thought it necessary to confine all Party work within the framework of the underground organisation. A variety of *otzovism* was ultimatumism.

p. 539

- <sup>295</sup> *Dichards*—the name given in Russian political literature to the extreme Right wing of the reactionary landed proprietors.

p. 542

- <sup>296</sup> *The men of December 14*—revolutionaries drawn from the Russian nobility, opponents of serfdom and the autocracy who raised the armed revolt on December 14, 1825.

p. 543

- <sup>297</sup> Quoted by Lenin from Alexander Herzen's *Ends and Beginnings*.

p. 543

- <sup>298</sup> Here Lenin quotes from Alexander Herzen's *Letters to an Old Comrade* (letters four and two).

p. 545

- <sup>299</sup> The reference is to the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861. p. 545
- <sup>300</sup> The *All-Russia Peasant Union*—a revolutionary-democratic organisation formed in 1905. It demanded political liberties and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly, and supported the boycott of the First Duma. The Union's agrarian programme envisaged the abolition of private property in land and the transfer of monasterial, church, crown and state lands to the peasants without compensation. Under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and liberals the Union's policy was a petty-bourgeois, half-and-half and vacillating one. p. 545
- <sup>301</sup> *Kolokol* (The Bell)—a political journal published by Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Ogaryov. Its motto was *Vivos voco!* (I call on the living!). It was printed at the Free Russian Printing Press founded by Herzen, from July 1, 1857, to April 1865 in London, and from May 1865 to July 1867 in Geneva. It appeared monthly, and for a short time, fortnightly. A total of 245 issues were brought out. In 1868 the journal was published in French (15 issues appeared), with supplements in Russian to some issues. Editions being up to 2,500 copies, the journal was widely distributed throughout Russia.  
*Kolokol* headed the revolutionary, uncensored press and was the precursor of the working-class press in Russia. It played an important part in developing the democratic and revolutionary movement in Russia, in the struggle against the autocracy and serfdom. p. 546
- <sup>302</sup> *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (The Pole Star)—a literary and political miscellany. A total of eight issues appeared. Issues 1 to 7 (1855-62) were printed in London at the Free Russian Printing Press founded by Herzen, and issue No. 8 in Geneva (1868). *Polyarnaya Zvezda* played an important part in developing progressive Russian literature and of social thinking. p. 546
- <sup>303</sup> *Raznochintsi* (commoners)—Russian intellectuals drawn from the merchant classes, the clergy, the small townfolk and the peasantry as distinct from those drawn from the nobility. p. 546
- <sup>304</sup> This refers to *Prosveshcheniye* (Enlightenment), a Bolshevik legal theoretical monthly (see Note 70). p. 549
- <sup>305</sup> *Borba* (Struggle)—Trotsky's journal published in St. Petersburg from February to July 1914. Trotsky waged a struggle against Lenin and the Bolshevik Party under cover of "non-factionalism". p. 549
- <sup>306</sup> *Severnaya Rabochaya Gazeta* (Northern Workers' Paper)—a daily of the Menshevik liquidators published in St. Petersburg from January 30 (February 12) to May 1 (14), 1914, from May 3 (16) onwards it was published under the title *Nasha Rabochaya Gazeta* (Our Workers' Paper). p. 549
- <sup>307</sup> The *Stockholm Congress* (Fourth Unity Congress of the RSDLP) was held from April 10 to 25 (April 23-May 8), 1906. It was attended by 112 delegates with the right to vote, representing 57 local Party organisations, and 22 delegates with voice but no vote.  
 The Mensheviks were in the majority, because many of the Bolshevik Party organisations which had headed the uprising were smashed and could not send their delegates to the Congress. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, who had the most numerous organisations in the non-industrial areas, where there was no revolutionary action of the masses, could send more delegates.  
 The main items on the agenda were: 1) revision of the agrarian programme, 2) appraisal of the current situation and the class tasks of



the proletariat 3) the attitude to the Duma 4) the armed uprising, 5) guerrilla warfare 6) joining forces with the rational Social Democratic parties, and 7) the Party Rules.

There was a bitter controversy between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks over every item. After a stubborn struggle the Congress adopted the Menshevik resolutions on the Duma and the armed uprising and approved the Menshevik agrarian programme. On the question of the attitude to the bourgeois parties the Congress confined itself to supporting the resolution of the International Amsterdam Congress. It adopted a compromise resolution on the trade unions and a resolution on the attitude to the peasant movement without any debate whatsoever.

At the same time in compliance with the demand of the Party rank and file, the Congress approved the first clause of the Rule in the word now proposed by Lenin thereby rejecting Martov's opportunist formulation. The Bolshevik proposition on democratic centralism was included in the Rules for the first time.

The Congress elected a Central Committee of three Bolshevik and seven Mensheviks, and a Menshevik editorial board of the central organ the newspaper *Sotsial Demokrat*.

The Fifth (London) Congress of the RSDLP (1907) was attended by 336 delegates representing over 147 thousand Party members and including 105 Bolsheviks, 97 Mensheviks, 57 Bundists, 11 Polish Social Democrats, 29 Jewish Social Democrats and 4 non-factionals. Bureau district centres sent Bolsheviks to the Congress. Headed by Lenin the Bolsheviks were solidly united. They were backed by the Social-Democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and by the Letts. The Bolsheviks united the Social Democrats on the basis of a revolutionary platform with a majority and secured victory for the revolutionary Marxist policy. The Congress adopted Bolshevik resolutions on all fundamental issues.

The Fifth Congress of the RSDLP signified a big victory of Bolshevism in Russia's working class movement. The Congress decisions summed up the victory of Bolshevism over the opportunistic Menshevik wing of the Party in the period of the bourgeois democratic revolution.

The Bolshevik tactics were approved as tactics obligatory for the whole Party. p. 550

*Pravda* (The Truth)—a legal Bolshevik daily published in St. Petersburg from April 22 (May 5) 1912. It was published with money collected by the workers themselves and had an average circulation of 40,000 with some issues running into 60,000 copies.

Lenin directed *Pravda* wrote for it almost daily and gave instructions to its editorial board. Some 270 articles and items written by him appeared in the newspaper under various pseudonyms.

*Pravda* was subjected to constant police persecution. During the first year of its existence thirty-six legal actions were brought against its editors who spent a total of 47½ months in prison. It was closed down eight times by the tsarist government but each time it appeared again under a new name. In spite of the difficult conditions the Bolsheviks managed to bring out 636 issues of *Pravda* in the course of six years. The newspaper was finally suppressed on July 5 (21) 1914 and publication was not resumed until after the February bourgeois democratic revolution of 1917. Beginning from March 5 (18) 1917 *Pravda* appeared as the organ of the Central and Petersburg Committees of the RSDLP. Lenin joined the editorial board on April 5 (18) on his return from abroad and guided the work of the editors. From July to October 1917 *Pravda* frequently changed its name owing to persecution by the counter-revolutionary bourgeois Provisional government appearing successively as *Istok Pravdy* (Pravda's Sheet), *Proletary* (The Proletarian), *Rilechye* (The

Worker), and *Rabochy Put* (Worker's Path). On October 27 (November 9), 1917, after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, the Central Organ of the Party began to appear under its original name—*Pravda*.

p. 551

- 309 *Pro-Party Bolsheviks*—conciliators with leanings towards the liquidators, headed by A. Lyubimov (Mark Sommer).

*Pro-Party Mensheviks*, headed by G. V. Plekhanov, came out against the liquidators during the period of reaction. While taking a Menshevik stand, the Plekhanovites stood for the preservation and strengthening of the illegal Party organisation and therefore formed a bloc with the Bolsheviks. Plekhanov broke the bloc with the Bolsheviks at the end of 1911. Under the guise of fighting "factionalism" and the split in the R.S.D.L.P. he attempted to reconcile the Bolsheviks with the opportunists. In 1912 the Plekhanovites, together with the Trotskyists, Bundists and liquidators, came out against the decisions of the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 551

- 310 *Nasha Zarya* (Our Dawn)—a legal monthly of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from January 1910 to September 1914. The liquidators' centre in Russia formed around this journal. p. 555

- 311 "*Judas*" *Golovlyov*—a character in Saltykov-Shchedin's book *The Golovlyov Family*, nicknamed "Judas" for his sanctimoniousness, hypocrisy and callousness. The name of Judas Golovlyov is often used to denote these views. p. 556

- 312 *Luch* (Ray)—a legal daily of the Menshevik liquidators, published in St. Petersburg from September 16 (29), 1912, to July 5 (18), 1913. A total of 237 issues were put out. The newspaper was maintained chiefly by contributions from the liberals. p. 556

- 343 *The Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials* (for purposes of secrecy it was known as "the summer" Conference) was held from September 23 to October 1 (October 6-14), 1913, in the village of Poronin (near Cracow), where Lenin was living at the time.

The national question, then occupying a prominent place among other questions of Russia's social life, was one of the main items on the Conference agenda. Lenin made a report on the national question. Basing itself on the Party programme, the Conference resolutely voted down the demand for "cultural-national autonomy" put forward by the Mensheviks and Bundists, and adopted programme propositions on the national question as worked out by Lenin. It also adopted a resolution to include the question of the national programme in the agenda of the forthcoming Party Congress.

In its resolution on the Social-Democratic Duma group, the Conference demanded that the Bolshevik and Menshevik members of the group should enjoy equal rights, and resolutely condemned the actions of the Mensheviks, who had taken advantage of a chance majority of one vote and violated the elementary rights of the Bolshevik deputies representing the overwhelming majority of workers in Russia. On instructions from Lenin and the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, the Bolshevik deputies left the joint Social-Democratic Duma group in October 1913 and formed an independent Bolshevik group (Russian Social-Democratic Labour group).

In his report on the Vienna International Socialist Congress which was to be held in 1914, Lenin proposed sending as many delegates as possible from both legal and illegal organisations, and suggested the holding of a Party Congress at the same time as the International Congress.

The Conference ended with a closing speech by Lenin. In view of the importance of the questions discussed and the resolutions adopted the Poronin Conference had the significance of a Party Conference. p 559

- <sup>314</sup> The *PSP Left wing*—a Polish Workers' Party formed in 1906 as a result of a split in the Polish Socialist Party (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*) a reformist nationalist organisation founded in 1892. p 561

- <sup>15</sup> The *Troublous Times*—a term used in pre-revolutionary Russian bourgeois historiography to denote the period of the peasant war and the struggle of the Russian people against the Polish and Swedish intervention in the early seventeenth century.

In 1608 the Polish troops under Pseudo-Dimitry II, a henchman of the Polish landed gentry who posed as the younger son of the Russian tsar Ivan the Terrible, invaded Russia and reached the outskirts of Moscow where they camped in the village of Iushino. A government headed by Pseudo-Dimitry was formed in Iushino in opposition to the Moscow government. Some of the Russian nobles and boyar aristocracy deserted from one camp to another in an effort to keep in with the winning side. The deserters were called Iushino turncoat. p 565

- <sup>316</sup> *Nauchnaya Mysl* (Scientific Thought)—a Menshevik journal published in Riga in 1908. p 569

- <sup>317</sup> *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny* (Social Democratic Review)—a journal published by the Polish Social Democrats in close co-operation with Rosa Luxemburg in Cracow from 1902 to 1904 and from 1908 to 1910. p 570

- <sup>18</sup> See Karl Marx *Capital* Vol. I Moscow 1972 p 16. p 570

- <sup>319</sup> *Russkaya Mysl* (Russian Thought)—a liberal bourgeois monthly published in Moscow from 1880 to 1918. Prior to 1900 it was of a liberal Narodnik trend. In the 1890s Marxists sometimes wrote in it. After the 1905 revolution it became the organ of the Right wing of the Cadet Party and was edited by Pyotr Struve. It propagated nationalism and religion and defended landed property. p 576

- <sup>320</sup> This refers to the Congress of the Austrian Social Democratic Party held in Brunn (Austria) from September 24 to 29, 1899. The national question was the chief item on the agenda. Two resolutions expressing different points of view were submitted to the Congress: (1) the resolution of the Party's Central Committee supporting the idea of the territorial autonomy of nations, and (2) the resolution of the Committee of the South Slav Social Democratic Party supporting the idea of extra-territorial cultural-national autonomy.

The Congress unanimously rejected the programme of cultural-national autonomy and adopted a compromise resolution recognising national autonomy within the boundaries of the Austrian state. p 578

- <sup>321</sup> *Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of the feudalist landowners which took shape in May 1906 and existed until October 1917. Its main object was to protect the autocratic system of the landed estates and the privileges of the nobility. p 584

- <sup>322</sup> On June 3 (16) 1907, the tsar issued a manifesto dissolving the Second Duma and modifying the electoral law. The new law considerably increased the representation of the landowners and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the Duma, and made great cuts in the number of peasants' p 584

and workers' representatives, which was already small enough. This was a gross violation of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, and the Fundamental Law of 1906 by which no laws could be passed by the government without the approval of the Duma. The Third Duma, which was elected on the basis of this law and met on November 1 (14), 1907, was a Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma.

p. 584

- <sup>323</sup> *Progressists*—a political group of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, which, during the elections to the Duma and within the Duma, attempted to unite elements of the various bourgeois-landowner parties and groups under the flag of "non-partisanship".

In November 1912 the Progressists formed an independent political party.

During the First World War the Progressists became more active and demanded a change of military leadership, the gearing of industry to the needs of the front, and a "responsible Ministry" with the participation of representatives of the Russian bourgeoisie. After the February bourgeois-democratic revolution some of the party's leaders became members of the bourgeois Provisional Government. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Progressist Party waged an active struggle against the Soviet government.

p. 584

- <sup>324</sup> *Rech* (Speech)—a daily published in St. Petersburg from February 23 (March 8), 1906, as the Central Organ of the Cadet Party. It was closed down on October 26 (November 8), 1917, by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.

p. 584

- <sup>325</sup> *Shlyakhi* (Paths)—the organ of the Ukrainian Students' Union (nationalistic trend), published in Lvov from April 1913 to March 1914.

p. 585

- <sup>326</sup> *Novoye Vremya* (New Times)—a daily published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to 1917. It was moderately liberal at the outset, but, after 1876, when it was published by A. S. Suvorin, it became the organ of reactionary circles of the nobility and the bureaucracy. After 1905 it became a mouthpiece of the Black Hundreds.

p. 587

- <sup>327</sup> *Zemshchina*—a Black-Hundred daily published in St. Petersburg from June 1909 to February 1917. Organ of the extreme Right-wing deputies of the Duma.

p. 587

- <sup>328</sup> Lenin is quoting from Gleb Uspensky's "Sentry Box" an expression signifying police arbitrariness.

p. 587

- <sup>329</sup> *Kievskaya Mysl* (Kiev Thought)—a bourgeois-democratic daily published in Kiev from 1906 to 1918.

p. 588

- <sup>330</sup> Lenin is quoting from Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*.

p. 590

- <sup>331</sup> *Naprzód* (Forward)—Central Organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia published in Cracow from 1892 onwards. It was a vehicle of petty-bourgeois nationalist ideas.

p. 592

- <sup>332</sup> Lenin is referring to the Polish national liberation rising of 1863-64 against the yoke of the tsarist autocracy. At first the rising was led by a Central National Committee formed by the petty-nobles' party of the "Reds" in

1862. Its programme demanding national independence for Poland, equal rights for all men in the country, irrespective of religion or birth, transfer to the peasants of the land tilled by them with full right of ownership and without redemption payments, abolition of the corvée, compensation of landowners for the alienated lands out of the state funds, etc., attracted to the rising diverse sections of the Polish population—artisans, workers, students, intellectuals from the gentry, part of the peasantry and the clergy.

In the course of the rising, Clements united around the party of the "Whites" (the party of the big landed aristocracy and the big bourgeoisie) joined it with the intention of using it in their own interests and, with the help of Britain and France, securing a profitable deal with the tsarist government.

The attitude of the revolutionary democrats of Russia towards the rebels was one of deep sympathy.

Owing to the inconsistency of the party of the "Reds", which failed to hold the revolutionary initiative, the leadership of the rising passed into the hands of the "Whites", who betrayed it. By the summer of 1864, the rising was brutally crushed by the tsarist troops.

Marx and Engels, who regarded the Polish rising of 1863-64 as a progressive movement, were fully in sympathy with it and wished the Polish people victory in its struggle for national liberation. On behalf of the German emigrant colony in London, Marx wrote an appeal for aid to the Poles. p. 599

<sup>331</sup> Lenin is referring to Wilhelm Liebknecht's reminiscences of Marx. p. 600

<sup>334</sup> *The Times*—a daily founded in 1785 in London; one of the most important conservative newspapers published by the British bourgeoisie p. 602

<sup>335</sup> *Fenianism*—a movement of Irish petty-bourgeois revolutionaries which developed in the late 1850s. The programme and activities of the Fenians were a reflection of the popular protest in Ireland against English colonial oppression. The Fenians demanded national independence for their country, the establishment of a democratic republic and the conversion of the tenant farmers into owners of the land they tilled. The conspiratorial plotting of the Fenians, however, prevented them from strengthening contacts with broad sections of the Irish people; nor were they connected with the general democratic and working-class movement of Great Britain. The revolt raised by the Fenians in February and March 1867 suffered a defeat. After the revolt the Fenians confined themselves to acts of terrorism and in the seventies their movement collapsed. p. 602

<sup>336</sup> *The New York Daily Tribune*—an American newspaper, published from 1841 to 1924. Until the middle fifties it was the organ of the Left wing of the American Whigs, and thereafter the organ of the Republican Party. Karl Marx contributed to the paper from August 1851 to March 1862 and at his request Frederick Engels wrote numerous articles for it. p. 604

<sup>337</sup> Lenin is quoting from G. V. Plekhanov's article "The Draft Programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Party" published in *Zarya* No. 4, 1902 p. 607

<sup>338</sup> The conferences referred to were: the *Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* ("Second All-Russia"), held in Kotka, Finland, from July 21 to July 23 (August 3-5), 1907, and the *Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* ("Third All-Russia"), held in Helsingfors from November 5 to November 12 (November 18-25), 1907. p. 610

- <sup>339</sup> Lenin is referring to the decisions of the plenum of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. (known as the "Unity" plenum), which was held in Paris from January 2 to 23 (January 15-February 5), 1910.

The plenum was attended by representatives of all factions and factional groups and of Social-Democratic organisations of the different nationalities in Russia. The conciliators were in the majority. Lenin waged a stubborn struggle against the liquidators, the *Uperyod* group, the Trotskyists and the conciliators, and tried to bring about a rapprochement between the Bolsheviks and pro-Party Mensheviks. On Lenin's insistence, the plenum adopted a resolution, "On the State of Affairs in the Party", which condemned liquidationism and otzovism, and pointed to the danger of these trends and the need for struggle against them. It also raised the question of the need to establish real unity in the Party in connection with the Party's ideological and political tasks at the given historical moment. As to the plenum's conciliatory decisions, they were sharply condemned by Lenin.

p. 610

- <sup>340</sup> A quotation from Saltykov-Shchedrin's essay "Abroad". p. 611

- <sup>341</sup> Lenin quotes from *Sketches of Seminary Life* by the Russian writer Pomyalovsky, who gave a true picture of the stern conditions, corporal punishment and brutal customs prevalent in the theological schools of tsarist Russia.

p. 611

- <sup>342</sup> *Dzvin* (The Bell)—a monthly legal Menshevik nationalistic journal published in the Ukrainian language in Kiev from January 1913 to the middle of 1914. A total of eighteen issues appeared.

p. 612

- <sup>343</sup> The liquidators' conference was held in Vienna in August 1912. The anti-Party August Bloc organised by Trotsky was formally established at this conference. The conference was attended by representatives of the Bund, the Caucasian Regional Committee, the Social-Democrats of the Lettish Region, the groups of liquidators, Trotskyists and otzovists resident abroad and some of the liquidators' groups in Russia. The overwhelming majority of delegates represented emigrant groups and were out of touch with the working class in Russia and not connected directly with local Party work.

The conference adopted anti-Party liquidationist decisions on all questions of Social-Democratic tactics and declared against the existence of an illegal Party. The adopted platform was patently opportunist.

The main task of the conference was the formation of the anti-Bolshevik bloc, but it consisted of ill-assorted elements and began to fall apart at the conference itself.

p. 612

- <sup>344</sup> Lenin quotes the words of a Sevastopol soldiers' song about an action at the river Chornaya on August 4, 1855, during the Crimean War. The song was written by Lev Tolstoy.

p. 613

- <sup>345</sup> The "*Popular Socialist*" Party—a petty-bourgeois party formed in 1906 from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The Popular Socialists advocated the formation of a bloc with the Cadets. Lenin stressed that this party "differs very little from the Cadets, for it deletes from its programme both republicanism and the demand for all the land" (*Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 228).

p. 615

- <sup>346</sup> The manifesto *The War and Russian Social-Democracy* was the first official document of the R.S.D.L.P. Central Committee setting forth the attitude of the Bolshevik Party towards the imperialist world war that had recently begun. It was widely circulated in Russia and abroad. It was sent as an

official document to the International Socialist Bureau (the executive organ of the Second International) and to a number of socialist newspapers in England, Germany, France, Sweden and Switzerland. On Lenin's instructions it was also sent to the conference of socialists of neutral countries.

The Party's most important propositions and slogans proclaimed in the manifesto found expression in Bolshevik leaflets printed in many big industrial centres of Russia.

p. 618

- 347 When the war broke out the Bolshevik deputies to the Fourth Duma, A. Y. Badayev, M. K. Muranov, G. I. Petrovsky, F. N. Sanilov and N. P. Shagov, resolutely came forward in defence of the working-class interests. In pursuance of the Party policy, they refused to vote for the war credits, exposed the imperialist, anti-popular character of the war, explained to the workers the truth about the war, and stirred them to action against tsarism, the bourgeoisie and the landowners. For their revolutionary activities during the war the Bolshevik deputies were brought to trial and exiled to Siberia.

p. 621

- 348 Soon after the beginning of the war the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolshevik Party issued a leaflet calling upon the workers and soldiers to organise for the struggle against the war and the autocracy under the slogans "Down with the autocratic monarchy!", "Long live socialism!" and "Long live the democratic republic!" In August the St. Petersburg Committee issued another illegal anti-war leaflet calling upon the workers and soldiers to organise and arm themselves.

p. 621

- 1 The *Stuttgart International Socialist Congress* (Seventh Congress of the Second International) was held on August 18-24, 1907. It was attended by 886 delegates representing socialist parties and trade unions.

The Congress discussed the following questions: (1) militarism and international conflicts; (2) relations between political parties and trade unions; (3) the colonial question; (4) the immigration and emigration of workers; (5) women's franchise.

During the Congress Lenin did a great deal of work to unite the Left forces in international Social-Democracy, and waged a resolute struggle against the opportunists and revisionists.

Lenin worked on the committee which drafted a resolution on "Militarism and International Conflicts", the main question on the agenda. Supported by the Polish Social-Democratic delegates, Lenin introduced important amendments into August Bebel's draft resolution and thus succeeded in radically amending it in the spirit of revolutionary Marxism.

The adoption of the resolution on "Militarism and International Conflicts" signified a great victory of the revolutionary over the opportunist wing in the international working-class movement.

The *Copenhagen International Socialist Congress* (the Eighth Congress of the Second International) was held from August 28 to September 3, 1910. It was attended by 896 delegates.

During the Congress Lenin organised a conference of the Left Social-Democratic delegates with the aim of uniting the revolutionary Marxists of the world.

The Congress resolution on the struggle against the war, "The Courts of Arbitration and Disarmament", confirmed the resolution of the Stuttgart Congress (1907) on "Militarism and International Conflicts", which included the amendments introduced by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg on the duty of the socialists of all countries to use the economic and political crises created by the war to overthrow the bourgeoisie. In addition, the resolution of the Copenhagen Congress made it binding on the socialist parties and their parliamentary deputies to demand from their govern-

ments a reduction in armaments, the settlement of conflicts between states by courts of arbitration, etc., and called upon the workers of all countries to protest against the threat of war.

*The Basle Congress of the Second International* (November 24-25, 1912) was convened as an extraordinary congress to decide the question of struggle against the imminent danger of an imperialist world war, which increased still more after the outbreak of the First Balkan War. The Congress was attended by 555 delegates. A mammoth anti-war demonstration and an international meeting of protest against the war took place on the opening day of the Congress.

On November 25 the Congress unanimously adopted a Manifesto on War, which warned the peoples of the menace of the impending world war. It exposed the predatory aims of the war which was being prepared by the imperialists and urged the workers of all countries to fight vigorously for peace, and "to counterpose the might of the international solidarity of the proletariat to capitalist imperialism". The Manifesto recommended that in the event of war the socialists should use the resulting economic and political crises to fight for a socialist revolution.

Kautsky, Vandervelde and other leaders of the Second International voted for the Manifesto, but on the outbreak of war they buried it in oblivion together with the other anti-war decisions of the international socialist congresses, and sided with their imperialist governments

p. 623

<sup>350</sup> The quotation is from Chernyshevsky's novel *The Prologue* p. 626

<sup>351</sup> F. Engels, "Flüchtlingsliteratur I. Eine polnische Proklamation" (Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969, S. 527). p. 627

<sup>352</sup> See Marx and Engels, To the Editorial Board of the *Sotsial-Demokrat*, February 23, 1865 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 166). p. 627

<sup>353</sup> *Sotsial-Demokrat*—Central Organ of the R.S.D.I.P. published illegally from February 1908 to January 1917. Altogether fifty-eight issues appeared, five of them with supplements.

Over eighty articles and items by Lenin were published in the newspaper.

During the grim years of reaction and the period of new upswing in the revolutionary movement, *Sotsial-Demokrat* was a factor of tremendous importance in the Bolsheviks' struggle against the liquidators, Trotskyists and otzovists for the preservation of the illegal Marxist party, and the strengthening of its unity and contacts with the masses.

During the First World War *Sotsial-Demokrat* was the Central Organ of the Bolshevik Party, in which capacity it played a vital part in spreading Bolshevik slogans on the issues of war, peace and revolution.

p. 629

<sup>354</sup> The conference of the R.S.D.I.P. groups abroad was held in Berne from February 14 to 19 (February 27 to March 4), 1915. It was convened on Lenin's initiative and had the significance of a general Party conference p. 629

<sup>355</sup> The book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* was written between January and June 1916. Lenin began to study the world literature on imperialism while still in Berne, in 1915. Early in February 1916, he left Berne for Zurich, where he continued his work on the book in the Zurich Cantonal Library. The excerpts summaries, notes and tables that Lenin



copied out from hundreds of foreign books, journals newspapers and statistical compilations amount to some 50 printed sheets

On June 19 (July 2), 1916, Lenin finished the book and sent the manuscript to *Parus* Publishers. The Menshevik elements among the publishing house management deleted from the book parts sharply criticising the opportunist theories of Kautsky and the Russian Mensheviks (Martov and others) and made corrections in the text which distorted not only Lenin's original style but also his ideas. Thus, Lenin's term "growing over" (of capitalism into imperialism) was altered to "transformation" *reactionary nature* (of the theory of ultra-imperialism) to 'backward character', etc.

In mid 1917 the book was published under the title *Imperialism the Latest Stage of Capitalism (A Popular Outline)* with a preface by Lenin dated April 26 1917.

The present edition is printed according to Volume 27 of V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (fifth Russian edition), prepared by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C. CPSU. The text corresponds to the manuscript p 631

- <sup>356</sup> This preface was first published under the title *Imperialism and Capitalism* in *Communist International* No 15 dated October 1921. In Lenin's lifetime separate editions of *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism* appeared in German in 1921 and in French and English (abridged) in 1923.

p 630

- <sup>357</sup> The *Treaty of Brest-Litovsk* between Soviet Russia and the countries of the German bloc (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) was signed on March 3 1918 and ratified by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on March 15. The terms of the treaty were extremely onerous for Soviet Russia. After the November 1918 revolution in Germany overthrew the monarchy the predatory unjust Brest-Litovsk was annulled by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on November 13.

p 638

- <sup>358</sup> The *Peace Treaty of Versailles*, which concluded the First World War (1914-18) was signed on June 28 1919 by the U.S.A., the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and other Allied Powers on the one hand and Germany on the other.

The treaty consolidated the repartition of the capitalist world in favour of the victors and established a system of relationships between countries which was aimed at strangling Soviet Russia and suppressing the world revolutionary movement.

p 638

- <sup>359</sup> *Wilsonism* - a term derived from the name of Woodrow Wilson, U.S. President (1913-21). During his presidency the U.S.A. entered the imperialist world war. Wilson and his supporters camouflaged U.S. imperialist policy with hypocritical demagogic slogans and phrases on 'democracy' and 'the concert of nations'.

From the very inception of Soviet power Wilson was one of the main pillars and organisers of the armed intervention against Soviet Russia. To counteract the influence the Soviet Government's peace policy exerted on the peoples of all countries Wilson put forward his demagogic 14-point peace programme intended to disguise U.S. aggressive policy. A false halo of a peace champion was created around Wilson by American propaganda and the European bourgeois press. However the hypocrisy of the petty bourgeois phrases used by Wilson and his supporters was soon exposed by the reactionary anti-labour home policy and aggressive foreign policy pursued by the Wilson Administration.

p 638

<sup>360</sup> Lenin has in mind the conference which was convened in Berne in February 1919 by the leaders of the West-European socialist parties with the aim of restoring the Second International. p. 639

<sup>361</sup> The *Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany*—a Centrist party set up at an inaugural congress at Gotha in April 1917. The Independents advocated “unity” with the social-chauvinists and went as far as rejection of the class struggle.

In October 1920, a split took place at the I.S.D.P.G. Congress in Halle. In December 1920 a considerable part of the Independents merged with the Communist Party of Germany. The Right-wing elements formed a separate party and took the old name of I.S.D.P.G., which existed until 1922. p. 639

<sup>362</sup> The *Spartacists*—members of a revolutionary organisation of German Left-wing Social-Democrats formed at the beginning of the imperialist world war by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and others. The Spartacists conducted revolutionary propaganda among the masses, organised massive anti-war action, led strikes, and exposed the imperialist nature of the world war and the treachery of the opportunist Social-Democratic leaders

In April 1917, the Spartacists joined the Centrist Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, but remained organisationally independent. During the revolution in Germany in November 1918, they formed the Spartacus League, issued their own programme (December 14) and broke with the Independents. At the inaugural congress held from December 30 1918, to January 1, 1919, they founded the Communist Party of Germany p. 639

<sup>363</sup> The “*Versaillais*”—rabid enemies of the Paris Commune of 1871, supporters of the Thiers counter-revolutionary government, which established itself in Versailles after the victory of the Commune. When the Paris Commune was defeated, the Versaillais treated the Communards with unheard-of brutality. After 1871, the word “Versaillais” became synonymous with brutal counter-revolution. p. 640

<sup>364</sup> Lenin is referring to the resolution on imperialism and the attitude of the socialists to war, adopted by the Chemnitz Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party on September 20, 1912. The resolution condemned the imperialist policy and emphasised the importance of the struggle for peace. p. 641

<sup>365</sup> In the present edition, the author’s references and notes are given as footnotes. p. 641

<sup>366</sup> Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1971, p. 606. p. 658

<sup>367</sup> The Stock Exchange crash in question occurred in the first half of 1873, at first in Austria-Hungary, and then in Germany and other countries. In the early 1870s, credit expansion, company promotion and Stock Exchange speculation continued to grow when industry and trade already felt the clear symptoms of the developing world economic crisis. The catastrophe broke out on the Vienna Stock Exchange on May 9, 1873. Within twenty-four hours shares fell by hundreds of millions. The number of bankrupts was enormous. Then the Stock Exchange crash spread to Germany. p. 660

<sup>368</sup> The *company promotion scandals* occurred during the widespread establishment of joint-stock companies in Germany in the early 1870s. The pro-

motion of companies was accompanied by wild speculation in real estate and securities, and by all manner of fraudulent operations by money-making bourgeois businessmen. p. 660

369 Lenin is referring to G. V. Plekhanov. p. 668

370 *French Panama*—an expression widely used after the exposure in France in 1892-93 of incredible abuses and corruption among state-men, politicians, officials and newspapers bribed by the French Panama Canal company. p. 676

371 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1971, p. 120. p. 719

372 Lenin has in mind the so-called Final Protocol of September 7, 1901, signed by the imperialist powers (Britain, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, the U.S.A.) and China as a result of the crushing of the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1901. Foreign capital obtained new opportunities for exploiting and plundering China. p. 723

373 The *Boxer* (more precisely I Ho T'uan) *Rebellion*—a popular anti-imperialist uprising in China in 1899-1901 organised by the I Ho Ch'uan (Righteous Harmony Fists) society, which later became known as I Ho T'uan (Righteous Harmony Bands). It was ruthlessly crushed by an expeditionary corps of the imperialist powers under the command of the German General Waldersee, with the German, Japanese, British, American and Russian imperialists taking part. China was forced to sign the Final Protocol which turned her into a semi-colony of foreign imperialism. p. 724

374 The "*Fashoda incident*" took place during the struggle between Britain and France for domination over the Nile valley. In 1898 France made an attempt to seize Fashoda (a village in Eastern Sudan, on the White Nile), but was compelled to abandon it under pressure from Britain. This incident brought Britain and France within a hair's breadth of war. p. 724

375 This article was directed against the un-Marxist and anti-Bolshevik attitude of the Bukharin-Pyatakov-Bosh group which began to take shape in the spring of 1915, when preparations were being made for publication of the journal *Kommunist*. Lenin's differences with the group were accentuated after the appearance of No. 12 of *Kommunist* in September 1915. Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh, who had left Baugy for Stockholm in the summer of 1915, united on the basis of the theses "On the Self-Determination Slogan". In these theses, which they sent to *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh opposed Lenin's theory of socialist revolution, denied the necessity of the struggle for democracy in the imperialist era and insisted on the Party withdrawing its demand for national self-determination.

Pyatakov and Bosh insisted on the Central Committee Bureau at once recognising them as a separate group not accountable to it and authorised to maintain independent contacts with Central Committee members in Russia and publish leaflets and other literature. Though this demand was turned down, the group attempted to establish contact with the Central Committee Bureau in Russia. Lenin sharply criticised the group's view and anti-Party, factional actions. On his proposal, joint publication of *Kommunist* by the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors and the group was discontinued.

"The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism" was written when the *Sotsial-Demokrat* editors had received Bukharin's comments on the theses

"The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination". The article was not published at the time. p. 732

<sup>376</sup> Reference is to the article "Who Will Accomplish the Political Revolution?" The author, A. A. Sanin, an Economist, was opposed to an independent working-class political party and denied the need for political revolution, believing that Russia's socialist transformation, which he considered the immediate task, could be accomplished through a general strike. p. 732

<sup>377</sup> Reference is to the Conference of R.S.D.L.P. groups abroad p. 732

<sup>378</sup> Reference is to Bukharin's theses "On the Self-Determination Slogan", written in November 1915 and submitted to the editors of *Sotsial-Demokrat* over the signatures of Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh. p. 732

<sup>379</sup> This refers to the draft programme of the Dutch Left compiled by Henriette Roland-Holst. p. 732

<sup>380</sup> *Urbote* (Herald)—theoretical organ of the Zimmerwald Left, published in German in Berne in 1916. Two issues appeared. The official publishers were Henriette Roland-Holst and Anton Pannekoek.

Lenin took an active part in founding the journal and, after the appearance of its first issue, in organising a French edition to reach a wider readership. A keen discussion was conducted on its pages by Left Zimmerwaldists on the right of nations to self-determination and the "disarmament" slogan. p. 733

<sup>381</sup> See Note 388. p. 733

<sup>382</sup> Lenin refers to the meeting of the extended International Socialist Committee held in Berne on February 5-9, 1916. It was attended by 22 representatives of internationalists of a number of countries. The composition of the meeting was indicative of the changed alignment of forces in favour of the Left, though most of the delegates, as at the Zimmerwald Conference, were Centrists.

The meeting adopted an appeal, "To All Affiliated Parties and Groups", in which were included, as a result of pressure from the Bolsheviks and the Left Social-Democrats, amendments in line with the Zimmerwald Left policy. However, the appeal was inconsistent, since it did not call for a break with social-chauvinism and opportunism. Not all of Lenin's amendments were adopted. The representatives of the Zimmerwald Left declared that though they did not consider the appeal satisfactory in all its points, they would vote for it as a step forward compared with the decisions of the First International Socialist Conference in Zimmerwald.

The meeting discussed the "Draft Decision on the Convocation of the Second Socialist Conference", adopted a number of its points and fixed the date of the convocation. Soon after, Lenin sent a report on this meeting to the Bolshevik groups abroad, instructing them to begin preparation for the Second International Socialist Conference at once. p. 733

<sup>383</sup> Lenin is here referring to the programme of the French Workers' Party adopted in 1880 and to the programmes of the German Social-Democratic Party adopted in Gotha in 1875 and in Erfurt in 1891. p. 735

<sup>384</sup> This article (in a letter Lenin calls it "Entwaffnung"—"On Disarmament") was written in German and meant for publication in the Swiss, Swedish

and Norwegian Left Social-Democratic press. However, it was not published at the time. Shortly afterwards Lenin re-edited it somewhat for publication in Russian.

The original, German text appeared in *Jugend-Internationale*, organ of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations, Nos. 9 and 10, September and October 1917, under the heading "Das Militarprogramm der proletarischen Revolution" p. 740

<sup>185</sup> *Jugend-Internationale* (The Youth International)—organ of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations which was associated with the Zimmerwald Left. It was published from September 1915 to May 1918 in Zurich. p. 740

<sup>186</sup> The reference is to Robert Grimm's theses on the war question published in the *Grütlianner* Nos. 162 and 164, July and 17, 1916. p. 740

<sup>187</sup> *Neues Leben* (New Life)—a monthly journal of the Swiss Social Democratic Party published in Berne from January 1915 to December 1917. It expressed the views of the Zimmerwald Right and early in 1917 took up a social-chauvinist position. p. 740

<sup>188</sup> Lenin is referring to the international socialist conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal.

The first *Zimmerwald Conference* met on September 8, 1915, and was attended by 38 delegates from eleven European countries. Lenin headed the RSDLP Central Committee delegation.

The Conference adopted the Manifesto To the European Proletariat in which, at the insistence of Lenin and the Left Social Democrats, several basic propositions of revolutionary Marxism were included. It also adopted a joint declaration by the German and French delegation, a statement of sympathy with war victims and fighters persecuted for their political activities, and elected the International Socialist Committee (ISC).

The Zimmerwald Left group was formed at this Conference. It included representatives of the RSDLP Central Committee headed by Lenin, the Regional Executive of the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, the Swedish Left (Karl Zeth Hogland), the Norwegian Left (Lure Nerman), the Swiss Left (Lutz Platten), and the International Socialists of Germany group (Julius Borchardt). The Zimmerwald Left waged an active struggle against the Centrist majority at the Conference. But it was only the Bolsheviks among the Left who advocated a fully consistent policy.

The second *International Conference* was held at Kienthal, a village near Berne, between April 24 and 30, 1916. It was attended by 43 delegates from 10 countries. The RSDLP Central Committee was represented by Lenin and two other delegates.

The Conference discussed the following questions:

(1) the struggle to end the war, (2) attitude of the proletariat on the peace issue, (3) agitation and propaganda, (4) parliamentary activity, (5) mass struggle, (6) convocation of the International Socialist Bureau.

Led by Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left was much stronger at Kienthal than at the earlier, Zimmerwald Conference. At Kienthal it united 17 delegates and some of its proposals obtained as many as 20 votes or nearly half of the total. This was indicative of how the relation of forces in the world labour movement had changed in favour of internationalism.

The Conference adopted a Manifesto To the Peoples Suffering Ruination and Death and a resolution criticising pacifism and the International Socialist Bureau. Lenin regarded the Conference decisions as a further step in uniting the internationalist forces against the imperialist war.

The Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences helped to unite the Left elements in the West-European Social-Democratic movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Subsequently these Left elements took an active part in founding communist parties in their countries and in organising the Third, Communist International. p. 745

- 389 *The Social-Democratic Labour Group (Arbeitsgemeinschaft)*—an organisation of German Centrists founded in March 1916 by Reichstag members who had broken with the Social-Democratic Reichstag group. It had the support of the majority of the Berlin organisation and became the backbone of the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, founded in April 1917. The new party sought to justify avowed social-chauvinists and advocated preservation of unity with them. p. 746

- 390 The *war industries committees* were established in Russia in May 1915 by the imperialist bourgeoisie to help the tsarist government in the prosecution of the war. The Central War Industry Committee was headed by one of Russia's biggest capitalists, Guchkov, leader of the Octobrists. In an attempt to bring the workers under their influence and foster chauvinist sentiments, the bourgeoisie decided to organise "workers' groups" in these committees, thereby creating the impression that a "class peace" had been achieved in Russia between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The Bolsheviks declared a boycott of the committees and successfully carried it out with the support of the majority of workers.

As a result of Bolshevik propaganda, elections to the "workers' groups" were held only in 70 out of a total of 239 regional and local committees, and workers' representatives were elected only in 36 of them. p. 746

- 391 *The Basle Manifesto*—a manifesto on the war issue—was adopted at the extraordinary International Socialist Congress held in Basle on November 24-25, 1912 (see Note 349). p. 746

- 392 *La Sentinelle*—a newspaper, organ of the Social-Democratic organisation of Neuchâtel Canton (Switzerland), published at La Chaux-de-Fonds from 1890 to 1906 and resumed in 1910. During the First World War it followed an internationalist policy. p. 749

- 393 *Volksrecht* (People's Right)—a daily paper, organ of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party founded in Zurich in 1898. During the First World War it published articles by Left Zimmerwaldists. p. 749

- 394 *Berner Tagwacht* (Berne Guardian)—a Social-Democratic newspaper founded in Berne in 1893. It published articles by Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring and other Social-Democrats in the early days of the First World War. In 1917 it came out in open support of the social-chauvinists. p. 749

- 395 The *Aarau Congress* of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party met on November 20-21, 1915. The central issue was the party's attitude towards the Zimmerwald internationalist group, and the struggle developed between the three following trends: (1) anti-Zimmerwaldists, (2) supporters of the Zimmerwald Right, and (3) supporters of the Zimmerwald Left.

Robert Grimm tabled a resolution urging the party to affiliate with the Zimmerwald group and endorse the political programme of the Zimmerwald Right. The Left forces, in an amendment moved by the Lausanne branch, called for mass revolutionary struggle against the war, declaring that only a victorious proletarian revolution could put an end to the imperialist war. Under Grimm's pressure, the amendment was withdrawn, but it was again proposed by M. M. Kharitonov, a Bolshevik with the right to vote delegated by one of the party's branches. Out of tactical considerations Grimm and his supporters were obliged to approve the amendment and it was carried by 258 votes to 141. p. 749

## NAME INDEX

### A

*Abramov Yakov Vasilyevich* (1858-1906)—Narodnik writer author of articles on social and economic questions—75 85 86

*Abramson (Portnoi Kusyel)* (1872-1941)—one of the leaders of the Bund, a Jewish nationalist organisation At the Second Congress of the RSDLP (1903) adopted an anti *Iskra* stand In the following years, until 1939 was Chairman of the Central Committee of the Bund in Poland—253, 310

*Adamovich (Vorovsky V'ac'iv)* (1871-1923) prominent functionary of the Bolshevik Party literary critic In 1901 published an article criticising Struve and Bernstein from the revolutionary standpoint—225

*Aesop* (6th-5th cent. B.C.)—Greek author of fables—102

*Aigald I*—German petty bourgeois economist, official in the Russian-Chinese Bank—670 671, 677 715

*Agunaldo Emilio* (b. 1869)—Philippine politician In 1896 took part in the Philippine people's revolt against the Spanish rule After the assassination of its leader A Bonifacio, which he organised in 1897, took over the leadership of the movement In 1899 became President of the newly established Philippine Republic Subsequently led the Philippine people in their struggle against the American

conquerors who replaced the Spanish colonialists 717

*Altenstadt Isai Lvovich (Yadin)* (1867-1937) a leader of the Bund At the Second Congress of the RSDLP adopted an anti *Iskra* stand After the Congress was an active Menshevik 256

*Akimov (Makhnovets Vladimir Petrovich)* (1872-1921)—Social Democrat spokesman of Economism, extreme opportunist At the Second Congress of the RSDLP opposed *Iskra* and after the Congress joined the extreme Right wing of the Mensheviks—248 249 250, 251 252 255 256 265 268, 270 280 281, 287, 288, 292 293, 296, 299 300 302 307, 310 312 313 314 316 317 318 322 323 324, 325 326 329 336 337 338 340 343 343 347 350 351, 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 368 371 381, 386 388 389 391 392 397 399 400 403 404 408 412 427 466 509

*Alexander II* (1818-1881)—Russian Emperor (1855-81)—416 547

*Alexandrov*—author of *Organizational Questions* (Letter to the Editors) published as a supplement to *Iskra* No. 56 January 1 1904—389, 391, 395

*Alexandrov*—see *Stem*

*Alexeyev Pyotr Alexeyevich* (1840-1891)—prominent revolutionary of the 1870s, a weaver carried on revolutionary propaganda among the workers was arrested and in court made his famous speech which he concluded by predicting

the inevitable fall of the tsarist autocracy.—39, 288

*A. M.*—see *Martynov, A.*

*Arakcheyev, Alexei Andreyevich* (1769-1834)—favourite of Russian Emperors Paul I and Alexander I; established a regime of police despotism in Russia.—313, 543

*Aristophanes* (c. 446-385 B.C.)—Greek playwright, author of comedies, political satires.—681

*Armstrong*—representative of the British arms manufacturing firm Armstrong, Whitworth & Co.—682

*Arnim-Suckow, Heinrich Alexander, Baron* (1798-1861)—Prussian diplomat, advocated Prussian monarchy's supremacy in Germany. From March to June 1848 was Foreign Minister in the Camphausen Government.—522

*Auer, Ignaz* (1846-1907)—German worker, harness-maker; prominent in the German Social-Democratic movement.—194

*Aveling, Eleanor* (1855-1898)—Marx's youngest daughter; wife of the English socialist Edward Aveling; took part in the English and international working-class movement.—19

*Axelrod, Pavel Borisovich* (1850-1928)—Social-Democrat; took part in founding the Emancipation of Labour group, the first Russian Marxist organisation. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. represented the *Iskra* minority, becoming a Menshevik after the Congress. In the years of reaction (1907-10) was a liquidator leader. During the First World War adopted a Centrist stand.—109, 125, 142, 150, 162, 243, 254, 271, 272, 277, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290, 292, 293, 294, 296, 297, 300, 301, 308, 312, 314, 332, 335, 346, 352, 356, 357, 358, 364, 369, 370, 373, 374, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 393, 394, 396, 397, 399, 400, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 409, 715

## B

*Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich* (1814-1876)—Russian revolutionary and ideologist of anarchism,

an active participant in the 1848-49 Revolution in Germany; member of the First International, where he carried on splitting activities directed against Marx and Engels with a view to taking over the leadership of the international working-class movement. Was expelled from the International in 1872.—18, 50, 488, 512, 544, 545

*Ballhorn, Johann*—German 16th-century printer.—143

*Baur, Bruno* (1809-1882)—German idealist philosopher, a prominent Young Hegelian, bourgeois radical; wrote several works on the history of early Christianity. After 1866 became a National-Liberal and follower of Bismarck.—16

*Baur, Otto* (1882-1938)—a leader of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party and the Second International; an ideologist of opportunism, author of the "national-cultural autonomy" theory. In 1918-19 was Foreign Minister of the Austrian Republic, took part in suppressing the revolutionary actions of the Austrian workers.—569, 570, 638

*Bayr*—owner of a large chemical factory in Elberfeld (Germany).—649

*Bazarov (Rudnev), Vladimir Alexandrovich* (1874-1939)—economist, writer and philosopher, translator of works by Marx and Engels into Russian; took part in the Social-Democratic movement. In the years of reaction (1907-10) departed from the Bolsheviks; was one of the leading champions of Machism.—51, 379

*Bebel, August* (1840-1913)—founder and a prominent leader of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International; a turner by trade. Actively opposed revisionism and reformism in the German working class movement.—101, 143, 185, 194, 225, 308, 360, 376, 465, 466

*Beer, Max* (1864-1943)—German historian of socialism.—692

*Belinsky, Vissarion Grigoryevich* (1811-1848)—outstanding Russian revolutionary democrat, literary



- critic, publicist and materialist philosopher.—110
- Belov (Tseitlin, L. S.)* (b. 1877)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. took a Centrist stand, joining the Mensheviks after the Congress. In 1907 withdrew from political activities.—258, 265, 417, 418, 420
- Beltov*—see *Plekhanov, Georgi Valentinovich*
- Benningson, E. P., Count* (b. 1875)—landowner; Octobrist, member of the Third and Fourth Dumas.—565
- Bérard, Victor* (1864-1931)—French bourgeois economist and writer.—718
- Berdyaev, Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1874-1948)—reactionary idealist philosopher and mystic; supported "legal Marxism" but subsequently became an avowed enemy of Marxism. In 1905 joined the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party.—233
- Bernhard, Ludwig* (1875-1935)—German economist and writer.—616
- Bernstein, Eduard* (1850-1932)—leader of the extreme opportunist wing of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International, ideologist of reformism and revisionism.—54, 55, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 127, 128, 139, 40, 146, 179, 202, 228, 236, 238, 376, 387, 404, 474, 488, 490, 499, 500, 639
- Biron, Ernest Johann* (1690-1772)—favourite of the Russian Empress Anna Ioanovna; exercised great influence on Russia's home and foreign policies.—543
- Bismarck, Otto Eduard*, prince (1815-1898)—Prussian statesman, monarchist; Chancellor of the German Empire (1871-90) who forcefully effected the unification of Germany under Prussian hegemony.—17, 42, 516, 556, 601, 620, 627, 628
- Blanc, Louis* (1811-1882)—French petty-bourgeois socialist, historian; repudiated the irreconcilable nature of class contradictions under capitalism and opposed the proletarian revolution, seeking agreement with the bourgeoisie.—526
- Blanqui, Louis Auguste* (1805-1881)—outstanding French revolutionary and prominent representative of Utopian communism; headed a number of secret revolutionary societies, but failed to understand the decisive role of the organisation of the masses for the revolutionary struggle and sought to seize power with the aid of a small group of revolutionary conspirators. Marx, Engels and Lenin highly appreciated Blanqui's revolutionary work but at the same time criticised his mistakes and the fallacy of his conspiratorial tactics.—385, 387, 388, 478
- Boborykin, Pyotr Dmitriyevich* (1836-1921)—Russian writer. His novel *In Another Way*, depicting in a distorted form the struggle between the Narodniks and the Marxists, evoked a justified protest from the progressive public.—81
- Bobrinsky, Vladimir Alexeyevich* (b. 1868)—landowner and sugar manufacturer, a reactionary politician and monarchist who advocated the Russification of the border regions.—626, 627
- Bogdanov, A. (Malinovsky, Alexander Alexandrovich)* (1873-1928)—Social-Democrat, philosopher, economist and sociologist. After the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution was an otzovist leader. As a philosopher, tried to create his own system, "empiriomonism", which was actually a variety of subjective idealist philosophy.—51
- Bohm-Bawerk, Eugene* (1851-1914)—a representative of the so-called Austrian school of political economy who tried to oppose the spread of Marxist ideas by way of a subjective, idealist interpretation of economic laws.—52, 53
- Born, Stephan (Buttermilch, Simon)* (1824-1898)—German worker; type-setter, member of the Communist League. During the 1848-49 Revolution in Germany was one of the first representatives of reformism in the German working-class movement. After the

- revolution withdrew from the working-class movement.—524, 525, 526
- Braun (Stepanov, Sergei Ivanovich)** (1876-1935)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. represented the *Iskra* majority; after the Congress became an active member of the Bolshevik Party.—344
- Brentano, Lujo** (1844-1931)—German bourgeois economist, champion of "state socialism"; sought to prove that it was possible to achieve social equality within the framework of capitalism by means of reforms and reconciliation of the interests of capitalists and workers. Using Marxist phraseology, Brentano and his followers tried to subordinate the working-class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie.—166, 233, 510, 511
- Brouckère, Louis de** (1870-1951)—Belgian socialist. Prior to the First World War belonged to the Left wing of the Belgian Workers' Party. During the war adopted a social-chauvinist stand.—55
- Brouckère (Makhnovets, Lydia Petrovna)** (b. 1877)—participant in the Social-Democratic movement from the late 1890s, an Economist. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted an anti-*Iskra* stand and subsequently retired from politics.—248, 249, 251, 252, 259, 292, 294, 299, 300, 341, 342, 350, 351, 352, 353, 356, 368, 408, 416
- Brousse, Paul** (1844-1912)—French petty-bourgeois socialist, leader of the opportunist wing of the socialist Party of Possibilists.—55
- Buchner, Friedrich Karl Christian Ludwig** (1824-1899)—German bourgeois philosopher, a leading representative of vulgar materialism; physician.—21
- Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich** (1888-1938)—writer and economist, member of the R.S.D.L.P. from 1906. During the First World War adopted an anti-Leninist stand on the questions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the state, the right of nations to self-determination and others. In 1917 maintained that the socialist revolution could not be victorious in Russia. After the October Socialist Revolution was a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, editor of *Pravda* and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. He repeatedly came out against the Party's general line: in 1918 headed the anti-Party group of Left Communists; in 1920-21 supported Trotsky in the discussion on the trade unions; from 1928 was a leader of the Right deviation in the Party. In 1929 was removed from the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee. In 1937 was expelled from the Party for his anti-Party activities.—664
- Bulgakov, Sergei Nikolayevich** (1871-1944)—bourgeois economist and idealist philosopher, a "legal Marxist" in the 1890s. After the 1905-07 Revolution joined the Constitutional-Democrats. — 107, 233
- Bulkin (Semyonov), Fyodor Afanasyevich** (b. 1888)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. In the years of reaction (1907-10) and the new revolutionary upsurge which followed was a liquidator.—556
- Bulygin, Alexander Grigoryevich** (1851-1919)—big landowner, Minister of the Interior from 1905. From February 1905, on the tsar's instructions, directed the drafting of a bill to convene a consultative Duma so as to weaken the rising revolutionary movement in Russia. The Bulygin Duma was never convened; it was swept away by the 1905-07 Revolution.—429, 459, 462, 463, 464, 563
- Burtsev, Vladimir Lvovich** (1862-1936)—participant in the revolutionary movement of the 1880s; was close to the Narodnaya Volya group. Sided with the Socialist-Revolutionaries before the 1905-07 Revolution and supported the Constitutional-Democrats after the defeat of the revolution.

During the First World War adopted an extreme chauvinist stand.—625

*Buryanov, Andrei Faddeyevich* (b. 1880)—Menshevik; was a liquidator during the period of reaction (1907-10) and the revolutionary upsurge which followed; during the First World War leaned towards defencism.—558

*B-v (Savinkov, Boris Uiktorovich)* (1879-1925)—one of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Waged a struggle against the Soviet government. Organised a number of counter-revolutionary revolts and conspiracies—190, 191, 192, 199

## C

*Calwer, Richard* (1868-1927)—German economist, representative of reformism and revisionism in the German Social-Democratic Party.—705

*Camphausen, Ludolf* (1803-1890)—German banker, one of the leaders of the Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie; in March-June 1848 he headed the Prussian Council of Ministers.—519, 520, 521, 522

*Canitz, August* (1783-1852)—Prussian general, representative of the reactionary nobility and bureaucracy; War Minister in the Camphausen Government (May-June 1848).—522

*Carnegie, Andrew* (1835-1919)—American multimillionaire.—712

*Chamberlain, Joseph* (1836-1914)—British statesman; an ideologist and exponent of the colonial policy of British imperialism; Secretary of State for Colonies (1895-1903).—692

*Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich* (1828-1889)—Russian revolutionary democrat, Utopian socialist, materialist philosopher, writer and literary critic, leader of the revolutionary-democratic movement of the 1860s in Russia. He was arrested in 1862 and sentenced to seven years of hard labour in Siberia, from where he returned only in 1883.—110, 546, 547, 548, 599, 626

*Chkheidze, Nikolai Semyonovich* (1864-1926)—Georgian Social-Democrat, Menshevik, a social-chauvinist during the First World War.—558, 715, 746

*Chkhenkeli, Akaky Ivanovich* (b. 1874)—Georgian Social-Democrat, Menshevik—715

*Cromwell, Oliver* (1599-1658)—leader of the bourgeoisie and of the nobility that joined it during the English bourgeois revolution of the 17th century; Lord Protector of England, Scotland and Ireland from 1653.—603

*Cunow, Heinrich* (1862-1936)—German Right-wing Social-Democrat, historian and sociologist. First joined the Marxists but later became a revisionist and falsifier of Marxism.—703, 704

## D

*Dan (Gurvich), Fyodor Ilyuch* (1871-1947)—Russian Social-Democrat, a Menshevik leader. After the defeat of the 1905-07 Revolution he headed a group of liquidators abroad—553, 558, 559

*David, Eduard* (1863-1930)—one of the Right-wing leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party, a revisionist. During the First World War he adopted a social-chauvinist stand.—101, 693

*Dedov (Knipovich, Lydia Mikhailovna)* (1856-1920)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik. She began revolutionary activities in the 1870s carrying on extensive educational work among the workers and playing an important part in establishing contacts between *Iskra* and local Party organisations in Russia. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D. she represented the *Iskra* majority—416, 418

*Denikin, Anton Ivanovich* (1872-1947)—tsarist general, one of the leaders of the whiteguard movement during the Civil War. Following Kornilov's death he became Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces fighting against the Soviet state in the South of

- Russia. When his troops were defeated by the Red Army in March 1920, Denikin fled the country.—639
- Deschanel, Paul* (1855-1922)—French statesman and writer. From 1889 to 1919 was member of the French Chamber of Deputies and its President several times.—682
- Deutsch, Lev Grigoryevich* (1855-1941)—one of the organisers of the Emancipation of Labour group, the first Russian Marxist organisation (founded in Geneva in 1883). Became a Menshevik in 1903. In 1918 he retired from politics.—257, 258, 265, 306, 318, 333, 366, 368, 373, 414, 417, 418, 419, 420
- Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beaconsfield* (1804-1881)—British reactionary statesman and writer; leader of the Conservative Party; he held portfolios in several governments and was Prime Minister in 1868 and 1874-80.—692
- Dobrolyubov, Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1836-1861)—Russian revolutionary democrat; outstanding literary critic and materialist philosopher.—546
- Dolgorukov, Pavel Dmitriyevich* (1866-1930)—Russian landowner, one of the founders of the bourgeois Constitutional-Democratic Party.—626
- Dontsov, Dmitro*—Ukrainian nationalist.—585
- Dragomanov, Mikhail Petrovich* (1841-1895)—Ukrainian historian, ethnographer and writer; a bourgeois liberal.—599
- Driault, Edouard*—French bourgeois historian.—698, 699
- Dubasov, Fyodor Vasilyevich* (1845-1912)—Adjutant-General and Admiral, one of the reactionary tsarist ringleaders. From November 1905 he was Governor-General of Moscow, and directed the suppression of the Moscow armed uprising of December 1905.—531
- Dühring, Eugen* (1833-1921)—German philosopher and economist. His philosophic views were an eclectic mixture of idealism and vulgar materialism and were subjected to annihilating criticism by Engels in his classical work *Anti-Dühring*—45, 50, 52, 99, 100
- Duncker, Franz* (1822-1888)—German bourgeois politician and publisher; one of the founders of reformist trade unions in the 1860s—123, 510

## E

- Edward VII* (1841-1910)—King of England (1901-10).—676
- Elm, Adolf* (1857-1916)—German Social-Democrat, co-operative and trade union leader; he wrote for the revisionist periodical *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (Socialist Monthly) in which he waged a struggle against the revolutionary programme and tactics of the Social-Democrats.—403
- Engelhardt, Alexander Nikolayevich* (1832-1893)—political journalist, Narodnik; known for his social activities and experience in organising efficient farming on his estate. He was the author of *From the Countryside*, written in the form of letters, and a number of other works on agriculture.—68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 79, 80
- Engels, Frederick* (1820-1895)—15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 50, 52, 67, 99, 108, 110, 114, 127, 133, 155, 478, 483, 488, 512, 524, 525, 526, 527, 532, 573, 598, 600, 601, 602, 603, 606, 627, 714, 715, 719, 742
- Epicurus* (341-270 B.C.)—Greek materialist philosopher, atheist—16
- Eschwege, Ludwig*—German economist, a contributor to the *Bank*, a German journal on economics published by Lansburgh (1912-13), for which he wrote several articles on finance capital.—652, 670, 675, 676, 718

## F

- Feuerbach, Ludwig* (1804-1872)—German materialist philosopher and atheist.—16, 20, 21, 45, 447, 544

*Fiedler, I. I.* (b. 1864)—director of a secondary school in Moscow where, with his consent, factory and office workers held their meetings and conferences in October 1905.—529

*Figner, Uera Nikolayevna* (1852-1942)—Russian revolutionary Narodnik, member of the Executive Committee of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) Party; was sentenced to death in 1884, the sentence being commuted to life imprisonment. After the 1905-07 Revolution lived abroad, returning to Russia in 1915; is also known as a writer.—200

*Fomin (Krokhmal, Victor Nikolayevich)* (1873-1933)—Russian Social-Democrat, Menshevik. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the *Iskra* minority.—322, 368, 369, 409, 414, 415, 416, 417

*Fourier, Charles* (1772-1837)—French Utopian socialist—111

## G

*Galliffet, Gaston* (1830-1909)—French general, butcher of the Paris Commune of 1871.—742

*Gapon, Georgi Apollonovich* (1870-1906)—Russian priest; organised a demonstration of St. Petersburg workers to present a petition to the tsar on January 9, 1905; the workers were massacred by tsarist troops. Subsequently was exposed as an agent provocateur—423, 477

*Garibaldi, Giuseppe* (1807-1882)—Italian national hero, leader of the Italian revolutionary democrats, an outstanding general. In 1848-67 headed the Italian people's struggle against foreign oppression and for the unification of Italy.—601

*Gierke, Otto*—Prussian Minister of Agriculture in the Hansemann Government (1848), member of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies.—522, 523

*Giffen, Robert* (1837-1910)—British economist and statistician, contributor to several statistical publications, chairman of a statistical society.—709

*Gladstone, William Ewart* (1809-1898)—prominent British politician and statesman, Liberal Party leader in the latter half of the 19th century; he pursued a policy of colonial expansion. In 1868-74 and later was repeatedly elected Prime Minister and was a member of several Liberal cabinets.—603, 604

*Glebov (Noskov, Vladimir Alexandrovich)* (1878-1913)—Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. belonged to the *Iskra* majority and was elected to the Central Committee. After the Congress adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Mensheviks. During the years of reaction (1907-10) retired from the political scene.—254, 305, 309, 315, 336, 359, 360, 362, 369, 415, 416

*Göhre, Paul* (1864-1928)—German politician and writer, an "extreme opportunist", as Lenin called him. Subsequently joined the Social-Democrats.—399

*Goldblatt—Medem, Vladimir Davydovich*

*Compers, Samuel* (1850-1924)—an opportunist leader of the U.S. trade union movement, permanent President of the American Federation of Labor from 1895.—639

*Gorin (Galkin), Vladimir Filippovich* (1863-1925)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik. At the second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. belonged to the *Iskra* majority. After the Congress waged an active struggle against the Mensheviks—258, 269, 270, 414, 416, 417, 420, 421

*Gorsky (Shotman, Alexander Vasilyevich)* (1880-1939)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik; a turner. At the second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. represented the St. Petersburg Party Committee and belonged to the *Iskra* majority. Took an active part in the 1905-07 Revolution.—265

*Gorter, Hermann* (1864-1927)—Dutch Social-Democrat, writer. During the First World War adopted an internationalist stand, supporting the Zimmerwald Left.—738

*Gredeskul, Nikolai Andreyevich* (b. 1864)—lawyer and writer, member of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. In 1905 was arrested for the publication of anti-government articles and was exiled in 1906.—515

*Grimm, Robert* (1881-1958)—a leader of the Swiss Social-Democratic Party. During the First World War adopted a Centrist stand. Was Chairman of the Socialist Conferences in Zimmerwald and Kienthal and Chairman of the International Socialist Commission.—740

*Guchkov, Alexander Ivanovich* (1862-1936)—representative of commercial and industrial interests in Russia, leader of the Octobrist Party, monarchist. During the First World War he was Chairman of the Central War Industries Committee.—537, 626

*Guesde, Jules* (1845-1922)—one of the founders and leaders of the Socialist Party of France and the Second International. Before the First World War headed the Party's revolutionary Left wing. At the outbreak of war adopted a social-chauvinist stand and joined the bourgeois government of France.—55, 95, 143, 163

*Guizot, François* (1787-1874)—French bourgeois historian and statesman. Was one of the first to present history from the standpoint of the class struggle, interpreting the latter, however, from the bourgeois point of view.—26

*Gusev, Sergei Ivanovich* (1874-1933)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.I.P. resolutely supported Lenin. Was Secretary of the Odessa R.S.D.L.P. Committee in 1905.—257, 258, 259, 269, 306, 314, 414, 415, 421

*Gwinner, Arthur* (1856-1931)—German financier, director of the German Bank.—686

## H

*Haase, Hugo* (1863-1919)—a leader of the German Social-Democratic Party. During the First World

War adopted a Centrist stand.—746

*Haecker, Emil* (1875-1934)—nationalist and Right-wing leader of the Polish Socialist Party.—598

*Hanecki (Fürstenberg), Jakub* (1879-1937)—a prominent leader of the Polish and Russian revolutionary movement.—607, 608

*Hankiewicz, Nikolai* (b. 1869)—founder and leader of the Ukrainian (Galician) Social-Democratic Party; a nationalist who advocated the union of the Ukraine and bourgeois Poland.—578

*Hanseman, David Justus* (1790-1864)—Prussian politician, German capitalist, a leader of the liberal bourgeoisie. From March to September 1848 was Prussia's Minister of Finance; pursued a treacherous policy of agreement with the reactionaries. After the defeat of the 1848-49 Revolution retired from politics.—521, 522

*Harcourt, William* (1827-1904)—British statesman, liberal; held responsible posts in the government from 1873; leader of the Liberal Party from 1894 to 1898.—516

*Hasselmann, Wilhelm* (b. 1844)—German Social-Democrat, a leader of the Lassallean General Association of German Workers; in 1880 was expelled from the German Social-Democratic Party as an anarchist.—128, 185

*Havemeyer, John Craig* (1833-1922)—American industrialist, head of a sugar trust and co-owner of other firms.—672

*Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich* (1770-1831)—classical German philosopher, objective idealist; elaborated idealist dialectics, one of the sources of dialectical materialism.—16, 20, 22, 23, 45, 50, 51, 110, 410, 543, 544

*Heine, Wolfgang* (1861-1944)—German Right-wing Social-Democrat. During the First World War adopted a social-chauvinist stand.—399, 400, 404

*Heinig, Kurt* (1886-1956)—German Social-Democrat, economist and writer.—670, 684, 685

- Henderson, Arthur** (1863-1935)—British politician, a Right-wing leader of the Labour Party. During the First World War became a social-chauvinist. Held various portfolios in the British Government between 1915 and 1931.—745
- Herostratus**—a Greek who in 356 B.C. set fire to the Temple of Diana, a famed monument of Antiquity, so that his name would be known to posterity.—104
- Hertz, Friedrich Otto** (b. 1878)—Austrian economist, Social-Democrat, revisionist; opposed the teachings of Marxism on the agrarian question in his book *Agrarian Questions from the Viewpoint of Socialism*, published in 1899.—107
- Hertz (Ulyanov, Dmitry Ilyich)** (1874-1943)—Lenin's younger brother; professional revolutionary, Bolshevik; physician. At the Second Congress of the RSDLP, belonged to the *Iskra* majority.—310, 311
- Hertzenstein, Mikhail Yakovlevich** (1859-1906)—economist, member of the First Duma, a leader of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and its theoretician on the agrarian question; was killed by Black-Hundred reactionaries in Finland after the dissolution of the First Duma.—525
- Heizen, Alexander Ivanovich** (1812-1870)—Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher and writer.—110, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548
- Heymann, Hans Gideon**—German bourgeois economist.—644, 668
- Hildebrand, Gerhard**—German Social-Democrat, economist and writer. In 1912 was expelled from the Social-Democratic Party for opportunism.—712
- Hilferding, Rudolf** (1877-1941)—an opportunist leader of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International; author of *Finance Capital*. During the First World War adopted a Centrist stand. After the war advanced the theory of "organised capitalism" advocating state-monopoly capitalism.—639, 641, 643, 666, 667, 672, 674, 697, 708, 718, 725
- Hill, David** (1850-1932)—American historian and diplomat.—724
- Hirsch, Max** (1832-1905)—German bourgeois economist and writer; member of the Progressist Party and Reichstag deputy. In 1868 he founded, with Franz Duncker, several reformist trade unions (the so-called Hirsch-Duncker trade unions). In his works opposed proletarian revolutionary tactics and defended reformism.—119, 123, 510
- Hobson, John Atkinson** (1858-1940)—British bourgeois economist, reformist and pacifist.—634, 639, 641, 679, 691, 702, 703, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 714, 717, 718, 722
- Hochberg, Karl** (1853-1885)—German Right-wing Social-Democrat, journalist. When the Anti Socialist Law was in operation (1878-90), condemned his party's revolutionary tactics and called on the workers to ally with the bourgeoisie. His opportunist views met with a sharp protest from Marx and Engels.—128
- Holyoak, George Jacob** (1817-1906)—leading figure in the British co-operative movement, reformist; publisher and contributor to a number of radical republican periodicals. From the 1850s co-operated with bourgeois radicals, supporting the theory of the workers' sharing in the profits of both capitalist and co-operative enterprises.—41
- Hubner, Otto** (1818-1877)—German statistician and economist; compiled statistical-geographical yearbooks.—693
- Hume, David** (1711-1776)—English philosopher, subjective idealist, agnostic.—21, 51
- Huxley, Thomas Henry** (1825-1895)—English philosopher and naturalist, a close associate of Charles Darwin and populariser of his theory of evolution; an inconsistent materialist.—21
- Huysmans, Camille** (1871-1968)—a veteran leader of the Belgian working-class movement, Secretary of the International Socialist

Bureau of the Second International, where he took a Centrist stand. Held portfolios in several Belgian cabinets.—729

*Hyndman, Henry Mayers* (1842-1921)—a founder of the British Socialist Party and the leader of its Right wing, an opportunist. In 1916 was expelled from the Party for his rabid support of the imperialist war.—639, 745

## I

*Ilovaisky, Dmitry Ivanovich* (1832-1920)—historian and writer, author of official textbooks on history for primary and secondary schools in tsarist Russia. His presentation of history dealt mainly with the activities of Russia's tsars and generals.—99

*Ivanov (Levina, Yevdokiya Semyonovna)* (1874-1905)—Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. represented the Kharkov Party Committee and adopted a Centrist stand. Following the Congress, joined the Mensheviks but soon after retired from politics.—265

*Ivanov, U.*—see *Zasulich, Vera Ivanovna*

## J

*Jaurès, Jean* (1859-1914)—prominent leader of the French and international socialist movements; founder and editor of *L'Humanité*. Jaurès led the opportunist Right wing of the French Socialist Party; was an active opponent of militarism; on the eve of the First World War was assassinated by a hireling of the militarists.—55, 283, 403, 476, 492

*Jeidels, Otto*—German economist.—652, 653, 662, 663, 664, 665, 683, 685

*Junius*—see *Luxemburg, Rosa*

## K

*Kablukov, Nikolai Alexeyevich* (1849-1919)—economist and statistician; adherent of liberal

Narodism. Sought to substantiate the theory of the "stability" of small-scale peasant farming, idealised the village commune and preached class peace.—523

*Kamensky*—see *Plekhanov, Georgi Valentinovich*

*Kant, Immanuel* (1724-1804)—father of the classical German idealist philosophy.—21, 51

*Kareyev, Nikolai Ivanovich* (1850-1931)—liberal bourgeois historian and writer. From 1905 was a member of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and an opponent of Marxism.—130

*Karsky (Topuridze, Diomid Alexandrovich)* (1871-1942)—Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. belonged to the *Iskra* majority; after the Congress joined the Mensheviks, opposing the central Party bodies elected at the Congress.—269, 300, 325

*Karyshov, Nikolai Alexandrovich* (1855-1905)—Russian economist and statistician, the author of books and articles on the economy of peasant farming in Russia, an advocate of liberal Narodnik views.—71

*Katkov, Mikhail Nikiforovich* (1818-1887)—reactionary writer; editor and publisher of *Moskovskiyе Vedomosti* (Moscow Gazette) (1863-87), the mouthpiece of monarchist reactionaries. Katkov called himself 'the faithful watchdog of the autocracy'. His name was associated with the most rabid monarchist reaction.—160

*Kautsky, Karl* (1854-1938)—a leader of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International. First a Marxist, subsequently deserted Marxism and became the ideologist of Centrism (Kautskyism), the most dangerous and harmful variety of opportunism. Was the editor of the theoretical journal *Die Neue Zeit*, the organ of the German Social-Democratic Party.—120, 121, 143, 202, 239, 293, 308, 339, 341, 400, 401, 402, 404, 465, 466, 500, 532, 561, 569, 570, 571, 573, 581, 583, 598, 633, 635, 638, 639, 641, 651, 689, 696,



- 714, 715, 717, 718, 719, 720, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 729, 736, 737, 742, 746, 748
- Kavelin, Konstantin Dmitriyevich* (1818-1885)—historian and lawyer, professor of Moscow and St. Petersburg Universities who supported the views of the liberal bourgeoisie and nobility. In the period of preparing the 1861 Reform, which freed the peasants from feudal bondage, opposed the revolutionary-democratic movement.—546
- Kestner, Fritz*—German bourgeois economist.—647, 650, 651
- Khalturin, Stepan Nikolayevich* (1856-1882)—Russian revolutionary worker; in 1878 founded the Northern Union of Russian Workers, one of the first illegal political revolutionary organisations. When the Union was crushed in 1879, associated himself with the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) Party and participated in several terrorist acts. In 1882 was arrested and sentenced to death.—288
- K. K.*—see *Kautsky, Karl*
- Knight, Robert* (1833-1911)—prominent leader of the British trade union movement; in 1871-99 was Secretary of the Boiler-Makers' Union and the Amalgamated Union of Boiler-Makers and Shipbuilders.—154
- Kokoshkin, Fyodor Fyodorovich* (1871-1918)—bourgeois politician and writer, a founder of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and member of its Central Committee.—588, 589, 590, 591, 595, 613, 614, 615, 616
- Kolchak, Alexander Vasilyevich* (1873-1920)—tsarist admiral, monarchist, one of the main leaders of the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia (1918-19).—639
- Koltsov, D. (Ginsburg, Boris Abramovich)* (1863-1929)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. belonged to the *Iskra* minority, becoming an active Menshevik after the Congress; a contributor to Menshevik publications.—254, 256, 329, 364, 526
- Kolyubakin, Alexander Mikhailovich* (1868-1915)—Zemstvo functionary, bourgeois liberal, Constitutional-Democrat (Cadet). In 1907 was a member of the Third Duma; Secretary of the Duma Cadet party group; member of the Cadet Central Committee.—588
- Kosovsky, V. (Levinson, M. Y.)* (1870-1941)—a Bund leader. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. represented the Foreign Committee of the Bund and opposed *Iskra*, becoming a Menshevik after the Congress. Was a liquidator during the years of reaction (1907-10), and a social-chauvinist during the First World War.—617
- Kostuch (Zbarowski, Mikhail Sotomonovich)* (1870-1935)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. represented the Odessa Party Committee and belonged to the *Iskra* minority becoming a liquidator in the years of reaction (1907-10).—265, 270, 293
- Kostrov (Jordania, Noi)* (1870-1933)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. joined the *Iskra* minority; was a leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks after the Congress. In the years of reaction (1907-10) supported the liquidators.—269, 347, 609
- Krestovnikov, Grigory Alexandrovich* (b. 1855)—Russian industrialist and stock-dealer, a leader of the Octobrist Party, the party of the monarchist bourgeoisie.—626
- Krichevsky, Boris Naumovich* (1866-1919)—Russian Social-Democrat and writer, one of the Economist leaders. In the late 1890s was a leader of the Union of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad, editing the Union's magazine *Rabocheye Deyelo* (Workers' Cause) (1899) in which he supported Bernstein's views. Withdrew from the Social-Democratic movement after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—98, 99, 127, 130, 141, 154, 178, 196, 207, 211, 219, 225, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 390, 391, 404, 466

*Kisopotkin, Pyotr Alexeyevich* (1842-1921)—a leading figure and theoretician of anarchism, a chauvinist during the First World War. On his return to Russia from emigration in 1917 remained on bourgeois positions but in 1920 addressed a letter to the workers of Europe acknowledging the historical significance of the October Socialist Revolution and calling on them to prevent an armed intervention against Soviet Russia.—625

*Krupp*—a family of industrialists, owners of a war industrial concern in Germany.—662, 682, 721, 722

*Kugelmann, Ludwig* (1830-1902)—German Social-Democrat, physician; participant in the 1848-49 Revolution in Germany and member of the First International Between 1862 and 1874 corresponded with Karl Marx, who lived in London, informing him of the state of affairs in Germany.—43

*Kuskova, Yekaterina Dmitriyevna* (1869-1958)—Russian bourgeois public figure and writer, supporter of Economism in Russian Social-Democracy, the author of the *Credo*, a vivid expression of the opportunist nature of Economism. Later supported the Constitutional-Democrats.—105

*Kutler, Nikolai Nikolayevich* (1859-1924)—statesman in tsarist Russia, member of the Second and Third Dumas; a Constitutional-Democratic Party leader.—626

## L

*Labriola, Arturo* (1873-1959)—Italian economist and theoretician of syndicalism.—55

*Lafargue, Laura* (1845-1911)—daughter of Marx and wife of the French socialist Paul Lafargue; was active in the French working-class movement.—19

*Lafargue, Paul* (1842-1911)—a prominent leader of the international working-class movement and pro-

pagandist of Marxism; member of the General Council of the International, a founder of the Workers' Party of France; disciple and comrade-in-arms of Marx and Engels.—143, 602

*Lagardelle, Hubert* (1874-1958)—French petty-bourgeois politician, anarcho-syndicalist.—55

*Lange (Stopani, Alexander Mitrofanovich)* (1871-1932)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik; helped organise the publication of *Iskra*. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. belonged to the *Iskra* majority. After the Congress was an active Party worker, helping to organise strikes and Soviets of Workers' Deputies.—252, 258, 269, 331, 333

*Lansburgh, Alfred* (b 1872)—German bourgeois economist, publisher of *Die Bank*, an economic journal in which he printed a number of articles on finance capital.—654, 655, 658, 676, 710, 718, 720, 721, 722

*Lassalle, Ferdinand* (1825-1864)—German petty-bourgeois socialist, founder of the General Association of German Workers, which played an important part in the working-class movement. However, Lassalle and his followers adopted an opportunist stand on the major political issues, for which they were sharply criticised by Marx and Engels.—18, 42, 92, 95, 100, 122, 573, 627

*Lavrov, Pyotr Lavrovich* (1823-1900)—Russian sociologist and writer, prominent ideologist of Narodism. Member of the *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom) organisation, and later of the *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will) party. Being an eclectic, he maintained that progress resulted from the activity of "critically-minded individuals".—196

*Legien, Karl* (1861-1920)—leader of the opportunist wing of the German trade union movement. During the First World War adopted a social-chauvinist stand.—745

*Lensky (Vilensky, Leonid Semyonovich)* (1880-1950)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second

- Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. belonged to the *Iskra* majority, becoming a Bolshevik after the Congress. In 1905 left the R.S.D.L.P. and became an editor of the anarchist magazine *Buntar* (Rebel); later retired from politics.—265, 300, 419
- Leo XIII* (*Gioacchino Vincenzo, Count Pecci*) (1810-1903)—elected Pope of the Roman Catholic Church in 1878; sought to adapt Catholicism to bourgeois society and restore the political might of the papacy. Urged the formation of working people's organisations supervised by the Church and collaborating with employers to oppose proletarian class organisations.—516
- Levy, Hermann* (b. 1881)—German bourgeois economist, author of works on finance capital.—644, 645
- Lieber* (*Goldman, Mikhail Isaakovich*) (1880-1937)—one of the leaders of the Bund, a Jewish nationalist organisation; headed the Bund delegation at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., adopting an extreme Right, anti-*Iskra* stand; after the Congress became a Menshevik.—263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 270, 271, 272, 279, 281, 293, 295, 297, 298, 299, 310, 316, 317, 318, 324, 338, 342, 352, 353, 374, 387, 609, 619
- Liebknecht, Wilhelm* (1826-1900)—outstanding figure in the German and international working-class movements; a founder and leader of the German Social-Democratic Party and the Second International.—42, 128, 154, 155, 185, 307, 308, 340
- Liebman, F. (Hersch, Peisach)* (b. 1882)—one of the leaders of the Bund, a Jewish nationalist organisation; was a Centrist during the First World War.—567, 568, 572, 586, 591, 597, 607, 611, 612, 617
- Liefmann, Robert* (1874-1941)—German bourgeois economist; professor, the author of works on sociology and economics.—647, 648, 652, 654, 655, 666, 667, 668, 674, 689
- Lincoln, Abraham* (1809-1865)—outstanding American statesman, U.S. President (1861-65); led the struggle for the abolition of Negro slavery.—717
- Lomonosov, Mikhail Vasilyevich* (1711-1765)—great Russian materialist scientist and poet.—141, 142, 144
- Longuet, Charles* (1839-1903)—prominent figure in the French working class movement, journalist; participant in the Paris Commune; subsequently adhered to Possibilism, an opportunist trend in the French Workers' Party.—602
- Longuet, Jean* (1876-1938)—member of the French Socialist Party and the Second International and writer, an active contributor to the French and international socialist press. During the First World War headed the pacifist Centrist minority of the French Socialist Party.—602, 746
- Longuet, Jenny* (1844-1883)—daughter of Karl Marx and wife of the French socialist Charles Longuet.—19
- Lopatun, Hermann Alexandrovich* (1845-1918)—Russian revolutionary, member of the Narodnaya Volya party and the General Council of the First International. Translated into Russian a part of Volume I of Marx's *Capital*.—600
- Louis Blanc*—see *Blanc, Louis*
- Luxemburg, Rosa* (1871-1919)—prominent figure in the German, Polish and international working-class movements, a Left-wing leader of the Second International and founder of the Communist Party of Germany.—565, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 583, 584, 585, 588, 589, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 600, 608, 609, 610, 611, 614, 615, 741
- L. Ul. (I. Uladimirov)* (pen-name of *Miron Konstantinovich Sheinfinkel*) (1879-1925)—Russian Social Democrat; while in emigration in Paris (1911), lectured on the national question.—582, 605
- Lvov (Moshinsky), Josef Nikolaye-*

- vich* (1875-1954)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a Centrist stand, joining the Mensheviks after the Congress.—265
- Lyadov* (*Mandelstamm*), *Martyn Nikolayevich* (1872-1947)—professional revolutionary and Bolshevik. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. supported the *Iskra* majority; after the Congress waged an active struggle against the Mensheviks in Russia and abroad.—258, 343, 414, 416, 417, 420, 421
- Lysis* (*Letailleur, Eugène*)—French bourgeois journalist, author of articles on economics and political affairs—672, 673

## M

- M.—see *Martov, L.*
- MacDonald, James Ramsay* (1866-1937)—British politician, a founder and leader of the Independent Labour Party and of the Labour Party. At the start of the First World War adopted a pacifist stand; eventually came to support the imperialist bourgeoisie Prime Minister of a number of Labour governments—638, 746
- Makhov* (*Kalafati, D. P.*) (1871-1940)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was a Centrist, joining the Mensheviks after the Congress. In 1913 retired from politics.—250, 251, 253, 256, 258, 259, 261, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 341, 342, 350, 351, 352, 356, 359, 368, 411, 416
- Malakhov, Nikolai Nikolayevich* (b 1827)—tsarist general, Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military District; one of those responsible for the massacre of the Moscow armed uprising of December 1905.—531
- Manuilov, Alexander Apollonovich* (1861-1929)—Russian bourgeois economist; Rector of Moscow University (1905-11), a prominent Cadet leader.—523
- Martov, L. (Isederbaum, Yuli Osipovich)* (1873-1923)—a Menshevik leader. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. headed the opportunist minority, continuing as a prominent ideologist of Menshevism. During the years of reaction (1907-10) supported the liquidators.—130, 140, 243, 247-50, 252-56, 259-67, 269, 270, 272-77, 279-81, 283, 285, 287-309, 311-25, 329, 332, 334-43, 346-347, 351-69, 372-74, 381-83, 387, 389, 394, 397, 399, 404, 405, 406, 409, 411, 414-17, 419-21, 476, 552, 613, 715, 729, 746
- Martynov, A. (Pieker, Alexander Samoilovich)* (1865-1935)—theoretician and leader of Economism, actively opposed Lenin's *Iskra* and was later one of the ideologists of Menshevism, becoming a liquidator during the years of reaction (1907-10).—127, 132-34, 136, 138-44, 146-48, 150, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 178, 211, 219, 220, 225, 230, 231, 233, 234, 238, 240, 248, 251-54, 259, 260, 265, 266, 268-72, 288, 292-94, 323-26, 329, 342, 343, 347, 350-53, 356-59, 386, 389, 403, 436, 438, 440, 446, 466, 472, 474-76, 479, 488, 490, 491, 500, 501, 512-13, 517-19, 565, 609
- Marx, Karl* (1818-1883)—15-34, 36, 38-53, 55, 56, 82, 88, 92, 96, 99, 102-05, 114, 119, 120, 127, 128, 130, 150, 155, 166, 168, 186, 202, 211, 220, 225, 233, 234, 236, 266, 268, 269, 270, 272, 346, 385, 394, 404, 410, 413, 423, 427, 428, 439, 444, 447, 450, 452, 454, 456, 457, 459, 463, 466, 473, 475, 477, 483, 490, 491, 492, 493, 502-04, 510-12, 516, 519-27, 532, 536, 540, 545, 549-53, 555, 556, 558, 561, 563-65, 567, 568, 570-75, 581-84, 588, 589, 591, 593, 596, 598-606, 608-12, 614-16, 622, 627, 628, 639, 644, 645, 658, 714, 715, 731
- Maslov, Pyotr Pavlovich* (1867-1946)—Russian Social-Democrat. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. joined the Mensheviks and wrote a number of works on the agrarian question, attempting to revise the basic tenets of Marxist political economy. During the First World War became a social-chauvinist.—622, 625, 693, 715

- Mayéras, Barthelemy* (b. 1879)—French socialist, journalist. Adopted a Centrist stand during the First World War.—746
- Mazepa, Ivan Stepanovich* (1644-1709)—Ukrainian hetman; headed the movement for dissociating the Ukraine from Russia and converting it into a separate state under Polish or Swedish protectorate.—589
- Mazzini, Giuseppe* (1805-1872)—Italian revolutionary, bourgeois democrat, a leader of the national liberation movement in Italy.—18, 601
- Medvedev (Nikolayev, Leonid Vladimirovich)*—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was a Centrist, joining the Mensheviks after the Congress.—265, 300
- Medem, Vladimir Davidovich* (1879-1923)—a Bund leader. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. opposed *Iskra*. In 1906 was elected to the Bund Central Committee and took part in the work of the Fifth R.S.D.L.P. Congress; supported the Mensheviks.—261, 280, 310, 386, 609, 610, 612
- Mehring, Franz* (1846-1919)—outstanding figure in the German working-class movement, a Left-wing leader and theoretician of the German Social-Democratic Party, historian, writer and literary critic. Was a founder, with Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and others, of the Communist Party of Germany.—129, 341, 459, 519, 520, 524, 525
- Menshikov, Mikhail Osipovich* (1859-1919)—reactionary writer, a prominent contributor to the newspaper *Novoye Uremya* (New Times). After the October Socialist Revolution waged an active struggle against Soviet power.—625
- Meshchersky, Vladimir Petrovich* (1839-1914)—reactionary journalist and publisher of the Black Hundred journal *Grazhdanin* (The Citizen).—160
- Mignet, François Auguste* (1796-1884)—French liberal bourgeois historian, one of the first to appreciate the historical role of the class struggle, although he reduced it to a struggle between the landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.—26
- Mikhailov, Alexander Dmitriyevich* (1855-1884)—a founder of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) Party and organiser of a number of its militant actions, was arrested in 1880 and sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to hard labour for life.—200
- Mikhailov, Nikolai Nikolayevich* (1870-1905)—dentist, agent-provocateur whose denunciation of Lenin and other leaders of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class led to their arrest in December 1897, served in the Police Department from 1902; in 1905 was assassinated by Socialist-Revolutionaries.—118
- Mikhailovsky, Nikolai Konstantinovich* (1842-1904)—Russian sociologist, writer and literary critic, prominent theoretician of liberal Narodism who waged a bitter struggle against Marxism.—57, 69, 74, 75, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 130, 232
- Millierand, Alexandre Etienne* (1859-1943)—French politician; a socialist in the 1890s, betrayed the cause of socialism in 1899, becoming a member of the reactionary bourgeois government of France.—54, 96, 236, 239, 403, 436, 474, 509, 639
- Minsky (Vilnkin, Nikolai Maximovich)* (1885-1937)—Russian poet and journalist, an advocate of bourgeois individualism in art.—57
- Mogilyansky, M. M.* (1873-1942)—barrister and journalist member of the Cadet Party; contributed to the Cadet organ *Rech* (Speech) and other Russian and Ukrainian periodicals.—584, 585
- Molenschott, Jacob* (1822-1893)—Dutch physiologist and vulgar materialist philosopher.—21
- Moll, Joseph* (1813-1849)—prominent figure in the German and international working-class movements and member of the Central

- Committee of the Communist League; took part in the 1848-49 Revolution.—524
- Morgan, John Pierpont* (1867-1943)—American financier and multimillionaire.—661, 687
- Most, Johann Joseph* (1846-1906)—German Social-Democrat; later became an anarchist.—43, 99, 128 185
- Mulberger, Arthur* (1847-1907)—German petty-bourgeois writer, a follower of Proudhon.—50, 99
- Muravyov (Mishenev, Gerasim Mikhailovich)* (d. 1906)—Russian Social-Democrat; at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the *Iskra* majority, becoming a Bolshevik after the Congress.—258, 319, 329, 330, 333, 334
- Myshkin, Ippolit Nikitich* (1848-1885)—Narodnik leader; in 1875 tried to arrange Chernyshevsky's escape from exile but failed and was arrested.—200, 288

## N

- Nadezhdin, L. (Zelensky, Yevgeny Osipovich)* (1877-1905)—first a Narodnik, he then became a Social-Democrat; in his writings supported the Economists, while preaching terrorism as an effective means of "stirring up the masses"; opposed Lenin's *Iskra*, becoming a contributor to Menshevik periodicals after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—211, 213, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 287, 316, 470
- Napoleon III (Louis Bonaparte)* (1808-1873)—Emperor of France (1852-70)—544
- Nartsov Tupyorlov (Narcissus Blunt Snout)*—see *Martov, L.*
- Nekrasov, Nikolai Ussanovich* (b. 1879)—deputy to the Third and Fourth Dumas, a Cadet After the February 1917 Revolution became a member of the bourgeois Provisional Government—588
- Neymarck, Alfred*—French bourgeois economist and statistician 677, 678, 679, 718

- Nicholas II (Romanov)* (1868-1918)—the last Emperor of Russia (1894-1917).—460, 464, 516, 620, 625
- Nietzsche, Friedrich* (1844-1900)—German voluntarist and irrationalist philosopher, an ideological forerunner of fascism—340
- Nobel*—founder of a well-known oil firm in Baku.—685
- N. N.*—see *Prokopovich, Sergei Nikolayevich*
- N.-on (Danielson, Nikolai Frantsevich)* (1844-1918)—Russian economist, author of a number of books on the subject, an ideologist of liberal Narodism in the 1880s and 1890s.—74
- Noske, Gustav* (1868-1946)—an opportunist leader of the German Social-Democratic Party, a social chauvinist during the First World War In January 1919 organised the assassination of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, leaders of the German workers and founders of the Communist Party of Germany —639

## O

- Orlov (Makhlis, Lazar Davydovich)* (1880-1925)—participant in the Social-Democratic movement from 1900, at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the *Iskra* majority, joining the Mensheviks after the Congress. Following the 1905-07 Revolution emigrated.—258, 259, 333, 344
- Orthodox (Axelrod, Lyubov Isaakovna)* (1868-1946)—philosopher and literary critic, Social-Democrat After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. became a Bolshevik, but later joined the Mensheviks, wrote a number of philosophical works revising Marxism—377
- Osipov (Zemlyachka, Rosalia Samoilovna)* (1876-1947)—professional revolutionary, prominent figure in the Communist Party and the Soviet state; joined the revolutionary movement in 1893. At the Second Congress of the

- R.S.D.L.P. represented the Odessa Party Committee and belonged to the *Iskra* majority. After the Congress was co-opted into the Central Committee as a Bolshevik: took an active part in the struggle against the Mensheviks, and also in the 1905-07 Revolution—344, 416
- Owen, Robert* (1771-1858)—English Utopian Socialist.—111
- Owens, Michael Joseph* (1859-1923)—American inventor of the bottle-making machine.—708
- Ozerov, Ivan Khristoforovich* (1869-1942)—bourgeois economist, professor of Moscow and St Petersburg Universities. In 1901-02 came out in support of Zubatov's provocateur tactics within the working-class movement—180, 181, 184

## P

- Panin (Makadzyub, Mark Saulovich)* (alias: Practical Worker) (b. 1876)—Russian Social-Democrat who joined the Mensheviks at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. During the years of reaction (1907-10) was a liquidator—310, 314
- Parvus (Gelfand, Alexander Lazarevich)* (1869-1924)—Menshevik, participant in the Russian and German Social-Democratic movements. During the First World War was an extreme chauvinist and an agent of German imperialism.—238
- Pavlovich (Krasikov, Pyotr Ananyevich)* (1870-1939)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik; began his revolutionary activity in 1892. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. represented the Kiev Party Committee and belonged to the *Iskra* majority. After the Congress took an active part in the struggle against the Mensheviks, and also in the 1905-07 Revolution.—253, 256, 258, 298, 299, 302, 308, 313, 314, 316, 318, 325, 328, 329
- Perovskaya, Sophia Lvovna* (1853-1881)—Russian revolutionary, prominent member of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) party. Was executed by the tsarist government for her role in the assassination of the Russian Emperor Alexander II—200
- Petrov, Anton* (1824-1861)—a peasant from the village of Bzdna, Kazan Gubernia, who led a peasant revolt in protest against the 1861 land reform.—547
- Petrunkovich, Ivan Iyich* (1844-1928)—landowner, Zemstvo member, one of the founders and leaders of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) Party, Chairman of its Central Committee, publisher of *Rech* (Speech), the central organ of the party, member of the First Duma—460, 509, 522
- Peshkhonov, Alexei Vasilyevich* (1867-1933)—bourgeois public figure and journalist, from 1906 a leader of the petty-bourgeois party of Popular Socialists—615
- Pisarcv, Dmitry Ivanovich* (1840-1868)—outstanding Russian revolutionary democrat, writer and literary critic, materialist philosopher—225
- Plekhanov, Georgi Valentinovich* (1856-1918)—outstanding leader of the Russian and international working class movements, first propagandist of Marxism, founder of the Emancipation of Labour group, the first Russian Marxist organisation. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. went over to the Mensheviks. In 1907-14 opposed liquidationism and became a social-chauvinist during the First World War—51, 82, 87, 88, 99, 125, 130, 141, 142, 144, 155, 209, 225, 237, 248, 250, 252, 253, 260, 261, 268, 269, 271, 274, 283, 284, 292, 300, 307, 308, 325, 332, 334, 335, 344, 346, 347, 357, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371, 372, 375, 374, 375, 376, 379, 380, 381, 383, 386, 388, 405, 407, 408, 409, 419, 420, 507, 513, 525, 526, 530, 558, 607, 608, 609, 612, 623, 625, 628, 745
- Poincaré, Raymond* (1860-1934)—French bourgeois politician and statesman, one of those who inspired the First World War; re-

peatedly held the posts of Minister and Prime Minister.—620  
*Pomyalovsky, Nikolai Gerasimovich* (1835-1863)—Russian democratic writer.—612

*Popov (Rozanov, Vladimir Nikolayevich)* (1876-1939)—Social-Democrat, Menshevik, member of the Yuzhny Rabochy (Southern Worker) group. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a centrist stand, becoming an active Menshevik after the Congress.—85, 253, 255, 258, 262, 265, 272, 275, 279, 281, 288, 293, 294, 305, 309, 312, 313, 314, 315, 329, 332, 336, 343, 357, 359, 368, 369, 408, 409, 414, 415, 416, 417

*Posadovsky (Mandelberg, Viktor Yevseyevich)* (b. 1870)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the *Iskra* minority joining the Mensheviks after the Congress.—260, 261, 265, 288, 329, 330, 331, 334

*Potresov, Alexander Nikolayevich (Starover)* (1869-1934)—a Menshevik leader. In the years of reaction (1907-10) headed the liquidators and was a social-chauvinist during the First World War.—101, 271, 305, 306, 310, 312, 332, 335, 344, 345, 347, 356, 361, 364, 414, 416, 419, 420, 461, 466, 486, 507, 514, 693, 715

"*Practical Worker*"—see *Panin*

*Pressmane, Adrien* (1879-1929)—French socialist. Adopted a Centrist stand during the First World War.—746

*Prokopovich, Sergei Nikolayevich* (1871-1955)—bourgeois economist and writer; prominent representative of Economism and one of the first champions of Bernsteinism in Russia.—104, 105, 122, 140, 233, 511

*Proudhon, Pierre Joseph* (1809-1865)—French writer, economist and sociologist, ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie, a founder of anarchism.—17, 18, 50, 88, 121, 526, 602, 603, 631

*Pushkevich, Vladimir Mitrofanovich* (1870-1920)—landowner, monarchist, reactionary. Founded the Black-Hundred organisations

in 1905-07 to fight the revolutionary movement.—537, 587, 591, 613, 614, 615, 616, 626, 627

## R

*Radek, Karl Berngardovich* (1885-1939)—participant in the Social-Democratic movement of Galicia, Poland and Germany from the early 1900s. An internationalist during the First World War, he showed an inclination to Centristism. Joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917, but was later expelled for his anti-Party activities.—733, 738

*Radishchev, Alexander Nikolayevich* (1749-1802)—outstanding Russian writer, revolutionary enlightener.—626

*Read, Nikolai Andreyevich* (c. 1793-1855)—Russian general accused of an unsuccessful offensive in the battle at the Chernaya River in the Crimean War (1853-56), waged by the coalition of Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia against Russia.—613

*Reger, Tadeus* (1872-1938)—member of the Polish Social-Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia, journalist; deputy to the Austrian parliament (1911-17).—578

*Reitern* (d 1861)—tsarist colonel who committed suicide in Warsaw rather than take part in the shootings and suppression of street demonstrations.—547

*Renan, Ernest Joseph* (1823-1892)—French theologian, Semitist and idealist philosopher, known for his works on the early Christians. In politics he was an avowed enemy of democracy and of the Paris Commune of 1871.—527

*Rhodes, Cecil* (1853-1902)—British politician, ideologist of imperialism and colonialism; organised the seizure by the British of vast territories in South Africa and was the initiator of the Boer War (1899-1902).—692, 693, 697

*Ricardo, David* (1772-1823)—British economist, prominent representative of classical bourgeois political economy.—33, 46

*Riessner, Jakob* (1853-1932)—German



- economist and banker.—647, 649, 655, 656, 657, 660, 661, 667, 679, 682, 685, 688, 729
- Rittinghausen, Moritz** (1814-1890)—German petty-bourgeois democrat; in 1848-49 wrote for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, published by Marx and Engels, and was a member of the First International.—202
- R. M.**—the author of "Our Reality", an article advocating Economist opportunist views.—128, 140, 144, 233, 234
- Rockefeller, John Davison** (1839-1937)—American oil magnate, founder of the dynasty of multimillionaires.—661, 685, 686, 687
- Rodbertus-Jagetzow, Johann Karl** (1805-1875)—German vulgar economist, Prussian landowner, a proponent of "state socialism".—33
- Rodichev, Fyodor Ivanovich** (b. 1856)—landowner, lawyer, and Zemstvo member, one of the leaders of the Cadet Party and a member of its Central Committee; was a deputy to all convocations of the Duma.—509, 522, 626
- Rogachov, Dmitry Mikhailovich** (1851-1884)—Russian revolutionary Narodnik, prominent member of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) party, who participated in several of its terrorist acts. Was arrested in 1876 and sentenced to ten years of hard labour, and died in prison.—200
- Romanovs**—a dynasty of Russian tsars and emperors (1613-1917)—547, 626, 627
- Rosenow, Emil** (1871-1904)—German Social Democrat and journalist who wrote for a number of Social-Democratic newspapers; was a Reichstag deputy from 1898 to 1903.—399
- Rothschild**—a dynasty of financial magnates in Western Europe.—685
- Rozanov, Vladimir Nikolayevich**—see *Popov*
- Rozanov, U. U.** (1856-1919)—reactionary philosopher, writer and critic.—57
- Rubanovich, Ilya Adolfovich** (1860-1920)—a leader of the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary Party; was a social-chauvinist during the First World War.—625
- Ruge, Arnold** (1802-1880)—German journalist, Young Hegelian and bourgeois radical. In 1844 in Paris co-published with Marx the *Deutsche-Französische Jahrbücher*. In 1848 was a deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly, after 1866 became a national-liberal and a supporter of Bismarck.—17
- Rusov (Knunyants, Bogdan Mirzadisanovich)** (1878-1911)—professional revolutionary, Bolshevik, member of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adhered to the *Iskra* majority. After the Congress was engaged in Party work in the Caucasus and Moscow.—257, 258, 300, 303, 307, 310, 311, 324, 329, 331, 332, 416, 418
- Ryazanov (Goldendakh), David Borisovich** (1870-1938)—Russian Social-Democrat, one of the organisers of the literary *Borba* (Struggle) group which came out against the Party programme drafted by *Iskra* and against Lenin's organisational principles of building a party. The Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. rejected the proposal to invite Ryazanov to the Congress as a representative of the *Borba* group.—253, 254, 335, 565

## S

- Sablina (Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna)** (1869-1939)—professional revolutionary, outstanding figure in the Communist Party and the Soviet state; Lenin's wife.—305, 420
- Saint-Simon, Henri Claude** (1760-1825)—French Utopian socialist.—111, 730, 731
- Sartorius von Waltershausen** (b. 1852)—German economist, an ideologist of German imperialism, whose field was economic relations and colonial policy.—698, 710

- Savenko, Anatoly Ivanovich* (b. 1874)—an extreme nationalist; wrote for the Black-Hundred newspapers.—589
- Sazonov, Georgi Petrovich* (b. 1857)—representative of reactionary Narodism who later became a member of the Black-Hundred Union of the Russian People.—74
- Schapper, Karl* (1812-1870)—prominent figure in the German and international working-class movements; active in the Communist League. In July 1850 emigrated to England and there became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist League. Joined August Willich in opposing the C.C. majority headed by Marx and Engels and was a leader of the sectarian-adventurist group of the Communist League.—42, 524
- Scheidemann, Philipp* (1865-1939)—a leader of the extreme Right wing of the German Social-Democratic Party, head of the German bourgeois government (February-June 1919); ruthlessly suppressed the working-class movement.—639, 745
- Schilder, Siegmund* (d. 1932)—German economist.—680, 682, 725
- Schramm, Karl August*—German Social-Democrat and opportunist who opposed the party's revolutionary tactics.—128
- Schulze-Delitzsch, Hermann* (1808-1883)—German vulgar economist and public figure; advocated the harmony of the class interests of the capitalists and workers.—122
- Schulze-Gaevernitz, Gerhardt* (1864-1943)—German bourgeois economist, a professor of political economy at Freiburg University; tried to prove the possibility of social peace in a capitalist society.—654, 656, 660, 661, 662, 666, 667, 668, 697, 698, 709, 710, 712, 713, 730
- Schweitzer, Johann Baptist* (1833-1875)—German public figure and writer, a Lassallean; President of the General Association of German Workers (1867-71), in which he pursued a policy of personal dictatorship.—128, 383
- Schwerin, Maximilian* (1804-1872)—Prussian politician, representative of the reactionary nobility and bureaucracy; in 1848 became a member of the liberal Cabinet of Camphausen.—522
- Sembat, Marcel* (1862-1922)—a reformist leader of the French Socialist Party and social-chauvinist during the First World War; became a member of the bourgeois government of France.—745
- Semkovsky (Bronstein, Semyon Yulyevich)* (b. 1882)—Russian Social-Democrat and Menshevik; wrote for several Menshevik newspapers, his main topic being the national question.—558, 567, 568, 572, 581, 586, 591, 597, 607, 612, 613, 614, 615
- Serebryakov, Yesper Alexandrovich* (1854-1921)—Russian revolutionary Narodnik, member of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) Party. Emigrated in 1883. From 1899 to 1902 was the publisher of the magazine *Nakanune* (On the Eve) in London.—200
- Serno-Solovyevich, Alexander Alexandrovich* (1838-1869)—a prominent figure in the revolutionary-democratic movement of the 1860s, one of the organisers of the Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom) secret society. In 1862 emigrated. Wrote a lampoon directed against Herzen's liberal vacillations.—546
- Shchedrin*—pseudonym of Mikhail Yevgrafovich Saltykov (1826-1889)—Russian satirist and revolutionary democrat.—194, 251, 563
- Shipov, Dmitry Nikolayevich* (1851-1920)—a landowner, prominent Zemstvo member and moderate liberal. In November 1905 was one of the organisers of the Union of October Seventeen (Octobrists) and Chairman of its Central Committee.—442, 455, 459, 491, 514, 518
- Skaldin (Yelenev, Fyodor Pavlovich)* (1828-1902)—Russian journalist who advocated bourgeois liberalism in the 1860s; wrote for the magazine *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (Fatherland Notes) and eventually joined the extreme reactionaries.—58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72

*Skobelev, Matvei Ivanovich* (1885-1939)—Russian Social-Democrat and Menshevik; was a Centrist during the First World War.—715

*Smirnov, E. (Gurevich Emmanuil Lvovich)* (b. 1865)—Russian Social-Democrat and Menshevik; was a liquidator during the years of reaction (1907-10), during the First World War became a social-chauvinist.—622, 625

*Smith, Adam* (1723-1790)—English economist, an outstanding representative of the classical school of bourgeois political economy.—30, 46

*Sorge, Friedrich Adolf* (1828-1906)—German socialist, prominent leader of the international working-class and socialist movements, a friend and comrade-in-arms of Marx and Engels. Participated in the 1848-49 Revolution in Germany, emigrating to America after its defeat. Took an active part in the labour movement there.—43

*Sorokin (Bauman, Nikolai Ernestovich)* (1873-1905)—professional revolutionary, a prominent leader of the Bolshevik Party; took an active part in the work of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. In 1903 headed the Moscow Party Committee; was murdered by the Black Hundreds during a demonstration in Moscow in October 1905.—252, 305, 333, 420

*Spectator (Nakhimson, Miron Isaakovich)* (b. 1880)—Russian economist and man of letters; adopted a Centrist stand during the First World War.—718

*Starover*—see *Potresov, Alexander Nikolayevich*

*Stasyulevich, Mikhail Matveyevich* (1826-1911)—journalist, professor of history and public figure, a prominent representative of moderate bourgeois liberalism who dreamed of a constitutional monarchy of the English type.—67

*Stead, William Thomas* (1849-1912)—English journalist, *The Times* correspondent in Russia in 1905.—692

*Stein (Alexandrova, Yekaterina*

*Mikhailovna)* (1864-1943)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. joined the *Iskra* minority becoming an active Menshevik after the Congress.—303, 414, 416, 417, 418, 420

*Stein, Lorenz* (1815-1890)—German bourgeois economist, attorney and historian.—23

*Stepanov (Nikitin, Ivan Konstantinovich)* (1877-1944)—Russian Social-Democrat, Bolshevik; a turner by trade. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was a delegate from the Kiev Committee belonging to the *Iskra* majority. Took an active part in the 1905-07 Revolution and later retired from politics.—265

*Stirner, Max (Schmidt, Kaspar)* (1806-1856)—German philosopher, an ideologist of bourgeois individualism and anarchism.—602

*Stolypin, Pyotr Arkadyevich* (1862-1911)—tsarist statesman and landowner, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Interior (1906-11). His name has become synonymous with a period of extreme political reaction in Russia (1907-10). Stolypin introduced an agrarian reform advantageous to the rich kulaks and disastrous for the rural poor — 537, 538, 542, 556

*Strakhov (Takhzarev, Konstantin Mikhailovich)* (1871-1925)—a participant in the Social-Democratic movement from 1893; took part in the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., siding with the Mensheviks after the split in the Party at the Congress; retired from Party work shortly after.—297

*Struve, Pyotr Berngardovich* (1870-1944)—bourgeois economist and writer; was a prominent representative of "legal Marxism" in the 1890s, becoming a Constitutional-Democratic Party leader in later years.—87, 91, 122, 140, 228, 233, 346, 347, 380, 427, 436, 455, 459, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 489, 490, 492, 509, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518

*Sudekum, Albert* (1871-1944)—an opportunist leader of the German

Social-Democratic Party; a revisionist. During the First World War became an extreme social-chauvinist.—693

*Supan, Alexander* (1847-1920)—German geographer.—690, 693

## T

*Thierry, Augustin* (1795-1856)—French statesman and historian. While admitting the division of society into classes, believed that classes originated as a result of the conquest of some peoples by others, and denied that the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat was irreconcilable.—26

*Thiers, Adolphe* (1797-1877)—French reactionary politician and historian; was one of the organisers of the brutal suppression of the Paris Commune.—26, 516

*Thomas, Albert* (1878-1923)—French politician and social-reformer; from 1910 was a leader of the parliamentary group of the Socialist Party, becoming a social-chauvinist during the First World War; was member of the bourgeois government of France.—638, 745

*Trachov, Pyotr Nikitch* (1844-1885)—an ideologist of revolutionary Narodism, a writer and literary critic.—226, 227

*Travinsky (Krzhizhanovsky), Gleb Maximilianovich* (1872-1959)—veteran leader of the Communist Party, a well-known Soviet scholar and electrical engineer. Began his revolutionary career in 1893 and was, together with Lenin, one of the organisers of the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was elected a member of the C.C. *in absentia*; actively contributed to the Bolshevik press.—309, 336, 369, 381, 409, 415, 416

*Trepov, Dmitry Fyodorovich* (1855-1906)—Moscow Chief of Police, becoming Governor-General of St. Petersburg in January 1905.—419

*Tréves, Claudio* (1868-1933)—a leader of the Italian Socialist Party and theoretician of Italian reformism. Was a Centrist during the First World War.—746

*Trotsky (Bronstein), Lev Davydovich* (1879-1940)—a bitter enemy of Leninism. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was a delegate from the Siberian League and adhered to the *Iskra* minority; after the Congress waged a struggle against the Bolsheviks on all questions pertaining to the theory and practice of socialist revolution. During the years of reaction (1907-10) was a liquidator. In 1912 organised the anti-Party August bloc. Adopted a Centrist stand during the First World War and waged a struggle against Lenin on questions of war, peace and revolution. Upon joining the Bolshevik Party on the eve of the October Revolution (1917), continued his splitting activities. After the October Socialist Revolution held various important posts, although continuing to oppose the Party's general line and the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. In 1927 was expelled from the Party and sent out of the country in 1929 for his anti-Soviet activities. In 1932 was deprived of Soviet citizenship.—250, 252, 269, 270, 271, 281, 297, 298, 305, 307, 316, 325, 329, 331, 336, 355, 357, 363, 364, 368, 369, 409, 414, 415, 416, 417, 427, 466, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 610, 611, 612

*Trubetskoi, Sergei Nikolayevich* (1862-1905)—Russian prince, idealist philosopher and liberal.—522

*Trubetskoi, Yevgeny Nikolayevich* (1863-1920)—Russian prince; representative of Russian bourgeois liberalism; an idealist philosopher and member of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. During the First World War was an ideologist of Russian imperialism.—509, 576

*Tsaryov (Lokerman, Alexander Samoilovich)* (1880-1937)—Rus-

- sian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. supported the Centre, becoming a Menshevik after the Congress.—265, 300, 310, 331
- Tschierschky, Siegfried* (b. 1872)—German economist whose field was the study of cartels, trusts and other forms of capitalist monopoly.—648, 658
- Tugan-Baranovsky, Mikhail Ivanovich* (1865-1919)—Russian bourgeois economist, prominent representative of "legal Marxism".—75
- Turati, Filippo* (1857-1932)—reformist leader of the Italian working-class movement; followed a policy of class collaboration between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; was a Centrist during the First World War.—474, 483
- Turgenev, Ivan Sergeyevich* (1818-1883)—Russian liberal writer.—547
- V
- Vahlteich, Karl Julius* (1839-1915)—German Right-wing Social-Democrat; a shoemaker by trade; one of the founders of the Lassallean General Association of German Workers and its first Secretary. After the adoption of the Anti-Socialist Law (1878) emigrated to the United States; participated in the labour movement there.—100
- Vandervelde, Emile* (1866-1938)—leader of the Belgian Workers' Party and Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International; was an extreme opportunist, becoming a social-chauvinist and a member of the Belgian bourgeois government during the First World War.—55, 745
- Vaneyev, Anatoly Alexeyevich* (1872-1899)—Russian Social-Democrat. In 1895 took an active part in organising the St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class and in preparing the publication of the newspaper *Rabocheye Dyelo* (Workers' Cause). Was arrested in connection with the League of Struggle case and exiled to Siberia in 1897.—115, 117
- Varlin, Louis Eugène* (1839-1871)—French revolutionary, an outstanding leader of the Paris Commune of 1871 and a member of the First International.—500
- Vasilyev (Lengnik, Friedrich)* (1873-1936)—joined the revolutionary Social-Democratic movement in 1893, Bolshevik; became member of the *Iskra* organisation in 1901, and at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was elected to the Party Central Committee.—409, 415
- Vasilyev, Nikita Vasilyevich* (b. 1855)—a colonel in the gendarmerie and champion of Zubatov's "police socialism"—180, 309, 369
- V. I. (Ivanshin, Vladimir Pavlovich)* (1869-1904)—Russian Social-Democrat, an Economist leader. In his articles set the workers' immediate economic interests against Social-Democracy's political tasks. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. became a Menshevik.—118, 125, 233
- Vladimir (Romanov, Vladimir Alexandrovich)* (1847-1909)—Russian Grand Duke, the uncle of Nicholas II. Commanded the Guards troops and was Commander-in-Chief of the St. Petersburg Military Area from 1884 to 1905; on the tsar's instructions ordered the troops to open fire on the St. Petersburg workers' demonstration on January 9, 1905.—422
- Vogt, Karl* (1817-1895)—German naturalist and vulgar materialist.—21
- Vollmar, Georg Heinrich* (1850-1922)—a leader of the opportunist wing of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany and proponent of reformism.—96, 303, 360, 403, 404
- Volynsky (Flexer, Akim Lvovich)* (1863-1926)—art critic; preached the reactionary theory of art for art's sake and was rabidly opposed to the democratic, revolutionary school of journalism.—85, 86
- V. U. (Vorontsov, Vasily Pavlovich)* (1847-1918)—economist and

writer, an ideologist of liberal Narodism in the 1880s and 1890s, the author of *The Destiny of Capitalism in Russia* and other books in which he repudiated the development of capitalism in Russia and extolled small commodity production. Advocated a reconciliation with the tsarist government and was strongly opposed to Marxism.—69, 71, 74, 78, 80, 87, 88, 90, 119, 120, 125, 127, 129

## W

*Warszawski, A. S. (Warski, Adolf)* (1868-1937)—the most prominent veteran leader of the Polish revolutionary movement. Was a delegate to the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. at which he was elected to the Party Central Committee. During the First World War adopted an internationalist stand. Was one of the founders of the Communist Workers' Party of Poland and a member of its Central Committee.—607, 608

*Webb, Beatrice* (1858-1943) and *Sidney* (1859-1947)—prominent British public figures, authors of books on the history of the working-class movement in England. Sidney Webb was one of the founders of the reformist Fabian Society. They adopted a social-chauvinist stand during the First World War. After the October Socialist Revolution the Webbs supported the Soviet Union.—138, 201

*Weitling, Wilhelm* (1808-1871)—German tailor prominent in the German working-class movement in its early days; a theoretician of Utopian "egalitarian" communism.—121

*Westphalen, Jenny, von* (1814-1881)—Karl Marx's wife and loyal supporter.—17

*Wilhelm II (Hohenzollern)* (1859-1941)—German emperor and king of Prussia (1888-1918).—618, 676

*Willich, August* (1810-1878)—Prussian officer, member of the Com-

munist League, a participant in the Baden-Pfalz uprising of 1849; was one of the leaders of the adventurist sectarian group that split away from the Communist League in 1850.—42

*Witte, Sergei Yulyevich* (1849-1915)—Russian statesman, Chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1905-06; he sought to preserve the monarchy through minor concessions and promises to the liberal bourgeoisie and the brutal suppression of the people.—164

*Woltmann, Ludwig* (1871-1907)—German reactionary sociologist and anthropologist who believed the economic struggle was the main task of the working-class movement. Was a proponent of racism who held that the Germans were a super race.—127

*Worms, Alphonse* (1868-1937)—lawyer, Professor of Moscow University and liberal. In 1901-02 lectured at meetings of the Zubatov organisations.—180

## X

X.—see *Maslov, Pyotr Pavlovich*

## Y

*Y. (Galperin, Lev Yefimovich)* (1872-1951)—Social-Democrat who embarked on a revolutionary career in 1898. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. joined the Bolsheviks; was member of the Party Council from the Editorial Board of the Party's Central Organ and was later co-opted to the Central Committee; adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Mensheviks. Retired from politics in 1906.—382

*Yegorov (Levin, Yefrem Yakovlevich)* (b. 1873)—Russian Social-Democrat. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted a Centrist stand, joining the Mensheviks after the Congress. Later retired from politics.—252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268,

- 269, 270, 271, 272, 279, 280, 281, 283, 300, 311, 314, 315, 318, 319, 323, 324, 341, 342, 352, 356, 368, 386, 399, 414, 416, 417, 418, 420
- Yudin (Aizenstadt, Isai Lvovich)* (1867-1937)—a leader of the Bund, a Jewish nationalist organisation. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. opposed the *Iskra* group, becoming an active Menshevik after the Congress.—256
- Yurkevich, L.* (1885-1918)—Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist.—567, 568, 572, 586, 597, 607, 612, 613, 614, 615
- Yuzhakov, Sergei Nikolayevich* (1849-1910)—a proponent of liberal Narodism, sociologist and writer; wrote for the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (Fatherland Notes), *Vestnik Yevropy* (European Messenger) and other magazines and was on the board of the magazine *Russkoye Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth); was bitterly opposed to Marxism—71, 74, 80, 87
- Yuzov (Kablitz, Iosif Ivanovich)* (1848-1893)—a writer and proponent of liberal Narodism in the 1880s and 1890s.—74, 75, 86, 87

## Z

- Zasulich, Vera Ivanovna (Ivanov, V.)* (1849-1919)—prominent participant in the Narodnik and, later, the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. In 1878 attempted to assassinate Trepov, the Governor of St. Petersburg. In 1883 took part in founding the Emancipation of Labour group, the first Russian Marxist organisation. At the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. joined the Mensheviks.—81, 198, 311, 364, 402, 419
- Zetkin, Clara* (1857-1933)—outstanding leader of the German and international working-class movements, one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany.—308
- Zhelyabov, Andrei Ivanovich* (1850-1881)—outstanding Russian revolutionary, prominent representative of revolutionary Narodism, an organiser and leader of the Narodnaya Volya Party.—20, 225, 288
- Zubatov, Sergei Vasilyevich* (1864-1917)—a colonel of the gendarmie, the initiator and organiser of "police socialism" (Zubatovism). In 1901-03 set up police-sponsored workers' organisations in Moscow and other cities to divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle. However, the organisations were swept out of existence by the tide of revolution.—104, 122, 124, 180, 181, 184

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## SUBJECT INDEX

### A

*Africa*—680, 690, 705, 716, 724, 727, 741

*Aggression, imperialist*—619, 723-26

*Agrarian programme of the Bolsheviks*

—in a bourgeois-democratic revolution—575-76, 623

—on the confiscation of lands belonging to landowners, the church, monasteries, the nobility and the Crown.

*Alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry*

—leading role of the proletariat—424, 460-61, 462-63, 493, 494, 523-24, 536-37

*Anarchism and anarchists*—452, 456, 502

*Anarcho-syndicalism*—622

*Asia*—571, 576, 587, 598, 599, 623, 625, 680, 690, 705, 707, 716, 741

*Autonomy, political*—605-06

### B

*Banks*

—economic essence and role of—642, 653-66, 670-78, 682, 683, 685-86, 699-700, 727

*Bernstein and Bernsteinianism, the struggle against the trend*

—essence, social roots and evolution—50, 54-56, 95-98, 103-04, 387, 404-05, 489, 499-500

—international character of Bern-

steinianism and its derivatives in various countries—54-55, 95-97, 100-01, 102, 105-08, 130, 489

*Blocs and agreements of the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle*—102-04, 109, 343-46, 424, 559-61

*Bolshevism*

—origin and historical roots of—242-43, 247, 272-74, 275-76, 301-06, 317-18, 325-26, 337-39, 341-43, 348-59, 384-90, 391, 394-96, 398, 403-05, 406-07, 409-13

—historical role and international significance of—55, 354-55, 384-85, 398, 386-87, 427-28

—its development and growth in the struggle against opportunism—55, 338-39, 356-59, 387-98, 403-04, 444-45

*Bourgeoisie*

—as a class—451-52, 461, 489-90, 493, 501-02, 508, 658, 689

*Bourgeoisie of the colonial and dependent countries*—580-82, 583, 605-06, 697-98

*Boycott and tactics of boycott*—563

*Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of 1918*—appraisal of its terms and its significance—638

*Bund (General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia) and the struggle against it*—general characteristic of—392-93

—bourgeois nationalism of—137, 216, 392-93



## C

*Cadets* (Constitutional-Democratic Party, Party of "People's Freedom")—54, 433, 586-87, 590-91

*Cadres, Party*

—enlistment and appointment of—158, 190-92, 196-98, 200-01, 204, 207, 224-25, 301-04, 328, 333  
—ideological and political education and training of—157, 158-59, 166-67, 173-74, 186, 187-95, 200-01, 204, 207-08, 215, 217-18, 219-20, 225, 539-40, 541

*Capitalism*

—definition of—31-32, 134-35, 452, 630-31, 677-79  
—inevitability of its doom—31-32, 37, 47, 49, 53, 142-43, 571, 572-73, 729-30

*Centrism and Centrists, the struggle against them*

—essence of—745  
—as a real threat to the working-class movement—621-22, 703  
—as concealed social-chauvinism—621-22, 745

*Chauvinism*—73, 109, 619-20, 621, 622, 625, 741

*Classes and class struggle*

—aims of—25-27, 39-43, 48

*Colonial wars*—740-41

*Communism*—39

*Communist International (Comintern, the Third International)*

—organisation of—622, 624, 745-46

*Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.), R.S.D.L.P., R.S.D.I.P.(B.)*

—as a party of a new type—94, 98, 110, 168, 172-73, 177-79, 187-90, 191-92, 196-98, 200-02, 229-31, 234, 392-93, 411-12, 427-28, 460, 481-82, 504-05, 525-26

—struggle for unity and discipline within the Party

—92-94, 98, 107, 129-39, 226-31, 236-37, 239-40, 245-46, 257-58, 296-97, 301-09, 356-74, 390-98, 403-13, 549-53, 555-56

—as a contingent of the international proletariat and its role in the world working-class and revolutionary movements—112

—significance of its historical experience—538-39

—criticism and self-criticism in the Party—244, 307-08, 539-40

—principle of collective leadership—230-31

*Compromises in politics*—102-04, 235-36, 376

*Conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war—the proletarian party's slogan*—624, 744-45, 748-49

*Counter-revolution*

—social basis of—492, 520-24

*Criticism and self-criticism*—244, 336, 539-40

## D

*Defence of the socialist country*—632, 742-43

*Democracy, bourgeois* (as a form of state)—53-54, 434, 743-44, 747

*Democracy, bourgeois* (as a political trend)—501-02, 638-39

*Democracy, inner party*—199, 318, 412

*Democratic centralism in the Party*—168-69, 195-202, 243-44, 272-74, 279-82, 311-12, 314, 337-38, 339, 369-74, 379, 389-98, 404-05, 411-12, 413

*Dictatorship, proletarian* (theory)—631

*Discipline, party*—215, 246-47, 252-54, 365, 366-67, 371-74, 379, 390-91, 392, 393-96, 412, 439

## E

*Economics*

—and politics—136, 703, 743

*Economism and Economists, the struggle against*

—essence, social roots and development of—92-241, 388-89, 440-41, 444-45, 446, 490, 491, 501, 511-12, 513, 563

*Equality*

—bourgeois and petty-bourgeois conception of—545

—Marxist conception of—627

*Equality of races and nations*—579-83, 599-600, 616, 627, 628

## F

*Fatherland*

—bourgeois—38

- need for historical approach to the concept of—38, 742
- and the proletariat—38, 625-28, 742
- socialist—742
- of oppressed nations—742

### *First World War (1914-18)*

- its essence and the driving forces behind it—618-19, 636-37, 737-38, 740-41, 742-43, 744
- tasks of the proletariat and the Bolsheviks' tactics regarding the war—618, 620-21, 623, 624, 630-32, 743-44, 746
- the Bolsheviks' struggle against social-chauvinism and social-imperialism—621, 622-23, 742, 745
- the Bolsheviks' struggle against Centrism and social-pacifism—612-22, 742, 745-46
- the slogan of the defeat of one's own government in the war—623, 627, 746-47
- the slogan of converting the imperialist war to a civil war and ways of its implementation—622, 624, 744-45, 748-49
- the national and colonial question—737-39, 740-43
- the national liberation movement in the East—741
- revolutionising of the masses—623-24, 638
- the revolutionary situation and the revolutionary crisis in Western Europe—638
- socialist revolution in Europe and the prospects of world revolution—623-34, 743-44, 746-47

### *Foreign military intervention and Civil War in Soviet Russia*

- Kolchak's offensive and defeat in the East (1918-19)—639
- Denikin's offensive and rout in the South (1919)—639
- experience—538-39

## G

### *German Social-Democratic Party*

- general characteristic of—99-101, 166-67, 185-86, 194-95, 198-99, 255, 307-09, 556, 620
- struggle of the Lefts against social-chauvinism and the Cent-

rism and their split-away during the First World War—621-22

*Great-Power chauvinism*—72-73, 614-17, 625-28, 741

## H

*Hegemony of the proletariat*—155-57, 393-94

## I

### *Ideology*—24

- class character of—84, 88-89, 121-22, 124-25
- bourgeois—65-66, 67-68, 120-23, 124-25, 625, 697, 715-16
- proletarian, socialist—17-18, 19-20, 49-50, 82, 88-89, 120-23, 393-94

### *Imperialism*

- essence and main features—630, 637-38, 640, 649-50, 661, 677, 699-715, 725-31, 741, 744-45
- as the last stage of the development of capitalism and the eve of socialist revolution—632, 634-731, 743-44

### *Industry in Russia*—707

*Inner-Party struggle*—95-96, 242-43, 244, 282-83, 348-74, 406-08

### *Internationalism, proletarian*

- its essence—38, 413, 580-82, 591-92, 627-28
- and the struggle against opportunism, nationalism and chauvinism—567-617, 620, 623-24, 628, 744-45
- unity of the proletariat's national and international tasks—595-96, 598, 599-600, 607-08, 616, 625-28
- and solidarity of the working people of the world—466, 548, 748-49
- as a prerequisite for the victory of the socialist revolution—619-20

*"Iskra", old, Leninist—the first all-Russia newspaper of revolutionary Marxists (1900-03)*—105, 116, 120, 122, 166, 172, 181, 563, 565

- Iskra*-ism as a trend and Bolshevism—92, 112-13, 129-30, 157-58, 214-16, 217-18, 227-28, 229, 248-249, 250-51, 266-67, 272-73, 275-76, 301-02, 323-24,

- 328-29, 333-34, 350, 351-52, 355, 356, 359, 398, 406-07, 412-13  
—struggle to organise an All-Russia political newspaper and founding of *Iskra*—94, 159-60, 174-75, 196, 211-31, 236, 241, 470  
—its seizure by the Mensheviks after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—334, 368-69, 371, 375-81, 382, 383-84, 410  
—its role in founding the Party and becoming its leading centre—150-51, 230, 247, 272-73, 301-02, 328

## K

*Kautsky and Kautskianism and the struggle against it*—Kautskianism, the Centrist trend in the Second International—639, 746

## L

- Labour, socialist and communist*—37, 38  
*League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class (St. Petersburg)*—115-16, 117, 118, 125, 179, 190, 214  
*Liberalism and the liberal bourgeoisie*—53, 166, 344-47, 508, 625

## M

- Material and production basis of socialism*—31-32, 36-37  
*Membership, party*—178, 197, 198, 201, 274, 282-301, 392, 394-95  
*Menshevism, Mensheviks and the struggle against them*  
—its opportunist essence and social roots—242-44, 246-49, 262-63, 265-67, 293-94, 306, 308, 312, 314, 330-34, 339, 341-42, 350-59, 361-63, 365-66, 367-68, 371, 374, 376-77, 380-81, 386-90, 393-97, 403-07, 409-13, 420, 440, 444-47, 454-55, 459, 460, 461, 465, 489-90, 499-503, 508-10, 526-27, 536, 538, 540, 562, 563, 565-66, 622, 715  
*Monopoly, capitalist*  
—as the economic essence of

imperialism—630, 634-35, 642-53, 666-68, 676-77, 678, 679, 681-82, 683-84, 687, 695, 696, 699-701, 703, 708, 715, 718, 725, 726-28

## N

- Narodism, Narodniks in Russia and the struggle against them*  
—its essence and class roots—65-66, 67-68, 69, 74-85, 89-90, 545, 551  
—revolutionary and reactionary aspects—65-66, 75-76, 83  
*National and national-colonial question*  
—under imperialism—38, 568-72, 573, 575-78, 590-92, 599-600, 619, 625-26, 630-31, 632, 634-35, 690-99, 701-03, 705-06, 715, 716-17, 725-26, 727, 732-39, 742-43  
*Nationalism*  
—of great-power bourgeoisie—73, 580, 582, 583-92, 614-16, 625-28  
—of the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations—738  
—petty-bourgeois—615-16  
*National liberation movements and revolutions*  
—in colonies and dependent countries under imperialism—571-72, 576-77, 599-600, 619, 626-27, 716-17, 724, 740-43  
*National liberation wars*—598-99, 737-38, 740-41, 578  
*National programme of the Bolsheviks*—67-69, 571-74, 579-83, 591, 593-96, 513-16, 625-28

## O

- Opportunism*  
—its essence and social roots—96-97, 101-02, 128, 238, 240, 283, 374, 385, 387, 398-99, 411-06, 412-13, 498-505, 563-64, 621-22, 623-24, 639-40, 713-15, 728-29, 742, 745-46, 747

## P

- Pacifism and pacifists*  
—bourgeois—633, 703

- social-pacifism as a variety of bourgeois pacifism—636, 638, 639, 641, 718, 745-46
- Paris Commune of 1871*
  - its lessons and historical significance—19, 43, 111, 624, 744
- Parliamentarism*—53-54
- Parliamentary tactics of the Bolsheviks*—473-75, 539-40, 746
- Party agitation*
  - its character and role in general
  - Party work—92-94, 131-41, 142-49, 151-57, 158-65, 174-75, 182-83, 190-91, 193-95, 208-11, 218, 227-28, 229, 230, 387-88, 497
- Party spirit in science, philosophy, literature and art*—49-53, 88-90
- Party unity*—97, 107, 231, 236-37, 245-46, 257-58, 357, 373-74, 390, 393-98, 411-13
- Party work among the masses*—155-56, 538-39, 541
- Patriotism*
  - criticism of bourgeois pseudo-patriotism—618, 619, 620, 622, 623-24, 625, 628
  - proletarian, Soviet—626-28
- Peace Treaty of Versailles, 1919*—638
- Peasantry*
  - as a class—26, 68-71, 523-24
  - as a driving force and the proletariat's ally in the bourgeois-democratic revolution—41, 449-50, 493-94
  - its dual nature and vacillations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—26, 267-68
  - its condition under capitalism—34-36, 52, 77-78
- Politics*
  - definition of—88-90
  - and economics—135-36, 723, 742-43
- Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.*
  - Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. January 5-17 (18-30), 1912*
  - its role and significance in welding the Bolsheviks into an independent party—550, 555, 557
- Pravda (Truth) (Rabochaya Pravda, Severnaya Pravda, Pravda Truda, Za Pravdu, Proletarskaya Pravda, Put Pravdy, Rabochy (1914), Trudovaya Pravda)*—Bolshevik legal daily newspaper; from 1917, the Central Organ of the Party)—551, 554, 556, 562, 585, 586, 587
- Production relations*
  - definition and essence—24, 25
  - in a capitalist society—27, 28-29, 46, 729-30
- Productive forces*
  - under imperialism—707-08
  - and production relations—24, 46
- Productivity of labour*
  - under capitalism—30, 33, 35-36, 47, 72, 90, 642
- Programme of the Party*
  - essence and significance—264, 389-91, 427-28, 434-35, 458
  - maximum programme—435
  - minimum programme—431, 432-33, 434-36, 437, 460, 478, 482, 732, 735, 740
- Proletariat in Russia*
  - characteristic of—159-60, 234, 426, 427, 429, 435-36, 451-53, 458, 461, 471-72, 490, 492, 504, 511-12, 548, 620, 621
  - role in the international working-class movement—112, 424, 548, 620, 628
  - hegemony in the revolutionary movement—112, 155-61, 233, 424, 426-28, 433, 434, 444, 450-55, 460-61, 471-72, 479-80, 492, 494, 502-05, 511, 524, 537, 539, 548, 620, 621
  - historical role—112, 115, 152-65, 174, 176, 413, 424, 433, 434, 450-55, 460-61, 511, 518-19, 537, 538-39, 548, 628
- Propaganda, party*
  - essence and role in the work of the Party—142-43, 153, 470, 497-98
- Property*
  - private—31, 35-36, 46-47, 457, 492, 637-38, 649, 666-68

## R

- Reformism and the struggle against it*—95-96, 103-04, 123-24, 622, 638, 639-40, 696, 703, 717, 718-20, 745-46
- Republic, democratic (bourgeois)*
  - essence and significance—38-39, 53-54, 480-82, 503, 524, 743, 747
  - parliamentarism as a guise for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie—53-54

*Revisionism and the struggle against it*

- essence and class roots—50-56, 95-98, 101-02, 103-04, 107-09, 233-34, 404, 474-75, 499-500
- international character—54-56, 95-97, 100-02, 108-10, 385
- non-acceptance of Marxist teaching on the class struggle, socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat—53, 53-54, 96-97, 98-101, 103-04, 126-27, 234

*Revolution*

- essence and role in social development—24, 126, 230-31, 410-11, 490, 503-04, 516-17, 630
- the question of power as its fundamental question—439
- uneven and diverse development in different countries—630-32
- objective conditions for inception and development—24-25, 434-35, 456
- political prerequisites and conditions for victory—48, 434-35, 458, 490, 517, 530-34, 538-39, 746
- and reform—53-54, 139-140

*Revolution, bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic*

- essence and tasks—47-48, 443-44, 445, 450-55, 482-83, 513-14, 523, 614
- and the proletarian party—42-43, 109-10, 158, 225, 230, 413, 425-527
- and the hegemony of the proletariat—112, 175-76, 422-24, 426-27, 433, 434, 443-45, 451-55, 460-61, 463, 471-72, 478-83, 491-96, 503-05, 511-12, 524, 537, 538-39, 545
- driving forces—41-43, 451-55, 461, 476-77, 483, 493-94, 503, 513-14, 523-24
- gradual transition of a bourgeois-democratic into a socialist revolution—435-36, 457-58, 479-83, 493-94, 511-12, 518-19
- and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry—482-83, 503-04, 519-23
- and the socialist revolution—445, 457-58, 480-83

*Revolution, bourgeois-democratic, in Russia*

- essence, tasks and significance—112, 115, 230, 233, 423-24, 425, 426-27, 430-37, 444-45, 450-56, 457-58, 479-83, 490-96, 502-05, 511-12, 513-14, 517, 522, 537-39, 575-78, 623
- driving forces—423-24, 449-50, 451-55, 457, 480-81, 487-96, 503-04, 511, 513-14, 523-24
- strategy and tactics of the Party—449-50, 460-61, 479-83, 494, 506-37, 538
- prerequisites for victory—427, 436-37, 457, 461, 493-94, 538-39

*Revolution, bourgeois-democratic, of 1905-07 in Russia*

- the Party's leading role—424, 425-527, 533-34, 538-39, 541-42, 545, 626
- and the question of its gradual transition into a socialist revolution—424 434 37 444, 458, 479-83, 493-94, 505, 511-12, 518-19
- and the hegemony of the proletariat—424, 426-28, 432-33, 434, 450-55, 460-61, 470-71 472, 489-96, 499-505, 511, 545
- driving forces—449-50, 457, 480-81, 487-96, 511-12, 513-14, 523-24, 545-46
- international significance—424, 457-58, 470-80

*Revolution in China in 1911—576*

*Revolution, socialist (proletarian)*

- essence and tasks—56, 438, 480-82, 519, 630, 734, 743-44
- possibility of its victory in one country first and conditions for its final victory—631, 741
- hegemony of the proletariat, the driving forces of the revolution and its reserves—444, 480-82, 493-94, 505, 511 12, 628
- dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism as its main task—37, 126-27, 518-19, 632
- its basic distinction from bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions—444-45, 458, 481-82, 483
- uneven development of capitalism and the possibility of breaking the imperialist chain in its most vulnerable link—631-32, 728, 741-42
- objective conditions for its

- beginning and development—  
23-25, 31-32, 37, 634, 638, 640,  
699-700, 726, 742-43
- its political prerequisites, con-  
ditions and inevitable victory—  
31-32, 37, 435-36, 630, 742-43
- Revolutionary adventurism*—470
- Revolutionary-democratic dictator-  
ship of the proletariat and the  
peasantry*—457, 475-83, 492-94,  
516, 517-18, 519-26
- Revolutionary movement in Russia*  
—the Bolshevik Party's leading  
role—112, 131-32, 157-58, 159,  
160-61, 187-89, 225, 228-31, 469-  
72, 484-85, 510-11, 531-32, 539,  
541-42, 562
- character and direction—422-24,  
429-30, 454-55, 456-59, 470-71,  
503-05, 548
- stages and conditions of devel-  
opment—110, 120, 196, 232-34,  
422-24, 468-29, 538-39, 543-45
- Revolutionary movement, internat-  
ional*  
—importance of its experience—  
109, 131, 142
- role of proletarian parties—187-  
88, 437
- and the role of revolutionary  
theory—108-09
- conditions of development—  
108-10, 437
- Revolutionary situation and revolu-  
tionary crisis*  
—and war—638
- and revolution—469-70, 516-18,  
638
- and the tactics of the proletarian  
party—469-70, 474-75, 516-18,  
530-34, 538-39
- Revolutionary wars*—622, 632, 740-  
43, 744
- Right of nations to self-determina-  
tion (Bolsheviks' programme  
demand)*  
—as posed in 1913—567-17, 735
- during the First World War—  
623, 625-28, 732-39
- Rules of the Party*  
—essence and significance—247,  
272-74, 282-83, 297-98, 338, 372,  
389-91, 394-96
- on democratic centralism and  
party discipline—272-73, 279-  
81, 282-83, 338, 389-90, 404-05

## S

- Social-chauvinism and the struggle  
against it*  
—essence and social roots—620-  
21, 622, 625-28, 634-35, 715, 745
- Social-Democracy of Poland and  
Lithuania (S.D.P. and L.)*—183
- the Polish Social-Democrats'  
views on the national question  
and criticism of these views—  
738
- Socialism*  
—definition and principles—37-39,  
631-32
- possibility of its victory in one  
country first, and conditions for  
its final victory—631, 741
- and the state—38-39, 632
- and democracy—
- political prerequisites, socialist  
revolution and the dictatorship  
of the proletariat—25-27, 31-32,  
37
- economic prerequisites—30, 31-  
32, 37
- Socialism, utopian*—19, 47-48, 111,  
544, 731
- Socialist reconstruction of agricul-  
ture (theory of)*—37, 39
- Socialist-Revolutionaries (S.R.s) and  
the struggle against them*  
—class and political nature—345,  
449-50, 451-466, 492, 524
- criticism of their programme—  
50, 345, 425, 427-28
- Sociology*—22-25
- State*  
—essence and role in society—  
38-39
- Statistics*  
—criticism of bourgeois statistics  
and exposure of its falsifica-  
tions—643, 718, 719-22
- methods of data processing—719-  
22
- Strategy and tactics of the Bolsheviks*  
—as a science of directing the  
class struggle of the proletar-  
iat—39-43, 425-28, 430, 494-96,  
497, 541-42
- flexibility of tactics and allow-  
ances for a given historical  
situation—39-43, 102-04, 127,  
174, 224, 230-31, 470, 474-75,  
480-83, 517, 538-39, 623-24,  
737-38
- experience of the international

and Russian revolutionary move-  
ment—39 43 116 425 26  
427-28 487 466 523 24, 525 26  
538 39

—basic rules of—39 41 229 30  
541

### Strike

—as a form of the proletarian  
class struggle role and signif-  
icance—287 299 471 72 603 04

## T

### Theory revolutionary

—essence—18 19 43 44 45 49  
82 102 03 108 12 120 122 24  
446 47 572 73

—importance in the class struggle  
of the proletariat—19 20 25  
27 39 43 47 48 105 107 12  
114 15 120 24 153 173 74  
189 90 191 92 194 95 426  
427 28 450 446 47 490 515

—need for creative develop-  
ment—84 85 111 12

### Trade unions and trade union mo- vement under capitalism

—tasks and role in the class  
struggle of the proletariat 41  
112 114 134 155 39 145 17  
74 209 286 289 290 11 12

—tasks of the proletarian party  
112 145 177 79 189 209 10  
286 289 90 511 12

—opportunism in the trade union  
movement and its social roots—  
119 122 23 153 55 179 51 714  
15 745 46

—labour aristocracy—41 71  
714 15

### Transport under capitalism—137 674 76 679 70, 05

### Trotsky and Trotskyism in the struggle against them

—essence of Trotskyism and the  
general nature of Trotsky's  
anti Party factional activity—  
424 551 53 560 61 565 60  
610 11

## U

### United States of America (U S A) 673 70, 747

## V

### Victory of socialism in one country (theory of)—631 741

## W

### Working class movement in Russia

—the Party's leading role—112

118 19 122 126 181 135 144

49 151 52 155 56 160 65 166

67 168 69 172 173 175 190

193 196 97 202 05 207 210 11

217 224 229 232 233 30

423 21 47 49 37 500 01

511 12 535 535 39 40 42

620 21

—influence of the peasants' move-  
ment—135 492 548

—role of the Russian proletariat  
in the international working  
class movement—424 621

forms of—120 144 41 426  
620 21

—stages and conditions of devel-  
opment 133 147 45 103 71  
177 85

### Working class movement international

—role of the Bolshevik Party and  
the Russian proletariat 112

—struggle between the revolution-  
ary and opportunist trends—

67 95 101 122 23 334 356

57 385 350 306 97 98 403

499 500 655 10 12 14 1

744 45 46 48 49

—unity of action by the workers  
of different countries

—pre requisites conditions of  
development and forms 48

55 6 109 10 111 122 23 126

29 135 36

—the role of revolutionary  
theory 95 101 108 12 122 93

—the leading role of proletarian  
parties—134 35 144 45 155 56

166 67 194 98

—importance of its experience—  
109 110 111

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